]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blame - ssl/t1_lib.c
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blame
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blob | blame (incremental) | history | HEAD
For more than 160 bits of security disable SHA1 HMAC
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
CommitLineData
58964a49
RE		 1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
f1fd4544 58/* ====================================================================
52b8dad8 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
f1fd4544
BM		 60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
58964a49
RE		 111
112#include <stdio.h>
ec577822 113#include <openssl/objects.h>
6434abbf
DSH		 114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
67c8e7f4 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
4817504d 117#include <openssl/rand.h>
09599b52
DSH		 118#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119#include <openssl/dh.h>
120#include <openssl/bn.h>
121#endif
58964a49
RE		 122#include "ssl_locl.h"
123
42182852 124const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
58964a49 125
367eb1f1 126#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
6434abbf
DSH		 127static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
2daceb03 130static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
09e4e4b9 131int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
367eb1f1 132#endif
6434abbf 133
f3b656b2 134SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
58964a49
RE		 135 tls1_enc,
136 tls1_mac,
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_alert_code,
e0af0405 146 tls1_export_keying_material,
173e72e6
DSH		 147 0,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
150 ssl3_handshake_write
151 };
152
153SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
154 tls1_enc,
155 tls1_mac,
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_alert_code,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 ssl3_handshake_write
170 };
171
172SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
173 tls1_enc,
174 tls1_mac,
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_alert_code,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
4221c0dd
DSH		 185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
173e72e6
DSH		 187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
189 ssl3_handshake_write
58964a49
RE		 190 };
191
f3b656b2 192long tls1_default_timeout(void)
58964a49
RE		 193 {
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
196 return(60*60*2);
197 }
198
6b691a5c 199int tls1_new(SSL *s)
58964a49
RE		 200 {
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
203 return(1);
204 }
205
6b691a5c 206void tls1_free(SSL *s)
58964a49 207 {
12bf56c0
DSH		 208#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 {
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 }
213#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
58964a49
RE		 214 ssl3_free(s);
215 }
216
6b691a5c 217void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
58964a49
RE		 218 {
219 ssl3_clear(s);
637f374a 220 s->version = s->method->version;
58964a49
RE		 221 }
222
525de5d3 223#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
eda3766b 224
b362ccab
DSH		 225typedef struct
226 {
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
230 } tls_curve_info;
231
232#define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233#define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234
235static tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
525de5d3 236 {
b362ccab
DSH		 237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
525de5d3 265 };
eda3766b 266
d0595f17
DSH		 267
268static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
eda3766b 269 {
d0595f17
DSH		 270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 };
274
275static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
276 {
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
c2c76a4d 280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
d0595f17
DSH		 281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
c2c76a4d 283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
d0595f17
DSH		 284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
c2c76a4d 287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
d0595f17
DSH		 288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
eda3766b
DSH		 305 };
306
2ea80354
DSH		 307static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
308 {
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
311 };
312
525de5d3
DSH		 313int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
314 {
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
1e26a8ba
GT		 316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
318 return 0;
b362ccab 319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
525de5d3
DSH		 320 }
321
322int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
323 {
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
325 switch (nid)
326 {
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
328 return 1;
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
330 return 2;
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
332 return 3;
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
334 return 4;
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
336 return 5;
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
338 return 6;
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
340 return 7;
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
342 return 8;
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
344 return 9;
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
346 return 10;
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
348 return 11;
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
350 return 12;
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
352 return 13;
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
354 return 14;
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
356 return 15;
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
358 return 16;
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
360 return 17;
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
362 return 18;
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
364 return 19;
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
366 return 20;
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
368 return 21;
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
370 return 22;
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
372 return 23;
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
374 return 24;
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
376 return 25;
6699cb84
DSH		 377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
378 return 26;
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
380 return 27;
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
382 return 28;
525de5d3
DSH		 383 default:
384 return 0;
385 }
386 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 387/* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
388 * preferred list
389 */
390static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
392 size_t *pcurveslen)
393 {
394 if (sess)
395 {
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
2ea80354 398 return;
fd2b65ce 399 }
2ea80354
DSH		 400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
fd2b65ce 402 {
2ea80354 403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
2ea80354 404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
d372d365 405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
2ea80354
DSH		 406 break;
407
b34aa49c
DSH		 408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
410 *pcurveslen = 2;
411 break;
412
2ea80354
DSH		 413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
415 *pcurveslen = 2;
416 break;
417 default:
fd2b65ce
DSH		 418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
420 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 421 if (!*pcurves)
422 {
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
425 }
426 }
b362ccab
DSH		 427
428/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
430 {
431 tls_curve_info *cinfo;
432 if (curve[0])
433 return 1;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
436 return 0;
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
439 }
440
d18b716d
DSH		 441/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
443 {
444 const unsigned char *curves;
445 size_t curveslen, i;
2ea80354 446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
d18b716d
DSH		 447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
448 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
450 if (suiteb_flags)
451 {
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
453 if (p[1])
454 return 0;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
456 {
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
458 return 0;
459 }
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
461 {
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
463 return 0;
464 }
465 else /* Should never happen */
466 return 0;
467 }
d18b716d
DSH		 468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
470 {
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
b362ccab 472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
d18b716d
DSH		 473 }
474 return 0;
475 }
d0595f17 476
a4352630 477/* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
2ea80354
DSH		 478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
479 * an EC tmp key.
d0595f17 480 */
a4352630
DSH		 481
482int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
d0595f17
DSH		 483 {
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
486 int k;
a4352630
DSH		 487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
488 if (s->server == 0)
489 return -1;
2ea80354
DSH		 490 if (nmatch == -2)
491 {
492 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
493 {
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
496 * checks.
497 */
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
504 return NID_undef;
505 }
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
507 nmatch = 0;
508 }
a4352630
DSH		 509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
510 &supp, &supplen);
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
512 &pref, &preflen);
513 preflen /= 2;
514 supplen /= 2;
d0595f17
DSH		 515 k = 0;
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
517 {
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
520 {
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
522 {
b362ccab
DSH		 523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
524 continue;
d0595f17 525 if (nmatch == k)
a4352630
DSH		 526 {
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
529 }
d0595f17
DSH		 530 k++;
531 }
532 }
533 }
d0595f17 534 if (nmatch == -1)
a4352630
DSH		 535 return k;
536 return 0;
d0595f17
DSH		 537 }
538
539int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
541 {
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
543 size_t i;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
546 */
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
549 if (!clist)
550 return 0;
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
552 {
553 unsigned long idmask;
554 int id;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
556 idmask = 1L << id;
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
558 {
559 OPENSSL_free(clist);
560 return 0;
561 }
562 dup_list |= idmask;
563 s2n(id, p);
564 }
565 if (*pext)
566 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
567 *pext = clist;
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
569 return 1;
570 }
571
f6dfbeed 572#define MAX_CURVELIST 28
d0595f17
DSH		 573
574typedef struct
575 {
576 size_t nidcnt;
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
578 } nid_cb_st;
579
580static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
581 {
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
583 size_t i;
584 int nid;
585 char etmp[20];
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
587 return 0;
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
589 return 0;
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
591 etmp[len] = 0;
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
598 return 0;
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
601 return 0;
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
603 return 1;
604 }
605/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
607 const char *str)
608 {
609 nid_cb_st ncb;
610 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
612 return 0;
8bb870df
DSH		 613 if (pext == NULL)
614 return 1;
d0595f17
DSH		 615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
616 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 617/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
619 EC_KEY *ec)
620 {
621 int is_prime, id;
622 const EC_GROUP *grp;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
624 if (!ec)
625 return 0;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
29b490a4 628 if (!grp)
fd2b65ce
DSH		 629 return 0;
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
631 if (!meth)
632 return 0;
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
634 is_prime = 1;
635 else
636 is_prime = 0;
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
641 if (id)
642 {
643 curve_id[0] = 0;
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
645 }
646 else
647 {
648 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
649 if (is_prime)
650 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
651 else
652 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
653 }
654 if (comp_id)
655 {
29b490a4
PS		 656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
657 return 0;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
659 {
660 if (is_prime)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
662 else
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
664 }
665 else
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
667 }
668 return 1;
669 }
670/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
673 {
674 const unsigned char *p;
675 size_t plen, i;
a4352630 676 int j;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
679 */
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
681 {
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
685 {
686 if (*comp_id == *p)
687 break;
688 }
689 if (i == plen)
690 return 0;
691 }
2ea80354
DSH		 692 if (!curve_id)
693 return 1;
a4352630
DSH		 694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
fd2b65ce 696 {
a4352630 697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
fd2b65ce
DSH		 698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
699 {
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
a4352630 701 break;
fd2b65ce 702 }
a4352630
DSH		 703 if (i == plen)
704 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
706 if (!s->server)
b362ccab 707 break;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 708 }
709 return 1;
710 }
d61ff83b 711
5087afa1
DSH		 712static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
713 size_t *pformatslen)
714 {
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
716 * use default */
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
718 {
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
721 }
722 else
723 {
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
726 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
728 else
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
730 }
731 }
732
d61ff83b
DSH		 733/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
735 */
2ea80354 736static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
fd2b65ce 737 {
fd2b65ce 738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
d61ff83b
DSH		 739 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
740 int rv;
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
fd2b65ce
DSH		 742 if (!pkey)
743 return 0;
d61ff83b
DSH		 744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
746 {
747 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
748 return 1;
749 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
751 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
752 if (!rv)
753 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
756 */
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
758 if (!rv)
759 return 0;
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
762 */
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
764 {
765 int check_md;
766 size_t i;
767 CERT *c = s->cert;
768 if (curve_id[0])
769 return 0;
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
775 else
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
779 break;
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
781 return 0;
782 if (set_ee_md == 2)
783 {
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
786 else
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
788 }
789 }
790 return rv;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 791 }
792/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
2ea80354 793int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
fd2b65ce
DSH		 794 {
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
ed83ba53
DSH		 797#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
ddd13d67 799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 800 return 1;
801#endif
2ea80354
DSH		 802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
804 */
805 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
806 {
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
812 else
813 return 0;
814 curve_id[0] = 0;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
817 return 0;
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
820 return 1;
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
822 else
823 {
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
825 if (!ec)
826 return 0;
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
828 return 0;
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
830 return 1;
831 return 0;
832 }
833
834 }
a4352630
DSH		 835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
836 {
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
839 return 1;
840 else return 0;
841 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 842 if (!ec)
843 {
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
845 return 1;
846 else
847 return 0;
848 }
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
1e4cb467 850 return 0;
d18b716d
DSH		 851/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
852#if 0
853 return 1;
854#else
fd2b65ce 855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
d18b716d 856#endif
fd2b65ce 857 }
d0595f17 858
14536c8c
DSH		 859#else
860
861static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
862 {
863 return 1;
864 }
865
525de5d3 866#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
f1fd4544 867
ed3883d2 868#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
fc101f88
DSH		 869
870/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
872 */
873
874#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
876#else
877#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
878#endif
879
880#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
882#else
883#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
884#endif
885
886#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
888#else
654ac273 889#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
fc101f88
DSH		 890#endif
891
892#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
896
897static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
901#endif
902#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
905#endif
906#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
908#endif
fc101f88 909};
14536c8c 910#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2ea80354
DSH		 911static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
914};
14536c8c 915#endif
b7bfe69b 916size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
f37f20ff 917 {
2ea80354
DSH		 918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
919 * preferences.
