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58964a49 RE |
1 | /* ssl/t1_lib.c */ |
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
3 | * All rights reserved. | |
4 | * | |
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
10621efd | 8 | * |
58964a49 RE |
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
10621efd | 15 | * |
58964a49 RE |
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | |
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
10621efd | 22 | * |
58964a49 RE |
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
25 | * are met: | |
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
10621efd | 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
58964a49 RE |
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
10621efd | 40 | * |
58964a49 RE |
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
10621efd | 52 | * |
58964a49 RE |
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
57 | */ | |
f1fd4544 | 58 | /* ==================================================================== |
52b8dad8 | 59 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
f1fd4544 BM |
60 | * |
61 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
62 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
63 | * are met: | |
64 | * | |
65 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
10621efd | 66 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
f1fd4544 BM |
67 | * |
68 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
69 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
70 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
71 | * distribution. | |
72 | * | |
73 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
74 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
75 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
76 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
77 | * | |
78 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
79 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
80 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
81 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
82 | * | |
83 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
84 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
85 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
86 | * | |
87 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
88 | * acknowledgment: | |
89 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
90 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
91 | * | |
92 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
93 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
94 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
95 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
96 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
97 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
98 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
99 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
100 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
101 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
102 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
103 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
104 | * ==================================================================== | |
105 | * | |
106 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
107 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
108 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
109 | * | |
110 | */ | |
58964a49 RE |
111 | |
112 | #include <stdio.h> | |
ec577822 | 113 | #include <openssl/objects.h> |
6434abbf DSH |
114 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
115 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> | |
67c8e7f4 | 116 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> |
bd6941cf | 117 | #include <openssl/rand.h> |
58964a49 RE |
118 | #include "ssl_locl.h" |
119 | ||
10621efd | 120 | const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
58964a49 | 121 | |
367eb1f1 | 122 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
6434abbf | 123 | static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, |
10621efd MC |
124 | const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, |
125 | SSL_SESSION **psess); | |
126 | #endif | |
127 | ||
128 | SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { | |
129 | tls1_enc, | |
130 | tls1_mac, | |
131 | tls1_setup_key_block, | |
132 | tls1_generate_master_secret, | |
133 | tls1_change_cipher_state, | |
134 | tls1_final_finish_mac, | |
135 | TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, | |
136 | tls1_cert_verify_mac, | |
137 | TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
138 | TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
139 | tls1_alert_code, | |
140 | tls1_export_keying_material, | |
141 | }; | |
58964a49 | 142 | |
f3b656b2 | 143 | long tls1_default_timeout(void) |
10621efd MC |
144 | { |
145 | /* | |
146 | * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for | |
147 | * http, the cache would over fill | |
148 | */ | |
149 | return (60 * 60 * 2); | |
150 | } | |
58964a49 | 151 | |
6b691a5c | 152 | int tls1_new(SSL *s) |
10621efd MC |
153 | { |
154 | if (!ssl3_new(s)) | |
155 | return (0); | |
156 | s->method->ssl_clear(s); | |
157 | return (1); | |
158 | } | |
58964a49 | 159 | |
6b691a5c | 160 | void tls1_free(SSL *s) |
10621efd | 161 | { |
12bf56c0 | 162 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
10621efd MC |
163 | if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { |
164 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); | |
165 | } | |
166 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ | |
167 | ssl3_free(s); | |
168 | } | |
58964a49 | 169 | |
6b691a5c | 170 | void tls1_clear(SSL *s) |
10621efd MC |
171 | { |
172 | ssl3_clear(s); | |
173 | s->version = s->method->version; | |
174 | } | |
58964a49 | 175 | |
525de5d3 | 176 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
55a47cd3 | 177 | |
10621efd MC |
178 | static int nid_list[] = { |
179 | NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ | |
180 | NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ | |
181 | NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ | |
182 | NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ | |
183 | NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ | |
184 | NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ | |
185 | NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ | |
186 | NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ | |
187 | NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ | |
188 | NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ | |
189 | NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ | |
190 | NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ | |
191 | NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ | |
192 | NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ | |
193 | NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ | |
194 | NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ | |
195 | NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ | |
196 | NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ | |
197 | NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ | |
198 | NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ | |
199 | NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ | |
200 | NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ | |
201 | NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ | |
202 | NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ | |
203 | NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ | |
204 | }; | |
205 | ||
206 | static int pref_list[] = { | |
207 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M | |
208 | NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ | |
209 | NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ | |
210 | # endif | |
211 | NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ | |
212 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M | |
213 | NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ | |
214 | NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ | |
215 | # endif | |
216 | NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ | |
217 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M | |
218 | NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ | |
219 | NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ | |
220 | # endif | |
221 | NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ | |
222 | NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ | |
223 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M | |
224 | NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ | |
225 | NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ | |
226 | NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ | |
227 | # endif | |
228 | NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ | |
229 | NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ | |
230 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M | |
231 | NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ | |
232 | NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ | |
233 | # endif | |
234 | NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ | |
235 | NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ | |
236 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M | |
237 | NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ | |
238 | NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ | |
239 | NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ | |
240 | # endif | |
241 | NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ | |
242 | NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ | |
243 | NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ | |
244 | }; | |
55a47cd3 | 245 | |
525de5d3 | 246 | int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) |
10621efd MC |
247 | { |
248 | /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ | |
249 | if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > | |
250 | sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) | |
251 | return 0; | |
252 | return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; | |
253 | } | |
525de5d3 DSH |
254 | |
255 | int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) | |
10621efd MC |
256 | { |
257 | /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ | |
258 | switch (nid) { | |
259 | case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ | |
260 | return 1; | |
261 | case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ | |
262 | return 2; | |
263 | case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ | |
264 | return 3; | |
265 | case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ | |
266 | return 4; | |
267 | case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ | |
268 | return 5; | |
269 | case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ | |
270 | return 6; | |
271 | case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ | |
272 | return 7; | |
273 | case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ | |
274 | return 8; | |
275 | case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ | |
276 | return 9; | |
277 | case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ | |
278 | return 10; | |
279 | case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ | |
280 | return 11; | |
281 | case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ | |
282 | return 12; | |
283 | case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ | |
284 | return 13; | |
285 | case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ | |
286 | return 14; | |
287 | case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ | |
288 | return 15; | |
289 | case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ | |
290 | return 16; | |
291 | case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ | |
292 | return 17; | |
293 | case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ | |
294 | return 18; | |
295 | case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ | |
296 | return 19; | |
297 | case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ | |
298 | return 20; | |
299 | case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ | |
300 | return 21; | |
301 | case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ | |
302 | return 22; | |
303 | case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ | |
304 | return 23; | |
305 | case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ | |
306 | return 24; | |
307 | case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ | |
308 | return 25; | |
309 | default: | |
310 | return 0; | |
311 | } | |
312 | } | |
313 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
f1fd4544 | 314 | |
ed3883d2 | 315 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
b81fde02 | 316 | |
10621efd MC |
317 | /* |
318 | * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this | |
4dde4708 DSH |
319 | * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. |
320 | */ | |
321 | ||
10621efd MC |
322 | # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
323 | # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ | |
324 | # else | |
325 | # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, | |
326 | # endif | |
327 | ||
328 | # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA | |
329 | # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ | |
330 | # else | |
331 | # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, | |
332 | # endif | |
333 | ||
334 | # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA | |
335 | # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) | |
336 | /* */ | |
337 | # else | |
338 | # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, | |
339 | # endif | |
340 | ||
341 | # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ | |
