]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blame - ssl/t1_lib.c
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blame
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blob | blame (incremental) | history | HEAD
Fix race condition in ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
CommitLineData
58964a49
RE		 1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
f1fd4544 58/* ====================================================================
52b8dad8 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
f1fd4544
BM		 60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
58964a49
RE		 111
112#include <stdio.h>
ec577822 113#include <openssl/objects.h>
6434abbf
DSH		 114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
67c8e7f4 116#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
4817504d 117#include <openssl/rand.h>
09599b52
DSH		 118#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119#include <openssl/dh.h>
120#include <openssl/bn.h>
121#endif
58964a49
RE		 122#include "ssl_locl.h"
123
42182852 124const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
58964a49 125
367eb1f1 126#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
6434abbf
DSH		 127static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
2daceb03 130static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
09e4e4b9 131int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
367eb1f1 132#endif
6434abbf 133
161e0a61 134SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
58964a49
RE		 135 tls1_enc,
136 tls1_mac,
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_alert_code,
e0af0405 146 tls1_export_keying_material,
173e72e6
DSH		 147 0,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
150 ssl3_handshake_write
151 };
152
161e0a61 153SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
173e72e6
DSH		 154 tls1_enc,
155 tls1_mac,
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_alert_code,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 ssl3_handshake_write
170 };
171
161e0a61 172SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
173e72e6
DSH		 173 tls1_enc,
174 tls1_mac,
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_alert_code,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
4221c0dd
DSH		 185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
173e72e6
DSH		 187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
189 ssl3_handshake_write
58964a49
RE		 190 };
191
f3b656b2 192long tls1_default_timeout(void)
58964a49
RE		 193 {
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
196 return(60*60*2);
197 }
198
6b691a5c 199int tls1_new(SSL *s)
58964a49
RE		 200 {
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
203 return(1);
204 }
205
6b691a5c 206void tls1_free(SSL *s)
58964a49 207 {
12bf56c0
DSH		 208#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 {
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 }
213#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
58964a49
RE		 214 ssl3_free(s);
215 }
216
6b691a5c 217void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
58964a49
RE		 218 {
219 ssl3_clear(s);
637f374a 220 s->version = s->method->version;
58964a49
RE		 221 }
222
525de5d3 223#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
eda3766b 224
b362ccab
DSH		 225typedef struct
226 {
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
230 } tls_curve_info;
231
232#define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233#define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234
235static tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
525de5d3 236 {
b362ccab
DSH		 237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
525de5d3 265 };
eda3766b 266
d0595f17
DSH		 267
268static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
eda3766b 269 {
d0595f17
DSH		 270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 };
274
275static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
276 {
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
c2c76a4d 280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
d0595f17
DSH		 281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
c2c76a4d 283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
d0595f17
DSH		 284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
c2c76a4d 287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
d0595f17
DSH		 288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
eda3766b
DSH		 305 };
306
2ea80354
DSH		 307static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
308 {
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
311 };
312
525de5d3
DSH		 313int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
314 {
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
1e26a8ba
GT		 316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
318 return 0;
b362ccab 319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
525de5d3
DSH		 320 }
321
322int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
323 {
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
325 switch (nid)
326 {
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
328 return 1;
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
330 return 2;
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
332 return 3;
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
334 return 4;
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
336 return 5;
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
338 return 6;
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
340 return 7;
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
342 return 8;
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
344 return 9;
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
346 return 10;
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
348 return 11;
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
350 return 12;
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
352 return 13;
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
354 return 14;
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
356 return 15;
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
358 return 16;
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
360 return 17;
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
362 return 18;
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
364 return 19;
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
366 return 20;
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
368 return 21;
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
370 return 22;
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
372 return 23;
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
374 return 24;
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
376 return 25;
6699cb84
DSH		 377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
378 return 26;
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
380 return 27;
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
382 return 28;
525de5d3
DSH		 383 default:
384 return 0;
385 }
386 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 387/* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
388 * preferred list
389 */
390static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
392 size_t *pcurveslen)
393 {
394 if (sess)
395 {
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
2ea80354 398 return;
fd2b65ce 399 }
2ea80354
DSH		 400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
fd2b65ce 402 {
2ea80354 403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
2ea80354 404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
d372d365 405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
2ea80354
DSH		 406 break;
407
b34aa49c
DSH		 408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
410 *pcurveslen = 2;
411 break;
412
2ea80354
DSH		 413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
415 *pcurveslen = 2;
416 break;
417 default:
fd2b65ce
DSH		 418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
420 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 421 if (!*pcurves)
422 {
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
425 }
426 }
b362ccab
DSH		 427
428/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
430 {
431 tls_curve_info *cinfo;
432 if (curve[0])
433 return 1;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
436 return 0;
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
439 }
440
d18b716d
DSH		 441/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
443 {
444 const unsigned char *curves;
445 size_t curveslen, i;
2ea80354 446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
d18b716d
DSH		 447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
448 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
450 if (suiteb_flags)
451 {
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
453 if (p[1])
454 return 0;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
456 {
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
458 return 0;
459 }
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
461 {
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
463 return 0;
464 }
465 else /* Should never happen */
466 return 0;
467 }
d18b716d
DSH		 468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
470 {
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
b362ccab 472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
d18b716d
DSH		 473 }
474 return 0;
475 }
d0595f17 476
a4352630 477/* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
2ea80354
DSH		 478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
479 * an EC tmp key.
d0595f17 480 */
a4352630
DSH		 481
482int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
d0595f17
DSH		 483 {
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
486 int k;
a4352630
DSH		 487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
488 if (s->server == 0)
489 return -1;
2ea80354
DSH		 490 if (nmatch == -2)
491 {
492 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
493 {
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
496 * checks.
497 */
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
504 return NID_undef;
505 }
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
507 nmatch = 0;
508 }
a4352630
DSH		 509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
510 &supp, &supplen);
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
512 &pref, &preflen);
513 preflen /= 2;
514 supplen /= 2;
d0595f17
DSH		 515 k = 0;
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
517 {
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
520 {
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
522 {
b362ccab
DSH		 523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
524 continue;
d0595f17 525 if (nmatch == k)
a4352630
DSH		 526 {
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
529 }
d0595f17
DSH		 530 k++;
531 }
532 }
533 }
d0595f17 534 if (nmatch == -1)
a4352630
DSH		 535 return k;
536 return 0;
d0595f17
DSH		 537 }
538
539int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
541 {
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
543 size_t i;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
546 */
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
549 if (!clist)
550 return 0;
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
552 {
553 unsigned long idmask;
554 int id;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
556 idmask = 1L << id;
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
558 {
559 OPENSSL_free(clist);
560 return 0;
561 }
562 dup_list |= idmask;
563 s2n(id, p);
564 }
565 if (*pext)
566 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
567 *pext = clist;
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
569 return 1;
570 }
571
f6dfbeed 572#define MAX_CURVELIST 28
d0595f17
DSH		 573
574typedef struct
575 {
576 size_t nidcnt;
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
578 } nid_cb_st;
579
580static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
581 {
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
583 size_t i;
584 int nid;
585 char etmp[20];
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
587 return 0;
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
589 return 0;
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
591 etmp[len] = 0;
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
598 return 0;
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
601 return 0;
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
603 return 1;
604 }
605/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
607 const char *str)
608 {
609 nid_cb_st ncb;
610 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
612 return 0;
8bb870df
DSH		 613 if (pext == NULL)
614 return 1;
d0595f17
DSH		 615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
616 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 617/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
619 EC_KEY *ec)
620 {
621 int is_prime, id;
622 const EC_GROUP *grp;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
624 if (!ec)
625 return 0;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
29b490a4 628 if (!grp)
fd2b65ce
DSH		 629 return 0;
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
631 if (!meth)
632 return 0;
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
634 is_prime = 1;
635 else
636 is_prime = 0;
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
641 if (id)
642 {
643 curve_id[0] = 0;
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
645 }
646 else
647 {
648 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
649 if (is_prime)
650 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
651 else
652 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
653 }
654 if (comp_id)
655 {
29b490a4
PS		 656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
657 return 0;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
659 {
660 if (is_prime)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
662 else
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
664 }
665 else
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
667 }
668 return 1;
669 }
670/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
673 {
674 const unsigned char *p;
675 size_t plen, i;
a4352630 676 int j;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
679 */
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
681 {
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
685 {
686 if (*comp_id == *p)
687 break;
688 }
689 if (i == plen)
690 return 0;
691 }
2ea80354
DSH		 692 if (!curve_id)
693 return 1;
a4352630
DSH		 694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
fd2b65ce 696 {
a4352630 697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
fd2b65ce
DSH		 698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
699 {
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
a4352630 701 break;
fd2b65ce 702 }
a4352630
DSH		 703 if (i == plen)
704 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
706 if (!s->server)
b362ccab 707 break;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 708 }
709 return 1;
710 }
d61ff83b 711
5087afa1
DSH		 712static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
713 size_t *pformatslen)
714 {
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
716 * use default */
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
718 {
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
721 }
722 else
723 {
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
726 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
728 else
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
730 }
731 }
732
d61ff83b
DSH		 733/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
735 */
2ea80354 736static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
fd2b65ce 737 {
fd2b65ce 738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
d61ff83b
DSH		 739 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
740 int rv;
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
fd2b65ce
DSH		 742 if (!pkey)
743 return 0;
d61ff83b
DSH		 744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
746 {
747 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
748 return 1;
749 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
751 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
752 if (!rv)
753 return 0;
2ea80354
DSH		 754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
756 */
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
758 if (!rv)
759 return 0;
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
762 */
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
764 {
765 int check_md;
766 size_t i;
767 CERT *c = s->cert;
768 if (curve_id[0])
769 return 0;
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
775 else
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
779 break;
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
781 return 0;
782 if (set_ee_md == 2)
783 {
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
786 else
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
788 }
789 }
790 return rv;
fd2b65ce
DSH		 791 }
792/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
2ea80354 793int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
fd2b65ce
DSH		 794 {
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
ed83ba53
DSH		 797#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
ddd13d67 799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 800 return 1;
801#endif
2ea80354
DSH		 802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
804 */
805 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
806 {
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
812 else
813 return 0;
814 curve_id[0] = 0;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
817 return 0;
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
820 return 1;
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
822 else
823 {
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
825 if (!ec)
826 return 0;
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
828 return 0;
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
830 return 1;
831 return 0;
832 }
833
834 }
a4352630
DSH		 835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
836 {
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
839 return 1;
840 else return 0;
841 }
fd2b65ce
DSH		 842 if (!ec)
843 {
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
845 return 1;
846 else
847 return 0;
848 }
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
1e4cb467 850 return 0;
d18b716d
DSH		 851/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
852#if 0
853 return 1;
854#else
fd2b65ce 855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
d18b716d 856#endif
fd2b65ce 857 }
d0595f17 858
14536c8c
DSH		 859#else
860
861static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
862 {
863 return 1;
864 }
865
525de5d3 866#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
f1fd4544 867
ed3883d2 868#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
fc101f88
DSH		 869
870/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
872 */
873
874#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
876#else
877#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
878#endif
879
880#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
882#else
883#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
884#endif
885
886#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
888#else
654ac273 889#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
fc101f88
DSH		 890#endif
891
892#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
896
897static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
901#endif
902#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
905#endif
906#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
908#endif
fc101f88 909};
14536c8c 910#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2ea80354
DSH		 911static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
914};
14536c8c 915#endif
b7bfe69b 916size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
f37f20ff 917 {
2ea80354
DSH		 918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
919 * preferences.
