]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
8e2f6b79 | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8e2f6b79 | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
12 | * | |
0f113f3e | 13 | * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
ea262260 BM |
14 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
15 | * | |
16 | * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
17 | * license provided above. | |
18 | * | |
ea262260 BM |
19 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
20 | * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. | |
21 | * | |
22 | */ | |
ddac1974 NL |
23 | /* ==================================================================== |
24 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
25 | * | |
26 | * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by | |
27 | * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
28 | * license. | |
29 | * | |
30 | * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of | |
31 | * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites | |
32 | * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. | |
33 | * | |
34 | * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in | |
35 | * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received | |
36 | * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. | |
37 | * | |
38 | * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not | |
39 | * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third | |
40 | * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights | |
41 | * to make use of the Contribution. | |
42 | * | |
43 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN | |
44 | * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA | |
45 | * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY | |
46 | * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR | |
47 | * OTHERWISE. | |
48 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 49 | |
d02b48c6 | 50 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 51 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 52 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
68570797 | 53 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
54 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
55 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
56 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
57 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
6434abbf | 58 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
ec577822 | 59 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
3c27208f | 60 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d095b68d | 61 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
dbad1690 | 62 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 63 | |
e46f2334 | 64 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
7d061fce | 65 | static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
d45ba43d | 66 | |
61ae935a | 67 | /* |
0f1e51ea MC |
68 | * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
69 | * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from | |
70 | * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. | |
71 | * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
72 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
73 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
74 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea MC |
75 | */ |
76 | static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
77 | { | |
78 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
79 | ||
80 | /* | |
81 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have | |
82 | * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by | |
83 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() | |
84 | */ | |
85 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
86 | default: | |
87 | break; | |
88 | ||
7d061fce MC |
89 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: |
90 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
91 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
92 | return 1; | |
93 | } | |
94 | break; | |
95 | ||
d7f8783f | 96 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
ef6c191b MC |
97 | if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { |
98 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { | |
99 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
100 | return 1; | |
101 | } | |
102 | break; | |
103 | } | |
104 | /* Fall through */ | |
105 | ||
106 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: | |
92760c21 | 107 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
0f1e51ea MC |
108 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
109 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
110 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
111 | return 1; | |
112 | } | |
113 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
114 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
115 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
116 | return 1; |
117 | } | |
118 | } | |
119 | break; | |
120 | ||
121 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
122 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { | |
92760c21 MC |
123 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
124 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
125 | return 1; |
126 | } | |
127 | } else { | |
128 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
129 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
130 | return 1; | |
131 | } | |
132 | } | |
133 | break; | |
134 | ||
135 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
136 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
137 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
138 | return 1; | |
139 | } | |
140 | break; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
141 | |
142 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
10109364 MC |
143 | /* |
144 | * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of | |
145 | * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert) | |
146 | */ | |
147 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) | |
148 | break; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
149 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { |
150 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE; | |
151 | return 1; | |
152 | } | |
153 | break; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
154 | } |
155 | ||
156 | /* No valid transition found */ | |
0f1e51ea MC |
157 | return 0; |
158 | } | |
159 | ||
160 | /* | |
161 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
162 | * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the | |
163 | * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
164 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 165 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
166 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
167 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 168 | */ |
8481f583 | 169 | int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 170 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 171 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 172 | |
f5ca0b04 | 173 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
174 | if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
175 | goto err; | |
176 | return 1; | |
177 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 178 | |
e8aa8b6c | 179 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
180 | default: |
181 | break; | |
182 | ||
61ae935a | 183 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
0386aad1 | 184 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
61ae935a MC |
185 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
186 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
187 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
188 | return 1; | |
189 | } | |
190 | break; | |
191 | ||
192 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
193 | /* | |
194 | * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either | |
195 | * 1) We didn't request a Certificate | |
196 | * OR | |
197 | * 2) If we did request one then | |
198 | * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned | |
199 | * AND | |
200 | * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 | |
201 | * list if we requested a certificate) | |
202 | */ | |
0f512756 MC |
203 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
204 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { | |
205 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
23dd09b5 MC |
206 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
207 | && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
0f512756 MC |
208 | /* |
209 | * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just | |
23dd09b5 MC |
210 | * not going to accept it because we require a client |
211 | * cert. | |
0f512756 MC |
212 | */ |
213 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, | |
214 | SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
340a2828 | 215 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, |
0f512756 MC |
216 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
217 | return 0; | |
218 | } | |
219 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
220 | return 1; | |
221 | } | |
222 | } else { | |
223 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
224 | return 1; | |
225 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
226 | } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
227 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
228 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
229 | return 1; | |
f100b031 | 230 | } |
61ae935a MC |
231 | } |
232 | break; | |
233 | ||
234 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
235 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
236 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
237 | return 1; | |
238 | } | |
239 | break; | |
240 | ||
241 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
242 | /* | |
243 | * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have | |
244 | * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| | |
245 | * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is | |
246 | * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in | |
a71a4966 | 247 | * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be |
61ae935a MC |
248 | * set. |
249 | */ | |
a71a4966 | 250 | if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { |
61ae935a MC |
251 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
252 | /* | |
253 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH | |
254 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is | |
255 | * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses | |
256 | * its key from the certificate for key exchange. | |
257 | */ | |
258 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
259 | return 1; | |
260 | } | |
261 | } else { | |
262 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
263 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
264 | return 1; | |
265 | } | |
266 | } | |
267 | break; | |
268 | ||
269 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
270 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
271 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
272 | return 1; | |
273 | } | |
274 | break; | |
275 | ||
276 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
277 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
aff8c126 | 278 | if (s->s3->npn_seen) { |
61ae935a MC |
279 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { |
280 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; | |
281 | return 1; | |
282 | } | |
283 | } else { | |
284 | #endif | |
285 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
286 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
287 | return 1; | |
288 | } | |
289 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
290 | } | |
291 | #endif | |
292 | break; | |
293 | ||
294 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
295 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
296 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
297 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
298 | return 1; | |
299 | } | |
300 | break; | |
301 | #endif | |
302 | ||
303 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
304 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
305 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
306 | return 1; | |
307 | } | |
308 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
309 | } |
310 | ||
5abeaf35 | 311 | err: |
61ae935a | 312 | /* No valid transition found */ |
672f3337 | 313 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
340a2828 | 314 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
61ae935a MC |
315 | return 0; |
316 | } | |
317 | ||
318 | /* | |
319 | * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? | |
320 | * | |
321 | * Valid return values are: | |
322 | * 1: Yes | |
323 | * 0: No | |
324 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 325 | static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
326 | { |
327 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
328 | ||
329 | /* | |
361a1191 | 330 | * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a |
61ae935a MC |
331 | * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For |
332 | * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if | |
333 | * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, | |
334 | * the server certificate contains the server's public key for | |
335 | * key exchange. | |
336 | */ | |
a230b26e | 337 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) |
61ae935a MC |
338 | /* |
339 | * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if | |
340 | * provided | |
341 | */ | |
342 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
343 | /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ | |
344 | || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) | |
345 | && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) | |
346 | /* For other PSK always send SKE */ | |
347 | || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) | |
348 | #endif | |
349 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
350 | /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ | |
351 | || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) | |
352 | #endif | |
a230b26e | 353 | ) { |
61ae935a MC |
354 | return 1; |
355 | } | |
356 | ||
357 | return 0; | |
358 | } | |
359 | ||
360 | /* | |
361 | * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? | |
362 | * | |
363 | * Valid return values are: | |
364 | * 1: Yes | |
365 | * 0: No | |
366 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 367 | static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
368 | { |
369 | if ( | |
370 | /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ | |
371 | s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER | |
372 | /* | |
373 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert | |
374 | * during re-negotiation: | |
375 | */ | |
a03a9dbe | 376 | && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 || |
61ae935a MC |
377 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) |
378 | /* | |
379 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see | |
380 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in | |
381 | * RFC 2246): | |
382 | */ | |
383 | && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) | |
a230b26e EK |
384 | /* |
385 | * ... except when the application insists on | |
386 | * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts | |
387 | * this for SSL 3) | |
388 | */ | |
61ae935a MC |
389 | || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
390 | /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ | |
391 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) | |
392 | /* | |
393 | * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests | |
394 | * are omitted | |
395 | */ | |
b7fa1f98 | 396 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { |
61ae935a MC |
397 | return 1; |
398 | } | |
399 | ||
400 | return 0; | |
401 | } | |
402 | ||
403 | /* | |
0f1e51ea MC |
404 | * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
405 | * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the | |
406 | * client. | |
0f1e51ea MC |
407 | */ |
408 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
409 | { | |
410 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
411 | ||
412 | /* | |
413 | * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated | |
414 | * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() | |
415 | */ | |
416 | ||
417 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
418 | default: | |
419 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
420 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
421 | ||
44c04a2e MC |
422 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
423 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { | |
424 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
425 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
426 | } | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
427 | /* Try to read from the client instead */ |
428 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
44c04a2e | 429 | |
0f1e51ea | 430 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
7d061fce MC |
431 | if (s->hello_retry_request) |
432 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; | |
433 | else | |
434 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
435 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
436 | ||
7d061fce MC |
437 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: |
438 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
439 | ||
0f1e51ea | 440 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
e46f2334 MC |
441 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; |
442 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
443 | ||
444 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
94ed2c67 | 445 | if (s->hit) |
92760c21 MC |
446 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
447 | else if (send_certificate_request(s)) | |
448 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
94ed2c67 | 449 | else |
0f1e51ea | 450 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
94ed2c67 | 451 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
452 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
453 | ||
0f1e51ea | 454 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
92760c21 | 455 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
0f1e51ea MC |
456 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
457 | ||
92760c21 | 458 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
459 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; |
460 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
461 | ||
462 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: | |
d805a57b | 463 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
464 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
465 | ||
466 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
f7e393be MC |
467 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; |
468 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
94ed2c67 | 469 | |
d7f8783f MC |
470 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
471 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
472 | ||
92760c21 | 473 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: |
30f05b19 MC |
474 | /* |
475 | * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're | |
476 | * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket | |
477 | * immediately. | |
478 | * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour | |
479 | * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the | |
480 | * session ticket? | |
481 | */ | |
482 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; | |
483 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
484 | ||
8cdc8c51 | 485 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: |
5bf47933 MC |
486 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { |
487 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
488 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
489 | } | |
490 | /* Fall through */ | |
491 | ||
44c04a2e | 492 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
30f05b19 | 493 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
0f1e51ea | 494 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
0f1e51ea MC |
495 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
496 | } | |
497 | } | |
498 | ||
499 | /* | |
500 | * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move | |
501 | * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. | |
61ae935a | 502 | */ |
8481f583 | 503 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 504 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 505 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 506 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
507 | /* |
508 | * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going | |
509 | * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later | |
510 | */ | |
511 | ||
f5ca0b04 | 512 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
