]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
1 | /* | |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
10 | #include <stdio.h> | |
11 | #include <limits.h> | |
12 | #include <errno.h> | |
13 | #include "../ssl_local.h" | |
14 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
15 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
16 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
17 | #include "record_local.h" | |
18 | #include "internal/packet.h" | |
19 | ||
20 | #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \ | |
21 | !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \ | |
22 | defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ | |
23 | defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \ | |
24 | ) | |
25 | # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK | |
26 | # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0 | |
27 | #endif | |
28 | ||
29 | void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s) | |
30 | { | |
31 | rl->s = s; | |
32 | RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer); | |
33 | SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); | |
34 | } | |
35 | ||
36 | void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) | |
37 | { | |
38 | rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; | |
39 | ||
40 | /* | |
41 | * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not | |
42 | * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is | |
43 | * that right? | |
44 | */ | |
45 | ||
46 | rl->packet = NULL; | |
47 | rl->packet_length = 0; | |
48 | rl->wnum = 0; | |
49 | memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment)); | |
50 | rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0; | |
51 | rl->wpend_tot = 0; | |
52 | rl->wpend_type = 0; | |
53 | rl->wpend_ret = 0; | |
54 | rl->wpend_buf = NULL; | |
55 | ||
56 | SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf); | |
57 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); | |
58 | rl->numrpipes = 0; | |
59 | SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); | |
60 | ||
61 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl); | |
62 | RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl); | |
63 | ||
64 | if (rl->d) | |
65 | DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); | |
66 | } | |
67 | ||
68 | void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl) | |
69 | { | |
70 | if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf)) | |
71 | ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s); | |
72 | if (rl->numwpipes > 0) | |
73 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s); | |
74 | SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); | |
75 | } | |
76 | ||
77 | /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */ | |
78 | int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) | |
79 | { | |
80 | return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0; | |
81 | } | |
82 | ||
83 | /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */ | |
84 | int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) | |
85 | { | |
86 | size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl); | |
87 | const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec; | |
88 | ||
89 | while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec])) | |
90 | curr_rec++; | |
91 | ||
92 | return curr_rec < num_recs; | |
93 | } | |
94 | ||
95 | int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) | |
96 | { | |
97 | return (rl->numwpipes > 0) | |
98 | && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0; | |
99 | } | |
100 | ||
101 | void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) | |
102 | { | |
103 | memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence)); | |
104 | } | |
105 | ||
106 | void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl) | |
107 | { | |
108 | memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence)); | |
109 | } | |
110 | ||
111 | size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) | |
112 | { | |
113 | size_t i, num = 0; | |
114 | ||
115 | if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) | |
116 | return 0; | |
117 | ||
118 | for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) { | |
119 | if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]) | |
120 | != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) | |
121 | return 0; | |
122 | num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]); | |
123 | } | |
124 | ||
125 | return num; | |
126 | } | |
127 | ||
128 | void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len) | |
129 | { | |
130 | ctx->default_read_buf_len = len; | |
131 | } | |
132 | ||
133 | void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len) | |
134 | { | |
135 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len); | |
136 | } | |
137 | ||
138 | const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s) | |
139 | { | |
140 | switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { | |
141 | case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: | |
142 | return "read header"; | |
143 | case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: | |
144 | return "read body"; | |
145 | case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: | |
146 | return "read done"; | |
147 | default: | |
148 | return "unknown"; | |
149 | } | |
150 | } | |
151 | ||
152 | const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s) | |
153 | { | |
154 | switch (s->rlayer.rstate) { | |
155 | case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER: | |
156 | return "RH"; | |
157 | case SSL_ST_READ_BODY: | |
158 | return "RB"; | |
159 | case SSL_ST_READ_DONE: | |
160 | return "RD"; | |
161 | default: | |
162 | return "unknown"; | |
163 | } | |
164 | } | |
165 | ||
166 | /* | |
167 | * Return values are as per SSL_read() | |
168 | */ | |
169 | int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold, | |
170 | size_t *readbytes) | |
171 | { | |
172 | /* | |
173 | * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase | |
174 | * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of | |
175 | * s->s3.rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If | |
176 | * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus | |
177 | * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) | |
178 | * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if | |
179 | * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were | |
180 | */ | |
181 | size_t len, left, align = 0; | |
182 | unsigned char *pkt; | |
183 | SSL3_BUFFER *rb; | |
184 | ||
185 | if (n == 0) | |
186 | return 0; | |
187 | ||
188 | rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf; | |
189 | if (rb->buf == NULL) | |
190 | if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { | |
191 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
192 | return -1; | |
193 | } | |
194 | ||
195 | left = rb->left; | |
196 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 | |
197 | align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
198 | align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); | |
199 | #endif | |
200 | ||
201 | if (!extend) { | |
202 | /* start with empty packet ... */ | |
203 | if (left == 0) | |
204 | rb->offset = align; | |
205 | else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
206 | /* | |
207 | * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload | |
208 | * alignment... | |
209 | */ | |
210 | pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; | |
211 | if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA | |
212 | && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { | |
213 | /* | |
214 | * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field | |
215 | * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about | |
216 | * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no | |
217 | * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer | |
218 | * overrun can be triggered. | |
219 | */ | |
220 | memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); | |
221 | rb->offset = align; | |
222 | } | |
223 | } | |
224 | s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; | |
225 | s->rlayer.packet_length = 0; | |
226 | /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ | |
227 | } | |
228 | ||
229 | len = s->rlayer.packet_length; | |
230 | pkt = rb->buf + align; | |
231 | /* | |
232 | * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already | |
233 | * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end | |
234 | */ | |
235 | if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { | |
236 | memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left); | |
237 | s->rlayer.packet = pkt; | |
238 | rb->offset = len + align; | |
239 | } | |
240 | ||
241 | /* | |
242 | * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read | |
243 | * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into | |
244 | * the buffer). | |
245 | */ | |
246 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
247 | if (left == 0 && extend) | |
248 | return 0; | |
249 | if (left > 0 && n > left) | |