920 */
14536c8c 921#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2ea80354
DSH		 922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
923 {
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
927
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
930 return 2;
931
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
934 return 2;
935 }
14536c8c 936#endif
3dbc46df
DSH		 937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
939 {
b7bfe69b
DSH		 940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df
DSH		 942 }
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
944 {
b7bfe69b
DSH		 945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df 947 }
4453cd8c 948 else
0f229cce 949 {
b7bfe69b 950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
45473632 951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
4453cd8c 952 }
b7bfe69b 953 }
ec4a50b3
DSH		 954/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
956 */
957int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
959 {
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
964 if (sigalg == -1)
965 return -1;
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
968 {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
970 return 0;
971 }
14536c8c 972#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2ea80354
DSH		 973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
974 {
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
978 return 0;
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
ed83ba53
DSH		 980 {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2ea80354 982 return 0;
ed83ba53 983 }
2ea80354
DSH		 984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
985 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
986 {
987 if (curve_id[0])
988 return 0;
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
990 {
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
992 {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
995 return 0;
996 }
997 }
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
999 {
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1001 {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1004 return 0;
1005 }
1006 }
1007 else
1008 return 0;
1009 }
1010 }
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1012 return 0;
14536c8c 1013#endif
2ea80354 1014
ec4a50b3
DSH		 1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1018 {
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1020 break;
1021 }
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
2ea80354 1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
ec4a50b3
DSH		 1024 {
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1026 return 0;
1027 }
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1029 if (*pmd == NULL)
1030 {
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1032 return 0;
1033 }
b362ccab
DSH		 1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1037 (void *)sig))
1038 {
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1040 return 0;
1041 }
319354eb
DSH		 1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1043 * wish.
1044 */
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
ec4a50b3
DSH		 1047 return 1;
1048 }
b362ccab 1049
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1050/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1054 *
1055 */
1056void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1057 {
1058 CERT *c = s->cert;
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1059 c->mask_a = 0;
1060 c->mask_k = 0;
4221c0dd 1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1e2d4cb0 1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1064 else
1065 c->mask_ssl = 0;
b362ccab
DSH		 1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1068 * signature algorithms.
1069 */
b362ccab 1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
b7bfe69b 1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
b362ccab 1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
b7bfe69b 1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
b362ccab 1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
b7bfe69b 1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
b7bfe69b
DSH		 1076#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1078 {
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 }
1082#endif
1083#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1086 {
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1089 }
1090#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 c->valid = 1;
f37f20ff 1092 }
fc101f88 1093
b362ccab 1094int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
8b8e5bed
DSH		 1095 {
1096 CERT *ct = s->cert;
1097 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1098 return 1;
b362ccab
DSH		 1099 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1100 }
1101
1102static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1103 {
1104 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1105 return 0;
1106 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
8b8e5bed
DSH		 1107 }
1108
22a10c89 1109unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
f1fd4544 1110 {
ed3883d2 1111 int extdatalen=0;
22a10c89
BL		 1112 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1113 unsigned char *ret = buf;
d0595f17
DSH		 1114#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1115 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1116 int using_ecc = 0;
874a18cf 1117 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
d0595f17
DSH		 1118 {
1119 int i;
1120 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1121 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1122
1123 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1124 {
1125 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1126
1127 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1128 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
4082fea8 1129 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
d0595f17
DSH		 1130 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1131 {
1132 using_ecc = 1;
1133 break;
1134 }
1135 }
1136 }
1137#endif
ed3883d2 1138
13f6d57b
DSH		 1139 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1140 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1141 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
22a10c89 1142 return orig;
5f8f94a6 1143
ed3883d2
BM		 1144 ret+=2;
1145
1146 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
6434abbf 1147
a70183bc 1148 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
f1fd4544 1149 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1150 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1151 unsigned long size_str;
1152 long lenmax;
1153
a70183bc 1154 /* check for enough space.
52b8dad8
BM		 1155 4 for the servername type and entension length
1156 2 for servernamelist length
1157 1 for the hostname type
1158 2 for hostname length
1159 + hostname length
a70183bc 1160 */
52b8dad8 1161
761772d7
BM		 1162 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1163 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
a70183bc
BM		 1164 return NULL;
1165
1166 /* extension type and length */
1167 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1168 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
f1fd4544 1169
a70183bc 1170 /* length of servername list */
ed3883d2 1171 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
a70183bc
BM		 1172
1173 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
f1fd4544 1174 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
ed3883d2 1175 s2n(size_str,ret);
ed3883d2
BM		 1176 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1177 ret+=size_str;
f1fd4544 1178 }
761772d7 1179
423c66f1 1180 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
bdd53508 1181 if (s->renegotiate)
423c66f1 1182 {
860c3dd1
DSH		 1183 int el;
1184
1185 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1186 {
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1188 return NULL;
1189 }
1190
22a10c89 1191 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
860c3dd1
DSH		 1192
1193 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1194 s2n(el,ret);
1195
1196 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1197 {
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 return NULL;
1200 }
1201
1202 ret += el;
1203 }
1204
edc032b5 1205#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1df80b65 1206 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
edc032b5 1207 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1df80b65 1208 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
edc032b5 1209
1df80b65
DSH		 1210 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1211 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
edc032b5
BL		 1212 {
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 return NULL;
1df80b65
DSH		 1215 }
1216
1217 /* check for enough space.
1218 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1219 1 for the srp user identity
1220 + srp user identity length
1221 */
1222 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1223
1224 /* fill in the extension */
edc032b5
BL		 1225 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1226 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1df80b65
DSH		 1227 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1228 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
edc032b5
BL		 1229 ret+=login_len;
1230 }
1231#endif
1232
36ca4ba6 1233#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d0595f17 1234 if (using_ecc)
36ca4ba6
BM		 1235 {
1236 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1237 long lenmax;
d0595f17
DSH		 1238 const unsigned char *plist;
1239 size_t plistlen;
b362ccab
DSH		 1240 size_t i;
1241 unsigned char *etmp;
5087afa1
DSH		 1242
1243 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
36ca4ba6 1244
761772d7 1245 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
d0595f17
DSH		 1246 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1247 if (plistlen > 255)
019fdc78
BM		 1248 {
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1250 return NULL;
1251 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 1252
1253 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
d0595f17
DSH		 1254 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1255 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1256 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1257 ret+=plistlen;
1258
33273721 1259 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
d0595f17 1260 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
fd2b65ce 1261 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
33273721 1262
761772d7 1263 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
d0595f17
DSH		 1264 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1265 if (plistlen > 65532)
33273721
BM		 1266 {
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 return NULL;
1269 }
b362ccab 1270
33273721
BM		 1271
1272 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
b362ccab
DSH		 1273 etmp = ret + 4;
1274 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1275 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1276 {
1277 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1278 {
1279 *etmp++ = plist[0];
1280 *etmp++ = plist[1];
1281 }
1282 }
1283
1284 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
a4974de9
BM		 1285
1286 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1287 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1288 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1289 * resolves this to two bytes.
