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add -badsig option to ocsp utility too.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
CommitLineData
58964a49
RE		 1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
f1fd4544 58/* ====================================================================
52b8dad8 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
f1fd4544
BM		 60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
58964a49
RE		 111
112#include <stdio.h>
ec577822 113#include <openssl/objects.h>
6434abbf
DSH		 114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
67c8e7f4 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
4817504d 117#include <openssl/rand.h>
58964a49
RE		 118#include "ssl_locl.h"
119
42182852 120const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
58964a49 121
367eb1f1 122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
6434abbf
DSH		 123static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
2daceb03 126static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
09e4e4b9 127int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
367eb1f1 128#endif
6434abbf 129
f3b656b2 130SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
58964a49
RE		 131 tls1_enc,
132 tls1_mac,
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_alert_code,
e0af0405 142 tls1_export_keying_material,
58964a49
RE		 143 };
144
f3b656b2 145long tls1_default_timeout(void)
58964a49
RE		 146 {
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
149 return(60*60*2);
150 }
151
6b691a5c 152int tls1_new(SSL *s)
58964a49
RE		 153 {
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
156 return(1);
157 }
158
6b691a5c 159void tls1_free(SSL *s)
58964a49 160 {
12bf56c0
DSH		 161#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
163 {
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
165 }
166#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
58964a49
RE		 167 ssl3_free(s);
168 }
169
6b691a5c 170void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
58964a49
RE		 171 {
172 ssl3_clear(s);
637f374a 173 s->version = s->method->version;
58964a49
RE		 174 }
175
525de5d3 176#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
eda3766b 177
525de5d3
DSH		 178static int nid_list[] =
179 {
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
205 };
eda3766b 206
d0595f17
DSH		 207
208static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
eda3766b 209 {
d0595f17
DSH		 210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
213 };
214
215static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
216 {
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
eda3766b
DSH		 242 };
243
2ea80354
DSH		 244static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
245 {
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
248 };
249
525de5d3
DSH		 250int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
251 {
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
1e26a8ba
GT		 253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
255 return 0;
525de5d3
DSH		 256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
257 }
258
259int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
260 {
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
262 switch (nid)
263 {
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
265 return 1;
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
267 return 2;
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
269 return 3;
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
271 return 4;
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
273 return 5;
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
275 return 6;
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
277 return 7;
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
279 return 8;
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
281 return 9;
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
283 return 10;
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
285 return 11;
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
287 return 12;
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
289 return 13;
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
291 return 14;
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
293 return 15;
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
295 return 16;
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
297 return 17;
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
299 return 18;
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
301 return 19;
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
303 return 20;
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
305 return 21;
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
307 return 22;
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
309 return 23;
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
311 return 24;
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
313 return 25;
314 default:
315 return 0;
316 }
317 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 318/* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
319 * preferred list
320 */
321static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
323 size_t *pcurveslen)
324 {
325 if (sess)
326 {
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
2ea80354 329 return;
fd2b65ce 330 }
2ea80354
DSH		 331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
fd2b65ce 333 {
2ea80354 334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
2ea80354
DSH		 335 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
336 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
d372d365 337 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
2ea80354
DSH		 338 break;
339
340 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
341 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
342 *pcurveslen = 2;
343 break;
344 default:
fd2b65ce
DSH		 345 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
346 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
347 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 348 if (!*pcurves)
349 {
350 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
351 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
352 }
353 }
d18b716d
DSH		 354/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
355int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
356 {
357 const unsigned char *curves;
358 size_t curveslen, i;
2ea80354 359 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
d18b716d
DSH		 360 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
361 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 362 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
363 if (suiteb_flags)
364 {
365 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
366 if (p[1])
367 return 0;
368 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
369 {
370 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
371 return 0;
372 }
373 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
374 {
375 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
376 return 0;
377 }
378 else /* Should never happen */
379 return 0;
380 }
d18b716d
DSH		 381 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
382 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
383 {
384 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
385 return 1;
386 }
387 return 0;
388 }
d0595f17 389
a4352630 390/* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
2ea80354
DSH		 391 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
392 * an EC tmp key.
d0595f17 393 */
a4352630
DSH		 394
395int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
d0595f17
DSH		 396 {
397 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
398 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
399 int k;
a4352630
DSH		 400 /* Can't do anything on client side */
401 if (s->server == 0)
402 return -1;
2ea80354
DSH		 403 if (nmatch == -2)
404 {
405 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
406 {
407 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
408 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
409 * checks.
410 */
411 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
412 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
413 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
414 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
415 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
416 /* Should never happen */
417 return NID_undef;
418 }
419 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
420 nmatch = 0;
421 }
a4352630
DSH		 422 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
423 &supp, &supplen);
424 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
425 &pref, &preflen);
426 preflen /= 2;
427 supplen /= 2;
d0595f17
DSH		 428 k = 0;
429 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
430 {
431 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
432 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
433 {
434 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
435 {
436 if (nmatch == k)
a4352630
DSH		 437 {
438 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
439 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
440 }
d0595f17
DSH		 441 k++;
442 }
443 }
444 }
d0595f17 445 if (nmatch == -1)
a4352630
DSH		 446 return k;
447 return 0;
d0595f17
DSH		 448 }
449
450int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
451 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
452 {
453 unsigned char *clist, *p;
454 size_t i;
455 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
456 * while curve ids < 32
457 */
458 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
459 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
460 if (!clist)
461 return 0;
462 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
463 {
464 unsigned long idmask;
465 int id;
466 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
467 idmask = 1L << id;
468 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
469 {
470 OPENSSL_free(clist);
471 return 0;
472 }
473 dup_list |= idmask;
474 s2n(id, p);
475 }
476 if (*pext)
477 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
478 *pext = clist;
479 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
480 return 1;
481 }
482
483#define MAX_CURVELIST 25
484
485typedef struct
486 {
487 size_t nidcnt;
488 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
489 } nid_cb_st;
490
491static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
492 {
493 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
494 size_t i;
495 int nid;
496 char etmp[20];
497 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
498 return 0;
499 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
500 return 0;
501 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
502 etmp[len] = 0;
503 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
504 if (nid == NID_undef)
505 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
506 if (nid == NID_undef)
507 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 return 0;
510 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
511 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
512 return 0;
513 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
514 return 1;
515 }
516/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
517int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
518 const char *str)
519 {
520 nid_cb_st ncb;
521 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
522 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
523 return 0;
8bb870df
DSH		 524 if (pext == NULL)
525 return 1;
d0595f17
DSH		 526 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
527 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 528/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
529static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
530 EC_KEY *ec)
531 {
532 int is_prime, id;
533 const EC_GROUP *grp;
534 const EC_POINT *pt;
535 const EC_METHOD *meth;
536 if (!ec)
537 return 0;
538 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
539 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
540 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
541 if (!grp || !pt)
542 return 0;
543 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
544 if (!meth)
545 return 0;
546 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
547 is_prime = 1;
548 else
549 is_prime = 0;
550 /* Determine curve ID */
551 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
552 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
553 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
554 if (id)
555 {
556 curve_id[0] = 0;
557 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
558 }
559 else
560 {
561 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
562 if (is_prime)
563 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
564 else
565 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
566 }
567 if (comp_id)
568 {
569 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
570 {
571 if (is_prime)
572 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
573 else
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
575 }
576 else
577 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
578 }
579 return 1;
580 }
581/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
582static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
583 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
584 {
585 const unsigned char *p;
586 size_t plen, i;
a4352630 587 int j;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 588 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
589 * is supported (see RFC4492).
590 */
591 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
592 {
593 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
594 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
595 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
596 {
597 if (*comp_id == *p)
598 break;
599 }
600 if (i == plen)
601 return 0;
602 }
2ea80354
DSH		 603 if (!curve_id)
604 return 1;
a4352630
DSH		 605 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
606 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
fd2b65ce 607 {
a4352630 608 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
fd2b65ce
DSH		 609 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
610 {
611 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
a4352630 612 break;
fd2b65ce 613 }
a4352630
DSH		 614 if (i == plen)
615 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 616 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
617 if (!s->server)
618 return 1;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 619 }
620 return 1;
621 }
d61ff83b 622
5087afa1
DSH		 623static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
624 size_t *pformatslen)
625 {
626 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
627 * use default */
628 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
629 {
630 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
631 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
632 }
633 else
634 {
635 *pformats = ecformats_default;
636 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
637 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
638 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
639 else
640 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
641 }
642 }
643
d61ff83b
DSH		 644/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
645 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
646 */
2ea80354 647static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
fd2b65ce 648 {
fd2b65ce 649 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
d61ff83b
DSH		 650 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
651 int rv;
652 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
fd2b65ce
DSH		 653 if (!pkey)
654 return 0;
d61ff83b
DSH		 655 /* If not EC nothing to do */
656 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
657 {
658 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
659 return 1;
660 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 661 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
662 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
663 if (!rv)
664 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 665 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
666 * supported curves extension.