250 | n = left; | |
251 | } | |
252 | ||
253 | /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ | |
254 | if (left >= n) { | |
255 | s->rlayer.packet_length += n; | |
256 | rb->left = left - n; | |
257 | rb->offset += n; | |
258 | *readbytes = n; | |
259 | return 1; | |
260 | } | |
261 | ||
262 | /* else we need to read more data */ | |
263 | ||
264 | if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { | |
265 | /* does not happen */ | |
266 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, | |
267 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
268 | return -1; | |
269 | } | |
270 | ||
271 | /* | |
272 | * Ktls always reads full records. | |
273 | * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS. | |
274 | */ | |
275 | if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !s->rlayer.read_ahead | |
276 | && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
277 | /* ignore max parameter */ | |
278 | max = n; | |
279 | } else { | |
280 | if (max < n) | |
281 | max = n; | |
282 | if (max > rb->len - rb->offset) | |
283 | max = rb->len - rb->offset; | |
284 | } | |
285 | ||
286 | while (left < n) { | |
287 | size_t bioread = 0; | |
288 | int ret; | |
289 | ||
290 | /* | |
291 | * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3.rbuf.buf and | |
292 | * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if | |
293 | * possible) | |
294 | */ | |
295 | ||
296 | clear_sys_error(); | |
297 | if (s->rbio != NULL) { | |
298 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
299 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ | |
300 | ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); | |
301 | if (ret >= 0) | |
302 | bioread = ret; | |
303 | } else { | |
304 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, | |
305 | SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
306 | ret = -1; | |
307 | } | |
308 | ||
309 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
310 | rb->left = left; | |
311 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
312 | if (len + left == 0) | |
313 | ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); | |
314 | return ret; | |
315 | } | |
316 | left += bioread; | |
317 | /* | |
318 | * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the | |
319 | * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to | |
320 | * byte oriented as in the TLS case. | |
321 | */ | |
322 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
323 | if (n > left) | |
324 | n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ | |
325 | } | |
326 | } | |
327 | ||
328 | /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ | |
329 | rb->offset += n; | |
330 | rb->left = left - n; | |
331 | s->rlayer.packet_length += n; | |
332 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
333 | *readbytes = n; | |
334 | return 1; | |
335 | } | |
336 | ||
337 | /* | |
338 | * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if | |
339 | * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. | |
340 | */ | |
341 | int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len, | |
342 | size_t *written) | |
343 | { | |
344 | const unsigned char *buf = buf_; | |
345 | size_t tot; | |
346 | size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes; | |
347 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK | |
348 | size_t nw; | |
349 | #endif | |
350 | SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; | |
351 | int i; | |
352 | size_t tmpwrit; | |
353 | ||
354 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
355 | tot = s->rlayer.wnum; | |
356 | /* | |
357 | * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out | |
358 | * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for | |
359 | * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for | |
360 | * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be | |
361 | * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then | |
362 | * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and | |
363 | * report the error in a way the user will notice | |
364 | */ | |
365 | if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum) | |
366 | || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) { | |
367 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, | |
368 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
369 | return -1; | |
370 | } | |
371 | ||
372 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING | |
373 | && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) { | |
374 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
375 | return -1; | |
376 | } | |
377 | ||
378 | s->rlayer.wnum = 0; | |
379 | ||
380 | /* | |
381 | * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate then go into init unless we | |
382 | * have writes pending - in which case we should finish doing that first. | |
383 | */ | |
384 | if (wb->left == 0 && s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) | |
385 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); | |
386 | ||
387 | /* | |
388 | * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in | |
389 | * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those | |
390 | * messages yet. | |
391 | */ | |
392 | if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) | |
393 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) { | |
394 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
395 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
396 | if (i < 0) | |
397 | return i; | |
398 | if (i == 0) { | |
399 | return -1; | |
400 | } | |
401 | } | |
402 | ||
403 | /* | |
404 | * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This | |
405 | * will happen with non blocking IO | |
406 | */ | |
407 | if (wb->left != 0) { | |
408 | /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ | |
409 | i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot, | |
410 | &tmpwrit); | |
411 | if (i <= 0) { | |
412 | /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ | |
413 | s->rlayer.wnum = tot; | |
414 | return i; | |
415 | } | |
416 | tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */ | |
417 | } | |
418 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK | |
419 | /* | |
420 | * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times* | |
421 | * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate | |
422 | * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the | |
423 | * compromise is considered worthy. | |
424 | */ | |
425 | if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && | |
426 | len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) && | |
427 | s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL && | |
428 | !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && | |
429 | EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) & | |
430 | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) { | |
431 | unsigned char aad[13]; | |
432 | EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; | |
433 | size_t packlen; | |
434 | int packleni; | |
435 | ||
436 | /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */ | |
437 | if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0) | |
438 | max_send_fragment -= 512; | |
439 | ||
440 | if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */ | |
441 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
442 | ||
443 | packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, | |
444 | EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE, | |
445 | (int)max_send_fragment, NULL); | |
446 | ||
447 | if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment) | |
448 | packlen *= 8; | |
449 | else | |
450 | packlen *= 4; | |
451 | ||
452 | if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) { | |
453 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
454 | return -1; | |
455 | } | |
456 | } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */ | |
457 | /* free jumbo buffer */ | |
458 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
459 | *written = tot; | |
460 | return 1; | |
461 | } | |
462 | ||
463 | n = (len - tot); | |
464 | for (;;) { | |
465 | if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) { | |
466 | /* free jumbo buffer */ | |
467 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
468 | break; | |
469 | } | |
470 | ||
471 | if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) { | |
472 | i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
473 | if (i <= 0) { | |
474 | /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ | |
475 | s->rlayer.wnum = tot; | |
476 | return i; | |
477 | } | |
478 | } | |
479 | ||
480 | if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment) | |
481 | nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8); | |
482 | else | |
483 | nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4); | |
484 | ||
485 | memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8); | |
486 | aad[8] = type; | |
487 | aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); | |
488 | aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); | |
489 | aad[11] = 0; | |
490 | aad[12] = 0; | |
491 | mb_param.out = NULL; | |
