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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
8e2f6b79 | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8e2f6b79 | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
12 | * | |
0f113f3e | 13 | * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
ea262260 BM |
14 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
15 | * | |
16 | * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
17 | * license provided above. | |
18 | * | |
ea262260 BM |
19 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
20 | * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. | |
21 | * | |
22 | */ | |
ddac1974 NL |
23 | /* ==================================================================== |
24 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
25 | * | |
26 | * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by | |
27 | * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
28 | * license. | |
29 | * | |
30 | * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of | |
31 | * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites | |
32 | * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. | |
33 | * | |
34 | * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in | |
35 | * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received | |
36 | * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. | |
37 | * | |
38 | * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not | |
39 | * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third | |
40 | * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights | |
41 | * to make use of the Contribution. | |
42 | * | |
43 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN | |
44 | * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA | |
45 | * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY | |
46 | * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR | |
47 | * OTHERWISE. | |
48 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 49 | |
d02b48c6 | 50 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 51 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 52 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
68570797 | 53 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
54 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
55 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
56 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
57 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
6434abbf | 58 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
ec577822 | 59 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
3c27208f | 60 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d095b68d | 61 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
dbad1690 | 62 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 63 | |
e46f2334 | 64 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
7d061fce | 65 | static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
d45ba43d | 66 | |
61ae935a | 67 | /* |
0f1e51ea MC |
68 | * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
69 | * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from | |
70 | * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. | |
71 | * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
72 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
73 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
74 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea MC |
75 | */ |
76 | static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
77 | { | |
78 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
79 | ||
80 | /* | |
81 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have | |
82 | * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by | |
83 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() | |
84 | */ | |
85 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
86 | default: | |
87 | break; | |
88 | ||
7d061fce MC |
89 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: |
90 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
91 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
92 | return 1; | |
93 | } | |
94 | break; | |
95 | ||
d7f8783f | 96 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
ef6c191b MC |
97 | if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { |
98 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { | |
99 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
100 | return 1; | |
101 | } | |
102 | break; | |
103 | } | |
104 | /* Fall through */ | |
105 | ||
106 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: | |
92760c21 | 107 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
0f1e51ea MC |
108 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
109 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
110 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
111 | return 1; | |
112 | } | |
113 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
114 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
115 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
116 | return 1; |
117 | } | |
118 | } | |
119 | break; | |
120 | ||
121 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
122 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { | |
92760c21 MC |
123 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
124 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
125 | return 1; |
126 | } | |
127 | } else { | |
128 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
129 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
130 | return 1; | |
131 | } | |
132 | } | |
133 | break; | |
134 | ||
135 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
136 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
137 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
138 | return 1; | |
139 | } | |
140 | break; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
141 | |
142 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
10109364 MC |
143 | /* |
144 | * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of | |
145 | * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert) | |
146 | */ | |
147 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) | |
148 | break; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
149 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { |
150 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; | |
151 | return 1; | |
152 | } | |
153 | break; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
154 | } |
155 | ||
156 | /* No valid transition found */ | |
0f1e51ea MC |
157 | return 0; |
158 | } | |
159 | ||
160 | /* | |
161 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
162 | * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the | |
163 | * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
164 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 165 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
166 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
167 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 168 | */ |
8481f583 | 169 | int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 170 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 171 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 172 | |
f5ca0b04 | 173 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
174 | if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
175 | goto err; | |
176 | return 1; | |
177 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 178 | |
e8aa8b6c | 179 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
180 | default: |
181 | break; | |
182 | ||
61ae935a | 183 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
0386aad1 | 184 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
61ae935a MC |
185 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
186 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
187 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
188 | return 1; | |
189 | } | |
190 | break; | |
191 | ||
192 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
193 | /* | |
194 | * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either | |
195 | * 1) We didn't request a Certificate | |
196 | * OR | |
197 | * 2) If we did request one then | |
198 | * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned | |
199 | * AND | |
200 | * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 | |
201 | * list if we requested a certificate) | |
202 | */ | |
0f512756 MC |
203 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
204 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { | |
205 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
23dd09b5 MC |
206 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
207 | && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
0f512756 MC |
208 | /* |
209 | * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just | |
23dd09b5 MC |
210 | * not going to accept it because we require a client |
211 | * cert. | |
0f512756 MC |
212 | */ |
213 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, | |
214 | SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
340a2828 | 215 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, |
0f512756 MC |
216 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
217 | return 0; | |
218 | } | |
219 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
220 | return 1; | |
221 | } | |
222 | } else { | |
223 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
224 | return 1; | |
225 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
226 | } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
227 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
228 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
229 | return 1; | |
f100b031 | 230 | } |
61ae935a MC |
231 | } |
232 | break; | |
233 | ||
234 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
235 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
236 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
237 | return 1; | |
238 | } | |
239 | break; | |
240 | ||
241 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
242 | /* | |
243 | * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have | |
244 | * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| | |
245 | * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is | |
246 | * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in | |
a71a4966 | 247 | * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be |
61ae935a MC |
248 | * set. |
249 | */ | |
a71a4966 | 250 | if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { |
61ae935a MC |
251 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
252 | /* | |
253 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH | |
254 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is | |
255 | * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses | |
256 | * its key from the certificate for key exchange. | |
257 | */ | |
258 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
259 | return 1; | |
260 | } | |
261 | } else { | |
262 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
263 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
264 | return 1; | |
265 | } | |
266 | } | |
267 | break; | |
268 | ||
269 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
270 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
271 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
272 | return 1; | |
273 | } | |
274 | break; | |
275 | ||
276 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
277 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
aff8c126 | 278 | if (s->s3->npn_seen) { |
61ae935a MC |
279 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { |
280 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; | |
281 | return 1; | |
282 | } | |
283 | } else { | |
284 | #endif | |
285 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
286 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
287 | return 1; | |
288 | } | |
289 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
290 | } | |
291 | #endif | |
292 | break; | |
293 | ||
294 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
295 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
296 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
297 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
298 | return 1; | |
299 | } | |
300 | break; | |
301 | #endif | |
302 | ||
303 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
304 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
305 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
306 | return 1; | |
307 | } | |
308 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
309 | } |
310 | ||
5abeaf35 | 311 | err: |
61ae935a | 312 | /* No valid transition found */ |
672f3337 | 313 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
340a2828 | 314 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
61ae935a MC |
315 | return 0; |
316 | } | |
317 | ||
318 | /* | |
319 | * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? | |
320 | * | |
321 | * Valid return values are: | |
322 | * 1: Yes | |
323 | * 0: No | |
324 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 325 | static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
326 | { |
327 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
328 | ||
329 | /* | |
361a1191 | 330 | * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a |
61ae935a MC |
331 | * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For |
332 | * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if | |
333 | * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, | |
334 | * the server certificate contains the server's public key for | |
335 | * key exchange. | |
336 | */ | |
a230b26e | 337 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) |
61ae935a MC |
338 | /* |
339 | * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if | |
340 | * provided | |
341 | */ | |
342 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
343 | /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ | |
344 | || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) | |
345 | && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) | |
346 | /* For other PSK always send SKE */ | |
347 | || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) | |
348 | #endif | |
349 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
350 | /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ | |
351 | || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) | |
352 | #endif | |
a230b26e | 353 | ) { |
61ae935a MC |
354 | return 1; |
355 | } | |
356 | ||
357 | return 0; | |
358 | } | |
359 | ||
360 | /* | |
361 | * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? | |
362 | * | |
363 | * Valid return values are: | |
364 | * 1: Yes | |
365 | * 0: No | |
366 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 367 | static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
368 | { |
369 | if ( | |
370 | /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ | |
371 | s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER | |
372 | /* | |
373 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert | |
374 | * during re-negotiation: | |
375 | */ | |
a03a9dbe | 376 | && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 || |
61ae935a MC |
377 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) |
378 | /* | |
379 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see | |
380 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in | |
381 | * RFC 2246): | |
382 | */ | |
383 | && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) | |
a230b26e EK |
384 | /* |
385 | * ... except when the application insists on | |
386 | * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts | |
387 | * this for SSL 3) | |
388 | */ | |
61ae935a MC |
389 | || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
390 | /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ | |
391 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) | |
392 | /* | |
393 | * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests | |
394 | * are omitted | |
395 | */ | |
b7fa1f98 | 396 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { |
61ae935a MC |
397 | return 1; |
398 | } | |
399 | ||
400 | return 0; | |
401 | } | |
402 | ||
403 | /* | |
0f1e51ea MC |
404 | * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
405 | * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the | |
406 | * client. | |
0f1e51ea MC |
407 | */ |
408 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
409 | { | |
410 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
411 | ||
412 | /* | |
413 | * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated | |
414 | * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() | |
415 | */ | |
416 | ||
417 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
418 | default: | |
419 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
420 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
421 | ||
44c04a2e MC |
422 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
423 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { | |
424 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
425 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
426 | } | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
427 | /* Try to read from the client instead */ |
428 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
44c04a2e | 429 | |
0f1e51ea | 430 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
7d061fce MC |
431 | if (s->hello_retry_request) |
432 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; | |
433 | else | |
434 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
435 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
436 | ||
7d061fce MC |
437 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: |
438 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
439 | ||
0f1e51ea | 440 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
e46f2334 MC |
441 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; |
442 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
443 | ||
444 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
94ed2c67 | 445 | if (s->hit) |
92760c21 MC |
446 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
447 | else if (send_certificate_request(s)) | |
448 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
94ed2c67 | 449 | else |
0f1e51ea | 450 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
94ed2c67 | 451 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
452 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
453 | ||
0f1e51ea | 454 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
92760c21 | 455 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
0f1e51ea MC |
456 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
457 | ||
92760c21 | 458 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
459 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; |
460 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
461 | ||
462 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: | |
d805a57b | 463 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
464 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
465 | ||
466 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
f7e393be MC |
467 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; |
468 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
94ed2c67 | 469 | |
d7f8783f MC |
470 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
471 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
472 | ||
92760c21 | 473 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: |
30f05b19 MC |
474 | /* |
475 | * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're | |
476 | * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket | |
477 | * immediately. | |
478 | * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour | |
479 | * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the | |
480 | * session ticket? | |
481 | */ | |
482 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; | |
483 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
484 | ||
8cdc8c51 | 485 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: |
5bf47933 MC |
486 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { |
487 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
488 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
489 | } | |
490 | /* Fall through */ | |
491 | ||
44c04a2e | 492 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
30f05b19 | 493 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
0f1e51ea | 494 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
0f1e51ea MC |
495 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
496 | } | |
497 | } | |
498 | ||
499 | /* | |
500 | * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move | |
501 | * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. | |
61ae935a | 502 | */ |
8481f583 | 503 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 504 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 505 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 506 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
507 | /* |
508 | * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going | |
509 | * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later | |