667 */
668 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
669 if (!rv)
670 return 0;
671 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
672 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
673 */
674 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
675 {
676 int check_md;
677 size_t i;
678 CERT *c = s->cert;
679 if (curve_id[0])
680 return 0;
681 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
682 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
683 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
684 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
685 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
686 else
687 return 0; /* Should never happen */
688 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
689 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
690 break;
691 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
692 return 0;
693 if (set_ee_md == 2)
694 {
695 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
696 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
697 else
698 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
699 }
700 }
701 return rv;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 702 }
703/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
2ea80354 704int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
fd2b65ce
DSH		 705 {
706 unsigned char curve_id[2];
707 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
ed83ba53
DSH		 708#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
709 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
ddd13d67 710 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 711 return 1;
712#endif
2ea80354
DSH		 713 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
714 * no other curves permitted.
715 */
716 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
717 {
718 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
719 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
720 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
721 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
722 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
723 else
724 return 0;
725 curve_id[0] = 0;
726 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
727 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
728 return 0;
729 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
730 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
731 return 1;
732 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
733 else
734 {
735 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
736 if (!ec)
737 return 0;
738 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
739 return 0;
740 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
741 return 1;
742 return 0;
743 }
744
745 }
a4352630
DSH		 746 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
747 {
748 /* Need a shared curve */
749 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
750 return 1;
751 else return 0;
752 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 753 if (!ec)
754 {
755 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
756 return 1;
757 else
758 return 0;
759 }
760 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
1e4cb467 761 return 0;
d18b716d
DSH		 762/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
763#if 0
764 return 1;
765#else
fd2b65ce 766 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
d18b716d 767#endif
fd2b65ce 768 }
d0595f17 769
525de5d3 770#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
f1fd4544 771
ed3883d2 772#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
fc101f88
DSH		 773
774/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
775 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
776 */
777
778#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
779#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
780#else
781#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
782#endif
783
784#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
785#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
786#else
787#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
788#endif
789
790#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
791#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
792#else
654ac273 793#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
fc101f88
DSH		 794#endif
795
796#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
797 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
798 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
799 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
800
801static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
802#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
803 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
804 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
805#endif
806#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
807 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
808 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
809#endif
810#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
811 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
812#endif
813#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
814 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
815#endif
816};
817
2ea80354
DSH		 818static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
819 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
820 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
821};
822
b7bfe69b 823size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
f37f20ff 824 {
2ea80354
DSH		 825 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
826 * preferences.
827 */
828 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
829 {
830 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
831 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
832 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
833
834 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
835 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
836 return 2;
837
838 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
839 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
840 return 2;
841 }
842
3dbc46df
DSH		 843 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
844 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
845 {
b7bfe69b
DSH		 846 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
847 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df
DSH		 848 }
849 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
850 {
b7bfe69b
DSH		 851 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
852 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df 853 }
4453cd8c 854 else
0f229cce 855 {
b7bfe69b 856 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
ebc5e72f 857#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
4453cd8c
DSH		 858 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
859 if (FIPS_mode())
b7bfe69b
DSH		 860 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
861 else
ebc5e72f 862#endif
b7bfe69b 863 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
4453cd8c 864 }
b7bfe69b 865 }
ec4a50b3
DSH		 866/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
867 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
868 */
869int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
870 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
871 {
872 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
873 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
874 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
875 /* Should never happen */
876 if (sigalg == -1)
877 return -1;
878 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
879 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
880 {
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
882 return 0;
883 }
2ea80354
DSH		 884 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
885 {
886 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
887 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
888 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
889 return 0;
890 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
ed83ba53
DSH		 891 {
892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2ea80354 893 return 0;
ed83ba53 894 }
2ea80354
DSH		 895 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
896 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
897 {
898 if (curve_id[0])
899 return 0;
900 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
901 {
902 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
903 {
904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
905 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
906 return 0;
907 }
908 }
909 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
910 {
911 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
912 {
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
914 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
915 return 0;
916 }
917 }
918 else
919 return 0;
920 }
921 }
922 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
923 return 0;
924
ec4a50b3
DSH		 925 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
926 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
927 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
928 {
929 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
930 break;
931 }
932 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
2ea80354 933 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
ec4a50b3
DSH		 934 {
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
936 return 0;
937 }
938 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
939 if (*pmd == NULL)
940 {
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
942 return 0;
943 }
319354eb
DSH		 944 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
945 * wish.
946 */
947 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
948 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
ec4a50b3
DSH		 949 return 1;
950 }
b7bfe69b
DSH		 951/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
952 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
953 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
954 * session and not global settings.
955 *
956 */
957void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
958 {
959 CERT *c = s->cert;
960 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
961 size_t i, sigalgslen;
962 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
963 c->mask_a = 0;
964 c->mask_k = 0;
965 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
966 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
967 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
968 else
969 c->mask_ssl = 0;
970 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
971 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
972 * TLS 1.2.
973 */
974 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
975 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
976 {
977 switch(sigalgs[1])
978 {
979#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
980 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
981 have_rsa = 1;
982 break;
983#endif
984#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
985 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
986 have_dsa = 1;
987 break;
988#endif
989#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
990 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
991 have_ecdsa = 1;
992 break;
993#endif
994 }
995 }
996 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
997 * signature algorithms.
998 */
999 if (!have_rsa)
1000 {
1001 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1002 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1003 }
1004 if (!have_dsa)
1005 {
1006 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1007 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1008 }
1009 if (!have_ecdsa)
1010 {
1011 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1012 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1013 }
1014#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1015 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1016 {
1017 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1018 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1019 }
1020#endif
1021#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1022 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1023 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1024 {
1025 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1026 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1027 }
1028#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1029 c->valid = 1;
f37f20ff 1030 }
fc101f88 1031
a9e1c50b
BL		 1032/* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1033static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1034 {
1035 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1036 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1037
1038 if (a > b)
1039 return 1;
1040 else if (a < b)
1041 return -1;
1042 return 0;
1043}
1044
f1fd4544
BM		 1045unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1046 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1047 int extdatalen=0;
1048 unsigned char *ret = p;
d0595f17
DSH		 1049#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1050 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1051 int using_ecc = 0;
1052 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1053 {
1054 int i;
1055 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1056 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1057
1058 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1059 {
1060 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1061
1062 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1063 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1064 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1065 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1066 {
1067 using_ecc = 1;
1068 break;
1069 }
1070 }
1071 }
1072#endif
ed3883d2 1073
13f6d57b
DSH		 1074 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1075 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1076 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
5f8f94a6
DSH		 1077 return p;
1078
ed3883d2
BM		 1079 ret+=2;
1080
1081 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
6434abbf 1082
a70183bc 1083 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
f1fd4544 1084 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1085 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1086 unsigned long size_str;
1087 long lenmax;
1088
a70183bc 1089 /* check for enough space.
52b8dad8
BM		 1090 4 for the servername type and entension length
1091 2 for servernamelist length
1092 1 for the hostname type
1093 2 for hostname length
1094 + hostname length
a70183bc 1095 */
52b8dad8 1096
761772d7
BM		 1097 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1098 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
a70183bc
BM		 1099 return NULL;
1100
1101 /* extension type and length */
1102 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1103 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
f1fd4544 1104
a70183bc 1105 /* length of servername list */
ed3883d2 1106 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
a70183bc
BM		 1107
1108 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
f1fd4544 1109 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
ed3883d2 1110 s2n(size_str,ret);
ed3883d2
BM		 1111 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1112 ret+=size_str;
f1fd4544 1113 }
761772d7 1114
423c66f1 1115 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
bdd53508 1116 if (s->renegotiate)
423c66f1 1117 {
860c3dd1
DSH		 1118 int el;
1119
1120 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1121 {
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 return NULL;
1124 }
1125
1126 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1127
1128 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1129 s2n(el,ret);
1130
1131 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1132 {
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1134 return NULL;
1135 }
1136
1137 ret += el;
1138 }
1139
edc032b5 1140#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1df80b65 1141 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
edc032b5 1142 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1df80b65 1143 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
edc032b5 1144
1df80b65
DSH		 1145 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1146 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
edc032b5
BL		 1147 {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1149 return NULL;
1df80b65
DSH		 1150 }
1151
1152 /* check for enough space.
1153 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1154 1 for the srp user identity
1155 + srp user identity length
1156 */
1157 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1158
1159 /* fill in the extension */
edc032b5
BL		 1160 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1161 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1df80b65
DSH		 1162 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1163 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
edc032b5
BL		 1164 ret+=login_len;
1165 }
1166#endif
1167
36ca4ba6 1168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d0595f17 1169 if (using_ecc)
36ca4ba6
BM		 1170 {
1171 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1172 long lenmax;
d0595f17
DSH		 1173 const unsigned char *plist;
1174 size_t plistlen;
5087afa1
DSH		 1175
1176 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
36ca4ba6 1177
761772d7 1178 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
d0595f17
DSH		 1179 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1180 if (plistlen > 255)
019fdc78
BM		 1181 {
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 return NULL;
1184 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 1185
1186 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
d0595f17
DSH		 1187 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1188 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1189 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1190 ret+=plistlen;
1191
33273721 1192 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
d0595f17 1193 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
fd2b65ce 1194 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
33273721 1195
761772d7 1196 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
d0595f17
DSH		 1197 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1198 if (plistlen > 65532)
33273721
BM		 1199 {
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 return NULL;
1202 }
1203
1204 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
d0595f17 1205 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
a4974de9
BM		 1206
1207 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1208 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1209 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1210 * resolves this to two bytes.