492 | mb_param.inp = aad; | |
493 | mb_param.len = nw; | |
494 | ||
495 | packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, | |
496 | EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, | |
497 | sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); | |
498 | packlen = (size_t)packleni; | |
499 | if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */ | |
500 | /* free jumbo buffer */ | |
501 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
502 | break; | |
503 | } | |
504 | ||
505 | mb_param.out = wb->buf; | |
506 | mb_param.inp = &buf[tot]; | |
507 | mb_param.len = nw; | |
508 | ||
509 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx, | |
510 | EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, | |
511 | sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0) | |
512 | return -1; | |
513 | ||
514 | s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave; | |
515 | if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) { | |
516 | int j = 6; | |
517 | while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ; | |
518 | } | |
519 | ||
520 | wb->offset = 0; | |
521 | wb->left = packlen; | |
522 | ||
523 | s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw; | |
524 | s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot]; | |
525 | s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; | |
526 | s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw; | |
527 | ||
528 | i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit); | |
529 | if (i <= 0) { | |
530 | /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ | |
531 | if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) { | |
532 | /* free jumbo buffer */ | |
533 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
534 | } | |
535 | s->rlayer.wnum = tot; | |
536 | return i; | |
537 | } | |
538 | if (tmpwrit == n) { | |
539 | /* free jumbo buffer */ | |
540 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
541 | *written = tot + tmpwrit; | |
542 | return 1; | |
543 | } | |
544 | n -= tmpwrit; | |
545 | tot += tmpwrit; | |
546 | } | |
547 | } else | |
548 | #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */ | |
549 | if (tot == len) { /* done? */ | |
550 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
551 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
552 | ||
553 | *written = tot; | |
554 | return 1; | |
555 | } | |
556 | ||
557 | n = (len - tot); | |
558 | ||
559 | max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); | |
560 | split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s); | |
561 | /* | |
562 | * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to | |
563 | * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined | |
564 | * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using | |
565 | * explicit IVs | |
566 | */ | |
567 | maxpipes = s->max_pipelines; | |
568 | if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) { | |
569 | /* | |
570 | * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we | |
571 | * shouldn't get here | |
572 | */ | |
573 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, | |
574 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
575 | return -1; | |
576 | } | |
577 | if (maxpipes == 0 | |
578 | || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL | |
579 | || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) | |
580 | & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) | |
581 | || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) | |
582 | maxpipes = 1; | |
583 | if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0 | |
584 | || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) { | |
585 | /* | |
586 | * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send | |
587 | * fragments so we shouldn't get here | |
588 | */ | |
589 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, | |
590 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
591 | return -1; | |
592 | } | |
593 | ||
594 | for (;;) { | |
595 | size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain; | |
596 | size_t numpipes, j; | |
597 | ||
598 | if (n == 0) | |
599 | numpipes = 1; | |
600 | else | |
601 | numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1; | |
602 | if (numpipes > maxpipes) | |
603 | numpipes = maxpipes; | |
604 | ||
605 | if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) { | |
606 | /* | |
607 | * We have enough data to completely fill all available | |
608 | * pipelines | |
609 | */ | |
610 | for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { | |
611 | pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment; | |
612 | } | |
613 | } else { | |
614 | /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */ | |
615 | tmppipelen = n / numpipes; | |
616 | remain = n % numpipes; | |
617 | for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { | |
618 | pipelens[j] = tmppipelen; | |
619 | if (j < remain) | |
620 | pipelens[j]++; | |
621 | } | |
622 | } | |
623 | ||
624 | i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0, | |
625 | &tmpwrit); | |
626 | if (i <= 0) { | |
627 | /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ | |
628 | /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */ | |
629 | s->rlayer.wnum = tot; | |
630 | return i; | |
631 | } | |
632 | ||
633 | if (tmpwrit == n || | |
634 | (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && | |
635 | (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { | |
636 | /* | |
637 | * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment | |
638 | * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: | |
639 | */ | |
640 | s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 0; | |
641 | ||
642 | if (tmpwrit == n | |
643 | && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0 | |
644 | && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
645 | ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
646 | ||
647 | *written = tot + tmpwrit; | |
648 | return 1; | |
649 | } | |
650 | ||
651 | n -= tmpwrit; | |
652 | tot += tmpwrit; | |
653 | } | |
654 | } | |
655 | ||
656 | int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, | |
657 | size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes, | |
658 | int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written) | |
659 | { | |
660 | WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; | |
661 | SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; | |
662 | WPACKET *thispkt; | |
663 | SSL3_RECORD *thiswr; | |
664 | unsigned char *recordstart; | |
665 | int i, mac_size, clear = 0; | |
666 | size_t prefix_len = 0; | |
667 | int eivlen = 0; | |
668 | size_t align = 0; | |
669 | SSL3_BUFFER *wb; | |
670 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
671 | size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0; | |
672 | size_t j; | |
673 | ||
674 | for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) | |
675 | totlen += pipelens[j]; | |
676 | /* | |
677 | * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This | |
678 | * will happen with non blocking IO | |
679 | */ | |
680 | if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
681 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ | |
682 | return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); | |
683 | } | |
684 | ||
685 | /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ | |
686 | if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) { | |
687 | i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
688 | if (i <= 0) { | |
689 | /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ | |
690 | return i; | |
691 | } | |
692 | /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ | |
693 | } | |
694 | ||
695 | if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) { | |
696 | if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) { | |
697 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
698 | return -1; | |
699 | } | |
700 | } | |
701 | ||
702 | if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) | |
703 | return 0; | |
704 | ||
705 | sess = s->session; | |
706 | ||
707 | if ((sess == NULL) || | |
708 | (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) { | |
709 | clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */ | |
710 | mac_size = 0; | |
711 | } else { | |
712 | /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */ | |
713 | mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); | |
714 | if (mac_size < 0) { | |
715 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
716 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
717 | goto err; | |
718 | } | |
719 | } | |
720 | ||
721 | /* | |
722 | * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself | |
723 | */ | |
724 | if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3.empty_fragment_done) { | |
725 | /* | |
726 | * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see | |
727 | * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) | |
728 | */ | |
729 | ||
730 | if (s->s3.need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | |
731 | /* | |
732 | * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this | |