342 | tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ | |
343 | tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ | |
344 | tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) | |
4dde4708 DSH |
345 | |
346 | static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { | |
10621efd MC |
347 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
348 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) | |
349 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) | |
350 | # endif | |
351 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 | |
352 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) | |
353 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) | |
354 | # endif | |
355 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | |
356 | tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) | |
357 | # endif | |
4dde4708 DSH |
358 | }; |
359 | ||
b81fde02 | 360 | int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) |
10621efd MC |
361 | { |
362 | size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); | |
363 | if (p) | |
364 | memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); | |
365 | return (int)slen; | |
366 | } | |
a149b246 | 367 | |
10621efd MC |
368 | unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, |
369 | unsigned char *limit) | |
370 | { | |
371 | int extdatalen = 0; | |
372 | unsigned char *orig = buf; | |
373 | unsigned char *ret = buf; | |
374 | ||
375 | /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ | |
376 | if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) | |
377 | return orig; | |
378 | ||
379 | ret += 2; | |
380 | ||
381 | if (ret >= limit) | |
382 | return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ | |
383 | ||
384 | if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { | |
385 | /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ | |
386 | unsigned long size_str; | |
387 | long lenmax; | |
388 | ||
cda8845d MC |
389 | /*- |
390 | * check for enough space. | |
391 | * 4 for the servername type and entension length | |
392 | * 2 for servernamelist length | |
393 | * 1 for the hostname type | |
394 | * 2 for hostname length | |
395 | * + hostname length | |
396 | */ | |
10621efd MC |
397 | |
398 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 | |
399 | || (size_str = | |
400 | strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) | |
401 | return NULL; | |
402 | ||
403 | /* extension type and length */ | |
404 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); | |
405 | s2n(size_str + 5, ret); | |
406 | ||
407 | /* length of servername list */ | |
408 | s2n(size_str + 3, ret); | |
409 | ||
410 | /* hostname type, length and hostname */ | |
411 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; | |
412 | s2n(size_str, ret); | |
413 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); | |
414 | ret += size_str; | |
415 | } | |
416 | ||
417 | /* Add RI if renegotiating */ | |
418 | if (s->renegotiate) { | |
419 | int el; | |
420 | ||
421 | if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { | |
422 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
423 | return NULL; | |
424 | } | |
761772d7 | 425 | |
10621efd MC |
426 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) |
427 | return NULL; | |
67c8e7f4 | 428 | |
10621efd MC |
429 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); |
430 | s2n(el, ret); | |
bd6941cf | 431 | |
10621efd MC |
432 | if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { |
433 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
434 | return NULL; | |
435 | } | |
68b33cc5 | 436 | |
10621efd MC |
437 | ret += el; |
438 | } | |
439 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
440 | /* Add SRP username if there is one */ | |
441 | if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the | |
442 | * Client Hello message */ | |
443 | ||
444 | int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
445 | if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { | |
446 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
447 | return NULL; | |
448 | } | |
060a38a2 | 449 | |
cda8845d MC |
450 | /*- |
451 | * check for enough space. | |
452 | * 4 for the srp type type and entension length | |
453 | * 1 for the srp user identity | |
454 | * + srp user identity length | |
455 | */ | |
10621efd MC |
456 | if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) |
457 | return NULL; | |
458 | ||
459 | /* fill in the extension */ | |
460 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); | |
461 | s2n(login_len + 1, ret); | |
462 | (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; | |
463 | memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); | |
464 | ret += login_len; | |
465 | } | |
466 | # endif | |
467 | ||
468 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
469 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { | |
470 | /* | |
471 | * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message | |
472 | */ | |
473 | long lenmax; | |
474 | ||
475 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) | |
476 | return NULL; | |
477 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) | |
478 | return NULL; | |
479 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) { | |
480 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
481 | return NULL; | |
482 | } | |
060a38a2 | 483 | |
10621efd MC |
484 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); |
485 | s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret); | |
486 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; | |
487 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, | |
488 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); | |
489 | ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; | |
490 | } | |
491 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) { | |
492 | /* | |
493 | * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message | |
494 | */ | |
495 | long lenmax; | |
496 | ||
497 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) | |
498 | return NULL; | |
499 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) | |
500 | return NULL; | |
501 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) { | |
502 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
503 | return NULL; | |
504 | } | |
060a38a2 | 505 | |
10621efd MC |
506 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); |
507 | s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); | |
508 | ||
509 | s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); | |
510 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, | |
511 | s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); | |
512 | ret += s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; | |
513 | } | |
514 | # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
515 | ||
516 | if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { | |
517 | int ticklen; | |
518 | if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) | |
519 | ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; | |
520 | else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && | |
521 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { | |
522 | ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; | |
523 | s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); | |
524 | if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) | |
525 | return NULL; | |
526 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, | |
527 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); | |
528 | s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; | |
529 | } else | |
530 | ticklen = 0; | |
531 | if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && | |
532 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) | |
533 | goto skip_ext; | |
534 | /* | |
535 | * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for | |
536 | * ticket | |
537 | */ | |
538 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) | |
539 | return NULL; | |
540 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); | |
541 | s2n(ticklen, ret); | |
542 | if (ticklen) { | |
543 | memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); | |
544 | ret += ticklen; | |
545 | } | |
546 | } | |
547 | skip_ext: | |
548 | ||
549 | if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
550 | if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) | |
551 | return NULL; | |
552 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); | |
553 | s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); | |
554 | s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); | |
555 | memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); | |
556 | ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); | |
557 | } | |
558 | # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | |
559 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { | |
560 | size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; | |
561 | ||
562 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) | |
563 | return NULL; | |
564 | if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ | |
565 | return NULL; | |
566 | ||
567 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); | |
568 | s2n(col + 2, ret); | |
569 | s2n(col, ret); | |
570 | memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); | |
571 | ret += col; | |
572 | } | |
573 | # endif | |
574 | ||
575 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && | |
576 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { | |
577 | int i; | |
578 | long extlen, idlen, itmp; | |
579 | OCSP_RESPID *id; | |
580 | ||
581 | idlen = 0; | |
582 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { | |
583 | id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); | |
584 | itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); | |
585 | if (itmp <= 0) | |
586 | return NULL; | |
587 | idlen += itmp + 2; | |
588 | } | |
ed3883d2 | 589 | |
10621efd MC |
590 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { |
591 | extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); | |
592 | if (extlen < 0) | |
593 | return NULL; | |
594 | } else | |
595 | extlen = 0; | |
596 | ||
597 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) | |
598 | return NULL; | |
599 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); | |
600 | if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) | |
601 | return NULL; | |
602 | s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); | |
603 | *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; | |
604 | s2n(idlen, ret); | |
605 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { | |
606 | /* save position of id len */ | |
607 | unsigned char *q = ret; | |
608 | id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); | |
609 | /* skip over id len */ | |
610 | ret += 2; | |
611 | itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); | |
612 | /* write id len */ | |
613 | s2n(itmp, q); | |
614 | } | |
615 | s2n(extlen, ret); | |
616 | if (extlen > 0) | |
617 | i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); | |
618 | } | |
619 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS | |
620 | /* Add Heartbeat extension */ | |
621 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) | |
622 | return NULL; | |
623 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); | |
624 | s2n(1, ret); | |
cda8845d MC |
625 | /*- |
626 | * Set mode: | |
627 | * 1: peer may send requests | |
628 | * 2: peer not allowed to send requests | |
629 | */ | |
10621efd MC |
630 | if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) |
631 | *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; | |
632 | else | |
633 | *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; | |
634 | # endif | |
635 | ||
636 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
637 | if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { | |
638 | /* | |
639 | * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support | |
640 | * for Next Protocol Negotiation | |
641 | */ | |
642 | if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) | |
643 | return NULL; | |
644 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); | |
645 | s2n(0, ret); | |
646 | } | |
647 | # endif | |
648 | ||
649 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
650 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { | |
651 | int el; | |
652 | ||
653 | ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); | |
654 | ||
655 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) | |
656 | return NULL; | |
657 | ||
658 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); | |
659 | s2n(el, ret); | |
660 | ||
661 | if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { | |
662 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
663 | return NULL; | |
664 | } | |
665 | ret += el; | |
666 | } | |
667 | # endif | |
668 | /* | |
669 | * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See | |
670 | * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this | |
671 | * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always | |
672 | * appear last. | |
673 | */ | |
674 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { | |
675 | int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
676 | /* | |
677 | * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the | |
678 | * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c | |
679 | * does not. | |
680 | */ | |
681 | if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) | |
682 | hlen -= 5; | |
683 | if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { | |
684 | hlen = 0x200 - hlen; | |
685 | if (hlen >= 4) | |
686 | hlen -= 4; | |
687 | else | |
688 | hlen = 0; | |
689 | ||
690 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); | |
691 | s2n(hlen, ret); | |
692 | memset(ret, 0, hlen); | |
693 | ret += hlen; | |
73582b81 | 694 | } |
10621efd | 695 | } |