1211 */
d0595f17
DSH		 1212 s2n(plistlen, ret);
1213 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1214 ret+=plistlen;
33273721 1215 }
36ca4ba6 1216#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
d3442bc7 1217
6434abbf
DSH		 1218 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1219 {
1220 int ticklen;
7ba3838a 1221 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
6434abbf 1222 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
12bf56c0
DSH		 1223 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1224 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1225 {
1226 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1227 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1228 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1229 return NULL;
1230 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1231 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1232 ticklen);
1233 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1234 }
6434abbf
DSH		 1235 else
1236 ticklen = 0;
12bf56c0
DSH		 1237 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1238 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1239 goto skip_ext;
6434abbf
DSH		 1240 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1241 * rest for ticket
1242 */
761772d7 1243 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
6434abbf
DSH		 1244 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1245 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1246 if (ticklen)
1247 {
1248 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1249 ret += ticklen;
1250 }
1251 }
12bf56c0 1252 skip_ext:
6434abbf 1253
7744ef1a 1254 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
a2f9200f 1255 {
0f229cce 1256 size_t salglen;
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1257 const unsigned char *salg;
1258 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
0f229cce 1259 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
a2f9200f
DSH		 1260 return NULL;
1261 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
0f229cce
DSH		 1262 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1263 s2n(salglen, ret);
b7bfe69b 1264 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
0f229cce 1265 ret += salglen;
a2f9200f
DSH		 1266 }
1267
761772d7 1268#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
8025e251
DSH		 1269 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1270 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
761772d7
BM		 1271 {
1272 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1273
1274 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1275 return NULL;
1276 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1277 return NULL;
1278
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1280 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1281 s2n(col, ret);
1282 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1283 ret += col;
1284 }
1285#endif
1286
8025e251
DSH		 1287 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1288 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 1289 {
1290 int i;
1291 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1292 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1293
1294 idlen = 0;
1295 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1296 {
1297 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1298 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1299 if (itmp <= 0)
1300 return NULL;
1301 idlen += itmp + 2;
1302 }
1303
1304 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1305 {
1306 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1307 if (extlen < 0)
1308 return NULL;
1309 }
1310 else
1311 extlen = 0;
1312
1313 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1314 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1315 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1316 return NULL;
1317 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1318 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1319 s2n(idlen, ret);
1320 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1321 {
1322 /* save position of id len */
1323 unsigned char *q = ret;
1324 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1325 /* skip over id len */
1326 ret += 2;
1327 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1328 /* write id len */
1329 s2n(itmp, q);
1330 }
1331 s2n(extlen, ret);
1332 if (extlen > 0)
1333 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1334 }
1335
4817504d
DSH		 1336#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1337 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1338 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1339 s2n(1,ret);
1340 /* Set mode:
1341 * 1: peer may send requests
1342 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1343 */
1344 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1345 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1346 else
1347 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1348#endif
1349
bf48836c 1350#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 1351 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1352 {
1353 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1354 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1355 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1356 return NULL;
1357 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1358 s2n(0,ret);
1359 }
1360#endif
1361
333f926d
BL		 1362 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1363 {
1364 int el;
1365
1366 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1367
1368 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1369
1370 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1371 s2n(el,ret);
1372
1373 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1374 {
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1376 return NULL;
1377 }
1378 ret += el;
1379 }
1380
a9e1c50b
BL		 1381 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1382 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1383 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1384 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1385 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1386 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1387 {
1388 size_t lenmax;
1389 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1390 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1391
1392 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1393
1394 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1395 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1396 s2n(ext_len, ret);
1397 *(ret++) = list_len;
1398 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1399 }
1400
1401 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
ed3883d2
BM		 1402 return p;
1403
1404 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1405 return ret;
52b8dad8 1406 }
ed3883d2 1407
f1fd4544
BM		 1408unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1409 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1410 int extdatalen=0;
1411 unsigned char *ret = p;
bf48836c
BL		 1412#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1413 int next_proto_neg_seen;
ee2ffc27 1414#endif
5087afa1
DSH		 1415 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1416 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1417 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1418 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
ed3883d2 1419
13f6d57b
DSH		 1420 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1421 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
5f8f94a6
DSH		 1422 return p;
1423
a13c20f6 1424 ret+=2;
ed3883d2
BM		 1425 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1426
a13c20f6 1427 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
f1fd4544 1428 {
761772d7 1429 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
ed3883d2
BM		 1430
1431 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1432 s2n(0,ret);
f1fd4544 1433 }
860c3dd1 1434
8025e251 1435 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
860c3dd1
DSH		 1436 {
1437 int el;
1438
1439 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1440 {
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1442 return NULL;
1443 }
1444
1445 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1446
1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1448 s2n(el,ret);
1449
1450 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1451 {
1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1453 return NULL;
1454 }
1455
1456 ret += el;
1457 }
1458
36ca4ba6 1459#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
5087afa1 1460 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
36ca4ba6 1461 {
5087afa1
DSH		 1462 const unsigned char *plist;
1463 size_t plistlen;
36ca4ba6
BM		 1464 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1465 long lenmax;
1466
5087afa1
DSH		 1467 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1468
761772d7 1469 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
5087afa1
DSH		 1470 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1471 if (plistlen > 255)
019fdc78
BM		 1472 {
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1474 return NULL;
1475 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 1476
1477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
5087afa1
DSH		 1478 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1479 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1480 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1481 ret+=plistlen;
a70183bc 1482
36ca4ba6 1483 }
33273721 1484 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
36ca4ba6 1485#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
67c8e7f4 1486
6434abbf
DSH		 1487 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1488 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1489 {
761772d7 1490 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
6434abbf
DSH		 1491 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1492 s2n(0,ret);
1493 }
761772d7 1494
67c8e7f4
DSH		 1495 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1496 {
1497 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1498 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1499 s2n(0,ret);
1500 }
1501
761772d7 1502#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
8025e251
DSH		 1503 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1504 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
761772d7
BM		 1505 {
1506 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
6434abbf 1507
761772d7
BM		 1508 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1509 return NULL;
1510 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1511 return NULL;
1512
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1514 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1515 s2n(sol, ret);
1516 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1517 ret += sol;
1518 }
1519#endif
333f926d
BL		 1520
1521 if(s->srtp_profile)
1522 {
1523 int el;
1524
1525 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1526
1527 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1528
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1530 s2n(el,ret);
1531
1532 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1533 {
7a236261 1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
333f926d
BL		 1535 return NULL;
1536 }
1537 ret+=el;
1538 }
1539
0e1dba93
DSH		 1540 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1541 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1542 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1543 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1544 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1545 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1546 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1547 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1548 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1549 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1550 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1551 ret+=36;
1552
1553 }
761772d7 1554
4817504d 1555#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
5733919d
DSH		 1556 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1557 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1558 {
1559 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1560 s2n(1,ret);
1561 /* Set mode:
1562 * 1: peer may send requests
1563 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1564 */
1565 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1566 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1567 else
1568 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
192540b5 1569
5733919d 1570 }
4817504d
DSH		 1571#endif
1572
bf48836c 1573#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 1574 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1575 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1576 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1577 {
1578 const unsigned char *npa;
1579 unsigned int npalen;
1580 int r;
1581
1582 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1583 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1584 {
1585 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1586 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1587 s2n(npalen,ret);
1588 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1589 ret += npalen;
1590 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1591 }
1592 }
1593#endif
1594
a9e1c50b
BL		 1595 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1596 * to it. */
1597 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1598 {
1599 size_t authz_length;
1600 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1601 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1602 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1603 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1604 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1605 size_t i;
1606 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1607
1608 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1609 * uint8_t authz_type
1610 * uint16_t length
1611 * uint8_t data[length]
1612 *
1613 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1614 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1615 {
1616 unsigned short length;
1617 unsigned char type;
1618
1619 type = *(authz++);
1620 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1621 type,
1622 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1623 authz_count++;
1624
1625 n2s(authz, length);
aeda172a
BL		 1626 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1627 i += 2;
a9e1c50b
BL		 1628 authz += length;
1629 i += length;
1630 }
1631
1632 if (authz_count)
1633 {
1634 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1635 * 2 bytes for extension type
1636 * 2 bytes for extension length
1637 * 1 byte for the list length
1638 * n bytes for the list */
1639 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1640
1641 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1642 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1643 s2n(ext_len, ret);
1644 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1645 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1646 }
1647
1648 authz = orig_authz;
1649 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1650 {
1651 unsigned short length;
1652 unsigned char type;
1653
1654 authz_count++;
1655 type = *(authz++);
1656 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1657 type,
1658 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1659 *(ret++) = type;
1660 n2s(authz, length);
aeda172a
BL		 1661 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1662 i += 2;
a9e1c50b
BL		 1663 authz += length;
1664 i += length;
1665 }
1666 }
1667
ed3883d2
BM		 1668 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1669 return p;
1670
1671 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1672 return ret;
52b8dad8 1673 }
ed3883d2 1674
b2284ed3
DSH		 1675static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1676 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1677 unsigned short type;
1678 unsigned short size;
1679 unsigned short len;
f1fd4544 1680 unsigned char *data = *p;
860c3dd1 1681 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
6dbb6219 1682 size_t i;
860c3dd1 1683
a13c20f6 1684 s->servername_done = 0;
67c8e7f4 1685 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
6f31dd72
BM		 1686#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1687 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1688#endif
ed3883d2 1689
4817504d
DSH		 1690#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1691 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1692 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1693#endif
4453cd8c
DSH		 1694 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1695 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1696 {
1697 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1698 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1699 }
1700 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1701 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1702 {
1703 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1704 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1705 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 1706 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1707 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1708 {
1709 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1710 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1711 }
4817504d 1712
ed3883d2 1713 if (data >= (d+n-2))
c27c9cb4 1714 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2
BM		 1715 n2s(data,len);
1716
52b8dad8 1717 if (data > (d+n-len))
c27c9cb4 1718 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2 1719
f1fd4544
BM		 1720 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1721 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1722 n2s(data,type);
1723 n2s(data,size);
1724
1725 if (data+size > (d+n))
c27c9cb4 1726 goto ri_check;
8e3b2dbb 1727#if 0
0e1dba93 1728 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
8e3b2dbb 1729#endif
6434abbf
DSH		 1730 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1731 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1732 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
a13c20f6
BM		 1733/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1734
1735 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1736 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1737 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1738 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1739 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1740 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1741 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1742 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1743 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1744 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1745 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1746 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1747 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1748 the value of the Host: field.