1290 */
b362ccab 1291 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
d0595f17 1292 s2n(plistlen, ret);
d0595f17 1293 ret+=plistlen;
33273721 1294 }
36ca4ba6 1295#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
d3442bc7 1296
b362ccab 1297 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
6434abbf
DSH		 1298 {
1299 int ticklen;
7ba3838a 1300 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
6434abbf 1301 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
12bf56c0
DSH		 1302 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1303 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1304 {
1305 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1306 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1307 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1308 return NULL;
1309 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1311 ticklen);
1312 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1313 }
6434abbf
DSH		 1314 else
1315 ticklen = 0;
12bf56c0
DSH		 1316 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1317 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1318 goto skip_ext;
6434abbf
DSH		 1319 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1320 * rest for ticket
1321 */
761772d7 1322 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
6434abbf
DSH		 1323 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1324 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1325 if (ticklen)
1326 {
1327 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1328 ret += ticklen;
1329 }
1330 }
12bf56c0 1331 skip_ext:
6434abbf 1332
cbd64894 1333 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
a2f9200f 1334 {
0f229cce 1335 size_t salglen;
b7bfe69b 1336 const unsigned char *salg;
b362ccab 1337 unsigned char *etmp;
b7bfe69b 1338 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
0f229cce 1339 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
a2f9200f
DSH		 1340 return NULL;
1341 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
b362ccab
DSH		 1342 etmp = ret;
1343 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1344 ret += 4;
deffd89a 1345 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
b362ccab
DSH		 1346 /* Fill in lengths */
1347 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1348 s2n(salglen, etmp);
0f229cce 1349 ret += salglen;
a2f9200f
DSH		 1350 }
1351
761772d7 1352#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 1353 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
761772d7
BM		 1354 {
1355 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1356
487dac87 1357 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
761772d7
BM		 1358 return NULL;
1359 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1360 return NULL;
1361
1362 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1363 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1364 s2n(col, ret);
1365 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1366 ret += col;
1367 }
1368#endif
1369
874a18cf 1370 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 1371 {
1372 int i;
1373 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1374 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1375
1376 idlen = 0;
1377 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1378 {
1379 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1380 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1381 if (itmp <= 0)
1382 return NULL;
1383 idlen += itmp + 2;
1384 }
1385
1386 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1387 {
1388 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1389 if (extlen < 0)
1390 return NULL;
1391 }
1392 else
1393 extlen = 0;
1394
1395 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1397 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1398 return NULL;
1399 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1400 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1401 s2n(idlen, ret);
1402 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1403 {
1404 /* save position of id len */
1405 unsigned char *q = ret;
1406 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1407 /* skip over id len */
1408 ret += 2;
1409 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1410 /* write id len */
1411 s2n(itmp, q);
1412 }
1413 s2n(extlen, ret);
1414 if (extlen > 0)
1415 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1416 }
1417
4817504d
DSH		 1418#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1419 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
c7f26739
DB		 1420 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1421 return NULL;
4817504d
DSH		 1422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1423 s2n(1,ret);
1424 /* Set mode:
1425 * 1: peer may send requests
1426 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1427 */
1428 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1429 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1430 else
1431 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1432#endif
1433
bf48836c 1434#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 1435 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1436 {
1437 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1438 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1439 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1440 return NULL;
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1442 s2n(0,ret);
1443 }
1444#endif
1445
6f017a8f
AL		 1446 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1447 {
1448 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1449 return NULL;
1450 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1451 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1452 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1453 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1454 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1455 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1456 }
1457
333f926d
BL		 1458 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1459 {
1460 int el;
1461
1462 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1463
22a10c89 1464 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
333f926d
BL		 1465
1466 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1467 s2n(el,ret);
1468
1469 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1470 {
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1472 return NULL;
1473 }
1474 ret += el;
1475 }
1476
a398f821
T		 1477 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1478 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1479 {
1480 size_t i;
1481 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1482
1483 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1484 {
1485 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1486 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1487
1488 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
9cd50f73
T		 1489 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1490 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1491 if (record->fn1)
1492 {
1493 int cb_retval = 0;
1494 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
0a602875
BL		 1495 &out, &outlen, al,
1496 record->arg);
9cd50f73
T		 1497 if (cb_retval == 0)
1498 return NULL; /* error */
1499 if (cb_retval == -1)
1500 continue; /* skip this extension */
1501 }
a398f821
T		 1502 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1503 return NULL;
1504 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1505 s2n(outlen, ret);
1506 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1507 ret += outlen;
1508 }
1509 }
5e3ff62c
DSH		 1510#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1511 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1512 s2n(0,ret);
1513#endif
01f2f18f 1514
4fcdd66f 1515 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
cd6bd5ff 1516 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
4fcdd66f
DSH		 1517 *
1518 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1519 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
0467ea68 1520 */
01f2f18f 1521 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
0467ea68 1522 {
01f2f18f
DSH		 1523 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1524 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1525 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1526 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1527 */
1528 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1529 hlen -= 5;
1530 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1531 {
1532 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1533 if (hlen >= 4)
1534 hlen -= 4;
1535 else
1536 hlen = 0;
4fcdd66f 1537
01f2f18f
DSH		 1538 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1539 s2n(hlen, ret);
1540 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1541 ret += hlen;
1542 }
0467ea68 1543 }
a398f821 1544
22a10c89
BL		 1545 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1546 return orig;
ed3883d2 1547
22a10c89 1548 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
ed3883d2 1549 return ret;
52b8dad8 1550 }
ed3883d2 1551
22a10c89 1552unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
f1fd4544 1553 {
ed3883d2 1554 int extdatalen=0;
22a10c89
BL		 1555 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1556 unsigned char *ret = buf;
e9add063
SD		 1557 size_t i;
1558 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
bf48836c
BL		 1559#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1560 int next_proto_neg_seen;
ee2ffc27 1561#endif
14536c8c 1562#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
5087afa1
DSH		 1563 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1564 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
4082fea8 1565 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
5087afa1 1566 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
14536c8c 1567#endif
13f6d57b
DSH		 1568 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1569 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
22a10c89 1570 return orig;
5f8f94a6 1571
a13c20f6 1572 ret+=2;
ed3883d2
BM		 1573 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1574
a13c20f6 1575 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
f1fd4544 1576 {
761772d7 1577 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
ed3883d2
BM		 1578
1579 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1580 s2n(0,ret);
f1fd4544 1581 }
860c3dd1 1582
8025e251 1583 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
860c3dd1
DSH		 1584 {
1585 int el;
1586
1587 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1588 {
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 return NULL;
1591 }
1592
22a10c89 1593 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
860c3dd1
DSH		 1594
1595 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1596 s2n(el,ret);
1597
1598 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1599 {
1600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1601 return NULL;
1602 }
1603
1604 ret += el;
1605 }
1606
36ca4ba6 1607#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874a18cf 1608 if (using_ecc)
36ca4ba6 1609 {
5087afa1
DSH		 1610 const unsigned char *plist;
1611 size_t plistlen;
36ca4ba6
BM		 1612 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1613 long lenmax;
1614
5087afa1
DSH		 1615 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1616
761772d7 1617 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
5087afa1
DSH		 1618 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1619 if (plistlen > 255)
019fdc78
BM		 1620 {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1622 return NULL;
1623 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 1624
1625 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
5087afa1
DSH		 1626 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1627 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1628 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1629 ret+=plistlen;
a70183bc 1630
36ca4ba6 1631 }
33273721 1632 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
36ca4ba6 1633#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
67c8e7f4 1634
b362ccab 1635 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
6434abbf 1636 {
761772d7 1637 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
6434abbf
DSH		 1638 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1639 s2n(0,ret);
1640 }
761772d7 1641
67c8e7f4
DSH		 1642 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1643 {
1644 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1645 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1646 s2n(0,ret);
1647 }
1648
761772d7 1649#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 1650 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
761772d7
BM		 1651 {
1652 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
6434abbf 1653
761772d7
BM		 1654 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1655 return NULL;
1656 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1657 return NULL;
1658
1659 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1660 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1661 s2n(sol, ret);
1662 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1663 ret += sol;
1664 }
1665#endif
333f926d
BL		 1666
1667 if(s->srtp_profile)
1668 {
1669 int el;
1670
1671 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1672
22a10c89 1673 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
333f926d
BL		 1674
1675 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1676 s2n(el,ret);
1677
1678 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1679 {
7a236261 1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
333f926d
BL		 1681 return NULL;
1682 }
1683 ret+=el;
1684 }
1685
0e1dba93
DSH		 1686 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1687 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1688 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1689 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1690 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1691 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1692 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1693 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1694 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1695 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1696 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1697 ret+=36;
1698
1699 }
761772d7 1700
4817504d 1701#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
5733919d
DSH		 1702 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1703 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1704 {
c7f26739
DB		 1705 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1706 return NULL;
5733919d
DSH		 1707 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1708 s2n(1,ret);
1709 /* Set mode:
1710 * 1: peer may send requests
1711 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1712 */
1713 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1714 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1715 else
1716 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
192540b5 1717
5733919d 1718 }
4817504d
DSH		 1719#endif
1720
bf48836c 1721#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 1722 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1723 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1724 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1725 {
1726 const unsigned char *npa;
1727 unsigned int npalen;
1728 int r;
1729
1730 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1731 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1732 {
1733 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1734 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1735 s2n(npalen,ret);
1736 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1737 ret += npalen;
1738 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1739 }
1740 }
1741#endif
1742
e9add063 1743 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
a398f821 1744 {
e9add063
SD		 1745 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1746 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1747 int cb_retval = 0;
1748
0a602875
BL		 1749 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1750
e9add063
SD		 1751 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1752 if (!record->fn2)
9dabfce1 1753 continue;
e9add063
SD		 1754 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1755 &out, &outlen, al,
1756 record->arg);
1757 if (cb_retval == 0)
1758 return NULL; /* error */
1759 if (cb_retval == -1)
9dabfce1 1760 continue; /* skip this extension */
e9add063
SD		 1761 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1762 return NULL;
1763 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1764 s2n(outlen, ret);
1765 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1766 ret += outlen;
a398f821 1767 }
5e3ff62c
DSH		 1768#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1769 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1770 {
1771 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1772 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1773 */
1774 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1775 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1776 else
1777 {
1778 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1779 s2n(0,ret);
1780 }
1781 }
1782#endif
a398f821 1783
6f017a8f
AL		 1784 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1785 {
1786 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1787 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1788
1789 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1790 return NULL;
1791 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1792 s2n(3 + len,ret);
1793 s2n(1 + len,ret);
1794 *ret++ = len;
1795 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1796 ret += len;
1797 }
1798
22a10c89
BL		 1799 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1800 return orig;
ed3883d2 1801
22a10c89 1802 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
ed3883d2 1803 return ret;
52b8dad8 1804 }
ed3883d2 1805
6f017a8f
AL		 1806/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1807 * ClientHello.
1808 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1809 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1810 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1811 * return.
