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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
c80149d9 | 4 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
8e2f6b79 | 5 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
6 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
7 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
8 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
9 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8e2f6b79 | 10 | */ |
846e33c7 | 11 | |
d02b48c6 | 12 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 13 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 14 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
68570797 | 15 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
16 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
17 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
6434abbf | 20 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
ec577822 | 21 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
3c27208f | 22 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d095b68d | 23 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
dbad1690 | 24 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 25 | |
e46f2334 | 26 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
d45ba43d | 27 | |
61ae935a | 28 | /* |
0f1e51ea MC |
29 | * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
30 | * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from | |
31 | * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. | |
32 | * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
33 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
34 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
35 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea MC |
36 | */ |
37 | static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
38 | { | |
39 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
40 | ||
41 | /* | |
42 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have | |
43 | * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by | |
44 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() | |
45 | */ | |
46 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
47 | default: | |
48 | break; | |
49 | ||
d7f8783f | 50 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
fc7129dc | 51 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
d4504fe5 MC |
52 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
53 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
54 | return 1; | |
55 | } | |
56 | break; | |
57 | } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { | |
ef6c191b MC |
58 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { |
59 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
60 | return 1; | |
61 | } | |
62 | break; | |
63 | } | |
64 | /* Fall through */ | |
65 | ||
66 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: | |
92760c21 | 67 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
0f1e51ea MC |
68 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
69 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
70 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
71 | return 1; | |
72 | } | |
73 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
74 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
75 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
76 | return 1; |
77 | } | |
78 | } | |
79 | break; | |
80 | ||
81 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
82 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { | |
92760c21 MC |
83 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
84 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
85 | return 1; |
86 | } | |
87 | } else { | |
88 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
89 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
90 | return 1; | |
91 | } | |
92 | } | |
93 | break; | |
94 | ||
95 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
96 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
97 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
98 | return 1; | |
99 | } | |
100 | break; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
101 | |
102 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
10109364 MC |
103 | /* |
104 | * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of | |
105 | * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert) | |
106 | */ | |
107 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) | |
108 | break; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
109 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { |
110 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; | |
111 | return 1; | |
112 | } | |
113 | break; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
114 | } |
115 | ||
116 | /* No valid transition found */ | |
0f1e51ea MC |
117 | return 0; |
118 | } | |
119 | ||
120 | /* | |
121 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
122 | * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the | |
123 | * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
124 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 125 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
126 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
127 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 128 | */ |
8481f583 | 129 | int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 130 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 131 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 132 | |
f5ca0b04 | 133 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
134 | if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
135 | goto err; | |
136 | return 1; | |
137 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 138 | |
e8aa8b6c | 139 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
140 | default: |
141 | break; | |
142 | ||
61ae935a | 143 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
0386aad1 | 144 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
61ae935a MC |
145 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
146 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
147 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
148 | return 1; | |
149 | } | |
150 | break; | |
151 | ||
152 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
153 | /* | |
154 | * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either | |
155 | * 1) We didn't request a Certificate | |
156 | * OR | |
157 | * 2) If we did request one then | |
158 | * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned | |
159 | * AND | |
160 | * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 | |
161 | * list if we requested a certificate) | |
162 | */ | |
0f512756 MC |
163 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
164 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { | |
165 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
23dd09b5 MC |
166 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
167 | && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
0f512756 MC |
168 | /* |
169 | * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just | |
23dd09b5 MC |
170 | * not going to accept it because we require a client |
171 | * cert. | |
0f512756 | 172 | */ |
3ec8d113 MC |
173 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
174 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, | |
175 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); | |
0f512756 MC |
176 | return 0; |
177 | } | |
178 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
179 | return 1; | |
180 | } | |
181 | } else { | |
182 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
183 | return 1; | |
184 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
185 | } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
186 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
187 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
188 | return 1; | |
f100b031 | 189 | } |
61ae935a MC |
190 | } |
191 | break; | |
192 | ||
193 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
194 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
195 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
196 | return 1; | |
197 | } | |
198 | break; | |
199 | ||
200 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
201 | /* | |
202 | * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have | |
203 | * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| | |
204 | * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is | |
205 | * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in | |
a71a4966 | 206 | * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be |
61ae935a MC |
207 | * set. |
208 | */ | |
a71a4966 | 209 | if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { |
61ae935a MC |
210 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
211 | /* | |
212 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH | |
213 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is | |
214 | * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses | |
215 | * its key from the certificate for key exchange. | |
216 | */ | |
217 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
218 | return 1; | |
219 | } | |
220 | } else { | |
221 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
222 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
223 | return 1; | |
224 | } | |
225 | } | |
226 | break; | |
227 | ||
228 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
229 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
230 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
231 | return 1; | |
232 | } | |
233 | break; | |
234 | ||
235 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
236 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
aff8c126 | 237 | if (s->s3->npn_seen) { |
61ae935a MC |
238 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { |
239 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; | |
240 | return 1; | |
241 | } | |
242 | } else { | |
243 | #endif | |
244 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
245 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
246 | return 1; | |
247 | } | |
248 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
249 | } | |
250 | #endif | |
251 | break; | |
252 | ||
253 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
254 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
255 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
256 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
257 | return 1; | |
258 | } | |
259 | break; | |
260 | #endif | |
261 | ||
262 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
263 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
264 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
265 | return 1; | |
266 | } | |
267 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
268 | } |
269 | ||
5abeaf35 | 270 | err: |
61ae935a | 271 | /* No valid transition found */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
272 | SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
273 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, | |
274 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
61ae935a MC |
275 | return 0; |
276 | } | |
277 | ||
278 | /* | |
279 | * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? | |
280 | * | |
281 | * Valid return values are: | |
282 | * 1: Yes | |
283 | * 0: No | |
284 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 285 | static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
286 | { |
287 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
288 | ||
289 | /* | |
361a1191 | 290 | * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a |
61ae935a MC |
291 | * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For |
292 | * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if | |
293 | * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, | |
294 | * the server certificate contains the server's public key for | |
295 | * key exchange. | |
296 | */ | |
a230b26e | 297 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) |
61ae935a MC |
298 | /* |
299 | * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if | |
300 | * provided | |
301 | */ | |
302 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
303 | /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ | |
304 | || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) | |
305 | && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) | |
306 | /* For other PSK always send SKE */ | |
307 | || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) | |
308 | #endif | |
309 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
310 | /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ | |
311 | || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) | |
312 | #endif | |
a230b26e | 313 | ) { |
61ae935a MC |
314 | return 1; |
315 | } | |
316 | ||
317 | return 0; | |
318 | } | |
319 | ||
320 | /* | |
321 | * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? | |
322 | * | |
323 | * Valid return values are: | |
324 | * 1: Yes | |
325 | * 0: No | |
326 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 327 | static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
328 | { |
329 | if ( | |
330 | /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ | |
331 | s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER | |
332 | /* | |
333 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert | |
334 | * during re-negotiation: | |
335 | */ | |
a03a9dbe | 336 | && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 || |
61ae935a MC |
337 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) |
338 | /* | |
339 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see | |
340 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in | |
341 | * RFC 2246): | |
342 | */ | |
343 | && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) | |
a230b26e EK |
344 | /* |
345 | * ... except when the application insists on | |
346 | * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts | |
347 | * this for SSL 3) | |
348 | */ | |
61ae935a MC |
349 | || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
350 | /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ | |
351 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) | |
352 | /* | |
353 | * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests | |
354 | * are omitted | |
355 | */ | |
b7fa1f98 | 356 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { |
61ae935a MC |
357 | return 1; |
358 | } | |
359 | ||
360 | return 0; | |
361 | } | |
362 | ||
363 | /* | |
0f1e51ea MC |
364 | * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
365 | * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the | |
366 | * client. | |
0f1e51ea MC |
367 | */ |
368 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
369 | { | |
370 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
371 | ||
372 | /* | |
373 | * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated | |
374 | * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() | |
375 | */ | |
376 | ||
377 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
378 | default: | |
379 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
3ec8d113 MC |
380 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
381 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION, | |
382 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0f1e51ea MC |
383 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
384 | ||
44c04a2e MC |
385 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
386 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { | |
387 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
388 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
389 | } | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
390 | /* Try to read from the client instead */ |
391 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
44c04a2e | 392 | |
0f1e51ea | 393 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
597c51bc | 394 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; |
d4504fe5 | 395 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
7d061fce | 396 | |
0f1e51ea | 397 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
fc7129dc MC |
398 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 |
399 | && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE) | |
db37d32c | 400 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; |
fc7129dc MC |
401 | else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) |
402 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; | |
db37d32c MC |
403 | else |
404 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
405 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
406 | ||
407 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
fc7129dc MC |
408 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) |
409 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; | |
410 | else | |
411 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
e46f2334 MC |
412 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
413 | ||
414 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
94ed2c67 | 415 | if (s->hit) |
92760c21 MC |
416 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
417 | else if (send_certificate_request(s)) | |
418 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
94ed2c67 | 419 | else |
0f1e51ea | 420 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
94ed2c67 | 421 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
422 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
423 | ||
0f1e51ea | 424 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
92760c21 | 425 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
0f1e51ea MC |
426 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
427 | ||
92760c21 | 428 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
429 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; |
430 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
431 | ||
432 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: | |
d805a57b | 433 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
434 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
435 | ||
436 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
f7e393be MC |
437 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; |
438 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
94ed2c67 | 439 | |
d7f8783f MC |
440 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
441 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
442 | ||
92760c21 | 443 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: |
30f05b19 MC |
444 | /* |
445 | * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're | |
446 | * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket | |
447 | * immediately. | |
448 | * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour | |
449 | * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the | |
450 | * session ticket? | |
451 | */ | |
452 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; | |
453 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
454 | ||
8cdc8c51 | 455 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: |
5bf47933 MC |
456 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { |
457 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
458 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
459 | } | |
460 | /* Fall through */ | |
461 | ||
44c04a2e | 462 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
30f05b19 | 463 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
0f1e51ea | 464 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
0f1e51ea MC |
465 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
466 | } | |
467 | } | |
468 | ||
469 | /* | |
470 | * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move | |
471 | * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. | |
61ae935a | 472 | */ |
8481f583 | 473 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 474 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 475 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 476 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
477 | /* |
478 | * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going | |
479 | * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later | |
480 | */ | |
481 | ||
f5ca0b04 | 482 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
483 | return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); |
484 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 485 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
486 | default: |
487 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
3ec8d113 MC |
488 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
489 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION, | |
490 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
491 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
492 | ||
0386aad1 MC |
493 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
494 | if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { | |
495 | /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ | |
496 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; | |
497 | st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; | |
498 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
499 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
500 | /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ |
501 | if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 502 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c7f47786 MC |
503 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
504 | } | |
0386aad1 MC |
505 | /* Fall through */ |
506 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 507 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
a230b26e | 508 | /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ |
e8aa8b6c | 509 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
61ae935a | 510 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
511 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
512 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
e8aa8b6c | 513 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a | 514 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
515 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
516 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified | |
a230b26e | 517 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) |
e8aa8b6c F |
518 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
519 | else | |
520 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
521 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 522 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
523 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
524 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 525 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
526 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
527 | if (s->hit) { | |
aff8c126 | 528 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) |
e8aa8b6c F |