513 | return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); |
514 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 515 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
516 | default: |
517 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
518 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
519 | ||
0386aad1 MC |
520 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
521 | if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { | |
522 | /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ | |
523 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; | |
524 | st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; | |
525 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
526 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
527 | /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ |
528 | if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { | |
529 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
530 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
531 | } | |
0386aad1 MC |
532 | /* Fall through */ |
533 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 534 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
a230b26e | 535 | /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ |
e8aa8b6c | 536 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
61ae935a | 537 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
538 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
539 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
e8aa8b6c | 540 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a | 541 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
542 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
543 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified | |
a230b26e | 544 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) |
e8aa8b6c F |
545 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
546 | else | |
547 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
548 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 549 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
550 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
551 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 552 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
553 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
554 | if (s->hit) { | |
aff8c126 | 555 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) |
e8aa8b6c F |
556 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
557 | else | |
558 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
559 | } else { | |
560 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ | |
561 | /* normal PSK or SRP */ | |
562 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & | |
a230b26e | 563 | (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
564 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
565 | } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
61ae935a | 566 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; |
e8aa8b6c | 567 | } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { |
61ae935a | 568 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; |
e8aa8b6c F |
569 | } else { |
570 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
61ae935a | 571 | } |
e8aa8b6c F |
572 | } |
573 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 574 | |
e8aa8b6c | 575 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
aff8c126 | 576 | if (s->ext.status_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c | 577 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; |
61ae935a | 578 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
579 | } |
580 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 581 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
582 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
583 | if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
584 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; | |
61ae935a | 585 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
586 | } |
587 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 588 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
589 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
590 | if (send_certificate_request(s)) { | |
591 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
61ae935a | 592 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
593 | } |
594 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 595 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
596 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
597 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
598 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 599 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
600 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
601 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
602 | ||
603 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
604 | if (s->hit) { | |
61ae935a | 605 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
61ae935a | 606 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
aff8c126 | 607 | } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
608 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
609 | } else { | |
610 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
611 | } | |
612 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
613 | ||
614 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
615 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
616 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 617 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
618 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: |
619 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; | |
620 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
621 | ||
622 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
623 | if (s->hit) { | |
624 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
625 | } | |
626 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
e8aa8b6c | 627 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
628 | } |
629 | } | |
630 | ||
631 | /* | |
632 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
633 | * the server to the client. | |
634 | */ | |
8481f583 | 635 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 636 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 637 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 638 | |
e8aa8b6c | 639 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
640 | default: |
641 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
642 | break; | |
643 | ||
61ae935a MC |
644 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
645 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
646 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
f5c7f5df | 647 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
648 | break; |
649 | ||
650 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
651 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
652 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f5c7f5df | 653 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
654 | /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ |
655 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
656 | } | |
657 | break; | |
658 | ||
659 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
660 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
661 | /* | |
662 | * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and | |
663 | * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now | |
664 | */ | |
665 | st->use_timer = 1; | |
666 | } | |
667 | break; | |
668 | ||
669 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
670 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
671 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) | |
672 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); | |
673 | #endif | |
674 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
675 | ||
676 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
30f05b19 MC |
677 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
678 | /* | |
679 | * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going | |
680 | * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off | |
681 | * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. | |
682 | */ | |
683 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0); | |
684 | } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
61ae935a MC |
685 | /* |
686 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
687 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer | |
688 | */ | |
689 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
690 | } | |
691 | break; | |
692 | ||
693 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
694 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
695 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { | |
fe3a3291 | 696 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
697 | return WORK_ERROR; |
698 | } | |
699 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
700 | /* | |
701 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
702 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have | |
703 | * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, | |
704 | * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. | |
705 | */ | |
706 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
707 | } | |
708 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
709 | ||
d7f8783f | 710 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
f7e393be MC |
711 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING) |
712 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
713 | /* Fall through */ | |
714 | ||
61ae935a | 715 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
30f05b19 | 716 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
717 | } |
718 | ||
719 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
720 | } | |
721 | ||
722 | /* | |
723 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
724 | * server to the client. | |
725 | */ | |
8481f583 | 726 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 727 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 728 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a MC |
729 | |
730 | s->init_num = 0; | |
731 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 732 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
733 | default: |
734 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
735 | break; | |
736 | ||
7d061fce MC |
737 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: |
738 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
739 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
740 | break; | |
741 | ||
61ae935a MC |
742 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
743 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
744 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2c4a056f MC |
745 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
746 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
747 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
748 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
749 | break; |
750 | ||
751 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
752 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
753 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
754 | /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ | |
2c4a056f MC |
755 | if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
756 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
757 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
758 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
759 | /* |
760 | * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to | |
761 | * treat like it was the first packet | |
762 | */ | |
763 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
764 | break; | |
765 | ||
766 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
767 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
768 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
769 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
770 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
771 | ||
772 | /* | |
773 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no | |
774 | * SCTP used. | |
775 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
776 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
777 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
61ae935a MC |
778 | |
779 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
780 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
781 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
782 | 0) <= 0) { | |
fe3a3291 | 783 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
784 | return WORK_ERROR; |
785 | } | |
786 | ||
787 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
788 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
789 | } | |
790 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
791 | /* |
792 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know | |
793 | * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted | |
794 | * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need | |
795 | * something clever in the record layer for this. | |
796 | */ | |
797 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
798 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
799 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
fe5e20fd MC |
800 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
801 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
802 | ||
803 | if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED | |
804 | && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
92760c21 | 805 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) |
fe5e20fd | 806 | return WORK_ERROR; |
92760c21 | 807 | } |
61ae935a MC |
808 | break; |
809 | ||
810 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
811 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
812 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { | |
813 | /* | |
814 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
815 | * no SCTP used. | |
816 | */ | |
817 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
818 | 0, NULL); | |
819 | } | |
820 | #endif | |
821 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
a230b26e EK |
822 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
823 | { | |
fe3a3291 | 824 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
825 | return WORK_ERROR; |
826 | } | |
827 | ||
828 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
829 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
830 | break; | |
831 | ||
832 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
833 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
834 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
835 | break; | |
836 | ||
837 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
838 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
839 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
840 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
841 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
842 | /* | |
843 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
844 | * no SCTP used. | |
845 | */ | |
846 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
847 | 0, NULL); | |
848 | } | |
849 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
850 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
851 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 852 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 MC |
853 | &s->session->master_key_length) |
854 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
855 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) | |
856 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
857 | } | |
61ae935a | 858 | break; |
30f05b19 | 859 | |
44c04a2e | 860 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: |
57389a32 MC |
861 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) |
862 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
57389a32 MC |
863 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) |
864 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
865 | break; | |
866 | ||
30f05b19 MC |
867 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
868 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
869 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
870 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
871 | } |
872 | ||
873 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
874 | } | |
875 | ||
876 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
877 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
878 | * server | |
61ae935a MC |
879 | * |
880 | * Valid return values are: | |
881 | * 1: Success | |
882 | * 0: Error | |
883 | */ | |
6392fb8e | 884 | int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
a15c953f | 885 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 886 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 887 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 888 | |
4a01c59f MC |
889 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
890 | default: | |
891 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
892 | return 0; | |
893 | ||
894 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
5923ad4b | 895 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 896 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 897 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
898 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
899 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f | 900 | break; |
f3b3d7f0 | 901 | |
4a01c59f | 902 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
6392fb8e MC |
903 | *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; |
904 | *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 905 | break; |
61ae935a | 906 | |
4a01c59f MC |
907 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
908 | /* No construction function needed */ | |
6392fb8e MC |
909 | *confunc = NULL; |
910 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 911 | break; |
61ae935a | 912 | |
4a01c59f | 913 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
6392fb8e MC |
914 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; |
915 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f | 916 | break; |
61ae935a | 917 | |
4a01c59f | 918 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
919 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; |
920 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f | 921 | break; |
61ae935a | 922 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
923 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: |
924 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; | |
925 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; | |
926 | break; | |
927 | ||
928 | ||
4a01c59f | 929 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
6392fb8e MC |
930 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; |
931 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f | 932 | break; |
61ae935a | 933 | |
4a01c59f | 934 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
6392fb8e MC |
935 | *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; |
936 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 937 | break; |
61ae935a | 938 | |
4a01c59f | 939 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
6392fb8e MC |
940 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; |
941 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
4a01c59f | 942 | break; |
61ae935a | 943 | |
4a01c59f | 944 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
6392fb8e MC |
945 | *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; |
946 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; | |
4a01c59f | 947 | break; |
61ae935a | 948 | |
4a01c59f | 949 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
6392fb8e MC |
950 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; |
951 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; | |
4a01c59f | 952 | break; |
61ae935a | 953 | |
4a01c59f | 954 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
955 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
956 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 957 | break; |
e46f2334 | 958 | |
f7e393be MC |
959 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
960 | *confunc = NULL; | |
961 | *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; | |
962 | break; | |
963 | ||
e46f2334 MC |
964 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: |
965 | *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; | |
966 | *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
967 | break; | |
7d061fce MC |
968 | |
969 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: | |
970 | *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request; | |
971 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; | |
972 | break; | |
44c04a2e MC |
973 | |
974 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
975 | *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; | |
976 | *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; | |
977 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 978 | } |
61ae935a | 979 | |
