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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
c80149d9 | 4 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
8e2f6b79 | 5 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
6 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
7 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
8 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
9 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8e2f6b79 | 10 | */ |
846e33c7 | 11 | |
d02b48c6 | 12 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 13 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 14 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
68570797 | 15 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
16 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
17 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
6434abbf | 20 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
3c27208f | 22 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d095b68d | 23 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
dbad1690 | 24 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 25 | |
e46f2334 | 26 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
7d061fce | 27 | static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
d45ba43d | 28 | |
61ae935a | 29 | /* |
0f1e51ea MC |
30 | * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
31 | * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from | |
32 | * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. | |
33 | * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
34 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
35 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
36 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea MC |
37 | */ |
38 | static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
39 | { | |
40 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
41 | ||
42 | /* | |
43 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have | |
44 | * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by | |
45 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() | |
46 | */ | |
47 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
48 | default: | |
49 | break; | |
50 | ||
d7f8783f | 51 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
d4504fe5 MC |
52 | if (s->hello_retry_request) { |
53 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
54 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
55 | return 1; | |
56 | } | |
57 | break; | |
58 | } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { | |
ef6c191b MC |
59 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { |
60 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
61 | return 1; | |
62 | } | |
63 | break; | |
64 | } | |
65 | /* Fall through */ | |
66 | ||
67 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: | |
92760c21 | 68 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
0f1e51ea MC |
69 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
70 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
71 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
72 | return 1; | |
73 | } | |
74 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
75 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
76 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
77 | return 1; |
78 | } | |
79 | } | |
80 | break; | |
81 | ||
82 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
83 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { | |
92760c21 MC |
84 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
85 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
86 | return 1; |
87 | } | |
88 | } else { | |
89 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
90 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
91 | return 1; | |
92 | } | |
93 | } | |
94 | break; | |
95 | ||
96 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
97 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
98 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
99 | return 1; | |
100 | } | |
101 | break; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
102 | |
103 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
10109364 MC |
104 | /* |
105 | * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of | |
106 | * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert) | |
107 | */ | |
108 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) | |
109 | break; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
110 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { |
111 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; | |
112 | return 1; | |
113 | } | |
114 | break; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
115 | } |
116 | ||
117 | /* No valid transition found */ | |
0f1e51ea MC |
118 | return 0; |
119 | } | |
120 | ||
121 | /* | |
122 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
123 | * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the | |
124 | * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
125 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 126 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
127 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
128 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 129 | */ |
8481f583 | 130 | int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 131 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 132 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 133 | |
f5ca0b04 | 134 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
135 | if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
136 | goto err; | |
137 | return 1; | |
138 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 139 | |
e8aa8b6c | 140 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
141 | default: |
142 | break; | |
143 | ||
61ae935a | 144 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
0386aad1 | 145 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
61ae935a MC |
146 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
147 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
148 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
149 | return 1; | |
150 | } | |
151 | break; | |
152 | ||
153 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
154 | /* | |
155 | * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either | |
156 | * 1) We didn't request a Certificate | |
157 | * OR | |
158 | * 2) If we did request one then | |
159 | * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned | |
160 | * AND | |
161 | * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 | |
162 | * list if we requested a certificate) | |
163 | */ | |
0f512756 MC |
164 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
165 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { | |
166 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
23dd09b5 MC |
167 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
168 | && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
0f512756 MC |
169 | /* |
170 | * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just | |
23dd09b5 MC |
171 | * not going to accept it because we require a client |
172 | * cert. | |
0f512756 | 173 | */ |
3ec8d113 MC |
174 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
175 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, | |
176 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); | |
0f512756 MC |
177 | return 0; |
178 | } | |
179 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
180 | return 1; | |
181 | } | |
182 | } else { | |
183 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
184 | return 1; | |
185 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
186 | } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
187 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
188 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
189 | return 1; | |
f100b031 | 190 | } |
61ae935a MC |
191 | } |
192 | break; | |
193 | ||
194 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
195 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
196 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
197 | return 1; | |
198 | } | |
199 | break; | |
200 | ||
201 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
202 | /* | |
203 | * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have | |
204 | * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| | |
205 | * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is | |
206 | * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in | |
a71a4966 | 207 | * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be |
61ae935a MC |
208 | * set. |
209 | */ | |
a71a4966 | 210 | if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { |
61ae935a MC |
211 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
212 | /* | |
213 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH | |
214 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is | |
215 | * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses | |
216 | * its key from the certificate for key exchange. | |
217 | */ | |
218 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
219 | return 1; | |
220 | } | |
221 | } else { | |
222 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
223 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
224 | return 1; | |
225 | } | |
226 | } | |
227 | break; | |
228 | ||
229 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
230 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
231 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
232 | return 1; | |
233 | } | |
234 | break; | |
235 | ||
236 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
237 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
aff8c126 | 238 | if (s->s3->npn_seen) { |
61ae935a MC |
239 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { |
240 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; | |
241 | return 1; | |
242 | } | |
243 | } else { | |
244 | #endif | |
245 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
246 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
247 | return 1; | |
248 | } | |
249 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
250 | } | |
251 | #endif | |
252 | break; | |
253 | ||
254 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
255 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
256 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
257 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
258 | return 1; | |
259 | } | |
260 | break; | |
261 | #endif | |
262 | ||
263 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
264 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
265 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
266 | return 1; | |
267 | } | |
268 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
269 | } |
270 | ||
5abeaf35 | 271 | err: |
61ae935a | 272 | /* No valid transition found */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
273 | SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
274 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, | |
275 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
61ae935a MC |
276 | return 0; |
277 | } | |
278 | ||
279 | /* | |
280 | * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? | |
281 | * | |
282 | * Valid return values are: | |
283 | * 1: Yes | |
284 | * 0: No | |
285 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 286 | static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
287 | { |
288 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
289 | ||
290 | /* | |
361a1191 | 291 | * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a |
61ae935a MC |
292 | * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For |
293 | * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if | |
294 | * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, | |
295 | * the server certificate contains the server's public key for | |
296 | * key exchange. | |
297 | */ | |
a230b26e | 298 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) |
61ae935a MC |
299 | /* |
300 | * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if | |
301 | * provided | |
302 | */ | |
303 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
304 | /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ | |
305 | || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) | |
306 | && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) | |
307 | /* For other PSK always send SKE */ | |
308 | || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) | |
309 | #endif | |
310 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
311 | /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ | |
312 | || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) | |
313 | #endif | |
a230b26e | 314 | ) { |
61ae935a MC |
315 | return 1; |
316 | } | |
317 | ||
318 | return 0; | |
319 | } | |
320 | ||
321 | /* | |
322 | * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? | |
323 | * | |
324 | * Valid return values are: | |
325 | * 1: Yes | |
326 | * 0: No | |
327 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 328 | static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
329 | { |
330 | if ( | |
331 | /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ | |
332 | s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER | |
333 | /* | |
334 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert | |
335 | * during re-negotiation: | |
336 | */ | |
a03a9dbe | 337 | && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 || |
61ae935a MC |
338 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) |
339 | /* | |
340 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see | |
341 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in | |
342 | * RFC 2246): | |
343 | */ | |
344 | && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) | |
a230b26e EK |
345 | /* |
346 | * ... except when the application insists on | |
347 | * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts | |
348 | * this for SSL 3) | |
349 | */ | |
61ae935a MC |
350 | || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
351 | /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ | |
352 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) | |
353 | /* | |
354 | * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests | |
355 | * are omitted | |
356 | */ | |
b7fa1f98 | 357 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { |
61ae935a MC |
358 | return 1; |
359 | } | |
360 | ||
361 | return 0; | |
362 | } | |
363 | ||
364 | /* | |
0f1e51ea MC |
365 | * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
366 | * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the | |
367 | * client. | |
0f1e51ea MC |
368 | */ |
369 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
370 | { | |
371 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
372 | ||
373 | /* | |
374 | * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated | |
375 | * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() | |
376 | */ | |
377 | ||
378 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
379 | default: | |
380 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
3ec8d113 MC |
381 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
382 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION, | |
383 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0f1e51ea MC |
384 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
385 | ||
44c04a2e MC |
386 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
387 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { | |
388 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
389 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
390 | } | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
391 | /* Try to read from the client instead */ |
392 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
44c04a2e | 393 | |
0f1e51ea | 394 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
7d061fce MC |
395 | if (s->hello_retry_request) |
396 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; | |
397 | else | |
398 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
399 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
400 | ||
7d061fce | 401 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: |
d4504fe5 MC |
402 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; |
403 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
7d061fce | 404 | |
0f1e51ea | 405 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
e46f2334 MC |
406 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; |
407 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
408 | ||
409 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
94ed2c67 | 410 | if (s->hit) |
92760c21 MC |
411 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
412 | else if (send_certificate_request(s)) | |
413 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
94ed2c67 | 414 | else |
0f1e51ea | 415 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
94ed2c67 | 416 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
417 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
418 | ||
0f1e51ea | 419 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
92760c21 | 420 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
0f1e51ea MC |
421 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
422 | ||
92760c21 | 423 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
424 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; |
425 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
426 | ||
427 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: | |
d805a57b | 428 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
429 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
430 | ||
431 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
f7e393be MC |
432 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; |
433 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
94ed2c67 | 434 | |
d7f8783f MC |
435 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
436 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
437 | ||
92760c21 | 438 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: |
30f05b19 MC |
439 | /* |
440 | * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're | |
441 | * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket | |
442 | * immediately. | |
443 | * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour | |
444 | * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the | |
445 | * session ticket? | |
446 | */ | |
447 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; | |
448 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
449 | ||
8cdc8c51 | 450 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: |
5bf47933 MC |
451 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { |
452 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
453 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
454 | } | |
455 | /* Fall through */ | |
456 | ||
44c04a2e | 457 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
30f05b19 | 458 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
0f1e51ea | 459 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
0f1e51ea MC |
460 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
461 | } | |
462 | } | |
463 | ||
464 | /* | |
465 | * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move | |
466 | * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. | |
61ae935a | 467 | */ |
8481f583 | 468 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 469 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 470 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 471 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
472 | /* |
473 | * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going | |
474 | * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later | |
475 | */ | |
476 | ||
f5ca0b04 | 477 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
478 | return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); |
479 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 480 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
481 | default: |
482 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
3ec8d113 MC |
483 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
484 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION, | |
485 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
486 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
487 | ||
0386aad1 MC |
488 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
489 | if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { | |
490 | /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ | |
491 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; | |
492 | st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; | |
493 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
494 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
495 | /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ |
496 | if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 497 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c7f47786 MC |
498 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
499 | } | |
0386aad1 MC |
500 | /* Fall through */ |
501 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 502 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
a230b26e | 503 | /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ |
e8aa8b6c | 504 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
61ae935a | 505 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
506 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
507 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
e8aa8b6c | 508 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a | 509 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
510 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
511 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified | |
a230b26e | 512 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) |
e8aa8b6c F |
513 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
514 | else | |
515 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
516 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 517 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
518 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
519 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 520 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
521 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
522 | if (s->hit) { | |
aff8c126 | 523 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) |
e8aa8b6c F |
524 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
525 | else | |
526 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
527 | } else { | |
528 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ | |
529 | /* normal PSK or SRP */ | |
530 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & | |
a230b26e | 531 | (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
532 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
533 | } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
61ae935a | 534 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; |
e8aa8b6c | 535 | } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { |
61ae935a | 536 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; |
e8aa8b6c F |
537 | } else { |
538 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
61ae935a | 539 | } |
e8aa8b6c F |
540 | } |
541 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 542 | |
e8aa8b6c | 543 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
aff8c126 | 544 | if (s->ext.status_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c | 545 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; |
61ae935a | 546 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
547 | } |
548 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 549 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
550 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
551 | if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
552 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; | |
61ae935a | 553 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
554 | } |
555 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 556 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
557 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
558 | if (send_certificate_request(s)) { | |
559 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
61ae935a | 560 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
561 | } |
562 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 563 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
564 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
565 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
566 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 567 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
568 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
569 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
570 | ||
571 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
572 | if (s->hit) { | |
61ae935a | 573 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
61ae935a | 574 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
aff8c126 | 575 | } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
576 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
577 | } else { | |
578 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
579 | } | |
580 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
581 | ||
582 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
583 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
584 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 585 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
586 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: |
587 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; | |
588 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
589 | ||
590 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
591 | if (s->hit) { | |
592 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
593 | } | |
594 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
e8aa8b6c | 595 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
596 | } |
597 | } | |
598 | ||
599 | /* | |
600 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
601 | * the server to the client. | |
602 | */ | |
8481f583 | 603 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 604 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 605 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 606 | |
e8aa8b6c | 607 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
608 | default: |
609 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
610 | break; | |
611 | ||
61ae935a MC |
612 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
613 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
614 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
f5c7f5df | 615 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
616 | break; |
617 | ||
618 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
619 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
620 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f5c7f5df | 621 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
622 | /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ |
623 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
624 | } | |
625 | break; | |
626 | ||
627 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
628 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
629 | /* | |
69687aa8 | 630 | * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and |
61ae935a MC |
631 | * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now |
632 | */ | |
633 | st->use_timer = 1; | |
634 | } | |
635 | break; | |
636 | ||
637 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
638 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
3ec8d113 MC |
639 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { |
640 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ | |
61ae935a | 641 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
3ec8d113 | 642 | } |
61ae935a MC |
643 | #endif |
644 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
645 | ||
646 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
30f05b19 MC |
647 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
648 | /* | |
649 | * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going | |
650 | * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off | |
651 | * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. | |
3ec8d113 MC |
652 | * |
653 | * Calls SSLfatal as required. | |
30f05b19 MC |
654 | */ |
655 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0); | |
656 | } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
61ae935a MC |
657 | /* |
658 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
659 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer | |
660 | */ | |
661 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
662 | } | |
663 | break; | |
664 | ||
665 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
666 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
667 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 668 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
61ae935a MC |
669 | return WORK_ERROR; |
670 | } | |
671 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
672 | /* | |
673 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
674 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have | |
675 | * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, | |
676 | * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. | |
677 | */ | |
678 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
679 | } | |
680 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
681 | ||
d7f8783f | 682 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
f7e393be MC |
683 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING) |
684 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
685 | /* Fall through */ | |
686 | ||
61ae935a | 687 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
3ec8d113 | 688 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ |
30f05b19 | 689 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
690 | } |
691 | ||
692 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
693 | } | |
694 | ||
695 | /* | |
696 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
697 | * server to the client. | |
698 | */ | |
8481f583 | 699 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 700 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 701 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a MC |
702 | |
703 | s->init_num = 0; | |
704 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 705 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
706 | default: |
707 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
708 | break; | |
709 | ||
7d061fce MC |
710 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: |
711 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
712 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
713 | break; | |
714 | ||
61ae935a MC |
715 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
716 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
717 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2c4a056f | 718 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 719 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c4a056f MC |
720 | return WORK_ERROR; |
721 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
722 | break; |
723 | ||
724 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
725 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
726 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
727 | /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ | |
2c4a056f | 728 | if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 729 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c4a056f MC |
730 | return WORK_ERROR; |
731 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
732 | /* |
733 | * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to | |
734 | * treat like it was the first packet | |
735 | */ | |
736 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
737 | break; | |
738 | ||
739 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
740 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
741 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
742 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
743 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
744 | ||
745 | /* | |
746 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no | |
747 | * SCTP used. | |
748 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
749 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
750 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
61ae935a MC |
751 | |
752 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
753 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
754 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
755 | 0) <= 0) { | |
3ec8d113 MC |
756 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
757 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK, | |
758 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
61ae935a MC |
759 | return WORK_ERROR; |
760 | } | |
761 | ||
762 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
763 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
764 | } | |
765 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
766 | /* |
767 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know | |
768 | * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted | |
769 | * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need | |
770 | * something clever in the record layer for this. | |
771 | */ | |
772 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
773 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
774 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3ec8d113 MC |
775 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { |
776 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe5e20fd | 777 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3ec8d113 | 778 | } |
fe5e20fd MC |
779 | |
780 | if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED | |
781 | && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3ec8d113 MC |
782 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
783 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe5e20fd | 784 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3ec8d113 | 785 | } |
92760c21 | 786 | } |
61ae935a MC |
787 | break; |
788 | ||
789 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
790 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
791 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { | |
792 | /* | |
793 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
794 | * no SCTP used. | |
795 | */ | |
796 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
797 | 0, NULL); | |
798 | } | |
799 | #endif | |
800 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
a230b26e EK |
801 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
802 | { | |
f63a17d6 | 803 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
61ae935a MC |
804 | return WORK_ERROR; |
805 | } | |
806 | ||
807 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
808 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
809 | break; | |
810 | ||
811 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
812 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
813 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
814 | break; | |
815 | ||
816 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
817 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
818 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
819 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
820 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
821 | /* | |
822 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
823 | * no SCTP used. | |
824 | */ | |
825 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
826 | 0, NULL); | |
827 | } | |
828 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
829 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
830 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 831 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 MC |
832 | &s->session->master_key_length) |
833 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
834 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) | |
f63a17d6 | 835 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
92760c21 MC |
836 | return WORK_ERROR; |
837 | } | |
61ae935a | 838 | break; |
30f05b19 | 839 | |
44c04a2e | 840 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
57389a32 MC |
841 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) |
842 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
3ec8d113 MC |
843 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { |
844 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
57389a32 | 845 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3ec8d113 | 846 | } |
57389a32 MC |
847 | break; |
848 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
849 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
850 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
851 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
852 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
853 | } |
854 | ||
855 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
856 | } | |
857 | ||
858 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
859 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
860 | * server | |
61ae935a MC |
861 | * |
862 | * Valid return values are: | |
863 | * 1: Success | |
864 | * 0: Error | |
865 | */ | |
6392fb8e | 866 | int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
a15c953f | 867 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 868 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 869 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 870 | |
4a01c59f MC |
871 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
872 | default: | |
873 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
874 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
875 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, | |
876 | SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); | |
4a01c59f MC |
877 | return 0; |
878 | ||
879 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
5923ad4b | 880 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 881 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 882 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
883 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
884 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f | 885 | break; |
f3b3d7f0 | 886 | |
4a01c59f | 887 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
6392fb8e MC |
888 | *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; |
889 | *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 890 | break; |
61ae935a | 891 | |
4a01c59f MC |
892 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
893 | /* No construction function needed */ | |
6392fb8e MC |
894 | *confunc = NULL; |
895 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 896 | break; |
61ae935a | 897 | |
4a01c59f | 898 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
6392fb8e MC |
899 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; |
900 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f | 901 | break; |
61ae935a | 902 | |
4a01c59f | 903 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
904 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; |
905 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f | 906 | break; |
61ae935a | 907 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
908 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: |
909 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; | |
910 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; | |
911 | break; | |
912 | ||
913 | ||
4a01c59f | 914 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
6392fb8e MC |
915 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; |
916 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f | 917 | break; |
61ae935a | 918 | |
4a01c59f | 919 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
6392fb8e MC |
920 | *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; |
921 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 922 | break; |
61ae935a | 923 | |
4a01c59f | 924 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
6392fb8e MC |
925 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; |
926 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
4a01c59f | 927 | break; |
61ae935a | 928 | |
4a01c59f | 929 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
6392fb8e MC |
930 | *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; |
931 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; | |
4a01c59f | 932 | break; |
61ae935a | 933 | |
4a01c59f | 934 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
6392fb8e MC |
935 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; |
936 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; | |
4a01c59f | 937 | break; |
61ae935a | 938 | |
4a01c59f | 939 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
940 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
941 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 942 | break; |
e46f2334 | 943 | |
f7e393be MC |
944 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
945 | *confunc = NULL; | |
946 | *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; | |
947 | break; | |
948 | ||
e46f2334 MC |
949 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: |
950 | *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; | |
951 | *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
952 | break; | |
7d061fce MC |
953 | |
954 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: | |
955 | *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request; | |
956 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; | |
957 | break; | |
44c04a2e MC |
958 | |
959 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
960 | *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; | |
961 | *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; | |
962 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 963 | } |
61ae935a | 964 | |
5923ad4b | 965 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
966 | } |
967 | ||
8a18bc25 AG |
968 | /* |
969 | * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, | |
970 | * calculated as follows: | |
971 | * | |
972 | * 2 + # client_version | |
973 | * 32 + # only valid length for random | |
974 | * 1 + # length of session_id | |
975 | * 32 + # maximum size for session_id | |
976 | * 2 + # length of cipher suites | |
977 | * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array | |
978 | * 1 + # length of compression_methods | |
979 | * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods | |
980 | * 2 + # length of extensions | |
981 | * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions | |
982 | */ | |
983 | #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 | |
984 | ||
61ae935a MC |
985 | #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 |
986 | #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 | |
987 | ||
988 | /* | |
989 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
990 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
991 | */ | |
eda75751 | 992 | size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 993 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 994 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 995 | |
e8aa8b6c | 996 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
997 | default: |
998 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
999 | return 0; | |
1000 | ||
61ae935a | 1001 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
8a18bc25 | 1002 | return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; |
61ae935a | 1003 | |
ef6c191b MC |
1004 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
1005 | return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1006 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1007 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: |
1008 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
1009 | ||
1010 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1011 | return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1012 | ||
1013 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1014 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
1015 | ||
1016 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1017 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1018 | return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1019 | #endif | |
1020 | ||
1021 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1022 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1023 | ||
1024 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1025 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1026 | |
1027 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1028 | return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1029 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1030 | } |
1031 | ||
1032 | /* | |
1033 | * Process a message that the server has received from the client. | |
1034 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1035 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
61ae935a | 1036 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1037 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1038 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1039 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1040 | default: |
1041 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