920 */
14536c8c 921#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2ea80354
DSH		 922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
923 {
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
927
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
930 return 2;
931
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
934 return 2;
935 }
14536c8c 936#endif
3dbc46df
DSH		 937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
939 {
b7bfe69b
DSH		 940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df
DSH		 942 }
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
944 {
b7bfe69b
DSH		 945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df 947 }
4453cd8c 948 else
0f229cce 949 {
b7bfe69b 950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
45473632 951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
4453cd8c 952 }
b7bfe69b 953 }
ec4a50b3
DSH		 954/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
956 */
957int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
959 {
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
964 if (sigalg == -1)
965 return -1;
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
968 {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
970 return 0;
971 }
14536c8c 972#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2ea80354
DSH		 973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
974 {
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
978 return 0;
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
ed83ba53
DSH		 980 {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2ea80354 982 return 0;
ed83ba53 983 }
2ea80354
DSH		 984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
985 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
986 {
987 if (curve_id[0])
988 return 0;
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
990 {
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
992 {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
995 return 0;
996 }
997 }
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
999 {
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1001 {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1004 return 0;
1005 }
1006 }
1007 else
1008 return 0;
1009 }
1010 }
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1012 return 0;
14536c8c 1013#endif
2ea80354 1014
ec4a50b3
DSH		 1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1018 {
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1020 break;
1021 }
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
2ea80354 1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
ec4a50b3
DSH		 1024 {
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1026 return 0;
1027 }
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1029 if (*pmd == NULL)
1030 {
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1032 return 0;
1033 }
b362ccab
DSH		 1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1037 (void *)sig))
1038 {
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1040 return 0;
1041 }
319354eb
DSH		 1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1043 * wish.
1044 */
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
ec4a50b3
DSH		 1047 return 1;
1048 }
b362ccab 1049
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1050/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1054 *
1055 */
1056void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1057 {
1058 CERT *c = s->cert;
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1059 c->mask_a = 0;
1060 c->mask_k = 0;
4221c0dd 1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1e2d4cb0 1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1064 else
1065 c->mask_ssl = 0;
b362ccab
DSH		 1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1068 * signature algorithms.
1069 */
b362ccab 1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
b7bfe69b 1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
b362ccab 1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
b7bfe69b 1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
b362ccab 1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
b7bfe69b 1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1076#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1078 {
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 }
1082#endif
1083#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1086 {
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1089 }
1090#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 c->valid = 1;
f37f20ff 1092 }
fc101f88 1093
b362ccab 1094int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
8b8e5bed
DSH		 1095 {
1096 CERT *ct = s->cert;
1097 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1098 return 1;
b362ccab
DSH		 1099 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1100 }
1101
1102static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1103 {
1104 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1105 return 0;
1106 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
8b8e5bed
DSH		 1107 }
1108
ac20719d 1109unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
f1fd4544 1110 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1111 int extdatalen=0;
1112 unsigned char *ret = p;
d0595f17
DSH		 1113#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1114 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1115 int using_ecc = 0;
874a18cf 1116 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
d0595f17
DSH		 1117 {
1118 int i;
1119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1121
1122 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1123 {
1124 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1125
1126 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1127 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
4082fea8 1128 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
d0595f17
DSH		 1129 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1130 {
1131 using_ecc = 1;
1132 break;
1133 }
1134 }
1135 }
1136#endif
ed3883d2 1137
13f6d57b
DSH		 1138 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1139 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1140 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
5f8f94a6
DSH		 1141 return p;
1142
ed3883d2
BM		 1143 ret+=2;
1144
1145 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
6434abbf 1146
a70183bc 1147 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
f1fd4544 1148 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1149 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1150 unsigned long size_str;
1151 long lenmax;
1152
a70183bc 1153 /* check for enough space.
52b8dad8
BM		 1154 4 for the servername type and entension length
1155 2 for servernamelist length
1156 1 for the hostname type
1157 2 for hostname length
1158 + hostname length
a70183bc 1159 */
52b8dad8 1160
761772d7
BM		 1161 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1162 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
a70183bc
BM		 1163 return NULL;
1164
1165 /* extension type and length */
1166 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1167 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
f1fd4544 1168
a70183bc 1169 /* length of servername list */
ed3883d2 1170 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
a70183bc
BM		 1171
1172 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
f1fd4544 1173 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
ed3883d2 1174 s2n(size_str,ret);
ed3883d2
BM		 1175 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1176 ret+=size_str;
f1fd4544 1177 }
761772d7 1178
423c66f1 1179 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
bdd53508 1180 if (s->renegotiate)
423c66f1 1181 {
860c3dd1
DSH		 1182 int el;
1183
1184 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1185 {
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 return NULL;
1188 }
1189
1190 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1191
1192 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1193 s2n(el,ret);
1194
1195 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1196 {
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 return NULL;
1199 }
1200
1201 ret += el;
1202 }
1203
edc032b5 1204#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1df80b65 1205 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
edc032b5 1206 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1df80b65 1207 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
edc032b5 1208
1df80b65
DSH		 1209 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1210 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
edc032b5
BL		 1211 {
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1213 return NULL;
1df80b65
DSH		 1214 }
1215
1216 /* check for enough space.
1217 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1218 1 for the srp user identity
1219 + srp user identity length
1220 */
1221 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1222
1223 /* fill in the extension */
edc032b5
BL		 1224 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1225 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1df80b65
DSH		 1226 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1227 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
edc032b5
BL		 1228 ret+=login_len;
1229 }
1230#endif
1231
36ca4ba6 1232#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d0595f17 1233 if (using_ecc)
36ca4ba6
BM		 1234 {
1235 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1236 long lenmax;
d0595f17
DSH		 1237 const unsigned char *plist;
1238 size_t plistlen;
b362ccab
DSH		 1239 size_t i;
1240 unsigned char *etmp;
5087afa1
DSH		 1241
1242 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
36ca4ba6 1243
761772d7 1244 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
d0595f17
DSH		 1245 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1246 if (plistlen > 255)
019fdc78
BM		 1247 {
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1249 return NULL;
1250 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 1251
1252 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
d0595f17
DSH		 1253 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1254 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1255 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1256 ret+=plistlen;
1257
33273721 1258 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
d0595f17 1259 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
fd2b65ce 1260 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
33273721 1261
761772d7 1262 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
d0595f17
DSH		 1263 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1264 if (plistlen > 65532)
33273721
BM		 1265 {
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1267 return NULL;
1268 }
b362ccab 1269
33273721
BM		 1270
1271 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
b362ccab
DSH		 1272 etmp = ret + 4;
1273 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1274 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1275 {
1276 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1277 {
1278 *etmp++ = plist[0];
1279 *etmp++ = plist[1];
1280 }
1281 }
1282
1283 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
a4974de9
BM		 1284
1285 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1286 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1287 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1288 * resolves this to two bytes.