5923ad4b | 980 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
981 | } |
982 | ||
8a18bc25 AG |
983 | /* |
984 | * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, | |
985 | * calculated as follows: | |
986 | * | |
987 | * 2 + # client_version | |
988 | * 32 + # only valid length for random | |
989 | * 1 + # length of session_id | |
990 | * 32 + # maximum size for session_id | |
991 | * 2 + # length of cipher suites | |
992 | * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array | |
993 | * 1 + # length of compression_methods | |
994 | * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods | |
995 | * 2 + # length of extensions | |
996 | * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions | |
997 | */ | |
998 | #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 | |
999 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1000 | #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 |
1001 | #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 | |
1002 | ||
1003 | /* | |
1004 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
1005 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
1006 | */ | |
eda75751 | 1007 | size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 1008 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1009 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1010 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1011 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1012 | default: |
1013 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1014 | return 0; | |
1015 | ||
61ae935a | 1016 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
8a18bc25 | 1017 | return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; |
61ae935a | 1018 | |
ef6c191b MC |
1019 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
1020 | return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1021 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1022 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: |
1023 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
1024 | ||
1025 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1026 | return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1027 | ||
1028 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1029 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
1030 | ||
1031 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1032 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1033 | return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1034 | #endif | |
1035 | ||
1036 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1037 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
1038 | ||
1039 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1040 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1041 | |
1042 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1043 | return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1044 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1045 | } |
1046 | ||
1047 | /* | |
1048 | * Process a message that the server has received from the client. | |
1049 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1050 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
61ae935a | 1051 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1052 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1053 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1054 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1055 | default: |
1056 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1057 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1058 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1059 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1060 | return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); | |
1061 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
1062 | case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
1063 | return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt); | |
1064 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1065 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: |
1066 | return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); | |
1067 | ||
1068 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1069 | return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
1070 | ||
1071 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1072 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
1073 | ||
1074 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1075 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
1076 | return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); | |
1077 | #endif | |
1078 | ||
1079 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1080 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
1081 | ||
1082 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1083 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
8cdc8c51 MC |
1084 | |
1085 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1086 | return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); | |
1087 | ||
61ae935a | 1088 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1089 | } |
1090 | ||
1091 | /* | |
1092 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
1093 | * from the client | |
1094 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1095 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 1096 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1097 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1098 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1099 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1100 | default: |
1101 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1102 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
1103 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1104 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1105 | return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); | |
1106 | ||
1107 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1108 | return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); | |
1109 | ||
1110 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1111 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
a230b26e EK |
1112 | if ( /* Is this SCTP? */ |
1113 | BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
1114 | /* Are we renegotiating? */ | |
1115 | && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
61ae935a MC |
1116 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; |
1117 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1118 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
1119 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
d99b0691 | 1120 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
1121 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
1122 | } else { | |
d99b0691 | 1123 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); |
61ae935a MC |
1124 | } |
1125 | #endif | |
1126 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 1127 | } |
92760c21 | 1128 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
1129 | } |
1130 | ||
edc032b5 | 1131 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
71fa4513 | 1132 | static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) |
0f113f3e MC |
1133 | { |
1134 | int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; | |
1135 | ||
1136 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1137 | ||
1138 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && | |
1139 | (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { | |
1140 | if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { | |
1141 | /* | |
1142 | * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp | |
1143 | * login name | |
1144 | */ | |
1145 | ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; | |
1146 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
1147 | } else { | |
1148 | ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); | |
1149 | } | |
1150 | } | |
1151 | return ret; | |
1152 | } | |
edc032b5 BL |
1153 | #endif |
1154 | ||
c536b6be | 1155 | int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, |
cb150cbc | 1156 | size_t cookie_len) |
8ba708e5 | 1157 | { |
8ba708e5 | 1158 | /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ |
c536b6be MC |
1159 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) |
1160 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) | |
1161 | return 0; | |
8ba708e5 | 1162 | |
c536b6be | 1163 | return 1; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1164 | } |
1165 | ||
7cea05dc | 1166 | int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1167 | { |
cb150cbc | 1168 | unsigned int cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1169 | if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || |
1170 | s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, | |
cb150cbc MC |
1171 | &cookie_leni) == 0 || |
1172 | cookie_leni > 255) { | |
f0659bdb | 1173 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, |
8ba708e5 | 1174 | SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); |
8ba708e5 MC |
1175 | return 0; |
1176 | } | |
cb150cbc | 1177 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 | 1178 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1179 | if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
1180 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { | |
c536b6be | 1181 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c536b6be MC |
1182 | return 0; |
1183 | } | |
8ba708e5 | 1184 | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1185 | return 1; |
1186 | } | |
1187 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1188 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1189 | /*- | |
1190 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
1191 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. | |
1192 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: | |
1193 | * SNI, | |
1194 | * elliptic_curves | |
1195 | * ec_point_formats | |
1196 | * | |
1197 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
1198 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
1199 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
1200 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
1201 | */ | |
1202 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) | |
1203 | { | |
805a2e9e MC |
1204 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { |
1205 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
1206 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
1207 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
1208 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
1209 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
1210 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
1211 | ||
1212 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
1213 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
1214 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
1215 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
1216 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ | |
1217 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ | |
1218 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
1219 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
1220 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
1221 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
1222 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
1223 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
1224 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
1225 | }; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1226 | /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ |
1227 | static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; | |
1266eefd MC |
1228 | unsigned int type; |
1229 | PACKET sni, tmppkt; | |
1230 | size_t ext_len; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1231 | |
1232 | tmppkt = hello->extensions; | |
1233 | ||
1234 | if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) | |
1235 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) | |
1236 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { | |
1237 | return; | |
6b473aca MC |
1238 | } |
1239 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1240 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
1241 | return; | |
1242 | ||
1243 | ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? | |
1244 | sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; | |
1245 | ||
1246 | s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, | |
1247 | ext_len); | |
6b473aca | 1248 | } |
805a2e9e | 1249 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
6b473aca | 1250 | |
be3583fa | 1251 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 1252 | { |
6b1bb98f | 1253 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 1254 | /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ |
1ab3836b | 1255 | PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; |
6e3ff632 | 1256 | static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; |
6b1bb98f | 1257 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello; |
e27f234a | 1258 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1259 | clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello)); |
1260 | if (clienthello == NULL) { | |
1261 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1262 | goto err; | |
1263 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
1264 | /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ |
1265 | if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { | |
1266 | s->renegotiate = 1; | |
1267 | s->new_session = 1; | |
1268 | } | |
1269 | ||
1ab3836b | 1270 | /* |
b1b4b543 | 1271 | * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. |
1ab3836b | 1272 | */ |
6b1bb98f | 1273 | clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); |
bbafa47b | 1274 | PACKET_null_init(&cookie); |
1ab3836b | 1275 | |
6b1bb98f | 1276 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
9ceb2426 | 1277 | unsigned int mt; |
b1b4b543 | 1278 | |
7d061fce MC |
1279 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) { |
1280 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1281 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
1282 | goto f_err; | |
1283 | } | |
1284 | ||
32ec4153 MC |
1285 | /*- |
1286 | * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 | |
1287 | * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS | |
1288 | * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes | |
1289 | * the rest right through. Its format is: | |
1290 | * Byte Content | |
1291 | * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer | |
1292 | * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here | |
1293 | * 3-4 version | |
1294 | * 5-6 cipher_spec_length | |
1295 | * 7-8 session_id_length | |
1296 | * 9-10 challenge_length | |
1297 | * ... ... | |
1298 | */ | |
1299 | ||
73999b62 | 1300 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) |
a230b26e | 1301 | || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1302 | /* |
1303 | * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record | |
1304 | * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record | |
1305 | * in the first place | |
1306 | */ | |
e27f234a | 1307 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d45ba43d | 1308 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1309 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1310 | } |
1311 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1312 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1313 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1314 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1315 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1316 | } |
1317 | ||
b3e2272c | 1318 | /* Parse the message and load client random. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1319 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1320 | /* |
1321 | * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello | |
1322 | * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. | |
e2994cf0 | 1323 | * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. |
32ec4153 | 1324 | */ |
1ab3836b | 1325 | unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; |
b3e2272c | 1326 | PACKET challenge; |
0f113f3e | 1327 | |
1ab3836b | 1328 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) |
a230b26e EK |
1329 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) |
1330 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { | |
e27f234a MC |
1331 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1332 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
6c3cca57 AE |
1333 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1334 | goto f_err; | |
5e9f0eeb | 1335 | } |
0f113f3e | 1336 | |
293b5ca4 AG |
1337 | if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
1338 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1339 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1340 | goto f_err; | |
1341 | } | |
1342 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1343 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
1ab3836b | 1344 | ciphersuite_len) |
6b1bb98f | 1345 | || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len) |
73999b62 | 1346 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) |
b3e2272c | 1347 | /* No extensions. */ |
73999b62 | 1348 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f0659bdb MC |
1349 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1350 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9ceb2426 MC |
1351 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1352 | goto f_err; | |
1353 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1354 | clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len; |
9ceb2426 | 1355 | |
fba7b84c | 1356 | /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
6b1bb98f | 1357 | * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit |
fba7b84c | 1358 | * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if |
6b1bb98f | 1359 | * sizeof(clienthello->random) does. |
fba7b84c MC |
1360 | */ |
1361 | challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1362 | ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; | |
6b1bb98f | 1363 | memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
b3e2272c | 1364 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, |
6b1bb98f | 1365 | clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - |
cb21df32 DB |
1366 | challenge_len, challenge_len) |
1367 | /* Advertise only null compression. */ | |
1368 | || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { | |
f0659bdb | 1369 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b3e2272c | 1370 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
9ceb2426 MC |
1371 | goto f_err; |
1372 | } | |
b3e2272c | 1373 | |
6b1bb98f | 1374 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
0f113f3e | 1375 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1376 | /* Regular ClientHello. */ |
6b1bb98f | 1377 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) |
e2994cf0 | 1378 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) |
6b1bb98f | 1379 | || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id, |
e2994cf0 | 1380 | SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1381 | &clienthello->session_id_len)) { |
9ceb2426 | 1382 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
f0659bdb | 1383 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
9ceb2426 MC |
1384 | goto f_err; |
1385 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1386 | |
b3e2272c | 1387 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 1388 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { |
32ec4153 | 1389 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
f0659bdb | 1390 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
32ec4153 MC |
1391 | goto f_err; |
1392 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1393 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1ab3836b | 1394 | DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, |
6b1bb98f | 1395 | &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1396 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1397 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1398 | goto f_err; | |
1399 | } | |
b3e2272c EK |
1400 | /* |
1401 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, | |
1402 | * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. | |
1403 | * So check cookie length... | |
1404 | */ | |
1405 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1406 | if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) |
a230b26e | 1407 | return 1; |
b3e2272c | 1408 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1409 | } |
0f113f3e | 1410 | |
6b1bb98f | 1411 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1412 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1413 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1414 | goto f_err; | |
1415 | } | |
1416 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1417 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
a230b26e EK |
1418 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1419 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1420 | goto f_err; | |
b3e2272c | 1421 | } |