3ec8d113 MC |
1042 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1043 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE, | |
1044 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1045 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
1046 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1047 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1048 | return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); | |
1049 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
1050 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
1051 | return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt); | |
1052 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1053 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: |
1054 | return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); | |
1055 | ||
1056 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1057 | return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
1058 | ||
1059 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1060 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
1061 | ||
1062 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1063 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1064 | return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); | |
1065 | #endif | |
1066 | ||
1067 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1068 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
1069 | ||
1070 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1071 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1072 | |
1073 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1074 | return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); | |
1075 | ||
61ae935a | 1076 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1077 | } |
1078 | ||
1079 | /* | |
1080 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
1081 | * from the client | |
1082 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1083 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 1084 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1085 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1086 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1087 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1088 | default: |
1089 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
3ec8d113 MC |
1090 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1091 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, | |
1092 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1093 | return WORK_ERROR; |
1094 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1095 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1096 | return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); | |
1097 | ||
1098 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1099 | return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); | |
61ae935a | 1100 | } |
92760c21 | 1101 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
1102 | } |
1103 | ||
edc032b5 | 1104 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1105 | /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */ |
1106 | static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s) | |
0f113f3e | 1107 | { |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1108 | int ret; |
1109 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1110 | |
1111 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && | |
1112 | (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { | |
1113 | if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { | |
1114 | /* | |
1115 | * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp | |
1116 | * login name | |
1117 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1118 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, |
1119 | SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, | |
1120 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
1121 | return -1; | |
0f113f3e | 1122 | } else { |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1123 | ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al); |
1124 | if (ret < 0) | |
1125 | return 0; | |
1126 | if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { | |
1127 | SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, | |
1128 | al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY | |
1129 | ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND | |
1130 | : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
1131 | return -1; | |
1132 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1133 | } |
1134 | } | |
29bfd5b7 | 1135 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1136 | } |
edc032b5 BL |
1137 | #endif |
1138 | ||
c536b6be | 1139 | int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, |
cb150cbc | 1140 | size_t cookie_len) |
8ba708e5 | 1141 | { |
8ba708e5 | 1142 | /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ |
c536b6be MC |
1143 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) |
1144 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) | |
1145 | return 0; | |
8ba708e5 | 1146 | |
c536b6be | 1147 | return 1; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1148 | } |
1149 | ||
7cea05dc | 1150 | int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1151 | { |
cb150cbc | 1152 | unsigned int cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1153 | if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || |
1154 | s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, | |
cb150cbc MC |
1155 | &cookie_leni) == 0 || |
1156 | cookie_leni > 255) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1157 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, |
1158 | SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1159 | return 0; |
1160 | } | |
cb150cbc | 1161 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 | 1162 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1163 | if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
1164 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1165 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, |
1166 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
c536b6be MC |
1167 | return 0; |
1168 | } | |
8ba708e5 | 1169 | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1170 | return 1; |
1171 | } | |
1172 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1173 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1174 | /*- | |
1175 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
1176 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. | |
1177 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: | |
1178 | * SNI, | |
1179 | * elliptic_curves | |
1180 | * ec_point_formats | |
33564cb7 | 1181 | * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only) |
805a2e9e MC |
1182 | * |
1183 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
1184 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
1185 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
1186 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
1187 | */ | |
1188 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) | |
1189 | { | |
805a2e9e MC |
1190 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { |
1191 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
1192 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
1193 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
1194 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
1195 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
1196 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
1197 | ||
1198 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
1199 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
1200 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
1201 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
1202 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ | |
1203 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ | |
1204 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
1205 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
1206 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
1207 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
1208 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
1209 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
1210 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
1211 | }; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1212 | /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ |
1213 | static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; | |
1266eefd MC |
1214 | unsigned int type; |
1215 | PACKET sni, tmppkt; | |
1216 | size_t ext_len; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1217 | |
1218 | tmppkt = hello->extensions; | |
1219 | ||
1220 | if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) | |
1221 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) | |
1222 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { | |
1223 | return; | |
6b473aca MC |
1224 | } |
1225 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1226 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
1227 | return; | |
1228 | ||
1229 | ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? | |
1230 | sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; | |
1231 | ||
1232 | s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, | |
1233 | ext_len); | |
6b473aca | 1234 | } |
805a2e9e | 1235 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
6b473aca | 1236 | |
be3583fa | 1237 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 1238 | { |
e27f234a | 1239 | /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ |
1ab3836b | 1240 | PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; |
6e3ff632 | 1241 | static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; |
6b1bb98f | 1242 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello; |
e27f234a | 1243 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1244 | clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); |
1245 | if (clienthello == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1246 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1247 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1248 | goto err; |
1249 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
1250 | /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ |
1251 | if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { | |
db0f35dd TS |
1252 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { |
1253 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
1254 | goto err; | |
1255 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
1256 | s->renegotiate = 1; |
1257 | s->new_session = 1; | |
1258 | } | |
1259 | ||
1ab3836b | 1260 | /* |
b1b4b543 | 1261 | * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. |
1ab3836b | 1262 | */ |
6b1bb98f | 1263 | clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); |
bbafa47b | 1264 | PACKET_null_init(&cookie); |
1ab3836b | 1265 | |
6b1bb98f | 1266 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
9ceb2426 | 1267 | unsigned int mt; |
b1b4b543 | 1268 | |
7d061fce | 1269 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1270 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1271 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
1272 | goto err; | |
7d061fce MC |
1273 | } |
1274 | ||
32ec4153 MC |
1275 | /*- |
1276 | * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 | |
1277 | * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS | |
1278 | * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes | |
1279 | * the rest right through. Its format is: | |
1280 | * Byte Content | |
1281 | * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer | |
1282 | * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here | |
1283 | * 3-4 version | |
1284 | * 5-6 cipher_spec_length | |
1285 | * 7-8 session_id_length | |
1286 | * 9-10 challenge_length | |
1287 | * ... ... | |
1288 | */ | |
1289 | ||
73999b62 | 1290 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) |
a230b26e | 1291 | || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1292 | /* |
1293 | * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record | |
1294 | * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record | |
1295 | * in the first place | |
1296 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1297 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1298 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d45ba43d | 1299 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1300 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1301 | } |
1302 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1303 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1304 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1305 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1ab3836b | 1306 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1307 | } |
1308 | ||
b3e2272c | 1309 | /* Parse the message and load client random. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1310 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1311 | /* |
1312 | * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello | |
1313 | * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. | |
e2994cf0 | 1314 | * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. |
32ec4153 | 1315 | */ |
1ab3836b | 1316 | unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; |
b3e2272c | 1317 | PACKET challenge; |
0f113f3e | 1318 | |
1ab3836b | 1319 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) |
a230b26e EK |
1320 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) |
1321 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1322 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1323 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1324 | goto err; | |
5e9f0eeb | 1325 | } |
0f113f3e | 1326 | |
293b5ca4 | 1327 | if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1328 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1329 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1330 | goto err; | |
293b5ca4 AG |
1331 | } |
1332 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1333 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
1ab3836b | 1334 | ciphersuite_len) |
6b1bb98f | 1335 | || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) |
73999b62 | 1336 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) |
b3e2272c | 1337 | /* No extensions. */ |
73999b62 | 1338 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1339 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1340 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1341 | goto err; | |
9ceb2426 | 1342 | } |
6b1bb98f | 1343 | clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; |
9ceb2426 | 1344 | |
fba7b84c | 1345 | /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
6b1bb98f | 1346 | * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit |
fba7b84c | 1347 | * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if |
6b1bb98f | 1348 | * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. |
fba7b84c MC |
1349 | */ |
1350 | challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1351 | ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; | |
6b1bb98f | 1352 | memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
b3e2272c | 1353 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, |
6b1bb98f | 1354 | clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - |
cb21df32 DB |
1355 | challenge_len, challenge_len) |
1356 | /* Advertise only null compression. */ | |
1357 | || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1358 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1359 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1360 | goto err; | |
9ceb2426 | 1361 | } |
b3e2272c | 1362 | |
6b1bb98f | 1363 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
0f113f3e | 1364 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1365 | /* Regular ClientHello. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1366 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) |
e2994cf0 | 1367 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) |
6b1bb98f | 1368 | || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, |
e2994cf0 | 1369 | SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1370 | &clienthello->session_id_len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1371 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1372 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1373 | goto err; | |
9ceb2426 | 1374 | } |
32ec4153 | 1375 | |
b3e2272c | 1376 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 1377 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1378 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1379 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1380 | goto err; | |
32ec4153 | 1381 | } |
6b1bb98f | 1382 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1ab3836b | 1383 | DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1384 | &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1385 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1386 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1387 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b | 1388 | } |
b3e2272c EK |
1389 | /* |
1390 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, | |
1391 | * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. | |
1392 | * So check cookie length... | |
1393 | */ | |
1394 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1395 | if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) |
eb5fd03b | 1396 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
b3e2272c | 1397 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1398 | } |
0f113f3e | 1399 | |
6b1bb98f | 1400 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1401 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1402 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1403 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b MC |
1404 | } |
1405 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1406 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1407 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1408 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1409 | goto err; | |
b3e2272c | 1410 | } |
1ab3836b | 1411 | |
b3e2272c | 1412 | /* Could be empty. */ |
1ab3836b | 1413 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { |
6b1bb98f | 1414 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
1ab3836b | 1415 | } else { |
ef57a475 MC |
1416 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions) |
1417 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1418 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1419 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1420 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b MC |
1421 | } |
1422 | } | |
1423 | } | |
1424 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1425 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, |
e2994cf0 | 1426 | MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, |
6b1bb98f | 1427 | &clienthello->compressions_len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1428 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1429 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1430 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b MC |
1431 | } |
1432 | ||
b1b4b543 | 1433 | /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ |
6b1bb98f | 1434 | extensions = clienthello->extensions; |
fe874d27 | 1435 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f63a17d6 | 1436 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, |
735d5b59 | 1437 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1438 | /* SSLfatal already been called */ |
1439 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b | 1440 | } |
6b1bb98f | 1441 | s->clienthello = clienthello; |
1ab3836b | 1442 | |
6b1bb98f | 1443 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
6b1bb98f | 1444 | |
f63a17d6 | 1445 | err: |
fbaf2857 RS |
1446 | if (clienthello != NULL) |
1447 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1448 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello); |
1449 | ||
1450 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1451 | } | |
1452 | ||
f63a17d6 | 1453 | static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s) |
6b1bb98f BK |
1454 | { |
1455 | unsigned int j; | |
bf846a6d | 1456 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1457 | int protverr; |
1458 | size_t loop; | |
1459 | unsigned long id; | |
1460 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1461 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; | |
1462 | #endif | |
1463 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
1464 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; | |
1465 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; | |
1466 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; | |
f7f2a01d | 1467 | DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
6b1bb98f | 1468 | |
1ab3836b | 1469 | /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ |
a9c0d8be DB |
1470 | /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */ |
1471 | if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) { | |
a9c0d8be | 1472 | /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */ |
f1b97da1 DB |
1473 | switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) { |
1474 | case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS: | |
1475 | break; | |
1476 | case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY: | |
a9c0d8be | 1477 | s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB; |
f1b97da1 DB |
1478 | return -1; |
1479 | case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR: | |
1480 | default: | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1481 | SSLfatal(s, al, |
1482 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1483 | SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); | |
f1b97da1 | 1484 | goto err; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1485 | } |
1486 | } | |
1ab3836b MC |
1487 | |
1488 | /* Set up the client_random */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1489 | memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
1ab3836b MC |
1490 | |
1491 | /* Choose the version */ | |
1492 | ||
6b1bb98f BK |
1493 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
1494 | if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION | |
1495 | || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) | |
b1b4b543 MC |
1496 | != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { |
1497 | /* | |
f63a17d6 | 1498 | * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't |
b1b4b543 MC |
1499 | * support it. |
1500 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1501 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1502 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1503 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); | |