1289 */
b362ccab 1290 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
d0595f17 1291 s2n(plistlen, ret);
d0595f17 1292 ret+=plistlen;
33273721 1293 }
36ca4ba6 1294#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
d3442bc7 1295
b362ccab 1296 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
6434abbf
DSH		 1297 {
1298 int ticklen;
7ba3838a 1299 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
6434abbf 1300 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
12bf56c0
DSH		 1301 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1302 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1303 {
1304 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1305 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1306 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1307 return NULL;
1308 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1309 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1310 ticklen);
1311 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1312 }
6434abbf
DSH		 1313 else
1314 ticklen = 0;
12bf56c0
DSH		 1315 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1316 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1317 goto skip_ext;
6434abbf
DSH		 1318 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1319 * rest for ticket
1320 */
761772d7 1321 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
6434abbf
DSH		 1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1323 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1324 if (ticklen)
1325 {
1326 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1327 ret += ticklen;
1328 }
1329 }
12bf56c0 1330 skip_ext:
6434abbf 1331
cbd64894 1332 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
a2f9200f 1333 {
0f229cce 1334 size_t salglen;
b7bfe69b 1335 const unsigned char *salg;
b362ccab 1336 unsigned char *etmp;
b7bfe69b 1337 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
0f229cce 1338 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
a2f9200f
DSH		 1339 return NULL;
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
b362ccab
DSH		 1341 etmp = ret;
1342 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1343 ret += 4;
1344 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, etmp, salg, salglen);
1345 /* Fill in lengths */
1346 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1347 s2n(salglen, etmp);
0f229cce 1348 ret += salglen;
a2f9200f
DSH		 1349 }
1350
761772d7 1351#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 1352 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
761772d7
BM		 1353 {
1354 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1355
1356 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1357 return NULL;
1358 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1359 return NULL;
1360
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1362 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1363 s2n(col, ret);
1364 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1365 ret += col;
1366 }
1367#endif
1368
874a18cf 1369 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 1370 {
1371 int i;
1372 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1373 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1374
1375 idlen = 0;
1376 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1377 {
1378 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1379 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1380 if (itmp <= 0)
1381 return NULL;
1382 idlen += itmp + 2;
1383 }
1384
1385 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1386 {
1387 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1388 if (extlen < 0)
1389 return NULL;
1390 }
1391 else
1392 extlen = 0;
1393
1394 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1395 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1396 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1397 return NULL;
1398 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1399 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1400 s2n(idlen, ret);
1401 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1402 {
1403 /* save position of id len */
1404 unsigned char *q = ret;
1405 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1406 /* skip over id len */
1407 ret += 2;
1408 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1409 /* write id len */
1410 s2n(itmp, q);
1411 }
1412 s2n(extlen, ret);
1413 if (extlen > 0)
1414 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1415 }
1416
4817504d
DSH		 1417#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1418 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1420 s2n(1,ret);
1421 /* Set mode:
1422 * 1: peer may send requests
1423 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1424 */
1425 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1426 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1427 else
1428 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1429#endif
1430
bf48836c 1431#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 1432 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1433 {
1434 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1435 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1436 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1437 return NULL;
1438 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1439 s2n(0,ret);
1440 }
1441#endif
1442
6f017a8f
AL		 1443 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1444 {
1445 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1446 return NULL;
1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1448 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1449 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1450 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1451 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1452 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1453 }
1454
333f926d
BL		 1455 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1456 {
1457 int el;
1458
1459 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1460
1461 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1462
1463 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1464 s2n(el,ret);
1465
1466 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1467 {
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1469 return NULL;
1470 }
1471 ret += el;
1472 }
1473
a398f821
T		 1474 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1475 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1476 {
1477 size_t i;
1478 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1479
1480 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1481 {
1482 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1483 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1484
1485 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
9cd50f73
T		 1486 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1487 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1488 if (record->fn1)
1489 {
1490 int cb_retval = 0;
1491 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
0a602875
BL		 1492 &out, &outlen, al,
1493 record->arg);
9cd50f73
T		 1494 if (cb_retval == 0)
1495 return NULL; /* error */
1496 if (cb_retval == -1)
1497 continue; /* skip this extension */
1498 }
a398f821
T		 1499 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1500 return NULL;
1501 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1502 s2n(outlen, ret);
1503 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1504 ret += outlen;
1505 }
1506 }
5e3ff62c
DSH		 1507#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1508 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1509 s2n(0,ret);
1510#endif
4fcdd66f
DSH		 1511#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1512 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1513 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
1514 *
1515 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1516 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
0467ea68 1517 */
4fcdd66f
DSH		 1518 {
1519 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1520 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1521 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1522 * not. */
1523 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1524 hlen -= 5;
0467ea68
DSH		 1525 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1526 {
1527 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
4fcdd66f
DSH		 1528 if (hlen >= 4)
1529 hlen -= 4;
1530 else
1531 hlen = 0;
1532
1533 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1534 s2n(hlen, ret);
0467ea68
DSH		 1535 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1536 ret += hlen;
1537 }
1538 }
1539#endif
a398f821 1540
a9e1c50b 1541 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
ed3883d2
BM		 1542 return p;
1543
1544 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1545 return ret;
52b8dad8 1546 }
ed3883d2 1547
ac20719d 1548unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
f1fd4544 1549 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1550 int extdatalen=0;
1551 unsigned char *ret = p;
e9add063
SD		 1552 size_t i;
1553 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
bf48836c
BL		 1554#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1555 int next_proto_neg_seen;
ee2ffc27 1556#endif
14536c8c 1557#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
5087afa1
DSH		 1558 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1559 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
4082fea8 1560 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
5087afa1 1561 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
14536c8c 1562#endif
13f6d57b
DSH		 1563 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1564 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
5f8f94a6
DSH		 1565 return p;
1566
a13c20f6 1567 ret+=2;
ed3883d2
BM		 1568 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1569
a13c20f6 1570 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
f1fd4544 1571 {
761772d7 1572 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
ed3883d2
BM		 1573
1574 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1575 s2n(0,ret);
f1fd4544 1576 }
860c3dd1 1577
8025e251 1578 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
860c3dd1
DSH		 1579 {
1580 int el;
1581
1582 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1583 {
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1585 return NULL;
1586 }
1587
1588 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1589
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1591 s2n(el,ret);
1592
1593 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1594 {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 return NULL;
1597 }
1598
1599 ret += el;
1600 }
1601
36ca4ba6 1602#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874a18cf 1603 if (using_ecc)
36ca4ba6 1604 {
5087afa1
DSH		 1605 const unsigned char *plist;
1606 size_t plistlen;
36ca4ba6
BM		 1607 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1608 long lenmax;
1609
5087afa1
DSH		 1610 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1611
761772d7 1612 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
5087afa1
DSH		 1613 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1614 if (plistlen > 255)
019fdc78
BM		 1615 {
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1617 return NULL;
1618 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 1619
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
5087afa1
DSH		 1621 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1622 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1623 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1624 ret+=plistlen;
a70183bc 1625
36ca4ba6 1626 }
33273721 1627 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
36ca4ba6 1628#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
67c8e7f4 1629
b362ccab 1630 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
6434abbf 1631 {
761772d7 1632 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
6434abbf
DSH		 1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1634 s2n(0,ret);
1635 }
761772d7 1636
67c8e7f4
DSH		 1637 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1638 {
1639 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1640 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1641 s2n(0,ret);
1642 }
1643
761772d7 1644#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 1645 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
761772d7
BM		 1646 {
1647 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
6434abbf 1648
761772d7
BM		 1649 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1650 return NULL;
1651 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1652 return NULL;
1653
1654 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1655 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1656 s2n(sol, ret);
1657 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1658 ret += sol;
1659 }
1660#endif
333f926d
BL		 1661
1662 if(s->srtp_profile)
1663 {
1664 int el;
1665
1666 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1667
1668 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1669
1670 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1671 s2n(el,ret);
1672
1673 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1674 {
7a236261 1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
333f926d
BL		 1676 return NULL;
1677 }
1678 ret+=el;
1679 }
1680
0e1dba93
DSH		 1681 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1682 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1683 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1684 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1685 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1686 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1687 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1688 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1689 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1690 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1691 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1692 ret+=36;
1693
1694 }
761772d7 1695
4817504d 1696#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
5733919d
DSH		 1697 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1698 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1699 {
1700 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1701 s2n(1,ret);
1702 /* Set mode:
1703 * 1: peer may send requests
1704 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1705 */
1706 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1707 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1708 else
1709 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
192540b5 1710
5733919d 1711 }
4817504d
DSH		 1712#endif
1713
bf48836c 1714#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 1715 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1716 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1717 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1718 {
1719 const unsigned char *npa;
1720 unsigned int npalen;
1721 int r;
1722
1723 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1724 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1725 {
1726 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1727 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1728 s2n(npalen,ret);
1729 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1730 ret += npalen;
1731 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1732 }
1733 }
1734#endif
1735
e9add063 1736 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
a398f821 1737 {
e9add063
SD		 1738 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1739 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1740 int cb_retval = 0;
1741
0a602875
BL		 1742 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1743
e9add063
SD		 1744 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1745 if (!record->fn2)
9dabfce1 1746 continue;
e9add063
SD		 1747 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1748 &out, &outlen, al,
1749 record->arg);
1750 if (cb_retval == 0)
1751 return NULL; /* error */
1752 if (cb_retval == -1)
9dabfce1 1753 continue; /* skip this extension */
e9add063
SD		 1754 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1755 return NULL;
1756 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1757 s2n(outlen, ret);
1758 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1759 ret += outlen;
a398f821 1760 }
5e3ff62c
DSH		 1761#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1762 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1763 {
1764 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1765 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1766 */
1767 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1768 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1769 else
1770 {
1771 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1772 s2n(0,ret);
1773 }
1774 }
1775#endif
a398f821 1776
6f017a8f
AL		 1777 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1778 {
1779 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1780 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1781
1782 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1783 return NULL;
1784 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1785 s2n(3 + len,ret);
1786 s2n(1 + len,ret);
1787 *ret++ = len;
1788 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1789 ret += len;
1790 }
1791
ed3883d2
BM		 1792 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1793 return p;
1794
1795 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1796 return ret;
52b8dad8 1797 }
ed3883d2 1798
6f017a8f
AL		 1799/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1800 * ClientHello.
1801 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1802 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1803 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1804 * return.