529 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
530 | else | |
531 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
532 | } else { | |
533 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ | |
534 | /* normal PSK or SRP */ | |
535 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & | |
a230b26e | 536 | (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
537 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
538 | } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
61ae935a | 539 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; |
e8aa8b6c | 540 | } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { |
61ae935a | 541 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; |
e8aa8b6c F |
542 | } else { |
543 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
61ae935a | 544 | } |
e8aa8b6c F |
545 | } |
546 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 547 | |
e8aa8b6c | 548 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
aff8c126 | 549 | if (s->ext.status_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c | 550 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; |
61ae935a | 551 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
552 | } |
553 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 554 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
555 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
556 | if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
557 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; | |
61ae935a | 558 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
559 | } |
560 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 561 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
562 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
563 | if (send_certificate_request(s)) { | |
564 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
61ae935a | 565 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
566 | } |
567 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 568 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
569 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
570 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
571 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 572 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
573 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
574 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
575 | ||
576 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
577 | if (s->hit) { | |
61ae935a | 578 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
61ae935a | 579 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
aff8c126 | 580 | } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
581 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
582 | } else { | |
583 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
584 | } | |
585 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
586 | ||
587 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
588 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
589 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 590 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
591 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: |
592 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; | |
593 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
594 | ||
595 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
596 | if (s->hit) { | |
597 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
598 | } | |
599 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
e8aa8b6c | 600 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
601 | } |
602 | } | |
603 | ||
604 | /* | |
605 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
606 | * the server to the client. | |
607 | */ | |
8481f583 | 608 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 609 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 610 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 611 | |
e8aa8b6c | 612 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
613 | default: |
614 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
615 | break; | |
616 | ||
61ae935a MC |
617 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
618 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
619 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
f5c7f5df | 620 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
621 | break; |
622 | ||
623 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
624 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
625 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f5c7f5df | 626 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
627 | /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ |
628 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
629 | } | |
630 | break; | |
631 | ||
632 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
633 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
634 | /* | |
69687aa8 | 635 | * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and |
61ae935a MC |
636 | * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now |
637 | */ | |
638 | st->use_timer = 1; | |
639 | } | |
640 | break; | |
641 | ||
642 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
643 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
3ec8d113 MC |
644 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { |
645 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ | |
61ae935a | 646 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
3ec8d113 | 647 | } |
61ae935a MC |
648 | #endif |
649 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
650 | ||
651 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
30f05b19 MC |
652 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
653 | /* | |
654 | * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going | |
655 | * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off | |
656 | * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. | |
56d36288 | 657 | * |
3ec8d113 | 658 | * Calls SSLfatal as required. |
30f05b19 | 659 | */ |
2a8db717 | 660 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0); |
30f05b19 | 661 | } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
61ae935a MC |
662 | /* |
663 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
664 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer | |
665 | */ | |
666 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
667 | } | |
668 | break; | |
669 | ||
670 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
fc7129dc MC |
671 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
672 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
673 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
674 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 675 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
61ae935a MC |
676 | return WORK_ERROR; |
677 | } | |
678 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
679 | /* | |
680 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
681 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have | |
682 | * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, | |
683 | * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. | |
684 | */ | |
685 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
686 | } | |
687 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
688 | ||
d7f8783f | 689 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
c36001c3 MC |
690 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING |
691 | && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) | |
f7e393be MC |
692 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
693 | /* Fall through */ | |
694 | ||
61ae935a | 695 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
3ec8d113 | 696 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ |
2a8db717 | 697 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
698 | } |
699 | ||
700 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
701 | } | |
702 | ||
703 | /* | |
704 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
705 | * server to the client. | |
706 | */ | |
8481f583 | 707 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 708 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 709 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a MC |
710 | |
711 | s->init_num = 0; | |
712 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 713 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
714 | default: |
715 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
716 | break; | |
717 | ||
61ae935a MC |
718 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
719 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
720 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2c4a056f | 721 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 722 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c4a056f MC |
723 | return WORK_ERROR; |
724 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
725 | break; |
726 | ||
727 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
728 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
729 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
730 | /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ | |
2c4a056f | 731 | if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 732 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c4a056f MC |
733 | return WORK_ERROR; |
734 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
735 | /* |
736 | * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to | |
737 | * treat like it was the first packet | |
738 | */ | |
739 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
740 | break; | |
741 | ||
742 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
fc7129dc | 743 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
75259b43 MC |
744 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0 |
745 | && statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
597c51bc MC |
746 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
747 | break; | |
748 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
749 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
750 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
751 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
752 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
753 | ||
754 | /* | |
755 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no | |
756 | * SCTP used. | |
757 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
758 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
759 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
61ae935a MC |
760 | |
761 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
762 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
763 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
764 | 0) <= 0) { | |
3ec8d113 MC |
765 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
766 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK, | |
767 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
61ae935a MC |
768 | return WORK_ERROR; |
769 | } | |
770 | ||
771 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
772 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
773 | } | |
774 | #endif | |
db37d32c | 775 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
fc7129dc MC |
776 | || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 |
777 | && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)) | |
db37d32c MC |
778 | break; |
779 | /* Fall through */ | |
780 | ||
781 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
75259b43 MC |
782 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
783 | if (!statem_flush(s)) | |
784 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
fc7129dc | 785 | break; |
75259b43 | 786 | } |
92760c21 MC |
787 | /* |
788 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know | |
789 | * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted | |
790 | * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need | |
791 | * something clever in the record layer for this. | |
792 | */ | |
793 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
794 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
795 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3ec8d113 MC |
796 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { |
797 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe5e20fd | 798 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3ec8d113 | 799 | } |
fe5e20fd MC |
800 | |
801 | if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED | |
802 | && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3ec8d113 MC |
803 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
804 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
fe5e20fd | 805 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3ec8d113 | 806 | } |
db37d32c | 807 | break; |
92760c21 | 808 | } |
61ae935a | 809 | |
61ae935a MC |
810 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
811 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { | |
812 | /* | |
813 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
814 | * no SCTP used. | |
815 | */ | |
816 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
817 | 0, NULL); | |
818 | } | |
819 | #endif | |
820 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
a230b26e EK |
821 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
822 | { | |
f63a17d6 | 823 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
61ae935a MC |
824 | return WORK_ERROR; |
825 | } | |
826 | ||
827 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
828 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
829 | break; | |
830 | ||
831 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
832 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
833 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
834 | break; | |
835 | ||
836 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
837 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
838 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
839 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
840 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
841 | /* | |
842 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
843 | * no SCTP used. | |
844 | */ | |
845 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
846 | 0, NULL); | |
847 | } | |
848 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
849 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
850 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 851 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 MC |
852 | &s->session->master_key_length) |
853 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
854 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) | |
f63a17d6 | 855 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
92760c21 MC |
856 | return WORK_ERROR; |
857 | } | |
61ae935a | 858 | break; |
30f05b19 | 859 | |
44c04a2e | 860 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
57389a32 MC |
861 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) |
862 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
3ec8d113 MC |
863 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { |
864 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
57389a32 | 865 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3ec8d113 | 866 | } |
57389a32 MC |
867 | break; |
868 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
869 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
870 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
871 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
872 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
873 | } |
874 | ||
875 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
876 | } | |
877 | ||
878 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
879 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
880 | * server | |
61ae935a MC |
881 | * |
882 | * Valid return values are: | |
883 | * 1: Success | |
884 | * 0: Error | |
885 | */ | |
6392fb8e | 886 | int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
a15c953f | 887 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 888 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 889 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 890 | |
4a01c59f MC |
891 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
892 | default: | |
893 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
894 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
895 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, | |
896 | SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); | |
4a01c59f MC |
897 | return 0; |
898 | ||
899 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
5923ad4b | 900 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 901 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 902 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
903 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
904 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f | 905 | break; |
f3b3d7f0 | 906 | |
4a01c59f | 907 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
6392fb8e MC |
908 | *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; |
909 | *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 910 | break; |
61ae935a | 911 | |
4a01c59f MC |
912 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
913 | /* No construction function needed */ | |
6392fb8e MC |
914 | *confunc = NULL; |
915 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 916 | break; |
61ae935a | 917 | |
4a01c59f | 918 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
6392fb8e MC |
919 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; |
920 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f | 921 | break; |
61ae935a | 922 | |
4a01c59f | 923 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
924 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; |
925 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f | 926 | break; |
61ae935a | 927 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
928 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: |
929 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; | |
930 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; | |
931 | break; | |
932 | ||
933 | ||
4a01c59f | 934 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
6392fb8e MC |
935 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; |
936 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f | 937 | break; |
61ae935a | 938 | |
4a01c59f | 939 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
6392fb8e MC |
940 | *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; |
941 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 942 | break; |
61ae935a | 943 | |
4a01c59f | 944 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
6392fb8e MC |
945 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; |
946 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
4a01c59f | 947 | break; |
61ae935a | 948 | |
4a01c59f | 949 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
6392fb8e MC |
950 | *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; |
951 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; | |
4a01c59f | 952 | break; |
61ae935a | 953 | |
4a01c59f | 954 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
6392fb8e MC |
955 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; |
956 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; | |
4a01c59f | 957 | break; |
61ae935a | 958 | |
4a01c59f | 959 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
960 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
961 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 962 | break; |
e46f2334 | 963 | |
f7e393be MC |
964 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
965 | *confunc = NULL; | |
966 | *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; | |
967 | break; | |
968 | ||
e46f2334 MC |
969 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: |
970 | *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; | |
971 | *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
972 | break; | |
7d061fce | 973 | |
44c04a2e MC |
974 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
975 | *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; | |
976 | *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; | |
977 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 978 | } |
61ae935a | 979 | |
5923ad4b | 980 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
981 | } |
982 | ||
8a18bc25 AG |
983 | /* |
984 | * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, | |
985 | * calculated as follows: | |
986 | * | |
987 | * 2 + # client_version | |
988 | * 32 + # only valid length for random | |
989 | * 1 + # length of session_id | |
990 | * 32 + # maximum size for session_id | |
991 | * 2 + # length of cipher suites | |
992 | * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array | |
993 | * 1 + # length of compression_methods | |
994 | * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods | |
995 | * 2 + # length of extensions | |
996 | * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions | |
997 | */ | |
998 | #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 | |
999 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1000 | #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 |
1001 | #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 | |
1002 | ||
1003 | /* | |
1004 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
1005 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
1006 | */ | |
eda75751 | 1007 | size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 1008 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1009 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1010 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1011 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1012 | default: |
1013 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1014 | return 0; | |
1015 | ||
61ae935a | 1016 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
8a18bc25 | 1017 | return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; |
61ae935a | 1018 | |
ef6c191b MC |
1019 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
1020 | return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1021 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1022 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: |
1023 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
1024 | ||
1025 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1026 | return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1027 | ||
1028 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1029 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
1030 | ||
1031 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1032 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1033 | return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1034 | #endif | |
1035 | ||