1749 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1750 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1751 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1752 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1753
1754*/
1755
f1fd4544
BM		 1756 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1757 {
a70183bc 1758 unsigned char *sdata;
ed3883d2 1759 int servname_type;
a70183bc
BM		 1760 int dsize;
1761
1762 if (size < 2)
1763 {
1764 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1765 return 0;
1766 }
1767 n2s(data,dsize);
52b8dad8 1768 size -= 2;
a70183bc 1769 if (dsize > size )
f1fd4544 1770 {
a70183bc
BM		 1771 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1772 return 0;
1773 }
1774
1775 sdata = data;
1776 while (dsize > 3)
1777 {
1778 servname_type = *(sdata++);
ed3883d2 1779 n2s(sdata,len);
a70183bc
BM		 1780 dsize -= 3;
1781
1782 if (len > dsize)
f1fd4544
BM		 1783 {
1784 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1785 return 0;
1786 }
a70183bc 1787 if (s->servername_done == 0)
f1fd4544
BM		 1788 switch (servname_type)
1789 {
1790 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
732d31be 1791 if (!s->hit)
f1fd4544 1792 {
732d31be
DSH		 1793 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1794 {
1795 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1796 return 0;
1797 }
1798 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
f1fd4544
BM		 1799 {
1800 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1801 return 0;
1802 }
732d31be
DSH		 1803 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1804 {
1805 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1806 return 0;
1807 }
ed3883d2 1808 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
a13c20f6
BM		 1809 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1810 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1811 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
40a70628 1812 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
a13c20f6
BM		 1813 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1814 return 0;
f1fd4544 1815 }
a13c20f6
BM		 1816 s->servername_done = 1;
1817
a13c20f6
BM		 1818 }
1819 else
732d31be
DSH		 1820 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1821 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
6b9e941e 1822 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
a13c20f6 1823
ed3883d2 1824 break;
f1fd4544 1825
ed3883d2
BM		 1826 default:
1827 break;
f1fd4544 1828 }
52b8dad8 1829
a70183bc 1830 dsize -= len;
f1fd4544 1831 }
a70183bc
BM		 1832 if (dsize != 0)
1833 {
1834 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1835 return 0;
1836 }
1837
ed3883d2 1838 }
edc032b5
BL		 1839#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1840 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1841 {
1df80b65
DSH		 1842 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1843 {
1844 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1845 return 0;
1846 }
1847 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
edc032b5 1848 {
1df80b65
DSH		 1849 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1850 return 0;
1851 }
1852 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1853 return -1;
1854 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1855 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1856
1857 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1858 {
1859 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1860 return 0;
edc032b5
BL		 1861 }
1862 }
1863#endif
ed3883d2 1864
36ca4ba6 1865#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
8025e251
DSH		 1866 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1867 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
36ca4ba6
BM		 1868 {
1869 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1870 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
36ca4ba6 1871
e83aefb3
DSH		 1872 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1873 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
36ca4ba6
BM		 1874 {
1875 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1876 return 0;
1877 }
732d31be 1878 if (!s->hit)
36ca4ba6 1879 {
732d31be
DSH		 1880 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1881 {
7d5686d3
DSH		 1882 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1883 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
732d31be
DSH		 1884 }
1885 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1886 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1887 {
1888 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1889 return 0;
1890 }
1891 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1892 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
36ca4ba6 1893 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 1894#if 0
1895 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1896 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1897 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1898 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1899 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
33273721
BM		 1900#endif
1901 }
8025e251
DSH		 1902 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1903 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
33273721
BM		 1904 {
1905 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1906 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1907 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1908
e83aefb3
DSH		 1909 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1910 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
33273721
BM		 1911 {
1912 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1913 return 0;
1914 }
732d31be 1915 if (!s->hit)
33273721 1916 {
732d31be
DSH		 1917 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1918 {
1919 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1920 return 0;
1921 }
1922 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1923 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1924 {
1925 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1926 return 0;
1927 }
1928 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1929 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
33273721 1930 }
33273721
BM		 1931#if 0
1932 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1933 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1934 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1935 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1936 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
36ca4ba6
BM		 1937#endif
1938 }
c6a27f01 1939#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
761772d7 1940#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
8025e251
DSH		 1941 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1942 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
761772d7
BM		 1943 {
1944 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1945
1946 if (size < 2)
1947 {
1948 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1949 return 0;
1950 }
1951 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1952 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1953 {
1954 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1955 return 0;
1956 }
1957
1958 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1959 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
02c27b11
BM		 1960 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1961 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1962 else
1963 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 1964 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1965 {
1966 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1967 return 0;
1968 }
1969 }
1970#endif
12bf56c0
DSH		 1971 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1972 {
1973 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1974 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1975 {
1976 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1977 return 0;
1978 }
1979 }
860c3dd1
DSH		 1980 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1981 {
1982 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1983 return 0;
1984 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1985 }
6b7be581
DSH		 1986 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1987 {
1988 int dsize;
4453cd8c 1989 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
6b7be581
DSH		 1990 {
1991 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1992 return 0;
1993 }
6b7be581
DSH		 1994 n2s(data,dsize);
1995 size -= 2;
4453cd8c 1996 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
6b7be581
DSH		 1997 {
1998 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1999 return 0;
2000 }
2001 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2002 {
2003 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2004 return 0;
2005 }
4453cd8c
DSH		 2006 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2007 * error.
2008 */
2009 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2010 {
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2012 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2013 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2014 return 0;
2015 }
6b7be581 2016 }
8025e251
DSH		 2017 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2018 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2019 {
2020
2021 if (size < 5)
2022 {
2023 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2024 return 0;
2025 }
2026
2027 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2028 size--;
2029 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2030 {
2031 const unsigned char *sdata;
2032 int dsize;
2033 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2034 n2s(data,dsize);
2035 size -= 2;
2036 if (dsize > size )
2037 {
2038 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2039 return 0;
2040 }
2041 while (dsize > 0)
2042 {
2043 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2044 int idsize;
2045 if (dsize < 4)
2046 {
2047 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 return 0;
2049 }
2050 n2s(data, idsize);
2051 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
9770924f 2052 size -= 2 + idsize;
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2053 if (dsize < 0)
2054 {
2055 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2056 return 0;
2057 }
2058 sdata = data;
2059 data += idsize;
2060 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2061 &sdata, idsize);
2062 if (!id)
2063 {
2064 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2065 return 0;
2066 }
2067 if (data != sdata)
2068 {
2069 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2070 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2071 return 0;
2072 }
2073 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2074 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2075 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2076 {
2077 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2078 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2079 return 0;
2080 }
2081 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2082 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2083 {
2084 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2085 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2086 return 0;
2087 }
2088 }
2089
2090 /* Read in request_extensions */
9770924f
BM		 2091 if (size < 2)
2092 {
2093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2094 return 0;
2095 }
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2096 n2s(data,dsize);
2097 size -= 2;
9770924f 2098 if (dsize != size)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2099 {
2100 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2101 return 0;
2102 }
2103 sdata = data;
2104 if (dsize > 0)
2105 {
25536ea6
DSH		 2106 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2107 {
2108 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2109 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2110 }
2111
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2112 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2113 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2114 &sdata, dsize);
2115 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2116 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2117 {
2118 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2119 return 0;
2120 }
2121 }
2122 }
2123 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2124 * so ignore it.