733 | * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these | |
734 | * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual | |
735 | * payload) | |
736 | */ | |
737 | size_t tmppipelen = 0; | |
738 | int ret; | |
739 | ||
740 | ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len); | |
741 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
742 | /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ | |
743 | goto err; | |
744 | } | |
745 | ||
746 | if (prefix_len > | |
747 | (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) { | |
748 | /* insufficient space */ | |
749 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
750 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
751 | goto err; | |
752 | } | |
753 | } | |
754 | ||
755 | s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 1; | |
756 | } | |
757 | ||
758 | if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { | |
759 | /* | |
760 | * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to | |
761 | * discard the const qualifier. | |
762 | * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when | |
763 | * switching to ktls. | |
764 | */ | |
765 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], (unsigned char *)buf); | |
766 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 0); | |
767 | goto wpacket_init_complete; | |
768 | } | |
769 | ||
770 | if (create_empty_fragment) { | |
771 | wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; | |
772 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0 | |
773 | /* | |
774 | * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be | |
775 | * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real | |
776 | * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers. | |
777 | */ | |
778 | align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
779 | align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); | |
780 | #endif | |
781 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); | |
782 | if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), | |
783 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) | |
784 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) { | |
785 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
786 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
787 | goto err; | |
788 | } | |
789 | wpinited = 1; | |
790 | } else if (prefix_len) { | |
791 | wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0]; | |
792 | if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], | |
793 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), | |
794 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) | |
795 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) | |
796 | + prefix_len, NULL)) { | |
797 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
798 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
799 | goto err; | |
800 | } | |
801 | wpinited = 1; | |
802 | } else { | |
803 | for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { | |
804 | thispkt = &pkt[j]; | |
805 | ||
806 | wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j]; | |
807 | #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0 | |
808 | align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
809 | align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD); | |
810 | #endif | |
811 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align); | |
812 | if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb), | |
813 | SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0) | |
814 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) { | |
815 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
816 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
817 | goto err; | |
818 | } | |
819 | wpinited++; | |
820 | } | |
821 | } | |
822 | ||
823 | /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */ | |
824 | if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) { | |
825 | int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
826 | if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { | |
827 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */ | |
828 | eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
829 | if (eivlen <= 1) | |
830 | eivlen = 0; | |
831 | } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { | |
832 | /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ | |
833 | eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
834 | } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { | |
835 | eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
836 | } | |
837 | } | |
838 | ||
839 | wpacket_init_complete: | |
840 | ||
841 | totlen = 0; | |
842 | /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */ | |
843 | memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr)); | |
844 | for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { | |
845 | unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION | |
846 | : s->version; | |
847 | unsigned char *compressdata = NULL; | |
848 | size_t maxcomplen; | |
849 | unsigned int rectype; | |
850 | ||
851 | thispkt = &pkt[j]; | |
852 | thiswr = &wr[j]; | |
853 | ||
854 | /* | |
855 | * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the | |
856 | * record type | |
857 | */ | |
858 | if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) | |
859 | && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL | |
860 | && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS | |
861 | || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) | |
862 | rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA; | |
863 | else | |
864 | rectype = type; | |
865 | SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype); | |
866 | ||
867 | /* | |
868 | * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes | |
869 | * and record version number > TLS 1.0 | |
870 | */ | |
871 | if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO | |
872 | && !s->renegotiate | |
873 | && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION | |
874 | && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) | |
875 | version = TLS1_VERSION; | |
876 | SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version); | |
877 | ||
878 | maxcomplen = pipelens[j]; | |
879 | if (s->compress != NULL) | |
880 | maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; | |
881 | ||
882 | /* | |
883 | * When using offload kernel will write the header. | |
884 | * Otherwise write the header now | |
885 | */ | |
886 | if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) | |
887 | && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype) | |
888 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version) | |
889 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt) | |
890 | || (eivlen > 0 | |
891 | && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL)) | |
892 | || (maxcomplen > 0 | |
893 | && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen, | |
894 | &compressdata)))) { | |
895 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
896 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
897 | goto err; | |
898 | } | |
899 | ||
900 | /* lets setup the record stuff. */ | |
901 | SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata); | |
902 | SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]); | |
903 | SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]); | |
904 | totlen += pipelens[j]; | |
905 | ||
906 | /* | |
907 | * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into | |
908 | * thiswr->data | |
909 | */ | |
910 | ||
911 | /* first we compress */ | |
912 | if (s->compress != NULL) { | |
913 | if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr) | |
914 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) { | |
915 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
916 | SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); | |
917 | goto err; | |
918 | } | |
919 | } else { | |
920 | if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { | |
921 | SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]); | |
922 | } else { | |
923 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) { | |
924 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
925 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
926 | goto err; | |
927 | } | |
928 | SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]); | |
929 | } | |
930 | } | |
931 | ||
932 | if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) | |
933 | && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL | |
934 | && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS | |
935 | || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { | |
936 | size_t rlen, max_send_fragment; | |
937 | ||
938 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) { | |
939 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
940 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
941 | goto err; | |
942 | } | |
943 | SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1); | |
944 | ||
945 | /* Add TLS1.3 padding */ | |
946 | max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); | |