1036 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1037 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1038 | ||
1039 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1040 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1041 | |
1042 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1043 | return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1044 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1045 | } |
1046 | ||
1047 | /* | |
1048 | * Process a message that the server has received from the client. | |
1049 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1050 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
61ae935a | 1051 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1052 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1053 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1054 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1055 | default: |
1056 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
3ec8d113 MC |
1057 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1058 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE, | |
1059 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1060 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
1061 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1062 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1063 | return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); | |
1064 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
1065 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
1066 | return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt); | |
1067 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1068 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: |
1069 | return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); | |
1070 | ||
1071 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1072 | return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
1073 | ||
1074 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1075 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
1076 | ||
1077 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1078 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1079 | return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); | |
1080 | #endif | |
1081 | ||
1082 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1083 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
1084 | ||
1085 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1086 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1087 | |
1088 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1089 | return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); | |
1090 | ||
61ae935a | 1091 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1092 | } |
1093 | ||
1094 | /* | |
1095 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
1096 | * from the client | |
1097 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1098 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 1099 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1100 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1101 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1102 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1103 | default: |
1104 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
3ec8d113 MC |
1105 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1106 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, | |
1107 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1108 | return WORK_ERROR; |
1109 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1110 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1111 | return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); | |
1112 | ||
1113 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1114 | return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); | |
61ae935a | 1115 | } |
92760c21 | 1116 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
1117 | } |
1118 | ||
edc032b5 | 1119 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1120 | /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */ |
1121 | static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s) | |
0f113f3e | 1122 | { |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1123 | int ret; |
1124 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1125 | |
1126 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && | |
1127 | (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { | |
1128 | if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { | |
1129 | /* | |
1130 | * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp | |
1131 | * login name | |
1132 | */ | |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1133 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, |
1134 | SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, | |
1135 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
1136 | return -1; | |
0f113f3e | 1137 | } else { |
29bfd5b7 MC |
1138 | ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, &al); |
1139 | if (ret < 0) | |
1140 | return 0; | |
1141 | if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { | |
1142 | SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO, | |
1143 | al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY | |
1144 | ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND | |
1145 | : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
1146 | return -1; | |
1147 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
1148 | } |
1149 | } | |
29bfd5b7 | 1150 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1151 | } |
edc032b5 BL |
1152 | #endif |
1153 | ||
c536b6be | 1154 | int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, |
cb150cbc | 1155 | size_t cookie_len) |
8ba708e5 | 1156 | { |
8ba708e5 | 1157 | /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ |
c536b6be MC |
1158 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) |
1159 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) | |
1160 | return 0; | |
8ba708e5 | 1161 | |
c536b6be | 1162 | return 1; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1163 | } |
1164 | ||
7cea05dc | 1165 | int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1166 | { |
cb150cbc | 1167 | unsigned int cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1168 | if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || |
1169 | s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, | |
cb150cbc MC |
1170 | &cookie_leni) == 0 || |
1171 | cookie_leni > 255) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1172 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, |
1173 | SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1174 | return 0; |
1175 | } | |
cb150cbc | 1176 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 | 1177 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1178 | if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
1179 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1180 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, |
1181 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
c536b6be MC |
1182 | return 0; |
1183 | } | |
8ba708e5 | 1184 | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1185 | return 1; |
1186 | } | |
1187 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1188 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1189 | /*- | |
1190 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
1191 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. | |
1192 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: | |
1193 | * SNI, | |
1194 | * elliptic_curves | |
1195 | * ec_point_formats | |
33564cb7 | 1196 | * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only) |
805a2e9e MC |
1197 | * |
1198 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
1199 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
1200 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
1201 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
1202 | */ | |
1203 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) | |
1204 | { | |
805a2e9e MC |
1205 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { |
1206 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
1207 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
1208 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
1209 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
1210 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
1211 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
1212 | ||
1213 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
1214 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
1215 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
1216 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
1217 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ | |
1218 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ | |
1219 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
1220 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
1221 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
1222 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
1223 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
1224 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
1225 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
1226 | }; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1227 | /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ |
1228 | static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; | |
1266eefd MC |
1229 | unsigned int type; |
1230 | PACKET sni, tmppkt; | |
1231 | size_t ext_len; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1232 | |
1233 | tmppkt = hello->extensions; | |
1234 | ||
1235 | if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) | |
1236 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) | |
1237 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { | |
1238 | return; | |
6b473aca MC |
1239 | } |
1240 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1241 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
1242 | return; | |
1243 | ||
1244 | ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? | |
1245 | sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; | |
1246 | ||
1247 | s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, | |
1248 | ext_len); | |
6b473aca | 1249 | } |
805a2e9e | 1250 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
6b473aca | 1251 | |
be3583fa | 1252 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 1253 | { |
e27f234a | 1254 | /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ |
1ab3836b | 1255 | PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; |
6e3ff632 | 1256 | static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; |
6b1bb98f | 1257 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello; |
e27f234a | 1258 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1259 | clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); |
1260 | if (clienthello == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1261 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1262 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1263 | goto err; |
1264 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
1265 | /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ |
1266 | if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { | |
db0f35dd TS |
1267 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { |
1268 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
1269 | goto err; | |
1270 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
1271 | s->renegotiate = 1; |
1272 | s->new_session = 1; | |
1273 | } | |
1274 | ||
1ab3836b | 1275 | /* |
b1b4b543 | 1276 | * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. |
1ab3836b | 1277 | */ |
6b1bb98f | 1278 | clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); |
bbafa47b | 1279 | PACKET_null_init(&cookie); |
1ab3836b | 1280 | |
6b1bb98f | 1281 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
9ceb2426 | 1282 | unsigned int mt; |
b1b4b543 | 1283 | |
fc7129dc MC |
1284 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) |
1285 | || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1286 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1287 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
1288 | goto err; | |
7d061fce MC |
1289 | } |
1290 | ||
32ec4153 MC |
1291 | /*- |
1292 | * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 | |
1293 | * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS | |
1294 | * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes | |
1295 | * the rest right through. Its format is: | |
1296 | * Byte Content | |
1297 | * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer | |
1298 | * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here | |
1299 | * 3-4 version | |
1300 | * 5-6 cipher_spec_length | |
1301 | * 7-8 session_id_length | |
1302 | * 9-10 challenge_length | |
1303 | * ... ... | |
1304 | */ | |
1305 | ||
73999b62 | 1306 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) |
a230b26e | 1307 | || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1308 | /* |
1309 | * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record | |
1310 | * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record | |
1311 | * in the first place | |
1312 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1313 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1314 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
d45ba43d | 1315 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1316 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1317 | } |
1318 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1319 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1320 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1321 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1ab3836b | 1322 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1323 | } |
1324 | ||
b3e2272c | 1325 | /* Parse the message and load client random. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1326 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1327 | /* |
1328 | * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello | |
1329 | * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. | |
e2994cf0 | 1330 | * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. |
32ec4153 | 1331 | */ |
1ab3836b | 1332 | unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; |
b3e2272c | 1333 | PACKET challenge; |
0f113f3e | 1334 | |
1ab3836b | 1335 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) |
a230b26e EK |
1336 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) |
1337 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1338 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1339 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1340 | goto err; | |
5e9f0eeb | 1341 | } |
0f113f3e | 1342 | |
293b5ca4 | 1343 | if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1344 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1345 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1346 | goto err; | |
293b5ca4 AG |
1347 | } |
1348 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1349 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
1ab3836b | 1350 | ciphersuite_len) |
6b1bb98f | 1351 | || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) |
73999b62 | 1352 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) |
b3e2272c | 1353 | /* No extensions. */ |
73999b62 | 1354 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1355 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1356 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1357 | goto err; | |
9ceb2426 | 1358 | } |
6b1bb98f | 1359 | clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; |
9ceb2426 | 1360 | |
fba7b84c | 1361 | /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
6b1bb98f | 1362 | * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit |
fba7b84c | 1363 | * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if |
6b1bb98f | 1364 | * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. |
fba7b84c MC |
1365 | */ |
1366 | challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1367 | ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; | |
6b1bb98f | 1368 | memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
b3e2272c | 1369 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, |
6b1bb98f | 1370 | clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - |
cb21df32 DB |
1371 | challenge_len, challenge_len) |
1372 | /* Advertise only null compression. */ | |
1373 | || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1374 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1375 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1376 | goto err; | |
9ceb2426 | 1377 | } |
b3e2272c | 1378 | |
6b1bb98f | 1379 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
0f113f3e | 1380 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1381 | /* Regular ClientHello. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1382 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) |
e2994cf0 | 1383 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) |
6b1bb98f | 1384 | || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, |
e2994cf0 | 1385 | SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1386 | &clienthello->session_id_len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1387 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1388 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1389 | goto err; | |
9ceb2426 | 1390 | } |
32ec4153 | 1391 | |
b3e2272c | 1392 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 1393 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1394 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1395 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1396 | goto err; | |
32ec4153 | 1397 | } |
6b1bb98f | 1398 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1ab3836b | 1399 | DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1400 | &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1401 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1402 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1403 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b | 1404 | } |
b3e2272c EK |
1405 | /* |
1406 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, | |
1407 | * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. | |
1408 | * So check cookie length... | |
1409 | */ | |
1410 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1411 | if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) |
eb5fd03b | 1412 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
b3e2272c | 1413 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1414 | } |
0f113f3e | 1415 | |
6b1bb98f | 1416 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1417 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1418 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1419 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b MC |
1420 | } |
1421 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1422 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1423 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1424 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1425 | goto err; | |
b3e2272c | 1426 | } |
1ab3836b | 1427 | |
b3e2272c | 1428 | /* Could be empty. */ |
1ab3836b | 1429 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { |
6b1bb98f | 1430 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
1ab3836b | 1431 | } else { |
ef57a475 MC |
1432 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions) |
1433 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1434 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1435 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1436 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b MC |
1437 | } |
1438 | } | |
1439 | } | |
1440 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1441 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, |
e2994cf0 | 1442 | MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, |
6b1bb98f | 1443 | &clienthello->compressions_len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1444 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1445 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1446 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b MC |
1447 | } |
1448 | ||
b1b4b543 | 1449 | /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ |
6b1bb98f | 1450 | extensions = clienthello->extensions; |
fe874d27 | 1451 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f63a17d6 | 1452 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, |
735d5b59 | 1453 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1454 | /* SSLfatal already been called */ |
1455 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b | 1456 | } |
6b1bb98f | 1457 | s->clienthello = clienthello; |
1ab3836b | 1458 | |
6b1bb98f | 1459 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
6b1bb98f | 1460 | |
f63a17d6 | 1461 | err: |
fbaf2857 RS |
1462 | if (clienthello != NULL) |
1463 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1464 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello); |
1465 | ||
1466 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1467 | } | |
1468 | ||
f63a17d6 | 1469 | static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s) |
6b1bb98f BK |
1470 | { |
1471 | unsigned int j; | |
bf846a6d | 1472 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1473 | int protverr; |
1474 | size_t loop; | |
1475 | unsigned long id; | |
1476 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1477 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; | |
1478 | #endif | |
1479 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
1480 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; | |
1481 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; | |
1482 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; | |
f7f2a01d | 1483 | DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; |
6b1bb98f | 1484 | |
1ab3836b | 1485 | /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ |
a9c0d8be DB |
1486 | /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */ |
1487 | if (s->ctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) { | |
a9c0d8be | 1488 | /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */ |
f1b97da1 DB |
1489 | switch (s->ctx->client_hello_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) { |
1490 | case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS: | |
1491 | break; | |
1492 | case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY: | |
a9c0d8be | 1493 | s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB; |
f1b97da1 DB |
1494 | return -1; |
1495 | case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR: | |
1496 | default: | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1497 | SSLfatal(s, al, |
1498 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1499 | SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); | |