73582b81 | 696 | |
10621efd MC |
697 | if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) |
698 | return orig; | |
060a38a2 | 699 | |
10621efd MC |
700 | s2n(extdatalen, orig); |
701 | return ret; | |
702 | } | |
060a38a2 | 703 | |
10621efd MC |
704 | unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, |
705 | unsigned char *limit) | |
706 | { | |
707 | int extdatalen = 0; | |
708 | unsigned char *orig = buf; | |
709 | unsigned char *ret = buf; | |
710 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
711 | int next_proto_neg_seen; | |
712 | # endif | |
713 | ||
714 | /* | |
715 | * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation | |
716 | */ | |
717 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) | |
718 | return orig; | |
719 | ||
720 | ret += 2; | |
721 | if (ret >= limit) | |
722 | return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ | |
723 | ||
724 | if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 | |
725 | && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { | |
726 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) | |
727 | return NULL; | |
728 | ||
729 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); | |
730 | s2n(0, ret); | |
731 | } | |
732 | ||
733 | if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { | |
734 | int el; | |
735 | ||
736 | if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { | |
737 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
738 | return NULL; | |
739 | } | |
060a38a2 | 740 | |
10621efd MC |
741 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) |
742 | return NULL; | |
060a38a2 | 743 | |
10621efd MC |
744 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); |
745 | s2n(el, ret); | |
060a38a2 | 746 | |
10621efd MC |
747 | if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { |
748 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
749 | return NULL; | |
750 | } | |
761772d7 | 751 | |
10621efd MC |
752 | ret += el; |
753 | } | |
754 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
755 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { | |
756 | /* | |
757 | * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message | |
758 | */ | |
759 | long lenmax; | |
760 | ||
761 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) | |
762 | return NULL; | |
763 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) | |
764 | return NULL; | |
765 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) { | |
766 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
767 | return NULL; | |
768 | } | |
bd6941cf | 769 | |
10621efd MC |
770 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); |
771 | s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret); | |
772 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; | |
773 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, | |
774 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); | |
775 | ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; | |
776 | ||
777 | } | |
778 | /* | |
779 | * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves | |
780 | * extension | |
781 | */ | |
782 | # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
783 | ||
784 | if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { | |
785 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) | |
786 | return NULL; | |
787 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); | |
788 | s2n(0, ret); | |
789 | } | |
790 | ||
791 | if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { | |
792 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) | |
793 | return NULL; | |
794 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); | |
795 | s2n(0, ret); | |
796 | } | |
797 | # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | |
798 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { | |
799 | size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; | |
800 | ||
801 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) | |
802 | return NULL; | |
803 | if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ | |
804 | return NULL; | |
805 | ||
806 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); | |
807 | s2n(sol + 2, ret); | |
808 | s2n(sol, ret); | |
809 | memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); | |
810 | ret += sol; | |
811 | } | |
812 | # endif | |
813 | ||
814 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
815 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { | |
816 | int el; | |
817 | ||
818 | ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); | |
819 | ||
820 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) | |
821 | return NULL; | |
822 | ||
823 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); | |
824 | s2n(el, ret); | |
825 | ||
826 | if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { | |
827 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
828 | return NULL; | |
829 | } | |
830 | ret += el; | |
831 | } | |
832 | # endif | |
833 | ||
834 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 | |
835 | || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) | |
836 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { | |
837 | const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { | |
838 | 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ | |
839 | 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ | |
840 | 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, | |
841 | 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, | |
842 | 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, | |
843 | 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 | |
844 | }; | |
845 | if (limit - ret < 36) | |
846 | return NULL; | |
847 | memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36); | |
848 | ret += 36; | |
849 | ||
850 | } | |
851 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS | |
852 | /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ | |
853 | if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { | |
854 | if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) | |
855 | return NULL; | |
856 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); | |
857 | s2n(1, ret); | |
cda8845d MC |
858 | /*- |
859 | * Set mode: | |
860 | * 1: peer may send requests | |
861 | * 2: peer not allowed to send requests | |
862 | */ | |
10621efd MC |
863 | if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) |
864 | *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; | |
865 | else | |
866 | *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; | |
867 | ||
868 | } | |
869 | # endif | |
870 | ||
871 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
872 | next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; | |
873 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
874 | if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { | |
875 | const unsigned char *npa; | |
876 | unsigned int npalen; | |
877 | int r; | |
878 | ||
879 | r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, | |
880 | s-> | |
881 | ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); | |
882 | if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
883 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) | |
884 | return NULL; | |
885 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); | |
886 | s2n(npalen, ret); | |
887 | memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); | |
888 | ret += npalen; | |
889 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
890 | } | |
891 | } | |
892 | # endif | |
68b33cc5 | 893 | |
10621efd MC |
894 | if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) |
895 | return orig; | |
ed3883d2 | 896 | |
10621efd MC |
897 | s2n(extdatalen, orig); |
898 | return ret; | |
899 | } | |
ed3883d2 | 900 | |
10621efd | 901 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
3e9a08ec TH |
902 | /*- |
903 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
4b61f6d2 RS |
904 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. |
905 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: | |
906 | * SNI, | |
907 | * elliptic_curves | |
908 | * ec_point_formats | |
909 | * | |
910 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
911 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
912 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
913 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
914 | */ | |
10621efd | 915 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, |
f141376a | 916 | const unsigned char *limit) |
10621efd MC |
917 | { |
918 | unsigned short type, size; | |
919 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { | |
920 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
921 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
922 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
923 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
924 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
925 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
926 | ||
927 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
928 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
929 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
930 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
931 | }; | |
932 | ||
933 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ | |
934 | static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { | |
935 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ | |
936 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
937 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
938 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
939 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
940 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
941 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
942 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
943 | }; | |
944 | ||
6f35f6de | 945 | if (limit - data <= 2) |
10621efd MC |
946 | return; |
947 | data += 2; | |
948 | ||
6f35f6de | 949 | if (limit - data < 4) |
10621efd MC |
950 | return; |
951 | n2s(data, type); | |
952 | n2s(data, size); | |
953 | ||
954 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) | |
955 | return; | |
956 | ||
6f35f6de | 957 | if (limit - data < size) |
10621efd MC |
958 | return; |
959 | data += size; | |
960 | ||
961 | if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
962 | const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); | |
963 | const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); | |
964 | ||
6f35f6de | 965 | if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) |
10621efd MC |
966 | return; |
967 | if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) | |
968 | return; | |
969 | if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) | |
970 | return; | |
971 | } else { | |
972 | const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); | |
973 | ||
6f35f6de | 974 | if (limit - data != (int)(len)) |
10621efd MC |
975 | return; |
976 | if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) | |
977 | return; | |
978 | } | |
979 | ||
980 | s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; | |
4b61f6d2 | 981 | } |
10621efd MC |
982 | # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
983 | ||
f141376a MC |
984 | int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, |
985 | unsigned char *limit, int *al) | |
10621efd MC |
986 | { |
987 | unsigned short type; | |
988 | unsigned short size; | |
989 | unsigned short len; | |
990 | unsigned char *data = *p; | |
991 | int renegotiate_seen = 0; | |
992 | int sigalg_seen = 0; | |
993 | ||
994 | s->servername_done = 0; | |
995 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; | |
996 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
997 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
998 | # endif | |
999 | ||
1000 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS | |
1001 | s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | | |
1002 | SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); | |
1003 | # endif | |
1004 | ||
1005 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1006 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) | |
f141376a | 1007 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit); |
10621efd MC |
1008 | # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
1009 | ||
1010 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
1011 | if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { | |
1012 | OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
1013 | s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; | |
1014 | } | |
1015 | # endif | |
1016 | ||
1017 | s->srtp_profile = NULL; | |
1018 | ||
f141376a | 1019 | if (data == limit) |
6cbc7890 AL |
1020 | goto ri_check; |
1021 | ||
6f35f6de | 1022 | if (limit - data < 2) |
6cbc7890 AL |
1023 | goto err; |
1024 | ||
10621efd MC |
1025 | n2s(data, len); |
1026 | ||
6f35f6de | 1027 | if (limit - data != len) |
72df35ac | 1028 | goto err; |
10621efd | 1029 | |
6f35f6de | 1030 | while (limit - data >= 4) { |
10621efd MC |
1031 | n2s(data, type); |
1032 | n2s(data, size); | |
1033 | ||
6f35f6de | 1034 | if (limit - data < size) |
72df35ac | 1035 | goto err; |
10621efd MC |
1036 | # if 0 |
1037 | fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); | |
1038 | # endif | |
1039 | if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) | |
1040 | s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); | |
3e9a08ec TH |
1041 | /*- |
1042 | * The servername extension is treated as follows: | |
1043 | * | |
1044 | * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. | |
1045 | * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, | |
1046 | * in which case an fatal alert is generated. | |
1047 | * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. | |
1048 | * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order | |
10621efd MC |