510 | */ | |
511 | ||
f5ca0b04 | 512 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
513 | return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); |
514 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 515 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
516 | default: |
517 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
518 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
519 | ||
0386aad1 MC |
520 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
521 | if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { | |
522 | /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ | |
523 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; | |
524 | st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; | |
525 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
526 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
527 | /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ |
528 | if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { | |
529 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
530 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
531 | } | |
0386aad1 MC |
532 | /* Fall through */ |
533 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 534 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
a230b26e | 535 | /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ |
e8aa8b6c | 536 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
61ae935a | 537 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
538 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
539 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
e8aa8b6c | 540 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a | 541 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
542 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
543 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified | |
a230b26e | 544 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) |
e8aa8b6c F |
545 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
546 | else | |
547 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
548 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 549 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
550 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
551 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 552 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
553 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
554 | if (s->hit) { | |
aff8c126 | 555 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) |
e8aa8b6c F |
556 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
557 | else | |
558 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
559 | } else { | |
560 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ | |
561 | /* normal PSK or SRP */ | |
562 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & | |
a230b26e | 563 | (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
564 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
565 | } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
61ae935a | 566 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; |
e8aa8b6c | 567 | } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { |
61ae935a | 568 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; |
e8aa8b6c F |
569 | } else { |
570 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
61ae935a | 571 | } |
e8aa8b6c F |
572 | } |
573 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 574 | |
e8aa8b6c | 575 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
aff8c126 | 576 | if (s->ext.status_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c | 577 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; |
61ae935a | 578 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
579 | } |
580 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 581 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
582 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
583 | if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
584 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; | |
61ae935a | 585 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
586 | } |
587 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 588 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
589 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
590 | if (send_certificate_request(s)) { | |
591 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
61ae935a | 592 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
593 | } |
594 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 595 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
596 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
597 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
598 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 599 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
600 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
601 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
602 | ||
603 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
604 | if (s->hit) { | |
61ae935a | 605 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
61ae935a | 606 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
aff8c126 | 607 | } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
608 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
609 | } else { | |
610 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
611 | } | |
612 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
613 | ||
614 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
615 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
616 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 617 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
618 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: |
619 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; | |
620 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
621 | ||
622 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
623 | if (s->hit) { | |
624 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
625 | } | |
626 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
e8aa8b6c | 627 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
628 | } |
629 | } | |
630 | ||
631 | /* | |
632 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
633 | * the server to the client. | |
634 | */ | |
8481f583 | 635 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 636 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 637 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 638 | |
e8aa8b6c | 639 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
640 | default: |
641 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
642 | break; | |
643 | ||
61ae935a MC |
644 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
645 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
646 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
f5c7f5df | 647 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
648 | break; |
649 | ||
650 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
651 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
652 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f5c7f5df | 653 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
654 | /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ |
655 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
656 | } | |
657 | break; | |
658 | ||
659 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
660 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
661 | /* | |
69687aa8 | 662 | * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and |
61ae935a MC |
663 | * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now |
664 | */ | |
665 | st->use_timer = 1; | |
666 | } | |
667 | break; | |
668 | ||
669 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
670 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
671 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) | |
672 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); | |
673 | #endif | |
674 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
675 | ||
676 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
30f05b19 MC |
677 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
678 | /* | |
679 | * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going | |
680 | * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off | |
681 | * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. | |
682 | */ | |
683 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0); | |
684 | } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
61ae935a MC |
685 | /* |
686 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
687 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer | |
688 | */ | |
689 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
690 | } | |
691 | break; | |
692 | ||
693 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
694 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
695 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { | |
fe3a3291 | 696 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
697 | return WORK_ERROR; |
698 | } | |
699 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
700 | /* | |
701 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
702 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have | |
703 | * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, | |
704 | * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. | |
705 | */ | |
706 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
707 | } | |
708 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
709 | ||
d7f8783f | 710 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
f7e393be MC |
711 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING) |
712 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
713 | /* Fall through */ | |
714 | ||
61ae935a | 715 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
30f05b19 | 716 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
717 | } |
718 | ||
719 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
720 | } | |
721 | ||
722 | /* | |
723 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
724 | * server to the client. | |
725 | */ | |
8481f583 | 726 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 727 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 728 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a MC |
729 | |
730 | s->init_num = 0; | |
731 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 732 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
733 | default: |
734 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
735 | break; | |
736 | ||
7d061fce MC |
737 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: |
738 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
739 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
740 | break; | |
741 | ||
61ae935a MC |
742 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
743 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
744 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2c4a056f MC |
745 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
746 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
747 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
748 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
749 | break; |
750 | ||
751 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
752 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
753 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
754 | /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ | |
2c4a056f MC |
755 | if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
756 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
757 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
758 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
759 | /* |
760 | * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to | |
761 | * treat like it was the first packet | |
762 | */ | |
763 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
764 | break; | |
765 | ||
766 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
767 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
768 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
769 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
770 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
771 | ||
772 | /* | |
773 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no | |
774 | * SCTP used. | |
775 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
776 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
777 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
61ae935a MC |
778 | |
779 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
780 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
781 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
782 | 0) <= 0) { | |
fe3a3291 | 783 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
784 | return WORK_ERROR; |
785 | } | |
786 | ||
787 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
788 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
789 | } | |
790 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
791 | /* |
792 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know | |
793 | * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted | |
794 | * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need | |
795 | * something clever in the record layer for this. | |
796 | */ | |
797 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
798 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
799 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
fe5e20fd MC |
800 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
801 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
802 | ||
803 | if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED | |
804 | && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
92760c21 | 805 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) |
fe5e20fd | 806 | return WORK_ERROR; |
92760c21 | 807 | } |
61ae935a MC |
808 | break; |
809 | ||
810 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
811 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
812 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { | |
813 | /* | |
814 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
815 | * no SCTP used. | |
816 | */ | |
817 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
818 | 0, NULL); | |
819 | } | |
820 | #endif | |
821 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
a230b26e EK |
822 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
823 | { | |
fe3a3291 | 824 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
825 | return WORK_ERROR; |
826 | } | |
827 | ||
828 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
829 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
830 | break; | |
831 | ||
832 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
833 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
834 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
835 | break; | |
836 | ||
837 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
838 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
839 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
840 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
841 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
842 | /* | |
843 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
844 | * no SCTP used. | |
845 | */ | |
846 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
847 | 0, NULL); | |
848 | } | |
849 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
850 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
851 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 852 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 MC |
853 | &s->session->master_key_length) |
854 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
855 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) | |
856 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
857 | } | |
61ae935a | 858 | break; |
30f05b19 | 859 | |
44c04a2e | 860 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
57389a32 MC |
861 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) |
862 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
57389a32 MC |
863 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) |
864 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
865 | break; | |
866 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
867 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
868 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
869 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
870 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
871 | } |
872 | ||
873 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
874 | } | |
875 | ||
876 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
877 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
878 | * server | |
61ae935a MC |
879 | * |
880 | * Valid return values are: | |
881 | * 1: Success | |
882 | * 0: Error | |
883 | */ | |
6392fb8e | 884 | int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
a15c953f | 885 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 886 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 887 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 888 | |
4a01c59f MC |
889 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
890 | default: | |
891 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
892 | return 0; | |
893 | ||
894 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
5923ad4b | 895 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 896 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 897 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
898 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
899 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f | 900 | break; |
f3b3d7f0 | 901 | |
4a01c59f | 902 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
6392fb8e MC |
903 | *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; |
904 | *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 905 | break; |
61ae935a | 906 | |
4a01c59f MC |
907 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
908 | /* No construction function needed */ | |
6392fb8e MC |
909 | *confunc = NULL; |
910 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 911 | break; |
61ae935a | 912 | |
4a01c59f | 913 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
6392fb8e MC |
914 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; |
915 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f | 916 | break; |
61ae935a | 917 | |
4a01c59f | 918 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
919 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; |
920 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f | 921 | break; |
61ae935a | 922 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
923 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: |
924 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; | |
925 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; | |
926 | break; | |
927 | ||
928 | ||
4a01c59f | 929 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
6392fb8e MC |
930 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; |
931 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f | 932 | break; |
61ae935a | 933 | |
4a01c59f | 934 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
6392fb8e MC |
935 | *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; |
936 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 937 | break; |
61ae935a | 938 | |
4a01c59f | 939 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
6392fb8e MC |
940 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; |
941 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
4a01c59f | 942 | break; |
61ae935a | 943 | |
4a01c59f | 944 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
6392fb8e MC |
945 | *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; |
946 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; | |
4a01c59f | 947 | break; |
61ae935a | 948 | |
4a01c59f | 949 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
6392fb8e MC |
950 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; |
951 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; | |
4a01c59f | 952 | break; |
61ae935a | 953 | |
4a01c59f | 954 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
955 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
956 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 957 | break; |
e46f2334 | 958 | |
f7e393be MC |
959 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
960 | *confunc = NULL; | |
961 | *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; | |
962 | break; | |
963 | ||
e46f2334 MC |
964 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: |
965 | *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; | |
966 | *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
967 | break; | |
7d061fce MC |
968 | |
969 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: | |
970 | *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request; | |
971 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; | |
972 | break; | |
44c04a2e MC |
973 | |
974 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