1812 *
1813 * returns: 0 on success. */
1814static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1815 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1816 {
1817 unsigned i;
1818 unsigned proto_len;
1819 const unsigned char *selected;
1820 unsigned char selected_len;
1821 int r;
1822
1823 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1824 return 0;
1825
1826 if (data_len < 2)
1827 goto parse_error;
1828
1829 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1830 * length-prefixed strings. */
1831 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1832 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1833 data_len -= 2;
1834 data += 2;
1835 if (data_len != i)
1836 goto parse_error;
1837
1838 if (data_len < 2)
1839 goto parse_error;
1840
1841 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1842 {
1843 proto_len = data[i];
1844 i++;
1845
1846 if (proto_len == 0)
1847 goto parse_error;
1848
1849 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1850 goto parse_error;
1851
1852 i += proto_len;
1853 }
1854
1855 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1856 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1857 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1858 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1859 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1860 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1861 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1862 {
1863 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1864 return -1;
1865 }
1866 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1867 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1868 }
1869 return 0;
1870
1871parse_error:
1872 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1873 return -1;
1874 }
1875
dece3209
RS		 1876#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1877/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1878 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1879 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1880 * SNI,
1881 * elliptic_curves
1882 * ec_point_formats
1883 *
1884 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1885 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1886 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1887 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1888 */
1889static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1890 unsigned short type, size;
1891 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1892 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1893 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1894 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1895 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1896 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1897 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1898
1899 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1900 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1901 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1902 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1903 };
1904
1905 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1906 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1907 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1908 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1909 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1910 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1911 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1912 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1913 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1914 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1915 };
1916
1917 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1918 return;
1919 data += 2;
1920
1921 if (data > (d+n-4))
1922 return;
1923 n2s(data,type);
1924 n2s(data,size);
1925
1926 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1927 return;
1928
1929 if (data+size > d+n)
1930 return;
1931 data += size;
1932
378341e1 1933 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
dece3209
RS		 1934 {
1935 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1936 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1937
1938 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1939 return;
1940 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1941 return;
1942 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1943 return;
1944 }
1945 else
1946 {
1947 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1948
1949 if (data + len != d+n)
1950 return;
1951 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1952 return;
1953 }
1954
1955 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1956}
cbf81235 1957#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
dece3209 1958
b2284ed3
DSH		 1959static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1960 {
ed3883d2
BM		 1961 unsigned short type;
1962 unsigned short size;
1963 unsigned short len;
f1fd4544 1964 unsigned char *data = *p;
860c3dd1 1965 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
6dbb6219 1966 size_t i;
860c3dd1 1967
a13c20f6 1968 s->servername_done = 0;
67c8e7f4 1969 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
6f31dd72
BM		 1970#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1971 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1972#endif
ed3883d2 1973
6f017a8f
AL		 1974 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1975 {
1976 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1977 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1978 }
1979
0b2bde70 1980 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
e9add063
SD		 1981 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1982 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
0b2bde70 1983 {
e9add063
SD		 1984 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1985 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1986 }
0b2bde70 1987
4817504d
DSH		 1988#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1989 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1990 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1991#endif
dece3209
RS		 1992
1993#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1994 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1995 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
cbf81235 1996#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
dece3209 1997
4453cd8c
DSH		 1998 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1999 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2000 {
2001 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2002 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2003 }
2004 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2005 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2006 {
2007 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2008 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2009 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 2010 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2011 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2012 {
2013 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2014 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2015 }
4817504d 2016
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2017#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2018 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2019#endif
2020
ed3883d2 2021 if (data >= (d+n-2))
c27c9cb4 2022 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2
BM		 2023 n2s(data,len);
2024
52b8dad8 2025 if (data > (d+n-len))
c27c9cb4 2026 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2 2027
f1fd4544
BM		 2028 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2029 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2030 n2s(data,type);
2031 n2s(data,size);
2032
2033 if (data+size > (d+n))
c27c9cb4 2034 goto ri_check;
8e3b2dbb 2035#if 0
0e1dba93 2036 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
8e3b2dbb 2037#endif
6434abbf
DSH		 2038 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2039 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2040 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
a13c20f6
BM		 2041/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2042
2043 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2044 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2045 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2046 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2047 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2048 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2049 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2050 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2051 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2052 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2053 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2054 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2055 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2056 the value of the Host: field.
2057 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2058 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2059 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2060 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2061
2062*/
2063
f1fd4544
BM		 2064 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2065 {
a70183bc 2066 unsigned char *sdata;
ed3883d2 2067 int servname_type;
a70183bc
BM		 2068 int dsize;
2069
2070 if (size < 2)
2071 {
2072 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 return 0;
2074 }
2075 n2s(data,dsize);
52b8dad8 2076 size -= 2;
a70183bc 2077 if (dsize > size )
f1fd4544 2078 {
a70183bc
BM		 2079 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 return 0;
2081 }
2082
2083 sdata = data;
2084 while (dsize > 3)
2085 {
2086 servname_type = *(sdata++);
ed3883d2 2087 n2s(sdata,len);
a70183bc
BM		 2088 dsize -= 3;
2089
2090 if (len > dsize)
f1fd4544
BM		 2091 {
2092 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 return 0;
2094 }
a70183bc 2095 if (s->servername_done == 0)
f1fd4544
BM		 2096 switch (servname_type)
2097 {
2098 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
732d31be 2099 if (!s->hit)
f1fd4544 2100 {
732d31be
DSH		 2101 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2102 {
2103 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 return 0;
2105 }
2106 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
f1fd4544
BM		 2107 {
2108 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2109 return 0;
2110 }
732d31be
DSH		 2111 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2112 {
2113 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2114 return 0;
2115 }
ed3883d2 2116 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
a13c20f6
BM		 2117 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2118 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2119 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
40a70628 2120 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
a13c20f6
BM		 2121 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2122 return 0;
f1fd4544 2123 }
a13c20f6
BM		 2124 s->servername_done = 1;
2125
a13c20f6
BM		 2126 }
2127 else
732d31be
DSH		 2128 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2129 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
6b9e941e 2130 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
a13c20f6 2131
ed3883d2 2132 break;
f1fd4544 2133
ed3883d2
BM		 2134 default:
2135 break;
f1fd4544 2136 }
52b8dad8 2137
a70183bc 2138 dsize -= len;
f1fd4544 2139 }
a70183bc
BM		 2140 if (dsize != 0)
2141 {
2142 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2143 return 0;
2144 }
2145
ed3883d2 2146 }
edc032b5
BL		 2147#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2148 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2149 {
1df80b65
DSH		 2150 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2151 {
2152 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2153 return 0;
2154 }
2155 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
edc032b5 2156 {
1df80b65
DSH		 2157 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2158 return 0;
2159 }
2160 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2161 return -1;
2162 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2163 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2164
2165 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2166 {
2167 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 return 0;
edc032b5
BL		 2169 }
2170 }
2171#endif
ed3883d2 2172
36ca4ba6 2173#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874a18cf 2174 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2175 {
2176 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2177 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
36ca4ba6 2178
e83aefb3
DSH		 2179 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2180 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2181 {
2182 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2183 return 0;
2184 }
732d31be 2185 if (!s->hit)
36ca4ba6 2186 {
732d31be
DSH		 2187 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2188 {
7d5686d3
DSH		 2189 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2190 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
732d31be
DSH		 2191 }
2192 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2193 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2194 {
2195 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2196 return 0;
2197 }
2198 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2199 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
36ca4ba6 2200 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 2201#if 0
2202 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2203 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2204 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2205 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2206 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
33273721
BM		 2207#endif
2208 }
874a18cf 2209 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
33273721
BM		 2210 {
2211 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2212 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2213 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2214
e83aefb3
DSH		 2215 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2216 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
33273721
BM		 2217 {
2218 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2219 return 0;
2220 }
732d31be 2221 if (!s->hit)
33273721 2222 {
732d31be
DSH		 2223 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2224 {
2225 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2226 return 0;
2227 }
2228 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2229 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2230 {
2231 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2232 return 0;
2233 }
2234 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2235 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
33273721 2236 }
33273721
BM		 2237#if 0
2238 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2239 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2240 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2241 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2242 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
36ca4ba6
BM		 2243#endif
2244 }
c6a27f01 2245#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
761772d7 2246#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 2247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
761772d7
BM		 2248 {
2249 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2250
2251 if (size < 2)
2252 {
2253 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2254 return 0;
2255 }
2256 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2257 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2258 {
2259 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2260 return 0;
2261 }
2262
2263 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2264 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
02c27b11
BM		 2265 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2266 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2267 else
2268 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2269 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2270 {
2271 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2272 return 0;
2273 }
2274 }
2275#endif
12bf56c0
DSH		 2276 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2277 {
2278 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2279 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2280 {
2281 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2282 return 0;
2283 }
2284 }
860c3dd1
DSH		 2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2286 {
2287 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2288 return 0;
2289 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2290 }
6b7be581
DSH		 2291 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2292 {
2293 int dsize;
4453cd8c 2294 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
6b7be581
DSH		 2295 {
2296 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2297 return 0;
2298 }
6b7be581
DSH		 2299 n2s(data,dsize);
2300 size -= 2;
4453cd8c 2301 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
6b7be581
DSH		 2302 {
2303 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 return 0;
2305 }
2306 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2307 {
2308 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2309 return 0;
2310 }
4453cd8c
DSH		 2311 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2312 * error.
2313 */
2314 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2315 {
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2317 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2318 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2319 return 0;
2320 }
6b7be581 2321 }
d0b039d4 2322 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2323 {
2324
2325 if (size < 5)
2326 {
2327 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2328 return 0;
2329 }
2330
2331 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2332 size--;
2333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2334 {
2335 const unsigned char *sdata;
2336 int dsize;
2337 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2338 n2s(data,dsize);
2339 size -= 2;
2340 if (dsize > size )
2341 {
2342 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2343 return 0;
2344 }
2345 while (dsize > 0)
2346 {
2347 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2348 int idsize;
2349 if (dsize < 4)
2350 {
2351 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2352 return 0;
2353 }
2354 n2s(data, idsize);
2355 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
9770924f 2356 size -= 2 + idsize;
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2357 if (dsize < 0)
2358 {
2359 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2360 return 0;
2361 }
2362 sdata = data;
2363 data += idsize;
2364 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2365 &sdata, idsize);
2366 if (!id)
2367 {
2368 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2369 return 0;
2370 }
2371 if (data != sdata)
2372 {
2373 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2374 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2375 return 0;
2376 }
2377 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2378 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2379 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2380 {
2381 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2382 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2383 return 0;
2384 }
2385 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2386 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2387 {
2388 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2389 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2390 return 0;
2391 }
2392 }
2393
2394 /* Read in request_extensions */
9770924f
BM		 2395 if (size < 2)
2396 {
2397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 return 0;
2399 }
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2400 n2s(data,dsize);
2401 size -= 2;
9770924f 2402 if (dsize != size)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2403 {
2404 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2405 return 0;
2406 }
2407 sdata = data;
2408 if (dsize > 0)
2409 {
25536ea6
DSH		 2410 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2411 {
2412 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2413 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2414 }
2415
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2416 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2417 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2418 &sdata, dsize);
2419 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2420 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2421 {
2422 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2423 return 0;
2424 }
2425 }
2426 }
2427 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2428 * so ignore it.
2429 */
2430 else
2431 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2432 }
4817504d
DSH		 2433#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2434 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2435 {
2436 switch(data[0])
2437 {
2438 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2439 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2440 break;
2441 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2442 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2443 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2444 break;
192540b5
DSH		 2445 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2446 return 0;
4817504d
DSH		 2447 }
2448 }
2449#endif
bf48836c 2450#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27 2451 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
6f017a8f
AL		 2452 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2453 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2454 {
2455 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2456 * renegotiation.