1805 *
1806 * returns: 0 on success. */
1807static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1808 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1809 {
1810 unsigned i;
1811 unsigned proto_len;
1812 const unsigned char *selected;
1813 unsigned char selected_len;
1814 int r;
1815
1816 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1817 return 0;
1818
1819 if (data_len < 2)
1820 goto parse_error;
1821
1822 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1823 * length-prefixed strings. */
1824 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1825 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1826 data_len -= 2;
1827 data += 2;
1828 if (data_len != i)
1829 goto parse_error;
1830
1831 if (data_len < 2)
1832 goto parse_error;
1833
1834 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1835 {
1836 proto_len = data[i];
1837 i++;
1838
1839 if (proto_len == 0)
1840 goto parse_error;
1841
1842 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1843 goto parse_error;
1844
1845 i += proto_len;
1846 }
1847
1848 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1849 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1850 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1851 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1852 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1853 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1854 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1855 {
1856 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1857 return -1;
1858 }
1859 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1860 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1861 }
1862 return 0;
1863
1864parse_error:
1865 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1866 return -1;
1867 }
1868
dece3209
RS		 1869#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1870/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1871 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1872 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1873 * SNI,
1874 * elliptic_curves
1875 * ec_point_formats
1876 *
1877 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1878 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1879 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1880 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1881 */
1882static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1883 unsigned short type, size;
1884 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1885 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1886 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1887 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1888 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1889 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1890 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1891
1892 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1893 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1894 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1895 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1896 };
1897
1898 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1899 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1900 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1901 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1902 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1903 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1904 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1905 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1906 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1907 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1908 };
1909
1910 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1911 return;
1912 data += 2;
1913
1914 if (data > (d+n-4))
1915 return;
1916 n2s(data,type);
1917 n2s(data,size);
1918
1919 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1920 return;
1921
1922 if (data+size > d+n)
1923 return;
1924 data += size;
1925
378341e1 1926 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
dece3209
RS		 1927 {
1928 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1929 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1930
1931 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1932 return;
1933 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1934 return;
1935 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1936 return;
1937 }
1938 else
1939 {
1940 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1941
1942 if (data + len != d+n)
1943 return;
1944 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1945 return;
1946 }
1947
1948 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1949}
cbf81235 1950#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
dece3209 1951
b2284ed3
DSH		 1952static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1953 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1954 unsigned short type;
1955 unsigned short size;
1956 unsigned short len;
f1fd4544 1957 unsigned char *data = *p;
860c3dd1 1958 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
6dbb6219 1959 size_t i;
860c3dd1 1960
a13c20f6 1961 s->servername_done = 0;
67c8e7f4 1962 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
6f31dd72
BM		 1963#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1964 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1965#endif
ed3883d2 1966
6f017a8f
AL		 1967 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1968 {
1969 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1970 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1971 }
1972
0b2bde70 1973 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
e9add063
SD		 1974 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1975 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
0b2bde70 1976 {
e9add063
SD		 1977 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1978 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1979 }
0b2bde70 1980
4817504d
DSH		 1981#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1982 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1983 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1984#endif
dece3209
RS		 1985
1986#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1987 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1988 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
cbf81235 1989#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
dece3209 1990
4453cd8c
DSH		 1991 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1992 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1993 {
1994 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1995 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1996 }
1997 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1998 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1999 {
2000 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2001 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2002 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 2003 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2004 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2005 {
2006 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2007 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2008 }
4817504d 2009
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2010#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2011 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2012#endif
2013
ed3883d2 2014 if (data >= (d+n-2))
c27c9cb4 2015 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2
BM		 2016 n2s(data,len);
2017
52b8dad8 2018 if (data > (d+n-len))
c27c9cb4 2019 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2 2020
f1fd4544
BM		 2021 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2022 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2023 n2s(data,type);
2024 n2s(data,size);
2025
2026 if (data+size > (d+n))
c27c9cb4 2027 goto ri_check;
8e3b2dbb 2028#if 0
0e1dba93 2029 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
8e3b2dbb 2030#endif
6434abbf
DSH		 2031 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2032 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2033 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
a13c20f6
BM		 2034/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2035
2036 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2037 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2038 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2039 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2040 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2041 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2042 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2043 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2044 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2045 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2046 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2047 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2048 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2049 the value of the Host: field.
2050 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2051 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2052 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2053 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2054
2055*/
2056
f1fd4544
BM		 2057 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2058 {
a70183bc 2059 unsigned char *sdata;
ed3883d2 2060 int servname_type;
a70183bc
BM		 2061 int dsize;
2062
2063 if (size < 2)
2064 {
2065 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 return 0;
2067 }
2068 n2s(data,dsize);
52b8dad8 2069 size -= 2;
a70183bc 2070 if (dsize > size )
f1fd4544 2071 {
a70183bc
BM		 2072 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 return 0;
2074 }
2075
2076 sdata = data;
2077 while (dsize > 3)
2078 {
2079 servname_type = *(sdata++);
ed3883d2 2080 n2s(sdata,len);
a70183bc
BM		 2081 dsize -= 3;
2082
2083 if (len > dsize)
f1fd4544
BM		 2084 {
2085 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2086 return 0;
2087 }
a70183bc 2088 if (s->servername_done == 0)
f1fd4544
BM		 2089 switch (servname_type)
2090 {
2091 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
732d31be 2092 if (!s->hit)
f1fd4544 2093 {
732d31be
DSH		 2094 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2095 {
2096 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 return 0;
2098 }
2099 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
f1fd4544
BM		 2100 {
2101 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2102 return 0;
2103 }
732d31be
DSH		 2104 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2105 {
2106 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2107 return 0;
2108 }
ed3883d2 2109 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
a13c20f6
BM		 2110 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2111 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2112 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
40a70628 2113 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
a13c20f6
BM		 2114 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2115 return 0;
f1fd4544 2116 }
a13c20f6
BM		 2117 s->servername_done = 1;
2118
a13c20f6
BM		 2119 }
2120 else
732d31be
DSH		 2121 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2122 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
6b9e941e 2123 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
a13c20f6 2124
ed3883d2 2125 break;
f1fd4544 2126
ed3883d2
BM		 2127 default:
2128 break;
f1fd4544 2129 }
52b8dad8 2130
a70183bc 2131 dsize -= len;
f1fd4544 2132 }
a70183bc
BM		 2133 if (dsize != 0)
2134 {
2135 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2136 return 0;
2137 }
2138
ed3883d2 2139 }
edc032b5
BL		 2140#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2141 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2142 {
1df80b65
DSH		 2143 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2144 {
2145 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2146 return 0;
2147 }
2148 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
edc032b5 2149 {
1df80b65
DSH		 2150 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2151 return 0;
2152 }
2153 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2154 return -1;
2155 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2156 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2157
2158 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2159 {
2160 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2161 return 0;
edc032b5
BL		 2162 }
2163 }
2164#endif
ed3883d2 2165
36ca4ba6 2166#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874a18cf 2167 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2168 {
2169 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2170 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
36ca4ba6 2171
e83aefb3
DSH		 2172 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2173 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2174 {
2175 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 return 0;
2177 }
732d31be 2178 if (!s->hit)
36ca4ba6 2179 {
732d31be
DSH		 2180 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2181 {
7d5686d3
DSH		 2182 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2183 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
732d31be
DSH		 2184 }
2185 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2186 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2187 {
2188 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2189 return 0;
2190 }
2191 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2192 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
36ca4ba6 2193 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 2194#if 0
2195 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2196 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2197 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2198 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2199 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
33273721
BM		 2200#endif
2201 }
874a18cf 2202 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
33273721
BM		 2203 {
2204 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2205 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2206 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2207
e83aefb3
DSH		 2208 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2209 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
33273721
BM		 2210 {
2211 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2212 return 0;
2213 }
732d31be 2214 if (!s->hit)
33273721 2215 {
732d31be
DSH		 2216 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2217 {
2218 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2219 return 0;
2220 }
2221 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2222 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2223 {
2224 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2225 return 0;
2226 }
2227 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2228 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
33273721 2229 }
33273721
BM		 2230#if 0
2231 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2232 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2233 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2234 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2235 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
36ca4ba6
BM		 2236#endif
2237 }
c6a27f01 2238#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
761772d7 2239#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 2240 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
761772d7
BM		 2241 {
2242 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2243
2244 if (size < 2)
2245 {
2246 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2247 return 0;
2248 }
2249 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2250 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2251 {
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2253 return 0;
2254 }
2255
2256 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2257 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
02c27b11
BM		 2258 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2259 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2260 else
2261 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2262 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2263 {
2264 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2265 return 0;
2266 }
2267 }
2268#endif
12bf56c0
DSH		 2269 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2270 {
2271 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2272 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2273 {
2274 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2275 return 0;
2276 }
2277 }
860c3dd1
DSH		 2278 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2279 {
2280 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2281 return 0;
2282 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2283 }
6b7be581
DSH		 2284 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2285 {
2286 int dsize;
4453cd8c 2287 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
6b7be581
DSH		 2288 {
2289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2290 return 0;
2291 }
6b7be581
DSH		 2292 n2s(data,dsize);
2293 size -= 2;
4453cd8c 2294 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
6b7be581
DSH		 2295 {
2296 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2297 return 0;
2298 }
2299 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2300 {
2301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2302 return 0;
2303 }
4453cd8c
DSH		 2304 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2305 * error.
2306 */
2307 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2308 {
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2310 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2311 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2312 return 0;
2313 }
6b7be581 2314 }
d0b039d4 2315 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2316 {
2317
2318 if (size < 5)
2319 {
2320 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2321 return 0;
2322 }
2323
2324 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2325 size--;
2326 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2327 {
2328 const unsigned char *sdata;
2329 int dsize;
2330 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2331 n2s(data,dsize);
2332 size -= 2;
2333 if (dsize > size )
2334 {
2335 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2336 return 0;
2337 }
2338 while (dsize > 0)
2339 {
2340 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2341 int idsize;
2342 if (dsize < 4)
2343 {
2344 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2345 return 0;
2346 }
2347 n2s(data, idsize);
2348 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
9770924f 2349 size -= 2 + idsize;
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2350 if (dsize < 0)
2351 {
2352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 return 0;
2354 }
2355 sdata = data;
2356 data += idsize;
2357 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2358 &sdata, idsize);
2359 if (!id)
2360 {
2361 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2362 return 0;
2363 }
2364 if (data != sdata)
2365 {
2366 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2367 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2368 return 0;
2369 }
2370 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2371 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2372 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2373 {
2374 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2375 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2376 return 0;
2377 }
2378 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2379 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2380 {
2381 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2382 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2383 return 0;
2384 }
2385 }
2386
2387 /* Read in request_extensions */
9770924f
BM		 2388 if (size < 2)
2389 {
2390 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2391 return 0;
2392 }
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2393 n2s(data,dsize);
2394 size -= 2;
9770924f 2395 if (dsize != size)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2396 {
2397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 return 0;
2399 }
2400 sdata = data;
2401 if (dsize > 0)
2402 {
25536ea6
DSH		 2403 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2404 {
2405 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2406 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2407 }
2408
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2409 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2410 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2411 &sdata, dsize);
2412 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2413 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2414 {
2415 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2416 return 0;
2417 }
2418 }
2419 }
2420 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2421 * so ignore it.
2422 */
2423 else
2424 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2425 }
4817504d
DSH		 2426#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2427 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2428 {
2429 switch(data[0])
2430 {
2431 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2432 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2433 break;
2434 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2435 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2436 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2437 break;
192540b5
DSH		 2438 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2439 return 0;
4817504d
DSH		 2440 }
2441 }
2442#endif
bf48836c 2443#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27 2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
6f017a8f
AL		 2445 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2446 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2447 {
2448 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2449 * renegotiation.