1ab3836b MC |
1504 | goto err; |
1505 | } | |
b1b4b543 | 1506 | /* SSLv3/TLS */ |
6b1bb98f | 1507 | s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1508 | } |
1509 | /* | |
1510 | * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check | |
1511 | * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. | |
1512 | */ | |
1513 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1514 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); |
1ab3836b | 1515 | } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && |
6b1bb98f | 1516 | DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1517 | protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; |
1518 | } else { | |
1519 | protverr = 0; | |
1520 | } | |
1521 | ||
1522 | if (protverr) { | |
7d061fce | 1523 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
b1b4b543 | 1524 | /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ |
6b1bb98f | 1525 | s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b | 1526 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
1527 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1528 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); | |
6b1bb98f | 1529 | goto err; |
b3e2272c EK |
1530 | } |
1531 | ||
635b7d3f | 1532 | /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */ |
9e0ac6a2 | 1533 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1534 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1535 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1536 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
9e0ac6a2 MC |
1537 | goto err; |
1538 | } | |
1539 | ||
1ed65871 DB |
1540 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1541 | /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ | |
1542 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1543 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1544 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1545 | clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1546 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1547 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1548 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
6b1bb98f | 1549 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1550 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */ |
1551 | } | |
a230b26e | 1552 | /* default verification */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1553 | } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len |
1554 | || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, | |
1ab3836b | 1555 | s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1556 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1557 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1558 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
6b1bb98f | 1559 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1560 | } |
1561 | s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; | |
1562 | } | |
1563 | if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1564 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); |
1ed65871 | 1565 | if (protverr != 0) { |
1ed65871 | 1566 | s->version = s->client_version; |
f63a17d6 MC |
1567 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1568 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); | |
6b1bb98f | 1569 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1570 | } |
1571 | } | |
1572 | } | |
1573 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1574 | s->hit = 0; |
1575 | ||
0de6d66d | 1576 | if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
f63a17d6 | 1577 | clienthello->isv2) || |
0de6d66d | 1578 | !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, |
dd5a4279 | 1579 | clienthello->isv2, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 | 1580 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
0de6d66d MC |
1581 | goto err; |
1582 | } | |
1583 | ||
1584 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; | |
1585 | /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ | |
1586 | if (scsvs != NULL) { | |
1587 | for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { | |
1588 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); | |
1589 | if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { | |
1590 | if (s->renegotiate) { | |
1591 | /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1592 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1593 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1594 | SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); | |
0de6d66d MC |
1595 | goto err; |
1596 | } | |
1597 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
1598 | } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && | |
1599 | !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { | |
1600 | /* | |
1601 | * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried | |
1602 | * a higher version. We should fail if the current version | |
1603 | * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first | |
1604 | * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger | |
1605 | * an insecure downgrade. | |
1606 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1607 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, |
1608 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1609 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
0de6d66d MC |
1610 | goto err; |
1611 | } | |
1612 | } | |
1613 | } | |
1614 | ||
1615 | /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */ | |
1616 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1617 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = | |
1618 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
1619 | ||
1620 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1621 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1622 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1623 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
0de6d66d MC |
1624 | goto err; |
1625 | } | |
abeb2a63 MC |
1626 | if (s->hello_retry_request |
1627 | && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL | |
1628 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) { | |
0de6d66d MC |
1629 | /* |
1630 | * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we | |
1631 | * just selected. Something must have changed. | |
1632 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1633 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1634 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1635 | SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); | |
0de6d66d MC |
1636 | goto err; |
1637 | } | |
1638 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; | |
1639 | } | |
1640 | ||
1ab3836b | 1641 | /* We need to do this before getting the session */ |
70af3d8e | 1642 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, |
fe874d27 | 1643 | SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1644 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) { |
1645 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1646 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
1647 | } |
1648 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1649 | /* |
1650 | * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. | |
1651 | * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. | |
1652 | * | |
1653 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in | |
1654 | * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally | |
1655 | * ignore resumption requests with flag | |
1656 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather | |
1657 | * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on | |
1658 | * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). | |
1659 | * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to | |
1660 | * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains | |
1661 | * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the | |
1662 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be | |
1663 | * ignored. | |
1664 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1665 | if (clienthello->isv2 || |
b3e2272c EK |
1666 | (s->new_session && |
1667 | (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1668 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { |
1669 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b3e2272c | 1670 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 1671 | } |
b3e2272c | 1672 | } else { |
f63a17d6 | 1673 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello); |
128ae276 | 1674 | if (i == 1) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1675 | /* previous session */ |
1676 | s->hit = 1; | |
1677 | } else if (i == -1) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1678 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
6b1bb98f | 1679 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1680 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1681 | /* i == 0 */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1682 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { |
1683 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
32ec4153 | 1684 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 1685 | } |
0f113f3e | 1686 | } |
b3e2272c | 1687 | } |
0f113f3e | 1688 | |
a5816a5a MC |
1689 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1690 | memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id, | |
1691 | s->clienthello->session_id_len); | |
1692 | s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len; | |
1693 | } | |
1694 | ||
a055a881 | 1695 | /* |
0de6d66d MC |
1696 | * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check |
1697 | * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption. | |
a055a881 MC |
1698 | */ |
1699 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) { | |
b3e2272c EK |
1700 | j = 0; |
1701 | id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
d02b48c6 | 1702 | |
413c4f45 | 1703 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
a230b26e | 1704 | fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); |
413c4f45 | 1705 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1706 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
1707 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
413c4f45 | 1708 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
b3e2272c EK |
1709 | fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", |
1710 | i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); | |
88f2a4cf | 1711 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1712 | if (c->id == id) { |
1713 | j = 1; | |
1714 | break; | |
32ec4153 | 1715 | } |
0f113f3e | 1716 | } |
b3e2272c | 1717 | if (j == 0) { |
ec30e856 | 1718 | /* |
b3e2272c EK |
1719 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked |
1720 | * to reuse it | |
ec30e856 | 1721 | */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1722 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1723 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1724 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); | |
6b1bb98f | 1725 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1726 | } |
b3e2272c | 1727 | } |
9ceb2426 | 1728 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1729 | for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { |
1730 | if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) | |
b3e2272c | 1731 | break; |
0f113f3e | 1732 | } |
32ec4153 | 1733 | |
6b1bb98f | 1734 | if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
b3e2272c | 1735 | /* no compress */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1736 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
1737 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1738 | SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); | |
6b1bb98f | 1739 | goto err; |
b3e2272c | 1740 | } |
f100b031 | 1741 | |
805a2e9e MC |
1742 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1743 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) | |
6b1bb98f | 1744 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); |
805a2e9e MC |
1745 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
1746 | ||
0f113f3e | 1747 | /* TLS extensions */ |
fe874d27 | 1748 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1749 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
1750 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1751 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1752 | } |
1753 | ||
1754 | /* | |
1755 | * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake | |
1756 | * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before | |
1757 | * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket | |
1758 | * processing to use it in key derivation. | |
1759 | */ | |
1760 | { | |
1761 | unsigned char *pos; | |
1762 | pos = s->s3->server_random; | |
f7f2a01d | 1763 | if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1764 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1765 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1766 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
6b1bb98f | 1767 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1768 | } |
1769 | } | |
1770 | ||
0de6d66d MC |
1771 | if (!s->hit |
1772 | && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION | |
1773 | && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1774 | && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1775 | && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { | |
4a640fb6 | 1776 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; |
8c1a5343 MC |
1777 | /* |
1778 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1779 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1780 | */ | |
1781 | int master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e | 1782 | |
8c1a5343 | 1783 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
aff8c126 | 1784 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, |
8c1a5343 | 1785 | &master_key_length, ciphers, |
0f113f3e | 1786 | &pref_cipher, |
aff8c126 | 1787 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) |
8c1a5343 MC |
1788 | && master_key_length > 0) { |
1789 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1790 | s->hit = 1; |
1791 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; | |
1792 | s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | |
1793 | ||
1794 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1795 | ||
1796 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ | |
3f4bf115 DSH |
1797 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) |
1798 | pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, | |
1799 | SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
0f113f3e | 1800 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1801 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1802 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1803 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
6b1bb98f | 1804 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1805 | } |
1806 | ||
1807 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; | |
25aaa98a | 1808 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); |
0f113f3e | 1809 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
25aaa98a | 1810 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
0f113f3e MC |
1811 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
1812 | } | |
1813 | } | |
58ece833 | 1814 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1815 | /* |
1816 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other | |
b2ce0337 | 1817 | * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression |
0f113f3e MC |
1818 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q. |
1819 | */ | |
1820 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; | |
1fe35494 MC |
1821 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1822 | /* | |
1823 | * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in | |
1824 | * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in | |
1825 | * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello. | |
1826 | */ | |
1827 | if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1828 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1829 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1830 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
1fe35494 MC |
1831 | goto err; |
1832 | } | |
1833 | } | |
09b6c2ef | 1834 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e | 1835 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ |
1fe35494 | 1836 | else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 1837 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; |
9ceb2426 | 1838 | unsigned int k; |
0f113f3e MC |
1839 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ |
1840 | /* Can't disable compression */ | |
1841 | if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1842 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1843 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1844 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); | |
6b1bb98f | 1845 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1846 | } |
1847 | /* Look for resumed compression method */ | |
1848 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { | |
1849 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1850 | if (comp_id == comp->id) { | |
1851 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1852 | break; | |
1853 | } | |
1854 | } | |
1855 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1856 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1857 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1858 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
6b1bb98f | 1859 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1860 | } |
1861 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1862 | for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { |
1863 | if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1864 | break; |
1865 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1866 | if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1867 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1868 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1869 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); | |
6b1bb98f | 1870 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1871 | } |
c19602b5 | 1872 | } else if (s->hit) { |
0f113f3e | 1873 | comp = NULL; |
1fe35494 | 1874 | } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { |
df6741c9 | 1875 | /* See if we have a match */ |
9ceb2426 MC |
1876 | int m, nn, v, done = 0; |
1877 | unsigned int o; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1878 | |
1879 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1880 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { | |
1881 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1882 | v = comp->id; | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1883 | for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { |
1884 | if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1885 | done = 1; |
1886 | break; | |
1887 | } | |
1888 | } | |
1889 | if (done) | |
1890 | break; | |
1891 | } | |
1892 | if (done) | |
1893 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1894 | else | |
1895 | comp = NULL; | |
1896 | } | |
e6f418bc | 1897 | #else |
0f113f3e MC |
1898 | /* |
1899 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1900 | * using compression. | |
1901 | */ | |
1902 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1903 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1904 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1905 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); | |
6b1bb98f | 1906 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1907 | } |
09b6c2ef | 1908 | #endif |
413c4f45 | 1909 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1910 | /* |
1911 | * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher | |
1912 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 1913 | |
a055a881 | 1914 | if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
25aaa98a | 1915 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); |
0f113f3e MC |
1916 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; |
1917 | if (ciphers == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1918 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1919 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1920 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
6b1bb98f | 1921 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1922 | } |
1923 | ciphers = NULL; | |
69b2d393 MC |
1924 | } |
1925 | ||
1926 | if (!s->hit) { | |
1927 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1928 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; | |
1929 | #else | |
1930 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; | |
1931 | #endif | |
0f113f3e | 1932 | if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 1933 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
0f113f3e MC |
1934 | goto err; |
1935 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
1936 | } |
1937 | ||
1938 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1939 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
1940 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1941 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
1942 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
1943 | return 1; | |
e27f234a | 1944 | err: |
e27f234a | 1945 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); |
6b1bb98f BK |
1946 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
1947 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1948 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
1949 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 1950 | |
6b1bb98f | 1951 | return 0; |
e27f234a MC |
1952 | } |
1953 | ||
24b8e4b2 MC |
1954 | /* |
1955 | * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
f63a17d6 | 1956 | * Upon failure, returns 0. |
24b8e4b2 | 1957 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 1958 | static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s) |
24b8e4b2 | 1959 | { |
aff8c126 | 1960 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1961 | |
1962 | /* | |
1963 | * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be | |
1964 | * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, | |
1965 | * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may | |
1966 | * influence which certificate is sent | |
1967 | */ | |
aff8c126 RS |
1968 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL |
1969 | && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { | |
24b8e4b2 | 1970 | int ret; |
1266eefd | 1971 | |
24b8e4b2 | 1972 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ |
a497cf25 | 1973 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) { |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1974 | /* |
1975 | * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate | |
1976 | * et al can pick it up. | |
1977 | */ | |
a497cf25 | 1978 | s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert; |
aff8c126 | 1979 | ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1980 | switch (ret) { |
1981 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | |
1982 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
aff8c126 | 1983 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1984 | break; |
1985 | /* status request response should be sent */ | |
1986 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | |
aff8c126 RS |
1987 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) |
1988 | s->ext.status_expected = 1; | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1989 | break; |
1990 | /* something bad happened */ | |
1991 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
1992 | default: | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1993 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1994 | SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST, | |
1995 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1996 | return 0; |
1997 | } | |
1998 | } | |
1999 | } | |
2000 | ||
2001 | return 1; | |
2002 | } | |
2003 | ||
5626f634 BK |
2004 | /* |
2005 | * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
29bfd5b7 | 2006 | * Upon failure, returns 0. |
5626f634 | 2007 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 2008 | int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s) |
5626f634 BK |
2009 | { |
2010 | const unsigned char *selected = NULL; | |
2011 | unsigned char selected_len = 0; | |
2012 | ||
2013 | if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) { | |
2014 | int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, | |
2015 | s->s3->alpn_proposed, | |
2016 | (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len, | |
2017 | s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg); | |
2018 | ||
2019 | if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
2020 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); | |
2021 | s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); | |
2022 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2023 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, |
2024 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5626f634 BK |
2025 | return 0; |
2026 | } | |
2027 | s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; | |
2028 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
2029 | /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ | |
2030 | s->s3->npn_seen = 0; | |
2031 | #endif | |
630369d9 | 2032 | |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2033 | /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ |
2034 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL | |
630369d9 MC |
2035 | || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len |
2036 | || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected, | |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2037 | selected_len) != 0) { |
2038 | /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ | |
630369d9 MC |
2039 | s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; |
2040 | ||
4be3a7c7 MC |
2041 | if (!s->hit) { |
2042 | /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */ | |
2043 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, | |
2044 | selected_len); | |
2045 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2046 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2047 | SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, | |
2048 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2049 | return 0; |
2050 | } | |
2051 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; | |
2052 | } | |
2053 | } | |
2054 | ||
5626f634 | 2055 | return 1; |
630369d9 | 2056 | } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2057 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, |
2058 | SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); | |
5626f634 BK |
2059 | return 0; |
2060 | } | |
630369d9 MC |
2061 | /* |
2062 | * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was | |
2063 | * present. | |
2064 | */ | |
5626f634 BK |
2065 | } |
2066 | ||
4be3a7c7 MC |
2067 | /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ |
2068 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { | |
2069 | /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ | |
630369d9 | 2070 | s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; |
4be3a7c7 | 2071 | } |
630369d9 | 2072 | |
5626f634 BK |
2073 | return 1; |
2074 | } | |
2075 | ||
be3583fa | 2076 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
e27f234a | 2077 | { |
4a640fb6 | 2078 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
e27f234a MC |
2079 | |
2080 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2081 | int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s); |
6b1bb98f | 2082 | if (rv == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2083 | /* SSLfatal() was already called */ |
2084 | goto err; | |
6b1bb98f BK |
2085 | } |
2086 | if (rv < 0) | |
2087 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2088 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; | |
2089 | } | |
2090 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { | |
a055a881 | 2091 | if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
e27f234a | 2092 | /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ |
0de6d66d | 2093 | if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2094 | int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); |
2095 | if (rv == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2096 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2097 | SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
2098 | SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); | |
2099 | goto err; | |
e27f234a MC |
2100 | } |
2101 | if (rv < 0) { | |
2102 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
6b1bb98f | 2103 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
e27f234a MC |
2104 | } |
2105 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
0f113f3e | 2106 | } |
e27f234a | 2107 | |
0de6d66d MC |
2108 | /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */ |
2109 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2110 | cipher = | |
2111 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
2112 | ||
2113 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2114 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
2115 | SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
2116 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
2117 | goto err; | |
0de6d66d MC |
2118 | } |
2119 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; | |
11c67eea | 2120 | } |
69b2d393 | 2121 | if (!s->hit) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2122 | if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) { |
2123 | /* SSLfatal already called */ | |
2124 | goto err; | |
2125 | } | |
69b2d393 MC |
2126 | /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ |
2127 | if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) | |
2128 | s->session->not_resumable = | |
8acc2799 MC |
2129 | s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, |
2130 | ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey | |
2131 | & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); | |
69b2d393 MC |
2132 | if (s->session->not_resumable) |
2133 | /* do not send a session ticket */ | |
2134 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; | |
2135 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2136 | } else { |
2137 | /* Session-id reuse */ | |
2138 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; | |
0f113f3e | 2139 | } |
0f113f3e | 2140 | |
e27f234a MC |
2141 | /*- |
2142 | * we now have the following setup. | |
2143 | * client_random | |
60250017 | 2144 | * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers |
2145 | * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers | |
e27f234a MC |
2146 | * compression - basically ignored right now |
2147 | * ssl version is set - sslv3 | |
2148 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. | |
2149 | * s->hit - session reuse flag | |
2150 | * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. | |
2151 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 2152 | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2153 | /* |
2154 | * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the | |
2155 | * certificate callbacks etc above. | |
2156 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2157 | if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) { |
2158 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2159 | goto err; | |
e27f234a | 2160 | } |
5626f634 BK |
2161 | /* |
2162 | * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and | |
630369d9 MC |
2163 | * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3 |
2164 | * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and | |
2165 | * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data. | |
5626f634 | 2166 | */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2167 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) { |
2168 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2169 | goto err; | |
5626f634 | 2170 | } |
0f113f3e | 2171 | |
6b1bb98f | 2172 | wst = WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a MC |
2173 | } |
2174 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
6b1bb98f | 2175 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { |
e27f234a | 2176 | int ret; |
29bfd5b7 | 2177 | if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) { |
e27f234a MC |
2178 | /* |
2179 | * callback indicates further work to be done | |
2180 | */ | |
2181 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
6b1bb98f | 2182 | return WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a | 2183 | } |
29bfd5b7 MC |
2184 | if (ret < 0) { |
2185 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2186 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2187 | } |
2188 | } | |
e27f234a | 2189 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 2190 | |
e27f234a | 2191 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
f63a17d6 | 2192 | err: |
e27f234a MC |
2193 | return WORK_ERROR; |
2194 | } | |
2195 | ||
7cea05dc | 2196 | int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2197 | { |
f63a17d6 | 2198 | int compm; |
ec60ccc1 | 2199 | size_t sl, len; |
f2342b7a | 2200 | int version; |
a5816a5a | 2201 | unsigned char *session_id; |
0f113f3e | 2202 | |
88050dd1 | 2203 | version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version; |
f2342b7a | 2204 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) |
8157d44b MC |
2205 | /* |
2206 | * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in | |
2207 | * tls_process_client_hello() | |
2208 | */ | |
7cea05dc | 2209 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2210 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, |
2211 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2212 | return 0; | |
8157d44b | 2213 | } |
0f113f3e | 2214 | |
e27f234a MC |
2215 | /*- |
2216 | * There are several cases for the session ID to send | |
2217 | * back in the server hello: | |
2218 | * - For session reuse from the session cache, | |
2219 | * we send back the old session ID. | |
2220 | * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) | |
2221 | * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" | |
2222 | * (which doesn't actually identify the session). | |
2223 | * - If it is a new session, we send back the new | |
2224 | * session ID. | |
2225 | * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, | |
2226 | * we send back a 0-length session ID. | |
a5816a5a MC |
2227 | * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client |
2228 | * regardless | |
e27f234a MC |
2229 | * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, |
2230 | * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed | |
2231 | * to send back. | |
2232 | */ | |
2233 | if (s->session->not_resumable || | |
2234 | (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) | |
2235 | && !s->hit)) | |
2236 | s->session->session_id_length = 0; | |
2237 | ||
a5816a5a MC |
2238 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
2239 | sl = s->tmp_session_id_len; | |
2240 | session_id = s->tmp_session_id; | |
2241 | } else { | |
2242 | sl = s->session->session_id_length; | |
2243 | session_id = s->session->session_id; | |
2244 | } | |
2245 | ||
ec60ccc1 | 2246 | if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2247 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, |
2248 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2249 | return 0; | |
e27f234a | 2250 | } |
0f113f3e | 2251 | |
8157d44b | 2252 | /* set up the compression method */ |
09b6c2ef | 2253 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
8157d44b | 2254 | compm = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 2255 | #else |
88050dd1 | 2256 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
8157d44b | 2257 | compm = 0; |
e27f234a | 2258 | else |
8157d44b | 2259 | compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; |
09b6c2ef | 2260 | #endif |
e481f9b9 | 2261 | |
a5816a5a | 2262 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl) |
7cea05dc | 2263 | || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) |
88050dd1 | 2264 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm) |
7da160b0 | 2265 | || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
3434f40b | 2266 | SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
fe874d27 MC |
2267 | ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO |
2268 | : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO, | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2269 | NULL, 0)) { |
2270 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2271 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 2272 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2273 | |
aff9929b MC |
2274 | if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
2275 | && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2276 | /* SSLfatal() already called */; |
2277 | return 0; | |
aff9929b MC |
2278 | } |
2279 | ||
e27f234a | 2280 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 2281 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2282 | |
7cea05dc | 2283 | int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 2284 | { |
e27f234a | 2285 | if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
5923ad4b | 2286 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 | 2287 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
5923ad4b MC |
2288 | return 0; |
2289 | } | |
e27f234a | 2290 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2291 | return 1; |
2292 | } | |
2293 | ||
7cea05dc | 2294 | int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2295 | { |
bc36ee62 | 2296 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e2b420fd | 2297 | EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; |
ea262260 | 2298 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2299 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e | 2300 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
348240c6 | 2301 | size_t encodedlen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 2302 | int curve_id = 0; |
d02b48c6 | 2303 | #endif |
f695571e | 2304 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
f63a17d6 | 2305 | int i; |
0f113f3e | 2306 | unsigned long type; |
2ac6115d | 2307 | const BIGNUM *r[4]; |
bfb0641f | 2308 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
fe3066ee | 2309 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
c13d2a5b MC |
2310 | size_t paramlen, paramoffset; |
2311 | ||
5923ad4b | 2312 | if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2313 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2314 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2315 | goto err; | |
c13d2a5b | 2316 | } |
0f113f3e | 2317 | |
6e59a892 | 2318 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2319 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2320 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2321 | goto err; | |
6e59a892 | 2322 | } |
0f113f3e | 2323 | |
e27f234a | 2324 | type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
e27f234a | 2325 | |
e27f234a | 2326 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; |
85269210 | 2327 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a MC |
2328 | /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ |
2329 | if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
2330 | } else | |
85269210 | 2331 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
bc36ee62 | 2332 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e27f234a | 2333 | if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
94d61512 BL |
2334 | CERT *cert = s->cert; |
2335 | ||
e2b420fd DSH |
2336 | EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; |
2337 | DH *dh; | |
2338 | ||
e27f234a | 2339 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { |
e2b420fd DSH |
2340 | DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); |
2341 | pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2342 | if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { | |
2343 | DH_free(dhp); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2344 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2345 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2346 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2347 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2348 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2349 | EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); |
2350 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2351 | } else { | |
2352 | pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; | |
2353 | } | |
2354 | if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { | |
2355 | DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); | |
2356 | pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); | |
2357 | if (pkdh == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2358 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2359 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2360 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2361 | goto err; | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2362 | } |
2363 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2364 | } | |
2365 | if (pkdhp == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2366 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2367 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2368 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
2369 | goto err; | |
e27f234a MC |
2370 | } |
2371 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, | |
e2b420fd | 2372 | EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2373 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
2374 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2375 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
2376 | goto err; | |
e27f234a | 2377 | } |
e2b420fd | 2378 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2379 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2380 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2381 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
2382 | goto err; |
2383 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2384 | |
0a699a07 | 2385 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); |
e2b420fd | 2386 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 | 2387 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
ffaef3f1 | 2388 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2389 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2390 | |
2391 | dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2392 | ||
2393 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2394 | pkdh = NULL; | |
2395 | ||
0aeddcfa MC |
2396 | DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]); |
2397 | DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL); | |
e27f234a | 2398 | } else |
d02b48c6 | 2399 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2400 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a | 2401 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
e27f234a | 2402 | |
880d9d86 | 2403 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2404 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2405 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2406 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
2407 | goto err; |
2408 | } | |
2409 | ||
57be4444 | 2410 | /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ |
8841154a | 2411 | curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); |
57be4444 | 2412 | if (curve_id == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2413 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
2414 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2415 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); | |
e27f234a MC |
2416 | goto err; |
2417 | } | |
f63a17d6 | 2418 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); |
880d9d86 DSH |
2419 | /* Generate a new key for this curve */ |
2420 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2421 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2422 | goto err; | |
57be4444 DSH |
2423 | } |
2424 | ||
880d9d86 | 2425 | /* Encode the public key. */ |
ec24630a DSH |
2426 | encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, |
2427 | &encodedPoint); | |
e27f234a | 2428 | if (encodedlen == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2429 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2430 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
e27f234a MC |
2431 | goto err; |
2432 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2433 | |
e27f234a MC |
2434 | /* |
2435 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we | |
2436 | * can set these to NULLs | |
2437 | */ | |
2438 | r[0] = NULL; | |
2439 | r[1] = NULL; | |
2440 | r[2] = NULL; | |
2441 | r[3] = NULL; | |
2442 | } else | |
10bf4fc2 | 2443 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
edc032b5 | 2444 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a MC |
2445 | if (type & SSL_kSRP) { |
2446 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || | |
2447 | (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || | |
2448 | (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2449 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2450 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2451 | SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); | |