2457 *
2458 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2459 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2460 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2461 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2462 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2463 * anything like that, but this might change).
2464
2465 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2466 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2467 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2468 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2469 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2470 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2471 }
2472#endif
761772d7 2473
6f017a8f
AL		 2474 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2475 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2476 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2477 {
2478 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2479 return 0;
2911575c 2480#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
6f017a8f
AL		 2481 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2482 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2911575c 2483#endif
6f017a8f
AL		 2484 }
2485
6434abbf 2486 /* session ticket processed earlier */
333f926d
BL		 2487 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2488 {
2489 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2490 al))
2491 return 0;
2492 }
a398f821
T		 2493 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2494 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2495 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2496 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2497 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2498 */
2499 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2500 {
2501 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2502
2503 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2504 {
2505 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2506 if (type == record->ext_type)
2507 {
a398f821
T		 2508 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2509 return 0;
a398f821
T		 2510 }
2511 }
2512 }
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2513#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2514 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2515 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2516#endif
a398f821 2517
6434abbf 2518 data+=size;
f1fd4544 2519 }
a9e1c50b 2520
f1fd4544 2521 *p = data;
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2522
2523 ri_check:
2524
2525 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2526
bdd53508 2527 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2528 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2529 {
fbed9f81 2530 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
aa09c2c6 2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2532 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2533 return 0;
2534 }
4453cd8c
DSH		 2535 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2536 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2537 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
c27c9cb4 2538
f1fd4544 2539 return 1;
52b8dad8 2540 }
f1fd4544 2541
b2284ed3
DSH		 2542int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2543 {
2544 int al = -1;
2545 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2546 {
2547 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2548 return 0;
2549 }
2550
2daceb03 2551 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
b2284ed3 2552 {
aa09c2c6 2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
b2284ed3
DSH		 2554 return 0;
2555 }
2556 return 1;
2557}
2558
bf48836c 2559#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
ee2ffc27
BL		 2560/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2561 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2562 * the length of the block. */
71fa4513 2563static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2564 {
2565 unsigned int off = 0;
2566
2567 while (off < len)
2568 {
2569 if (d[off] == 0)
2570 return 0;
2571 off += d[off];
2572 off++;
2573 }
2574
2575 return off == len;
2576 }
2577#endif
2578
09e4e4b9 2579static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
f1fd4544 2580 {
c8bbd98a 2581 unsigned short length;
ed3883d2
BM		 2582 unsigned short type;
2583 unsigned short size;
ed3883d2 2584 unsigned char *data = *p;
ed3883d2 2585 int tlsext_servername = 0;
860c3dd1 2586 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
ed3883d2 2587
6f31dd72
BM		 2588#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2589 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2590#endif
2591
6f017a8f
AL		 2592 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2593 {
2594 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2595 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2596 }
2597
4817504d
DSH		 2598#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2599 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2600 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2601#endif
2602
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2603#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2604 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2605#endif
2606
ed3883d2 2607 if (data >= (d+n-2))
c27c9cb4 2608 goto ri_check;
ed3883d2 2609
c8bbd98a
BL		 2610 n2s(data,length);
2611 if (data+length != d+n)
2612 {
2613 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2614 return 0;
2615 }
ed3883d2 2616
f1fd4544
BM		 2617 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2618 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2619 n2s(data,type);
2620 n2s(data,size);
2621
2622 if (data+size > (d+n))
c27c9cb4 2623 goto ri_check;
f1fd4544 2624
6434abbf
DSH		 2625 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2626 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2627 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2628
f1fd4544
BM		 2629 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2630 {
2631 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2632 {
2633 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2634 return 0;
2635 }
ed3883d2 2636 tlsext_servername = 1;
f1fd4544 2637 }
ed3883d2 2638
36ca4ba6 2639#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874a18cf 2640 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
36ca4ba6
BM		 2641 {
2642 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2643 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
36ca4ba6
BM		 2644
2645 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2646 {
2647 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2648 return 0;
2649 }
fb0bc2b2 2650 if (!s->hit)
36ca4ba6 2651 {
fb0bc2b2
GT		 2652 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2653 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2654 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2655 {
2656 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2657 return 0;
2658 }
2659 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2660 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
36ca4ba6 2661 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 2662#if 0
2663 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2664 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2665 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2666 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2667 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2668#endif
2669 }
c6a27f01 2670#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
6434abbf
DSH		 2671
2672 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2673 {
12bf56c0
DSH		 2674 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2675 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2676 {
2677 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2678 return 0;
2679 }
b362ccab 2680 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
6434abbf
DSH		 2681 {
2682 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2683 return 0;
2684 }
2685 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2686 }
761772d7 2687#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
874a18cf 2688 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
761772d7
BM		 2689 {
2690 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2691
2692 if (size < 2)
2693 {
2694 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2695 return 0;
2696 }
2697 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2698 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2699 {
2700 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2701 return 0;
2702 }
2703
2704 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2705 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
02c27b11
BM		 2706 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2707 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2708 else
2709 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2710
2711 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2712 {
2713 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2714 return 0;
2715 }
2716 }
2717#endif
874a18cf 2718 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
67c8e7f4
DSH		 2719 {
2720 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2721 * a status request message.
2722 */
2723 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2724 {
2725 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2726 return 0;
2727 }
2728 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2729 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2730 }
bf48836c 2731#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
6f31dd72
BM		 2732 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2733 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2734 {
2735 unsigned char *selected;
2736 unsigned char selected_len;
2737
2738 /* We must have requested it. */
eef69354 2739 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
ee2ffc27
BL		 2740 {
2741 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2742 return 0;
2743 }
2744 /* The data must be valid */
2745 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2746 {
2747 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2748 return 0;
2749 }
2750 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2751 {
2752 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 return 0;
2754 }
2755 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2756 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2757 {
2758 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2759 return 0;
2760 }
2761 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2762 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
6f31dd72 2763 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
ee2ffc27
BL		 2764 }
2765#endif
6f017a8f
AL		 2766
2767 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2768 {
2769 unsigned len;
2770
2771 /* We must have requested it. */
2772 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2773 {
2774 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2775 return 0;
2776 }
2777 if (size < 4)
2778 {
2779 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2780 return 0;
2781 }
2782 /* The extension data consists of:
2783 * uint16 list_length
2784 * uint8 proto_length;
2785 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2786 len = data[0];
2787 len <<= 8;
2788 len |= data[1];
2789 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2790 {
2791 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2792 return 0;
2793 }
2794 len = data[2];
2795 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2796 {
2797 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2798 return 0;
2799 }
2800 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2801 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2802 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2803 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2804 {
2805 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2806 return 0;
2807 }
2808 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2809 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2810 }
2811
860c3dd1
DSH		 2812 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2813 {
2814 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2815 return 0;
2816 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2817 }
4817504d
DSH		 2818#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2819 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2820 {
2821 switch(data[0])
2822 {
2823 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2824 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2825 break;
2826 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2827 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2828 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2829 break;
192540b5
DSH		 2830 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2831 return 0;
4817504d
DSH		 2832 }
2833 }
2834#endif
333f926d
BL		 2835 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2836 {
2837 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2838 al))
2839 return 0;
2840 }
a398f821
T		 2841 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2842 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2843 * callback */
2844 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2845 {
2846 size_t i;
2847 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2848
2849 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2850 {
2851 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2852 if (record->ext_type == type)
2853 {
2854 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2855 return 0;
2856 break;
2857 }
2858 }
2859 }
5e3ff62c
DSH		 2860#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2861 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2862 {
2863 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2864 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2865 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2866 }
2867#endif
a9e1c50b
BL		 2868
2869 data += size;
f1fd4544 2870 }
ed3883d2
BM		 2871
2872 if (data != d+n)
f1fd4544
BM		 2873 {
2874 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2875 return 0;
2876 }
ed3883d2 2877
f1fd4544
BM		 2878 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2879 {
2880 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2881 {
2882 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2883 {
ed3883d2
BM		 2884 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2885 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
f1fd4544
BM		 2886 {
2887 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2888 return 0;
2889 }
2890 }
2891 else
2892 {
2893 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2894 return 0;
2895 }
ed3883d2 2896 }
f1fd4544 2897 }
ed3883d2 2898
f1fd4544 2899 *p = data;
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2900
2901 ri_check:
2902
2903 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2904 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2905 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2906 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2907 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2908 * absence on initial connect only.
2909 */
c2c49969
DSH		 2910 if (!renegotiate_seen
2911 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
ef51b4b9 2912 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
c27c9cb4 2913 {
fbed9f81 2914 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
09e4e4b9 2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
c27c9cb4
DSH		 2916 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2917 return 0;
2918 }
2919
f1fd4544 2920 return 1;
52b8dad8 2921 }
ed3883d2 2922
b2172f4f 2923
36ca4ba6
BM		 2924int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2925 {
761772d7
BM		 2926
2927#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2928 {
2929 int r = 1;
2930
2931 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2932 {
2933 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2934 if (!r)
2935 return -1;
2936 }
2937
2938 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2939 {
2940 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2941 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2942
02c27b11
BM		 2943 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2944 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2945 else
2946 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 2947 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2948 {
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2950 return -1;
2951 }
2952 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2953 }
2954
2955 if (r == 2)
2956 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2957 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2958 }
2959#endif
2960
36ca4ba6 2961 return 1;
52b8dad8 2962 }
36ca4ba6
BM		 2963
2964int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2965 {
36ca4ba6 2966 return 1;
52b8dad8 2967 }
36ca4ba6 2968
2daceb03 2969static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
f1fd4544 2970 {
241520e6 2971 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
36ca4ba6
BM		 2972 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2973
2974#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
33273721
BM		 2975 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2976 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2977 */
2978 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2979 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
36ca4ba6
BM		 2980 */
2981#endif
2982
2983 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2984 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2985 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2986 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2987
761772d7
BM		 2988#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2989 {
2990 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2991 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2daceb03
BL		 2992 * so this has to happen here in
2993 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
761772d7
BM		 2994
2995 int r = 1;
2996
2997 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2998 {
2999 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3000 if (!r)
3001 {
3002 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3003 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3004 goto err;
3005 }
3006 }
3007
3008 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3009 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3010 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3011
3012 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3013 {
3014 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3015 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3016 {
3017 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3018 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3019
02c27b11
BM		 3020 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3021 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3022 else
3023 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
761772d7
BM		 3024 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3025 {
3026 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3027 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3028 goto err;
3029 }
3030 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3031 }
3032 }
3033
3034 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3035 {
3036 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3037 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3038 * abort the handshake.