1049 | * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. |
1050 | * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when | |
1051 | * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. | |
3e9a08ec TH |
1052 | * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time |
1053 | * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the | |
1054 | * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and | |
1055 | * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername | |
1056 | * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches | |
10621efd | 1057 | * the value of the Host: field. |
3e9a08ec | 1058 | * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION |
10621efd MC |
1059 | * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the |
1060 | * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername | |
1061 | * extension. | |
1062 | * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. | |
3e9a08ec | 1063 | * |
10621efd | 1064 | */ |
ed3883d2 | 1065 | |
10621efd MC |
1066 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { |
1067 | unsigned char *sdata; | |
1068 | int servname_type; | |
1069 | int dsize; | |
1070 | ||
72df35ac MC |
1071 | if (size < 2) |
1072 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1073 | n2s(data, dsize); |
1074 | size -= 2; | |
72df35ac MC |
1075 | if (dsize > size) |
1076 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1077 | |
1078 | sdata = data; | |
1079 | while (dsize > 3) { | |
1080 | servname_type = *(sdata++); | |
1081 | n2s(sdata, len); | |
1082 | dsize -= 3; | |
1083 | ||
72df35ac MC |
1084 | if (len > dsize) |
1085 | goto err; | |
1086 | ||
10621efd MC |
1087 | if (s->servername_done == 0) |
1088 | switch (servname_type) { | |
1089 | case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: | |
1090 | if (!s->hit) { | |
72df35ac MC |
1091 | if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) |
1092 | goto err; | |
1093 | ||
10621efd MC |
1094 | if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { |
1095 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1096 | return 0; | |
1097 | } | |
1098 | if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = | |
1099 | OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { | |
1100 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1101 | return 0; | |
1102 | } | |
1103 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); | |
1104 | s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; | |
1105 | if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { | |
1106 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); | |
1107 | s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; | |
1108 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1109 | return 0; | |
1110 | } | |
1111 | s->servername_done = 1; | |
761772d7 | 1112 | |
10621efd MC |
1113 | } else |
1114 | s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname | |
1115 | && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len | |
1116 | && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, | |
1117 | (char *)sdata, len) == 0; | |
060a38a2 | 1118 | |
10621efd | 1119 | break; |
2456cd58 | 1120 | |
10621efd MC |
1121 | default: |
1122 | break; | |
1123 | } | |
2456cd58 | 1124 | |
10621efd MC |
1125 | dsize -= len; |
1126 | } | |
72df35ac MC |
1127 | if (dsize != 0) |
1128 | goto err; | |
2456cd58 | 1129 | |
10621efd MC |
1130 | } |
1131 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
1132 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { | |
72df35ac MC |
1133 | if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) |
1134 | goto err; | |
1135 | if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) | |
1136 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1137 | if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) |
1138 | return -1; | |
1139 | memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); | |
1140 | s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; | |
1141 | ||
72df35ac MC |
1142 | if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) |
1143 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1144 | } |
1145 | # endif | |
1146 | ||
1147 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1148 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { | |
1149 | unsigned char *sdata = data; | |
1150 | int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); | |
1151 | ||
72df35ac MC |
1152 | if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) |
1153 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1154 | if (!s->hit) { |
1155 | if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { | |
1156 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); | |
1157 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; | |
1158 | } | |
1159 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; | |
1160 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = | |
1161 | OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { | |
1162 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1163 | return 0; | |
1164 | } | |
1165 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = | |
1166 | ecpointformatlist_length; | |
1167 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, | |
1168 | ecpointformatlist_length); | |
1169 | } | |
1170 | # if 0 | |
1171 | fprintf(stderr, | |
1172 | "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", | |
1173 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); | |
1174 | sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; | |
1175 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) | |
1176 | fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); | |
1177 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1178 | # endif | |
1179 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { | |
1180 | unsigned char *sdata = data; | |
1181 | int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); | |
1182 | ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); | |
1183 | ||
1184 | if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || | |
1185 | ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || | |
1186 | /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ | |
72df35ac MC |
1187 | ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) |
1188 | goto err; | |
1189 | ||
10621efd | 1190 | if (!s->hit) { |
72df35ac MC |
1191 | if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) |
1192 | goto err; | |
1193 | ||
10621efd MC |
1194 | s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; |
1195 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = | |
1196 | OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { | |
1197 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1198 | return 0; | |
1199 | } | |
1200 | s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = | |
1201 | ellipticcurvelist_length; | |
1202 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, | |
1203 | ellipticcurvelist_length); | |
1204 | } | |
1205 | # if 0 | |
1206 | fprintf(stderr, | |
1207 | "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", | |
1208 | s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); | |
1209 | sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; | |
1210 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) | |
1211 | fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); | |
1212 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1213 | # endif | |
1214 | } | |
1215 | # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
1216 | # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | |
1217 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && | |
1218 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { | |
1219 | unsigned char *sdata = data; | |
1220 | ||
1221 | if (size < 2) { | |
1222 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1223 | return 0; | |
1224 | } | |
1225 | n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); | |
1226 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { | |
1227 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1228 | return 0; | |
1229 | } | |
1230 | ||
1231 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { | |
1232 | /* shouldn't really happen */ | |
1233 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); | |
1234 | } | |
1235 | ||
1236 | /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ | |
1237 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) | |
1238 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); | |
1239 | else | |
1240 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = | |
1241 | BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); | |
1242 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { | |
1243 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1244 | return 0; | |
1245 | } | |
1246 | } | |
1247 | # endif | |
1248 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { | |
1249 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && | |
1250 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, | |
1251 | s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) | |
1252 | { | |
1253 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1254 | return 0; | |
1255 | } | |
1256 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { | |
1257 | if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) | |
1258 | return 0; | |
1259 | renegotiate_seen = 1; | |
1260 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { | |
1261 | int dsize; | |
72df35ac MC |
1262 | if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) |
1263 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1264 | sigalg_seen = 1; |
1265 | n2s(data, dsize); | |
1266 | size -= 2; | |
72df35ac MC |
1267 | if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) |
1268 | goto err; | |
1269 | if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) | |
1270 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1271 | } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && |
1272 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { | |
1273 | ||
72df35ac MC |
1274 | if (size < 5) |
1275 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1276 | |
1277 | s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; | |
1278 | size--; | |
1279 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { | |
1280 | const unsigned char *sdata; | |
1281 | int dsize; | |
1282 | /* Read in responder_id_list */ | |
1283 | n2s(data, dsize); | |
1284 | size -= 2; | |
72df35ac MC |
1285 | if (dsize > size) |
1286 | goto err; | |
2c0d295e MC |
1287 | |
1288 | /* | |
1289 | * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake | |
1290 | * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 | |
1291 | */ | |
1292 | sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, | |
1293 | OCSP_RESPID_free); | |
1294 | if (dsize > 0) { | |
1295 | s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); | |
1296 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { | |
1297 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1298 | return 0; | |
1299 | } | |
1300 | } else { | |
1301 | s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
10621efd MC |
1304 | while (dsize > 0) { |
1305 | OCSP_RESPID *id; | |
1306 | int idsize; | |
72df35ac MC |
1307 | if (dsize < 4) |
1308 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1309 | n2s(data, idsize); |
1310 | dsize -= 2 + idsize; | |
1311 | size -= 2 + idsize; | |
72df35ac MC |
1312 | if (dsize < 0) |
1313 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1314 | sdata = data; |
1315 | data += idsize; | |
1316 | id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); | |
72df35ac MC |
1317 | if (!id) |
1318 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1319 | if (data != sdata) { |
1320 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
72df35ac | 1321 | goto err; |
10621efd | 1322 | } |
10621efd MC |
1323 | if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { |
1324 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
1325 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1326 | return 0; | |
1327 | } | |
1328 | } | |
2456cd58 | 1329 | |
10621efd | 1330 | /* Read in request_extensions */ |
72df35ac MC |
1331 | if (size < 2) |
1332 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1333 | n2s(data, dsize); |
1334 | size -= 2; | |
72df35ac MC |
1335 | if (dsize != size) |
1336 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1337 | sdata = data; |
1338 | if (dsize > 0) { | |
1339 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { | |
1340 | sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, | |
1341 | X509_EXTENSION_free); | |
1342 | } | |
1343 | ||
1344 | s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = | |
1345 | d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); | |
72df35ac MC |
1346 | if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) |
1347 | goto err; | |
10621efd MC |
1348 | } |
1349 | } | |
1350 | /* | |
1351 | * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. | |
1352 | */ | |
1353 | else | |
1354 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; | |
1355 | } | |
1356 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS | |
1357 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { | |
1358 | switch (data[0]) { | |
1359 | case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ | |
1360 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; | |
1361 | break; | |
1362 | case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ | |
1363 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; | |
1364 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; | |
1365 | break; | |
1366 | default: | |
1367 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1368 | return 0; | |
1369 | } | |
1370 | } | |
1371 | # endif | |
1372 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1373 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && | |
1374 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { | |
cda8845d MC |
1375 | /*- |
1376 | * We shouldn't accept this extension on a | |
1377 | * renegotiation. | |
1378 | * | |
1379 | * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we | |
1380 | * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on | |
1381 | * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when | |
1382 | * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an | |
1383 | * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing | |
1384 | * anything like that, but this might change). | |
1385 | * | |
1386 | * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake | |
1387 | * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > | |
1388 | * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen | |
1389 | * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new | |
1390 | * Finished message could have been computed.) | |
1391 | */ | |
10621efd MC |
1392 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
1393 | } | |
1394 | # endif | |
1395 | ||
1396 | /* session ticket processed earlier */ | |
1397 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
1398 | else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) | |
1399 | && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { | |
1400 | if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) | |
1401 | return 0; | |
1402 | } | |
1403 | # endif | |
f1fd4544 | 1404 | |
10621efd MC |
1405 | data += size; |
1406 | } | |
68b33cc5 | 1407 | |
72df35ac | 1408 | /* Spurious data on the end */ |
f141376a | 1409 | if (data != limit) |
72df35ac MC |
1410 | goto err; |
1411 | ||
10621efd | 1412 | *p = data; |
8cd897a4 | 1413 | |
10621efd | 1414 | ri_check: |
bd6941cf | 1415 | |
10621efd | 1416 | /* Need RI if renegotiating */ |
ed3883d2 | 1417 | |
10621efd MC |
1418 | if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && |
1419 | !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
1420 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1421 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, | |
1422 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
1423 | return 0; | |
1424 | } | |
060a38a2 | 1425 | |
10621efd | 1426 | return 1; |
72df35ac MC |
1427 | err: |
1428 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1429 | return 0; | |
10621efd MC |
1430 | } |
1431 | ||
1432 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1433 | /* | |
1434 | * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No | |
1435 | * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly | |
1436 | * fill the length of the block. | |
1437 | */ | |
1438 | static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) | |
1439 | { | |
1440 | unsigned int off = 0; | |
ed3883d2 | 1441 | |
10621efd MC |
1442 | while (off < len) { |
1443 | if (d[off] == 0) | |
1444 | return 0; | |
1445 | off += d[off]; | |
1446 | off++; | |
1447 | } | |
1448 | ||
1449 | return off == len; | |
1450 | } | |
1451 | # endif | |
1452 | ||
1453 | int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, | |
1454 | int n, int *al) | |
1455 | { | |
1456 | unsigned short length; | |
1457 | unsigned short type; | |
1458 | unsigned short size; | |
1459 | unsigned char *data = *p; | |
1460 | int tlsext_servername = 0; | |
1461 | int renegotiate_seen = 0; | |
1462 | ||
1463 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1464 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
1465 | # endif | |
1466 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; | |
1467 | ||
1468 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS | |
1469 | s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | | |
1470 | SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); | |
1471 | # endif | |
1472 | ||
6f35f6de | 1473 | if ((d + n) - data <= 2) |
10621efd MC |
1474 | goto ri_check; |
1475 | ||
1476 | n2s(data, length); | |
6f35f6de | 1477 | if ((d + n) - data != length) { |
10621efd MC |
1478 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1479 | return 0; | |
1480 | } | |
1481 | ||
6f35f6de | 1482 | while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { |
10621efd MC |
1483 | n2s(data, type); |
1484 | n2s(data, size); | |
1485 | ||
6f35f6de | 1486 | if ((d + n) - data < size) |
10621efd MC |
1487 | goto ri_check; |
1488 | ||
1489 | if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) | |
1490 | s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); | |
1491 | ||
1492 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { | |
1493 | if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { | |
1494 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1495 | return 0; | |
1496 | } | |
1497 | tlsext_servername = 1; | |
1498 | } | |
1499 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1500 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { | |
1501 | unsigned char *sdata = data; | |
1502 | int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); | |
1503 | ||
1504 | if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || | |
1505 | ecpointformatlist_length < 1) { | |
1506 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1507 | return 0; | |
1508 | } | |
1509 | if (!s->hit) { | |
1510 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; | |
1511 | if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) | |
1512 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); | |
1513 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = | |
1514 | OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { | |
1515 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1516 | return 0; | |
1517 | } | |
1518 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = | |
1519 | ecpointformatlist_length; | |
1520 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, | |
1521 | ecpointformatlist_length); | |
1522 | } | |
1523 | # if 0 | |
1524 | fprintf(stderr, | |
1525 | "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); | |
1526 | sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; | |
1527 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) | |
1528 | fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); | |
1529 | fprintf(stderr, "\n"); | |
1530 | # endif | |
1531 | } | |
1532 | # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
1533 | ||
1534 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { | |
1535 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && | |
1536 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, | |
1537 | s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) | |
1538 | { | |
1539 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1540 | return 0; | |
1541 | } | |
1542 | if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) | |
1543 | || (size > 0)) { | |
1544 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
1545 | return 0; | |
1546 | } | |
1547 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
1548 | } | |
1549 | # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | |
1550 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && | |
1551 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { | |
1552 | unsigned char *sdata = data; | |
1553 | ||
1554 | if (size < 2) { | |
1555 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1556 | return 0; | |
1557 | } | |
1558 | n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); | |
1559 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { | |
1560 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1561 | return 0; | |
1562 | } | |
1563 | ||
1564 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { | |
1565 | /* shouldn't really happen */ | |
1566 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); | |
1567 | } | |
1568 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { | |
1569 | /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ | |
1570 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); | |
1571 | } else { | |
1572 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = | |
1573 | BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); | |
1574 | } | |
1575 | ||
1576 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { | |
1577 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1578 | return 0; | |
1579 | } | |
1580 | } | |
1581 | # endif | |
1582 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && | |
1583 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { | |
1584 | /* | |
1585 | * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status | |
1586 | * request message. | |
1587 | */ | |
1588 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { | |
1589 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
1590 | return 0; | |
1591 | } | |
1592 | /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ | |
1593 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; | |
1594 | } | |
1595 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
1596 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && | |
1597 | s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { | |
1598 | unsigned char *selected; | |
1599 | unsigned char selected_len; | |
1600 | ||
1601 | /* We must have requested it. */ | |
1602 | if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { | |
1603 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
1604 | return 0; | |
1605 | } | |
1606 | /* The data must be valid */ | |
1607 | if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { | |
1608 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1609 | return 0; | |
1610 | } | |
1611 | if (s-> | |
1612 | ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, | |
1613 | size, | |
1614 | s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != | |
1615 | SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
1616 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1617 | return 0; | |
1618 | } | |
1619 | s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); | |
1620 | if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { | |
1621 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1622 | return 0; | |
1623 | } | |
1624 | memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); | |
1625 | s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; | |
1626 | s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
1627 | } | |
1628 | # endif | |
1629 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { | |
1630 | if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) | |
1631 | return 0; | |
1632 | renegotiate_seen = 1; | |
1633 | } | |
1634 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS | |
1635 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { | |
1636 | switch (data[0]) { | |
1637 | case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ | |
1638 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; | |
1639 | break; | |
1640 | case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ | |
1641 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; | |
1642 | s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; | |
1643 | break; | |
1644 | default: | |
1645 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
1646 | return 0; | |
1647 | } | |
1648 | } | |
1649 | # endif | |
1650 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
1651 | else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { | |
1652 | if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) | |
1653 | return 0; | |
1654 | } | |
1655 | # endif | |
1656 | ||
1657 | data += size; | |
1658 | } | |
1659 | ||
1660 | if (data != d + n) { | |
1661 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1662 | return 0; | |
1663 | } | |
1664 | ||
1665 | if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { | |
1666 | if (s->tlsext_hostname) { | |
1667 | if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { | |
1668 | s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); | |
1669 | if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { | |
1670 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1671 | return 0; | |
1672 | } | |
1673 | } else { | |
1674 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1675 | return 0; | |
1676 | } | |
1677 | } | |
1678 | } | |
1679 | ||
1680 | *p = data; | |
1681 | ||
1682 | ri_check: | |
1683 | ||
1684 | /* | |
1685 | * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid | |
1686 | * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello | |
1687 | * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. | |
1688 | * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which | |
1689 | * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on | |
1690 | * initial connect only. | |
1691 | */ | |
1692 | if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) | |
1693 | && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
1694 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1695 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, | |
1696 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
1697 | return 0; | |
1698 | } | |
1699 | ||
1700 | return 1; | |
1701 | } | |
b2172f4f | 1702 | |
36ca4ba6 | 1703 | int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
10621efd MC |
1704 | { |
1705 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1706 | /* | |
1707 | * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher | |
1708 | * suite, send the point formats and elliptic curves we support. | |
1709 | */ | |
1710 | int using_ecc = 0; | |
1711 | int i; | |
1712 | unsigned char *j; | |
1713 | unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; | |
1714 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); | |
1715 | ||
1716 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { | |
1717 | SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); | |
1718 | ||
1719 | alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; | |
1720 | alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; | |
1721 | if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) | |