f1b97da1 | 1500 | goto err; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1501 | } |
1502 | } | |
1ab3836b MC |
1503 | |
1504 | /* Set up the client_random */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1505 | memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
1ab3836b MC |
1506 | |
1507 | /* Choose the version */ | |
1508 | ||
6b1bb98f BK |
1509 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
1510 | if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION | |
1511 | || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) | |
b1b4b543 MC |
1512 | != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { |
1513 | /* | |
f63a17d6 | 1514 | * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't |
b1b4b543 MC |
1515 | * support it. |
1516 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1517 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1518 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1519 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); | |
1ab3836b MC |
1520 | goto err; |
1521 | } | |
b1b4b543 | 1522 | /* SSLv3/TLS */ |
6b1bb98f | 1523 | s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1524 | } |
1525 | /* | |
1526 | * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check | |
1527 | * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. | |
1528 | */ | |
1529 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1530 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); |
1ab3836b | 1531 | } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && |
6b1bb98f | 1532 | DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1533 | protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; |
1534 | } else { | |
1535 | protverr = 0; | |
1536 | } | |
1537 | ||
1538 | if (protverr) { | |
7d061fce | 1539 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
b1b4b543 | 1540 | /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ |
6b1bb98f | 1541 | s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b | 1542 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
1543 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1544 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); | |
6b1bb98f | 1545 | goto err; |
b3e2272c EK |
1546 | } |
1547 | ||
635b7d3f | 1548 | /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */ |
9e0ac6a2 | 1549 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1550 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
1551 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1552 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
9e0ac6a2 MC |
1553 | goto err; |
1554 | } | |
1555 | ||
1ed65871 DB |
1556 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1557 | /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ | |
1558 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1559 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1560 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1561 | clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1562 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1563 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1564 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
6b1bb98f | 1565 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1566 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */ |
1567 | } | |
a230b26e | 1568 | /* default verification */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1569 | } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len |
1570 | || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, | |
1ab3836b | 1571 | s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1572 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1573 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1574 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
6b1bb98f | 1575 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1576 | } |
1577 | s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; | |
1578 | } | |
1579 | if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { | |
f7f2a01d | 1580 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd); |
1ed65871 | 1581 | if (protverr != 0) { |
1ed65871 | 1582 | s->version = s->client_version; |
f63a17d6 MC |
1583 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, |
1584 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); | |
6b1bb98f | 1585 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1586 | } |
1587 | } | |
1588 | } | |
1589 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1590 | s->hit = 0; |
1591 | ||
0de6d66d | 1592 | if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
f63a17d6 | 1593 | clienthello->isv2) || |
0de6d66d | 1594 | !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, |
dd5a4279 | 1595 | clienthello->isv2, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 | 1596 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
0de6d66d MC |
1597 | goto err; |
1598 | } | |
1599 | ||
1600 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; | |
1601 | /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ | |
1602 | if (scsvs != NULL) { | |
1603 | for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { | |
1604 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); | |
1605 | if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { | |
1606 | if (s->renegotiate) { | |
1607 | /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1608 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1609 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1610 | SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); | |
0de6d66d MC |
1611 | goto err; |
1612 | } | |
1613 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
1614 | } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && | |
1615 | !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { | |
1616 | /* | |
1617 | * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried | |
1618 | * a higher version. We should fail if the current version | |
1619 | * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first | |
1620 | * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger | |
1621 | * an insecure downgrade. | |
1622 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1623 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK, |
1624 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1625 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
0de6d66d MC |
1626 | goto err; |
1627 | } | |
1628 | } | |
1629 | } | |
1630 | ||
1631 | /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */ | |
1632 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1633 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = | |
1634 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
1635 | ||
1636 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1637 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1638 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1639 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
0de6d66d MC |
1640 | goto err; |
1641 | } | |
fc7129dc | 1642 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING |
abeb2a63 MC |
1643 | && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL |
1644 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) { | |
0de6d66d MC |
1645 | /* |
1646 | * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we | |
1647 | * just selected. Something must have changed. | |
1648 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1649 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1650 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1651 | SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); | |
0de6d66d MC |
1652 | goto err; |
1653 | } | |
1654 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; | |
1655 | } | |
1656 | ||
1ab3836b | 1657 | /* We need to do this before getting the session */ |
70af3d8e | 1658 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, |
fe874d27 | 1659 | SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1660 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) { |
1661 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1662 | goto err; |
1ab3836b MC |
1663 | } |
1664 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1665 | /* |
1666 | * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. | |
1667 | * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. | |
1668 | * | |
1669 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in | |
1670 | * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally | |
1671 | * ignore resumption requests with flag | |
1672 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather | |
1673 | * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on | |
1674 | * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). | |
1675 | * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to | |
1676 | * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains | |
1677 | * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the | |
1678 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be | |
1679 | * ignored. | |
1680 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1681 | if (clienthello->isv2 || |
b3e2272c EK |
1682 | (s->new_session && |
1683 | (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1684 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { |
1685 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
b3e2272c | 1686 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 1687 | } |
b3e2272c | 1688 | } else { |
f63a17d6 | 1689 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello); |
128ae276 | 1690 | if (i == 1) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1691 | /* previous session */ |
1692 | s->hit = 1; | |
1693 | } else if (i == -1) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1694 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
6b1bb98f | 1695 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1696 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1697 | /* i == 0 */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1698 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) { |
1699 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
32ec4153 | 1700 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 1701 | } |
0f113f3e | 1702 | } |
b3e2272c | 1703 | } |
0f113f3e | 1704 | |
a5816a5a MC |
1705 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1706 | memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id, | |
1707 | s->clienthello->session_id_len); | |
1708 | s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len; | |
1709 | } | |
1710 | ||
a055a881 | 1711 | /* |
0de6d66d MC |
1712 | * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check |
1713 | * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption. | |
a055a881 MC |
1714 | */ |
1715 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) { | |
b3e2272c EK |
1716 | j = 0; |
1717 | id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
d02b48c6 | 1718 | |
413c4f45 | 1719 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
a230b26e | 1720 | fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); |
413c4f45 | 1721 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1722 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
1723 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
413c4f45 | 1724 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
b3e2272c EK |
1725 | fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", |
1726 | i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); | |
88f2a4cf | 1727 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1728 | if (c->id == id) { |
1729 | j = 1; | |
1730 | break; | |
32ec4153 | 1731 | } |
0f113f3e | 1732 | } |
b3e2272c | 1733 | if (j == 0) { |
ec30e856 | 1734 | /* |
b3e2272c EK |
1735 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked |
1736 | * to reuse it | |
ec30e856 | 1737 | */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1738 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1739 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1740 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); | |
6b1bb98f | 1741 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1742 | } |
b3e2272c | 1743 | } |
9ceb2426 | 1744 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1745 | for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { |
1746 | if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) | |
b3e2272c | 1747 | break; |
0f113f3e | 1748 | } |
32ec4153 | 1749 | |
6b1bb98f | 1750 | if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
b3e2272c | 1751 | /* no compress */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1752 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
1753 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1754 | SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); | |
6b1bb98f | 1755 | goto err; |
b3e2272c | 1756 | } |
f100b031 | 1757 | |
805a2e9e MC |
1758 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1759 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) | |
6b1bb98f | 1760 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); |
805a2e9e MC |
1761 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
1762 | ||
0f113f3e | 1763 | /* TLS extensions */ |
fe874d27 | 1764 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1765 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
1766 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1767 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1768 | } |
1769 | ||
1770 | /* | |
1771 | * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake | |
1772 | * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before | |
1773 | * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket | |
1774 | * processing to use it in key derivation. | |
1775 | */ | |
1776 | { | |
1777 | unsigned char *pos; | |
1778 | pos = s->s3->server_random; | |
f7f2a01d | 1779 | if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1780 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1781 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1782 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
6b1bb98f | 1783 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1784 | } |
1785 | } | |
1786 | ||
0de6d66d MC |
1787 | if (!s->hit |
1788 | && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION | |
1789 | && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1790 | && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) | |
1791 | && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { | |
4a640fb6 | 1792 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; |
8c1a5343 MC |
1793 | /* |
1794 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1795 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1796 | */ | |
1797 | int master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e | 1798 | |
8c1a5343 | 1799 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
aff8c126 | 1800 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, |
8c1a5343 | 1801 | &master_key_length, ciphers, |
0f113f3e | 1802 | &pref_cipher, |
aff8c126 | 1803 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) |
8c1a5343 MC |
1804 | && master_key_length > 0) { |
1805 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1806 | s->hit = 1; |
1807 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; | |
1808 | s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | |
1809 | ||
1810 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1811 | ||
1812 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ | |
3f4bf115 DSH |
1813 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) |
1814 | pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, | |
1815 | SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
0f113f3e | 1816 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1817 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1818 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1819 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
6b1bb98f | 1820 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1821 | } |
1822 | ||
1823 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; | |
25aaa98a | 1824 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); |
0f113f3e | 1825 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
25aaa98a | 1826 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
0f113f3e MC |
1827 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
1828 | } | |
1829 | } | |
58ece833 | 1830 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1831 | /* |
1832 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other | |
b2ce0337 | 1833 | * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression |
0f113f3e MC |
1834 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q. |
1835 | */ | |
1836 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; | |
1fe35494 MC |
1837 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1838 | /* | |
1839 | * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in | |
1840 | * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in | |
1841 | * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello. | |
1842 | */ | |
1843 | if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1844 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1845 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1846 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
1fe35494 MC |
1847 | goto err; |
1848 | } | |
1849 | } | |
09b6c2ef | 1850 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e | 1851 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ |
1fe35494 | 1852 | else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { |
0f113f3e | 1853 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; |
9ceb2426 | 1854 | unsigned int k; |
0f113f3e MC |
1855 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ |
1856 | /* Can't disable compression */ | |
1857 | if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1858 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1859 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1860 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); | |
6b1bb98f | 1861 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1862 | } |
1863 | /* Look for resumed compression method */ | |
1864 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { | |
1865 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1866 | if (comp_id == comp->id) { | |
1867 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1868 | break; | |
1869 | } | |
1870 | } | |
1871 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1872 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1873 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1874 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
6b1bb98f | 1875 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1876 | } |
1877 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1878 | for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { |
1879 | if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1880 | break; |
1881 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1882 | if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1883 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1884 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1885 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); | |
6b1bb98f | 1886 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1887 | } |
c19602b5 | 1888 | } else if (s->hit) { |
0f113f3e | 1889 | comp = NULL; |
1fe35494 | 1890 | } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { |
df6741c9 | 1891 | /* See if we have a match */ |
9ceb2426 MC |
1892 | int m, nn, v, done = 0; |
1893 | unsigned int o; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1894 | |
1895 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1896 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { | |
1897 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1898 | v = comp->id; | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1899 | for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { |
1900 | if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1901 | done = 1; |
1902 | break; | |
1903 | } | |
1904 | } | |
1905 | if (done) | |
1906 | break; | |
1907 | } | |
1908 | if (done) | |
1909 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1910 | else | |
1911 | comp = NULL; | |
1912 | } | |
e6f418bc | 1913 | #else |
0f113f3e MC |
1914 | /* |
1915 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1916 | * using compression. | |
1917 | */ | |
1918 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1919 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1920 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1921 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); | |
6b1bb98f | 1922 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1923 | } |
09b6c2ef | 1924 | #endif |
413c4f45 | 1925 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1926 | /* |
1927 | * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher | |
1928 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 1929 | |
a055a881 | 1930 | if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
25aaa98a | 1931 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); |
0f113f3e MC |
1932 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; |
1933 | if (ciphers == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1934 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1935 | SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1936 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
6b1bb98f | 1937 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1938 | } |
1939 | ciphers = NULL; | |
69b2d393 MC |
1940 | } |
1941 | ||
1942 | if (!s->hit) { | |
1943 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1944 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; | |
1945 | #else | |
1946 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; | |
1947 | #endif | |
0f113f3e | 1948 | if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 1949 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
0f113f3e MC |
1950 | goto err; |
1951 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
1952 | } |
1953 | ||
1954 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1955 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
1956 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1957 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
1958 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
1959 | return 1; | |
e27f234a | 1960 | err: |
e27f234a | 1961 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); |
6b1bb98f BK |
1962 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
1963 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1964 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
1965 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 1966 | |
6b1bb98f | 1967 | return 0; |
e27f234a MC |
1968 | } |
1969 | ||
24b8e4b2 MC |
1970 | /* |
1971 | * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