1ab3836b | 1422 | |
b3e2272c | 1423 | /* Could be empty. */ |
1ab3836b | 1424 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { |
6b1bb98f | 1425 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions); |
1ab3836b | 1426 | } else { |
6b1bb98f | 1427 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1428 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1429 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1430 | goto f_err; | |
1431 | } | |
1432 | } | |
1433 | } | |
1434 | ||
6b1bb98f | 1435 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions, |
e2994cf0 | 1436 | MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, |
6b1bb98f | 1437 | &clienthello->compressions_len)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1438 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1439 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1440 | goto f_err; | |
1441 | } | |
1442 | ||
b1b4b543 | 1443 | /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ |
6b1bb98f | 1444 | extensions = clienthello->extensions; |
fadd9a1e | 1445 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
6b1bb98f BK |
1446 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, &al, |
1447 | &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len)) { | |
1ab3836b MC |
1448 | /* SSLerr already been called */ |
1449 | goto f_err; | |
1450 | } | |
6b1bb98f | 1451 | s->clienthello = clienthello; |
1ab3836b | 1452 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1453 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
1454 | f_err: | |
1455 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1456 | err: | |
1457 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
1458 | ||
1459 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1460 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello); | |
1461 | ||
1462 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1463 | } | |
1464 | ||
1465 | static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, int *al) | |
1466 | { | |
1467 | unsigned int j; | |
1468 | int i; | |
1469 | int protverr; | |
1470 | size_t loop; | |
1471 | unsigned long id; | |
1472 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1473 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; | |
1474 | #endif | |
1475 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
1476 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; | |
1477 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; | |
1478 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello; | |
1479 | ||
1480 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1ab3836b | 1481 | /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1482 | /* Give the early callback a crack at things */ |
1483 | if (s->ctx->early_cb != NULL) { | |
1484 | int code; | |
1485 | /* A failure in the early callback terminates the connection. */ | |
1486 | code = s->ctx->early_cb(s, al, s->ctx->early_cb_arg); | |
1487 | if (code == 0) | |
1488 | goto err; | |
1489 | if (code < 0) { | |
1490 | s->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_WORK; | |
1491 | return code; | |
1492 | } | |
1493 | } | |
1ab3836b MC |
1494 | |
1495 | /* Set up the client_random */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1496 | memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
1ab3836b MC |
1497 | |
1498 | /* Choose the version */ | |
1499 | ||
6b1bb98f BK |
1500 | if (clienthello->isv2) { |
1501 | if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION | |
1502 | || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00) | |
b1b4b543 MC |
1503 | != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { |
1504 | /* | |
1505 | * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't | |
1506 | * support it. | |
1507 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1508 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); |
1ab3836b MC |
1509 | goto err; |
1510 | } | |
b1b4b543 | 1511 | /* SSLv3/TLS */ |
6b1bb98f | 1512 | s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1513 | } |
1514 | /* | |
1515 | * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check | |
1516 | * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. | |
1517 | */ | |
1518 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1519 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello); |
1ab3836b | 1520 | } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && |
6b1bb98f | 1521 | DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1522 | protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; |
1523 | } else { | |
1524 | protverr = 0; | |
1525 | } | |
1526 | ||
1527 | if (protverr) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1528 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); |
7d061fce | 1529 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { |
b1b4b543 | 1530 | /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ |
6b1bb98f | 1531 | s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version; |
1ab3836b | 1532 | } |
6b1bb98f BK |
1533 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
1534 | goto err; | |
b3e2272c EK |
1535 | } |
1536 | ||
1ed65871 DB |
1537 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1538 | /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ | |
1539 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1540 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1541 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie, |
1542 | clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { | |
1543 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1544 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1ed65871 | 1545 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); |
6b1bb98f | 1546 | goto err; |
1ed65871 DB |
1547 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */ |
1548 | } | |
a230b26e | 1549 | /* default verification */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1550 | } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len |
1551 | || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, | |
1ab3836b | 1552 | s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { |
6b1bb98f BK |
1553 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1554 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
1555 | goto err; | |
1ed65871 DB |
1556 | } |
1557 | s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; | |
1558 | } | |
1559 | if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1560 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello); |
1ed65871 | 1561 | if (protverr != 0) { |
6b1bb98f | 1562 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); |
1ed65871 | 1563 | s->version = s->client_version; |
6b1bb98f BK |
1564 | *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
1565 | goto err; | |
1ed65871 DB |
1566 | } |
1567 | } | |
1568 | } | |
1569 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1570 | s->hit = 0; |
1571 | ||
1ab3836b | 1572 | /* We need to do this before getting the session */ |
70af3d8e | 1573 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, |
4b299b8e | 1574 | EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
6b1bb98f BK |
1575 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, al)) { |
1576 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
1577 | goto err; | |
1ab3836b MC |
1578 | } |
1579 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1580 | /* |
1581 | * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. | |
1582 | * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. | |
1583 | * | |
1584 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in | |
1585 | * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally | |
1586 | * ignore resumption requests with flag | |
1587 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather | |
1588 | * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on | |
1589 | * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). | |
1590 | * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to | |
1591 | * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains | |
1592 | * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the | |
1593 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be | |
1594 | * ignored. | |
1595 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1596 | if (clienthello->isv2 || |
b3e2272c EK |
1597 | (s->new_session && |
1598 | (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { | |
1599 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
1600 | goto err; | |
1601 | } else { | |
6b1bb98f | 1602 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello, al); |
128ae276 | 1603 | if (i == 1) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1604 | /* previous session */ |
1605 | s->hit = 1; | |
1606 | } else if (i == -1) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1607 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1608 | } else { |
b3e2272c EK |
1609 | /* i == 0 */ |
1610 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
32ec4153 | 1611 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1612 | } |
b3e2272c | 1613 | } |
0f113f3e | 1614 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1615 | if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, |
1616 | clienthello->isv2, al) || | |
1617 | !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs, | |
1618 | clienthello->isv2, al)) { | |
1619 | goto err; | |
b3e2272c | 1620 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1621 | |
90134d98 BK |
1622 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; |
1623 | /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */ | |
1624 | if (scsvs != NULL) { | |
1625 | for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) { | |
1626 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i); | |
1627 | if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { | |
1628 | if (s->renegotiate) { | |
1629 | /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1630 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
90134d98 | 1631 | SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); |
6b1bb98f BK |
1632 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1633 | goto err; | |
90134d98 BK |
1634 | } |
1635 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
1636 | } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV && | |
1637 | !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { | |
1638 | /* | |
1639 | * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried | |
1640 | * a higher version. We should fail if the current version | |
1641 | * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first | |
1642 | * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger | |
1643 | * an insecure downgrade. | |
1644 | */ | |
6b1bb98f | 1645 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
90134d98 | 1646 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
6b1bb98f BK |
1647 | *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; |
1648 | goto err; | |
90134d98 BK |
1649 | } |
1650 | } | |
1651 | } | |
1652 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1653 | /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ |
1654 | if (s->hit) { | |
1655 | j = 0; | |
1656 | id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
d02b48c6 | 1657 | |
413c4f45 | 1658 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
a230b26e | 1659 | fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); |
413c4f45 | 1660 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1661 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
1662 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
413c4f45 | 1663 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
b3e2272c EK |
1664 | fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", |
1665 | i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); | |
88f2a4cf | 1666 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1667 | if (c->id == id) { |
1668 | j = 1; | |
1669 | break; | |
32ec4153 | 1670 | } |
0f113f3e | 1671 | } |
b3e2272c | 1672 | if (j == 0) { |
ec30e856 | 1673 | /* |
b3e2272c EK |
1674 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked |
1675 | * to reuse it | |
ec30e856 | 1676 | */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1677 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
1678 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
b3e2272c | 1679 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); |
6b1bb98f | 1680 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1681 | } |
b3e2272c | 1682 | } |
9ceb2426 | 1683 | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1684 | for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) { |
1685 | if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0) | |
b3e2272c | 1686 | break; |
0f113f3e | 1687 | } |
32ec4153 | 1688 | |
6b1bb98f | 1689 | if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
b3e2272c | 1690 | /* no compress */ |
6b1bb98f BK |
1691 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1692 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); | |
1693 | goto err; | |
b3e2272c | 1694 | } |
f100b031 | 1695 | |
805a2e9e MC |
1696 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1697 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) | |
6b1bb98f | 1698 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello); |
805a2e9e MC |
1699 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
1700 | ||
0f113f3e | 1701 | /* TLS extensions */ |
24b8e4b2 | 1702 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
6b1bb98f BK |
1703 | clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, al)) { |
1704 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); | |
1705 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1706 | } |
1707 | ||
1708 | /* | |
1709 | * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake | |
1710 | * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before | |
1711 | * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket | |
1712 | * processing to use it in key derivation. | |
1713 | */ | |
1714 | { | |
1715 | unsigned char *pos; | |
1716 | pos = s->s3->server_random; | |
1717 | if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1718 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1719 | } |
1720 | } | |
1721 | ||
aff8c126 | 1722 | if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { |
4a640fb6 | 1723 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; |
8c1a5343 MC |
1724 | /* |
1725 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1726 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1727 | */ | |
1728 | int master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e | 1729 | |
8c1a5343 | 1730 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
aff8c126 | 1731 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, |
8c1a5343 | 1732 | &master_key_length, ciphers, |
0f113f3e | 1733 | &pref_cipher, |
aff8c126 | 1734 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) |
8c1a5343 MC |
1735 | && master_key_length > 0) { |
1736 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1737 | s->hit = 1; |
1738 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; | |
1739 | s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | |
1740 | ||
1741 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1742 | ||
1743 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ | |
3f4bf115 DSH |
1744 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) |
1745 | pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, | |
1746 | SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
0f113f3e | 1747 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) { |
6b1bb98f BK |
1748 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1749 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
1750 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1751 | } |
1752 | ||
1753 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; | |
25aaa98a | 1754 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); |
0f113f3e | 1755 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
25aaa98a | 1756 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
0f113f3e MC |
1757 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
1758 | } | |
1759 | } | |
58ece833 | 1760 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1761 | /* |
1762 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other | |
b2ce0337 | 1763 | * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression |
0f113f3e MC |
1764 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q. |
1765 | */ | |
1766 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; | |
09b6c2ef | 1767 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e | 1768 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ |
c19602b5 | 1769 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
0f113f3e | 1770 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; |
9ceb2426 | 1771 | unsigned int k; |
0f113f3e MC |
1772 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ |
1773 | /* Can't disable compression */ | |
1774 | if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1775 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
0f113f3e | 1776 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
6b1bb98f | 1777 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1778 | } |
1779 | /* Look for resumed compression method */ | |
1780 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { | |
1781 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1782 | if (comp_id == comp->id) { | |
1783 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1784 | break; | |
1785 | } | |
1786 | } | |
1787 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1788 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
0f113f3e | 1789 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
6b1bb98f | 1790 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1791 | } |
1792 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1793 | for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) { |
1794 | if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1795 | break; |
1796 | } | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1797 | if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) { |
1798 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1799 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
8fdc99cb | 1800 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); |
6b1bb98f | 1801 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1802 | } |
c19602b5 | 1803 | } else if (s->hit) { |
0f113f3e | 1804 | comp = NULL; |
c19602b5 MC |
1805 | } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods |
1806 | && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
df6741c9 | 1807 | /* See if we have a match */ |
9ceb2426 MC |
1808 | int m, nn, v, done = 0; |
1809 | unsigned int o; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1810 | |
1811 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1812 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { | |
1813 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1814 | v = comp->id; | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1815 | for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) { |
1816 | if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1817 | done = 1; |
1818 | break; | |
1819 | } | |
1820 | } | |
1821 | if (done) | |
1822 | break; | |
1823 | } | |
1824 | if (done) | |
1825 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1826 | else | |
1827 | comp = NULL; | |
1828 | } | |
e6f418bc | 1829 | #else |
0f113f3e MC |
1830 | /* |
1831 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1832 | * using compression. | |
1833 | */ | |
1834 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1835 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
1836 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1837 | } |
09b6c2ef | 1838 | #endif |
413c4f45 | 1839 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1840 | /* |
1841 | * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher | |
1842 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 1843 | |
0f113f3e | 1844 | if (!s->hit) { |
09b6c2ef | 1845 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e | 1846 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 1847 | #else |
0f113f3e | 1848 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; |
09b6c2ef | 1849 | #endif |
25aaa98a | 1850 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); |
0f113f3e MC |
1851 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; |
1852 | if (ciphers == NULL) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1853 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1854 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1855 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1856 | } |
1857 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1858 | if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { | |
6b1bb98f | 1859 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
0f113f3e MC |
1860 | goto err; |
1861 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
1862 | } |
1863 | ||
1864 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1865 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