1722 | || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { | |
1723 | using_ecc = 1; | |
1724 | break; | |
1725 | } | |
1726 | } | |
1727 | using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); | |
1728 | if (using_ecc) { | |
1729 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) | |
1730 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); | |
1731 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) { | |
1732 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, | |
1733 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1734 | return -1; | |
1735 | } | |
1736 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; | |
1737 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; | |
1738 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = | |
1739 | TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; | |
1740 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = | |
1741 | TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; | |
1742 | ||
1743 | /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */ | |
1744 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) | |
1745 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); | |
1746 | s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = | |
1747 | sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; | |
1748 | if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = | |
1749 | OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { | |
1750 | s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; | |
1751 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, | |
1752 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1753 | return -1; | |
1754 | } | |
1755 | for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < | |
1756 | sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) { | |
1757 | int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); | |
1758 | s2n(id, j); | |
1759 | } | |
1760 | } | |
1761 | # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
1762 | ||
1763 | # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | |
1764 | { | |
1765 | int r = 1; | |
1766 | ||
1767 | if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { | |
1768 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, | |
1769 | s-> | |
1770 | ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); | |
1771 | if (!r) | |
1772 | return -1; | |
1773 | } | |
1774 | ||
1775 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { | |
1776 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { | |
1777 | /* shouldn't really happen */ | |
1778 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); | |
1779 | } | |
1780 | ||
1781 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { | |
1782 | /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ | |
1783 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); | |
1784 | } else { | |
1785 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = | |
1786 | BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, | |
1787 | s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); | |
1788 | } | |
1789 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { | |
1790 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, | |
1791 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1792 | return -1; | |
1793 | } | |
1794 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = | |
1795 | s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; | |
1796 | } | |
761772d7 | 1797 | |
10621efd MC |
1798 | if (r == 2) |
1799 | /* | |
1800 | * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate | |
1801 | * server opaque PRF input | |
1802 | */ | |
1803 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = | |
1804 | s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; | |
1805 | } | |
1806 | # endif | |
1807 | ||
1808 | return 1; | |
1809 | } | |
36ca4ba6 BM |
1810 | |
1811 | int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) | |
10621efd MC |
1812 | { |
1813 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1814 | /* | |
1815 | * If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats | |
1816 | * we support if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note | |
1817 | * that the server is not supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. | |
1818 | */ | |
1819 | ||
1820 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
1821 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
1822 | int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) | |
1823 | || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); | |
1824 | using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); | |
1825 | ||
1826 | if (using_ecc) { | |
1827 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) | |
1828 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); | |
1829 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) { | |
1830 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, | |
1831 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1832 | return -1; | |
1833 | } | |
1834 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; | |
1835 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; | |
1836 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = | |
1837 | TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; | |
1838 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = | |
1839 | TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; | |
1840 | } | |
1841 | # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
1842 | ||
1843 | return 1; | |
1844 | } | |
36ca4ba6 | 1845 | |
70d91d60 | 1846 | int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) |
10621efd MC |
1847 | { |
1848 | int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; | |
1849 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1850 | ||
1851 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1852 | /* | |
1853 | * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely | |
1854 | * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. | |
1855 | */ | |
1856 | /* | |
1857 | * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely | |
1858 | * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. | |
1859 | */ | |
1860 | # endif | |
1861 | ||
1862 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
1863 | ret = | |
1864 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
1865 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
1866 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL | |
1867 | && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
1868 | ret = | |
1869 | s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
1870 | s-> | |
1871 | initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
1872 | ||
1873 | # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | |
1874 | { | |
1875 | /* | |
1876 | * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we | |
1877 | * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this | |
1878 | * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). | |
1879 | */ | |
1880 | ||
1881 | int r = 1; | |
1882 | ||
1883 | if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { | |
1884 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, | |
1885 | s-> | |
1886 | ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); | |
1887 | if (!r) { | |
1888 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | |
1889 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1890 | goto err; | |
1891 | } | |
1892 | } | |
36ca4ba6 | 1893 | |
10621efd MC |
1894 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { |
1895 | /* shouldn't really happen */ | |
1896 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); | |
1897 | } | |
1898 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; | |
1899 | ||
1900 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { | |
1901 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && | |
1902 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == | |
1903 | s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { | |
1904 | /* | |
1905 | * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF | |
1906 | * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! | |
1907 | */ | |
1908 | ||
1909 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { | |
1910 | /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ | |
1911 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); | |
1912 | } else { | |
1913 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = | |
1914 | BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, | |
1915 | s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); | |
1916 | } | |
1917 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { | |
1918 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | |
1919 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1920 | goto err; | |
1921 | } | |
1922 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = | |
1923 | s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; | |
1924 | } | |
1925 | } | |
36ca4ba6 | 1926 | |
10621efd MC |
1927 | if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { |
1928 | /* | |
1929 | * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we | |
1930 | * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the | |
1931 | * handshake. | |
1932 | */ | |
1933 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | |
1934 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
1935 | } | |
1936 | } | |
761772d7 BM |
1937 | |
1938 | err: | |
10621efd MC |
1939 | # endif |
1940 | switch (ret) { | |
1941 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
1942 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1943 | return -1; | |
1944 | ||
1945 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
1946 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
1947 | return 1; | |
1948 | ||
1949 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
1950 | s->servername_done = 0; | |
1951 | default: | |
1952 | return 1; | |
1953 | } | |
1954 | } | |
f1fd4544 | 1955 | |
70d91d60 | 1956 | int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) |
10621efd MC |
1957 | { |
1958 | int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; | |
1959 | int al; | |
1960 | ||
1961 | /* | |
1962 | * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be | |
1963 | * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has | |
1964 | * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because | |
1965 | * this may influence which certificate is sent | |
1966 | */ | |
1967 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { | |
1968 | int r; | |
1969 | CERT_PKEY *certpkey; | |
1970 | certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); | |
1971 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ | |
1972 | if (certpkey == NULL) { | |
1973 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | |
1974 | return 1; | |
1975 | } | |
1976 | /* | |
1977 | * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate | |
1978 | * et al can pick it up. | |
1979 | */ | |
1980 | s->cert->key = certpkey; | |
1981 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); | |
1982 | switch (r) { | |
1983 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | |
1984 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
1985 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | |
1986 | break; | |
1987 | /* status request response should be sent */ | |
1988 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | |
1989 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) | |
1990 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; | |
1991 | else | |
1992 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | |
1993 | break; | |
1994 | /* something bad happened */ | |
1995 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
1996 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | |
1997 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1998 | goto err; | |
1999 | } | |
2000 | } else | |
2001 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | |
70d91d60 BL |
2002 | |
2003 | err: | |
10621efd MC |
2004 | switch (ret) { |
2005 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
2006 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2007 | return -1; | |
2008 | ||
2009 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
2010 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
2011 | return 1; | |
2012 | ||
2013 | default: | |
2014 | return 1; | |
2015 | } | |
2016 | } | |
70d91d60 | 2017 | |
36ca4ba6 | 2018 | int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
10621efd MC |
2019 | { |
2020 | int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; | |
2021 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
2022 | ||
2023 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2024 | /* | |
2025 | * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher | |
2026 | * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it | |
2027 | * must contain uncompressed. | |
2028 | */ | |
2029 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
2030 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
2031 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) | |
2032 | && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) | |
2033 | && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) | |
2034 | && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) | |
2035 | && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) | |
2036 | || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { | |
2037 | /* we are using an ECC cipher */ | |
2038 | size_t i; | |
2039 | unsigned char *list; | |
2040 | int found_uncompressed = 0; | |
2041 | list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; | |
2042 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { | |
2043 | if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { | |
2044 | found_uncompressed = 1; | |
2045 | break; | |
2046 | } | |
2047 | } | |
2048 | if (!found_uncompressed) { | |