947 | rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); | |
948 | if (rlen < max_send_fragment) { | |
949 | size_t padding = 0; | |
950 | size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen; | |
951 | if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) { | |
952 | padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg); | |
953 | } else if (s->block_padding > 0) { | |
954 | size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1; | |
955 | size_t remainder; | |
956 | ||
957 | /* optimize for power of 2 */ | |
958 | if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0) | |
959 | remainder = rlen & mask; | |
960 | else | |
961 | remainder = rlen % s->block_padding; | |
962 | /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */ | |
963 | if (remainder == 0) | |
964 | padding = 0; | |
965 | else | |
966 | padding = s->block_padding - remainder; | |
967 | } | |
968 | if (padding > 0) { | |
969 | /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */ | |
970 | if (padding > max_padding) | |
971 | padding = max_padding; | |
972 | if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) { | |
973 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
974 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
975 | goto err; | |
976 | } | |
977 | SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding); | |
978 | } | |
979 | } | |
980 | } | |
981 | ||
982 | /* | |
983 | * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from | |
984 | * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points | |
985 | * in the wb->buf | |
986 | */ | |
987 | ||
988 | if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { | |
989 | unsigned char *mac; | |
990 | ||
991 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) | |
992 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { | |
993 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
994 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
995 | goto err; | |
996 | } | |
997 | } | |
998 | ||
999 | /* | |
1000 | * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption. | |
1001 | * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using | |
1002 | * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case. | |
1003 | */ | |
1004 | if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { | |
1005 | if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, | |
1006 | SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE, | |
1007 | NULL) | |
1008 | /* | |
1009 | * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this | |
1010 | * sub-packet | |
1011 | */ | |
1012 | || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) { | |
1013 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
1014 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1015 | goto err; | |
1016 | } | |
1017 | ||
1018 | /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */ | |
1019 | recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len; | |
1020 | SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart); | |
1021 | SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr); | |
1022 | SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len); | |
1023 | } | |
1024 | } | |
1025 | ||
1026 | if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) { | |
1027 | /* | |
1028 | * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to | |
1029 | * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function. | |
1030 | */ | |
1031 | if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) { | |
1032 | if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { | |
1033 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
1034 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1035 | } | |
1036 | goto err; | |
1037 | } | |
1038 | } else { | |
1039 | if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) { | |
1040 | if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1) { | |
1041 | if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { | |
1042 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
1043 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1044 | } | |
1045 | goto err; | |
1046 | } | |
1047 | } | |
1048 | } | |
1049 | ||
1050 | for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) { | |
1051 | size_t origlen; | |
1052 | ||
1053 | thispkt = &pkt[j]; | |
1054 | thiswr = &wr[j]; | |
1055 | ||
1056 | if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) | |
1057 | goto mac_done; | |
1058 | ||
1059 | /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */ | |
1060 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen) | |
1061 | /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */ | |
1062 | || origlen > thiswr->length | |
1063 | || (thiswr->length > origlen | |
1064 | && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, | |
1065 | thiswr->length - origlen, | |
1066 | NULL))) { | |
1067 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
1068 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1069 | goto err; | |
1070 | } | |
1071 | if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) { | |
1072 | unsigned char *mac; | |
1073 | ||
1074 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac) | |
1075 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) { | |
1076 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
1077 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1078 | goto err; | |
1079 | } | |
1080 | SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size); | |
1081 | } | |
1082 | ||
1083 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len) | |
1084 | || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) { | |
1085 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
1086 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1087 | goto err; | |
1088 | } | |
1089 | ||
1090 | if (s->msg_callback) { | |
1091 | recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len | |
1092 | - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
1093 | s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart, | |
1094 | SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
1095 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1096 | ||
1097 | if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { | |
1098 | unsigned char ctype = type; | |
1099 | ||
1100 | s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, | |
1101 | &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1102 | } | |
1103 | } | |
1104 | ||
1105 | if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) { | |
1106 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
1107 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1108 | goto err; | |
1109 | } | |
1110 | ||
1111 | /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */ | |
1112 | SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
1113 | ||
1114 | if (create_empty_fragment) { | |
1115 | /* | |
1116 | * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write | |
1117 | * out anything here | |
1118 | */ | |
1119 | if (j > 0) { | |
1120 | /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */ | |
1121 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, | |
1122 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1123 | goto err; | |
1124 | } | |
1125 | *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr); | |
1126 | return 1; | |
1127 | } | |
1128 | ||
1129 | mac_done: | |
1130 | /* | |
1131 | * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which | |
1132 | * is thiswr->length long | |
1133 | */ | |
1134 | SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for | |
1135 | * debugging */ | |
1136 | ||
1137 | /* now let's set up wb */ | |
1138 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j], | |
1139 | prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr)); | |
1140 | } | |
1141 | ||
1142 | /* | |
1143 | * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write | |
1144 | * retries later | |
1145 | */ | |
1146 | s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen; | |
1147 | s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; | |
1148 | s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; | |
1149 | s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen; | |
1150 | ||
1151 | /* we now just need to write the buffer */ | |
1152 | return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written); | |
1153 | err: | |
1154 | for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++) | |
1155 | WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]); | |
1156 | return -1; | |
1157 | } | |
1158 | ||
1159 | /* if s->s3.wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this | |
1160 | * | |
1161 | * Return values are as per SSL_write() | |
1162 | */ | |
1163 | int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, | |
1164 | size_t *written) | |
1165 | { | |
1166 | int i; | |
1167 | SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf; | |
1168 | size_t currbuf = 0; | |
1169 | size_t tmpwrit = 0; | |
1170 | ||
1171 | if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len) | |
1172 | || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) | |