1866 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1867 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
1868 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
1869 | return 1; | |
e27f234a | 1870 | err: |
fe3a3291 | 1871 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
1872 | |
1873 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1874 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); |
1875 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts); | |
1876 | OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); | |
1877 | s->clienthello = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 1878 | |
6b1bb98f | 1879 | return 0; |
e27f234a MC |
1880 | } |
1881 | ||
24b8e4b2 MC |
1882 | /* |
1883 | * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
1266eefd | 1884 | * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert. |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1885 | */ |
1886 | static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al) | |
1887 | { | |
aff8c126 | 1888 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1889 | |
1890 | /* | |
1891 | * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be | |
1892 | * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, | |
1893 | * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may | |
1894 | * influence which certificate is sent | |
1895 | */ | |
aff8c126 RS |
1896 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL |
1897 | && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { | |
24b8e4b2 | 1898 | int ret; |
1266eefd | 1899 | |
24b8e4b2 | 1900 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ |
a497cf25 | 1901 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) { |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1902 | /* |
1903 | * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate | |
1904 | * et al can pick it up. | |
1905 | */ | |
a497cf25 | 1906 | s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert; |
aff8c126 | 1907 | ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1908 | switch (ret) { |
1909 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | |
1910 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
aff8c126 | 1911 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1912 | break; |
1913 | /* status request response should be sent */ | |
1914 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | |
aff8c126 RS |
1915 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) |
1916 | s->ext.status_expected = 1; | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1917 | break; |
1918 | /* something bad happened */ | |
1919 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
1920 | default: | |
1921 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1922 | return 0; | |
1923 | } | |
1924 | } | |
1925 | } | |
1926 | ||
1927 | return 1; | |
1928 | } | |
1929 | ||
be3583fa | 1930 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
e27f234a | 1931 | { |
d13dd4be | 1932 | int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
4a640fb6 | 1933 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
e27f234a MC |
1934 | |
1935 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { | |
6b1bb98f BK |
1936 | int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s, &al); |
1937 | if (rv == 0) { | |
1938 | /* SSLErr() was already called */ | |
1939 | goto f_err; | |
1940 | } | |
1941 | if (rv < 0) | |
1942 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
1943 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; | |
1944 | } | |
1945 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { | |
e27f234a MC |
1946 | if (!s->hit) { |
1947 | /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ | |
1948 | if (s->cert->cert_cb) { | |
1949 | int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
1950 | if (rv == 0) { | |
1951 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
a230b26e EK |
1952 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1953 | SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
1954 | goto f_err; |
1955 | } | |
1956 | if (rv < 0) { | |
1957 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
6b1bb98f | 1958 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
e27f234a MC |
1959 | } |
1960 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
0f113f3e | 1961 | } |
a230b26e EK |
1962 | cipher = |
1963 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
e27f234a MC |
1964 | |
1965 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
a230b26e EK |
1966 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1967 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
e27f234a | 1968 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 1969 | } |
e27f234a | 1970 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; |
4a419f60 | 1971 | if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al)) |
56723275 | 1972 | goto f_err; |
e27f234a MC |
1973 | /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ |
1974 | if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1975 | s->session->not_resumable = |
1976 | s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey | |
1977 | & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) | |
1978 | != 0)); | |
e27f234a MC |
1979 | if (s->session->not_resumable) |
1980 | /* do not send a session ticket */ | |
aff8c126 | 1981 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
e27f234a MC |
1982 | } else { |
1983 | /* Session-id reuse */ | |
1984 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; | |
0f113f3e | 1985 | } |
0f113f3e | 1986 | |
e27f234a MC |
1987 | /*- |
1988 | * we now have the following setup. | |
1989 | * client_random | |
60250017 | 1990 | * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers |
1991 | * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers | |
e27f234a MC |
1992 | * compression - basically ignored right now |
1993 | * ssl version is set - sslv3 | |
1994 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. | |
1995 | * s->hit - session reuse flag | |
1996 | * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. | |
1997 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 1998 | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1999 | /* |
2000 | * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the | |
2001 | * certificate callbacks etc above. | |
2002 | */ | |
2003 | if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) { | |
2004 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
2005 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
2006 | goto f_err; | |
e27f234a | 2007 | } |
0f113f3e | 2008 | |
6b1bb98f | 2009 | wst = WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a MC |
2010 | } |
2011 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
6b1bb98f | 2012 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) { |
e27f234a MC |
2013 | int ret; |
2014 | if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { | |
2015 | /* | |
2016 | * callback indicates further work to be done | |
2017 | */ | |
2018 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
6b1bb98f | 2019 | return WORK_MORE_C; |
e27f234a MC |
2020 | } |
2021 | if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { | |
2022 | /* | |
2023 | * This is not really an error but the only means to for | |
2024 | * a client to detect whether srp is supported. | |
2025 | */ | |
2026 | if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) | |
2027 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
a230b26e | 2028 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
7bb37cb5 E |
2029 | else |
2030 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
2031 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
e27f234a | 2032 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2033 | } |
2034 | } | |
e27f234a | 2035 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 2036 | |
e27f234a | 2037 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
0f113f3e | 2038 | f_err: |
e27f234a | 2039 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
fe3a3291 | 2040 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
2041 | return WORK_ERROR; |
2042 | } | |
2043 | ||
7cea05dc | 2044 | int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2045 | { |
ec60ccc1 MC |
2046 | int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
2047 | size_t sl, len; | |
f2342b7a | 2048 | int version; |
0f113f3e | 2049 | |
b97667ce | 2050 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */ |
f2342b7a MC |
2051 | version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version; |
2052 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) | |
8157d44b MC |
2053 | /* |
2054 | * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in | |
2055 | * tls_process_client_hello() | |
2056 | */ | |
7cea05dc | 2057 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
8157d44b MC |
2058 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2059 | goto err; | |
2060 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2061 | |
e27f234a MC |
2062 | /*- |
2063 | * There are several cases for the session ID to send | |
2064 | * back in the server hello: | |
2065 | * - For session reuse from the session cache, | |
2066 | * we send back the old session ID. | |
2067 | * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) | |
2068 | * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" | |
2069 | * (which doesn't actually identify the session). | |
2070 | * - If it is a new session, we send back the new | |
2071 | * session ID. | |
2072 | * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, | |
2073 | * we send back a 0-length session ID. | |
2074 | * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, | |
2075 | * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed | |
2076 | * to send back. | |
2077 | */ | |
2078 | if (s->session->not_resumable || | |
2079 | (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) | |
2080 | && !s->hit)) | |
2081 | s->session->session_id_length = 0; | |
2082 | ||
2083 | sl = s->session->session_id_length; | |
ec60ccc1 | 2084 | if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { |
e27f234a | 2085 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 2086 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2087 | } |
0f113f3e | 2088 | |
8157d44b | 2089 | /* set up the compression method */ |
09b6c2ef | 2090 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
8157d44b | 2091 | compm = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 2092 | #else |
e27f234a | 2093 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
8157d44b | 2094 | compm = 0; |
e27f234a | 2095 | else |
8157d44b | 2096 | compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; |
09b6c2ef | 2097 | #endif |
e481f9b9 | 2098 | |
71728dd8 MC |
2099 | if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
2100 | && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)) | |
7cea05dc | 2101 | || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) |
71728dd8 MC |
2102 | || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
2103 | && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) | |
7da160b0 | 2104 | || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
3434f40b | 2105 | SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
1266eefd | 2106 | ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO |
30aeba43 MC |
2107 | : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO, |
2108 | NULL, 0, &al)) { | |
e27f234a | 2109 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 2110 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2111 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2112 | |
aff9929b MC |
2113 | if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
2114 | && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
2115 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2116 | goto err; | |
2117 | } | |
2118 | ||
e27f234a | 2119 | return 1; |
8157d44b | 2120 | err: |
7da160b0 | 2121 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
8157d44b | 2122 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2123 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2124 | |
7cea05dc | 2125 | int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 2126 | { |
e27f234a | 2127 | if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
5923ad4b MC |
2128 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
2129 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2130 | return 0; | |
2131 | } | |
e27f234a | 2132 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2133 | return 1; |
2134 | } | |
2135 | ||
7cea05dc | 2136 | int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2137 | { |
bc36ee62 | 2138 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e2b420fd | 2139 | EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; |
ea262260 | 2140 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2141 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e | 2142 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
348240c6 | 2143 | size_t encodedlen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 2144 | int curve_id = 0; |
d02b48c6 | 2145 | #endif |
f695571e | 2146 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; |
c13d2a5b | 2147 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i; |
0f113f3e | 2148 | unsigned long type; |
2ac6115d | 2149 | const BIGNUM *r[4]; |
bfb0641f | 2150 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
fe3066ee | 2151 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
c13d2a5b MC |
2152 | size_t paramlen, paramoffset; |
2153 | ||
5923ad4b | 2154 | if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { |
e4e1aa90 | 2155 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2156 | goto f_err; |
2157 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2158 | |
6e59a892 RL |
2159 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { |
2160 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
6e59a892 RL |
2161 | goto f_err; |
2162 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2163 | |
e27f234a | 2164 | type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
e27f234a | 2165 | |
e27f234a | 2166 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; |
85269210 | 2167 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a MC |
2168 | /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ |
2169 | if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
2170 | } else | |
85269210 | 2171 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
bc36ee62 | 2172 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e27f234a | 2173 | if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
94d61512 BL |
2174 | CERT *cert = s->cert; |
2175 | ||
e2b420fd DSH |
2176 | EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; |
2177 | DH *dh; | |
2178 | ||
e27f234a | 2179 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { |
e2b420fd DSH |
2180 | DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); |
2181 | pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2182 | if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { | |
2183 | DH_free(dhp); | |
e27f234a | 2184 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
0f113f3e | 2185 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 2186 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 2187 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2188 | EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); |
2189 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2190 | } else { | |
2191 | pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; | |
2192 | } | |
2193 | if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { | |
2194 | DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); | |
2195 | pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); | |
2196 | if (pkdh == NULL) { | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2197 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2198 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2199 | goto f_err; | |
2200 | } | |
2201 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2202 | } | |
2203 | if (pkdhp == NULL) { | |
e27f234a MC |
2204 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
2205 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2206 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
2207 | goto f_err; | |
2208 | } | |
2209 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, | |
e2b420fd | 2210 | EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { |
e27f234a MC |
2211 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
2212 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2213 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
2214 | goto f_err; | |
2215 | } | |
e2b420fd | 2216 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2217 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2218 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2219 | goto err; | |
2220 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2221 | |
0a699a07 | 2222 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); |
e27f234a | 2223 | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2224 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { |
2225 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
ffaef3f1 | 2226 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2227 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2228 | |
2229 | dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2230 | ||
2231 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2232 | pkdh = NULL; | |
2233 | ||
0aeddcfa MC |
2234 | DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]); |
2235 | DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL); | |
e27f234a | 2236 | } else |
d02b48c6 | 2237 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2238 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a | 2239 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
57be4444 | 2240 | int nid; |
e27f234a | 2241 | |
880d9d86 | 2242 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2243 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2244 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2245 | goto err; | |
2246 | } | |
2247 | ||
57be4444 | 2248 | /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ |
de4d764e | 2249 | nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); |
57be4444 DSH |
2250 | curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); |
2251 | if (curve_id == 0) { | |
e27f234a MC |
2252 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2253 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); | |
2254 | goto err; | |
2255 | } | |
0a699a07 | 2256 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); |
880d9d86 DSH |
2257 | /* Generate a new key for this curve */ |
2258 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { | |
880d9d86 | 2259 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
57be4444 DSH |
2260 | goto f_err; |
2261 | } | |
2262 | ||
880d9d86 | 2263 | /* Encode the public key. */ |
ec24630a DSH |
2264 | encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, |
2265 | &encodedPoint); | |
e27f234a | 2266 | if (encodedlen == 0) { |
cae41364 | 2267 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
e27f234a MC |
2268 | goto err; |
2269 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2270 | |
e27f234a MC |
2271 | /* |
2272 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we | |
2273 | * can set these to NULLs | |
2274 | */ | |
2275 | r[0] = NULL; | |
2276 | r[1] = NULL; | |
2277 | r[2] = NULL; | |
2278 | r[3] = NULL; | |
2279 | } else | |
10bf4fc2 | 2280 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
edc032b5 | 2281 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a MC |
2282 | if (type & SSL_kSRP) { |
2283 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || | |
2284 | (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || | |
2285 | (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { | |
2286 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2287 | SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); | |
2288 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2289 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2290 | r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; |
2291 | r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; | |
2292 | r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; | |
2293 | r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; | |
2294 | } else | |
2295 | #endif | |
2296 | { | |
2297 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2298 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2299 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); | |
2300 | goto f_err; | |
2301 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2302 | |
f695571e DSH |
2303 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0) |
2304 | || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) { | |
2305 | lu = NULL; | |
2306 | } else if (lu == NULL) { | |
2307 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2308 | goto f_err; | |
e27f234a | 2309 | } |
0f113f3e | 2310 | |
85269210 | 2311 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a | 2312 | if (type & SSL_PSK) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2313 | size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