975 | *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; | |
976 | *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; | |
977 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 978 | } |
61ae935a | 979 | |
5923ad4b | 980 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
981 | } |
982 | ||
8a18bc25 AG |
983 | /* |
984 | * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, | |
985 | * calculated as follows: | |
986 | * | |
987 | * 2 + # client_version | |
988 | * 32 + # only valid length for random | |
989 | * 1 + # length of session_id | |
990 | * 32 + # maximum size for session_id | |
991 | * 2 + # length of cipher suites | |
992 | * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array | |
993 | * 1 + # length of compression_methods | |
994 | * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods | |
995 | * 2 + # length of extensions | |
996 | * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions | |
997 | */ | |
998 | #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 | |
999 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1000 | #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 |
1001 | #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 | |
1002 | ||
1003 | /* | |
1004 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
1005 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
1006 | */ | |
eda75751 | 1007 | size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 1008 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1009 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1010 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1011 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1012 | default: |
1013 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1014 | return 0; | |
1015 | ||
61ae935a | 1016 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
8a18bc25 | 1017 | return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; |
61ae935a | 1018 | |
ef6c191b MC |
1019 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
1020 | return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1021 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1022 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: |
1023 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
1024 | ||
1025 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1026 | return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1027 | ||
1028 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1029 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
1030 | ||
1031 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1032 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1033 | return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1034 | #endif | |
1035 | ||
1036 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1037 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1038 | ||
1039 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1040 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1041 | |
1042 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1043 | return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1044 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1045 | } |
1046 | ||
1047 | /* | |
1048 | * Process a message that the server has received from the client. | |
1049 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1050 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
61ae935a | 1051 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1052 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1053 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1054 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1055 | default: |
1056 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1057 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1058 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1059 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1060 | return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); | |
1061 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
1062 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
1063 | return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt); | |
1064 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1065 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: |
1066 | return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); | |
1067 | ||
1068 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1069 | return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
1070 | ||
1071 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1072 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
1073 | ||
1074 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1075 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1076 | return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); | |
1077 | #endif | |
1078 | ||
1079 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1080 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
1081 | ||
1082 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1083 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1084 | |
1085 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1086 | return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); | |
1087 | ||
61ae935a | 1088 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1089 | } |
1090 | ||
1091 | /* | |
1092 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
1093 | * from the client | |
1094 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1095 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 1096 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1097 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1098 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1099 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1100 | default: |
1101 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1102 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
1103 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1104 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1105 | return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); | |
1106 | ||
1107 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1108 | return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); | |
61ae935a | 1109 | } |
92760c21 | 1110 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
1111 | } |
1112 | ||
edc032b5 | 1113 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
71fa4513 | 1114 | static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) |
0f113f3e MC |
1115 | { |
1116 | int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; | |
1117 | ||
1118 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1119 | ||
1120 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && | |
1121 | (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { | |
1122 | if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { | |
1123 | /* | |
1124 | * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp | |
1125 | * login name | |
1126 | */ | |
1127 | ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; | |
1128 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
1129 | } else { | |
1130 | ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); | |
1131 | } | |
1132 | } | |
1133 | return ret; | |
1134 | } | |
edc032b5 BL |
1135 | #endif |
1136 | ||
c536b6be | 1137 | int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, |
cb150cbc | 1138 | size_t cookie_len) |
8ba708e5 | 1139 | { |
8ba708e5 | 1140 | /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ |
c536b6be MC |
1141 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) |
1142 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) | |
1143 | return 0; | |
8ba708e5 | 1144 | |
c536b6be | 1145 | return 1; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1146 | } |
1147 | ||
7cea05dc | 1148 | int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1149 | { |
cb150cbc | 1150 | unsigned int cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1151 | if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || |
1152 | s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, | |
cb150cbc MC |
1153 | &cookie_leni) == 0 || |
1154 | cookie_leni > 255) { | |
f0659bdb | 1155 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, |
8ba708e5 | 1156 | SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); |
8ba708e5 MC |
1157 | return 0; |
1158 | } | |
cb150cbc | 1159 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 | 1160 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1161 | if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
1162 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { | |
c536b6be | 1163 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c536b6be MC |
1164 | return 0; |
1165 | } | |
8ba708e5 | 1166 | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1167 | return 1; |
1168 | } | |
1169 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1170 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1171 | /*- | |
1172 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
1173 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. | |
1174 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: | |
1175 | * SNI, | |
1176 | * elliptic_curves | |
1177 | * ec_point_formats | |
33564cb7 | 1178 | * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only) |
805a2e9e MC |
1179 | * |
1180 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
1181 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
1182 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
1183 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
1184 | */ | |
1185 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) | |
1186 | { | |
805a2e9e MC |
1187 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { |
1188 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
1189 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
1190 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
1191 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
1192 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
1193 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
1194 | ||
1195 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
1196 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
1197 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
1198 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
1199 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ | |
1200 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ | |
1201 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
1202 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
1203 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
1204 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
1205 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
1206 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
1207 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
1208 | }; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1209 | /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ |
1210 | static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; | |
1266eefd MC |
1211 | unsigned int type; |
1212 | PACKET sni, tmppkt; | |
1213 | size_t ext_len; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1214 | |
1215 | tmppkt = hello->extensions; | |
1216 | ||
1217 | if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) | |
1218 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) | |
1219 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { | |
1220 | return; | |
6b473aca MC |
1221 | } |
1222 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1223 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
1224 | return; | |
1225 | ||
1226 | ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? | |
1227 | sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; | |
1228 | ||
1229 | s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, | |
1230 | ext_len); | |
6b473aca | 1231 | } |
805a2e9e | 1232 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
6b473aca | 1233 | |
be3583fa | 1234 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 1235 | { |
6b1bb98f | 1236 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 1237 | /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ |
1ab3836b | 1238 | PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; |
6e3ff632 | 1239 | static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; |
6b1bb98f | 1240 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello; |
e27f234a | 1241 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1242 | clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); |
1243 | if (clienthello == NULL) { | |
1244 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1245 | goto err; | |
1246 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
1247 | /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ |
1248 | if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { | |
1249 | s->renegotiate = 1; | |
1250 | s->new_session = 1; | |
1251 | } | |
1252 | ||
1ab3836b | 1253 | /* |
b1b4b543 | 1254 | * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. |
1ab3836b | 1255 | */ |
6b1bb98f | 1256 | clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); |
bbafa47b | 1257 | PACKET_null_init(&cookie); |
1ab3836b | 1258 | |
6b1bb98f | 1259 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
9ceb2426 | 1260 | unsigned int mt; |
b1b4b543 | 1261 | |
7d061fce MC |
1262 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) { |
1263 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1264 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
1265 | goto f_err; | |
1266 | } | |
1267 | ||
32ec4153 MC |
1268 | /*- |
1269 | * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 | |
1270 | * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS | |
1271 | * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes | |
1272 | * the rest right through. Its format is: | |
1273 | * Byte Content | |
1274 | * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer | |
1275 | * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here | |
1276 | * 3-4 version | |
1277 | * 5-6 cipher_spec_length | |
1278 | * 7-8 session_id_length | |
1279 | * 9-10 challenge_length | |
1280 | * ... ... | |
1281 | */ | |
1282 | ||
73999b62 | 1283 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) |
a230b26e | 1284 | || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1285 | /* |
1286 | * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record | |
1287 | * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record | |
1288 | * in the first place | |
1289 | */ | |
e27f234a | 1290 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d45ba43d | 1291 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1292 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1293 | } |
1294 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1295 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1296 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1297 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1298 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1299 | } |
1300 | ||
b3e2272c | 1301 | /* Parse the message and load client random. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1302 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1303 | /* |
1304 | * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello | |
1305 | * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. | |
e2994cf0 | 1306 | * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. |
32ec4153 | 1307 | */ |
1ab3836b | 1308 | unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; |
b3e2272c | 1309 | PACKET challenge; |
0f113f3e | 1310 | |
1ab3836b | 1311 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) |
a230b26e EK |
1312 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) |
1313 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { | |
e27f234a MC |
1314 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1315 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
6c3cca57 AE |
1316 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1317 | goto f_err; | |
5e9f0eeb | 1318 | } |
0f113f3e | 1319 | |
293b5ca4 AG |
1320 | if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
1321 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1322 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1323 | goto f_err; | |
1324 | } | |
1325 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1326 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
1ab3836b | 1327 | ciphersuite_len) |
6b1bb98f | 1328 | || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) |
73999b62 | 1329 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) |
b3e2272c | 1330 | /* No extensions. */ |
73999b62 | 1331 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f0659bdb MC |
1332 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1333 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9ceb2426 MC |
1334 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1335 | goto f_err; | |
1336 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1337 | clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; |
9ceb2426 | 1338 | |
fba7b84c | 1339 | /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
6b1bb98f | 1340 | * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit |
fba7b84c | 1341 | * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if |
6b1bb98f | 1342 | * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. |
fba7b84c MC |
1343 | */ |
1344 | challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1345 | ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; | |
6b1bb98f | 1346 | memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
b3e2272c | 1347 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, |
6b1bb98f | 1348 | clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - |
cb21df32 DB |
1349 | challenge_len, challenge_len) |
1350 | /* Advertise only null compression. */ | |
1351 | || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { | |
f0659bdb | 1352 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b3e2272c | 1353 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
9ceb2426 MC |
1354 | goto f_err; |
1355 | } | |
b3e2272c | 1356 | |
6b1bb98f | 1357 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
0f113f3e | 1358 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1359 | /* Regular ClientHello. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1360 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) |
e2994cf0 | 1361 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) |
6b1bb98f | 1362 | || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, |
e2994cf0 | 1363 | SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1364 | &clienthello->session_id_len)) { |
9ceb2426 | 1365 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
f0659bdb | 1366 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
9ceb2426 MC |
1367 | goto f_err; |
1368 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1369 | |
b3e2272c | 1370 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 1371 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { |
32ec4153 | 1372 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
f0659bdb | 1373 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
32ec4153 MC |
1374 | goto f_err; |
1375 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1376 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1ab3836b | 1377 | DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1378 | &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1379 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1380 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1381 | goto f_err; | |
1382 | } | |
b3e2272c EK |
1383 | /* |
1384 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, | |
1385 | * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. | |
1386 | * So check cookie length... | |
1387 | */ | |
1388 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1389 | if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) |
a230b26e | 1390 | return 1; |
b3e2272c | 1391 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1392 | } |
0f113f3e | 1393 | |
6b1bb98f | 1394 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1395 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1396 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1397 | goto f_err; | |
1398 | } | |
1399 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1400 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
a230b26e EK |
1401 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1402 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1403 | goto f_err; | |
b3e2272c | 1404 | } |
1ab3836b | 1405 | |
b3e2272c | 1406 | /* Could be empty. */ |
1ab3836b | 1407 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { |
6b1bb98f | 1408 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
1ab3836b | 1409 | } else { |
6b1bb98f | 1410 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1411 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1412 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1413 | goto f_err; | |
1414 | } | |
1415 | } | |
1416 | } | |
1417 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1418 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, |