1173 | && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf)) | |
1174 | || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) { | |
1175 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, | |
1176 | SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); | |
1177 | return -1; | |
1178 | } | |
1179 | ||
1180 | for (;;) { | |
1181 | /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */ | |
1182 | if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0 | |
1183 | && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) { | |
1184 | currbuf++; | |
1185 | continue; | |
1186 | } | |
1187 | clear_sys_error(); | |
1188 | if (s->wbio != NULL) { | |
1189 | s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; | |
1190 | ||
1191 | /* | |
1192 | * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages, | |
1193 | * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO | |
1194 | */ | |
1195 | if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | |
1196 | i = BIO_flush(s->wbio); | |
1197 | if (i <= 0) | |
1198 | return i; | |
1199 | } | |
1200 | ||
1201 | if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) | |
1202 | && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | |
1203 | BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type); | |
1204 | } | |
1205 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ | |
1206 | i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *) | |
1207 | &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf]) | |
1208 | [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]), | |
1209 | (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])); | |
1210 | if (i >= 0) | |
1211 | tmpwrit = i; | |
1212 | } else { | |
1213 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, | |
1214 | SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
1215 | i = -1; | |
1216 | } | |
1217 | if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) { | |
1218 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); | |
1219 | SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); | |
1220 | if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes) | |
1221 | continue; | |
1222 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1223 | *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret; | |
1224 | return 1; | |
1225 | } else if (i <= 0) { | |
1226 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1227 | /* | |
1228 | * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in | |
1229 | * using a datagram service | |
1230 | */ | |
1231 | SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0); | |
1232 | } | |
1233 | return i; | |
1234 | } | |
1235 | SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); | |
1236 | SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit); | |
1237 | } | |
1238 | } | |
1239 | ||
1240 | /*- | |
1241 | * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. | |
1242 | * 'type' is one of the following: | |
1243 | * | |
1244 | * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) | |
1245 | * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) | |
1246 | * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) | |
1247 | * | |
1248 | * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first | |
1249 | * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). | |
1250 | * | |
1251 | * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as | |
1252 | * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec | |
1253 | * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| | |
1254 | * argument is non NULL. | |
1255 | * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store | |
1256 | * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol | |
1257 | * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): | |
1258 | * Change cipher spec protocol | |
1259 | * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored | |
1260 | * Alert protocol | |
1261 | * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) | |
1262 | * Handshake protocol | |
1263 | * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have | |
1264 | * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages | |
1265 | * here, anything else is handled by higher layers | |
1266 | * Application data protocol | |
1267 | * none of our business | |
1268 | */ | |
1269 | int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, | |
1270 | size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes) | |
1271 | { | |
1272 | int i, j, ret; | |
1273 | size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes; | |
1274 | SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
1275 | SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; | |
1276 | void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; | |
1277 | int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s); | |
1278 | ||
1279 | rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf; | |
1280 | ||
1281 | if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) { | |
1282 | /* Not initialized yet */ | |
1283 | if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { | |
1284 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1285 | return -1; | |
1286 | } | |
1287 | } | |
1288 | ||
1289 | if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) | |
1290 | && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek | |
1291 | && (type != | |
1292 | SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { | |
1293 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1294 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1295 | return -1; | |
1296 | } | |
1297 | ||
1298 | if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) | |
1299 | /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ | |
1300 | { | |
1301 | unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; | |
1302 | unsigned char *dst = buf; | |
1303 | unsigned int k; | |
1304 | ||
1305 | /* peek == 0 */ | |
1306 | n = 0; | |
1307 | while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { | |
1308 | *dst++ = *src++; | |
1309 | len--; | |
1310 | s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--; | |
1311 | n++; | |
1312 | } | |
1313 | /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ | |
1314 | for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++) | |
1315 | s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; | |
1316 | ||
1317 | if (recvd_type != NULL) | |
1318 | *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; | |
1319 | ||
1320 | *readbytes = n; | |
1321 | return 1; | |
1322 | } | |
1323 | ||
1324 | /* | |
1325 | * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. | |
1326 | */ | |
1327 | ||
1328 | if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) { | |
1329 | /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ | |
1330 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
1331 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1332 | if (i < 0) | |
1333 | return i; | |
1334 | if (i == 0) | |
1335 | return -1; | |
1336 | } | |
1337 | start: | |
1338 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1339 | ||
1340 | /*- | |
1341 | * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs] | |
1342 | * rr[i].type - is the type of record | |
1343 | * rr[i].data, - data | |
1344 | * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read | |
1345 | * rr[i].length, - number of bytes. | |
1346 | */ | |
1347 | rr = s->rlayer.rrec; | |
1348 | num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); | |
1349 | ||
1350 | do { | |
1351 | /* get new records if necessary */ | |
1352 | if (num_recs == 0) { | |
1353 | ret = ssl3_get_record(s); | |
1354 | if (ret <= 0) { | |
1355 | /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ | |
1356 | return ret; | |
1357 | } | |
1358 | num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); | |
1359 | if (num_recs == 0) { | |
1360 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1361 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1362 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1363 | return -1; | |
1364 | } | |
1365 | } | |
1366 | /* Skip over any records we have already read */ | |
1367 | for (curr_rec = 0; | |
1368 | curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]); | |
1369 | curr_rec++) ; | |
1370 | if (curr_rec == num_recs) { | |
1371 | RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0); | |
1372 | num_recs = 0; | |
1373 | curr_rec = 0; | |
1374 | } | |
1375 | } while (num_recs == 0); | |
1376 | rr = &rr[curr_rec]; | |
1377 | ||
1378 | if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0 | |
1379 | && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE | |
1380 | && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1381 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1382 | SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA); | |
1383 | return -1; | |
1384 | } | |
1385 | ||
1386 | /* | |
1387 | * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty | |
1388 | * record that isn't an alert. | |
1389 | */ | |
1390 | if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT | |
1391 | && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0) | |