2314 | ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); | |
2315 | ||
2316 | /* | |
2317 | * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already | |
2318 | * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case | |
2319 | */ | |
2320 | if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN | |
7cea05dc | 2321 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, |
c13d2a5b MC |
2322 | len)) { |
2323 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2324 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2325 | goto f_err; | |
85269210 | 2326 | } |
e27f234a | 2327 | } |
85269210 DSH |
2328 | #endif |
2329 | ||
e27f234a | 2330 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2331 | unsigned char *binval; |
2332 | int res; | |
2333 | ||
edc032b5 | 2334 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a | 2335 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { |
7cea05dc | 2336 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); |
e27f234a | 2337 | } else |
78a01b3f | 2338 | #endif |
7cea05dc | 2339 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2340 | |
2341 | if (!res) { | |
2342 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2343 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2344 | goto f_err; | |
2345 | } | |
2346 | ||
78a01b3f | 2347 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
a230b26e | 2348 | /*- |
78a01b3f | 2349 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS |
2350 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length | |
2351 | * as the prime | |
2352 | */ | |
2353 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2354 | size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); |
ff819477 | 2355 | |
c13d2a5b | 2356 | if (len > 0) { |
7cea05dc | 2357 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2358 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2359 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2360 | goto f_err; | |
2361 | } | |
2362 | memset(binval, 0, len); | |
78a01b3f | 2363 | } |
c13d2a5b | 2364 | } |
edc032b5 | 2365 | #endif |
7cea05dc MC |
2366 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) |
2367 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2368 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2369 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2370 | goto f_err; | |
2371 | } | |
2372 | ||
2373 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); | |
e27f234a | 2374 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2375 | |
10bf4fc2 | 2376 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a MC |
2377 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2378 | /* | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2379 | * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the |
2380 | * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] | |
2381 | * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded | |
2382 | * point itself | |
e27f234a | 2383 | */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2384 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) |
2385 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
2386 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) | |
2387 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2388 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2389 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2390 | goto f_err; | |
2391 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2392 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
2393 | encodedPoint = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2394 | } |
ea262260 BM |
2395 | #endif |
2396 | ||
e27f234a | 2397 | /* not anonymous */ |
f695571e | 2398 | if (lu != NULL) { |
a497cf25 | 2399 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; |
f695571e DSH |
2400 | const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx); |
2401 | unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2; | |
2402 | size_t siglen; | |
2403 | ||
2404 | if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) { | |
2405 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2406 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2407 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2408 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2409 | goto f_err; | |
2410 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2411 | /* |
2412 | * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p | |
2413 | * points to the space at the end. | |
2414 | */ | |
c13d2a5b | 2415 | |
f695571e DSH |
2416 | /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ |
2417 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { | |
2418 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2419 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2420 | goto f_err; | |
2421 | } | |
2422 | /* send signature algorithm */ | |
2423 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) | |
2424 | return 0; | |
2425 | /* | |
2426 | * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig | |
2427 | * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it | |
2428 | * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET | |
2429 | * afterwards. | |
2430 | */ | |
2431 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
2432 | if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) | |
2433 | || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { | |
2434 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2435 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2436 | goto f_err; | |
2437 | } | |
2438 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | |
2439 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 | |
2440 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2441 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
f695571e | 2442 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
5f3d93e4 | 2443 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 2444 | } |
f695571e DSH |
2445 | } |
2446 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), | |
2447 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
2448 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), | |
2449 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
2450 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, | |
2451 | s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, | |
2452 | paramlen) <= 0 | |
2453 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0 | |
2454 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) | |
2455 | || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { | |
e27f234a | 2456 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
f695571e | 2457 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
77d514c5 MC |
2458 | goto f_err; |
2459 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2460 | } |
2461 | ||
bfb0641f | 2462 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2463 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
2464 | f_err: |
2465 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2466 | err: | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2467 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
2468 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2469 | #endif | |
556efe79 | 2470 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
b548a1f1 | 2471 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
ea262260 | 2472 | #endif |
bfb0641f | 2473 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2474 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2475 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2476 | |
7cea05dc | 2477 | int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2478 | { |
348240c6 | 2479 | int i; |
0f113f3e | 2480 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 2481 | |
03f44b97 DSH |
2482 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
2483 | /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */ | |
2484 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { | |
2485 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2486 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2487 | goto err; | |
2488 | } | |
2489 | } else { | |
2490 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ | |
2491 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) | |
2492 | || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
2493 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2494 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2495 | goto err; | |
2496 | } | |
28ff8ef3 | 2497 | } |
0f113f3e | 2498 | |
e27f234a | 2499 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
98c792d1 | 2500 | const uint16_t *psigs; |
a9669ddc | 2501 | size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); |
703bcee0 | 2502 | |
7cea05dc | 2503 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
8f12296e | 2504 | || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) |
7cea05dc MC |
2505 | || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) |
2506 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2507 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
2508 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2509 | goto err; | |
2510 | } | |
e27f234a | 2511 | } |
0f113f3e | 2512 | |
28ff8ef3 | 2513 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
7cea05dc | 2514 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2515 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2516 | goto err; | |
2517 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2518 | |
2519 | sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
e27f234a MC |
2520 | if (sk != NULL) { |
2521 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2522 | unsigned char *namebytes; |
2523 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); | |
2524 | int namelen; | |
2525 | ||
2526 | if (name == NULL | |
2527 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
7cea05dc | 2528 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2529 | &namebytes) |
2530 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
2531 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2532 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a | 2533 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2534 | } |
2535 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2536 | } |
2537 | /* else no CA names */ | |
5923ad4b | 2538 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
e27f234a MC |
2539 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2540 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2541 | } |
03f44b97 DSH |
2542 | /* |
2543 | * TODO(TLS1.3) implement configurable certificate_extensions | |
2544 | * For now just send zero length extensions. | |
2545 | */ | |
2546 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
2547 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2548 | goto err; | |
2549 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 2550 | |
e27f234a MC |
2551 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; |
2552 | ||
2553 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 2554 | err: |
28ff8ef3 | 2555 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 2556 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2557 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2558 | |
0907d710 | 2559 | static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
e27f234a | 2560 | { |
85269210 | 2561 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
0907d710 MC |
2562 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
2563 | size_t psklen; | |
2564 | PACKET psk_identity; | |
efcdbcbe | 2565 | |
0907d710 MC |
2566 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { |
2567 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2568 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 MC |
2569 | return 0; |
2570 | } | |
2571 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
2572 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2573 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
0907d710 MC |
2574 | return 0; |
2575 | } | |
2576 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { | |
2577 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
a230b26e | 2578 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); |
0907d710 MC |
2579 | return 0; |
2580 | } | |
85269210 | 2581 | |
0907d710 MC |
2582 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { |
2583 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2584 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2585 | return 0; |
2586 | } | |
85269210 | 2587 | |
0907d710 | 2588 | psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, |
a230b26e | 2589 | psk, sizeof(psk)); |
85269210 | 2590 | |
0907d710 MC |
2591 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
2592 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2593 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2594 | return 0; |
2595 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
2596 | /* | |
2597 | * PSK related to the given identity not found | |
2598 | */ | |
2599 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
c76a4aea | 2600 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
0907d710 MC |
2601 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
2602 | return 0; | |
2603 | } | |
85269210 | 2604 | |
0907d710 MC |
2605 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); |
2606 | s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); | |
2607 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); | |
85269210 | 2608 | |
0907d710 MC |
2609 | if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { |
2610 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2611 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 | 2612 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2613 | } |
0907d710 MC |
2614 | |
2615 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; | |
2616 | ||
2617 | return 1; | |
2618 | #else | |
2619 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2620 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2621 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 | 2622 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2623 | #endif |
0907d710 MC |
2624 | } |
2625 | ||
0907d710 MC |
2626 | static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2627 | { | |
bc36ee62 | 2628 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
0907d710 MC |
2629 | unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
2630 | int decrypt_len; | |
2631 | unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; | |
2632 | size_t j, padding_len; | |
2633 | PACKET enc_premaster; | |
2634 | RSA *rsa = NULL; | |
2635 | unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; | |
2636 | int ret = 0; | |
2637 | ||
d0ff28f8 | 2638 | rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey); |
0907d710 MC |
2639 | if (rsa == NULL) { |
2640 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2641 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); |
0907d710 MC |
2642 | return 0; |
2643 | } | |
2644 | ||
2645 | /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ | |
2646 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2647 | enc_premaster = *pkt; | |
2648 | } else { | |
2649 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) | |
2650 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
2651 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2652 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 | 2653 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2654 | } |
0907d710 | 2655 | } |
0f113f3e | 2656 | |
0907d710 MC |
2657 | /* |
2658 | * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to | |
2659 | * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret | |
2660 | * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because | |
2661 | * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. | |
2662 | */ | |
2663 | if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2664 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2665 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
0907d710 MC |
2666 | return 0; |
2667 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2668 | |
0907d710 MC |
2669 | rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); |
2670 | if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { | |
2671 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2672 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 MC |
2673 | return 0; |
2674 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2675 | |
0907d710 MC |
2676 | /* |
2677 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of | |
2678 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, | |
2679 | * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and | |
2680 | * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt | |
2681 | * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 | |
2682 | */ | |
20ca916d | 2683 | |
a230b26e | 2684 | if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) |
0907d710 | 2685 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2686 | |
0907d710 MC |
2687 | /* |
2688 | * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of | |
2689 | * the timing-sensitive code below. | |
2690 | */ | |
348240c6 MC |
2691 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
2692 | decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), | |
2693 | PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), | |
2694 | rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | |
0907d710 MC |
2695 | if (decrypt_len < 0) |
2696 | goto err; | |
20ca916d | 2697 | |
0907d710 | 2698 | /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ |
5b8fa431 | 2699 | |
0907d710 MC |
2700 | /* |
2701 | * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys | |
2702 | * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures | |
2703 | * PS is at least 8 bytes. | |
2704 | */ | |
2705 | if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2706 | *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2707 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
0907d710 MC |
2708 | goto err; |
2709 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2710 | |
0907d710 MC |
2711 | padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
2712 | decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & | |
a230b26e | 2713 | constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); |
0907d710 MC |
2714 | for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { |
2715 | decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); | |
2716 | } | |
2717 | decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); | |
5b8fa431 | 2718 | |
0907d710 MC |
2719 | /* |
2720 | * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then | |
2721 | * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The | |
2722 | * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack | |
2723 | * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number | |
2724 | * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in | |
2725 | * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. | |
2726 | */ | |
2727 | version_good = | |
2728 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2729 | (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); | |
2730 | version_good &= | |
2731 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], | |
2732 | (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); | |
0f113f3e | 2733 | |
0907d710 MC |
2734 | /* |
2735 | * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the | |
2736 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the | |
2737 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). | |
2738 | * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol | |
2739 | * version instead if the server does not support the requested | |
2740 | * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such | |
2741 | * clients. | |
2742 | */ | |
2743 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { | |
2744 | unsigned char workaround_good; | |
2745 | workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2746 | (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); | |
2747 | workaround_good &= | |
5b8fa431 | 2748 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], |
0907d710 MC |
2749 | (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); |
2750 | version_good |= workaround_good; | |
2751 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2752 | |
0907d710 MC |
2753 | /* |
2754 | * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to | |
2755 | * remain non-zero (0xff). | |
2756 | */ | |
2757 | decrypt_good &= version_good; | |
0f113f3e | 2758 | |
0907d710 MC |
2759 | /* |
2760 | * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using | |
2761 | * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not | |
2762 | * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees | |
2763 | * it is still sufficiently large to read from. | |
2764 | */ | |
2765 | for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { | |
2766 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = | |
2767 | constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, | |
2768 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], | |
2769 | rand_premaster_secret[j]); | |