2450 *
2451 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2452 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2453 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2454 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2455 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2456 * anything like that, but this might change).
2457
2458 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2459 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2460 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2461 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2462 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2463 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2464 }
2465#endif
761772d7 2466
6f017a8f
AL		 2467 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2468 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2469 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2470 {
2471 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2472 return 0;
2911575c 2473#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
6f017a8f
AL		 2474 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2475 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2911575c 2476#endif
6f017a8f
AL		 2477 }
2478
6434abbf 2479 /* session ticket processed earlier */
333f926d
BL		 2480 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2481 {
2482 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2483 al))
2484 return 0;
2485 }
a398f821
T		 2486 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2487 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2488 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2489 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2490 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2491 */
2492 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2493 {
2494 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2495
2496 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2497 {
2498 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2499 if (type == record->ext_type)
2500 {
a398f821
T		 2501 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2502 return 0;
a398f821
T		 2503 }
2504 }
2505 }
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2506#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2507 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2508 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2509#endif
a398f821 2510
6434abbf 2511 data+=size;
f1fd4544 2512 }
a9e1c50b 2513
f1fd4544 2514 *p = data;
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2515
2516 ri_check:
2517
2518 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2519
bdd53508 2520 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2521 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2522 {
fbed9f81 2523 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
aa09c2c6 2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2525 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2526 return 0;
2527 }
4453cd8c
DSH		 2528 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2529 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2530 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
c27c9cb4 2531
f1fd4544 2532 return 1;
52b8dad8 2533 }
f1fd4544 2534
b2284ed3
DSH		 2535int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2536 {
2537 int al = -1;
2538 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2539 {
2540 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2541 return 0;
2542 }
2543
2daceb03 2544 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
b2284ed3 2545 {
aa09c2c6 2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
b2284ed3
DSH		 2547 return 0;
2548 }
2549 return 1;
2550}
2551
bf48836c 2552#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 2553/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2554 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2555 * the length of the block. */
71fa4513 2556static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2557 {
2558 unsigned int off = 0;
2559
2560 while (off < len)
2561 {
2562 if (d[off] == 0)
2563 return 0;
2564 off += d[off];
2565 off++;
2566 }
2567
2568 return off == len;
2569 }
2570#endif
2571
09e4e4b9 2572static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
f1fd4544 2573 {
c8bbd98a 2574 unsigned short length;
ed3883d2
BM		 2575 unsigned short type;
2576 unsigned short size;
ed3883d2 2577 unsigned char *data = *p;
ed3883d2 2578 int tlsext_servername = 0;
860c3dd1 2579 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
ed3883d2 2580
6f31dd72
BM		 2581#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2582 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2583#endif
2584
6f017a8f
AL		 2585 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2586 {
2587 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2588 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2589 }
2590
4817504d
DSH		 2591#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2592 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2593 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2594#endif
2595
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2596#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2597 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2598#endif
2599
ed3883d2 2600 if (data >= (d+n-2))
c27c9cb4 2601 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2 2602
c8bbd98a
BL		 2603 n2s(data,length);
2604 if (data+length != d+n)
2605 {
2606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2607 return 0;
2608 }
ed3883d2 2609
f1fd4544
BM		 2610 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2611 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2612 n2s(data,type);
2613 n2s(data,size);
2614
2615 if (data+size > (d+n))
c27c9cb4 2616 goto ri_check;
f1fd4544 2617
6434abbf
DSH		 2618 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2619 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2620 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2621
f1fd4544
BM		 2622 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2623 {
2624 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2625 {
2626 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2627 return 0;
2628 }
ed3883d2 2629 tlsext_servername = 1;
f1fd4544 2630 }
ed3883d2 2631
36ca4ba6 2632#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874a18cf 2633 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2634 {
2635 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2636 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
36ca4ba6
BM		 2637
2638 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2639 {
2640 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2641 return 0;
2642 }
2643 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
b6acb8d0 2644 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
36ca4ba6
BM		 2645 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2646 {
2647 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2648 return 0;
2649 }
2650 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2651 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2652#if 0
2653 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2654 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2655 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2656 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2657 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2658#endif
2659 }
c6a27f01 2660#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
6434abbf
DSH		 2661
2662 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2663 {
12bf56c0
DSH		 2664 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2665 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2666 {
2667 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2668 return 0;
2669 }
b362ccab 2670 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
6434abbf
DSH		 2671 {
2672 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2673 return 0;
2674 }
2675 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2676 }
761772d7 2677#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 2678 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
761772d7
BM		 2679 {
2680 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2681
2682 if (size < 2)
2683 {
2684 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2685 return 0;
2686 }
2687 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2688 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2689 {
2690 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2691 return 0;
2692 }
2693
2694 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2695 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
02c27b11
BM		 2696 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2697 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2698 else
2699 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2700
2701 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2702 {
2703 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2704 return 0;
2705 }
2706 }
2707#endif
874a18cf 2708 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2709 {
2710 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2711 * a status request message.
2712 */
2713 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2714 {
2715 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2716 return 0;
2717 }
2718 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2719 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2720 }
bf48836c 2721#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
6f31dd72
BM		 2722 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2723 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2724 {
2725 unsigned char *selected;
2726 unsigned char selected_len;
2727
2728 /* We must have requested it. */
eef69354 2729 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2730 {
2731 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2732 return 0;
2733 }
2734 /* The data must be valid */
2735 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2736 {
2737 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2738 return 0;
2739 }
2740 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2741 {
2742 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2743 return 0;
2744 }
2745 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2746 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2747 {
2748 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2749 return 0;
2750 }
2751 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2752 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
6f31dd72 2753 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
ee2ffc27
BL		 2754 }
2755#endif
6f017a8f
AL		 2756
2757 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2758 {
2759 unsigned len;
2760
2761 /* We must have requested it. */
2762 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2763 {
2764 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2765 return 0;
2766 }
2767 if (size < 4)
2768 {
2769 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2770 return 0;
2771 }
2772 /* The extension data consists of:
2773 * uint16 list_length
2774 * uint8 proto_length;
2775 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2776 len = data[0];
2777 len <<= 8;
2778 len |= data[1];
2779 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2780 {
2781 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2782 return 0;
2783 }
2784 len = data[2];
2785 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2786 {
2787 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2788 return 0;
2789 }
2790 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2791 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2792 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2793 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2794 {
2795 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2796 return 0;
2797 }
2798 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2799 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2800 }
2801
860c3dd1
DSH		 2802 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2803 {
2804 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2805 return 0;
2806 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2807 }
4817504d
DSH		 2808#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2809 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2810 {
2811 switch(data[0])
2812 {
2813 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2814 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2815 break;
2816 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2817 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2818 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2819 break;
192540b5
DSH		 2820 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2821 return 0;
4817504d
DSH		 2822 }
2823 }
2824#endif
333f926d
BL		 2825 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2826 {
2827 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2828 al))
2829 return 0;
2830 }
a398f821
T		 2831 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2832 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2833 * callback */
2834 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2835 {
2836 size_t i;
2837 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2838
2839 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2840 {
2841 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2842 if (record->ext_type == type)
2843 {
2844 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2845 return 0;
2846 break;
2847 }
2848 }
2849 }
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2850#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2851 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2852 {
2853 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2854 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2855 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2856 }
2857#endif
a9e1c50b
BL		 2858
2859 data += size;
f1fd4544 2860 }
ed3883d2
BM		 2861
2862 if (data != d+n)
f1fd4544
BM		 2863 {
2864 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2865 return 0;
2866 }
ed3883d2 2867
f1fd4544
BM		 2868 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2869 {
2870 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2871 {
2872 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2873 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2874 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2875 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
f1fd4544
BM		 2876 {
2877 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2878 return 0;
2879 }
2880 }
2881 else
2882 {
2883 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2884 return 0;
2885 }
ed3883d2 2886 }
f1fd4544 2887 }
ed3883d2 2888
f1fd4544 2889 *p = data;
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2890
2891 ri_check:
2892
2893 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2894 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2895 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2896 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2897 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2898 * absence on initial connect only.
2899 */
c2c49969
DSH		 2900 if (!renegotiate_seen
2901 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
ef51b4b9 2902 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
c27c9cb4 2903 {
fbed9f81 2904 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
09e4e4b9 2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2906 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2907 return 0;
2908 }
2909
f1fd4544 2910 return 1;
52b8dad8 2911 }
ed3883d2 2912
b2172f4f 2913
36ca4ba6
BM		 2914int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2915 {
761772d7
BM		 2916
2917#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2918 {
2919 int r = 1;
2920
2921 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2922 {
2923 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2924 if (!r)
2925 return -1;
2926 }
2927
2928 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2929 {
2930 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2931 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2932
02c27b11
BM		 2933 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2934 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2935 else
2936 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2937 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2938 {
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2940 return -1;
2941 }
2942 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2943 }
2944
2945 if (r == 2)
2946 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2947 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2948 }
2949#endif
2950
36ca4ba6 2951 return 1;
52b8dad8 2952 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 2953
2954int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2955 {
36ca4ba6 2956 return 1;
52b8dad8 2957 }
36ca4ba6 2958
2daceb03 2959static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
f1fd4544 2960 {
241520e6 2961 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
36ca4ba6
BM		 2962 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2963
2964#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
33273721
BM		 2965 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2966 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2967 */
2968 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2969 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
36ca4ba6
BM		 2970 */
2971#endif
2972
2973 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2974 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2975 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2976 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2977
761772d7
BM		 2978#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2979 {
2980 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2981 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2daceb03
BL		 2982 * so this has to happen here in
2983 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
761772d7
BM		 2984
2985 int r = 1;
2986
2987 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2988 {
2989 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2990 if (!r)
2991 {
2992 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2993 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2994 goto err;
2995 }
2996 }
2997
2998 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2999 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3000 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3001
3002 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3003 {
3004 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3005 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3006 {
3007 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3008 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3009
02c27b11
BM		 3010 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3011 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3012 else
3013 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 3014 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3015 {
3016 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3017 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3018 goto err;
3019 }
3020 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3021 }
3022 }
3023
3024 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3025 {
3026 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3027 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3028 * abort the handshake.