e2994cf0 | 1419 | MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, |
6b1bb98f | 1420 | &clienthello->compressions_len)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1421 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1422 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1423 | goto f_err; | |
1424 | } | |
1425 | ||
b1b4b543 | 1426 | /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ |
6b1bb98f | 1427 | extensions = clienthello->extensions; |
fe874d27 | 1428 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
6b1bb98f | 1429 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, &al, |
735d5b59 | 1430 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1431 | /* SSLerr already been called */ |
1432 | goto f_err; | |
1433 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1434 | s->clienthello = clienthello; |
1ab3836b | 1435 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1436 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
1437 | f_err: | |
1438 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1439 | err: | |
1440 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
1441 | ||
1442 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1443 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello); | |
1444 | ||
1445 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1446 | } | |
1447 | ||
bf846a6d | 1448 | static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, int *pal) |
6b1bb98f BK |
1449 | { |
1450 | unsigned int j; | |
bf846a6d | 1451 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1452 | int protverr; |
1453 | size_t loop; | |
1454 | unsigned long id; | |
1455 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1456 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; | |
1457 | #endif | |
1458 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
1459 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; | |
1460 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; | |
1461 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; | |
f7f2a01d | 1462 | DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
6b1bb98f | 1463 | |
1ab3836b | 1464 | /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1465 | /* Give the early callback a crack at things */ |
1466 | if (s->ctx->early_cb != NULL) { | |
1467 | int code; | |
1468 | /* A failure in the early callback terminates the connection. */ | |
bf846a6d | 1469 | code = s->ctx->early_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->early_cb_arg); |
6b1bb98f BK |
1470 | if (code == 0) |
1471 | goto err; | |
1472 | if (code < 0) { | |
1473 | s->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_WORK; | |
1474 | return code; | |
1475 | } | |
1476 | } | |
1ab3836b MC |
1477 | |
1478 | /* Set up the client_random */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1479 | memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
1ab3836b MC |
1480 | |
1481 | /* Choose the version */ | |
1482 | ||
6b1bb98f BK |
1483 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
1484 | if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION | |
1485 | || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) | |
b1b4b543 MC |
1486 | != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { |
1487 | /* | |
1488 | * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't | |
1489 | * support it. | |
1490 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1491 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); |
1ab3836b MC |
1492 | goto err; |
1493 | } | |
b1b4b543 | 1494 | /* SSLv3/TLS */ |
6b1bb98f | 1495 | s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1496 | } |
1497 | /* | |
1498 | * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check | |
1499 | * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. | |
1500 | */ | |
1501 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1502 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); |
1ab3836b | 1503 | } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && |
6b1bb98f | 1504 | DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1505 | protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; |
1506 | } else { | |
1507 | protverr = 0; | |
1508 | } | |
1509 | ||
1510 | if (protverr) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1511 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); |
7d061fce | 1512 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
b1b4b543 | 1513 | /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ |
6b1bb98f | 1514 | s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b | 1515 | } |
bf846a6d | 1516 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
6b1bb98f | 1517 | goto err; |
b3e2272c EK |
1518 | } |
1519 | ||
635b7d3f | 1520 | /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */ |
9e0ac6a2 | 1521 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { |
bf846a6d | 1522 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
9e0ac6a2 MC |
1523 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1524 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
1525 | goto err; | |
1526 | } | |
1527 | ||
1ed65871 DB |
1528 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1529 | /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ | |
1530 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1531 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1532 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1533 | clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { | |
bf846a6d | 1534 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
6b1bb98f | 1535 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1ed65871 | 1536 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
6b1bb98f | 1537 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1538 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */ |
1539 | } | |
a230b26e | 1540 | /* default verification */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1541 | } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len |
1542 | || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, | |
1ab3836b | 1543 | s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { |
bf846a6d | 1544 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1545 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
1546 | goto err; | |
1ed65871 DB |
1547 | } |
1548 | s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; | |
1549 | } | |
1550 | if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1551 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); |
1ed65871 | 1552 | if (protverr != 0) { |
6b1bb98f | 1553 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); |
1ed65871 | 1554 | s->version = s->client_version; |
bf846a6d | 1555 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
6b1bb98f | 1556 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1557 | } |
1558 | } | |
1559 | } | |
1560 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1561 | s->hit = 0; |
1562 | ||
1ab3836b | 1563 | /* We need to do this before getting the session */ |
70af3d8e | 1564 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, |
fe874d27 | 1565 | SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
bf846a6d | 1566 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) { |
6b1bb98f BK |
1567 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
1568 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b MC |
1569 | } |
1570 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1571 | /* |
1572 | * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. | |
1573 | * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. | |
1574 | * | |
1575 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in | |
1576 | * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally | |
1577 | * ignore resumption requests with flag | |
1578 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather | |
1579 | * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on | |
1580 | * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). | |
1581 | * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to | |
1582 | * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains | |
1583 | * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the | |
1584 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be | |
1585 | * ignored. | |
1586 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1587 | if (clienthello->isv2 || |
b3e2272c EK |
1588 | (s->new_session && |
1589 | (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { | |
1590 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
1591 | goto err; | |
1592 | } else { | |
bf846a6d | 1593 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello, &al); |
128ae276 | 1594 | if (i == 1) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1595 | /* previous session */ |
1596 | s->hit = 1; | |
1597 | } else if (i == -1) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1598 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1599 | } else { |
b3e2272c EK |
1600 | /* i == 0 */ |
1601 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
32ec4153 | 1602 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1603 | } |
b3e2272c | 1604 | } |
0f113f3e | 1605 | |
6b1bb98f | 1606 | if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
bf846a6d | 1607 | clienthello->isv2, &al) || |
6b1bb98f | 1608 | !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, |
bf846a6d | 1609 | clienthello->isv2, &al)) { |
6b1bb98f | 1610 | goto err; |
b3e2272c | 1611 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1612 | |
90134d98 BK |
1613 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; |
1614 | /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ | |
1615 | if (scsvs != NULL) { | |
1616 | for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { | |
1617 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); | |
1618 | if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { | |
1619 | if (s->renegotiate) { | |
1620 | /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1621 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
90134d98 | 1622 | SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); |
bf846a6d | 1623 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
6b1bb98f | 1624 | goto err; |
90134d98 BK |
1625 | } |
1626 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
1627 | } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && | |
1628 | !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { | |
1629 | /* | |
1630 | * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried | |
1631 | * a higher version. We should fail if the current version | |
1632 | * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first | |
1633 | * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger | |
1634 | * an insecure downgrade. | |
1635 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1636 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
90134d98 | 1637 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
bf846a6d | 1638 | al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; |
6b1bb98f | 1639 | goto err; |
90134d98 BK |
1640 | } |
1641 | } | |
1642 | } | |
1643 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1644 | /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ |
1645 | if (s->hit) { | |
1646 | j = 0; | |
1647 | id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
d02b48c6 | 1648 | |
413c4f45 | 1649 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
a230b26e | 1650 | fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); |
413c4f45 | 1651 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1652 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
1653 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
413c4f45 | 1654 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
b3e2272c EK |
1655 | fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", |
1656 | i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); | |
88f2a4cf | 1657 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1658 | if (c->id == id) { |
1659 | j = 1; | |
1660 | break; | |
32ec4153 | 1661 | } |
0f113f3e | 1662 | } |
b3e2272c | 1663 | if (j == 0) { |
ec30e856 | 1664 | /* |
b3e2272c EK |
1665 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked |
1666 | * to reuse it | |
ec30e856 | 1667 | */ |
bf846a6d | 1668 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
6b1bb98f | 1669 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
b3e2272c | 1670 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); |
6b1bb98f | 1671 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1672 | } |
b3e2272c | 1673 | } |
9ceb2426 | 1674 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1675 | for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { |
1676 | if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) | |
b3e2272c | 1677 | break; |
0f113f3e | 1678 | } |
32ec4153 | 1679 | |
6b1bb98f | 1680 | if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
b3e2272c | 1681 | /* no compress */ |
bf846a6d | 1682 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1683 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); |
1684 | goto err; | |
b3e2272c | 1685 | } |
f100b031 | 1686 | |
805a2e9e MC |
1687 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1688 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) | |
6b1bb98f | 1689 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); |
805a2e9e MC |
1690 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
1691 | ||
0f113f3e | 1692 | /* TLS extensions */ |
fe874d27 | 1693 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
735d5b59 | 1694 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) { |
6b1bb98f BK |
1695 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
1696 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1697 | } |
1698 | ||
1699 | /* | |
1700 | * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake | |
1701 | * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before | |
1702 | * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket | |
1703 | * processing to use it in key derivation. | |
1704 | */ | |
1705 | { | |
1706 | unsigned char *pos; | |
1707 | pos = s->s3->server_random; | |
f7f2a01d | 1708 | if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) { |
6b1bb98f | 1709 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1710 | } |
1711 | } | |
1712 | ||
aff8c126 | 1713 | if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { |
4a640fb6 | 1714 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; |
8c1a5343 MC |
1715 | /* |
1716 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1717 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1718 | */ | |
1719 | int master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e | 1720 | |
8c1a5343 | 1721 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
aff8c126 | 1722 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, |
8c1a5343 | 1723 | &master_key_length, ciphers, |
0f113f3e | 1724 | &pref_cipher, |
aff8c126 | 1725 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) |
8c1a5343 MC |
1726 | && master_key_length > 0) { |
1727 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1728 | s->hit = 1; |
1729 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; | |
1730 | s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | |
1731 | ||
1732 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1733 | ||
1734 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ | |
3f4bf115 DSH |
1735 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) |
1736 | pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, | |
1737 | SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
0f113f3e | 1738 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) { |
bf846a6d | 1739 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1740 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
1741 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1742 | } |
1743 | ||
1744 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; | |
25aaa98a | 1745 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); |
0f113f3e | 1746 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
25aaa98a | 1747 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
0f113f3e MC |
1748 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
1749 | } | |
1750 | } | |
58ece833 | 1751 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1752 | /* |
1753 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other | |
b2ce0337 | 1754 | * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression |
0f113f3e MC |
1755 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q. |
1756 | */ | |
1757 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; | |
1fe35494 MC |
1758 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1759 | /* | |
1760 | * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in | |
1761 | * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in | |
1762 | * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello. | |
1763 | */ | |
1764 | if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) { | |
1765 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1766 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1767 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
1768 | goto err; | |
1769 | } | |
1770 | } | |
09b6c2ef | 1771 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e | 1772 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ |
1fe35494 | 1773 | else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 1774 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; |
9ceb2426 | 1775 | unsigned int k; |
0f113f3e MC |
1776 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ |
1777 | /* Can't disable compression */ | |
1778 | if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1779 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
0f113f3e | 1780 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
6b1bb98f | 1781 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1782 | } |
1783 | /* Look for resumed compression method */ | |
1784 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { | |
1785 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1786 | if (comp_id == comp->id) { | |
1787 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1788 | break; | |
1789 | } | |
1790 | } | |
1791 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1792 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
0f113f3e | 1793 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
6b1bb98f | 1794 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1795 | } |
1796 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1797 | for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { |
1798 | if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1799 | break; |
1800 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1801 | if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
bf846a6d | 1802 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
6b1bb98f | 1803 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
8fdc99cb | 1804 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); |
6b1bb98f | 1805 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1806 | } |
c19602b5 | 1807 | } else if (s->hit) { |
0f113f3e | 1808 | comp = NULL; |
1fe35494 | 1809 | } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { |
df6741c9 | 1810 | /* See if we have a match */ |
9ceb2426 MC |
1811 | int m, nn, v, done = 0; |
1812 | unsigned int o; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1813 | |
1814 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1815 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { | |
1816 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1817 | v = comp->id; | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1818 | for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { |
1819 | if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1820 | done = 1; |
1821 | break; | |
1822 | } | |
1823 | } | |
1824 | if (done) | |
1825 | break; | |
1826 | } | |
1827 | if (done) | |
1828 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1829 | else | |
1830 | comp = NULL; | |
1831 | } | |
e6f418bc | 1832 | #else |
0f113f3e MC |
1833 | /* |
1834 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1835 | * using compression. | |
1836 | */ | |
1837 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1838 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
1839 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1840 | } |
09b6c2ef | 1841 | #endif |
413c4f45 | 1842 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1843 | /* |
1844 | * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher | |
1845 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 1846 | |
69b2d393 | 1847 | if (!s->hit || s->hello_retry_request) { |
25aaa98a | 1848 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); |
0f113f3e MC |
1849 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; |
1850 | if (ciphers == NULL) { | |
bf846a6d | 1851 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1852 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
1853 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1854 | } |