f63a17d6 | 1972 | * Upon failure, returns 0. |
24b8e4b2 | 1973 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 1974 | static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s) |
24b8e4b2 | 1975 | { |
aff8c126 | 1976 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1977 | |
1978 | /* | |
1979 | * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be | |
1980 | * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, | |
1981 | * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may | |
1982 | * influence which certificate is sent | |
1983 | */ | |
aff8c126 RS |
1984 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL |
1985 | && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { | |
24b8e4b2 | 1986 | int ret; |
1266eefd | 1987 | |
24b8e4b2 | 1988 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ |
a497cf25 | 1989 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) { |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1990 | /* |
1991 | * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate | |
1992 | * et al can pick it up. | |
1993 | */ | |
a497cf25 | 1994 | s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert; |
aff8c126 | 1995 | ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1996 | switch (ret) { |
1997 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | |
1998 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
aff8c126 | 1999 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2000 | break; |
2001 | /* status request response should be sent */ | |
2002 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | |
aff8c126 RS |
2003 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) |
2004 | s->ext.status_expected = 1; | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2005 | break; |
2006 | /* something bad happened */ | |
2007 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
2008 | default: | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2009 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2010 | SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST, | |
2011 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2012 | return 0; |
2013 | } | |
2014 | } | |
2015 | } | |
2016 | ||
2017 | return 1; | |
2018 | } | |
2019 | ||
5626f634 BK |
2020 | /* |
2021 | * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
29bfd5b7 | 2022 | * Upon failure, returns 0. |
5626f634 | 2023 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 2024 | int tls_handle_alpn(SSL *s) |
5626f634 BK |
2025 | { |
2026 | const unsigned char *selected = NULL; | |
2027 | unsigned char selected_len = 0; | |
2028 | ||
2029 | if (s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) { | |
2030 | int r = s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, | |
2031 | s->s3->alpn_proposed, | |
2032 | (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len, | |
2033 | s->ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg); | |
2034 | ||
2035 | if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
2036 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); | |
2037 | s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); | |
2038 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2039 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, |
2040 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5626f634 BK |
2041 | return 0; |
2042 | } | |
2043 | s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; | |
2044 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
2045 | /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ | |
2046 | s->s3->npn_seen = 0; | |
2047 | #endif | |
630369d9 | 2048 | |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2049 | /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ |
2050 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL | |
630369d9 MC |
2051 | || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len |
2052 | || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected, | |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2053 | selected_len) != 0) { |
2054 | /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ | |
630369d9 MC |
2055 | s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; |
2056 | ||
4be3a7c7 MC |
2057 | if (!s->hit) { |
2058 | /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */ | |
2059 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, | |
2060 | selected_len); | |
2061 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2062 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2063 | SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, | |
2064 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
4be3a7c7 MC |
2065 | return 0; |
2066 | } | |
2067 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len; | |
2068 | } | |
2069 | } | |
2070 | ||
5626f634 | 2071 | return 1; |
630369d9 | 2072 | } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2073 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN, |
2074 | SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); | |
5626f634 BK |
2075 | return 0; |
2076 | } | |
630369d9 MC |
2077 | /* |
2078 | * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was | |
2079 | * present. | |
2080 | */ | |
5626f634 BK |
2081 | } |
2082 | ||
4be3a7c7 MC |
2083 | /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */ |
2084 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { | |
2085 | /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */ | |
630369d9 | 2086 | s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; |
4be3a7c7 | 2087 | } |
630369d9 | 2088 | |
5626f634 BK |
2089 | return 1; |
2090 | } | |
2091 | ||
be3583fa | 2092 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
e27f234a | 2093 | { |
4a640fb6 | 2094 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
e27f234a MC |
2095 | |
2096 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2097 | int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s); |
6b1bb98f | 2098 | if (rv == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2099 | /* SSLfatal() was already called */ |
2100 | goto err; | |
6b1bb98f BK |
2101 | } |
2102 | if (rv < 0) | |
2103 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2104 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; | |
2105 | } | |
2106 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { | |
a055a881 | 2107 | if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
e27f234a | 2108 | /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ |
0de6d66d | 2109 | if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2110 | int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); |
2111 | if (rv == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2112 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2113 | SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
2114 | SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); | |
2115 | goto err; | |
e27f234a MC |
2116 | } |
2117 | if (rv < 0) { | |
2118 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
6b1bb98f | 2119 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
e27f234a MC |
2120 | } |
2121 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
0f113f3e | 2122 | } |
e27f234a | 2123 | |
0de6d66d MC |
2124 | /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */ |
2125 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2126 | cipher = | |
2127 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
2128 | ||
2129 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2130 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
2131 | SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
2132 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
2133 | goto err; | |
0de6d66d MC |
2134 | } |
2135 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; | |
11c67eea | 2136 | } |
69b2d393 | 2137 | if (!s->hit) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2138 | if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) { |
2139 | /* SSLfatal already called */ | |
2140 | goto err; | |
2141 | } | |
69b2d393 MC |
2142 | /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ |
2143 | if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) | |
2144 | s->session->not_resumable = | |
8acc2799 MC |
2145 | s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, |
2146 | ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey | |
2147 | & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); | |
69b2d393 MC |
2148 | if (s->session->not_resumable) |
2149 | /* do not send a session ticket */ | |
2150 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; | |
2151 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2152 | } else { |
2153 | /* Session-id reuse */ | |
2154 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; | |
0f113f3e | 2155 | } |
0f113f3e | 2156 | |
e27f234a MC |
2157 | /*- |
2158 | * we now have the following setup. | |
2159 | * client_random | |
60250017 | 2160 | * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers |
2161 | * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers | |
e27f234a MC |
2162 | * compression - basically ignored right now |
2163 | * ssl version is set - sslv3 | |
2164 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. | |
2165 | * s->hit - session reuse flag | |
2166 | * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. | |
2167 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 2168 | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
2169 | /* |
2170 | * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the | |
2171 | * certificate callbacks etc above. | |
2172 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2173 | if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) { |
2174 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2175 | goto err; | |
e27f234a | 2176 | } |
5626f634 BK |
2177 | /* |
2178 | * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and | |
630369d9 MC |
2179 | * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3 |
2180 | * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and | |
2181 | * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data. | |
5626f634 | 2182 | */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2183 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) { |
2184 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2185 | goto err; | |
5626f634 | 2186 | } |
0f113f3e | 2187 | |
6b1bb98f | 2188 | wst = WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a MC |
2189 | } |
2190 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
6b1bb98f | 2191 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { |
e27f234a | 2192 | int ret; |
29bfd5b7 | 2193 | if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) { |
e27f234a MC |
2194 | /* |
2195 | * callback indicates further work to be done | |
2196 | */ | |
2197 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
6b1bb98f | 2198 | return WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a | 2199 | } |
29bfd5b7 MC |
2200 | if (ret < 0) { |
2201 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
f63a17d6 | 2202 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2203 | } |
2204 | } | |
e27f234a | 2205 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 2206 | |
e27f234a | 2207 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
f63a17d6 | 2208 | err: |
e27f234a MC |
2209 | return WORK_ERROR; |
2210 | } | |
2211 | ||
7cea05dc | 2212 | int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2213 | { |
f63a17d6 | 2214 | int compm; |
ec60ccc1 | 2215 | size_t sl, len; |
f2342b7a | 2216 | int version; |
a5816a5a | 2217 | unsigned char *session_id; |
fc7129dc | 2218 | int usetls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING; |
0f113f3e | 2219 | |
597c51bc | 2220 | version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version; |
f2342b7a | 2221 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) |
8157d44b MC |
2222 | /* |
2223 | * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in | |
2224 | * tls_process_client_hello() | |
2225 | */ | |
597c51bc | 2226 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, |
fc7129dc | 2227 | s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING |
597c51bc MC |
2228 | ? hrrrandom : s->s3->server_random, |
2229 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2230 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, |
2231 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2232 | return 0; | |
8157d44b | 2233 | } |
0f113f3e | 2234 | |
e27f234a MC |
2235 | /*- |
2236 | * There are several cases for the session ID to send | |
2237 | * back in the server hello: | |
2238 | * - For session reuse from the session cache, | |
2239 | * we send back the old session ID. | |
2240 | * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) | |
2241 | * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" | |
2242 | * (which doesn't actually identify the session). | |
2243 | * - If it is a new session, we send back the new | |
2244 | * session ID. | |
2245 | * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, | |
2246 | * we send back a 0-length session ID. | |
a5816a5a MC |
2247 | * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client |
2248 | * regardless | |
e27f234a MC |
2249 | * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, |
2250 | * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed | |
2251 | * to send back. | |
2252 | */ | |
2253 | if (s->session->not_resumable || | |
2254 | (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) | |
2255 | && !s->hit)) | |
2256 | s->session->session_id_length = 0; | |
2257 | ||
597c51bc | 2258 | if (usetls13) { |
a5816a5a MC |
2259 | sl = s->tmp_session_id_len; |
2260 | session_id = s->tmp_session_id; | |
2261 | } else { | |
2262 | sl = s->session->session_id_length; | |
2263 | session_id = s->session->session_id; | |
2264 | } | |
2265 | ||
ec60ccc1 | 2266 | if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2267 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, |
2268 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2269 | return 0; | |
e27f234a | 2270 | } |
0f113f3e | 2271 | |
8157d44b | 2272 | /* set up the compression method */ |
09b6c2ef | 2273 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
8157d44b | 2274 | compm = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 2275 | #else |
597c51bc | 2276 | if (usetls13 || s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
8157d44b | 2277 | compm = 0; |
e27f234a | 2278 | else |
8157d44b | 2279 | compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; |
09b6c2ef | 2280 | #endif |
e481f9b9 | 2281 | |
426dfc9f | 2282 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl) |
7cea05dc | 2283 | || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) |
88050dd1 | 2284 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm) |
7da160b0 | 2285 | || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
597c51bc | 2286 | s->hello_retry_request |
fc7129dc | 2287 | == SSL_HRR_PENDING |
597c51bc MC |
2288 | ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST |
2289 | : (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
2290 | ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | |
2291 | : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO), | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2292 | NULL, 0)) { |
2293 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2294 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 2295 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2296 | |
fc7129dc | 2297 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
597c51bc MC |
2298 | /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ |
2299 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
2300 | s->session = NULL; | |
2301 | s->hit = 0; | |
2302 | ||
2303 | /* | |
2304 | * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with | |
2305 | * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. | |
2306 | */ | |
43054d3d | 2307 | if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { |
597c51bc MC |
2308 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2309 | return 0; | |
2310 | } | |
2311 | } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) | |
2312 | && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2313 | /* SSLfatal() already called */; |
2314 | return 0; | |
aff9929b MC |
2315 | } |
2316 | ||
e27f234a | 2317 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 2318 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2319 | |
7cea05dc | 2320 | int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 2321 | { |
e27f234a | 2322 | if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
5923ad4b | 2323 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 | 2324 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
5923ad4b MC |
2325 | return 0; |
2326 | } | |
e27f234a | 2327 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2328 | return 1; |
2329 | } | |
2330 | ||
7cea05dc | 2331 | int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2332 | { |
bc36ee62 | 2333 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e2b420fd | 2334 | EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; |
ea262260 | 2335 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2336 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e | 2337 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
348240c6 | 2338 | size_t encodedlen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 2339 | int curve_id = 0; |
d02b48c6 | 2340 | #endif |
f695571e | 2341 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
f63a17d6 | 2342 | int i; |
0f113f3e | 2343 | unsigned long type; |
2ac6115d | 2344 | const BIGNUM *r[4]; |
bfb0641f | 2345 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
fe3066ee | 2346 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
c13d2a5b MC |
2347 | size_t paramlen, paramoffset; |
2348 | ||
5923ad4b | 2349 | if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2350 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2351 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2352 | goto err; | |
c13d2a5b | 2353 | } |
0f113f3e | 2354 | |
6e59a892 | 2355 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2356 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2357 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2358 | goto err; | |
6e59a892 | 2359 | } |
0f113f3e | 2360 | |
e27f234a | 2361 | type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
e27f234a | 2362 | |
e27f234a | 2363 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; |
85269210 | 2364 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a MC |
2365 | /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ |
2366 | if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
2367 | } else | |
85269210 | 2368 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
bc36ee62 | 2369 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e27f234a | 2370 | if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
94d61512 BL |
2371 | CERT *cert = s->cert; |
2372 | ||
e2b420fd DSH |
2373 | EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; |
2374 | DH *dh; | |
2375 | ||
e27f234a | 2376 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { |
e2b420fd DSH |
2377 | DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); |
2378 | pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2379 | if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { | |
2380 | DH_free(dhp); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2381 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2382 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2383 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2384 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2385 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2386 | EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); |
2387 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2388 | } else { | |
2389 | pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; | |
2390 | } | |
2391 | if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { | |
2392 | DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); | |
2393 | pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); | |
2394 | if (pkdh == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2395 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2396 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2397 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2398 | goto err; | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2399 | } |
2400 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2401 | } | |
2402 | if (pkdhp == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2403 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2404 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2405 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
2406 | goto err; | |
e27f234a MC |
2407 | } |
2408 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, | |
e2b420fd | 2409 | EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2410 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
2411 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2412 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
2413 | goto err; | |
e27f234a | 2414 | } |
e2b420fd | 2415 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2416 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2417 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2418 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
2419 | goto err; |
2420 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2421 | |
0a699a07 | 2422 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); |
e2b420fd | 2423 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 | 2424 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
ffaef3f1 | 2425 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2426 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2427 | |
2428 | dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2429 | ||
2430 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2431 | pkdh = NULL; | |
2432 | ||
0aeddcfa MC |
2433 | DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]); |
2434 | DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL); | |
e27f234a | 2435 | } else |
d02b48c6 | 2436 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2437 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a | 2438 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
e27f234a | 2439 | |
880d9d86 | 2440 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2441 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2442 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2443 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
2444 | goto err; |
2445 | } | |
2446 | ||
57be4444 | 2447 | /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ |
8841154a | 2448 | curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); |