2770 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2771 | |
0907d710 MC |
2772 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, |
2773 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
2774 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2775 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2776 | goto err; |
2777 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2778 | |
0907d710 MC |
2779 | ret = 1; |
2780 | err: | |
2781 | OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); | |
2782 | return ret; | |
2783 | #else | |
2784 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2785 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2786 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2787 | return 0; |
2788 | #endif | |
2789 | } | |
2790 | ||
642360f9 MC |
2791 | static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2792 | { | |
2793 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2794 | EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; | |
2795 | DH *cdh; | |
2796 | unsigned int i; | |
2797 | BIGNUM *pub_key; | |
2798 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2799 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2800 | int ret = 0; | |
2801 | ||
31a7d80d | 2802 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { |
642360f9 | 2803 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
c76a4aea | 2804 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
642360f9 MC |
2805 | SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
2806 | goto err; | |
2807 | } | |
642360f9 MC |
2808 | skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; |
2809 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
2810 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2811 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2812 | goto err; |
2813 | } | |
2814 | ||
2815 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2816 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2817 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2818 | goto err; |
2819 | } | |
2820 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { | |
2821 | /* We already checked we have enough data */ | |
2822 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2823 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2824 | goto err; |
2825 | } | |
2826 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2827 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { | |
c76a4aea | 2828 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); |
642360f9 MC |
2829 | goto err; |
2830 | } | |
2831 | cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); | |
2832 | pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); | |
2833 | ||
2834 | if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { | |
c76a4aea | 2835 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2836 | if (pub_key != NULL) |
2837 | BN_free(pub_key); | |
2838 | goto err; | |
2839 | } | |
2840 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2841 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
642360f9 | 2842 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2843 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2844 | goto err; |
2845 | } | |
2846 | ||
2847 | ret = 1; | |
2848 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2849 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
2850 | err: | |
2851 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2852 | return ret; | |
2853 | #else | |
2854 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2855 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2856 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2857 | return 0; |
2858 | #endif | |
2859 | } | |
2860 | ||
19ed1ec1 MC |
2861 | static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2862 | { | |
2863 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2864 | EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; | |
2865 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2866 | int ret = 0; | |
2867 | ||
2868 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2869 | /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ | |
2870 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2871 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2872 | goto err; |
2873 | } else { | |
2874 | unsigned int i; | |
2875 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2876 | ||
2877 | /* | |
2878 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the | |
2879 | * ClientKeyExchange message. | |
2880 | */ | |
2881 | ||
2882 | /* Get encoded point length */ | |
fb933982 DSH |
2883 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) |
2884 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
19ed1ec1 | 2885 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2886 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2887 | goto err; |
2888 | } | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2889 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); |
2890 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { | |
c76a4aea | 2891 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2892 | goto err; |
2893 | } | |
ec24630a | 2894 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { |
fb933982 | 2895 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
c76a4aea | 2896 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2897 | goto err; |
2898 | } | |
2899 | } | |
2900 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2901 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
19ed1ec1 | 2902 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2903 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2904 | goto err; |
2905 | } | |
2906 | ||
2907 | ret = 1; | |
2908 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2909 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
2910 | err: | |
2911 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2912 | ||
2913 | return ret; | |
2914 | #else | |
2915 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2916 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2917 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2918 | return 0; |
2919 | #endif | |
2920 | } | |
2921 | ||
c437eef6 MC |
2922 | static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2923 | { | |
2924 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2925 | unsigned int i; | |
2926 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2927 | ||
2928 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) | |
a230b26e | 2929 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { |
c437eef6 | 2930 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2931 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); |
c437eef6 MC |
2932 | return 0; |
2933 | } | |
2934 | if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { | |
c76a4aea | 2935 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
c437eef6 MC |
2936 | return 0; |
2937 | } | |
a230b26e | 2938 | if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { |
c437eef6 | 2939 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
c76a4aea | 2940 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); |
c437eef6 MC |
2941 | return 0; |
2942 | } | |
2943 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); | |
2944 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
2945 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
c76a4aea | 2946 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
2947 | return 0; |
2948 | } | |
2949 | ||
2950 | if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { | |
c76a4aea | 2951 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2952 | return 0; |
2953 | } | |
2954 | ||
2955 | return 1; | |
2956 | #else | |
2957 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2958 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2959 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2960 | return 0; |
2961 | #endif | |
2962 | } | |
2963 | ||
2964 | static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
2965 | { | |
2966 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
2967 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; | |
2968 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; | |
2969 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; | |
2970 | const unsigned char *start; | |
2971 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen; | |
2972 | unsigned long alg_a; | |
2973 | int Ttag, Tclass; | |
2974 | long Tlen; | |
348240c6 | 2975 | size_t sess_key_len; |
c437eef6 MC |
2976 | const unsigned char *data; |
2977 | int ret = 0; | |
2978 | ||
2979 | /* Get our certificate private key */ | |
2980 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
2981 | if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { | |
2982 | /* | |
2983 | * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too | |
2984 | */ | |
2985 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; | |
2986 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
2987 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; | |
2988 | } | |
2989 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
2990 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2991 | } | |
2992 | } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { | |
2993 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2994 | } | |
2995 | ||
2996 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); | |
2997 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
2998 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2999 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
3000 | return 0; |
3001 | } | |
3002 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { | |
3003 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 3004 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3005 | return 0; |
3006 | } | |
3007 | /* | |
3008 | * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe | |
3009 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from | |
3010 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a | |
3011 | * client certificate for authorization only. | |
3012 | */ | |
3013 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
3014 | if (client_pub_pkey) { | |
3015 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) | |
3016 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
3017 | } | |
3018 | /* Decrypt session key */ | |
3019 | sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
3020 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { | |
3021 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 3022 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3023 | goto err; |
3024 | } | |
348240c6 | 3025 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
a230b26e | 3026 | if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, |
348240c6 | 3027 | &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
a230b26e | 3028 | || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { |
c437eef6 | 3029 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 3030 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
3031 | goto err; |
3032 | } | |
3033 | start = data; | |
3034 | inlen = Tlen; | |
3035 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt | |
3036 | (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { | |
3037 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 3038 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
3039 | goto err; |
3040 | } | |
3041 | /* Generate master secret */ | |
3042 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, | |
3043 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
3044 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 3045 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3046 | goto err; |
3047 | } | |
3048 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ | |
3049 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl | |
3050 | (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) | |
3051 | s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; | |
3052 | ||
3053 | ret = 1; | |
3054 | err: | |
3055 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3056 | return ret; | |
3057 | #else | |
3058 | /* Should never happen */ | |
3059 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 3060 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
3061 | return 0; |
3062 | #endif | |
3063 | } | |
3064 | ||
0907d710 MC |
3065 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3066 | { | |
3067 | int al = -1; | |
3068 | unsigned long alg_k; | |
3069 | ||
3070 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
3071 | ||
3072 | /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ | |
3073 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) | |
3074 | goto err; | |
3075 | ||
3076 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { | |
3077 | /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ | |
3078 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
3079 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
a230b26e EK |
3080 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
3081 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9059eb71 | 3082 | goto err; |
0907d710 MC |
3083 | } |
3084 | /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ | |
3085 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { | |
69f68237 | 3086 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3087 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9059eb71 | 3088 | goto err; |
69f68237 | 3089 | } |
0907d710 MC |
3090 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
3091 | if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al)) | |
3092 | goto err; | |
642360f9 MC |
3093 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
3094 | if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 3095 | goto err; |
19ed1ec1 MC |
3096 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
3097 | if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al)) | |
3098 | goto err; | |
c437eef6 MC |
3099 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
3100 | if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 3101 | goto err; |
c437eef6 MC |
3102 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
3103 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 3104 | goto err; |
c437eef6 | 3105 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 3106 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
a230b26e EK |
3107 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
3108 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); | |
9059eb71 | 3109 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
3110 | } |
3111 | ||
e27f234a | 3112 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e | 3113 | err: |
0907d710 MC |
3114 | if (al != -1) |
3115 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
85269210 DSH |
3116 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
3117 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); | |
3118 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; | |
58964a49 | 3119 | #endif |
fe3a3291 | 3120 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a | 3121 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3122 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3123 | |
be3583fa | 3124 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
94836de2 | 3125 | { |
94836de2 | 3126 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
c130dd8e MC |
3127 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
3128 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3129 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
3130 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
3131 | /* | |
3132 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
3133 | * used. | |
3134 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
3135 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
3136 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
c130dd8e MC |
3137 | |
3138 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
3139 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
3140 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
3141 | 0) <= 0) { | |
fe3a3291 | 3142 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
0fe2a0af | 3143 | return WORK_ERROR; |
c130dd8e | 3144 | } |
94836de2 | 3145 | |
c130dd8e MC |
3146 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
3147 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
94836de2 | 3148 | } |
c130dd8e MC |
3149 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; |
3150 | } | |
94836de2 | 3151 | |
c130dd8e | 3152 | if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B) |
a230b26e EK |
3153 | /* Is this SCTP? */ |
3154 | && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
3155 | /* Are we renegotiating? */ | |
3156 | && s->renegotiate | |
3157 | /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */ | |
3158 | && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify) | |
3159 | && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
c130dd8e MC |
3160 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; |
3161 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
3162 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
3163 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
d99b0691 | 3164 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); |
c130dd8e MC |
3165 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
3166 | } else { | |
fe3a3291 | 3167 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); |
94836de2 MC |
3168 | } |
3169 | #endif | |
3170 | ||
149c2ef5 | 3171 | if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { |
a230b26e EK |
3172 | /* |
3173 | * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need | |
3174 | * the handshake_buffer | |
149c2ef5 MC |
3175 | */ |
3176 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
3177 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
3178 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
3179 | } | |
94836de2 | 3180 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
28f4580c | 3181 | } else { |
94836de2 MC |
3182 | if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { |
3183 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3184 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
fe3a3291 | 3185 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
94836de2 MC |
3186 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3187 | } | |
3188 | /* | |
3189 | * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support | |
3190 | * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op | |
3191 | */ | |
3192 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { | |
fe3a3291 | 3193 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
94836de2 MC |
3194 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3195 | } | |
94836de2 MC |
3196 | } |
3197 | ||
3198 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3199 | } | |
3200 | ||
be3583fa | 3201 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3202 | { |
20dbe585 | 3203 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
3204 | X509 *x = NULL; |
3205 | unsigned long l, llen; | |
b6981744 | 3206 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
e27f234a | 3207 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
e96e0f8e | 3208 | PACKET spkt, context; |
d805a57b | 3209 | size_t chainidx; |
0f113f3e MC |
3210 | |
3211 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
e27f234a MC |
3212 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3213 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3214 | } |
3215 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3216 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */ |
3217 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)) | |
3218 | || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) | |
3219 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) | |
3220 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 3221 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3222 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
3223 | goto f_err; |
3224 | } | |
0bc09ecd | 3225 | |
d805a57b | 3226 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { |
0bc09ecd | 3227 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) |
a230b26e | 3228 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { |
0f113f3e | 3229 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3230 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3231 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
3232 | goto f_err; | |
3233 | } | |
3234 | ||
0bc09ecd MC |
3235 | certstart = certbytes; |
3236 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); | |
0f113f3e | 3237 | if (x == NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
3238 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
3239 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e | 3240 | } |
0bc09ecd | 3241 | if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { |
0f113f3e | 3242 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3243 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3244 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
3245 | goto f_err; | |
3246 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3247 | |