e27f234a | 2452 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2453 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2454 | r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; |
2455 | r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; | |
2456 | r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; | |
2457 | r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; | |
2458 | } else | |
2459 | #endif | |
2460 | { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2461 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2462 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2463 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); | |
2464 | goto err; | |
e27f234a | 2465 | } |
0f113f3e | 2466 | |
f695571e DSH |
2467 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) |
2468 | || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { | |
2469 | lu = NULL; | |
2470 | } else if (lu == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2471 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
2472 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2473 | goto err; | |
e27f234a | 2474 | } |
0f113f3e | 2475 | |
85269210 | 2476 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a | 2477 | if (type & SSL_PSK) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2478 | size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
2479 | ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); | |
2480 | ||
2481 | /* | |
2482 | * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already | |
2483 | * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case | |
2484 | */ | |
2485 | if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN | |
7cea05dc | 2486 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, |
c13d2a5b | 2487 | len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2488 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2489 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2490 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2491 | goto err; | |
85269210 | 2492 | } |
e27f234a | 2493 | } |
85269210 DSH |
2494 | #endif |
2495 | ||
e27f234a | 2496 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2497 | unsigned char *binval; |
2498 | int res; | |
2499 | ||
edc032b5 | 2500 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a | 2501 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { |
7cea05dc | 2502 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); |
e27f234a | 2503 | } else |
78a01b3f | 2504 | #endif |
7cea05dc | 2505 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2506 | |
2507 | if (!res) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2508 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2509 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2510 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2511 | goto err; | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2512 | } |
2513 | ||
78a01b3f | 2514 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
a230b26e | 2515 | /*- |
78a01b3f | 2516 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS |
2517 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length | |
2518 | * as the prime | |
2519 | */ | |
2520 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2521 | size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); |
ff819477 | 2522 | |
c13d2a5b | 2523 | if (len > 0) { |
7cea05dc | 2524 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2525 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2526 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2527 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2528 | goto err; | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2529 | } |
2530 | memset(binval, 0, len); | |
78a01b3f | 2531 | } |
c13d2a5b | 2532 | } |
edc032b5 | 2533 | #endif |
7cea05dc MC |
2534 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) |
2535 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2536 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2537 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2538 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2539 | goto err; | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2540 | } |
2541 | ||
2542 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); | |
e27f234a | 2543 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2544 | |
10bf4fc2 | 2545 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a MC |
2546 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2547 | /* | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2548 | * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the |
2549 | * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] | |
2550 | * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded | |
2551 | * point itself | |
e27f234a | 2552 | */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2553 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) |
2554 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
2555 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) | |
2556 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2557 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2558 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2559 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2560 | goto err; | |
c13d2a5b | 2561 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2562 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
2563 | encodedPoint = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2564 | } |
ea262260 BM |
2565 | #endif |
2566 | ||
e27f234a | 2567 | /* not anonymous */ |
f695571e | 2568 | if (lu != NULL) { |
a497cf25 | 2569 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2570 | const EVP_MD *md; |
2571 | unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs; | |
2572 | size_t siglen, tbslen; | |
2573 | int rv; | |
f695571e | 2574 | |
b2021556 | 2575 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { |
f695571e | 2576 | /* Should never happen */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2577 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2578 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2579 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2580 | goto err; | |
f695571e | 2581 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2582 | /* |
2583 | * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p | |
2584 | * points to the space at the end. | |
2585 | */ | |
c13d2a5b | 2586 | |
f695571e DSH |
2587 | /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ |
2588 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2589 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2590 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2591 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2592 | goto err; | |
f695571e DSH |
2593 | } |
2594 | /* send signature algorithm */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2595 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
2596 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2597 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2598 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2599 | goto err; | |
2600 | } | |
f695571e DSH |
2601 | /* |
2602 | * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig | |
2603 | * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it | |
2604 | * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET | |
2605 | * afterwards. | |
2606 | */ | |
2607 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
2608 | if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) | |
2609 | || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2610 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2611 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2612 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2613 | goto err; | |
f695571e DSH |
2614 | } |
2615 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | |
2616 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 | |
2617 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2618 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2619 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2620 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
2621 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2622 | } |
f695571e | 2623 | } |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2624 | tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, |
2625 | s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, | |
2626 | paramlen); | |
2627 | if (tbslen == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2628 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2629 | goto err; | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2630 | } |
2631 | rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen); | |
2632 | OPENSSL_free(tbs); | |
2633 | if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) | |
f695571e | 2634 | || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2635 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2636 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2637 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2638 | goto err; | |
77d514c5 | 2639 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
2640 | } |
2641 | ||
bfb0641f | 2642 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2643 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 2644 | err: |
e2b420fd DSH |
2645 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
2646 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2647 | #endif | |
556efe79 | 2648 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
b548a1f1 | 2649 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
ea262260 | 2650 | #endif |
bfb0641f | 2651 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2652 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2653 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2654 | |
7cea05dc | 2655 | int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2656 | { |
03f44b97 DSH |
2657 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
2658 | /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */ | |
2659 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2660 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2661 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2662 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2663 | return 0; | |
03f44b97 | 2664 | } |
32f66107 | 2665 | |
fe874d27 MC |
2666 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
2667 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL, | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2668 | 0)) { |
2669 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2670 | return 0; | |
03f44b97 | 2671 | } |
32f66107 DSH |
2672 | goto done; |
2673 | } | |
2674 | ||
2675 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ | |
2676 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) | |
2677 | || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2678 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2679 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2680 | return 0; | |
28ff8ef3 | 2681 | } |
0f113f3e | 2682 | |
e27f234a | 2683 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
98c792d1 | 2684 | const uint16_t *psigs; |
a9669ddc | 2685 | size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); |
703bcee0 | 2686 | |
7cea05dc | 2687 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
8f12296e | 2688 | || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) |
7cea05dc MC |
2689 | || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) |
2690 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2691 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2692 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2693 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2694 | return 0; | |
28ff8ef3 | 2695 | } |
e27f234a | 2696 | } |
0f113f3e | 2697 | |
5d6cca05 | 2698 | if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2699 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2700 | return 0; | |
28ff8ef3 | 2701 | } |
e27f234a | 2702 | |
32f66107 | 2703 | done: |
e27f234a | 2704 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; |
e27f234a | 2705 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 2706 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2707 | |
f63a17d6 | 2708 | static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 2709 | { |
85269210 | 2710 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
0907d710 MC |
2711 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
2712 | size_t psklen; | |
2713 | PACKET psk_identity; | |
efcdbcbe | 2714 | |
0907d710 | 2715 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2716 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2717 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
0907d710 MC |
2718 | return 0; |
2719 | } | |
2720 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2721 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2722 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
0907d710 MC |
2723 | return 0; |
2724 | } | |
2725 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2726 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2727 | SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); | |
0907d710 MC |
2728 | return 0; |
2729 | } | |
85269210 | 2730 | |
0907d710 | 2731 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2732 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2733 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0907d710 MC |
2734 | return 0; |
2735 | } | |
85269210 | 2736 | |
0907d710 | 2737 | psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, |
a230b26e | 2738 | psk, sizeof(psk)); |
85269210 | 2739 | |
0907d710 | 2740 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2741 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2742 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0907d710 MC |
2743 | return 0; |
2744 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
2745 | /* | |
2746 | * PSK related to the given identity not found | |
2747 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2748 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, |
2749 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
2750 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
0907d710 MC |
2751 | return 0; |
2752 | } | |
85269210 | 2753 | |
0907d710 MC |
2754 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); |
2755 | s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); | |
2756 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); | |
85269210 | 2757 | |
0907d710 | 2758 | if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2759 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2760 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
0907d710 | 2761 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2762 | } |
0907d710 MC |
2763 | |
2764 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; | |
2765 | ||
2766 | return 1; | |
2767 | #else | |
2768 | /* Should never happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2769 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2770 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0907d710 | 2771 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2772 | #endif |
0907d710 MC |
2773 | } |
2774 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2775 | static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
0907d710 | 2776 | { |
bc36ee62 | 2777 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
0907d710 MC |
2778 | unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
2779 | int decrypt_len; | |
2780 | unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; | |
2781 | size_t j, padding_len; | |
2782 | PACKET enc_premaster; | |
2783 | RSA *rsa = NULL; | |
2784 | unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; | |
2785 | int ret = 0; | |
2786 | ||
d0ff28f8 | 2787 | rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey); |
0907d710 | 2788 | if (rsa == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2789 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, |
2790 | SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); | |
0907d710 MC |
2791 | return 0; |
2792 | } | |
2793 | ||
2794 | /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ | |
2795 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2796 | enc_premaster = *pkt; | |
2797 | } else { | |
2798 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) | |
2799 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2800 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, |
2801 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
0907d710 | 2802 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2803 | } |
0907d710 | 2804 | } |
0f113f3e | 2805 | |
0907d710 MC |
2806 | /* |
2807 | * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to | |
2808 | * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret | |
2809 | * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because | |
2810 | * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. | |
2811 | */ | |
2812 | if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2813 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, |
2814 | RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); | |
0907d710 MC |
2815 | return 0; |
2816 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2817 | |
0907d710 MC |
2818 | rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); |
2819 | if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2820 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, |
2821 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
0907d710 MC |
2822 | return 0; |
2823 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2824 | |
0907d710 MC |
2825 | /* |
2826 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of | |
2827 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, | |
2828 | * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and | |
2829 | * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt | |
2830 | * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 | |
2831 | */ | |
20ca916d | 2832 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2833 | if (ssl_randbytes(s, rand_premaster_secret, |
2834 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) { | |
2835 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, | |
2836 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0907d710 | 2837 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 2838 | } |
0f113f3e | 2839 | |
0907d710 MC |
2840 | /* |
2841 | * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of | |
2842 | * the timing-sensitive code below. | |
2843 | */ | |
348240c6 MC |
2844 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
2845 | decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), | |
2846 | PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), | |
2847 | rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2848 | if (decrypt_len < 0) { |
2849 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, | |
2850 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0907d710 | 2851 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 2852 | } |
20ca916d | 2853 | |
0907d710 | 2854 | /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ |
5b8fa431 | 2855 | |
0907d710 MC |
2856 | /* |
2857 | * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys | |
2858 | * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures | |
2859 | * PS is at least 8 bytes. | |
2860 | */ | |
2861 | if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2862 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, |
2863 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
0907d710 MC |
2864 | goto err; |
2865 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2866 | |
0907d710 MC |
2867 | padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
2868 | decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & | |
a230b26e | 2869 | constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); |
0907d710 MC |
2870 | for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { |
2871 | decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); | |
2872 | } | |
2873 | decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); | |
5b8fa431 | 2874 | |
0907d710 MC |
2875 | /* |
2876 | * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then | |
2877 | * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The | |
2878 | * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack | |
2879 | * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number | |
2880 | * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in | |
2881 | * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. | |
2882 | */ | |
2883 | version_good = | |
2884 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2885 | (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); | |
2886 | version_good &= | |
2887 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], | |
2888 | (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); | |
0f113f3e | 2889 | |
0907d710 MC |
2890 | /* |
2891 | * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the | |
2892 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the | |
2893 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). | |
2894 | * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol | |
2895 | * version instead if the server does not support the requested | |
2896 | * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such | |
2897 | * clients. | |
2898 | */ | |
2899 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { | |
2900 | unsigned char workaround_good; | |
2901 | workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2902 | (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); | |
2903 | workaround_good &= | |
5b8fa431 | 2904 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], |
0907d710 MC |
2905 | (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); |
2906 | version_good |= workaround_good; | |
2907 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2908 | |
0907d710 MC |
2909 | /* |
2910 | * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to | |
2911 | * remain non-zero (0xff). | |
2912 | */ | |
2913 | decrypt_good &= version_good; | |
0f113f3e | 2914 | |
0907d710 MC |
2915 | /* |
2916 | * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using | |
2917 | * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not | |
2918 | * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees | |
2919 | * it is still sufficiently large to read from. | |
2920 | */ | |
2921 | for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { | |
2922 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = | |
2923 | constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, | |
2924 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], | |
2925 | rand_premaster_secret[j]); | |