57be4444 | 2449 | if (curve_id == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2450 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
2451 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2452 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); | |
e27f234a MC |
2453 | goto err; |
2454 | } | |
f63a17d6 | 2455 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); |
880d9d86 DSH |
2456 | /* Generate a new key for this curve */ |
2457 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2458 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2459 | goto err; | |
57be4444 DSH |
2460 | } |
2461 | ||
880d9d86 | 2462 | /* Encode the public key. */ |
ec24630a DSH |
2463 | encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, |
2464 | &encodedPoint); | |
e27f234a | 2465 | if (encodedlen == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2466 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2467 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
e27f234a MC |
2468 | goto err; |
2469 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2470 | |
e27f234a MC |
2471 | /* |
2472 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we | |
2473 | * can set these to NULLs | |
2474 | */ | |
2475 | r[0] = NULL; | |
2476 | r[1] = NULL; | |
2477 | r[2] = NULL; | |
2478 | r[3] = NULL; | |
2479 | } else | |
10bf4fc2 | 2480 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
edc032b5 | 2481 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a MC |
2482 | if (type & SSL_kSRP) { |
2483 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || | |
2484 | (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || | |
2485 | (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2486 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2487 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2488 | SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); | |
e27f234a | 2489 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2490 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2491 | r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; |
2492 | r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; | |
2493 | r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; | |
2494 | r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; | |
2495 | } else | |
2496 | #endif | |
2497 | { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2498 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2499 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2500 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); | |
2501 | goto err; | |
e27f234a | 2502 | } |
0f113f3e | 2503 | |
f695571e DSH |
2504 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) |
2505 | || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { | |
2506 | lu = NULL; | |
2507 | } else if (lu == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2508 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
2509 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2510 | goto err; | |
e27f234a | 2511 | } |
0f113f3e | 2512 | |
85269210 | 2513 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a | 2514 | if (type & SSL_PSK) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2515 | size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
2516 | ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); | |
2517 | ||
2518 | /* | |
2519 | * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already | |
2520 | * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case | |
2521 | */ | |
2522 | if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN | |
7cea05dc | 2523 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, |
c13d2a5b | 2524 | len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2525 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2526 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2527 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2528 | goto err; | |
85269210 | 2529 | } |
e27f234a | 2530 | } |
85269210 DSH |
2531 | #endif |
2532 | ||
e27f234a | 2533 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2534 | unsigned char *binval; |
2535 | int res; | |
2536 | ||
edc032b5 | 2537 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a | 2538 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { |
7cea05dc | 2539 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); |
e27f234a | 2540 | } else |
78a01b3f | 2541 | #endif |
7cea05dc | 2542 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2543 | |
2544 | if (!res) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2545 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2546 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2547 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2548 | goto err; | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2549 | } |
2550 | ||
78a01b3f | 2551 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
a230b26e | 2552 | /*- |
78a01b3f | 2553 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS |
2554 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length | |
2555 | * as the prime | |
2556 | */ | |
2557 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2558 | size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); |
ff819477 | 2559 | |
c13d2a5b | 2560 | if (len > 0) { |
7cea05dc | 2561 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2562 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2563 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2564 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2565 | goto err; | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2566 | } |
2567 | memset(binval, 0, len); | |
78a01b3f | 2568 | } |
c13d2a5b | 2569 | } |
edc032b5 | 2570 | #endif |
7cea05dc MC |
2571 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) |
2572 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2573 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2574 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2575 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2576 | goto err; | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2577 | } |
2578 | ||
2579 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); | |
e27f234a | 2580 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2581 | |
10bf4fc2 | 2582 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a MC |
2583 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2584 | /* | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2585 | * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the |
2586 | * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] | |
2587 | * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded | |
2588 | * point itself | |
e27f234a | 2589 | */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2590 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) |
2591 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
2592 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) | |
2593 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2594 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2595 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2596 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2597 | goto err; | |
c13d2a5b | 2598 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2599 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
2600 | encodedPoint = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2601 | } |
ea262260 BM |
2602 | #endif |
2603 | ||
e27f234a | 2604 | /* not anonymous */ |
f695571e | 2605 | if (lu != NULL) { |
a497cf25 | 2606 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2607 | const EVP_MD *md; |
2608 | unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs; | |
2609 | size_t siglen, tbslen; | |
2610 | int rv; | |
f695571e | 2611 | |
b2021556 | 2612 | if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { |
f695571e | 2613 | /* Should never happen */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2614 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2615 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2616 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2617 | goto err; | |
f695571e | 2618 | } |
f695571e DSH |
2619 | /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ |
2620 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2621 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2622 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2623 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2624 | goto err; | |
f695571e DSH |
2625 | } |
2626 | /* send signature algorithm */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2627 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { |
2628 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2629 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2630 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2631 | goto err; | |
2632 | } | |
f695571e DSH |
2633 | /* |
2634 | * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig | |
2635 | * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it | |
2636 | * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET | |
2637 | * afterwards. | |
2638 | */ | |
2639 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
2640 | if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) | |
2641 | || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2642 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2643 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2644 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2645 | goto err; | |
f695571e DSH |
2646 | } |
2647 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | |
2648 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 | |
2649 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2650 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2651 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2652 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
2653 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2654 | } |
f695571e | 2655 | } |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2656 | tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, |
2657 | s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, | |
2658 | paramlen); | |
2659 | if (tbslen == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2660 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2661 | goto err; | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2662 | } |
2663 | rv = EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen); | |
2664 | OPENSSL_free(tbs); | |
2665 | if (rv <= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) | |
f695571e | 2666 | || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2667 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2668 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2669 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2670 | goto err; | |
77d514c5 | 2671 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
2672 | } |
2673 | ||
bfb0641f | 2674 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2675 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 2676 | err: |
e2b420fd DSH |
2677 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
2678 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2679 | #endif | |
556efe79 | 2680 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
b548a1f1 | 2681 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
ea262260 | 2682 | #endif |
bfb0641f | 2683 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2684 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2685 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2686 | |
7cea05dc | 2687 | int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2688 | { |
03f44b97 DSH |
2689 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
2690 | /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */ | |
2691 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2692 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2693 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2694 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2695 | return 0; | |
03f44b97 | 2696 | } |
32f66107 | 2697 | |
fe874d27 MC |
2698 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
2699 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL, | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2700 | 0)) { |
2701 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2702 | return 0; | |
03f44b97 | 2703 | } |
32f66107 DSH |
2704 | goto done; |
2705 | } | |
2706 | ||
2707 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ | |
2708 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) | |
2709 | || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2710 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2711 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2712 | return 0; | |
28ff8ef3 | 2713 | } |
0f113f3e | 2714 | |
e27f234a | 2715 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
98c792d1 | 2716 | const uint16_t *psigs; |
a9669ddc | 2717 | size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); |
703bcee0 | 2718 | |
7cea05dc | 2719 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
8f12296e | 2720 | || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) |
7cea05dc MC |
2721 | || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) |
2722 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2723 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2724 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2725 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2726 | return 0; | |
28ff8ef3 | 2727 | } |
e27f234a | 2728 | } |
0f113f3e | 2729 | |
5d6cca05 | 2730 | if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2731 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2732 | return 0; | |
28ff8ef3 | 2733 | } |
e27f234a | 2734 | |
32f66107 | 2735 | done: |
e27f234a | 2736 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; |
e27f234a | 2737 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 2738 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2739 | |
f63a17d6 | 2740 | static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 2741 | { |
85269210 | 2742 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
0907d710 MC |
2743 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
2744 | size_t psklen; | |
2745 | PACKET psk_identity; | |
efcdbcbe | 2746 | |
0907d710 | 2747 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2748 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2749 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
0907d710 MC |
2750 | return 0; |
2751 | } | |
2752 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2753 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2754 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
0907d710 MC |
2755 | return 0; |
2756 | } | |
2757 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2758 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2759 | SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); | |
0907d710 MC |
2760 | return 0; |
2761 | } | |
85269210 | 2762 | |
0907d710 | 2763 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2764 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2765 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0907d710 MC |
2766 | return 0; |
2767 | } | |
85269210 | 2768 | |
0907d710 | 2769 | psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, |
a230b26e | 2770 | psk, sizeof(psk)); |
85269210 | 2771 | |
0907d710 | 2772 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2773 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2774 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0907d710 MC |
2775 | return 0; |
2776 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
2777 | /* | |
2778 | * PSK related to the given identity not found | |
2779 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2780 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, |
2781 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
2782 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
0907d710 MC |
2783 | return 0; |
2784 | } | |
85269210 | 2785 | |
0907d710 MC |
2786 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); |
2787 | s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); | |
2788 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); | |
85269210 | 2789 | |
0907d710 | 2790 | if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2791 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2792 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
0907d710 | 2793 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2794 | } |
0907d710 MC |
2795 | |
2796 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; | |
2797 | ||
2798 | return 1; | |
2799 | #else | |
2800 | /* Should never happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2801 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2802 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0907d710 | 2803 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2804 | #endif |
0907d710 MC |
2805 | } |
2806 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2807 | static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
0907d710 | 2808 | { |
bc36ee62 | 2809 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
0907d710 MC |
2810 | unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
2811 | int decrypt_len; | |
2812 | unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; | |
2813 | size_t j, padding_len; | |
2814 | PACKET enc_premaster; | |
2815 | RSA *rsa = NULL; | |
2816 | unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; | |
2817 | int ret = 0; | |
2818 | ||
d0ff28f8 | 2819 | rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey); |
0907d710 | 2820 | if (rsa == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2821 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, |
2822 | SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); | |
0907d710 MC |
2823 | return 0; |
2824 | } | |
2825 | ||
2826 | /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ | |
2827 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2828 | enc_premaster = *pkt; | |
2829 | } else { | |
2830 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) | |
2831 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2832 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, |
2833 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
0907d710 | 2834 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2835 | } |
0907d710 | 2836 | } |
0f113f3e | 2837 | |
0907d710 MC |
2838 | /* |
2839 | * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to | |
2840 | * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret | |
2841 | * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because | |
2842 | * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. | |
2843 | */ | |
2844 | if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2845 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, |
2846 | RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); | |
0907d710 MC |
2847 | return 0; |
2848 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2849 | |
0907d710 MC |
2850 | rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); |
2851 | if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2852 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, |
2853 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
0907d710 MC |
2854 | return 0; |
2855 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2856 | |
0907d710 MC |
2857 | /* |
2858 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of | |
2859 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, | |
2860 | * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and | |
2861 | * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt | |
2862 | * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 | |
2863 | */ | |
20ca916d | 2864 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2865 | if (ssl_randbytes(s, rand_premaster_secret, |
2866 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) { | |
2867 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, | |
2868 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0907d710 | 2869 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 2870 | } |
0f113f3e | 2871 | |
0907d710 MC |
2872 | /* |
2873 | * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of | |
2874 | * the timing-sensitive code below. | |
2875 | */ | |
348240c6 MC |
2876 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
2877 | decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), | |
2878 | PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), | |
2879 | rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2880 | if (decrypt_len < 0) { |
2881 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, | |
2882 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0907d710 | 2883 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 2884 | } |
20ca916d | 2885 | |
0907d710 | 2886 | /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ |
5b8fa431 | 2887 | |
0907d710 MC |
2888 | /* |
2889 | * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys | |
2890 | * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures | |
2891 | * PS is at least 8 bytes. | |
2892 | */ | |
2893 | if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2894 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, |
2895 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
0907d710 MC |
2896 | goto err; |
2897 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2898 | |
0907d710 MC |
2899 | padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
2900 | decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & | |
a230b26e | 2901 | constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); |
0907d710 MC |
2902 | for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { |
2903 | decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); | |
2904 | } | |
2905 | decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); | |
5b8fa431 | 2906 | |
0907d710 MC |
2907 | /* |
2908 | * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then | |
2909 | * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The | |
2910 | * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack | |
2911 | * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number | |
2912 | * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in | |
2913 | * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. | |
2914 | */ | |
2915 | version_good = | |
2916 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2917 | (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); | |
2918 | version_good &= | |
2919 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], | |
2920 | (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); | |
0f113f3e | 2921 | |
0907d710 MC |
2922 | /* |
2923 | * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the | |
2924 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the | |
2925 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). | |
2926 | * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol | |
2927 | * version instead if the server does not support the requested | |
2928 | * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such | |
2929 | * clients. | |
2930 | */ | |
2931 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { | |
2932 | unsigned char workaround_good; | |
2933 | workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2934 | (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); | |
2935 | workaround_good &= | |
5b8fa431 | 2936 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], |
0907d710 MC |
2937 | (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); |
2938 | version_good |= workaround_good; | |
2939 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2940 | |
0907d710 MC |
2941 | /* |
2942 | * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to | |
2943 | * remain non-zero (0xff). | |
2944 | */ | |
2945 | decrypt_good &= version_good; | |
0f113f3e | 2946 | |
0907d710 MC |
2947 | /* |
2948 | * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using | |
2949 | * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not | |
2950 | * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees | |
2951 | * it is still sufficiently large to read from. | |
2952 | */ | |
2953 | for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { | |
2954 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = | |
2955 | constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, | |
2956 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], | |
2957 | rand_premaster_secret[j]); | |
2958 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2959 | |
0907d710 MC |
2960 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, |
2961 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2962 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
0907d710 MC |
2963 | goto err; |
2964 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2965 | |
0907d710 MC |
2966 | ret = 1; |
2967 | err: | |
2968 | OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); | |
2969 | return ret; | |
2970 | #else | |
2971 | /* Should never happen */ | |
3ec8d113 MC |
2972 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, |
2973 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0907d710 MC |
2974 | return 0; |
2975 | #endif | |
2976 | } | |
2977 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2978 | static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
642360f9 MC |
2979 | { |
2980 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2981 | EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; | |
2982 | DH *cdh; | |
2983 | unsigned int i; | |
2984 | BIGNUM *pub_key; | |
2985 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2986 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2987 | int ret = 0; | |
2988 | ||
31a7d80d | 2989 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { |
f63a17d6 | 2990 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
642360f9 MC |
2991 | SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
2992 | goto err; | |
2993 | } | |
642360f9 MC |
2994 | skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; |
2995 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2996 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
2997 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
642360f9 MC |
2998 | goto err; |
2999 | } | |
3000 | ||
3001 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3002 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
3003 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
642360f9 MC |
3004 | goto err; |
3005 | } | |
3006 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { | |
3007 | /* We already checked we have enough data */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3008 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
3009 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
642360f9 MC |
3010 | goto err; |
3011 | } | |
3012 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
3013 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3014 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
3015 | SSL_R_BN_LIB); | |
642360f9 MC |
3016 | goto err; |
3017 | } | |
3018 | cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); | |
3019 | pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); | |
3020 | ||
3021 | if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3022 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
3023 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
642360f9 MC |
3024 | if (pub_key != NULL) |
3025 | BN_free(pub_key); | |
3026 | goto err; | |
3027 | } | |
3028 | ||
0f1e51ea | 3029 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
f63a17d6 | 3030 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
642360f9 MC |
3031 | goto err; |
3032 | } | |
3033 | ||
3034 | ret = 1; | |
3035 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
3036 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
3037 | err: | |
3038 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
3039 | return ret; | |
3040 | #else | |
3041 | /* Should never happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3042 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
3043 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
642360f9 MC |
3044 | return 0; |
3045 | #endif | |
3046 | } | |
3047 | ||
f63a17d6 | 3048 | static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3049 | { |
3050 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
3051 | EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; | |
3052 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
3053 | int ret = 0; | |
3054 | ||
3055 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
3056 | /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3057 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, |
3058 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3059 | goto err; |
3060 | } else { | |
3061 | unsigned int i; | |
3062 | const unsigned char *data; | |
3063 | ||
3064 | /* | |
3065 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the | |
3066 | * ClientKeyExchange message. | |
3067 | */ | |
3068 | ||
3069 | /* Get encoded point length */ | |
fb933982 DSH |
3070 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) |
3071 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3072 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, |
3073 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3074 | goto err; |
3075 | } | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3076 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); |
3077 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3078 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, |
3079 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3080 | goto err; |
3081 | } | |
ec24630a | 3082 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3083 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, |
3084 | ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3085 | goto err; |
3086 | } | |
3087 | } | |
3088 | ||
0f1e51ea | 3089 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
f63a17d6 | 3090 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3091 | goto err; |
3092 | } | |
3093 | ||
3094 | ret = 1; | |
3095 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
3096 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
3097 | err: | |
3098 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
3099 | ||
3100 | return ret; | |
3101 | #else | |
3102 | /* Should never happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3103 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, |
3104 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3105 | return 0; |
3106 | #endif | |
3107 | } | |
3108 | ||
f63a17d6 | 3109 | static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
c437eef6 MC |
3110 | { |
3111 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
3112 | unsigned int i; | |
3113 | const unsigned char *data; | |
3114 | ||
3115 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) | |
a230b26e | 3116 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3117 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, |
3118 | SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3119 | return 0; |
3120 | } | |
3121 | if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3122 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, |
3123 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3124 | return 0; |
3125 | } | |
a230b26e | 3126 | if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3127 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, |
3128 | SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3129 | return 0; |
3130 | } | |
3131 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); | |
3132 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
3133 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3134 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, |
3135 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3136 | return 0; |
3137 | } | |
3138 | ||
3139 | if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3140 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c437eef6 MC |
3141 | return 0; |
3142 | } | |
3143 | ||
3144 | return 1; | |
3145 | #else | |
3146 | /* Should never happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3147 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, |
3148 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3149 | return 0; |
3150 | #endif | |
3151 | } | |
3152 | ||
f63a17d6 | 3153 | static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
c437eef6 MC |
3154 | { |
3155 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
3156 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; | |
3157 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; | |
3158 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; | |
3159 | const unsigned char *start; | |
3160 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen; | |
3161 | unsigned long alg_a; | |
3162 | int Ttag, Tclass; | |
3163 | long Tlen; | |
348240c6 | 3164 | size_t sess_key_len; |
c437eef6 MC |
3165 | const unsigned char *data; |
3166 | int ret = 0; | |
3167 | ||
3168 | /* Get our certificate private key */ | |
3169 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
3170 | if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { | |
3171 | /* | |
3172 | * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too | |
3173 | */ | |
3174 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; | |
3175 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
3176 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; | |
3177 | } | |
3178 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
3179 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
3180 | } | |
3181 | } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { | |
3182 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
3183 | } | |
3184 | ||
3185 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); | |
3186 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3187 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, |
3188 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3189 | return 0; |
3190 | } | |
3191 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3192 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, |
3193 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3194 | return 0; |
3195 | } | |
3196 | /* | |
3197 | * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe | |
3198 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from | |
3199 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a | |
3200 | * client certificate for authorization only. | |
3201 | */ | |
3202 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
3203 | if (client_pub_pkey) { | |
3204 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) | |
3205 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
3206 | } | |
3207 | /* Decrypt session key */ | |
3208 | sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
3209 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3210 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, |
3211 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3212 | goto err; |
3213 | } | |
348240c6 | 3214 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
a230b26e | 3215 | if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, |
348240c6 | 3216 | &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
a230b26e | 3217 | || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3218 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, |
3219 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3220 | goto err; |
3221 | } | |
3222 | start = data; | |
3223 | inlen = Tlen; | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3224 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, |
3225 | inlen) <= 0) { | |
3226 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, | |
3227 | SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3228 | goto err; |
3229 | } | |
3230 | /* Generate master secret */ | |
3231 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, | |
3232 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3233 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c437eef6 MC |
3234 | goto err; |
3235 | } | |
3236 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3237 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, |
3238 | NULL) > 0) | |
c437eef6 MC |
3239 | s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; |
3240 | ||
3241 | ret = 1; | |
3242 | err: | |
3243 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3244 | return ret; | |
3245 | #else | |
3246 | /* Should never happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3247 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, |
3248 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
c437eef6 MC |
3249 | return 0; |
3250 | #endif | |
3251 | } | |
3252 | ||
0907d710 MC |
3253 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3254 | { | |
0907d710 MC |
3255 | unsigned long alg_k; |
3256 | ||
3257 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
3258 | ||
3259 | /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3260 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { |
3261 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0907d710 | 3262 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3263 | } |
0907d710 MC |
3264 | |
3265 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { | |
3266 | /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ | |
3267 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3268 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
3269 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3270 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9059eb71 | 3271 | goto err; |
0907d710 MC |
3272 | } |
3273 | /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ | |
3274 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3275 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
9059eb71 | 3276 | goto err; |
69f68237 | 3277 | } |
0907d710 | 3278 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3279 | if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) { |
3280 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0907d710 | 3281 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3282 | } |
642360f9 | 3283 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3284 | if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) { |
3285 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 3286 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3287 | } |
19ed1ec1 | 3288 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3289 | if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) { |
3290 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
19ed1ec1 | 3291 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3292 | } |
c437eef6 | 3293 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3294 | if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) { |
3295 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 3296 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3297 | } |
c437eef6 | 3298 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3299 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) { |
3300 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 3301 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3302 | } |
c437eef6 | 3303 | } else { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3304 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3305 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3306 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); | |
9059eb71 | 3307 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3308 | } |
3309 | ||
e27f234a | 3310 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e | 3311 | err: |
85269210 DSH |
3312 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
3313 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); | |
3314 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; | |
58964a49 | 3315 | #endif |
e27f234a | 3316 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3317 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3318 | |
be3583fa | 3319 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
94836de2 | 3320 | { |
94836de2 | 3321 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
c130dd8e MC |
3322 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
3323 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3324 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
3325 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
3326 | /* | |
3327 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
3328 | * used. | |
3329 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
3330 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
3331 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
c130dd8e MC |
3332 | |
3333 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
3334 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
3335 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
3336 | 0) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3337 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3338 | SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3339 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
0fe2a0af | 3340 | return WORK_ERROR; |
c130dd8e | 3341 | } |
94836de2 | 3342 | |
c130dd8e MC |
3343 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
3344 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
94836de2 | 3345 | } |
94836de2 MC |
3346 | } |
3347 | #endif | |
3348 | ||
149c2ef5 | 3349 | if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { |
a230b26e EK |
3350 | /* |
3351 | * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need | |
3352 | * the handshake_buffer | |
149c2ef5 MC |
3353 | */ |
3354 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3355 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
149c2ef5 MC |
3356 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3357 | } | |
94836de2 | 3358 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
28f4580c | 3359 | } else { |
94836de2 | 3360 | if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3361 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3362 | SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3363 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
94836de2 MC |
3364 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3365 | } | |
3366 | /* | |
3367 | * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support | |
3368 | * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op | |
3369 | */ | |
3370 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 3371 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
94836de2 MC |
3372 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3373 | } | |
94836de2 MC |
3374 | } |
3375 | ||
3376 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3377 | } | |
3378 | ||
be3583fa | 3379 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3380 | { |
f63a17d6 | 3381 | int i; |
eb5fd03b | 3382 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
3383 | X509 *x = NULL; |
3384 | unsigned long l, llen; | |
b6981744 | 3385 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
e27f234a | 3386 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
e96e0f8e | 3387 | PACKET spkt, context; |
d805a57b | 3388 | size_t chainidx; |
0f113f3e MC |
3389 | |
3390 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3391 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
3392 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3393 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3394 | } |
3395 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3396 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */ |
3397 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)) | |
3398 | || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) | |
3399 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) | |
3400 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3401 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
3402 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3403 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 3404 | } |
0bc09ecd | 3405 | |
d805a57b | 3406 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { |
0bc09ecd | 3407 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) |
a230b26e | 3408 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3409 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
3410 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3411 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3412 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3413 | } |
3414 | ||
0bc09ecd MC |
3415 | certstart = certbytes; |
3416 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); | |
0f113f3e | 3417 | if (x == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3418 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
3419 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
3420 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 3421 | } |
0bc09ecd | 3422 | if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3423 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
3424 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3425 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3426 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 3427 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
3428 | |
3429 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3430 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
3431 | PACKET extensions; | |
3432 | ||
3433 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3434 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
3435 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3436 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
3437 | goto err; | |
e96e0f8e | 3438 | } |
fe874d27 MC |
3439 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, |