3248 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3249 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
3250 | PACKET extensions; | |
3251 | ||
3252 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { | |
3253 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3254 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
3255 | goto f_err; | |
3256 | } | |
3257 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, | |
fc5ece2e | 3258 | &rawexts, &al, NULL) |
e96e0f8e | 3259 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, |
5ee289ea MC |
3260 | rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) { |
3261 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e | 3262 | goto f_err; |
5ee289ea MC |
3263 | } |
3264 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3265 | } |
3266 | ||
0f113f3e | 3267 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
e27f234a MC |
3268 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3269 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3270 | } |
3271 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3272 | } |
3273 | ||
3274 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { | |
3275 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ | |
3276 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
3277 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 3278 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3279 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); |
3280 | goto f_err; | |
3281 | } | |
3282 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ | |
3283 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
3284 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
e27f234a | 3285 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e | 3286 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
42c28b63 | 3287 | al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED; |
0f113f3e MC |
3288 | goto f_err; |
3289 | } | |
3290 | /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ | |
124037fd | 3291 | if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3292 | goto f_err; |
3293 | } | |
3294 | } else { | |
3295 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
3296 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
3297 | if (i <= 0) { | |
3298 | al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); | |
e27f234a | 3299 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3300 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
3301 | goto f_err; | |
3302 | } | |
3303 | if (i > 1) { | |
e27f234a | 3304 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); |
0f113f3e MC |
3305 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
3306 | goto f_err; | |
3307 | } | |
8382fd3a | 3308 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); |
0f113f3e MC |
3309 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
3310 | al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 3311 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3312 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
3313 | goto f_err; | |
3314 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
3315 | } |
3316 | ||
222561fe | 3317 | X509_free(s->session->peer); |
0f113f3e MC |
3318 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); |
3319 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
3320 | ||
c34b0f99 DSH |
3321 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); |
3322 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3323 | |
3324 | /* | |
3325 | * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE | |
3326 | * message | |
3327 | */ | |
94ed2c67 | 3328 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { |
0f1e51ea MC |
3329 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
3330 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3331 | goto f_err; | |
3332 | } | |
3333 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3334 | /* |
3335 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own | |
d4d78943 | 3336 | * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c |
0f113f3e | 3337 | */ |
0f113f3e | 3338 | sk = NULL; |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3339 | |
3340 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
3341 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3342 | && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
3343 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
3344 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
3345 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3346 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3347 | goto f_err; | |
3348 | } | |
3349 | ||
e27f234a | 3350 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
66696478 RS |
3351 | goto done; |
3352 | ||
0f113f3e | 3353 | f_err: |
66696478 | 3354 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
fe3a3291 | 3355 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
66696478 | 3356 | done: |
222561fe RS |
3357 | X509_free(x); |
3358 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
e27f234a | 3359 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 3360 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3361 | |
7cea05dc | 3362 | int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3363 | { |
a497cf25 | 3364 | CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert; |
e96e0f8e | 3365 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3366 | |
a497cf25 | 3367 | if (cpk == NULL) { |
e27f234a | 3368 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a MC |
3369 | return 0; |
3370 | } | |
3371 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3372 | /* |
3373 | * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context | |
3374 | * for the server Certificate message | |
3375 | */ | |
3376 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) | |
3377 | || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) { | |
e27f234a | 3378 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e | 3379 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e27f234a MC |
3380 | return 0; |
3381 | } | |
3382 | ||
3383 | return 1; | |
3384 | } | |
3385 | ||
7cea05dc | 3386 | int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
3387 | { |
3388 | unsigned char *senc = NULL; | |
83ae4661 | 3389 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
bf7c6817 | 3390 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; |
a00d75e1 | 3391 | unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; |
e27f234a | 3392 | const unsigned char *const_p; |
a00d75e1 | 3393 | int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; |
e27f234a MC |
3394 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
3395 | unsigned int hlen; | |
222da979 | 3396 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; |
e27f234a | 3397 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
d139723b | 3398 | unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; |
30f05b19 | 3399 | int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
a00d75e1 | 3400 | size_t macoffset, macendoffset; |
30f05b19 MC |
3401 | union { |
3402 | unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; | |
3403 | uint32_t age_add; | |
3404 | } age_add_u; | |
e27f234a | 3405 | |
fc24f0bf MC |
3406 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
3407 | if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) | |
3408 | goto err; | |
3409 | s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; | |
2c604cb9 | 3410 | s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); |
f6370040 MC |
3411 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { |
3412 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected); | |
3413 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected = | |
3414 | OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); | |
3415 | if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { | |
3416 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3417 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3418 | goto err; | |
3419 | } | |
3420 | s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; | |
3421 | } | |
3422 | s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data; | |
fc24f0bf MC |
3423 | } |
3424 | ||
e27f234a MC |
3425 | /* get session encoding length */ |
3426 | slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); | |
3427 | /* | |
3428 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too | |
3429 | * long | |
3430 | */ | |
3431 | if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { | |
f6370040 MC |
3432 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3433 | goto err; | |
e27f234a MC |
3434 | } |
3435 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); | |
a71edf3b | 3436 | if (senc == NULL) { |
f6370040 MC |
3437 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3438 | goto err; | |
e27f234a | 3439 | } |
0f113f3e | 3440 | |
846ec07d | 3441 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
bf7c6817 | 3442 | hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); |
83ae4661 MC |
3443 | if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { |
3444 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3445 | goto err; | |
3446 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3447 | |
e27f234a MC |
3448 | p = senc; |
3449 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) | |
3450 | goto err; | |
687eaf27 | 3451 | |
e27f234a MC |
3452 | /* |
3453 | * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up | |
3454 | */ | |
3455 | const_p = senc; | |
3456 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); | |
3457 | if (sess == NULL) | |
3458 | goto err; | |
3459 | sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ | |
0f113f3e | 3460 | |
e27f234a MC |
3461 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
3462 | if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ | |
3463 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3464 | goto err; | |
3465 | } | |
3466 | p = senc; | |
3467 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { | |
3468 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3469 | goto err; | |
3470 | } | |
3471 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
0f113f3e | 3472 | |
e27f234a MC |
3473 | /* |
3474 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does | |
3475 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. | |
3476 | */ | |
aff8c126 | 3477 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { |
5c753de6 | 3478 | /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ |
aff8c126 | 3479 | int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, |
5c753de6 TS |
3480 | hctx, 1); |
3481 | ||
3482 | if (ret == 0) { | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3483 | |
3484 | /* Put timeout and length */ | |
7cea05dc | 3485 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) |
4a01c59f | 3486 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
a00d75e1 MC |
3487 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
3488 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5c753de6 | 3489 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3490 | } |
5c753de6 TS |
3491 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3492 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
3493 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
3494 | return 1; | |
3495 | } | |
3496 | if (ret < 0) | |
e27f234a | 3497 | goto err; |
d139723b | 3498 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); |
e27f234a | 3499 | } else { |
d139723b KR |
3500 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); |
3501 | ||
3502 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); | |
3503 | if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0) | |
687eaf27 | 3504 | goto err; |
d139723b | 3505 | if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, |
aff8c126 | 3506 | tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv)) |
687eaf27 | 3507 | goto err; |
aff8c126 RS |
3508 | if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key, |
3509 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key), | |
e27f234a | 3510 | EVP_sha256(), NULL)) |
4f9fab6b | 3511 | goto err; |
aff8c126 RS |
3512 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, |
3513 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3514 | } |
3515 | ||
e27f234a | 3516 | /* |
2c604cb9 MC |
3517 | * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this |
3518 | * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity). | |
3519 | * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the | |
3520 | * timeout. | |
e27f234a | 3521 | */ |
2c604cb9 MC |
3522 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, |
3523 | (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
3524 | ? 0 : s->session->timeout) | |
30f05b19 MC |
3525 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
3526 | && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)) | |
a00d75e1 | 3527 | /* Now the actual ticket data */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3528 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
3529 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) | |
a00d75e1 | 3530 | /* Output key name */ |
7cea05dc | 3531 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) |
a00d75e1 | 3532 | /* output IV */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3533 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) |
3534 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3535 | &encdata1) |
3536 | /* Encrypt session data */ | |
3537 | || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) | |
7cea05dc | 3538 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3539 | || encdata1 != encdata2 |
3540 | || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) | |
7cea05dc | 3541 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3542 | || encdata1 + len != encdata2 |
3543 | || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH | |
7cea05dc | 3544 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3545 | || !HMAC_Update(hctx, |
3546 | (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, | |
3547 | macendoffset - macoffset) | |
7cea05dc | 3548 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3549 | || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) |
3550 | || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
7cea05dc | 3551 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) |
a00d75e1 | 3552 | || macdata1 != macdata2 |
30f05b19 MC |
3553 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt) |
3554 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3555 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, | |
3556 | EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3557 | NULL, 0, &al))) { | |
a00d75e1 | 3558 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3559 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3560 | } |
bcaad809 DSH |
3561 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
3562 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
e27f234a MC |
3563 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3564 | ||
3565 | return 1; | |
687eaf27 | 3566 | err: |
f6370040 | 3567 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
b548a1f1 | 3568 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
846ec07d | 3569 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
bf7c6817 | 3570 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); |
a00d75e1 | 3571 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3572 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3573 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 3574 | |
f63e4288 MC |
3575 | /* |
3576 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
3577 | * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
3578 | */ | |
3579 | int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
e27f234a | 3580 | { |
8cbfcc70 RS |
3581 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) |
3582 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, | |
3583 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { | |
f63e4288 MC |
3584 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3585 | return 0; | |
3586 | } | |
3587 | ||
3588 | return 1; | |
3589 | } | |
3590 | ||
3591 | int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3592 | { | |
3593 | if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { | |
cc59ad10 | 3594 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
cc59ad10 MC |
3595 | return 0; |
3596 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
3597 | |
3598 | return 1; | |
3599 | } | |
3600 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3601 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
e27f234a MC |
3602 | /* |
3603 | * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. | |
3604 | * It sets the next_proto member in s if found | |
3605 | */ | |
be3583fa | 3606 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3607 | { |
73999b62 | 3608 | PACKET next_proto, padding; |
e27f234a MC |
3609 | size_t next_proto_len; |
3610 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
3611 | /*- |
3612 | * The payload looks like: | |
3613 | * uint8 proto_len; | |
3614 | * uint8 proto[proto_len]; | |
3615 | * uint8 padding_len; | |
3616 | * uint8 padding[padding_len]; | |
3617 | */ | |
73999b62 MC |
3618 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) |
3619 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) | |
3620 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
e27f234a | 3621 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
c3fc7eea | 3622 | goto err; |
cf9b0b6f | 3623 | } |
0f113f3e | 3624 | |
aff8c126 RS |
3625 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { |
3626 | s->ext.npn_len = 0; | |
c3fc7eea MC |
3627 | goto err; |
3628 | } | |
3629 | ||
aff8c126 | 3630 | s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; |
0f113f3e | 3631 | |
e27f234a | 3632 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
a230b26e | 3633 | err: |
fe3a3291 | 3634 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a | 3635 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3636 | } |
6434abbf | 3637 | #endif |
d45ba43d | 3638 | |
e46f2334 MC |
3639 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3640 | { | |
3434f40b MC |
3641 | int al; |
3642 | ||
e96e0f8e | 3643 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
30aeba43 | 3644 | NULL, 0, &al)) { |
3434f40b | 3645 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e46f2334 | 3646 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3434f40b | 3647 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e46f2334 MC |
3648 | return 0; |
3649 | } | |
3650 | ||
3651 | return 1; | |
3652 | } | |
3653 | ||
7d061fce MC |
3654 | static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3655 | { | |
429ff318 | 3656 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
7d061fce MC |
3657 | |
3658 | /* | |
3659 | * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release | |
3660 | * (should be s->version) | |
3661 | */ | |
3662 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) | |
3663 | || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, | |
3664 | NULL, 0, &al)) { | |
7d061fce MC |
3665 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3666 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
3667 | return 0; | |
3668 | } | |
3669 | ||
3670 | /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */ | |
3671 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
3672 | s->session = NULL; | |
3673 | s->hit = 0; | |
3674 | ||
3675 | return 1; | |
3676 | } | |
ef6c191b MC |
3677 | |
3678 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
3679 | { | |
3680 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3681 | ||
3682 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
3683 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3684 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3685 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
3686 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
3687 | } | |
3688 | ||
3689 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING | |
3690 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { | |
3691 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3692 | goto err; | |
3693 | } | |
3694 | ||
3695 | /* | |
3696 | * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on | |
3697 | * a record boundary. | |
3698 | */ | |
3699 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
3700 | al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
3701 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, | |
3702 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
3703 | goto err; | |
3704 | } | |
3705 | ||
3706 | s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; | |
3707 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3708 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { | |
3709 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3710 | goto err; | |
3711 | } | |
3712 | ||
3713 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
3714 | err: | |
3715 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
3716 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
3717 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
3718 | } |