2926 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2927 | |
0907d710 MC |
2928 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, |
2929 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2930 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
0907d710 MC |
2931 | goto err; |
2932 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2933 | |
0907d710 MC |
2934 | ret = 1; |
2935 | err: | |
2936 | OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); | |
2937 | return ret; | |
2938 | #else | |
2939 | /* Should never happen */ | |
3ec8d113 MC |
2940 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, |
2941 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0907d710 MC |
2942 | return 0; |
2943 | #endif | |
2944 | } | |
2945 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2946 | static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
642360f9 MC |
2947 | { |
2948 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2949 | EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; | |
2950 | DH *cdh; | |
2951 | unsigned int i; | |
2952 | BIGNUM *pub_key; | |
2953 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2954 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2955 | int ret = 0; | |
2956 | ||
31a7d80d | 2957 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { |
f63a17d6 | 2958 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
642360f9 MC |
2959 | SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
2960 | goto err; | |
2961 | } | |
642360f9 MC |
2962 | skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; |
2963 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2964 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
2965 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
642360f9 MC |
2966 | goto err; |
2967 | } | |
2968 | ||
2969 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2970 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
2971 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
642360f9 MC |
2972 | goto err; |
2973 | } | |
2974 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { | |
2975 | /* We already checked we have enough data */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2976 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
2977 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
642360f9 MC |
2978 | goto err; |
2979 | } | |
2980 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2981 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2982 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
2983 | SSL_R_BN_LIB); | |
642360f9 MC |
2984 | goto err; |
2985 | } | |
2986 | cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); | |
2987 | pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); | |
2988 | ||
2989 | if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2990 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
2991 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
642360f9 MC |
2992 | if (pub_key != NULL) |
2993 | BN_free(pub_key); | |
2994 | goto err; | |
2995 | } | |
2996 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2997 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
f63a17d6 | 2998 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
642360f9 MC |
2999 | goto err; |
3000 | } | |
3001 | ||
3002 | ret = 1; | |
3003 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
3004 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
3005 | err: | |
3006 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
3007 | return ret; | |
3008 | #else | |
3009 | /* Should never happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3010 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
3011 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
642360f9 MC |
3012 | return 0; |
3013 | #endif | |
3014 | } | |
3015 | ||
f63a17d6 | 3016 | static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3017 | { |
3018 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
3019 | EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; | |
3020 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
3021 | int ret = 0; | |
3022 | ||
3023 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
3024 | /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3025 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, |
3026 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3027 | goto err; |
3028 | } else { | |
3029 | unsigned int i; | |
3030 | const unsigned char *data; | |
3031 | ||
3032 | /* | |
3033 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the | |
3034 | * ClientKeyExchange message. | |
3035 | */ | |
3036 | ||
3037 | /* Get encoded point length */ | |
fb933982 DSH |
3038 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) |
3039 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3040 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, |
3041 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3042 | goto err; |
3043 | } | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3044 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); |
3045 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3046 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, |
3047 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3048 | goto err; |
3049 | } | |
ec24630a | 3050 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3051 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, |
3052 | ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3053 | goto err; |
3054 | } | |
3055 | } | |
3056 | ||
0f1e51ea | 3057 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
f63a17d6 | 3058 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3059 | goto err; |
3060 | } | |
3061 | ||
3062 | ret = 1; | |
3063 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
3064 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
3065 | err: | |
3066 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
3067 | ||
3068 | return ret; | |
3069 | #else | |
3070 | /* Should never happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3071 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, |
3072 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3073 | return 0; |
3074 | #endif | |
3075 | } | |
3076 | ||
f63a17d6 | 3077 | static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
c437eef6 MC |
3078 | { |
3079 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
3080 | unsigned int i; | |
3081 | const unsigned char *data; | |
3082 | ||
3083 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) | |
a230b26e | 3084 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3085 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, |
3086 | SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3087 | return 0; |
3088 | } | |
3089 | if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3090 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, |
3091 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3092 | return 0; |
3093 | } | |
a230b26e | 3094 | if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3095 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, |
3096 | SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3097 | return 0; |
3098 | } | |
3099 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); | |
3100 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
3101 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3102 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, |
3103 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3104 | return 0; |
3105 | } | |
3106 | ||
3107 | if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3108 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c437eef6 MC |
3109 | return 0; |
3110 | } | |
3111 | ||
3112 | return 1; | |
3113 | #else | |
3114 | /* Should never happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3115 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, |
3116 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3117 | return 0; |
3118 | #endif | |
3119 | } | |
3120 | ||
f63a17d6 | 3121 | static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
c437eef6 MC |
3122 | { |
3123 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
3124 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; | |
3125 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; | |
3126 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; | |
3127 | const unsigned char *start; | |
3128 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen; | |
3129 | unsigned long alg_a; | |
3130 | int Ttag, Tclass; | |
3131 | long Tlen; | |
348240c6 | 3132 | size_t sess_key_len; |
c437eef6 MC |
3133 | const unsigned char *data; |
3134 | int ret = 0; | |
3135 | ||
3136 | /* Get our certificate private key */ | |
3137 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
3138 | if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { | |
3139 | /* | |
3140 | * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too | |
3141 | */ | |
3142 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; | |
3143 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
3144 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; | |
3145 | } | |
3146 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
3147 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
3148 | } | |
3149 | } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { | |
3150 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
3151 | } | |
3152 | ||
3153 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); | |
3154 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3155 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, |
3156 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3157 | return 0; |
3158 | } | |
3159 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3160 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, |
3161 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3162 | return 0; |
3163 | } | |
3164 | /* | |
3165 | * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe | |
3166 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from | |
3167 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a | |
3168 | * client certificate for authorization only. | |
3169 | */ | |
3170 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
3171 | if (client_pub_pkey) { | |
3172 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) | |
3173 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
3174 | } | |
3175 | /* Decrypt session key */ | |
3176 | sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
3177 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3178 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, |
3179 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3180 | goto err; |
3181 | } | |
348240c6 | 3182 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
a230b26e | 3183 | if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, |
348240c6 | 3184 | &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
a230b26e | 3185 | || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3186 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, |
3187 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3188 | goto err; |
3189 | } | |
3190 | start = data; | |
3191 | inlen = Tlen; | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3192 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, |
3193 | inlen) <= 0) { | |
3194 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, | |
3195 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3196 | goto err; |
3197 | } | |
3198 | /* Generate master secret */ | |
3199 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, | |
3200 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3201 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c437eef6 MC |
3202 | goto err; |
3203 | } | |
3204 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3205 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, |
3206 | NULL) > 0) | |
c437eef6 MC |
3207 | s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; |
3208 | ||
3209 | ret = 1; | |
3210 | err: | |
3211 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3212 | return ret; | |
3213 | #else | |
3214 | /* Should never happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3215 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, |
3216 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3217 | return 0; |
3218 | #endif | |
3219 | } | |
3220 | ||
0907d710 MC |
3221 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3222 | { | |
0907d710 MC |
3223 | unsigned long alg_k; |
3224 | ||
3225 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
3226 | ||
3227 | /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3228 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { |
3229 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0907d710 | 3230 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3231 | } |
0907d710 MC |
3232 | |
3233 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { | |
3234 | /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ | |
3235 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3236 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
3237 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3238 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9059eb71 | 3239 | goto err; |
0907d710 MC |
3240 | } |
3241 | /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ | |
3242 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3243 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
9059eb71 | 3244 | goto err; |
69f68237 | 3245 | } |
0907d710 | 3246 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3247 | if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) { |
3248 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0907d710 | 3249 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3250 | } |
642360f9 | 3251 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3252 | if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) { |
3253 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 3254 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3255 | } |
19ed1ec1 | 3256 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3257 | if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) { |
3258 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
19ed1ec1 | 3259 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3260 | } |
c437eef6 | 3261 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3262 | if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) { |
3263 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 3264 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3265 | } |
c437eef6 | 3266 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3267 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) { |
3268 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 3269 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3270 | } |
c437eef6 | 3271 | } else { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3272 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3273 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3274 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); | |
9059eb71 | 3275 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3276 | } |
3277 | ||
e27f234a | 3278 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e | 3279 | err: |
85269210 DSH |
3280 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
3281 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); | |
3282 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; | |
58964a49 | 3283 | #endif |
e27f234a | 3284 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3285 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3286 | |
be3583fa | 3287 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
94836de2 | 3288 | { |
94836de2 | 3289 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
c130dd8e MC |
3290 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
3291 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3292 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
3293 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
3294 | /* | |
3295 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
3296 | * used. | |
3297 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
3298 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
3299 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
c130dd8e MC |
3300 | |
3301 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
3302 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
3303 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
3304 | 0) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3305 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3306 | SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3307 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0fe2a0af | 3308 | return WORK_ERROR; |
c130dd8e | 3309 | } |
94836de2 | 3310 | |
c130dd8e MC |
3311 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
3312 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
94836de2 | 3313 | } |
94836de2 MC |
3314 | } |
3315 | #endif | |
3316 | ||
149c2ef5 | 3317 | if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { |
a230b26e EK |
3318 | /* |
3319 | * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need | |
3320 | * the handshake_buffer | |
149c2ef5 MC |
3321 | */ |
3322 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3323 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
149c2ef5 MC |
3324 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3325 | } | |
94836de2 | 3326 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
28f4580c | 3327 | } else { |
94836de2 | 3328 | if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3329 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3330 | SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3331 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
94836de2 MC |
3332 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3333 | } | |
3334 | /* | |
3335 | * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support | |
3336 | * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op | |
3337 | */ | |
3338 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3339 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
94836de2 MC |
3340 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3341 | } | |
94836de2 MC |
3342 | } |
3343 | ||
3344 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3345 | } | |
3346 | ||
be3583fa | 3347 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3348 | { |
f63a17d6 | 3349 | int i; |
eb5fd03b | 3350 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
3351 | X509 *x = NULL; |
3352 | unsigned long l, llen; | |
b6981744 | 3353 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
e27f234a | 3354 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
e96e0f8e | 3355 | PACKET spkt, context; |
d805a57b | 3356 | size_t chainidx; |
0f113f3e MC |
3357 | |
3358 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3359 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
3360 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3361 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3362 | } |
3363 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3364 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */ |
3365 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)) | |
3366 | || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) | |
3367 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) | |
3368 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3369 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
3370 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3371 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 3372 | } |
0bc09ecd | 3373 | |
d805a57b | 3374 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { |
0bc09ecd | 3375 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) |
a230b26e | 3376 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3377 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
3378 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3379 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3380 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3381 | } |
3382 | ||
0bc09ecd MC |
3383 | certstart = certbytes; |
3384 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); | |
0f113f3e | 3385 | if (x == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3386 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
3387 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
3388 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 3389 | } |
0bc09ecd | 3390 | if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3391 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
3392 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3393 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3394 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 3395 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
3396 | |
3397 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3398 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
3399 | PACKET extensions; | |
3400 | ||
3401 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3402 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
3403 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3404 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
3405 | goto err; | |
e96e0f8e | 3406 | } |
fe874d27 MC |
3407 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, |
3408 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, | |
f63a17d6 | 3409 | NULL, chainidx == 0) |
8e1634ec | 3410 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, |
f63a17d6 | 3411 | rawexts, x, chainidx, |
8e1634ec | 3412 | PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) { |
5ee289ea | 3413 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
f63a17d6 | 3414 | goto err; |
5ee289ea MC |
3415 | } |
3416 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3417 | } |
3418 | ||
0f113f3e | 3419 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3420 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3421 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3422 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3423 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3424 | } |
3425 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3426 | } |
3427 | ||
3428 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { | |
3429 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ | |
3430 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3431 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3432 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3433 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); | |
3434 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3435 | } |
3436 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ | |
3437 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
3438 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3439 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, |
3440 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3441 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); | |
3442 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3443 | } |
3444 | /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ | |
124037fd | 3445 | if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3446 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3447 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3448 | } |
3449 | } else { | |
3450 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
3451 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
3452 | if (i <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3453 | SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result), |
3454 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3455 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); | |
3456 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3457 | } |
3458 | if (i > 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3459 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3460 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); | |
3461 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 3462 | } |
8382fd3a | 3463 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); |
0f113f3e | 3464 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3465 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3466 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3467 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
3468 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 3469 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
3470 | } |
3471 | ||
222561fe | 3472 | X509_free(s->session->peer); |
0f113f3e MC |
3473 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); |
3474 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
3475 | ||
c34b0f99 DSH |
3476 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); |
3477 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3478 | |
3479 | /* | |
3480 | * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE | |
3481 | * message | |
3482 | */ | |
94ed2c67 | 3483 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3484 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3485 | goto err; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3486 | } |
3487 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3488 | /* |
3489 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own | |
d4d78943 | 3490 | * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c |
0f113f3e | 3491 | */ |
0f113f3e | 3492 | sk = NULL; |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3493 | |
3494 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
3495 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3496 | && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
3497 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
3498 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3499 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3500 | goto err; | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3501 | } |
3502 | ||
e27f234a | 3503 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
66696478 | 3504 | |
f63a17d6 | 3505 | err: |
222561fe RS |
3506 | X509_free(x); |
3507 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
e27f234a | 3508 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 3509 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3510 | |
7cea05dc | 3511 | int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3512 | { |
a497cf25 | 3513 | CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert; |
e27f234a | 3514 | |
a497cf25 | 3515 | if (cpk == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3516 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3517 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
3518 | return 0; |
3519 | } | |
3520 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3521 | /* |
3522 | * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context | |
3523 | * for the server Certificate message | |
3524 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3525 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { |
3526 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3527 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3528 | return 0; | |
3529 | } | |
3530 | if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) { | |
3531 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e27f234a MC |
3532 | return 0; |
3533 | } | |
3534 | ||
3535 | return 1; | |
3536 | } | |
3537 | ||
7cea05dc | 3538 | int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
3539 | { |
3540 | unsigned char *senc = NULL; | |
83ae4661 | 3541 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
bf7c6817 | 3542 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; |
a00d75e1 | 3543 | unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; |
e27f234a | 3544 | const unsigned char *const_p; |
a00d75e1 | 3545 | int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; |
e27f234a MC |
3546 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
3547 | unsigned int hlen; | |
222da979 | 3548 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; |
e27f234a | 3549 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
d139723b | 3550 | unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; |
f63a17d6 | 3551 | int iv_len; |
a00d75e1 | 3552 | size_t macoffset, macendoffset; |
30f05b19 MC |
3553 | union { |
3554 | unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; | |
3555 | uint32_t age_add; | |
3556 | } age_add_u; | |
e27f234a | 3557 | |
fc24f0bf | 3558 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3559 | if (ssl_randbytes(s, age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) { |
3560 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3561 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3562 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
fc24f0bf | 3563 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3564 | } |
fc24f0bf | 3565 | s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; |
9b6a8254 MC |
3566 | /* |
3567 | * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a | |
3568 | * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple | |
3569 | * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed. | |
3570 | */ | |
3571 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce); | |
3572 | s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char)); | |
3573 | if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3574 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3575 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3576 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
9b6a8254 MC |
3577 | goto err; |
3578 | } | |
3579 | s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1; | |
2c604cb9 | 3580 | s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); |
f6370040 MC |
3581 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { |
3582 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); | |
3583 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected = | |
3584 | OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); | |
3585 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3586 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3587 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3588 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f6370040 MC |
3589 | goto err; |
3590 | } | |
3591 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; | |
3592 | } | |
3593 | s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data; | |
fc24f0bf MC |
3594 | } |
3595 | ||
e27f234a MC |
3596 | /* get session encoding length */ |
3597 | slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); | |
3598 | /* | |
3599 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too | |
3600 | * long | |
3601 | */ | |
3602 | if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3603 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3604 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f6370040 | 3605 | goto err; |
e27f234a MC |
3606 | } |
3607 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); | |
a71edf3b | 3608 | if (senc == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3609 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3610 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f6370040 | 3611 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 3612 | } |
0f113f3e | 3613 | |
846ec07d | 3614 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
bf7c6817 | 3615 | hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); |
83ae4661 | 3616 | if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3617 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3618 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
83ae4661 MC |
3619 | goto err; |
3620 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3621 | |
e27f234a | 3622 | p = senc; |
f63a17d6 MC |
3623 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) { |
3624 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3625 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a | 3626 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3627 | } |
687eaf27 | 3628 | |
e27f234a MC |
3629 | /* |
3630 | * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up | |
3631 | */ | |
3632 | const_p = senc; | |
3633 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3634 | if (sess == NULL) { |
3635 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3636 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a | 3637 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3638 | } |
e27f234a | 3639 | sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ |
0f113f3e | 3640 | |
e27f234a | 3641 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
f63a17d6 MC |
3642 | if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { |
3643 | /* shouldn't ever happen */ | |
3644 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3645 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
3646 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); |
3647 | goto err; | |
3648 | } | |
3649 | p = senc; | |
3650 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3651 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3652 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
3653 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); |
3654 | goto err; | |
3655 | } | |
3656 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
0f113f3e | 3657 | |
e27f234a MC |
3658 | /* |
3659 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does | |
3660 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. | |
3661 | */ | |
aff8c126 | 3662 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { |
5c753de6 | 3663 | /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ |
aff8c126 | 3664 | int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, |
5c753de6 TS |
3665 | hctx, 1); |
3666 | ||
3667 | if (ret == 0) { | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3668 | |
3669 | /* Put timeout and length */ | |
7cea05dc | 3670 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) |
4a01c59f | 3671 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3672 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3673 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3674 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5c753de6 | 3675 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3676 | } |
5c753de6 TS |
3677 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3678 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
3679 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
3680 | return 1; | |
3681 | } | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3682 | if (ret < 0) { |
3683 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3684 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3685 | SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); | |
e27f234a | 3686 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3687 | } |
d139723b | 3688 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); |
e27f234a | 3689 | } else { |
d139723b KR |
3690 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); |
3691 | ||
3692 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3693 | if (ssl_randbytes(s, iv, iv_len) <= 0 |
3694 | || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, | |
3695 | tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv) | |
3696 | || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key, | |
3697 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key), | |
3698 | EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { | |
3699 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3700 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3701 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
4f9fab6b | 3702 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3703 | } |
aff8c126 RS |
3704 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, |
3705 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3706 | } |
3707 | ||
e27f234a | 3708 | /* |
2c604cb9 MC |
3709 | * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this |
3710 | * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity). | |
3711 | * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the | |
3712 | * timeout. | |
e27f234a | 3713 | */ |
2c604cb9 MC |
3714 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, |
3715 | (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
3716 | ? 0 : s->session->timeout) | |
30f05b19 | 3717 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
9b6a8254 | 3718 | && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add) |
51598215 MC |
3719 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce, |
3720 | s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len))) | |
a00d75e1 | 3721 | /* Now the actual ticket data */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3722 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
3723 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) | |
a00d75e1 | 3724 | /* Output key name */ |
7cea05dc | 3725 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) |
a00d75e1 | 3726 | /* output IV */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3727 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) |
3728 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3729 | &encdata1) |
3730 | /* Encrypt session data */ | |
3731 | || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) | |
7cea05dc | 3732 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3733 | || encdata1 != encdata2 |
3734 | || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) | |
7cea05dc | 3735 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3736 | || encdata1 + len != encdata2 |
3737 | || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH | |
7cea05dc | 3738 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3739 | || !HMAC_Update(hctx, |
3740 | (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, | |
3741 | macendoffset - macoffset) | |
7cea05dc | 3742 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3743 | || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) |
3744 | || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
7cea05dc | 3745 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) |
a00d75e1 | 3746 | || macdata1 != macdata2 |
f63a17d6 | 3747 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
3ec8d113 MC |
3748 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3749 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a | 3750 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3751 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
3752 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
3753 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, | |
3754 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3755 | NULL, 0)) { | |
3756 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3757 | goto err; | |
3758 | } | |
bcaad809 DSH |
3759 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
3760 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
e27f234a MC |
3761 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3762 | ||
3763 | return 1; | |
687eaf27 | 3764 | err: |
b548a1f1 | 3765 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
846ec07d | 3766 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
bf7c6817 | 3767 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); |
e27f234a | 3768 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3769 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 3770 | |
f63e4288 MC |
3771 | /* |
3772 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
3773 | * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
3774 | */ | |
3775 | int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
e27f234a | 3776 | { |
8cbfcc70 RS |
3777 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) |
3778 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, | |
3779 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { | |
3ec8d113 MC |
3780 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, |
3781 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f63e4288 MC |
3782 | return 0; |
3783 | } | |
3784 | ||
3785 | return 1; | |
3786 | } | |
3787 | ||
3788 | int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3789 | { | |
3790 | if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { | |
3ec8d113 | 3791 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
cc59ad10 MC |
3792 | return 0; |
3793 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
3794 | |
3795 | return 1; | |
3796 | } | |
3797 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3798 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
e27f234a MC |
3799 | /* |
3800 | * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. | |
3801 | * It sets the next_proto member in s if found | |
3802 | */ | |
be3583fa | 3803 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3804 | { |
73999b62 | 3805 | PACKET next_proto, padding; |
e27f234a MC |
3806 | size_t next_proto_len; |
3807 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
3808 | /*- |
3809 | * The payload looks like: | |
3810 | * uint8 proto_len; | |
3811 | * uint8 proto[proto_len]; | |
3812 | * uint8 padding_len; | |
3813 | * uint8 padding[padding_len]; | |
3814 | */ | |
73999b62 MC |
3815 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) |
3816 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) | |
3817 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3818 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, |
3819 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3820 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
cf9b0b6f | 3821 | } |
0f113f3e | 3822 | |
aff8c126 RS |
3823 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { |
3824 | s->ext.npn_len = 0; | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3825 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, |
3826 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3827 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c3fc7eea MC |
3828 | } |
3829 | ||
aff8c126 | 3830 | s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; |
0f113f3e | 3831 | |
e27f234a | 3832 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 3833 | } |
6434abbf | 3834 | #endif |
d45ba43d | 3835 | |
e46f2334 MC |
3836 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3837 | { | |
fe874d27 | 3838 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
f63a17d6 MC |
3839 | NULL, 0)) { |
3840 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e46f2334 MC |
3841 | return 0; |
3842 | } | |
3843 | ||
3844 | return 1; | |
3845 | } | |
3846 | ||
7d061fce MC |
3847 | static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3848 | { | |
11c67eea | 3849 | size_t len = 0; |
7d061fce MC |
3850 | |
3851 | /* | |
3852 | * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release | |
3853 | * (should be s->version) | |
3854 | */ | |
3855 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3856 | || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, |
3857 | &len)) { | |
3858 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3859 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3860 | return 0; | |
3861 | } | |
3862 | ||
3863 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, | |
3864 | NULL, 0)) { | |
3865 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3866 | return 0; | |
7d061fce MC |
3867 | } |
3868 | ||
3869 | /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ | |
3870 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
3871 | s->session = NULL; | |
3872 | s->hit = 0; | |
3873 | ||
11c67eea MC |
3874 | /* |
3875 | * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with | |
3876 | * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. | |
3877 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3878 | if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) { |
3879 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3880 | return 0; | |
3881 | } | |
11c67eea | 3882 | |
7d061fce MC |
3883 | return 1; |
3884 | } | |
ef6c191b MC |
3885 | |
3886 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
3887 | { | |
ef6c191b | 3888 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3889 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, |
3890 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
ef6c191b MC |
3891 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
3892 | } | |
3893 | ||
3894 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING | |
3895 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3896 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, |
3897 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3898 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
ef6c191b MC |
3899 | } |
3900 | ||
3901 | /* | |
3902 | * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on | |
3903 | * a record boundary. | |
3904 | */ | |
3905 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3906 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
3907 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, | |
3908 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
3909 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
ef6c191b MC |
3910 | } |
3911 | ||
3912 | s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; | |
3913 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3914 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3915 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3916 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
ef6c191b MC |
3917 | } |
3918 | ||
3919 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
ef6c191b | 3920 | } |