2125 */
2126 else
2127 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2128 }
4817504d
DSH		 2129#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2130 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2131 {
2132 switch(data[0])
2133 {
2134 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2135 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2136 break;
2137 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2138 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2139 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2140 break;
192540b5
DSH		 2141 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2142 return 0;
4817504d
DSH		 2143 }
2144 }
2145#endif
bf48836c 2146#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27 2147 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
71fa4513 2148 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2149 {
2150 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2151 * renegotiation.
2152 *
2153 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2154 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2155 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2156 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2157 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2158 * anything like that, but this might change).
2159
2160 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2161 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2162 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2163 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2164 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2165 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2166 }
2167#endif
761772d7 2168
6434abbf 2169 /* session ticket processed earlier */
333f926d
BL		 2170 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2171 {
2172 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2173 al))
2174 return 0;
2175 }
2176
a9e1c50b
BL		 2177 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2178 {
2179 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2180 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2181
2182 if (size == 0)
2183 {
2184 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 return 0;
2186 }
2187
2188 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2189
2190 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2191 {
2192 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2193 return 0;
2194 }
2195
2196 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2197 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2198 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2199 if (!s->hit)
2200 {
195b9eee
BL		 2201 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2202 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
a9e1c50b
BL		 2203 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2204 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2205 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2206 {
2207 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2208 return 0;
2209 }
2210
2211 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2212 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2213 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2214 sdata,
2215 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2216
2217 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2218 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2219 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2220 1 /* element size */,
2221 byte_compare);
2222
2223 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2224 {
2225 if (i > 0 &&
2226 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2227 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2228 {
2229 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2230 return 0;
2231 }
2232 }
2233 }
2234 }
2235
6434abbf 2236 data+=size;
f1fd4544 2237 }
a9e1c50b 2238
f1fd4544 2239 *p = data;
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2240
2241 ri_check:
2242
2243 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2244
bdd53508 2245 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2246 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2247 {
fbed9f81 2248 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
aa09c2c6 2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2250 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2251 return 0;
2252 }
4453cd8c
DSH		 2253 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2254 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2255 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
c27c9cb4 2256
f1fd4544 2257 return 1;
52b8dad8 2258 }
f1fd4544 2259
b2284ed3
DSH		 2260int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2261 {
2262 int al = -1;
2263 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2264 {
2265 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2266 return 0;
2267 }
2268
2daceb03 2269 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
b2284ed3 2270 {
aa09c2c6 2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
b2284ed3
DSH		 2272 return 0;
2273 }
2274 return 1;
2275}
2276
bf48836c 2277#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 2278/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2279 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2280 * the length of the block. */
71fa4513 2281static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2282 {
2283 unsigned int off = 0;
2284
2285 while (off < len)
2286 {
2287 if (d[off] == 0)
2288 return 0;
2289 off += d[off];
2290 off++;
2291 }
2292
2293 return off == len;
2294 }
2295#endif
2296
09e4e4b9 2297static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
f1fd4544 2298 {
c8bbd98a 2299 unsigned short length;
ed3883d2
BM		 2300 unsigned short type;
2301 unsigned short size;
ed3883d2 2302 unsigned char *data = *p;
ed3883d2 2303 int tlsext_servername = 0;
860c3dd1 2304 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
ed3883d2 2305
6f31dd72
BM		 2306#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2307 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2308#endif
2309
4817504d
DSH		 2310#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2311 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2312 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2313#endif
2314
ed3883d2 2315 if (data >= (d+n-2))
c27c9cb4 2316 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2 2317
c8bbd98a
BL		 2318 n2s(data,length);
2319 if (data+length != d+n)
2320 {
2321 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 return 0;
2323 }
ed3883d2 2324
f1fd4544
BM		 2325 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2326 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2327 n2s(data,type);
2328 n2s(data,size);
2329
2330 if (data+size > (d+n))
c27c9cb4 2331 goto ri_check;
f1fd4544 2332
6434abbf
DSH		 2333 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2334 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2335 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2336
f1fd4544
BM		 2337 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2338 {
2339 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2340 {
2341 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2342 return 0;
2343 }
ed3883d2 2344 tlsext_servername = 1;
f1fd4544 2345 }
ed3883d2 2346
36ca4ba6 2347#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
8025e251
DSH		 2348 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2349 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2350 {
2351 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2352 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
36ca4ba6
BM		 2353
2354 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2355 {
2356 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2357 return 0;
2358 }
2359 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
b6acb8d0 2360 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
36ca4ba6
BM		 2361 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2362 {
2363 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2364 return 0;
2365 }
2366 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2367 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2368#if 0
2369 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2370 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2371 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2372 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2373 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2374#endif
2375 }
c6a27f01 2376#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
6434abbf
DSH		 2377
2378 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2379 {
12bf56c0
DSH		 2380 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2381 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2382 {
2383 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2384 return 0;
2385 }
6434abbf
DSH		 2386 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2387 || (size > 0))
2388 {
2389 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2390 return 0;
2391 }
2392 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2393 }
761772d7 2394#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
8025e251
DSH		 2395 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2396 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
761772d7
BM		 2397 {
2398 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2399
2400 if (size < 2)
2401 {
2402 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2403 return 0;
2404 }
2405 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2406 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2407 {
2408 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2409 return 0;
2410 }
2411
2412 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2413 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
02c27b11
BM		 2414 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2415 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2416 else
2417 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2418
2419 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2420 {
2421 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2422 return 0;
2423 }
2424 }
2425#endif
8025e251
DSH		 2426 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2427 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2428 {
2429 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2430 * a status request message.
2431 */
2432 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2433 {
2434 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2435 return 0;
2436 }
2437 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2438 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2439 }
bf48836c 2440#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
6f31dd72
BM		 2441 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2442 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2443 {
2444 unsigned char *selected;
2445 unsigned char selected_len;
2446
2447 /* We must have requested it. */
2448 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2449 {
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2451 return 0;
2452 }
2453 /* The data must be valid */
2454 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2455 {
2456 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2457 return 0;
2458 }
2459 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2460 {
2461 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2462 return 0;
2463 }
2464 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2465 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2466 {
2467 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2468 return 0;
2469 }
2470 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2471 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
6f31dd72 2472 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
ee2ffc27
BL		 2473 }
2474#endif
860c3dd1
DSH		 2475 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2476 {
2477 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2478 return 0;
2479 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2480 }
4817504d
DSH		 2481#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2482 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2483 {
2484 switch(data[0])
2485 {
2486 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2487 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2488 break;
2489 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2490 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2491 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2492 break;
192540b5
DSH		 2493 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2494 return 0;
4817504d
DSH		 2495 }
2496 }
2497#endif
333f926d
BL		 2498 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2499 {
2500 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2501 al))
2502 return 0;
2503 }
2504
a9e1c50b
BL		 2505 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2506 {
2507 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2508 * an authz hello extension if the client
2509 * didn't request a proof. */
2510 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2511 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2512
2513 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2514 {
2515 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2516 return 0;
2517 }
2518
2519 if (!size)
2520 {
2521 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2522 return 0;
2523 }
2524
2525 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2526 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2527 {
2528 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2529 return 0;
2530 }
2531
2532 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2533 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2534 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2535 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2536 {
2537 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2538 return 0;
2539 }
2540
2541 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2542 }
2543
2544 data += size;
f1fd4544 2545 }
ed3883d2
BM		 2546
2547 if (data != d+n)
f1fd4544
BM		 2548 {
2549 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2550 return 0;
2551 }
ed3883d2 2552
f1fd4544
BM		 2553 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2554 {
2555 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2556 {
2557 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2558 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2559 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2560 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
f1fd4544
BM		 2561 {
2562 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2563 return 0;
2564 }
2565 }
2566 else
2567 {
2568 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2569 return 0;
2570 }
ed3883d2 2571 }
f1fd4544 2572 }
ed3883d2 2573
f1fd4544 2574 *p = data;
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2575
2576 ri_check:
2577
2578 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2579 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2580 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2581 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2582 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2583 * absence on initial connect only.
2584 */
c2c49969
DSH		 2585 if (!renegotiate_seen
2586 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
ef51b4b9 2587 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
c27c9cb4 2588 {
fbed9f81 2589 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
09e4e4b9 2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2591 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2592 return 0;
2593 }
2594
f1fd4544 2595 return 1;
52b8dad8 2596 }
ed3883d2 2597
b2172f4f 2598
36ca4ba6
BM		 2599int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2600 {
761772d7
BM		 2601
2602#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2603 {
2604 int r = 1;
2605
2606 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2607 {
2608 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2609 if (!r)
2610 return -1;
2611 }
2612
2613 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2614 {
2615 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2616 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2617
02c27b11
BM		 2618 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2619 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2620 else
2621 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2622 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2623 {
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2625 return -1;
2626 }
2627 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2628 }
2629
2630 if (r == 2)
2631 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2632 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2633 }
2634#endif
2635
36ca4ba6 2636 return 1;
52b8dad8 2637 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 2638
2639int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2640 {
36ca4ba6 2641 return 1;
52b8dad8 2642 }
36ca4ba6 2643
2daceb03 2644static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
f1fd4544 2645 {
241520e6 2646 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
36ca4ba6
BM		 2647 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2648
2649#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
33273721
BM		 2650 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2651 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2652 */
2653 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2654 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
36ca4ba6
BM		 2655 */
2656#endif
2657
2658 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2659 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2660 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2661 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2662
761772d7
BM		 2663#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2664 {
2665 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2666 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2daceb03
BL		 2667 * so this has to happen here in
2668 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
761772d7
BM		 2669
2670 int r = 1;
2671
2672 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2673 {
2674 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2675 if (!r)
2676 {
2677 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2678 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2679 goto err;
2680 }
2681 }
2682
2683 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2684 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2685 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2686
2687 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2688 {
2689 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2690 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2691 {
2692 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2693 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2694
02c27b11
BM		 2695 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2696 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2697 else
2698 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2699 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2700 {
2701 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2702 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2703 goto err;
2704 }
2705 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2706 }
2707 }
2708
2709 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2710 {
2711 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2712 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2713 * abort the handshake.