3039 */
3040 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3041 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3042 }
3043 }
761772d7
BM		 3044
3045 err:
2daceb03 3046#endif
52b8dad8
BM		 3047 switch (ret)
3048 {
36ca4ba6
BM		 3049 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3050 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3051 return -1;
3052
3053 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3054 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3055 return 1;
3056
3057 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3058 s->servername_done=0;
3059 default:
3060 return 1;
52b8dad8 3061 }
36ca4ba6 3062 }
f1fd4544 3063
2daceb03
BL		 3064int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3065 {
3066 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3067 int al;
3068
3069 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3070 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3071 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3072 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3073 */
3074 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3075 {
3076 int r;
e5db9c3b
DSH		 3077 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3078 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3079 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3080 if (certpkey == NULL)
3081 {
3082 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3083 return 1;
3084 }
3085 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3086 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3087 */
3088 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2daceb03
BL		 3089 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3090 switch (r)
3091 {
3092 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3093 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3094 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3095 break;
3096 /* status request response should be sent */
3097 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3098 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3099 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3100 else
3101 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3102 break;
3103 /* something bad happened */
3104 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3105 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3106 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3107 goto err;
3108 }
3109 }
3110 else
3111 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3112
3113 err:
3114 switch (ret)
3115 {
3116 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3118 return -1;
3119
3120 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3121 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3122 return 1;
3123
3124 default:
3125 return 1;
3126 }
3127 }
3128
36ca4ba6
BM		 3129int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3130 {
3131 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
58ece833 3132 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
241520e6 3133
36ca4ba6 3134#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
d0205686
DSH		 3135 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3136 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3137 * it must contain uncompressed.
36ca4ba6 3138 */
52b8dad8
BM		 3139 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3140 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
36ca4ba6 3141 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
d0205686 3142 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
4082fea8 3143 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
36ca4ba6
BM		 3144 {
3145 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
90bdfd97 3146 size_t i;
36ca4ba6
BM		 3147 unsigned char *list;
3148 int found_uncompressed = 0;
b9865f11 3149 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
36ca4ba6
BM		 3150 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3151 {
3152 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3153 {
3154 found_uncompressed = 1;
3155 break;
3156 }
3157 }
3158 if (!found_uncompressed)
3159 {
a291745e 3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
36ca4ba6
BM		 3161 return -1;
3162 }
3163 }
3164 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3165#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3166
241520e6 3167 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
58ece833 3168 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
241520e6 3169 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
58ece833 3170 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
241520e6 3171
761772d7
BM		 3172#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3173 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3174 {
3175 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3176 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3177
3178 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3179 {
3180 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3181 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3182 }
3183
3184 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3185 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3186 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3187 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3188 {
3189 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3190 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3191 }
3192 }
3193#endif
3194
04e2ab2c
DSH		 3195 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3196 * tell the callback
3197 */
3198 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
121f9e74 3199 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
04e2ab2c
DSH		 3200 {
3201 int r;
3202 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3203 * there is no response.
3204 */
3205 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3206 {
3207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3208 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3209 }
3210 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3211 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3212 if (r == 0)
3213 {
3214 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3215 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3216 }
3217 if (r < 0)
3218 {
3219 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3220 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3221 }
3222 }
3223
52b8dad8
BM		 3224 switch (ret)
3225 {
58ece833
BM		 3226 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3227 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3228 return -1;
3229
3230 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3231 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3232 return 1;
3233
3234 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3235 s->servername_done=0;
3236 default:
3237 return 1;
52b8dad8 3238 }
f1fd4544 3239 }
33273721 3240
09e4e4b9
DSH		 3241int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3242 {
3243 int al = -1;
3244 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3245 return 1;
3246 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3247 {
3248 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3249 return 0;
3250 }
3251
3252 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3253 {
3254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3255 return 0;
3256 }
3257 return 1;
3258}
3259
c519e89f
BM		 3260/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3261 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3262 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3263 *
3264 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3265 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3266 * extension, if any.
3267 * len: the length of the session ID.
3268 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3269 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3270 * point to the resulting session.
3271 *
3272 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3273 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3274 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3275 *
3276 * Returns:
3277 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3278 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3279 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3280 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3281 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3282 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3283 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3284 *
3285 * Side effects:
3286 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3287 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3288 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3289 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3290 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3291 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
6434abbf 3292 */
6434abbf 3293int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
c519e89f 3294 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
6434abbf
DSH		 3295 {
3296 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3297 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3298 unsigned short i;
e8da6a1d 3299
c519e89f
BM		 3300 *ret = NULL;
3301 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3302
e8da6a1d 3303 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
c519e89f
BM		 3304 * to permit stateful resumption.
3305 */
b362ccab 3306 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
c519e89f 3307 return 0;
6434abbf 3308 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
c519e89f 3309 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3310 if (p >= limit)
3311 return -1;
07a9d1a2 3312 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
cbd64894 3313 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
07a9d1a2
DSH		 3314 {
3315 i = *(p++);
3316 p+= i;
3317 if (p >= limit)
3318 return -1;
3319 }
6434abbf
DSH		 3320 /* Skip past cipher list */
3321 n2s(p, i);
3322 p+= i;
3323 if (p >= limit)
3324 return -1;
3325 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3326 i = *(p++);
3327 p += i;
3328 if (p > limit)
3329 return -1;
3330 /* Now at start of extensions */
3331 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
c519e89f 3332 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3333 n2s(p, i);
3334 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3335 {
3336 unsigned short type, size;
3337 n2s(p, type);
3338 n2s(p, size);
3339 if (p + size > limit)
c519e89f 3340 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3341 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3342 {
c519e89f 3343 int r;
6434abbf
DSH		 3344 if (size == 0)
3345 {
c519e89f
BM		 3346 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3347 * currently have one. */
6434abbf 3348 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
c519e89f 3349 return 1;
6434abbf 3350 }
12bf56c0
DSH		 3351 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3352 {
c519e89f
BM		 3353 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3354 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3355 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3356 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3357 * calculate the master secret later. */
3358 return 2;
3359 }
3360 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3361 switch (r)
3362 {
3363 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3364 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3365 return 2;
3366 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3367 return r;
3368 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3369 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3370 return 3;
3371 default: /* fatal error */
3372 return -1;
12bf56c0 3373 }
6434abbf
DSH		 3374 }
3375 p += size;
3376 }
c519e89f 3377 return 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3378 }
3379
c519e89f
BM		 3380/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3381 *
3382 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3383 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3384 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3385 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3386 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3387 * point to the resulting session.
3388 *
3389 * Returns:
3390 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3391 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3392 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3393 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3394 */
6434abbf
DSH		 3395static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3396 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3397 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3398 {
3399 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3400 unsigned char *sdec;
3401 const unsigned char *p;
8a2062fe 3402 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
6434abbf
DSH		 3403 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3404 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3405 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
661dc143 3406 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3407 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3408 if (eticklen < 48)
c519e89f 3409 return 2;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3410 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3411 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3412 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
661dc143 3413 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
8a2062fe
DSH		 3414 {
3415 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
661dc143 3416 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
8a2062fe
DSH		 3417 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3418 if (rv < 0)
3419 return -1;
3420 if (rv == 0)
c519e89f 3421 return 2;
8a2062fe
DSH		 3422 if (rv == 2)
3423 renew_ticket = 1;
3424 }
3425 else
3426 {
3427 /* Check key name matches */
661dc143 3428 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
c519e89f 3429 return 2;
661dc143 3430 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
8a2062fe
DSH		 3431 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3432 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
661dc143 3433 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
8a2062fe 3434 }
6434abbf 3435 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
c519e89f
BM		 3436 * integrity checks on ticket.
3437 */
8a2062fe 3438 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
0eab41fb
BL		 3439 if (mlen < 0)
3440 {
3441 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3442 return -1;
3443 }
6434abbf 3444 eticklen -= mlen;
6434abbf 3445 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
6434abbf
DSH		 3446 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3447 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3448 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
7c770d57 3449 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
c519e89f 3450 return 2;
6434abbf 3451 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
6434abbf 3452 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
8a2062fe
DSH		 3453 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3454 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
6434abbf
DSH		 3455 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3456 if (!sdec)
3457 {
3458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3459 return -1;
3460 }
3461 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3462 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
44724bee
DSH		 3463 {
3464 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3465 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
c519e89f 3466 return 2;
44724bee 3467 }
6434abbf
DSH		 3468 slen += mlen;
3469 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3470 p = sdec;
c519e89f 3471
6434abbf
DSH		 3472 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3473 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3474 if (sess)
3475 {
c519e89f
BM		 3476 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3477 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3478 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3479 * as required by standard.