3029 */
3030 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3031 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3032 }
3033 }
761772d7
BM		 3034
3035 err:
2daceb03 3036#endif
52b8dad8
BM		 3037 switch (ret)
3038 {
36ca4ba6
BM		 3039 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3040 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3041 return -1;
3042
3043 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3044 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3045 return 1;
3046
3047 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3048 s->servername_done=0;
3049 default:
3050 return 1;
52b8dad8 3051 }
36ca4ba6 3052 }
f1fd4544 3053
2daceb03
BL		 3054int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3055 {
3056 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3057 int al;
3058
3059 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3060 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3061 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3062 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3063 */
3064 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3065 {
3066 int r;
e5db9c3b
DSH		 3067 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3068 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3069 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3070 if (certpkey == NULL)
3071 {
3072 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3073 return 1;
3074 }
3075 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3076 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3077 */
3078 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2daceb03
BL		 3079 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3080 switch (r)
3081 {
3082 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3083 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3084 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3085 break;
3086 /* status request response should be sent */
3087 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3088 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3089 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3090 else
3091 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3092 break;
3093 /* something bad happened */
3094 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3095 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3096 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3097 goto err;
3098 }
3099 }
3100 else
3101 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3102
3103 err:
3104 switch (ret)
3105 {
3106 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3107 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3108 return -1;
3109
3110 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3111 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3112 return 1;
3113
3114 default:
3115 return 1;
3116 }
3117 }
3118
36ca4ba6
BM		 3119int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3120 {
3121 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
58ece833 3122 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
241520e6 3123
36ca4ba6 3124#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d0205686
DSH		 3125 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3126 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3127 * it must contain uncompressed.
36ca4ba6 3128 */
52b8dad8
BM		 3129 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3130 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
36ca4ba6 3131 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
d0205686 3132 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
4082fea8 3133 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
36ca4ba6
BM		 3134 {
3135 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
90bdfd97 3136 size_t i;
36ca4ba6
BM		 3137 unsigned char *list;
3138 int found_uncompressed = 0;
b9865f11 3139 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
36ca4ba6
BM		 3140 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3141 {
3142 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3143 {
3144 found_uncompressed = 1;
3145 break;
3146 }
3147 }
3148 if (!found_uncompressed)
3149 {
a291745e 3150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
36ca4ba6
BM		 3151 return -1;
3152 }
3153 }
3154 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3155#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3156
241520e6 3157 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
58ece833 3158 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
241520e6 3159 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
58ece833 3160 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
241520e6 3161
761772d7
BM		 3162#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3163 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3164 {
3165 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3166 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3167
3168 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3169 {
3170 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3171 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3172 }
3173
3174 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3175 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3176 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3177 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3178 {
3179 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3180 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3181 }
3182 }
3183#endif
3184
04e2ab2c
DSH		 3185 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3186 * tell the callback
3187 */
3188 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
121f9e74 3189 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
04e2ab2c
DSH		 3190 {
3191 int r;
3192 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3193 * there is no response.
3194 */
3195 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3196 {
3197 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3198 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3199 }
3200 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3201 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3202 if (r == 0)
3203 {
3204 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3205 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3206 }
3207 if (r < 0)
3208 {
3209 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3210 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3211 }
3212 }
3213
52b8dad8
BM		 3214 switch (ret)
3215 {
58ece833
BM		 3216 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3217 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3218 return -1;
3219
3220 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3221 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3222 return 1;
3223
3224 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3225 s->servername_done=0;
3226 default:
3227 return 1;
52b8dad8 3228 }
f1fd4544 3229 }
33273721 3230
09e4e4b9
DSH		 3231int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3232 {
3233 int al = -1;
3234 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3235 return 1;
3236 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3237 {
3238 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3239 return 0;
3240 }
3241
3242 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3243 {
3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3245 return 0;
3246 }
3247 return 1;
3248}
3249
c519e89f
BM		 3250/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3251 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3252 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3253 *
3254 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3255 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3256 * extension, if any.
3257 * len: the length of the session ID.
3258 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3259 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3260 * point to the resulting session.
3261 *
3262 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3263 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3264 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3265 *
3266 * Returns:
3267 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3268 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3269 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3270 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3271 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3272 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3273 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3274 *
3275 * Side effects:
3276 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3277 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3278 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3279 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3280 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3281 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
6434abbf 3282 */
6434abbf 3283int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
c519e89f 3284 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
6434abbf
DSH		 3285 {
3286 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3287 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3288 unsigned short i;
e8da6a1d 3289
c519e89f
BM		 3290 *ret = NULL;
3291 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3292
e8da6a1d 3293 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
c519e89f
BM		 3294 * to permit stateful resumption.
3295 */
b362ccab 3296 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
c519e89f 3297 return 0;
6434abbf 3298 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
c519e89f 3299 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3300 if (p >= limit)
3301 return -1;
07a9d1a2 3302 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
cbd64894 3303 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
07a9d1a2
DSH		 3304 {
3305 i = *(p++);
3306 p+= i;
3307 if (p >= limit)
3308 return -1;
3309 }
6434abbf
DSH		 3310 /* Skip past cipher list */
3311 n2s(p, i);
3312 p+= i;
3313 if (p >= limit)
3314 return -1;
3315 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3316 i = *(p++);
3317 p += i;
3318 if (p > limit)
3319 return -1;
3320 /* Now at start of extensions */
3321 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
c519e89f 3322 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3323 n2s(p, i);
3324 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3325 {
3326 unsigned short type, size;
3327 n2s(p, type);
3328 n2s(p, size);
3329 if (p + size > limit)
c519e89f 3330 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3331 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3332 {
c519e89f 3333 int r;
6434abbf
DSH		 3334 if (size == 0)
3335 {
c519e89f
BM		 3336 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3337 * currently have one. */
6434abbf 3338 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
c519e89f 3339 return 1;
6434abbf 3340 }
12bf56c0
DSH		 3341 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3342 {
c519e89f
BM		 3343 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3344 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3345 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3346 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3347 * calculate the master secret later. */
3348 return 2;
3349 }
3350 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3351 switch (r)
3352 {
3353 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3354 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3355 return 2;
3356 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3357 return r;
3358 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3359 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3360 return 3;
3361 default: /* fatal error */
3362 return -1;
12bf56c0 3363 }
6434abbf
DSH		 3364 }
3365 p += size;
3366 }
c519e89f 3367 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3368 }
3369
c519e89f
BM		 3370/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3371 *
3372 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3373 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3374 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3375 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3376 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3377 * point to the resulting session.
3378 *
3379 * Returns:
3380 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3381 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3382 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3383 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3384 */
6434abbf
DSH		 3385static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3386 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3387 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3388 {
3389 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3390 unsigned char *sdec;
3391 const unsigned char *p;
8a2062fe 3392 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3393 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3394 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3395 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
661dc143 3396 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3397 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3398 if (eticklen < 48)
c519e89f 3399 return 2;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3400 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3401 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3402 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
661dc143 3403 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
8a2062fe
DSH		 3404 {
3405 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
661dc143 3406 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
8a2062fe
DSH		 3407 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3408 if (rv < 0)
3409 return -1;
3410 if (rv == 0)
c519e89f 3411 return 2;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3412 if (rv == 2)
3413 renew_ticket = 1;
3414 }
3415 else
3416 {
3417 /* Check key name matches */
661dc143 3418 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
c519e89f 3419 return 2;
661dc143 3420 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
8a2062fe
DSH		 3421 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3422 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
661dc143 3423 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
8a2062fe 3424 }
6434abbf 3425 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
c519e89f
BM		 3426 * integrity checks on ticket.
3427 */
8a2062fe 3428 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
0eab41fb
BL		 3429 if (mlen < 0)
3430 {
3431 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3432 return -1;
3433 }
6434abbf 3434 eticklen -= mlen;
6434abbf 3435 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
6434abbf
DSH		 3436 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3437 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3438 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
7c770d57 3439 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
c519e89f 3440 return 2;
6434abbf 3441 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
6434abbf 3442 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
8a2062fe
DSH		 3443 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3444 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
6434abbf
DSH		 3445 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3446 if (!sdec)
3447 {
3448 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3449 return -1;
3450 }
3451 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3452 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
c519e89f 3453 return 2;
6434abbf
DSH		 3454 slen += mlen;
3455 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3456 p = sdec;
c519e89f 3457
6434abbf
DSH		 3458 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3459 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3460 if (sess)
3461 {
c519e89f
BM		 3462 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3463 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3464 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3465 * as required by standard.