2714 */
2715 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2716 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2717 }
2718 }
761772d7
BM		 2719
2720 err:
2daceb03 2721#endif
52b8dad8
BM		 2722 switch (ret)
2723 {
36ca4ba6
BM		 2724 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2725 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2726 return -1;
2727
2728 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2729 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2730 return 1;
2731
2732 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2733 s->servername_done=0;
2734 default:
2735 return 1;
52b8dad8 2736 }
36ca4ba6 2737 }
f1fd4544 2738
2daceb03
BL		 2739int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2740 {
2741 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2742 int al;
2743
2744 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2745 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2746 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2747 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2748 */
2749 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2750 {
2751 int r;
e5db9c3b
DSH		 2752 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2753 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2754 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2755 if (certpkey == NULL)
2756 {
2757 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2758 return 1;
2759 }
2760 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2761 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2762 */
2763 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2daceb03
BL		 2764 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2765 switch (r)
2766 {
2767 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2768 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2769 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2770 break;
2771 /* status request response should be sent */
2772 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2773 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2774 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2775 else
2776 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2777 break;
2778 /* something bad happened */
2779 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2780 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2781 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2782 goto err;
2783 }
2784 }
2785 else
2786 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2787
2788 err:
2789 switch (ret)
2790 {
2791 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2792 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2793 return -1;
2794
2795 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2796 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2797 return 1;
2798
2799 default:
2800 return 1;
2801 }
2802 }
2803
36ca4ba6
BM		 2804int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2805 {
2806 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
58ece833 2807 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
241520e6 2808
36ca4ba6 2809#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d0205686
DSH		 2810 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2811 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2812 * it must contain uncompressed.
36ca4ba6 2813 */
52b8dad8
BM		 2814 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2815 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
36ca4ba6 2816 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
d0205686 2817 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
52b8dad8 2818 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
36ca4ba6
BM		 2819 {
2820 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
90bdfd97 2821 size_t i;
36ca4ba6
BM		 2822 unsigned char *list;
2823 int found_uncompressed = 0;
b9865f11 2824 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
36ca4ba6
BM		 2825 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2826 {
2827 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2828 {
2829 found_uncompressed = 1;
2830 break;
2831 }
2832 }
2833 if (!found_uncompressed)
2834 {
a291745e 2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
36ca4ba6
BM		 2836 return -1;
2837 }
2838 }
2839 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2840#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2841
241520e6 2842 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
58ece833 2843 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
241520e6 2844 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
58ece833 2845 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
241520e6 2846
761772d7
BM		 2847#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2848 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2849 {
2850 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2851 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2852
2853 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2854 {
2855 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2856 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2857 }
2858
2859 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2860 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2861 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2862 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2863 {
2864 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2865 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2866 }
2867 }
2868#endif
2869
04e2ab2c
DSH		 2870 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2871 * tell the callback
2872 */
2873 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
121f9e74 2874 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
04e2ab2c
DSH		 2875 {
2876 int r;
2877 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2878 * there is no response.
2879 */
2880 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2881 {
2882 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2883 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2884 }
2885 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2886 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2887 if (r == 0)
2888 {
2889 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2890 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2891 }
2892 if (r < 0)
2893 {
2894 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2895 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2896 }
2897 }
2898
52b8dad8
BM		 2899 switch (ret)
2900 {
58ece833
BM		 2901 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2902 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2903 return -1;
2904
2905 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2906 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2907 return 1;
2908
2909 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2910 s->servername_done=0;
2911 default:
2912 return 1;
52b8dad8 2913 }
f1fd4544 2914 }
33273721 2915
09e4e4b9
DSH		 2916int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2917 {
2918 int al = -1;
2919 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2920 return 1;
2921 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2922 {
2923 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2924 return 0;
2925 }
2926
2927 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2928 {
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2930 return 0;
2931 }
2932 return 1;
2933}
2934
c519e89f
BM		 2935/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2936 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2937 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2938 *
2939 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2940 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2941 * extension, if any.
2942 * len: the length of the session ID.
2943 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2944 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2945 * point to the resulting session.
2946 *
2947 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2948 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2949 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2950 *
2951 * Returns:
2952 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2953 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2954 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2955 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2956 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2957 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2958 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2959 *
2960 * Side effects:
2961 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2962 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2963 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2964 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2965 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2966 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
6434abbf 2967 */
6434abbf 2968int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
c519e89f 2969 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
6434abbf
DSH		 2970 {
2971 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2972 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2973 unsigned short i;
e8da6a1d 2974
c519e89f
BM		 2975 *ret = NULL;
2976 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2977
e8da6a1d 2978 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
c519e89f
BM		 2979 * to permit stateful resumption.
2980 */
e8da6a1d 2981 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
c519e89f 2982 return 0;
6434abbf 2983 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
c519e89f 2984 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 2985 if (p >= limit)
2986 return -1;
07a9d1a2
DSH		 2987 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2988 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2989 {
2990 i = *(p++);
2991 p+= i;
2992 if (p >= limit)
2993 return -1;
2994 }
6434abbf
DSH		 2995 /* Skip past cipher list */
2996 n2s(p, i);
2997 p+= i;
2998 if (p >= limit)
2999 return -1;
3000 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3001 i = *(p++);
3002 p += i;
3003 if (p > limit)
3004 return -1;
3005 /* Now at start of extensions */
3006 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
c519e89f 3007 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3008 n2s(p, i);
3009 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3010 {
3011 unsigned short type, size;
3012 n2s(p, type);
3013 n2s(p, size);
3014 if (p + size > limit)
c519e89f 3015 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3016 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3017 {
c519e89f 3018 int r;
6434abbf
DSH		 3019 if (size == 0)
3020 {
c519e89f
BM		 3021 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3022 * currently have one. */
6434abbf 3023 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
c519e89f 3024 return 1;
6434abbf 3025 }
12bf56c0
DSH		 3026 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3027 {
c519e89f
BM		 3028 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3029 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3030 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3031 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3032 * calculate the master secret later. */
3033 return 2;
3034 }
3035 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3036 switch (r)
3037 {
3038 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3039 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3040 return 2;
3041 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3042 return r;
3043 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3044 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3045 return 3;
3046 default: /* fatal error */
3047 return -1;
12bf56c0 3048 }
6434abbf
DSH		 3049 }
3050 p += size;
3051 }
c519e89f 3052 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3053 }
3054
c519e89f
BM		 3055/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3056 *
3057 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3058 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3059 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3060 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3061 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3062 * point to the resulting session.
3063 *
3064 * Returns:
3065 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3066 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3067 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3068 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3069 */
6434abbf
DSH		 3070static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3071 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3072 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3073 {
3074 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3075 unsigned char *sdec;
3076 const unsigned char *p;
8a2062fe 3077 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3078 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3079 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3080 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
661dc143 3081 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3082 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3083 if (eticklen < 48)
c519e89f 3084 return 2;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3085 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3086 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3087 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
661dc143 3088 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
8a2062fe
DSH		 3089 {
3090 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
661dc143 3091 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
8a2062fe
DSH		 3092 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3093 if (rv < 0)
3094 return -1;
3095 if (rv == 0)
c519e89f 3096 return 2;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3097 if (rv == 2)
3098 renew_ticket = 1;
3099 }
3100 else
3101 {
3102 /* Check key name matches */
661dc143 3103 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
c519e89f 3104 return 2;
661dc143 3105 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
8a2062fe
DSH		 3106 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3107 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
661dc143 3108 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
8a2062fe 3109 }
6434abbf 3110 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
c519e89f
BM		 3111 * integrity checks on ticket.
3112 */
8a2062fe 3113 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
0eab41fb
BL		 3114 if (mlen < 0)
3115 {
3116 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3117 return -1;
3118 }
6434abbf 3119 eticklen -= mlen;
6434abbf 3120 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
6434abbf
DSH		 3121 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3122 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3123 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3124 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
c519e89f 3125 return 2;
6434abbf 3126 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
6434abbf 3127 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
8a2062fe
DSH		 3128 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3129 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
6434abbf
DSH		 3130 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3131 if (!sdec)
3132 {
3133 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3134 return -1;
3135 }
3136 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3137 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
c519e89f 3138 return 2;
6434abbf
DSH		 3139 slen += mlen;
3140 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3141 p = sdec;
c519e89f 3142
6434abbf
DSH		 3143 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3144 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3145 if (sess)
3146 {
c519e89f
BM		 3147 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3148 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3149 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3150 * as required by standard.