3440 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, | |
f63a17d6 | 3441 | NULL, chainidx == 0) |
8e1634ec | 3442 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, |
f63a17d6 | 3443 | rawexts, x, chainidx, |
8e1634ec | 3444 | PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) { |
5ee289ea | 3445 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
f63a17d6 | 3446 | goto err; |
5ee289ea MC |
3447 | } |
3448 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3449 | } |
3450 | ||
0f113f3e | 3451 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3452 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3453 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3454 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3455 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3456 | } |
3457 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3458 | } |
3459 | ||
3460 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { | |
3461 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ | |
3462 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3463 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3464 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3465 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); | |
3466 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3467 | } |
3468 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ | |
3469 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
3470 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3471 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED, |
3472 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3473 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); | |
3474 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3475 | } |
3476 | /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ | |
124037fd | 3477 | if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3478 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3479 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3480 | } |
3481 | } else { | |
3482 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
3483 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
3484 | if (i <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3485 | SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result), |
3486 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3487 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); | |
3488 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3489 | } |
3490 | if (i > 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3491 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3492 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); | |
3493 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 3494 | } |
8382fd3a | 3495 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); |
0f113f3e | 3496 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3497 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3498 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3499 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
3500 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 3501 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
3502 | } |
3503 | ||
222561fe | 3504 | X509_free(s->session->peer); |
0f113f3e MC |
3505 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); |
3506 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
3507 | ||
c34b0f99 DSH |
3508 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); |
3509 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3510 | |
3511 | /* | |
3512 | * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE | |
3513 | * message | |
3514 | */ | |
94ed2c67 | 3515 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3516 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3517 | goto err; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3518 | } |
3519 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3520 | /* |
3521 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own | |
d4d78943 | 3522 | * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c |
0f113f3e | 3523 | */ |
0f113f3e | 3524 | sk = NULL; |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3525 | |
3526 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
3527 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3528 | && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
3529 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
3530 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3531 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3532 | goto err; | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3533 | } |
3534 | ||
e27f234a | 3535 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
66696478 | 3536 | |
f63a17d6 | 3537 | err: |
222561fe RS |
3538 | X509_free(x); |
3539 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
e27f234a | 3540 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 3541 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3542 | |
7cea05dc | 3543 | int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3544 | { |
a497cf25 | 3545 | CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert; |
e27f234a | 3546 | |
a497cf25 | 3547 | if (cpk == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3548 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3549 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
3550 | return 0; |
3551 | } | |
3552 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3553 | /* |
3554 | * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context | |
3555 | * for the server Certificate message | |
3556 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3557 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { |
3558 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3559 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3560 | return 0; | |
3561 | } | |
3562 | if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) { | |
3563 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e27f234a MC |
3564 | return 0; |
3565 | } | |
3566 | ||
3567 | return 1; | |
3568 | } | |
3569 | ||
7cea05dc | 3570 | int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
3571 | { |
3572 | unsigned char *senc = NULL; | |
83ae4661 | 3573 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
bf7c6817 | 3574 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; |
a00d75e1 | 3575 | unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; |
e27f234a | 3576 | const unsigned char *const_p; |
a00d75e1 | 3577 | int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; |
e27f234a MC |
3578 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
3579 | unsigned int hlen; | |
222da979 | 3580 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; |
e27f234a | 3581 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
d139723b | 3582 | unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; |
f63a17d6 | 3583 | int iv_len; |
a00d75e1 | 3584 | size_t macoffset, macendoffset; |
30f05b19 MC |
3585 | union { |
3586 | unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; | |
3587 | uint32_t age_add; | |
3588 | } age_add_u; | |
e27f234a | 3589 | |
fc24f0bf | 3590 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3591 | if (ssl_randbytes(s, age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) { |
3592 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3593 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3594 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
fc24f0bf | 3595 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3596 | } |
fc24f0bf | 3597 | s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; |
9b6a8254 MC |
3598 | /* |
3599 | * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a | |
3600 | * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple | |
3601 | * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed. | |
3602 | */ | |
3603 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick_nonce); | |
3604 | s->session->ext.tick_nonce = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char)); | |
3605 | if (s->session->ext.tick_nonce == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3606 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3607 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3608 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
9b6a8254 MC |
3609 | goto err; |
3610 | } | |
3611 | s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len = 1; | |
2c604cb9 | 3612 | s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); |
f6370040 MC |
3613 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { |
3614 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); | |
3615 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected = | |
3616 | OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); | |
3617 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3618 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3619 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3620 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f6370040 MC |
3621 | goto err; |
3622 | } | |
3623 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; | |
3624 | } | |
3625 | s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data; | |
fc24f0bf MC |
3626 | } |
3627 | ||
e27f234a MC |
3628 | /* get session encoding length */ |
3629 | slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); | |
3630 | /* | |
3631 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too | |
3632 | * long | |
3633 | */ | |
3634 | if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3635 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3636 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f6370040 | 3637 | goto err; |
e27f234a MC |
3638 | } |
3639 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); | |
a71edf3b | 3640 | if (senc == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3641 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3642 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f6370040 | 3643 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 3644 | } |
0f113f3e | 3645 | |
846ec07d | 3646 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
bf7c6817 | 3647 | hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); |
83ae4661 | 3648 | if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3649 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3650 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
83ae4661 MC |
3651 | goto err; |
3652 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3653 | |
e27f234a | 3654 | p = senc; |
f63a17d6 MC |
3655 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) { |
3656 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3657 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a | 3658 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3659 | } |
687eaf27 | 3660 | |
e27f234a MC |
3661 | /* |
3662 | * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up | |
3663 | */ | |
3664 | const_p = senc; | |
3665 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3666 | if (sess == NULL) { |
3667 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3668 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a | 3669 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3670 | } |
e27f234a | 3671 | sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ |
0f113f3e | 3672 | |
e27f234a | 3673 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
f63a17d6 MC |
3674 | if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { |
3675 | /* shouldn't ever happen */ | |
3676 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3677 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
3678 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); |
3679 | goto err; | |
3680 | } | |
3681 | p = senc; | |
3682 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3683 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3684 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
3685 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); |
3686 | goto err; | |
3687 | } | |
3688 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
0f113f3e | 3689 | |
e27f234a MC |
3690 | /* |
3691 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does | |
3692 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. | |
3693 | */ | |
aff8c126 | 3694 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { |
5c753de6 | 3695 | /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ |
aff8c126 | 3696 | int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, |
5c753de6 TS |
3697 | hctx, 1); |
3698 | ||
3699 | if (ret == 0) { | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3700 | |
3701 | /* Put timeout and length */ | |
7cea05dc | 3702 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) |
4a01c59f | 3703 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3704 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3705 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3706 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5c753de6 | 3707 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3708 | } |
5c753de6 TS |
3709 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3710 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
3711 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
3712 | return 1; | |
3713 | } | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3714 | if (ret < 0) { |
3715 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3716 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3717 | SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); | |
e27f234a | 3718 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3719 | } |
d139723b | 3720 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); |
e27f234a | 3721 | } else { |
d139723b KR |
3722 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); |
3723 | ||
3724 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3725 | if (ssl_randbytes(s, iv, iv_len) <= 0 |
3726 | || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, | |
3727 | tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv) | |
3728 | || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key, | |
3729 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key), | |
3730 | EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { | |
3731 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3732 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3733 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
4f9fab6b | 3734 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3735 | } |
aff8c126 RS |
3736 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, |
3737 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3738 | } |
3739 | ||
e27f234a | 3740 | /* |
2c604cb9 MC |
3741 | * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this |
3742 | * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity). | |
3743 | * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the | |
3744 | * timeout. | |
e27f234a | 3745 | */ |
2c604cb9 MC |
3746 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, |
3747 | (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
3748 | ? 0 : s->session->timeout) | |
30f05b19 | 3749 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
9b6a8254 | 3750 | && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add) |
51598215 MC |
3751 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_nonce, |
3752 | s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len))) | |
a00d75e1 | 3753 | /* Now the actual ticket data */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3754 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
3755 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) | |
a00d75e1 | 3756 | /* Output key name */ |
7cea05dc | 3757 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) |
a00d75e1 | 3758 | /* output IV */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3759 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) |
3760 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3761 | &encdata1) |
3762 | /* Encrypt session data */ | |
3763 | || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) | |
7cea05dc | 3764 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3765 | || encdata1 != encdata2 |
3766 | || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) | |
7cea05dc | 3767 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3768 | || encdata1 + len != encdata2 |
3769 | || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH | |
7cea05dc | 3770 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3771 | || !HMAC_Update(hctx, |
3772 | (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, | |
3773 | macendoffset - macoffset) | |
7cea05dc | 3774 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3775 | || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) |
3776 | || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
7cea05dc | 3777 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) |
a00d75e1 | 3778 | || macdata1 != macdata2 |
f63a17d6 | 3779 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
3ec8d113 MC |
3780 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3781 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a | 3782 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3783 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
3784 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
3785 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, | |
3786 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3787 | NULL, 0)) { | |
3788 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3789 | goto err; | |
3790 | } | |
bcaad809 DSH |
3791 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
3792 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
e27f234a MC |
3793 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3794 | ||
3795 | return 1; | |
687eaf27 | 3796 | err: |
b548a1f1 | 3797 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
846ec07d | 3798 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
bf7c6817 | 3799 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); |
e27f234a | 3800 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3801 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 3802 | |
f63e4288 MC |
3803 | /* |
3804 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
3805 | * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
3806 | */ | |
3807 | int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
e27f234a | 3808 | { |
8cbfcc70 RS |
3809 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) |
3810 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, | |
3811 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { | |
3ec8d113 MC |
3812 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, |
3813 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f63e4288 MC |
3814 | return 0; |
3815 | } | |
3816 | ||
3817 | return 1; | |
3818 | } | |
3819 | ||
3820 | int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3821 | { | |
3822 | if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { | |
3ec8d113 | 3823 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
cc59ad10 MC |
3824 | return 0; |
3825 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
3826 | |
3827 | return 1; | |
3828 | } | |
3829 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3830 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
e27f234a MC |
3831 | /* |
3832 | * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. | |
3833 | * It sets the next_proto member in s if found | |
3834 | */ | |
be3583fa | 3835 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3836 | { |
73999b62 | 3837 | PACKET next_proto, padding; |
e27f234a MC |
3838 | size_t next_proto_len; |
3839 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
3840 | /*- |
3841 | * The payload looks like: | |
3842 | * uint8 proto_len; | |
3843 | * uint8 proto[proto_len]; | |
3844 | * uint8 padding_len; | |
3845 | * uint8 padding[padding_len]; | |
3846 | */ | |
73999b62 MC |
3847 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) |
3848 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) | |
3849 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3850 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, |
3851 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3852 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
cf9b0b6f | 3853 | } |
0f113f3e | 3854 | |
aff8c126 RS |
3855 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { |
3856 | s->ext.npn_len = 0; | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3857 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, |
3858 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3859 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
c3fc7eea MC |
3860 | } |
3861 | ||
aff8c126 | 3862 | s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; |
0f113f3e | 3863 | |
e27f234a | 3864 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 3865 | } |
6434abbf | 3866 | #endif |
d45ba43d | 3867 | |
e46f2334 MC |
3868 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3869 | { | |
fe874d27 | 3870 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
f63a17d6 MC |
3871 | NULL, 0)) { |
3872 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e46f2334 MC |
3873 | return 0; |
3874 | } | |
3875 | ||
3876 | return 1; | |
3877 | } | |
3878 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
3879 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3880 | { | |
ef6c191b | 3881 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3882 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, |
3883 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
ef6c191b MC |
3884 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
3885 | } | |
3886 | ||
3887 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING | |
3888 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3889 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, |
3890 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3891 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
ef6c191b MC |
3892 | } |
3893 | ||
3894 | /* | |
3895 | * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on | |
3896 | * a record boundary. | |
3897 | */ | |
3898 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3899 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
3900 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, | |
3901 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
3902 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
ef6c191b MC |
3903 | } |
3904 | ||
3905 | s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; | |
3906 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3907 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3908 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
3909 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
ef6c191b MC |
3910 | } |
3911 | ||
3912 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
ef6c191b | 3913 | } |