3466 */
6434abbf
DSH		 3467 if (sesslen)
3468 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3469 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3470 *psess = sess;
c519e89f
BM		 3471 if (renew_ticket)
3472 return 4;
3473 else
3474 return 3;
6434abbf 3475 }
c519e89f
BM		 3476 ERR_clear_error();
3477 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3478 * ticket. */
3479 return 2;
6434abbf 3480 }
6434abbf 3481
6b7be581
DSH		 3482/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3483
3484typedef struct
3485 {
3486 int nid;
3487 int id;
3488 } tls12_lookup;
3489
3490static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
6b7be581 3491 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
6b7be581 3492 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
6b7be581
DSH		 3493 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3494 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
6b7be581
DSH		 3495 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3496 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
6b7be581
DSH		 3497};
3498
3499static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
6b7be581 3500 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
6b7be581 3501 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
6b7be581 3502 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
6b7be581
DSH		 3503};
3504
3505static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3506 {
3507 size_t i;
3508 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3509 {
3510 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3511 return table[i].id;
3512 }
3513 return -1;
3514 }
e7f8ff43 3515
6b7be581
DSH		 3516static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3517 {
3518 size_t i;
3519 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3520 {
e7f8ff43 3521 if ((table[i].id) == id)
6b7be581
DSH		 3522 return table[i].nid;
3523 }
e7f8ff43 3524 return NID_undef;
6b7be581 3525 }
a2f9200f
DSH		 3526
3527int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
6b7be581
DSH		 3528 {
3529 int sig_id, md_id;
1db5f356
DSH		 3530 if (!md)
3531 return 0;
6b7be581
DSH		 3532 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3533 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3534 if (md_id == -1)
3535 return 0;
a2f9200f 3536 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
6b7be581
DSH		 3537 if (sig_id == -1)
3538 return 0;
3539 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3540 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3541 return 1;
3542 }
3543
a2f9200f
DSH		 3544int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3545 {
3546 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3547 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3548 }
3549
b362ccab 3550typedef struct
a2f9200f 3551 {
b362ccab
DSH		 3552 int nid;
3553 int secbits;
3554 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3555 } tls12_hash_info;
3556
3557static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3558#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3559 {NID_md5, 64, 0},
3560#else
3561 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
ebc5e72f 3562#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 3563#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3564 {NID_sha1, 80, 0},
3565#else
3566 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
a2f9200f 3567#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 3568#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3569 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3570 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3571#else
3572 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3573 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
a2f9200f 3574#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 3575#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3576 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3577 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3578#else
3579 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3580 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
a2f9200f 3581#endif
b362ccab 3582};
a2f9200f 3583
b362ccab
DSH		 3584static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3585 {
3586 if (hash_alg == 0)
3587 return NULL;
3588 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
a2f9200f 3589 return NULL;
b362ccab
DSH		 3590 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3591 }
a2f9200f 3592
b362ccab
DSH		 3593const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3594 {
3595 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3596#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3597 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3598 return NULL;
3599#endif
3600 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3601 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3602 return NULL;
3603 return inf->mfunc();
a2f9200f
DSH		 3604 }
3605
4453cd8c
DSH		 3606static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3607 {
3608 switch(sig_alg)
3609 {
3610#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3611 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3612 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3613#endif
3614#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3615 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3616 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3617#endif
3618#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3619 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3620 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3621#endif
3622 }
3623 return -1;
3624 }
3625
3626/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3627static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3628 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3629 {
8e2a06bf 3630 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
4453cd8c
DSH		 3631 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3632 return;
3633 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3634 {
3635 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3636 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3637 if (phash_nid)
3638 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3639 }
3640 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3641 {
3642 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3643 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3644 if (psign_nid)
3645 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3646 }
3647 if (psignhash_nid)
3648 {
3649 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3650 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3651 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3652 else
3653 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3654 }
3655 }
b362ccab
DSH		 3656/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3657static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3658 {
3659 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3660 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3661 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3662 return 0;
3663 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3664 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3665 return 0;
3666 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3667 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3668 }
3669
3670/* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3671 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3672 * then RSA is disabled.
3673 */
3674
3675void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3676 {
3677 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3678 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3679 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3680 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3681 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3682 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3683 * if we have to.
3684 */
3685 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3686 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3687 {
3688 switch(sigalgs[1])
3689 {
3690#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3691 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3692 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3693 have_rsa = 1;
3694 break;
3695#endif
3696#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3697 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3698 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3699 have_dsa = 1;
3700 break;
3701#endif
3702#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3703 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3704 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3705 have_ecdsa = 1;
3706 break;
3707#endif
3708 }
3709 }
3710 if (!have_rsa)
3711 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3712 if (!have_dsa)
3713 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3714 if (!have_ecdsa)
3715 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3716 }
3717
3718size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3719 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3720 {
3721 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3722 size_t i;
3723 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3724 {
3725 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3726 {
3727 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3728 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3729 }
3730 }
3731 return tmpout - out;
3732 }
3733
4453cd8c 3734/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
b362ccab 3735static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
4453cd8c
DSH		 3736 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3737 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3738 {
3739 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3740 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3741 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3742 {
3743 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
b362ccab 3744 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
4453cd8c
DSH		 3745 continue;
3746 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3747 {
3748 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3749 {
3750 nmatch++;
3751 if (shsig)
3752 {
3753 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3754 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3755 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3756 &shsig->sign_nid,
3757 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3758 ptmp);
3759 shsig++;
3760 }
3761 break;
3762 }
3763 }
3764 }
3765 return nmatch;
3766 }
3767
3768/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3769static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3770 {
3771 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3772 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3773 size_t nmatch;
3774 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3775 CERT *c = s->cert;
2ea80354 3776 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
4563da1d
DSH		 3777 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3778 {
3779 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3780 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3781 }
3dbc46df 3782 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2ea80354 3783 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3dbc46df
DSH		 3784 {
3785 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3786 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3787 }
2ea80354 3788 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3dbc46df
DSH		 3789 {
3790 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
4453cd8c 3791 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df 3792 }
4453cd8c 3793 else
2ea80354
DSH		 3794 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3795 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
4453cd8c
DSH		 3796 {
3797 pref = conf;
3798 preflen = conflen;
3799 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3800 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3801 }
3802 else
3803 {
3804 allow = conf;
3805 allowlen = conflen;
3806 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3807 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3808 }
b362ccab 3809 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
4453cd8c
DSH		 3810 if (!nmatch)
3811 return 1;
3812 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3813 if (!salgs)
3814 return 0;
b362ccab 3815 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
4453cd8c
DSH		 3816 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3817 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3818 return 1;
3819 }
3820
3821
6b7be581
DSH		 3822/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3823
8f829124 3824int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
6b7be581 3825 {
4453cd8c
DSH		 3826 int idx;
3827 size_t i;
6b7be581
DSH		 3828 const EVP_MD *md;
3829 CERT *c = s->cert;
e7f8ff43 3830 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
cbd64894
DSH		 3831 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3832 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
6b7be581 3833 return 1;
8f829124
DSH		 3834 /* Should never happen */
3835 if (!c)
3836 return 0;
6b7be581 3837
4563da1d
DSH		 3838 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3839 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
4453cd8c 3840 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
0f229cce 3841 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
e7f8ff43 3842 return 0;
4453cd8c
DSH		 3843 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3844 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
6b7be581 3845
4453cd8c 3846 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
6b7be581 3847
ed83ba53 3848#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
ddd13d67 3849 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 3850 {
3851 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3852 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3853 */
3854 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3855 if (s->server)
3856 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3857 else
3858 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3859 if (sigs)
3860 {
3861 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3862 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3863 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3864 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3865 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3866 {
3867 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3868 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3869 }
3870 }
3871 }
3872#endif
3873
4453cd8c
DSH		 3874 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3875 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3876 {
3877 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3878 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
6b7be581 3879 {
e7f8ff43 3880 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
4453cd8c 3881 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
6dbb6219 3882 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4453cd8c 3883 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
6dbb6219
DSH		 3884 {
3885 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4453cd8c 3886 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
6dbb6219 3887 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3888 }
3889
6b7be581 3890 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 3891 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3892 * use the certificate for signing.
6b7be581 3893 */
2ea80354 3894 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
d61ff83b
DSH		 3895 {
3896 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3897 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3898 */
6b7be581 3899#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3900 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3901 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
6b7be581
DSH		 3902#endif
3903#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3904 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3905 {
3906 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3907 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3908 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3909#endif
3910#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3911 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3912 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
6b7be581 3913#endif
d61ff83b 3914 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3915 return 1;
3916 }
3917
4817504d 3918
e7f8ff43 3919int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
4453cd8c 3920 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3921 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3922 {
4453cd8c
DSH		 3923 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3924 if (psig == NULL)
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3925 return 0;
3926 if (idx >= 0)
3927 {
4453cd8c 3928 idx <<= 1;
0f229cce 3929 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
e7f8ff43 3930 return 0;
4453cd8c 3931 psig += idx;
e7f8ff43 3932 if (rhash)
4453cd8c
DSH		 3933 *rhash = psig[0];
3934 if (rsig)
3935 *rsig = psig[1];
3936 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
e7f8ff43 3937 }
4453cd8c
DSH		 3938 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3939 }
3940
3941int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3942 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3943 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3944 {
3945 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3946 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3947 return 0;
3948 shsigalgs += idx;
3949 if (phash)
3950 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3951 if (psign)
3952 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3953 if (psignhash)
3954 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3955 if (rsig)
3956 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3957 if (rhash)
3958 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3959 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3960 }
3961
3962
4817504d
DSH		 3963#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3964int
3965tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3966 {
3967 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3968 unsigned short hbtype;
3969 unsigned int payload;
3970 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3971
3972 /* Read type and payload length first */
3973 hbtype = *p++;
3974 n2s(p, payload);
3975 pl = p;
3976
3977 if (s->msg_callback)
3978 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3979 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3980 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3981
3982 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3983 {
3984 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3985 int r;
3986
3987 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3988 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3989 * payload, plus padding
3990 */
3991 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3992 bp = buffer;
3993
3994 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3995 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3996 s2n(payload, bp);
3997 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
57cb030c
DSH		 3998 bp += payload;
3999 /* Random padding */
4000 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4001
4817504d
DSH		 4002 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4003
4004 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4005 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4006 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4007 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4008
4009 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4010
4011 if (r < 0)
4012 return r;
4013 }
4014 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4015 {
4016 unsigned int seq;
4017
4018 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4019 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4020 * sequence number */
4021 n2s(pl, seq);
4022
4023 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4024 {
4025 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
4026 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4027 }
4028 }
4029
4030 return 0;
4031 }
4032
4033int
4034tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4035 {
4036 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4037 int ret;
4038 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4039 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4040
4041 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4042 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4043 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4044 {
4045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4046 return -1;
4047 }
4048
4049 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4050 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4051 {
4052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4053 return -1;
4054 }
4055
4056 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4057 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4058 {
4059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4060 return -1;
4061 }
4062
4063 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4064 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4065 */
4066 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4067
4068 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4069 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4070 * some random stuff.