3151 */
6434abbf
DSH		 3152 if (sesslen)
3153 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3154 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3155 *psess = sess;
c519e89f
BM		 3156 if (renew_ticket)
3157 return 4;
3158 else
3159 return 3;
6434abbf 3160 }
c519e89f
BM		 3161 ERR_clear_error();
3162 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3163 * ticket. */
3164 return 2;
6434abbf 3165 }
6434abbf 3166
6b7be581
DSH		 3167/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3168
3169typedef struct
3170 {
3171 int nid;
3172 int id;
3173 } tls12_lookup;
3174
3175static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
6b7be581 3176 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
6b7be581 3177 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
6b7be581
DSH		 3178 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3179 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
6b7be581
DSH		 3180 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3181 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
6b7be581
DSH		 3182};
3183
3184static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
6b7be581 3185 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
6b7be581 3186 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
6b7be581 3187 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
6b7be581
DSH		 3188};
3189
3190static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3191 {
3192 size_t i;
3193 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3194 {
3195 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3196 return table[i].id;
3197 }
3198 return -1;
3199 }
e7f8ff43 3200
6b7be581
DSH		 3201static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3202 {
3203 size_t i;
3204 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3205 {
e7f8ff43 3206 if ((table[i].id) == id)
6b7be581
DSH		 3207 return table[i].nid;
3208 }
e7f8ff43 3209 return NID_undef;
6b7be581 3210 }
a2f9200f
DSH		 3211
3212int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
6b7be581
DSH		 3213 {
3214 int sig_id, md_id;
1db5f356
DSH		 3215 if (!md)
3216 return 0;
6b7be581
DSH		 3217 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3218 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3219 if (md_id == -1)
3220 return 0;
a2f9200f 3221 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
6b7be581
DSH		 3222 if (sig_id == -1)
3223 return 0;
3224 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3225 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3226 return 1;
3227 }
3228
a2f9200f
DSH		 3229int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3230 {
3231 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3232 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3233 }
3234
3235const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3236 {
3237 switch(hash_alg)
3238 {
3239#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3240 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
ebc5e72f
DSH		 3241#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3242 if (FIPS_mode())
3243 return NULL;
3244#endif
a2f9200f
DSH		 3245 return EVP_md5();
3246#endif
3247#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3248 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3249 return EVP_sha1();
3250#endif
3251#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3252 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3253 return EVP_sha224();
3254
3255 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3256 return EVP_sha256();
3257#endif
3258#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3259 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3260 return EVP_sha384();
3261
3262 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3263 return EVP_sha512();
3264#endif
3265 default:
3266 return NULL;
3267
3268 }
3269 }
3270
4453cd8c
DSH		 3271static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3272 {
3273 switch(sig_alg)
3274 {
3275#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3276 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3277 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3278#endif
3279#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3280 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3281 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3282#endif
3283#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3284 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3285 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3286#endif
3287 }
3288 return -1;
3289 }
3290
3291/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3292static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3293 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3294 {
8e2a06bf 3295 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
4453cd8c
DSH		 3296 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3297 return;
3298 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3299 {
3300 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3301 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3302 if (phash_nid)
3303 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3304 }
3305 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3306 {
3307 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3308 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3309 if (psign_nid)
3310 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3311 }
3312 if (psignhash_nid)
3313 {
3314 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3315 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3316 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3317 else
3318 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3319 }
3320 }
3321/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3322static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3323 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3324 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3325 {
3326 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3327 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3328 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3329 {
3330 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3331 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3332 continue;
3333 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3334 continue;
3335 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3336 {
3337 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3338 {
3339 nmatch++;
3340 if (shsig)
3341 {
3342 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3343 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3344 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3345 &shsig->sign_nid,
3346 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3347 ptmp);
3348 shsig++;
3349 }
3350 break;
3351 }
3352 }
3353 }
3354 return nmatch;
3355 }
3356
3357/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3358static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3359 {
3360 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3361 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3362 size_t nmatch;
3363 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3364 CERT *c = s->cert;
2ea80354 3365 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3dbc46df 3366 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2ea80354 3367 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3dbc46df
DSH		 3368 {
3369 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3370 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3371 }
2ea80354 3372 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3dbc46df
DSH		 3373 {
3374 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
4453cd8c 3375 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df 3376 }
4453cd8c 3377 else
2ea80354
DSH		 3378 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3379 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
4453cd8c
DSH		 3380 {
3381 pref = conf;
3382 preflen = conflen;
3383 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3384 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3385 }
3386 else
3387 {
3388 allow = conf;
3389 allowlen = conflen;
3390 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3391 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3392 }
3393 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3394 if (!nmatch)
3395 return 1;
3396 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3397 if (!salgs)
3398 return 0;
3399 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3400 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3401 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3402 return 1;
3403 }
3404
3405
6b7be581
DSH		 3406/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3407
8f829124 3408int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
6b7be581 3409 {
4453cd8c
DSH		 3410 int idx;
3411 size_t i;
6b7be581
DSH		 3412 const EVP_MD *md;
3413 CERT *c = s->cert;
e7f8ff43 3414 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
6b7be581 3415 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
238b6361 3416 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
6b7be581 3417 return 1;
8f829124
DSH		 3418 /* Should never happen */
3419 if (!c)
3420 return 0;
6b7be581 3421
4453cd8c 3422 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
0f229cce 3423 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
e7f8ff43 3424 return 0;
4453cd8c
DSH		 3425 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3426 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
6b7be581 3427
4453cd8c 3428 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
6b7be581 3429
ed83ba53 3430#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
ddd13d67 3431 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 3432 {
3433 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3434 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3435 */
3436 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3437 if (s->server)
3438 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3439 else
3440 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3441 if (sigs)
3442 {
3443 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3444 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3445 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3446 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3447 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3448 {
3449 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3450 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3451 }
3452 }
3453 }
3454#endif
3455
4453cd8c
DSH		 3456 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3457 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3458 {
3459 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3460 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
6b7be581 3461 {
e7f8ff43 3462 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
4453cd8c 3463 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
6dbb6219 3464 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4453cd8c 3465 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
6dbb6219
DSH		 3466 {
3467 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4453cd8c 3468 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
6dbb6219 3469 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3470 }
3471
6b7be581 3472 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 3473 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3474 * use the certificate for signing.
6b7be581 3475 */
2ea80354 3476 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
d61ff83b
DSH		 3477 {
3478 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3479 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3480 */
6b7be581 3481#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3482 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3483 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
6b7be581
DSH		 3484#endif
3485#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3486 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3487 {
3488 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3489 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3490 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3491#endif
3492#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3493 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3494 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
6b7be581 3495#endif
d61ff83b 3496 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3497 return 1;
3498 }
3499
4817504d 3500
e7f8ff43 3501int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
4453cd8c 3502 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3503 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3504 {
4453cd8c
DSH		 3505 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3506 if (psig == NULL)
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3507 return 0;
3508 if (idx >= 0)
3509 {
4453cd8c 3510 idx <<= 1;
0f229cce 3511 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
e7f8ff43 3512 return 0;
4453cd8c 3513 psig += idx;
e7f8ff43 3514 if (rhash)
4453cd8c
DSH		 3515 *rhash = psig[0];
3516 if (rsig)
3517 *rsig = psig[1];
3518 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
e7f8ff43 3519 }
4453cd8c
DSH		 3520 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3521 }
3522
3523int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3524 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3525 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3526 {
3527 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3528 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3529 return 0;
3530 shsigalgs += idx;
3531 if (phash)
3532 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3533 if (psign)
3534 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3535 if (psignhash)
3536 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3537 if (rsig)
3538 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3539 if (rhash)
3540 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3541 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3542 }
3543
3544
4817504d
DSH		 3545#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3546int
3547tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3548 {
3549 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3550 unsigned short hbtype;
3551 unsigned int payload;
3552 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3553
3554 /* Read type and payload length first */
3555 hbtype = *p++;
3556 n2s(p, payload);
3557 pl = p;
3558
3559 if (s->msg_callback)
3560 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3561 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3562 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3563
3564 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3565 {
3566 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3567 int r;
3568
3569 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3570 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3571 * payload, plus padding
3572 */
3573 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3574 bp = buffer;
3575
3576 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3577 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3578 s2n(payload, bp);
3579 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
57cb030c
DSH		 3580 bp += payload;
3581 /* Random padding */
3582 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3583
4817504d
DSH		 3584 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3585
3586 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3587 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3588 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3589 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3590
3591 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3592
3593 if (r < 0)
3594 return r;
3595 }
3596 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3597 {
3598 unsigned int seq;
3599
3600 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3601 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3602 * sequence number */
3603 n2s(pl, seq);
3604
3605 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3606 {
3607 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3608 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3609 }
3610 }
3611
3612 return 0;
3613 }
3614
3615int
3616tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3617 {
3618 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3619 int ret;
3620 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3621 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3622
3623 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3624 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3625 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3626 {
3627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3628 return -1;
3629 }
3630
3631 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3632 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3633 {
3634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3635 return -1;
3636 }
3637
3638 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3639 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3640 {
3641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3642 return -1;
3643 }
3644
3645 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3646 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3647 */
3648 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3649
3650 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3651 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3652 * some random stuff.