1855 | ciphers = NULL; | |
69b2d393 MC |
1856 | } |
1857 | ||
1858 | if (!s->hit) { | |
1859 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1860 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; | |
1861 | #else | |
1862 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; | |
1863 | #endif | |
0f113f3e | 1864 | if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { |
6b1bb98f | 1865 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
0f113f3e MC |
1866 | goto err; |
1867 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
1868 | } |
1869 | ||
1870 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1871 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
1872 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1873 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
1874 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
1875 | return 1; | |
e27f234a | 1876 | err: |
fe3a3291 | 1877 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
bf846a6d | 1878 | *pal = al; |
e27f234a MC |
1879 | |
1880 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1881 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
1882 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1883 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
1884 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 1885 | |
6b1bb98f | 1886 | return 0; |
e27f234a MC |
1887 | } |
1888 | ||
24b8e4b2 MC |
1889 | /* |
1890 | * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
1266eefd | 1891 | * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert. |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1892 | */ |
1893 | static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al) | |
1894 | { | |
aff8c126 | 1895 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1896 | |
1897 | /* | |
1898 | * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be | |
1899 | * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, | |
1900 | * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may | |
1901 | * influence which certificate is sent | |
1902 | */ | |
aff8c126 RS |
1903 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL |
1904 | && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { | |
24b8e4b2 | 1905 | int ret; |
1266eefd | 1906 | |
24b8e4b2 | 1907 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ |
a497cf25 | 1908 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) { |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1909 | /* |
1910 | * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate | |
1911 | * et al can pick it up. | |
1912 | */ | |
a497cf25 | 1913 | s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert; |
aff8c126 | 1914 | ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1915 | switch (ret) { |
1916 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | |
1917 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
aff8c126 | 1918 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1919 | break; |
1920 | /* status request response should be sent */ | |
1921 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | |
aff8c126 RS |
1922 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) |
1923 | s->ext.status_expected = 1; | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1924 | break; |
1925 | /* something bad happened */ | |
1926 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
1927 | default: | |
1928 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1929 | return 0; | |
1930 | } | |
1931 | } | |
1932 | } | |
1933 | ||
1934 | return 1; | |
1935 | } | |
1936 | ||
be3583fa | 1937 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
e27f234a | 1938 | { |
d13dd4be | 1939 | int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
4a640fb6 | 1940 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
e27f234a MC |
1941 | |
1942 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1943 | int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s, &al); |
1944 | if (rv == 0) { | |
1945 | /* SSLErr() was already called */ | |
1946 | goto f_err; | |
1947 | } | |
1948 | if (rv < 0) | |
1949 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
1950 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; | |
1951 | } | |
1952 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { | |
69b2d393 | 1953 | if (!s->hit || s->hello_retry_request) { |
e27f234a MC |
1954 | /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ |
1955 | if (s->cert->cert_cb) { | |
1956 | int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
1957 | if (rv == 0) { | |
1958 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
a230b26e EK |
1959 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1960 | SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
1961 | goto f_err; |
1962 | } | |
1963 | if (rv < 0) { | |
1964 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
6b1bb98f | 1965 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
e27f234a MC |
1966 | } |
1967 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
0f113f3e | 1968 | } |
a230b26e EK |
1969 | cipher = |
1970 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
e27f234a MC |
1971 | |
1972 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
a230b26e EK |
1973 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1974 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
e27f234a | 1975 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 1976 | } |
11c67eea MC |
1977 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL |
1978 | && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id) { | |
1979 | /* | |
1980 | * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we | |
1981 | * just selected. Something must have changed. | |
1982 | */ | |
1983 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1984 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); | |
1985 | goto f_err; | |
1986 | } | |
e27f234a | 1987 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; |
69b2d393 MC |
1988 | if (!s->hit) { |
1989 | if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al)) | |
1990 | goto f_err; | |
1991 | /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ | |
1992 | if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) | |
1993 | s->session->not_resumable = | |
1994 | s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey | |
1995 | & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) | |
1996 | != 0)); | |
1997 | if (s->session->not_resumable) | |
1998 | /* do not send a session ticket */ | |
1999 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; | |
2000 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2001 | } else { |
2002 | /* Session-id reuse */ | |
2003 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; | |
0f113f3e | 2004 | } |
0f113f3e | 2005 | |
e27f234a MC |
2006 | /*- |
2007 | * we now have the following setup. | |
2008 | * client_random | |
60250017 | 2009 | * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers |
2010 | * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers | |
e27f234a MC |
2011 | * compression - basically ignored right now |
2012 | * ssl version is set - sslv3 | |
2013 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. | |
2014 | * s->hit - session reuse flag | |
2015 | * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. | |
2016 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 2017 | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2018 | /* |
2019 | * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the | |
2020 | * certificate callbacks etc above. | |
2021 | */ | |
2022 | if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) { | |
2023 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
2024 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
2025 | goto f_err; | |
e27f234a | 2026 | } |
0f113f3e | 2027 | |
6b1bb98f | 2028 | wst = WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a MC |
2029 | } |
2030 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
6b1bb98f | 2031 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { |
e27f234a MC |
2032 | int ret; |
2033 | if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { | |
2034 | /* | |
2035 | * callback indicates further work to be done | |
2036 | */ | |
2037 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
6b1bb98f | 2038 | return WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a MC |
2039 | } |
2040 | if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { | |
2041 | /* | |
2042 | * This is not really an error but the only means to for | |
2043 | * a client to detect whether srp is supported. | |
2044 | */ | |
2045 | if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) | |
2046 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
a230b26e | 2047 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
7bb37cb5 E |
2048 | else |
2049 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
2050 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
e27f234a | 2051 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2052 | } |
2053 | } | |
e27f234a | 2054 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 2055 | |
e27f234a | 2056 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
0f113f3e | 2057 | f_err: |
e27f234a | 2058 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
fe3a3291 | 2059 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
2060 | return WORK_ERROR; |
2061 | } | |
2062 | ||
7cea05dc | 2063 | int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2064 | { |
ec60ccc1 MC |
2065 | int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
2066 | size_t sl, len; | |
f2342b7a | 2067 | int version; |
0f113f3e | 2068 | |
b97667ce | 2069 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */ |
f2342b7a MC |
2070 | version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version; |
2071 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) | |
8157d44b MC |
2072 | /* |
2073 | * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in | |
2074 | * tls_process_client_hello() | |
2075 | */ | |
7cea05dc | 2076 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
8157d44b MC |
2077 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2078 | goto err; | |
2079 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2080 | |
e27f234a MC |
2081 | /*- |
2082 | * There are several cases for the session ID to send | |
2083 | * back in the server hello: | |
2084 | * - For session reuse from the session cache, | |
2085 | * we send back the old session ID. | |
2086 | * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) | |
2087 | * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" | |
2088 | * (which doesn't actually identify the session). | |
2089 | * - If it is a new session, we send back the new | |
2090 | * session ID. | |
2091 | * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, | |
2092 | * we send back a 0-length session ID. | |
2093 | * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, | |
2094 | * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed | |
2095 | * to send back. | |
2096 | */ | |
2097 | if (s->session->not_resumable || | |
2098 | (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) | |
2099 | && !s->hit)) | |
2100 | s->session->session_id_length = 0; | |
2101 | ||
2102 | sl = s->session->session_id_length; | |
ec60ccc1 | 2103 | if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { |
e27f234a | 2104 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 2105 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2106 | } |
0f113f3e | 2107 | |
8157d44b | 2108 | /* set up the compression method */ |
09b6c2ef | 2109 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
8157d44b | 2110 | compm = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 2111 | #else |
e27f234a | 2112 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
8157d44b | 2113 | compm = 0; |
e27f234a | 2114 | else |
8157d44b | 2115 | compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; |
09b6c2ef | 2116 | #endif |
e481f9b9 | 2117 | |
71728dd8 MC |
2118 | if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
2119 | && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)) | |
7cea05dc | 2120 | || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) |
71728dd8 MC |
2121 | || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
2122 | && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) | |
7da160b0 | 2123 | || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
3434f40b | 2124 | SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
fe874d27 MC |
2125 | ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO |
2126 | : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO, | |
30aeba43 | 2127 | NULL, 0, &al)) { |
e27f234a | 2128 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 2129 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2130 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2131 | |
aff9929b MC |
2132 | if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
2133 | && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
2134 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2135 | goto err; | |
2136 | } | |
2137 | ||
e27f234a | 2138 | return 1; |
8157d44b | 2139 | err: |
7da160b0 | 2140 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
8157d44b | 2141 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2142 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2143 | |
7cea05dc | 2144 | int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 2145 | { |
e27f234a | 2146 | if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
5923ad4b MC |
2147 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
2148 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2149 | return 0; | |
2150 | } | |
e27f234a | 2151 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2152 | return 1; |
2153 | } | |
2154 | ||
7cea05dc | 2155 | int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2156 | { |
bc36ee62 | 2157 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e2b420fd | 2158 | EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; |
ea262260 | 2159 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2160 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e | 2161 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
348240c6 | 2162 | size_t encodedlen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 2163 | int curve_id = 0; |
d02b48c6 | 2164 | #endif |
f695571e | 2165 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
c13d2a5b | 2166 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i; |
0f113f3e | 2167 | unsigned long type; |
2ac6115d | 2168 | const BIGNUM *r[4]; |
bfb0641f | 2169 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
fe3066ee | 2170 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
c13d2a5b MC |
2171 | size_t paramlen, paramoffset; |
2172 | ||
5923ad4b | 2173 | if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { |
e4e1aa90 | 2174 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2175 | goto f_err; |
2176 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2177 | |
6e59a892 RL |
2178 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { |
2179 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
6e59a892 RL |
2180 | goto f_err; |
2181 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2182 | |
e27f234a | 2183 | type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
e27f234a | 2184 | |
e27f234a | 2185 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; |
85269210 | 2186 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a MC |
2187 | /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ |
2188 | if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
2189 | } else | |
85269210 | 2190 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
bc36ee62 | 2191 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e27f234a | 2192 | if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
94d61512 BL |
2193 | CERT *cert = s->cert; |
2194 | ||
e2b420fd DSH |
2195 | EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; |
2196 | DH *dh; | |
2197 | ||
e27f234a | 2198 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { |
e2b420fd DSH |
2199 | DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); |
2200 | pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2201 | if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { | |
2202 | DH_free(dhp); | |
e27f234a | 2203 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
0f113f3e | 2204 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 2205 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 2206 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2207 | EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); |
2208 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2209 | } else { | |
2210 | pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; | |
2211 | } | |
2212 | if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { | |
2213 | DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); | |
2214 | pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); | |
2215 | if (pkdh == NULL) { | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2216 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2217 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2218 | goto f_err; | |
2219 | } | |
2220 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2221 | } | |
2222 | if (pkdhp == NULL) { | |
e27f234a MC |
2223 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
2224 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2225 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
2226 | goto f_err; | |
2227 | } | |
2228 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, | |
e2b420fd | 2229 | EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { |
e27f234a MC |
2230 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
2231 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2232 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
2233 | goto f_err; | |
2234 | } | |
e2b420fd | 2235 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2236 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2237 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2238 | goto err; | |
2239 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2240 | |
0a699a07 | 2241 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); |
e27f234a | 2242 | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2243 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { |
2244 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
ffaef3f1 | 2245 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2246 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2247 | |
2248 | dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2249 | ||
2250 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2251 | pkdh = NULL; | |
2252 | ||
0aeddcfa MC |
2253 | DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]); |
2254 | DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL); | |
e27f234a | 2255 | } else |
d02b48c6 | 2256 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2257 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a | 2258 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
57be4444 | 2259 | int nid; |
e27f234a | 2260 | |
880d9d86 | 2261 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2262 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2263 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2264 | goto err; | |
2265 | } | |
2266 | ||
57be4444 | 2267 | /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ |
de4d764e | 2268 | nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); |
57be4444 DSH |
2269 | curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); |
2270 | if (curve_id == 0) { | |
e27f234a MC |
2271 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2272 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); | |
2273 | goto err; | |
2274 | } | |
0a699a07 | 2275 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); |
880d9d86 DSH |
2276 | /* Generate a new key for this curve */ |
2277 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { | |
880d9d86 | 2278 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
57be4444 DSH |
2279 | goto f_err; |
2280 | } | |
2281 | ||
880d9d86 | 2282 | /* Encode the public key. */ |
ec24630a DSH |
2283 | encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, |
2284 | &encodedPoint); | |
e27f234a | 2285 | if (encodedlen == 0) { |
cae41364 | 2286 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
e27f234a MC |
2287 | goto err; |
2288 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2289 | |
e27f234a MC |
2290 | /* |
2291 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we | |
2292 | * can set these to NULLs | |
2293 | */ | |
2294 | r[0] = NULL; | |
2295 | r[1] = NULL; | |
2296 | r[2] = NULL; | |
2297 | r[3] = NULL; | |
2298 | } else | |
10bf4fc2 | 2299 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
edc032b5 | 2300 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a MC |
2301 | if (type & SSL_kSRP) { |
2302 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || | |
2303 | (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || | |
2304 | (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { | |
2305 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2306 | SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); | |
2307 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2308 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2309 | r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; |
2310 | r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; | |
2311 | r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; | |
2312 | r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; | |
2313 | } else | |
2314 | #endif | |
2315 | { | |
2316 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2317 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2318 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); | |
2319 | goto f_err; | |
2320 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2321 | |
f695571e DSH |
2322 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) |
2323 | || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { | |
2324 | lu = NULL; | |
2325 | } else if (lu == NULL) { | |
2326 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2327 | goto f_err; | |
e27f234a | 2328 | } |
0f113f3e | 2329 | |
85269210 | 2330 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a | 2331 | if (type & SSL_PSK) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2332 | size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
2333 | ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); | |
2334 | ||
2335 | /* | |
2336 | * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already | |
2337 | * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case | |
2338 | */ | |
2339 | if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN | |
7cea05dc | 2340 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, |
c13d2a5b MC |
2341 | len)) { |
2342 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2343 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2344 | goto f_err; | |
85269210 | 2345 | } |
e27f234a | 2346 | } |
85269210 DSH |
2347 | #endif |
2348 | ||
e27f234a | 2349 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2350 | unsigned char *binval; |
2351 | int res; | |
2352 | ||
edc032b5 | 2353 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a | 2354 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { |
7cea05dc | 2355 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); |
e27f234a | 2356 | } else |
78a01b3f | 2357 | #endif |
7cea05dc | 2358 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2359 | |
2360 | if (!res) { | |
2361 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2362 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2363 | goto f_err; | |
2364 | } | |
2365 | ||
78a01b3f | 2366 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
a230b26e | 2367 | /*- |
78a01b3f | 2368 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS |
2369 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length | |
2370 | * as the prime | |
2371 | */ | |
2372 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2373 | size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); |
ff819477 | 2374 | |
c13d2a5b | 2375 | if (len > 0) { |
7cea05dc | 2376 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2377 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2378 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2379 | goto f_err; | |
2380 | } | |
2381 | memset(binval, 0, len); | |
78a01b3f | 2382 | } |
c13d2a5b | 2383 | } |
edc032b5 | 2384 | #endif |
7cea05dc MC |
2385 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) |
2386 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2387 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2388 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2389 | goto f_err; | |
2390 | } | |
2391 | ||
2392 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); | |
e27f234a | 2393 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2394 | |
10bf4fc2 | 2395 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a MC |
2396 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2397 | /* | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2398 | * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the |
2399 | * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] | |
2400 | * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded | |
2401 | * point itself | |
e27f234a | 2402 | */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2403 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) |
2404 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
2405 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) | |
2406 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2407 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2408 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2409 | goto f_err; | |
2410 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2411 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
2412 | encodedPoint = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2413 | } |
ea262260 BM |
2414 | #endif |
2415 | ||
e27f234a | 2416 | /* not anonymous */ |
f695571e | 2417 | if (lu != NULL) { |
a497cf25 | 2418 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; |
f695571e DSH |
2419 | const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx); |
2420 | unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2; | |
2421 | size_t siglen; | |
2422 | ||
2423 | if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) { | |
2424 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2425 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2426 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2427 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2428 | goto f_err; | |
2429 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2430 | /* |
2431 | * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p | |
2432 | * points to the space at the end. | |
2433 | */ | |
c13d2a5b | 2434 | |
f695571e DSH |
2435 | /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ |
2436 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { | |
2437 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2438 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2439 | goto f_err; | |
2440 | } | |
2441 | /* send signature algorithm */ | |
2442 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) | |
2443 | return 0; | |
2444 | /* | |
2445 | * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig | |
2446 | * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it | |
2447 | * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET | |
2448 | * afterwards. | |
2449 | */ | |
2450 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
2451 | if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) | |
2452 | || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { | |
2453 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2454 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2455 | goto f_err; | |
2456 | } | |
2457 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | |
2458 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 | |
2459 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2460 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
f695571e | 2461 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f3d93e4 | 2462 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 2463 | } |
f695571e DSH |
2464 | } |
2465 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), | |
2466 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
2467 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), | |
2468 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
2469 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, | |
2470 | s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, | |
2471 | paramlen) <= 0 | |
2472 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0 | |
2473 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) | |
2474 | || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { | |
e27f234a | 2475 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
f695571e | 2476 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
77d514c5 MC |
2477 | goto f_err; |
2478 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2479 | } |
2480 | ||
bfb0641f | 2481 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2482 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
2483 | f_err: |
2484 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2485 | err: | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2486 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
2487 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2488 | #endif | |
556efe79 | 2489 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
b548a1f1 | 2490 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
ea262260 | 2491 | #endif |
bfb0641f | 2492 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2493 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2494 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2495 | |
7cea05dc | 2496 | int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2497 | { |
32f66107 DSH |
2498 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
2499 | ||
03f44b97 DSH |
2500 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
2501 | /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */ | |
2502 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { | |
2503 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2504 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2505 | goto err; | |
2506 | } | |
32f66107 | 2507 | |
fe874d27 MC |
2508 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
2509 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL, | |
2510 | 0, &al)) { | |
03f44b97 DSH |
2511 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
2512 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2513 | goto err; | |
2514 | } | |
32f66107 DSH |
2515 | goto done; |
2516 | } | |
2517 | ||
2518 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ | |
2519 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) | |
2520 | || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
2521 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2522 | goto err; | |
28ff8ef3 | 2523 | } |
0f113f3e | 2524 | |
e27f234a | 2525 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
98c792d1 | 2526 | const uint16_t *psigs; |
a9669ddc | 2527 | size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); |
703bcee0 | 2528 | |
7cea05dc | 2529 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
8f12296e | 2530 | || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) |
7cea05dc MC |
2531 | || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) |
2532 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2533 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
2534 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2535 | goto err; | |
2536 | } | |
e27f234a | 2537 | } |
0f113f3e | 2538 | |
5d6cca05 | 2539 | if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) { |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2540 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2541 | goto err; | |
2542 | } | |
e27f234a | 2543 | |
32f66107 | 2544 | done: |
e27f234a | 2545 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; |
e27f234a | 2546 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 2547 | err: |
32f66107 | 2548 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e27f234a | 2549 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2550 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2551 | |
0907d710 | 2552 | static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
e27f234a | 2553 | { |
85269210 | 2554 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
0907d710 MC |
2555 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
2556 | size_t psklen; | |
2557 | PACKET psk_identity; | |
efcdbcbe | 2558 | |
0907d710 MC |
2559 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { |
2560 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2561 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 MC |
2562 | return 0; |
2563 | } | |
2564 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
2565 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2566 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
0907d710 MC |
2567 | return 0; |
2568 | } | |
2569 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { | |
2570 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
a230b26e | 2571 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); |
0907d710 MC |
2572 | return 0; |
2573 | } | |
85269210 | 2574 | |
0907d710 MC |
2575 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { |
2576 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2577 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2578 | return 0; |
2579 | } | |
85269210 | 2580 | |
0907d710 | 2581 | psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, |
a230b26e | 2582 | psk, sizeof(psk)); |
85269210 | 2583 | |
0907d710 MC |
2584 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
2585 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2586 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2587 | return 0; |
2588 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
2589 | /* | |
2590 | * PSK related to the given identity not found | |
2591 | */ | |
2592 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
c76a4aea | 2593 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
0907d710 MC |
2594 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
2595 | return 0; | |
2596 | } | |
85269210 | 2597 | |
0907d710 MC |
2598 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); |
2599 | s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); | |
2600 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); | |
85269210 | 2601 | |
0907d710 MC |
2602 | if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { |
2603 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2604 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 | 2605 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2606 | } |
0907d710 MC |
2607 | |
2608 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; | |
2609 | ||
2610 | return 1; | |
2611 | #else | |
2612 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2613 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2614 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 | 2615 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2616 | #endif |
0907d710 MC |
2617 | } |
2618 | ||
0907d710 MC |
2619 | static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2620 | { | |
bc36ee62 | 2621 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
0907d710 MC |
2622 | unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
2623 | int decrypt_len; | |
2624 | unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; | |
2625 | size_t j, padding_len; | |
2626 | PACKET enc_premaster; | |
2627 | RSA *rsa = NULL; | |
2628 | unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; | |
2629 | int ret = 0; | |
2630 | ||
d0ff28f8 | 2631 | rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey); |
0907d710 MC |
2632 | if (rsa == NULL) { |
2633 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2634 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); |
0907d710 MC |
2635 | return 0; |
2636 | } | |
2637 | ||
2638 | /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ | |
2639 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2640 | enc_premaster = *pkt; | |
2641 | } else { | |
2642 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) | |
2643 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
2644 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2645 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 | 2646 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2647 | } |
0907d710 | 2648 | } |
0f113f3e | 2649 | |
0907d710 MC |
2650 | /* |
2651 | * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to | |
2652 | * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret | |
2653 | * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because | |
2654 | * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. | |
2655 | */ | |
2656 | if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2657 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2658 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
0907d710 MC |
2659 | return 0; |
2660 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2661 | |
0907d710 MC |
2662 | rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); |
2663 | if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { | |
2664 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2665 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 MC |
2666 | return 0; |
2667 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2668 | |
0907d710 MC |
2669 | /* |
2670 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of | |
2671 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, | |
2672 | * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and | |
2673 | * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt | |
2674 | * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 | |
2675 | */ | |
20ca916d | 2676 | |
a230b26e | 2677 | if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) |
0907d710 | 2678 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2679 | |
0907d710 MC |
2680 | /* |
2681 | * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of | |
2682 | * the timing-sensitive code below. | |
2683 | */ | |
348240c6 MC |
2684 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
2685 | decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), | |
2686 | PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), | |
2687 | rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | |
0907d710 MC |
2688 | if (decrypt_len < 0) |
2689 | goto err; | |
20ca916d | 2690 | |
0907d710 | 2691 | /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ |
5b8fa431 | 2692 | |
0907d710 MC |
2693 | /* |
2694 | * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys | |
2695 | * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures | |
2696 | * PS is at least 8 bytes. | |
2697 | */ | |
2698 | if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2699 | *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2700 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
0907d710 MC |
2701 | goto err; |
2702 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2703 | |
0907d710 MC |
2704 | padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
2705 | decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & | |
a230b26e | 2706 | constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); |
0907d710 MC |
2707 | for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { |
2708 | decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); | |
2709 | } | |
2710 | decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); | |
5b8fa431 | 2711 | |
0907d710 MC |
2712 | /* |
2713 | * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then | |
2714 | * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The | |
2715 | * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack | |
2716 | * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number | |
2717 | * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in | |
2718 | * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. | |
2719 | */ | |
2720 | version_good = | |
2721 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2722 | (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); | |
2723 | version_good &= | |
2724 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], | |
2725 | (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); | |
0f113f3e | 2726 | |
0907d710 MC |
2727 | /* |
2728 | * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the | |
2729 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the | |
2730 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). | |
2731 | * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol | |
2732 | * version instead if the server does not support the requested | |
2733 | * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such | |
2734 | * clients. | |
2735 | */ | |
2736 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { | |
2737 | unsigned char workaround_good; | |
2738 | workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2739 | (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); | |
2740 | workaround_good &= | |
5b8fa431 | 2741 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], |
0907d710 MC |
2742 | (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); |
2743 | version_good |= workaround_good; | |
2744 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2745 | |
0907d710 MC |
2746 | /* |
2747 | * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to | |
2748 | * remain non-zero (0xff). | |
2749 | */ | |
2750 | decrypt_good &= version_good; | |
0f113f3e | 2751 | |
0907d710 MC |
2752 | /* |
2753 | * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using | |
2754 | * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not | |
2755 | * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees | |
2756 | * it is still sufficiently large to read from. | |
2757 | */ | |