3480 */
6434abbf
DSH		 3481 if (sesslen)
3482 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3483 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3484 *psess = sess;
c519e89f
BM		 3485 if (renew_ticket)
3486 return 4;
3487 else
3488 return 3;
6434abbf 3489 }
c519e89f
BM		 3490 ERR_clear_error();
3491 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3492 * ticket. */
3493 return 2;
6434abbf 3494 }
6434abbf 3495
6b7be581
DSH		 3496/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3497
3498typedef struct
3499 {
3500 int nid;
3501 int id;
3502 } tls12_lookup;
3503
3504static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
6b7be581 3505 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
6b7be581 3506 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
6b7be581
DSH		 3507 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3508 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
6b7be581
DSH		 3509 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3510 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
6b7be581
DSH		 3511};
3512
3513static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
6b7be581 3514 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
6b7be581 3515 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
6b7be581 3516 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
6b7be581
DSH		 3517};
3518
3519static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3520 {
3521 size_t i;
3522 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3523 {
3524 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3525 return table[i].id;
3526 }
3527 return -1;
3528 }
e7f8ff43 3529
6b7be581
DSH		 3530static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3531 {
3532 size_t i;
3533 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3534 {
e7f8ff43 3535 if ((table[i].id) == id)
6b7be581
DSH		 3536 return table[i].nid;
3537 }
e7f8ff43 3538 return NID_undef;
6b7be581 3539 }
a2f9200f
DSH		 3540
3541int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
6b7be581
DSH		 3542 {
3543 int sig_id, md_id;
1db5f356
DSH		 3544 if (!md)
3545 return 0;
6b7be581
DSH		 3546 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3547 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3548 if (md_id == -1)
3549 return 0;
a2f9200f 3550 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
6b7be581
DSH		 3551 if (sig_id == -1)
3552 return 0;
3553 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3554 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3555 return 1;
3556 }
3557
a2f9200f
DSH		 3558int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3559 {
3560 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3561 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3562 }
3563
b362ccab 3564typedef struct
a2f9200f 3565 {
b362ccab
DSH		 3566 int nid;
3567 int secbits;
3568 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3569 } tls12_hash_info;
3570
3571static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3572#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3573 {NID_md5, 64, 0},
3574#else
3575 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
ebc5e72f 3576#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 3577#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3578 {NID_sha1, 80, 0},
3579#else
3580 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
a2f9200f 3581#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 3582#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3583 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3584 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3585#else
3586 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3587 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
a2f9200f 3588#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 3589#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3590 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3591 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3592#else
3593 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3594 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
a2f9200f 3595#endif
b362ccab 3596};
a2f9200f 3597
b362ccab
DSH		 3598static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3599 {
3600 if (hash_alg == 0)
3601 return NULL;
3602 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
a2f9200f 3603 return NULL;
b362ccab
DSH		 3604 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3605 }
a2f9200f 3606
b362ccab
DSH		 3607const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3608 {
3609 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3610#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3611 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3612 return NULL;
3613#endif
3614 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3615 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3616 return NULL;
3617 return inf->mfunc();
a2f9200f
DSH		 3618 }
3619
4453cd8c
DSH		 3620static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3621 {
3622 switch(sig_alg)
3623 {
3624#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3625 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3626 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3627#endif
3628#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3629 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3630 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3631#endif
3632#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3633 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3634 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3635#endif
3636 }
3637 return -1;
3638 }
3639
3640/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3641static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3642 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3643 {
8e2a06bf 3644 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
4453cd8c
DSH		 3645 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3646 return;
3647 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3648 {
3649 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3650 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3651 if (phash_nid)
3652 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3653 }
3654 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3655 {
3656 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3657 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3658 if (psign_nid)
3659 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3660 }
3661 if (psignhash_nid)
3662 {
3663 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3664 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3665 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3666 else
3667 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3668 }
3669 }
b362ccab
DSH		 3670/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3671static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3672 {
3673 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3674 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3675 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3676 return 0;
3677 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3678 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3679 return 0;
3680 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3681 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3682 }
3683
3684/* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3685 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3686 * then RSA is disabled.
3687 */
3688
3689void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3690 {
3691 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3692 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3693 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3694 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3695 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3696 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3697 * if we have to.
3698 */
3699 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3700 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3701 {
3702 switch(sigalgs[1])
3703 {
3704#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3705 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3706 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3707 have_rsa = 1;
3708 break;
3709#endif
3710#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3711 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3712 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3713 have_dsa = 1;
3714 break;
3715#endif
3716#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3717 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3718 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3719 have_ecdsa = 1;
3720 break;
3721#endif
3722 }
3723 }
3724 if (!have_rsa)
3725 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3726 if (!have_dsa)
3727 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3728 if (!have_ecdsa)
3729 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3730 }
3731
3732size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3733 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3734 {
3735 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3736 size_t i;
3737 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3738 {
3739 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3740 {
3741 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3742 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3743 }
3744 }
3745 return tmpout - out;
3746 }
3747
4453cd8c 3748/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
b362ccab 3749static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
4453cd8c
DSH		 3750 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3751 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3752 {
3753 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3754 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3755 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3756 {
3757 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
b362ccab 3758 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
4453cd8c
DSH		 3759 continue;
3760 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3761 {
3762 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3763 {
3764 nmatch++;
3765 if (shsig)
3766 {
3767 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3768 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3769 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3770 &shsig->sign_nid,
3771 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3772 ptmp);
3773 shsig++;
3774 }
3775 break;
3776 }
3777 }
3778 }
3779 return nmatch;
3780 }
3781
3782/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3783static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3784 {
3785 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3786 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3787 size_t nmatch;
3788 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3789 CERT *c = s->cert;
2ea80354 3790 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
4563da1d
DSH		 3791 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3792 {
3793 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3794 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3795 }
3dbc46df 3796 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2ea80354 3797 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3dbc46df
DSH		 3798 {
3799 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3800 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3801 }
2ea80354 3802 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3dbc46df
DSH		 3803 {
3804 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
4453cd8c 3805 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3dbc46df 3806 }
4453cd8c 3807 else
2ea80354
DSH		 3808 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3809 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
4453cd8c
DSH		 3810 {
3811 pref = conf;
3812 preflen = conflen;
3813 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3814 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3815 }
3816 else
3817 {
3818 allow = conf;
3819 allowlen = conflen;
3820 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3821 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3822 }
b362ccab 3823 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
4453cd8c
DSH		 3824 if (!nmatch)
3825 return 1;
3826 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3827 if (!salgs)
3828 return 0;
b362ccab 3829 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
4453cd8c
DSH		 3830 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3831 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3832 return 1;
3833 }
3834
3835
6b7be581
DSH		 3836/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3837
8f829124 3838int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
6b7be581 3839 {
4453cd8c
DSH		 3840 int idx;
3841 size_t i;
6b7be581
DSH		 3842 const EVP_MD *md;
3843 CERT *c = s->cert;
e7f8ff43 3844 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
cbd64894
DSH		 3845 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3846 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
6b7be581 3847 return 1;
8f829124
DSH		 3848 /* Should never happen */
3849 if (!c)
3850 return 0;
6b7be581 3851
4563da1d
DSH		 3852 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3853 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
4453cd8c 3854 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
0f229cce 3855 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
e7f8ff43 3856 return 0;
4453cd8c
DSH		 3857 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3858 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
6b7be581 3859
4453cd8c 3860 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
6b7be581 3861
ed83ba53 3862#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
ddd13d67 3863 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 3864 {
3865 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3866 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3867 */
3868 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3869 if (s->server)
3870 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3871 else
3872 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3873 if (sigs)
3874 {
3875 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3876 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3877 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3878 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3879 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3880 {
3881 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3882 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3883 }
3884 }
3885 }
3886#endif
3887
4453cd8c
DSH		 3888 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3889 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3890 {
3891 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3892 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
6b7be581 3893 {
e7f8ff43 3894 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
4453cd8c 3895 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
6dbb6219 3896 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4453cd8c 3897 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
6dbb6219
DSH		 3898 {
3899 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4453cd8c 3900 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
6dbb6219 3901 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3902 }
3903
6b7be581 3904 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 3905 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3906 * use the certificate for signing.
6b7be581 3907 */
2ea80354 3908 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
d61ff83b
DSH		 3909 {
3910 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3911 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3912 */
6b7be581 3913#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3914 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3915 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
6b7be581
DSH		 3916#endif
3917#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3918 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3919 {
3920 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3921 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3922 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3923#endif
3924#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
d61ff83b
DSH		 3925 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3926 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
6b7be581 3927#endif
d61ff83b 3928 }
6b7be581
DSH		 3929 return 1;
3930 }
3931
4817504d 3932
e7f8ff43 3933int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
4453cd8c 3934 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3935 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3936 {
4453cd8c
DSH		 3937 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3938 if (psig == NULL)
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3939 return 0;
3940 if (idx >= 0)
3941 {
4453cd8c 3942 idx <<= 1;
0f229cce 3943 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
e7f8ff43 3944 return 0;
4453cd8c 3945 psig += idx;
e7f8ff43 3946 if (rhash)
4453cd8c
DSH		 3947 *rhash = psig[0];
3948 if (rsig)
3949 *rsig = psig[1];
3950 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
e7f8ff43 3951 }
4453cd8c
DSH		 3952 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3953 }
3954
3955int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3956 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3957 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3958 {
3959 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3960 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3961 return 0;
3962 shsigalgs += idx;
3963 if (phash)
3964 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3965 if (psign)
3966 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3967 if (psignhash)
3968 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3969 if (rsig)
3970 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3971 if (rhash)
3972 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3973 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
e7f8ff43
DSH		 3974 }
3975
3976
4817504d
DSH		 3977#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3978int
3979tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3980 {
3981 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3982 unsigned short hbtype;
3983 unsigned int payload;
3984 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3985
4817504d
DSH		 3986 if (s->msg_callback)
3987 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3988 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3989 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3990
731f4314
DSH		 3991 /* Read type and payload length first */
3992 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3993 return 0; /* silently discard */
3994 hbtype = *p++;
3995 n2s(p, payload);
3996 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3997 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3998 pl = p;
3999
4817504d
DSH		 4000 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4001 {
4002 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4003 int r;
4004
4005 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4006 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4007 * payload, plus padding
4008 */
4009 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4010 bp = buffer;
4011
4012 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4013 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4014 s2n(payload, bp);
4015 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
57cb030c
DSH		 4016 bp += payload;
4017 /* Random padding */
4018 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4019
4817504d
DSH		 4020 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4021
4022 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4023 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4024 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4025 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4026
4027 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4028
4029 if (r < 0)
4030 return r;
4031 }
4032 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4033 {
4034 unsigned int seq;
4035
4036 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4037 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4038 * sequence number */
4039 n2s(pl, seq);
4040
4041 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4042 {
4043 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
4044 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4045 }
4046 }
4047
4048 return 0;
4049 }
4050
4051int
4052tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4053 {
4054 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4055 int ret;
4056 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4057 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4058
4059 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4060 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4061 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4062 {
4063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4064 return -1;
4065 }
4066
4067 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4068 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4069 {
4070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4071 return -1;
4072 }
4073
4074 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4075 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4076 {
4077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4078 return -1;
4079 }
4080
4081 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4082 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4083 */
4084 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4085
4086 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4087 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4088 * some random stuff.