1392 | s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; | |
1393 | ||
1394 | /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ | |
1395 | ||
1396 | if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, | |
1397 | * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ | |
1398 | && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { | |
1399 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1400 | SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); | |
1401 | return -1; | |
1402 | } | |
1403 | ||
1404 | /* | |
1405 | * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in | |
1406 | * 'peek' mode) | |
1407 | */ | |
1408 | if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { | |
1409 | SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); | |
1410 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1411 | return 0; | |
1412 | } | |
1413 | ||
1414 | if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) | |
1415 | || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC | |
1416 | && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL | |
1417 | && !is_tls13)) { | |
1418 | /* | |
1419 | * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or | |
1420 | * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
1421 | * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC | |
1422 | */ | |
1423 | /* | |
1424 | * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are | |
1425 | * doing a handshake for the first time | |
1426 | */ | |
1427 | if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && | |
1428 | (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { | |
1429 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1430 | SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); | |
1431 | return -1; | |
1432 | } | |
1433 | ||
1434 | if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE | |
1435 | && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC | |
1436 | && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { | |
1437 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1438 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1439 | return -1; | |
1440 | } | |
1441 | ||
1442 | if (recvd_type != NULL) | |
1443 | *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr); | |
1444 | ||
1445 | if (len == 0) { | |
1446 | /* | |
1447 | * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to | |
1448 | * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause | |
1449 | * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. | |
1450 | */ | |
1451 | if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) | |
1452 | SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); | |
1453 | return 0; | |
1454 | } | |
1455 | ||
1456 | totalbytes = 0; | |
1457 | do { | |
1458 | if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) | |
1459 | n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); | |
1460 | else | |
1461 | n = len - totalbytes; | |
1462 | ||
1463 | memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); | |
1464 | buf += n; | |
1465 | if (peek) { | |
1466 | /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */ | |
1467 | if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) | |
1468 | SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); | |
1469 | } else { | |
1470 | SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); | |
1471 | SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); | |
1472 | if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) { | |
1473 | s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; | |
1474 | SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0); | |
1475 | SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); | |
1476 | } | |
1477 | } | |
1478 | if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0 | |
1479 | || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) { | |
1480 | curr_rec++; | |
1481 | rr++; | |
1482 | } | |
1483 | totalbytes += n; | |
1484 | } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs | |
1485 | && totalbytes < len); | |
1486 | if (totalbytes == 0) { | |
1487 | /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */ | |
1488 | goto start; | |
1489 | } | |
1490 | if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs | |
1491 | && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) | |
1492 | && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) | |
1493 | ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); | |
1494 | *readbytes = totalbytes; | |
1495 | return 1; | |
1496 | } | |
1497 | ||
1498 | /* | |
1499 | * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, | |
1500 | * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we | |
1501 | * were actually expecting a CCS). | |
1502 | */ | |
1503 | ||
1504 | /* | |
1505 | * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record | |
1506 | */ | |
1507 | if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { | |
1508 | /* | |
1509 | * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2 | |
1510 | * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an | |
1511 | * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to | |
1512 | * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong | |
1513 | */ | |
1514 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1515 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1516 | return -1; | |
1517 | } | |
1518 | ||
1519 | if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION | |
1520 | && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { | |
1521 | /* | |
1522 | * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version | |
1523 | * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing | |
1524 | * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello | |
1525 | * if we are a server. | |
1526 | */ | |
1527 | s->version = rr->rec_version; | |
1528 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1529 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
1530 | return -1; | |
1531 | } | |
1532 | ||
1533 | /*- | |
1534 | * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; | |
1535 | * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) | |
1536 | */ | |
1537 | ||
1538 | if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
1539 | unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr; | |
1540 | unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) | |
1541 | + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr); | |
1542 | PACKET alert; | |
1543 | ||
1544 | if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) | |
1545 | || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level) | |
1546 | || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr) | |
1547 | || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) { | |
1548 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1549 | SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT); | |
1550 | return -1; | |
1551 | } | |
1552 | ||
1553 | if (s->msg_callback) | |
1554 | s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s, | |
1555 | s->msg_callback_arg); | |
1556 | ||
1557 | if (s->info_callback != NULL) | |
1558 | cb = s->info_callback; | |
1559 | else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) | |
1560 | cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
1561 | ||
1562 | if (cb != NULL) { | |
1563 | j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; | |
1564 | cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); | |
1565 | } | |
1566 | ||
1567 | if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING | |
1568 | || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) { | |
1569 | s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr; | |
1570 | SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); | |
1571 | ||
1572 | s->rlayer.alert_count++; | |
1573 | if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { | |
1574 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1575 | SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); | |
1576 | return -1; | |
1577 | } | |
1578 | } | |
1579 | ||
1580 | /* | |
1581 | * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3 | |
1582 | * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore. | |
1583 | */ | |
1584 | if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) { | |
1585 | goto start; | |
1586 | } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY | |
1587 | && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) { | |
1588 | s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
1589 | return 0; | |
1590 | } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) { | |
1591 | char tmp[16]; | |
1592 | ||
1593 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
1594 | s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr; | |
1595 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1596 | SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); | |
1597 | BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr); | |
1598 | ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); | |
1599 | s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
1600 | SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); | |