2758 | for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { | |
2759 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = | |
2760 | constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, | |
2761 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], | |
2762 | rand_premaster_secret[j]); | |
2763 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2764 | |
0907d710 MC |
2765 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, |
2766 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
2767 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2768 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2769 | goto err; |
2770 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2771 | |
0907d710 MC |
2772 | ret = 1; |
2773 | err: | |
2774 | OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); | |
2775 | return ret; | |
2776 | #else | |
2777 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2778 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2779 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2780 | return 0; |
2781 | #endif | |
2782 | } | |
2783 | ||
642360f9 MC |
2784 | static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2785 | { | |
2786 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2787 | EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; | |
2788 | DH *cdh; | |
2789 | unsigned int i; | |
2790 | BIGNUM *pub_key; | |
2791 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2792 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2793 | int ret = 0; | |
2794 | ||
31a7d80d | 2795 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { |
642360f9 | 2796 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
c76a4aea | 2797 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
642360f9 MC |
2798 | SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
2799 | goto err; | |
2800 | } | |
642360f9 MC |
2801 | skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; |
2802 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
2803 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2804 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2805 | goto err; |
2806 | } | |
2807 | ||
2808 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2809 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2810 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2811 | goto err; |
2812 | } | |
2813 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { | |
2814 | /* We already checked we have enough data */ | |
2815 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2816 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2817 | goto err; |
2818 | } | |
2819 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2820 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { | |
c76a4aea | 2821 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); |
642360f9 MC |
2822 | goto err; |
2823 | } | |
2824 | cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); | |
2825 | pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); | |
2826 | ||
2827 | if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { | |
c76a4aea | 2828 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2829 | if (pub_key != NULL) |
2830 | BN_free(pub_key); | |
2831 | goto err; | |
2832 | } | |
2833 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2834 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
642360f9 | 2835 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2836 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2837 | goto err; |
2838 | } | |
2839 | ||
2840 | ret = 1; | |
2841 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2842 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
2843 | err: | |
2844 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2845 | return ret; | |
2846 | #else | |
2847 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2848 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2849 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2850 | return 0; |
2851 | #endif | |
2852 | } | |
2853 | ||
19ed1ec1 MC |
2854 | static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2855 | { | |
2856 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2857 | EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; | |
2858 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2859 | int ret = 0; | |
2860 | ||
2861 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2862 | /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ | |
2863 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2864 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2865 | goto err; |
2866 | } else { | |
2867 | unsigned int i; | |
2868 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2869 | ||
2870 | /* | |
2871 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the | |
2872 | * ClientKeyExchange message. | |
2873 | */ | |
2874 | ||
2875 | /* Get encoded point length */ | |
fb933982 DSH |
2876 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) |
2877 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
19ed1ec1 | 2878 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2879 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2880 | goto err; |
2881 | } | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2882 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); |
2883 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { | |
c76a4aea | 2884 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2885 | goto err; |
2886 | } | |
ec24630a | 2887 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { |
fb933982 | 2888 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
c76a4aea | 2889 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2890 | goto err; |
2891 | } | |
2892 | } | |
2893 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2894 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
19ed1ec1 | 2895 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2896 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2897 | goto err; |
2898 | } | |
2899 | ||
2900 | ret = 1; | |
2901 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2902 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
2903 | err: | |
2904 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2905 | ||
2906 | return ret; | |
2907 | #else | |
2908 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2909 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2910 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2911 | return 0; |
2912 | #endif | |
2913 | } | |
2914 | ||
c437eef6 MC |
2915 | static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2916 | { | |
2917 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2918 | unsigned int i; | |
2919 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2920 | ||
2921 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) | |
a230b26e | 2922 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { |
c437eef6 | 2923 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2924 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); |
c437eef6 MC |
2925 | return 0; |
2926 | } | |
2927 | if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { | |
c76a4aea | 2928 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
c437eef6 MC |
2929 | return 0; |
2930 | } | |
a230b26e | 2931 | if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { |
c437eef6 | 2932 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
c76a4aea | 2933 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); |
c437eef6 MC |
2934 | return 0; |
2935 | } | |
2936 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); | |
2937 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
2938 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
c76a4aea | 2939 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
2940 | return 0; |
2941 | } | |
2942 | ||
2943 | if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { | |
c76a4aea | 2944 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2945 | return 0; |
2946 | } | |
2947 | ||
2948 | return 1; | |
2949 | #else | |
2950 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2951 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2952 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2953 | return 0; |
2954 | #endif | |
2955 | } | |
2956 | ||
2957 | static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
2958 | { | |
2959 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
2960 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; | |
2961 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; | |
2962 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; | |
2963 | const unsigned char *start; | |
2964 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen; | |
2965 | unsigned long alg_a; | |
2966 | int Ttag, Tclass; | |
2967 | long Tlen; | |
348240c6 | 2968 | size_t sess_key_len; |
c437eef6 MC |
2969 | const unsigned char *data; |
2970 | int ret = 0; | |
2971 | ||
2972 | /* Get our certificate private key */ | |
2973 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
2974 | if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { | |
2975 | /* | |
2976 | * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too | |
2977 | */ | |
2978 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; | |
2979 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
2980 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; | |
2981 | } | |
2982 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
2983 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2984 | } | |
2985 | } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { | |
2986 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2987 | } | |
2988 | ||
2989 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); | |
2990 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
2991 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2992 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
2993 | return 0; |
2994 | } | |
2995 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { | |
2996 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2997 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2998 | return 0; |
2999 | } | |
3000 | /* | |
3001 | * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe | |
3002 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from | |
3003 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a | |
3004 | * client certificate for authorization only. | |
3005 | */ | |
3006 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
3007 | if (client_pub_pkey) { | |
3008 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) | |
3009 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
3010 | } | |
3011 | /* Decrypt session key */ | |
3012 | sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
3013 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { | |
3014 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 3015 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3016 | goto err; |
3017 | } | |
348240c6 | 3018 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
a230b26e | 3019 | if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, |
348240c6 | 3020 | &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
a230b26e | 3021 | || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { |
c437eef6 | 3022 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 3023 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
3024 | goto err; |
3025 | } | |
3026 | start = data; | |
3027 | inlen = Tlen; | |
3028 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt | |
3029 | (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { | |
3030 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 3031 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
3032 | goto err; |
3033 | } | |
3034 | /* Generate master secret */ | |
3035 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, | |
3036 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
3037 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 3038 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3039 | goto err; |
3040 | } | |
3041 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ | |
3042 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl | |
3043 | (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) | |
3044 | s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; | |
3045 | ||
3046 | ret = 1; | |
3047 | err: | |
3048 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3049 | return ret; | |
3050 | #else | |
3051 | /* Should never happen */ | |
3052 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 3053 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3054 | return 0; |
3055 | #endif | |
3056 | } | |
3057 | ||
0907d710 MC |
3058 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3059 | { | |
3060 | int al = -1; | |
3061 | unsigned long alg_k; | |
3062 | ||
3063 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
3064 | ||
3065 | /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ | |
3066 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) | |
3067 | goto err; | |
3068 | ||
3069 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { | |
3070 | /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ | |
3071 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
3072 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
a230b26e EK |
3073 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
3074 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9059eb71 | 3075 | goto err; |
0907d710 MC |
3076 | } |
3077 | /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ | |
3078 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { | |
69f68237 | 3079 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3080 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9059eb71 | 3081 | goto err; |
69f68237 | 3082 | } |
0907d710 MC |
3083 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
3084 | if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al)) | |
3085 | goto err; | |
642360f9 MC |
3086 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
3087 | if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 3088 | goto err; |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3089 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
3090 | if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al)) | |
3091 | goto err; | |
c437eef6 MC |
3092 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
3093 | if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 3094 | goto err; |
c437eef6 MC |
3095 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
3096 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 3097 | goto err; |
c437eef6 | 3098 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 3099 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
a230b26e EK |
3100 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
3101 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); | |
9059eb71 | 3102 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3103 | } |
3104 | ||
e27f234a | 3105 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e | 3106 | err: |
0907d710 MC |
3107 | if (al != -1) |
3108 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
85269210 DSH |
3109 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
3110 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); | |
3111 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; | |
58964a49 | 3112 | #endif |
fe3a3291 | 3113 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a | 3114 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3115 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3116 | |
be3583fa | 3117 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
94836de2 | 3118 | { |
94836de2 | 3119 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
c130dd8e MC |
3120 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
3121 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3122 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
3123 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
3124 | /* | |
3125 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
3126 | * used. | |
3127 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
3128 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
3129 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
c130dd8e MC |
3130 | |
3131 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
3132 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
3133 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
3134 | 0) <= 0) { | |
fe3a3291 | 3135 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
0fe2a0af | 3136 | return WORK_ERROR; |
c130dd8e | 3137 | } |
94836de2 | 3138 | |
c130dd8e MC |
3139 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
3140 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
94836de2 | 3141 | } |
94836de2 MC |
3142 | } |
3143 | #endif | |
3144 | ||
149c2ef5 | 3145 | if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { |
a230b26e EK |
3146 | /* |
3147 | * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need | |
3148 | * the handshake_buffer | |
149c2ef5 MC |
3149 | */ |
3150 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
3151 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
3152 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
3153 | } | |
94836de2 | 3154 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
28f4580c | 3155 | } else { |
94836de2 MC |
3156 | if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { |
3157 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3158 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
fe3a3291 | 3159 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
94836de2 MC |
3160 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3161 | } | |
3162 | /* | |
3163 | * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support | |
3164 | * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op | |
3165 | */ | |
3166 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { | |
fe3a3291 | 3167 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
94836de2 MC |
3168 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3169 | } | |
94836de2 MC |
3170 | } |
3171 | ||
3172 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3173 | } | |
3174 | ||
be3583fa | 3175 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3176 | { |
20dbe585 | 3177 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
3178 | X509 *x = NULL; |
3179 | unsigned long l, llen; | |
b6981744 | 3180 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
e27f234a | 3181 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
e96e0f8e | 3182 | PACKET spkt, context; |
d805a57b | 3183 | size_t chainidx; |
0f113f3e MC |
3184 | |
3185 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
e27f234a MC |
3186 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3187 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3188 | } |
3189 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3190 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */ |
3191 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)) | |
3192 | || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) | |
3193 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) | |
3194 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 3195 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3196 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
3197 | goto f_err; |
3198 | } | |
0bc09ecd | 3199 | |
d805a57b | 3200 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { |
0bc09ecd | 3201 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) |
a230b26e | 3202 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { |
0f113f3e | 3203 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3204 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3205 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
3206 | goto f_err; | |
3207 | } | |
3208 | ||
0bc09ecd MC |
3209 | certstart = certbytes; |
3210 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); | |
0f113f3e | 3211 | if (x == NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
3212 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
3213 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e | 3214 | } |
0bc09ecd | 3215 | if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { |
0f113f3e | 3216 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3217 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3218 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
3219 | goto f_err; | |
3220 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3221 | |
3222 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3223 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
3224 | PACKET extensions; | |
3225 | ||
3226 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { | |
3227 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3228 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
3229 | goto f_err; | |
3230 | } | |
fe874d27 MC |
3231 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, |
3232 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, | |
735d5b59 | 3233 | &al, NULL, chainidx == 0) |
8e1634ec TT |
3234 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, |
3235 | rawexts, x, chainidx, &al, | |
3236 | PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) { | |