3653 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3654 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3655 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3656 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3657 * - Padding
3658 */
3659 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3660 p = buf;
3661 /* Message Type */
3662 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3663 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3664 s2n(payload, p);
3665 /* Sequence number */
3666 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3667 /* 16 random bytes */
3668 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3669 p += 16;
3670 /* Random padding */
3671 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3672
3673 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3674 if (ret >= 0)
3675 {
3676 if (s->msg_callback)
3677 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3678 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3679 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3680
3681 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3682 }
3683
3684 OPENSSL_free(buf);
3685
3686 return ret;
3687 }
3688#endif
0f229cce 3689
4453cd8c 3690#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
0f229cce
DSH		 3691
3692typedef struct
3693 {
3694 size_t sigalgcnt;
3695 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3696 } sig_cb_st;
3697
3698static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3699 {
3700 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3701 size_t i;
3702 char etmp[20], *p;
3703 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3704 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3705 return 0;
3706 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3707 return 0;
3708 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3709 etmp[len] = 0;
3710 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3711 if (!p)
3712 return 0;
3713 *p = 0;
3714 p++;
3715 if (!*p)
3716 return 0;
3717
3718 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3719 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3720 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3721 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3722 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3723 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3724 else return 0;
3725
3726 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3727 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3728 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3729 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3730 return 0;
3731
3732 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3733 {
3734 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3735 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3736 return 0;
3737 }
3738 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3739 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3740 return 1;
3741 }
3742
3743/* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3744 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3dbc46df 3745int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
0f229cce
DSH		 3746 {
3747 sig_cb_st sig;
3748 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
3749 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3750 return 0;
8bb870df
DSH		 3751 if (c == NULL)
3752 return 1;
3dbc46df 3753 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
0f229cce
DSH		 3754 }
3755
3dbc46df 3756int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
0f229cce 3757 {
4453cd8c 3758 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
0f229cce
DSH		 3759 int rhash, rsign;
3760 size_t i;
3761 if (salglen & 1)
3762 return 0;
4453cd8c 3763 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
0f229cce
DSH		 3764 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3765 return 0;
4453cd8c 3766 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
0f229cce 3767 {
4453cd8c 3768 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
0f229cce 3769 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4453cd8c 3770 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
0f229cce
DSH		 3771 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3772
3773 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3774 goto err;
4453cd8c
DSH		 3775 *sptr++ = rhash;
3776 *sptr++ = rsign;
0f229cce
DSH		 3777 }
3778
3dbc46df
DSH		 3779 if (client)
3780 {
3781 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3782 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3783 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3784 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3785 }
3786 else
3787 {
3788 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3789 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3790 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3791 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3792 }
0f229cce 3793
0f229cce
DSH		 3794 return 1;
3795
3796 err:
3797 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3798 return 0;
3799 }
4453cd8c 3800
d61ff83b
DSH		 3801static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3802 {
3803 int sig_nid;
3804 size_t i;
3805 if (default_nid == -1)
3806 return 1;
3807 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3808 if (default_nid)
3809 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3810 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3811 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3812 return 1;
3813 return 0;
3814 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 3815/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3816static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3817 {
3818 X509_NAME *nm;
3819 int i;
3820 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3821 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3822 {
3823 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3824 return 1;
3825 }
3826 return 0;
3827 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 3828
3829/* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
6dbb6219
DSH		 3830 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3831 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3832 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
d61ff83b 3833 */
6dbb6219
DSH		 3834
3835/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3836
3837#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3838 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3839/* Strict mode flags */
3840#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3841 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3842 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3843
d61ff83b
DSH		 3844int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3845 int idx)
3846 {
3847 int i;
6dbb6219
DSH		 3848 int rv = 0;
3849 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
d61ff83b
DSH		 3850 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3851 CERT *c = s->cert;
2ea80354
DSH		 3852 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3853 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
d61ff83b
DSH		 3854 if (idx != -1)
3855 {
2ea80354
DSH		 3856 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3857 if (idx == -2)
3858 {
3859 cpk = c->key;
3860 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3861 }
3862 else
3863 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
d61ff83b
DSH		 3864 x = cpk->x509;
3865 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3866 chain = cpk->chain;
2ea80354 3867 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
d61ff83b
DSH		 3868 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3869 if (!x || !pk)
3870 goto end;
ed83ba53
DSH		 3871#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3872 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
ddd13d67 3873 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 3874 {
3875 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3876 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3877 return rv;
3878 }
3879#endif
d61ff83b
DSH		 3880 }
3881 else
3882 {
6dbb6219
DSH		 3883 if (!x || !pk)
3884 goto end;
d61ff83b
DSH		 3885 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3886 if (idx == -1)
3887 goto end;
6dbb6219 3888 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2ea80354 3889 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
6dbb6219
DSH		 3890 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3891 else
3892 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3893 strict_mode = 1;
d61ff83b
DSH		 3894 }
3895
2ea80354
DSH		 3896 if (suiteb_flags)
3897 {
3898 int ok;
3899 if (check_flags)
3900 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3901 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3902 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3903 {
3904 if (check_flags)
3905 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3906 else
3907 goto end;
3908 }
3909 }
6dbb6219 3910
d61ff83b
DSH		 3911 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3912 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3913 * and strict mode.
3914 */
6dbb6219 3915 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
d61ff83b
DSH		 3916 {
3917 int default_nid;
3918 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3919 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3920 default_nid = 0;
3921 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3922 else
3923 {
3924 switch(idx)
3925 {
3926 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3927 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3928 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3929 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3930 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3931 break;
3932
3933 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3934 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3935 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3936 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3937 break;
3938
3939 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
3940 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3941 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3942 break;
3943
3944 default:
3945 default_nid = -1;
3946 break;
3947 }
3948 }
3949 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3950 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3951 * sha1.
3952 */
15a70fe5 3953 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
d61ff83b
DSH		 3954 {
3955 size_t j;
3956 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3957 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3958 {
3959 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3960 break;
3961 }
3962 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
6dbb6219
DSH		 3963 {
3964 if (check_flags)
3965 goto skip_sigs;
3966 else
3967 goto end;
3968 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 3969 }
3970 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3971 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
6dbb6219
DSH		 3972 {
3973 if (!check_flags) goto end;
3974 }
3975 else
3976 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3977 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
d61ff83b
DSH		 3978 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3979 {
3980 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3981 default_nid))
6dbb6219
DSH		 3982 {
3983 if (check_flags)
3984 {
3985 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3986 break;
3987 }
3988 else
3989 goto end;
3990 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 3991 }
3992 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 3993 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3994 else if(check_flags)
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3996 skip_sigs:
2ea80354
DSH		 3997 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3998 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
6dbb6219
DSH		 3999 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4000 else if (!check_flags)
d61ff83b 4001 goto end;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4002 if (!s->server)
4003 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
d61ff83b 4004 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
6dbb6219 4005 else if (strict_mode)
d61ff83b 4006 {
6dbb6219 4007 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4008 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4009 {
2ea80354
DSH		 4010 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4011 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4012 {
4013 if (check_flags)
4014 {
4015 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4016 break;
4017 }
4018 else
4019 goto end;
4020 }
4021 }
4022 }
4023 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4024 {
4025 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4026 int check_type = 0;
4027 switch (pk->type)
4028 {
4029 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4030 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4031 break;
4032 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4033 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4034 break;
4035 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4036 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4037 break;
4038 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4039 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4040 {
4041 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4042 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4043 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4044 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4045 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4046 }
4047 }
4048 if (check_type)
4049 {
4050 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4051 int ctypelen;
4052 if (c->ctypes)
4053 {
4054 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4055 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4056 }
4057 else
4058 {
4059 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4060 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4061 }
4062 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4063 {
4064 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4065 {
4066 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4067 break;
4068 }
4069 }
4070 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4071 goto end;
4072 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4073 else
4074 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4075
4076
4077 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4078
4079 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4080 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4081
4082 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4083 {
4084 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4085 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4086 }
4087 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4088 {
4089 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4090 {
4091 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4092 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4093 {
4094 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4095 break;
4096 }
4097 }
4098 }
4099 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4100 goto end;
d61ff83b 4101 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4102 else
4103 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4104
4105 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4106 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4107
4108 end:
6dbb6219
DSH		 4109
4110 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
d61ff83b 4111 {
6dbb6219
DSH		 4112 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4113 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4114 else if (cpk->digest)
d61ff83b 4115 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4116 }
4117 else
4118 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4119
4120 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4121 * if the chain is invalid.
4122 */
4123 if (!check_flags)
4124 {
4125 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4126 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4127 else
2ea80354
DSH		 4128 {
4129 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4130 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4131 return 0;
4132 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4133 }
4134 return rv;
4135 }
4136
4137/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4138void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4139 {
4140 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4141 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4142 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4143 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4144 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4145 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4146 }
18d71588
DSH		 4147/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4148int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4149 {
4150 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4151 }
d61ff83b 4152
4453cd8c 4153#endif
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