2049 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, | |
2050 | SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); | |
2051 | return -1; | |
2052 | } | |
2053 | } | |
2054 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; | |
2055 | # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
2056 | ||
2057 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
2058 | ret = | |
2059 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
2060 | s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
2061 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL | |
2062 | && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | |
2063 | ret = | |
2064 | s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
2065 | s-> | |
2066 | initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
2067 | ||
2068 | # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | |
2069 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { | |
2070 | /* | |
2071 | * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on | |
2072 | * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a | |
2073 | * value from the server too. | |
2074 | */ | |
2075 | ||
2076 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { | |
2077 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | |
2078 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2079 | } | |
761772d7 | 2080 | |
10621efd MC |
2081 | /* |
2082 | * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to | |
2083 | * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. | |
2084 | */ | |
2085 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || | |
2086 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != | |
2087 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { | |
2088 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | |
2089 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
2090 | } | |
2091 | } | |
2092 | # endif | |
2093 | ||
a7316aac MC |
2094 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); |
2095 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; | |
2096 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; | |
10621efd MC |
2097 | /* |
2098 | * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the | |
2099 | * callback | |
2100 | */ | |
2101 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) | |
604f67f5 | 2102 | && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { |
10621efd MC |
2103 | int r; |
2104 | /* | |
a7316aac MC |
2105 | * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback |
2106 | * knows there is no response | |
10621efd | 2107 | */ |
10621efd MC |
2108 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); |
2109 | if (r == 0) { | |
2110 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; | |
2111 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | |
2112 | } | |
2113 | if (r < 0) { | |
2114 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
2115 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | |
2116 | } | |
2117 | } | |
2118 | ||
2119 | switch (ret) { | |
2120 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
2121 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2122 | return -1; | |
2123 | ||
2124 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
2125 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
2126 | return 1; | |
2127 | ||
2128 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
2129 | s->servername_done = 0; | |
2130 | default: | |
2131 | return 1; | |
2132 | } | |
2133 | } | |
33273721 | 2134 | |
3e9a08ec TH |
2135 | /*- |
2136 | * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the | |
3c3f0259 BM |
2137 | * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle |
2138 | * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. | |
2139 | * | |
2140 | * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will | |
2141 | * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket | |
2142 | * extension, if any. | |
2143 | * len: the length of the session ID. | |
2144 | * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. | |
2145 | * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to | |
2146 | * point to the resulting session. | |
2147 | * | |
2148 | * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key | |
2149 | * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will | |
2150 | * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. | |
2151 | * | |
2152 | * Returns: | |
2153 | * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. | |
2154 | * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). | |
2155 | * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports | |
2156 | * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. | |
2157 | * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but | |
2158 | * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. | |
2159 | * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. | |
2160 | * | |
2161 | * Side effects: | |
2162 | * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue | |
2163 | * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support | |
2164 | * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have | |
2165 | * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if | |
2166 | * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. | |
2167 | * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. | |
6434abbf | 2168 | */ |
6434abbf | 2169 | int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, |
10621efd MC |
2170 | const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) |
2171 | { | |
2172 | /* Point after session ID in client hello */ | |
2173 | const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; | |
2174 | unsigned short i; | |
2175 | ||
2176 | *ret = NULL; | |
2177 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; | |
2178 | ||
2179 | /* | |
2180 | * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful | |
2181 | * resumption. | |
2182 | */ | |
2183 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) | |
2184 | return 0; | |
2185 | if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) | |
2186 | return 0; | |
2187 | if (p >= limit) | |
2188 | return -1; | |
2189 | /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ | |
2190 | if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2191 | i = *(p++); | |
6f35f6de MC |
2192 | |
2193 | if (limit - p <= i) | |
10621efd | 2194 | return -1; |
6f35f6de MC |
2195 | |
2196 | p += i; | |
10621efd MC |
2197 | } |
2198 | /* Skip past cipher list */ | |
2199 | n2s(p, i); | |
6f35f6de | 2200 | if (limit - p <= i) |
10621efd | 2201 | return -1; |
6f35f6de MC |
2202 | p += i; |
2203 | ||
10621efd MC |
2204 | /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ |
2205 | i = *(p++); | |
6f35f6de | 2206 | if (limit - p < i) |
10621efd | 2207 | return -1; |
6f35f6de MC |
2208 | p += i; |
2209 | ||
10621efd | 2210 | /* Now at start of extensions */ |
6f35f6de | 2211 | if (limit - p <= 2) |
10621efd MC |
2212 | return 0; |
2213 | n2s(p, i); | |
6f35f6de | 2214 | while (limit - p >= 4) { |
10621efd MC |
2215 | unsigned short type, size; |
2216 | n2s(p, type); | |
2217 | n2s(p, size); | |
6f35f6de | 2218 | if (limit - p < size) |
10621efd MC |
2219 | return 0; |
2220 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { | |
2221 | int r; | |
2222 | if (size == 0) { | |
2223 | /* | |
2224 | * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have | |
2225 | * one. | |
2226 | */ | |
2227 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
2228 | return 1; | |
2229 | } | |
2230 | if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { | |
2231 | /* | |
2232 | * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than | |
2233 | * generating the session from ticket now, trigger | |
2234 | * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to | |
2235 | * calculate the master secret later. | |
2236 | */ | |
2237 | return 2; | |
2238 | } | |
2239 | r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); | |
2240 | switch (r) { | |
2241 | case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ | |
2242 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
2243 | return 2; | |
2244 | case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ | |
2245 | return r; | |
2246 | case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ | |
2247 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
2248 | return 3; | |
2249 | default: /* fatal error */ | |
2250 | return -1; | |
2251 | } | |
2252 | } | |
2253 | p += size; | |
2254 | } | |
2255 | return 0; | |
2256 | } | |
6434abbf | 2257 | |
3e9a08ec TH |
2258 | /*- |
2259 | * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. | |
3c3f0259 BM |
2260 | * |
2261 | * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. | |
2262 | * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. | |
2263 | * sess_id: points at the session ID. | |
2264 | * sesslen: the length of the session ID. | |
2265 | * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to | |
2266 | * point to the resulting session. | |
2267 | * | |
2268 | * Returns: | |
2269 | * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. | |
2270 | * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. | |
2271 | * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. | |
2272 | * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. | |
2273 | */ | |
10621efd MC |
2274 | static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, |
2275 | int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, | |
2276 | int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) | |
2277 | { | |
2278 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
2279 | unsigned char *sdec; | |
2280 | const unsigned char *p; | |
2281 | int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; | |
2282 | unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
2283 | HMAC_CTX hctx; | |
2284 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; | |
2285 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; | |
1bbe48ab | 2286 | |
10621efd MC |
2287 | /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ |
2288 | HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); | |
2289 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
2290 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { | |
2291 | unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; | |
2292 | int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, | |
2293 | &ctx, &hctx, 0); | |
2294 | if (rv < 0) | |
2295 | return -1; | |
2296 | if (rv == 0) | |
2297 | return 2; | |
2298 | if (rv == 2) | |
2299 | renew_ticket = 1; | |
2300 | } else { | |
2301 | /* Check key name matches */ | |
2302 | if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) | |
2303 | return 2; | |
a5184a6c MC |
2304 | if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, |
2305 | tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0 | |
2306 | || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, | |
2307 | tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, | |
2308 | etick + 16) <= 0) { | |
2309 | goto err; | |
2310 | } | |
10621efd MC |
2311 | } |
2312 | /* | |
2313 | * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity | |
2314 | * checks on ticket. | |
2315 | */ | |
2316 | mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); | |
2317 | if (mlen < 0) { | |
a5184a6c | 2318 | goto err; |
10621efd | 2319 | } |
1bbe48ab DSH |
2320 | /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ |
2321 | if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) { | |
2322 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | |
2323 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
2324 | return 2; | |
2325 | } | |
2326 | ||
10621efd MC |
2327 | eticklen -= mlen; |
2328 | /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ | |
a5184a6c MC |
2329 | if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 |
2330 | || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { | |
2331 | goto err; | |
2332 | } | |
10621efd MC |
2333 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); |
2334 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { | |
2335 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
2336 | return 2; | |
2337 | } | |
2338 | /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ | |
2339 | /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ | |
2340 | p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); | |
2341 | eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); | |
2342 | sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); | |
d31b2513 MC |
2343 | if (sdec == NULL |
2344 | || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { | |
10621efd | 2345 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
d31b2513 | 2346 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); |
10621efd MC |
2347 | return -1; |
2348 | } | |
10621efd MC |
2349 | if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { |
2350 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
2351 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); | |
2352 | return 2; | |
2353 | } | |
2354 | slen += mlen; | |
2355 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
2356 | p = sdec; | |
2357 | ||
2358 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); | |
2359 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); | |
2360 | if (sess) { | |
2361 | /* | |
2362 | * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect | |
2363 | * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session | |
2364 | * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by | |
2365 | * standard. | |
2366 | */ | |
2367 | if (sesslen) | |
2368 | memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); | |
2369 | sess->session_id_length = sesslen; | |
2370 | *psess = sess; | |
2371 | if (renew_ticket) | |
2372 | return 4; | |
2373 | else | |
2374 | return 3; | |
2375 | } | |
2376 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