5ee289ea | 3237 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
e96e0f8e | 3238 | goto f_err; |
5ee289ea MC |
3239 | } |
3240 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3241 | } |
3242 | ||
0f113f3e | 3243 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
e27f234a MC |
3244 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3245 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3246 | } |
3247 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3248 | } |
3249 | ||
3250 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { | |
3251 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ | |
3252 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
3253 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 3254 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3255 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); |
3256 | goto f_err; | |
3257 | } | |
3258 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ | |
3259 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
3260 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
e27f234a | 3261 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e | 3262 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
42c28b63 | 3263 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED; |
0f113f3e MC |
3264 | goto f_err; |
3265 | } | |
3266 | /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ | |
124037fd | 3267 | if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3268 | goto f_err; |
3269 | } | |
3270 | } else { | |
3271 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
3272 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
3273 | if (i <= 0) { | |
3274 | al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); | |
e27f234a | 3275 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3276 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
3277 | goto f_err; | |
3278 | } | |
3279 | if (i > 1) { | |
e27f234a | 3280 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); |
0f113f3e MC |
3281 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
3282 | goto f_err; | |
3283 | } | |
8382fd3a | 3284 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); |
0f113f3e MC |
3285 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
3286 | al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 3287 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3288 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
3289 | goto f_err; | |
3290 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
3291 | } |
3292 | ||
222561fe | 3293 | X509_free(s->session->peer); |
0f113f3e MC |
3294 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); |
3295 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
3296 | ||
c34b0f99 DSH |
3297 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); |
3298 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3299 | |
3300 | /* | |
3301 | * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE | |
3302 | * message | |
3303 | */ | |
94ed2c67 | 3304 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { |
0f1e51ea MC |
3305 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
3306 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3307 | goto f_err; | |
3308 | } | |
3309 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3310 | /* |
3311 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own | |
d4d78943 | 3312 | * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c |
0f113f3e | 3313 | */ |
0f113f3e | 3314 | sk = NULL; |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3315 | |
3316 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
3317 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3318 | && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
3319 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
3320 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
3321 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3322 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3323 | goto f_err; | |
3324 | } | |
3325 | ||
e27f234a | 3326 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
66696478 RS |
3327 | goto done; |
3328 | ||
0f113f3e | 3329 | f_err: |
66696478 | 3330 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
fe3a3291 | 3331 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
66696478 | 3332 | done: |
222561fe RS |
3333 | X509_free(x); |
3334 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
e27f234a | 3335 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 3336 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3337 | |
7cea05dc | 3338 | int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3339 | { |
a497cf25 | 3340 | CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert; |
e96e0f8e | 3341 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3342 | |
a497cf25 | 3343 | if (cpk == NULL) { |
e27f234a | 3344 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
3345 | return 0; |
3346 | } | |
3347 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3348 | /* |
3349 | * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context | |
3350 | * for the server Certificate message | |
3351 | */ | |
3352 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) | |
3353 | || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) { | |
e27f234a | 3354 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e | 3355 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e27f234a MC |
3356 | return 0; |
3357 | } | |
3358 | ||
3359 | return 1; | |
3360 | } | |
3361 | ||
7cea05dc | 3362 | int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
3363 | { |
3364 | unsigned char *senc = NULL; | |
83ae4661 | 3365 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
bf7c6817 | 3366 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; |
a00d75e1 | 3367 | unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; |
e27f234a | 3368 | const unsigned char *const_p; |
a00d75e1 | 3369 | int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; |
e27f234a MC |
3370 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
3371 | unsigned int hlen; | |
222da979 | 3372 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; |
e27f234a | 3373 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
d139723b | 3374 | unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; |
30f05b19 | 3375 | int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
a00d75e1 | 3376 | size_t macoffset, macendoffset; |
30f05b19 MC |
3377 | union { |
3378 | unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; | |
3379 | uint32_t age_add; | |
3380 | } age_add_u; | |
e27f234a | 3381 | |
fc24f0bf MC |
3382 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
3383 | if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) | |
3384 | goto err; | |
3385 | s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; | |
2c604cb9 | 3386 | s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); |
f6370040 MC |
3387 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { |
3388 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); | |
3389 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected = | |
3390 | OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); | |
3391 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
3392 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3393 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3394 | goto err; | |
3395 | } | |
3396 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; | |
3397 | } | |
3398 | s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data; | |
fc24f0bf MC |
3399 | } |
3400 | ||
e27f234a MC |
3401 | /* get session encoding length */ |
3402 | slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); | |
3403 | /* | |
3404 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too | |
3405 | * long | |
3406 | */ | |
3407 | if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { | |
f6370040 MC |
3408 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3409 | goto err; | |
e27f234a MC |
3410 | } |
3411 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); | |
a71edf3b | 3412 | if (senc == NULL) { |
f6370040 MC |
3413 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3414 | goto err; | |
e27f234a | 3415 | } |
0f113f3e | 3416 | |
846ec07d | 3417 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
bf7c6817 | 3418 | hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); |
83ae4661 MC |
3419 | if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { |
3420 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3421 | goto err; | |
3422 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3423 | |
e27f234a MC |
3424 | p = senc; |
3425 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) | |
3426 | goto err; | |
687eaf27 | 3427 | |
e27f234a MC |
3428 | /* |
3429 | * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up | |
3430 | */ | |
3431 | const_p = senc; | |
3432 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); | |
3433 | if (sess == NULL) | |
3434 | goto err; | |
3435 | sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ | |
0f113f3e | 3436 | |
e27f234a MC |
3437 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
3438 | if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ | |
3439 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3440 | goto err; | |
3441 | } | |
3442 | p = senc; | |
3443 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { | |
3444 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3445 | goto err; | |
3446 | } | |
3447 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
0f113f3e | 3448 | |
e27f234a MC |
3449 | /* |
3450 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does | |
3451 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. | |
3452 | */ | |
aff8c126 | 3453 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { |
5c753de6 | 3454 | /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ |
aff8c126 | 3455 | int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, |
5c753de6 TS |
3456 | hctx, 1); |
3457 | ||
3458 | if (ret == 0) { | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3459 | |
3460 | /* Put timeout and length */ | |
7cea05dc | 3461 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) |
4a01c59f | 3462 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
a00d75e1 MC |
3463 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
3464 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5c753de6 | 3465 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3466 | } |
5c753de6 TS |
3467 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3468 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
3469 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
3470 | return 1; | |
3471 | } | |
3472 | if (ret < 0) | |
e27f234a | 3473 | goto err; |
d139723b | 3474 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); |
e27f234a | 3475 | } else { |
d139723b KR |
3476 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); |
3477 | ||
3478 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); | |
3479 | if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0) | |
687eaf27 | 3480 | goto err; |
d139723b | 3481 | if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, |
aff8c126 | 3482 | tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv)) |
687eaf27 | 3483 | goto err; |
aff8c126 RS |
3484 | if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key, |
3485 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key), | |
e27f234a | 3486 | EVP_sha256(), NULL)) |
4f9fab6b | 3487 | goto err; |
aff8c126 RS |
3488 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, |
3489 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3490 | } |
3491 | ||
e27f234a | 3492 | /* |
2c604cb9 MC |
3493 | * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this |
3494 | * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity). | |
3495 | * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the | |
3496 | * timeout. | |
e27f234a | 3497 | */ |
2c604cb9 MC |
3498 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, |
3499 | (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
3500 | ? 0 : s->session->timeout) | |
30f05b19 MC |
3501 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
3502 | && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)) | |
a00d75e1 | 3503 | /* Now the actual ticket data */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3504 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
3505 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) | |
a00d75e1 | 3506 | /* Output key name */ |
7cea05dc | 3507 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) |
a00d75e1 | 3508 | /* output IV */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3509 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) |
3510 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3511 | &encdata1) |
3512 | /* Encrypt session data */ | |
3513 | || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) | |
7cea05dc | 3514 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3515 | || encdata1 != encdata2 |
3516 | || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) | |
7cea05dc | 3517 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3518 | || encdata1 + len != encdata2 |
3519 | || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH | |
7cea05dc | 3520 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3521 | || !HMAC_Update(hctx, |
3522 | (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, | |
3523 | macendoffset - macoffset) | |
7cea05dc | 3524 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3525 | || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) |
3526 | || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
7cea05dc | 3527 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) |
a00d75e1 | 3528 | || macdata1 != macdata2 |
30f05b19 MC |
3529 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt) |
3530 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3531 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, | |
fe874d27 | 3532 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
30f05b19 | 3533 | NULL, 0, &al))) { |
a00d75e1 | 3534 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3535 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3536 | } |
bcaad809 DSH |
3537 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
3538 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
e27f234a MC |
3539 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3540 | ||
3541 | return 1; | |
687eaf27 | 3542 | err: |
f6370040 | 3543 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b548a1f1 | 3544 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
846ec07d | 3545 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
bf7c6817 | 3546 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); |
a00d75e1 | 3547 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3548 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3549 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 3550 | |
f63e4288 MC |
3551 | /* |
3552 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
3553 | * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
3554 | */ | |
3555 | int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
e27f234a | 3556 | { |
8cbfcc70 RS |
3557 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) |
3558 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, | |
3559 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { | |
f63e4288 MC |
3560 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3561 | return 0; | |
3562 | } | |
3563 | ||
3564 | return 1; | |
3565 | } | |
3566 | ||
3567 | int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3568 | { | |
3569 | if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { | |
cc59ad10 | 3570 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
cc59ad10 MC |
3571 | return 0; |
3572 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
3573 | |
3574 | return 1; | |
3575 | } | |
3576 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3577 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
e27f234a MC |
3578 | /* |
3579 | * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. | |
3580 | * It sets the next_proto member in s if found | |
3581 | */ | |
be3583fa | 3582 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3583 | { |
73999b62 | 3584 | PACKET next_proto, padding; |
e27f234a MC |
3585 | size_t next_proto_len; |
3586 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
3587 | /*- |
3588 | * The payload looks like: | |
3589 | * uint8 proto_len; | |
3590 | * uint8 proto[proto_len]; | |
3591 | * uint8 padding_len; | |
3592 | * uint8 padding[padding_len]; | |
3593 | */ | |
73999b62 MC |
3594 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) |
3595 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) | |
3596 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
e27f234a | 3597 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
c3fc7eea | 3598 | goto err; |
cf9b0b6f | 3599 | } |
0f113f3e | 3600 | |
aff8c126 RS |
3601 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { |
3602 | s->ext.npn_len = 0; | |
c3fc7eea MC |
3603 | goto err; |
3604 | } | |
3605 | ||
aff8c126 | 3606 | s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; |
0f113f3e | 3607 | |
e27f234a | 3608 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
a230b26e | 3609 | err: |
fe3a3291 | 3610 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a | 3611 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3612 | } |
6434abbf | 3613 | #endif |
d45ba43d | 3614 | |
e46f2334 MC |
3615 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3616 | { | |
3434f40b MC |
3617 | int al; |
3618 | ||
fe874d27 | 3619 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
30aeba43 | 3620 | NULL, 0, &al)) { |
3434f40b | 3621 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e46f2334 | 3622 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3434f40b | 3623 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e46f2334 MC |
3624 | return 0; |
3625 | } | |
3626 | ||
3627 | return 1; | |
3628 | } | |
3629 | ||
7d061fce MC |
3630 | static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3631 | { | |
429ff318 | 3632 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
11c67eea | 3633 | size_t len = 0; |
7d061fce MC |
3634 | |
3635 | /* | |
3636 | * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release | |
3637 | * (should be s->version) | |
3638 | */ | |
3639 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
11c67eea | 3640 | || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) |
fe874d27 MC |
3641 | || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
3642 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, | |
7d061fce | 3643 | NULL, 0, &al)) { |
7d061fce | 3644 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
11c67eea | 3645 | goto err; |
7d061fce MC |
3646 | } |
3647 | ||
3648 | /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ | |
3649 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
3650 | s->session = NULL; | |
3651 | s->hit = 0; | |
3652 | ||
11c67eea MC |
3653 | /* |
3654 | * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with | |
3655 | * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. | |
3656 | */ | |
3657 | if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) | |
3658 | goto err; | |
3659 | ||
7d061fce | 3660 | return 1; |
11c67eea MC |
3661 | err: |
3662 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
3663 | return 0; | |
7d061fce | 3664 | } |
ef6c191b MC |
3665 | |
3666 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
3667 | { | |
3668 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3669 | ||
3670 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
3671 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3672 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3673 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
3674 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
3675 | } | |
3676 | ||
3677 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING | |
3678 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { | |
3679 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3680 | goto err; | |
3681 | } | |
3682 | ||
3683 | /* | |
3684 | * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on | |
3685 | * a record boundary. | |
3686 | */ | |
3687 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
3688 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
3689 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, | |
3690 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
3691 | goto err; | |
3692 | } | |
3693 | ||
3694 | s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; | |
3695 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3696 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
3697 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3698 | goto err; | |
3699 | } | |
3700 | ||
3701 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
3702 | err: | |
3703 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
3704 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
3705 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
3706 | } |