4071 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4072 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4073 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4074 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4075 * - Padding
4076 */
4077 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4078 p = buf;
4079 /* Message Type */
4080 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4081 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4082 s2n(payload, p);
4083 /* Sequence number */
4084 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4085 /* 16 random bytes */
4086 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4087 p += 16;
4088 /* Random padding */
4089 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4090
4091 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4092 if (ret >= 0)
4093 {
4094 if (s->msg_callback)
4095 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4096 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4097 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4098
4099 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4100 }
4101
4102 OPENSSL_free(buf);
4103
4104 return ret;
4105 }
4106#endif
0f229cce 4107
4453cd8c 4108#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
0f229cce
DSH		 4109
4110typedef struct
4111 {
4112 size_t sigalgcnt;
4113 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4114 } sig_cb_st;
4115
4116static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4117 {
4118 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4119 size_t i;
4120 char etmp[20], *p;
4121 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4122 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4123 return 0;
4124 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4125 return 0;
4126 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4127 etmp[len] = 0;
4128 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4129 if (!p)
4130 return 0;
4131 *p = 0;
4132 p++;
4133 if (!*p)
4134 return 0;
4135
4136 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4137 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4138 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4139 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4140 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4141 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4142 else return 0;
4143
4144 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4145 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4146 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4147 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4148 return 0;
4149
4150 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4151 {
4152 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4153 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4154 return 0;
4155 }
4156 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4157 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4158 return 1;
4159 }
4160
4161/* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4162 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3dbc46df 4163int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
0f229cce
DSH		 4164 {
4165 sig_cb_st sig;
4166 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
4167 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4168 return 0;
8bb870df
DSH		 4169 if (c == NULL)
4170 return 1;
3dbc46df 4171 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
0f229cce
DSH		 4172 }
4173
3dbc46df 4174int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
0f229cce 4175 {
4453cd8c 4176 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
0f229cce
DSH		 4177 int rhash, rsign;
4178 size_t i;
4179 if (salglen & 1)
4180 return 0;
4453cd8c 4181 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
0f229cce
DSH		 4182 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4183 return 0;
4453cd8c 4184 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
0f229cce 4185 {
4453cd8c 4186 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
0f229cce 4187 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4453cd8c 4188 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
0f229cce
DSH		 4189 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4190
4191 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4192 goto err;
4453cd8c
DSH		 4193 *sptr++ = rhash;
4194 *sptr++ = rsign;
0f229cce
DSH		 4195 }
4196
3dbc46df
DSH		 4197 if (client)
4198 {
4199 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4200 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4201 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4202 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4203 }
4204 else
4205 {
4206 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4207 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4208 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4209 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4210 }
0f229cce 4211
0f229cce
DSH		 4212 return 1;
4213
4214 err:
4215 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4216 return 0;
4217 }
4453cd8c 4218
d61ff83b
DSH		 4219static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4220 {
4221 int sig_nid;
4222 size_t i;
4223 if (default_nid == -1)
4224 return 1;
4225 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4226 if (default_nid)
4227 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4228 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4229 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4230 return 1;
4231 return 0;
4232 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4233/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4234static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4235 {
4236 X509_NAME *nm;
4237 int i;
4238 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4239 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4240 {
4241 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4242 return 1;
4243 }
4244 return 0;
4245 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4246
4247/* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
6dbb6219
DSH		 4248 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4249 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4250 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
d61ff83b 4251 */
6dbb6219
DSH		 4252
4253/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4254
4255#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4256 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4257/* Strict mode flags */
4258#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4259 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4260 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4261
d61ff83b
DSH		 4262int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4263 int idx)
4264 {
4265 int i;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4266 int rv = 0;
4267 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4268 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4269 CERT *c = s->cert;
2ea80354
DSH		 4270 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4271 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
d61ff83b
DSH		 4272 if (idx != -1)
4273 {
2ea80354
DSH		 4274 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4275 if (idx == -2)
4276 {
4277 cpk = c->key;
4278 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4279 }
4280 else
4281 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4282 x = cpk->x509;
4283 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4284 chain = cpk->chain;
2ea80354 4285 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4286 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4287 if (!x || !pk)
4288 goto end;
ed83ba53
DSH		 4289#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4290 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
ddd13d67 4291 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 4292 {
4293 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4294 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4295 return rv;
4296 }
4297#endif
d61ff83b
DSH		 4298 }
4299 else
4300 {
6dbb6219
DSH		 4301 if (!x || !pk)
4302 goto end;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4303 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4304 if (idx == -1)
4305 goto end;
6dbb6219 4306 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2ea80354 4307 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
6dbb6219
DSH		 4308 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4309 else
4310 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4311 strict_mode = 1;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4312 }
4313
2ea80354
DSH		 4314 if (suiteb_flags)
4315 {
4316 int ok;
4317 if (check_flags)
4318 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4319 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4320 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4321 {
4322 if (check_flags)
4323 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4324 else
4325 goto end;
4326 }
4327 }
6dbb6219 4328
d61ff83b
DSH		 4329 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4330 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4331 * and strict mode.
4332 */
6dbb6219 4333 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4334 {
4335 int default_nid;
4336 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4337 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4338 default_nid = 0;
4339 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4340 else
4341 {
4342 switch(idx)
4343 {
4344 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4345 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4346 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4347 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4348 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4349 break;
4350
4351 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4352 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4353 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4354 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4355 break;
4356
4357 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4358 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4359 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4360 break;
4361
4362 default:
4363 default_nid = -1;
4364 break;
4365 }
4366 }
4367 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4368 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4369 * sha1.
4370 */
15a70fe5 4371 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4372 {
4373 size_t j;
4374 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4375 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4376 {
4377 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4378 break;
4379 }
4380 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
6dbb6219
DSH		 4381 {
4382 if (check_flags)
4383 goto skip_sigs;
4384 else
4385 goto end;
4386 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4387 }
4388 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4389 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4390 {
4391 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4392 }
4393 else
4394 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4395 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4396 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4397 {
4398 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4399 default_nid))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4400 {
4401 if (check_flags)
4402 {
4403 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4404 break;
4405 }
4406 else
4407 goto end;
4408 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4409 }
4410 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4411 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4412 else if(check_flags)
4413 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4414 skip_sigs:
2ea80354
DSH		 4415 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4416 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4417 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4418 else if (!check_flags)
d61ff83b 4419 goto end;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4420 if (!s->server)
4421 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
d61ff83b 4422 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
6dbb6219 4423 else if (strict_mode)
d61ff83b 4424 {
6dbb6219 4425 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4426 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4427 {
2ea80354
DSH		 4428 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4429 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4430 {
4431 if (check_flags)
4432 {
4433 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4434 break;
4435 }
4436 else
4437 goto end;
4438 }
4439 }
4440 }
4441 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4442 {
4443 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4444 int check_type = 0;
4445 switch (pk->type)
4446 {
4447 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4448 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4449 break;
4450 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4451 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4452 break;
4453 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4454 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4455 break;
4456 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4457 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4458 {
4459 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4460 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4461 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4462 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4463 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4464 }
4465 }
4466 if (check_type)
4467 {
4468 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4469 int ctypelen;
4470 if (c->ctypes)
4471 {
4472 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4473 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4474 }
4475 else
4476 {
4477 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4478 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4479 }
4480 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4481 {
4482 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4483 {
4484 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4485 break;
4486 }
4487 }
4488 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4489 goto end;
4490 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4491 else
4492 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4493
4494
4495 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4496
4497 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4498 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4499
4500 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4501 {
4502 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4503 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4504 }
4505 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4506 {
4507 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4508 {
4509 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4510 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4511 {
4512 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4513 break;
4514 }
4515 }
4516 }
4517 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4518 goto end;
d61ff83b 4519 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4520 else
4521 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4522
4523 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4524 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4525
4526 end:
6dbb6219
DSH		 4527
4528 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
d61ff83b 4529 {
6dbb6219
DSH		 4530 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4531 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4532 else if (cpk->digest)
d61ff83b 4533 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4534 }
4535 else
4536 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4537
4538 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4539 * if the chain is invalid.
4540 */
4541 if (!check_flags)
4542 {
4543 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4544 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4545 else
2ea80354
DSH		 4546 {
4547 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4548 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4549 return 0;
4550 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4551 }
4552 return rv;
4553 }
4554
4555/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4556void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4557 {
4558 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4559 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4560 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4561 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4562 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4563 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4564 }
18d71588
DSH		 4565/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4566int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4567 {
4568 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4569 }
d61ff83b 4570
4453cd8c 4571#endif
09599b52
DSH		 4572
4573#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4574DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4575 {
4576 int dh_secbits = 80;
4577 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4578 return DH_get_1024_160();
4579 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4580 {
4581 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4582 dh_secbits = 128;
4583 else
4584 dh_secbits = 80;
4585 }
4586 else
4587 {
4588 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4589 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4590 }
4591
4592 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4593 {
4594 DH *dhp = DH_new();
4595 if (!dhp)
4596 return NULL;
4597 dhp->g = BN_new();
4598 if (dhp->g)
4599 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4600 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4601 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4602 else
4603 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4604 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4605 {
4606 DH_free(dhp);
4607 return NULL;
4608 }
4609 return dhp;
4610 }
4611 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4612 return DH_get_2048_224();
4613 return DH_get_1024_160();
4614 }
4615#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 4616
4617static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4618 {
4619 int secbits;
4620 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4621 if (pkey)
4622 {
4623 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4624 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4625 }
4626 else
4627 secbits = -1;
4628 if (s)
4629 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4630 else
4631 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4632 }
4633
4634static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4635 {
4636 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4637 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4638 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4639 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4640 {
4641 const EVP_MD *md;
4642 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4643 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4644 }
4645 if (s)
4646 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4647 else
4648 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4649 }
4650
4651int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4652 {
4653 if (vfy)
4654 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4655 if (is_ee)
4656 {
4657 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4658 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4659 }
4660 else
4661 {
4662 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4663 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4664 }
4665 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4666 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4667 return 1;
4668 }
4669
4670/* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4671 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4672 * not sending one to the peer.
4673 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4674 */
4675
4676int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4677 {
4678 int rv, start_idx, i;
4679 if (x == NULL)
4680 {
4681 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4682 start_idx = 1;
4683 }
4684 else
4685 start_idx = 0;
4686
4687 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4688 if (rv != 1)
4689 return rv;
4690
4691 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4692 {
4693 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4694 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4695 if (rv != 1)
4696 return rv;
4697 }
4698 return 1;
4699 }
A mirror of the official openssl repository