4089 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4090 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4091 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4092 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4093 * - Padding
4094 */
4095 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4096 p = buf;
4097 /* Message Type */
4098 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4099 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4100 s2n(payload, p);
4101 /* Sequence number */
4102 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4103 /* 16 random bytes */
4104 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4105 p += 16;
4106 /* Random padding */
4107 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4108
4109 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4110 if (ret >= 0)
4111 {
4112 if (s->msg_callback)
4113 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4114 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4115 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4116
4117 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4118 }
4119
4120 OPENSSL_free(buf);
4121
4122 return ret;
4123 }
4124#endif
0f229cce 4125
4453cd8c 4126#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
0f229cce
DSH		 4127
4128typedef struct
4129 {
4130 size_t sigalgcnt;
4131 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4132 } sig_cb_st;
4133
4134static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4135 {
4136 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4137 size_t i;
4138 char etmp[20], *p;
4139 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4140 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4141 return 0;
4142 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4143 return 0;
4144 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4145 etmp[len] = 0;
4146 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4147 if (!p)
4148 return 0;
4149 *p = 0;
4150 p++;
4151 if (!*p)
4152 return 0;
4153
4154 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4155 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4156 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4157 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4158 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4159 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4160 else return 0;
4161
4162 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4163 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4164 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4165 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4166 return 0;
4167
4168 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4169 {
4170 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4171 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4172 return 0;
4173 }
4174 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4175 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4176 return 1;
4177 }
4178
4179/* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4180 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3dbc46df 4181int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
0f229cce
DSH		 4182 {
4183 sig_cb_st sig;
4184 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
4185 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4186 return 0;
8bb870df
DSH		 4187 if (c == NULL)
4188 return 1;
3dbc46df 4189 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
0f229cce
DSH		 4190 }
4191
3dbc46df 4192int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
0f229cce 4193 {
4453cd8c 4194 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
0f229cce
DSH		 4195 int rhash, rsign;
4196 size_t i;
4197 if (salglen & 1)
4198 return 0;
4453cd8c 4199 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
0f229cce
DSH		 4200 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4201 return 0;
4453cd8c 4202 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
0f229cce 4203 {
4453cd8c 4204 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
0f229cce 4205 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4453cd8c 4206 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
0f229cce
DSH		 4207 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4208
4209 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4210 goto err;
4453cd8c
DSH		 4211 *sptr++ = rhash;
4212 *sptr++ = rsign;
0f229cce
DSH		 4213 }
4214
3dbc46df
DSH		 4215 if (client)
4216 {
4217 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4218 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4219 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4220 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4221 }
4222 else
4223 {
4224 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4225 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4226 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4227 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4228 }
0f229cce 4229
0f229cce
DSH		 4230 return 1;
4231
4232 err:
4233 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4234 return 0;
4235 }
4453cd8c 4236
d61ff83b
DSH		 4237static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4238 {
4239 int sig_nid;
4240 size_t i;
4241 if (default_nid == -1)
4242 return 1;
4243 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4244 if (default_nid)
4245 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4246 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4247 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4248 return 1;
4249 return 0;
4250 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4251/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4252static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4253 {
4254 X509_NAME *nm;
4255 int i;
4256 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4257 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4258 {
4259 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4260 return 1;
4261 }
4262 return 0;
4263 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4264
4265/* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
6dbb6219
DSH		 4266 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4267 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4268 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
d61ff83b 4269 */
6dbb6219
DSH		 4270
4271/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4272
4273#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4274 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4275/* Strict mode flags */
4276#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4277 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4278 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4279
d61ff83b
DSH		 4280int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4281 int idx)
4282 {
4283 int i;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4284 int rv = 0;
4285 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4286 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4287 CERT *c = s->cert;
2ea80354
DSH		 4288 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4289 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
d61ff83b
DSH		 4290 if (idx != -1)
4291 {
2ea80354
DSH		 4292 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4293 if (idx == -2)
4294 {
4295 cpk = c->key;
4296 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4297 }
4298 else
4299 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4300 x = cpk->x509;
4301 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4302 chain = cpk->chain;
2ea80354 4303 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4304 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4305 if (!x || !pk)
4306 goto end;
ed83ba53
DSH		 4307#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4308 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
ddd13d67 4309 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
ed83ba53
DSH		 4310 {
4311 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4312 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4313 return rv;
4314 }
4315#endif
d61ff83b
DSH		 4316 }
4317 else
4318 {
6dbb6219
DSH		 4319 if (!x || !pk)
4320 goto end;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4321 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4322 if (idx == -1)
4323 goto end;
6dbb6219 4324 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2ea80354 4325 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
6dbb6219
DSH		 4326 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4327 else
4328 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4329 strict_mode = 1;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4330 }
4331
2ea80354
DSH		 4332 if (suiteb_flags)
4333 {
4334 int ok;
4335 if (check_flags)
4336 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4337 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4338 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4339 {
4340 if (check_flags)
4341 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4342 else
4343 goto end;
4344 }
4345 }
6dbb6219 4346
d61ff83b
DSH		 4347 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4348 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4349 * and strict mode.
4350 */
6dbb6219 4351 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4352 {
4353 int default_nid;
4354 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4355 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4356 default_nid = 0;
4357 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4358 else
4359 {
4360 switch(idx)
4361 {
4362 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4363 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4364 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4365 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4366 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4367 break;
4368
4369 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4370 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4371 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4372 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4373 break;
4374
4375 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4376 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4377 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4378 break;
4379
4380 default:
4381 default_nid = -1;
4382 break;
4383 }
4384 }
4385 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4386 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4387 * sha1.
4388 */
15a70fe5 4389 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4390 {
4391 size_t j;
4392 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4393 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4394 {
4395 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4396 break;
4397 }
4398 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
6dbb6219
DSH		 4399 {
4400 if (check_flags)
4401 goto skip_sigs;
4402 else
4403 goto end;
4404 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4405 }
4406 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4407 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4408 {
4409 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4410 }
4411 else
4412 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4413 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4414 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4415 {
4416 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4417 default_nid))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4418 {
4419 if (check_flags)
4420 {
4421 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4422 break;
4423 }
4424 else
4425 goto end;
4426 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4427 }
4428 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4429 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4430 else if(check_flags)
4431 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4432 skip_sigs:
2ea80354
DSH		 4433 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4434 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4435 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4436 else if (!check_flags)
d61ff83b 4437 goto end;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4438 if (!s->server)
4439 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
d61ff83b 4440 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
6dbb6219 4441 else if (strict_mode)
d61ff83b 4442 {
6dbb6219 4443 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4444 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4445 {
2ea80354
DSH		 4446 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4447 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
6dbb6219
DSH		 4448 {
4449 if (check_flags)
4450 {
4451 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4452 break;
4453 }
4454 else
4455 goto end;
4456 }
4457 }
4458 }
4459 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4460 {
4461 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4462 int check_type = 0;
4463 switch (pk->type)
4464 {
4465 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4466 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4467 break;
4468 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4469 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4470 break;
4471 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4472 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4473 break;
4474 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4475 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4476 {
4477 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4478 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4479 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4480 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4481 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4482 }
4483 }
4484 if (check_type)
4485 {
4486 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4487 int ctypelen;
4488 if (c->ctypes)
4489 {
4490 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4491 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4492 }
4493 else
4494 {
4495 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4496 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4497 }
4498 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4499 {
4500 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4501 {
4502 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4503 break;
4504 }
4505 }
4506 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
d61ff83b
DSH		 4507 goto end;
4508 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4509 else
4510 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4511
4512
4513 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4514
4515 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4516 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4517
4518 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4519 {
4520 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4521 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4522 }
4523 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4524 {
4525 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4526 {
4527 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4528 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4529 {
4530 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4531 break;
4532 }
4533 }
4534 }
4535 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4536 goto end;
d61ff83b 4537 }
6dbb6219
DSH		 4538 else
4539 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4540
4541 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4542 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
d61ff83b
DSH		 4543
4544 end:
6dbb6219
DSH		 4545
4546 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
d61ff83b 4547 {
6dbb6219
DSH		 4548 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4549 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4550 else if (cpk->digest)
d61ff83b 4551 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
6dbb6219
DSH		 4552 }
4553 else
4554 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4555
4556 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4557 * if the chain is invalid.
4558 */
4559 if (!check_flags)
4560 {
4561 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4562 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4563 else
2ea80354
DSH		 4564 {
4565 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4566 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4567 return 0;
4568 }
d61ff83b
DSH		 4569 }
4570 return rv;
4571 }
4572
4573/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4574void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4575 {
4576 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4577 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4578 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4579 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4580 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4581 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4582 }
18d71588
DSH		 4583/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4584int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4585 {
4586 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4587 }
d61ff83b 4588
4453cd8c 4589#endif
09599b52
DSH		 4590
4591#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4592DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4593 {
4594 int dh_secbits = 80;
4595 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4596 return DH_get_1024_160();
4597 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4598 {
4599 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4600 dh_secbits = 128;
4601 else
4602 dh_secbits = 80;
4603 }
4604 else
4605 {
4606 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4607 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4608 }
4609
4610 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4611 {
4612 DH *dhp = DH_new();
4613 if (!dhp)
4614 return NULL;
4615 dhp->g = BN_new();
4616 if (dhp->g)
4617 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4618 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4619 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4620 else
4621 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4622 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4623 {
4624 DH_free(dhp);
4625 return NULL;
4626 }
4627 return dhp;
4628 }
4629 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4630 return DH_get_2048_224();
4631 return DH_get_1024_160();
4632 }
4633#endif
b362ccab
DSH		 4634
4635static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4636 {
4637 int secbits;
4638 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4639 if (pkey)
4640 {
4641 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4642 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4643 }
4644 else
4645 secbits = -1;
4646 if (s)
4647 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4648 else
4649 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4650 }
4651
4652static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4653 {
4654 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4655 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4656 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4657 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4658 {
4659 const EVP_MD *md;
4660 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4661 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4662 }
4663 if (s)
4664 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4665 else
4666 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4667 }
4668
4669int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4670 {
4671 if (vfy)
4672 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4673 if (is_ee)
4674 {
4675 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4676 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4677 }
4678 else
4679 {
4680 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4681 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4682 }
4683 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4684 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4685 return 1;
4686 }
4687
4688/* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4689 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4690 * not sending one to the peer.
4691 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4692 */
4693
4694int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4695 {
4696 int rv, start_idx, i;
4697 if (x == NULL)
4698 {
4699 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4700 start_idx = 1;
4701 }
4702 else
4703 start_idx = 0;
4704
4705 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4706 if (rv != 1)
4707 return rv;
4708
4709 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4710 {
4711 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4712 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4713 if (rv != 1)
4714 return rv;
4715 }
4716 return 1;
4717 }
A mirror of the official openssl repository