2377 | /* | |
2378 | * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. | |
2379 | */ | |
2380 | return 2; | |
a5184a6c MC |
2381 | err: |
2382 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
2383 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | |
2384 | return -1; | |
10621efd | 2385 | } |
6434abbf | 2386 | |
9472baae DSH |
2387 | /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ |
2388 | ||
10621efd MC |
2389 | typedef struct { |
2390 | int nid; | |
2391 | int id; | |
2392 | } tls12_lookup; | |
9472baae DSH |
2393 | |
2394 | static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { | |
10621efd MC |
2395 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
2396 | {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, | |
2397 | # endif | |
2398 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | |
2399 | {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, | |
2400 | # endif | |
2401 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 | |
2402 | {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, | |
2403 | {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, | |
2404 | # endif | |
2405 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 | |
2406 | {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, | |
2407 | {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} | |
2408 | # endif | |
9472baae DSH |
2409 | }; |
2410 | ||
2411 | static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { | |
10621efd MC |
2412 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
2413 | {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, | |
2414 | # endif | |
2415 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA | |
2416 | {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, | |
2417 | # endif | |
2418 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA | |
2419 | {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} | |
2420 | # endif | |
9472baae DSH |
2421 | }; |
2422 | ||
2423 | static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) | |
10621efd MC |
2424 | { |
2425 | size_t i; | |
2426 | for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { | |
2427 | if (table[i].nid == nid) | |
2428 | return table[i].id; | |
2429 | } | |
2430 | return -1; | |
2431 | } | |
9472baae | 2432 | |
10621efd MC |
2433 | # if 0 |
2434 | static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) | |
2435 | { | |
2436 | size_t i; | |
2437 | for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { | |
2438 | if (table[i].id == id) | |
2439 | return table[i].nid; | |
2440 | } | |
2441 | return -1; | |
2442 | } | |
2443 | # endif | |
2444 | ||
2445 | int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, | |
2446 | const EVP_MD *md) | |
2447 | { | |
2448 | int sig_id, md_id; | |
2449 | if (!md) | |
2450 | return 0; | |
2451 | md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, | |
2452 | sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); | |
2453 | if (md_id == -1) | |
2454 | return 0; | |
2455 | sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); | |
2456 | if (sig_id == -1) | |
2457 | return 0; | |
2458 | p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; | |
2459 | p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; | |
2460 | return 1; | |
2461 | } | |
9472baae DSH |
2462 | |
2463 | int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) | |
10621efd MC |
2464 | { |
2465 | return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, | |
2466 | sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); | |
2467 | } | |
9472baae DSH |
2468 | |
2469 | const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) | |
10621efd MC |
2470 | { |
2471 | switch (hash_alg) { | |
2472 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | |
2473 | case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: | |
2474 | return EVP_sha1(); | |
2475 | # endif | |
2476 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 | |
2477 | case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: | |
2478 | return EVP_sha224(); | |
2479 | ||
2480 | case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: | |
2481 | return EVP_sha256(); | |
2482 | # endif | |
2483 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 | |
2484 | case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: | |
2485 | return EVP_sha384(); | |
2486 | ||
2487 | case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: | |
2488 | return EVP_sha512(); | |
2489 | # endif | |
2490 | default: | |
2491 | return NULL; | |
2492 | ||
2493 | } | |
2494 | } | |
9472baae DSH |
2495 | |
2496 | /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ | |
2497 | ||
376838a6 | 2498 | int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) |
10621efd MC |
2499 | { |
2500 | int i, idx; | |
2501 | const EVP_MD *md; | |
2502 | CERT *c = s->cert; | |
2503 | /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ | |
2504 | if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
2505 | return 1; | |
2506 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2507 | if (!c) | |
2508 | return 0; | |
2509 | ||
2510 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; | |
2511 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; | |
2512 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; | |
2513 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; | |
2514 | ||
2515 | for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) { | |
2516 | unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i + 1]; | |
2517 | ||
2518 | switch (sig_alg) { | |
2519 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
2520 | case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: | |
2521 | idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; | |
2522 | break; | |
2523 | # endif | |
2524 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA | |
2525 | case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: | |
2526 | idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; | |
2527 | break; | |
2528 | # endif | |
2529 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA | |
2530 | case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: | |
2531 | idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; | |
2532 | break; | |
2533 | # endif | |
2534 | default: | |
2535 | continue; | |
2536 | } | |
2537 | ||
2538 | if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { | |
2539 | md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); | |
2540 | if (md) { | |
2541 | c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; | |
2542 | if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) | |
2543 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; | |
2544 | } | |
2545 | } | |
2546 | ||
2547 | } | |
2548 | ||
2549 | /* | |
2550 | * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not | |
2551 | * supported it stays as NULL. | |
2552 | */ | |
2553 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA | |
2554 | if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) | |
2555 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); | |
2556 | # endif | |
2557 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
2558 | if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { | |
2559 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); | |
2560 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); | |
2561 | } | |
2562 | # endif | |
2563 | # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA | |
2564 | if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) | |
2565 | c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); | |
2566 | # endif | |
2567 | return 1; | |
2568 | } | |
9472baae | 2569 | |
6434abbf | 2570 | #endif |
bd6941cf DSH |
2571 | |
2572 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS | |
10621efd MC |
2573 | int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) |
2574 | { | |
2575 | unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; | |
2576 | unsigned short hbtype; | |
2577 | unsigned int payload; | |
2578 | unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ | |
2579 | ||
2580 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
2581 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, | |
2582 | &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, | |
2583 | s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
2584 | ||
2585 | /* Read type and payload length first */ | |
2586 | if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) | |
2587 | return 0; /* silently discard */ | |
2588 | hbtype = *p++; | |
2589 | n2s(p, payload); | |
2590 | if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) | |
2591 | return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ | |
2592 | pl = p; | |
2593 | ||
2594 | if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { | |
2595 | unsigned char *buffer, *bp; | |
2596 | int r; | |
2597 | ||
2598 | /* | |
2599 | * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, | |
2600 | * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding | |
2601 | */ | |
2602 | buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); | |
4275ee38 MC |
2603 | if (buffer == NULL) |
2604 | return -1; | |
10621efd MC |
2605 | bp = buffer; |
2606 | ||
2607 | /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ | |
2608 | *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; | |
2609 | s2n(payload, bp); | |
2610 | memcpy(bp, pl, payload); | |
2611 | bp += payload; | |
2612 | /* Random padding */ | |
05200ee5 | 2613 | if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { |
75019056 MC |
2614 | OPENSSL_free(buffer); |
2615 | return -1; | |
2616 | } | |
10621efd MC |
2617 | |
2618 | r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, | |
2619 | 3 + payload + padding); | |
2620 | ||
2621 | if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) | |
2622 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, | |
2623 | buffer, 3 + payload + padding, | |
2624 | s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
2625 | ||
2626 | OPENSSL_free(buffer); | |
2627 | ||
2628 | if (r < 0) | |
2629 | return r; | |
2630 | } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { | |
2631 | unsigned int seq; | |
2632 | ||
2633 | /* | |
2634 | * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 | |
2635 | * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number | |
2636 | */ | |
2637 | n2s(pl, seq); | |
2638 | ||
2639 | if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { | |
2640 | s->tlsext_hb_seq++; | |
2641 | s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; | |
2642 | } | |
2643 | } | |
2644 | ||
2645 | return 0; | |
2646 | } | |
2647 | ||
2648 | int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) | |
2649 | { | |
2650 | unsigned char *buf, *p; | |
75019056 | 2651 | int ret = -1; |
10621efd MC |
2652 | unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ |
2653 | unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ | |
2654 | ||
2655 | /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ | |
2656 | if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || | |
2657 | s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { | |
2658 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); | |
2659 | return -1; | |
2660 | } | |
2661 | ||
2662 | /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ | |
2663 | if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { | |
2664 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); | |
2665 | return -1; | |
2666 | } | |
2667 | ||
2668 | /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ | |
2669 | if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { | |
2670 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
2671 | return -1; | |
2672 | } | |
2673 | ||
2674 | /* | |
2675 | * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 | |
2676 | * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. | |
2677 | */ | |
2678 | OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); | |
2679 | ||
cda8845d MC |
2680 | /*- |
2681 | * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number | |
2682 | * as payload to distuingish different messages and add | |
2683 | * some random stuff. | |
2684 | * - Message Type, 1 byte | |
2685 | * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) | |
2686 | * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) | |
2687 | * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) | |
2688 | * - Padding | |
2689 | */ | |
10621efd MC |
2690 | buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); |
2691 | p = buf; | |
2692 | /* Message Type */ | |
2693 | *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; | |
2694 | /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ | |
2695 | s2n(payload, p); | |
2696 | /* Sequence number */ | |
2697 | s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); | |
2698 | /* 16 random bytes */ | |
05200ee5 | 2699 | if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { |
75019056 MC |
2700 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2701 | goto err; | |
2702 | } | |
10621efd MC |
2703 | p += 16; |
2704 | /* Random padding */ | |
05200ee5 | 2705 | if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { |
75019056 MC |
2706 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2707 | goto err; | |
2708 | } | |
10621efd MC |
2709 | |
2710 | ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); | |
2711 | if (ret >= 0) { | |
2712 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
2713 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, | |
2714 | buf, 3 + payload + padding, | |
2715 | s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
2716 | ||
2717 | s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; | |
2718 | } | |
2719 | ||
75019056 | 2720 | err: |
10621efd MC |
2721 | OPENSSL_free(buf); |
2722 | ||
2723 | return ret; | |
2724 | } | |
bd6941cf | 2725 | #endif |