1601 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
1602 | return 0; | |
1603 | } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { | |
1604 | /* | |
1605 | * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested | |
1606 | * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal | |
1607 | * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it | |
1608 | * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In | |
1609 | * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if | |
1610 | * the peer refused it where we carry on. | |
1611 | */ | |
1612 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1613 | SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
1614 | return -1; | |
1615 | } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { | |
1616 | /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */ | |
1617 | goto start; | |
1618 | } | |
1619 | ||
1620 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1621 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); | |
1622 | return -1; | |
1623 | } | |
1624 | ||
1625 | if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { | |
1626 | if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
1627 | BIO *rbio; | |
1628 | ||
1629 | /* | |
1630 | * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are | |
1631 | * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other | |
1632 | * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them | |
1633 | * because we are unable to write any response due to having already | |
1634 | * sent close_notify. | |
1635 | */ | |
1636 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1637 | SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); | |
1638 | SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); | |
1639 | ||
1640 | if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0) | |
1641 | goto start; | |
1642 | ||
1643 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1644 | rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
1645 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); | |
1646 | BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); | |
1647 | return -1; | |
1648 | } | |
1649 | } else { | |
1650 | /* | |
1651 | * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have | |
1652 | * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have | |
1653 | * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled | |
1654 | * above. | |
1655 | * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify | |
1656 | */ | |
1657 | SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0); | |
1658 | SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); | |
1659 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1660 | SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY); | |
1661 | return -1; | |
1662 | } | |
1663 | } | |
1664 | ||
1665 | /* | |
1666 | * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we | |
1667 | * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the | |
1668 | * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data | |
1669 | * that we're just going to discard. | |
1670 | */ | |
1671 | if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
1672 | size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment); | |
1673 | unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; | |
1674 | size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; | |
1675 | ||
1676 | n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ | |
1677 | if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n) | |
1678 | n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */ | |
1679 | ||
1680 | /* now move 'n' bytes: */ | |
1681 | memcpy(dest + *dest_len, | |
1682 | SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n); | |
1683 | SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n); | |
1684 | SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n); | |
1685 | *dest_len += n; | |
1686 | if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) | |
1687 | SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); | |
1688 | ||
1689 | if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) | |
1690 | goto start; /* fragment was too small */ | |
1691 | } | |
1692 | ||
1693 | if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
1694 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1695 | SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
1696 | return -1; | |
1697 | } | |
1698 | ||
1699 | /* | |
1700 | * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or | |
1701 | * protocol violation) | |
1702 | */ | |
1703 | if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) | |
1704 | && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { | |
1705 | int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING); | |
1706 | ||
1707 | /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */ | |
1708 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); | |
1709 | ||
1710 | i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
1711 | /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ | |
1712 | if (i < 0) | |
1713 | return i; | |
1714 | if (i == 0) { | |
1715 | return -1; | |
1716 | } | |
1717 | ||
1718 | /* | |
1719 | * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a | |
1720 | * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read | |
1721 | * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now. | |
1722 | */ | |
1723 | if (ined) | |
1724 | return -1; | |
1725 | ||
1726 | if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { | |
1727 | if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) { | |
1728 | /* no read-ahead left? */ | |
1729 | BIO *bio; | |
1730 | /* | |
1731 | * In the case where we try to read application data, but we | |
1732 | * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry | |
1733 | * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty | |
1734 | * problems in the blocking world | |
1735 | */ | |
1736 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1737 | bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
1738 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); | |
1739 | BIO_set_retry_read(bio); | |
1740 | return -1; | |
1741 | } | |
1742 | } | |
1743 | goto start; | |
1744 | } | |
1745 | ||
1746 | switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) { | |
1747 | default: | |
1748 | /* | |
1749 | * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but | |
1750 | * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the | |
1751 | * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where | |
1752 | * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised | |
1753 | * record types, using up resources processing them. | |
1754 | */ | |
1755 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1756 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | |
1757 | return -1; | |
1758 | case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: | |
1759 | case SSL3_RT_ALERT: | |
1760 | case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: | |
1761 | /* | |
1762 | * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of | |
1763 | * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but | |
1764 | * that should not happen when type != rr->type | |
1765 | */ | |
1766 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1767 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1768 | return -1; | |
1769 | case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: | |
1770 | /* | |
1771 | * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have | |
1772 | * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() | |
1773 | * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read | |
1774 | * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet | |
1775 | * started), we will indulge it. | |
1776 | */ | |
1777 | if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { | |
1778 | s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2; | |
1779 | return -1; | |
1780 | } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { | |
1781 | /* | |
1782 | * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data, | |
1783 | * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server | |
1784 | * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a | |
1785 | * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be | |
1786 | * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null | |
1787 | * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next | |
1788 | * record. | |
1789 | */ | |
1790 | if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length, | |
1791 | EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { | |
1792 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1793 | return -1; | |
1794 | } | |
1795 | SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr); | |
1796 | goto start; | |
1797 | } else { | |
1798 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, | |
1799 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | |
1800 | return -1; | |
1801 | } | |
1802 | } | |
1803 | } | |
1804 | ||
1805 | void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq) | |
1806 | { | |
1807 | int i; | |
1808 | ||
1809 | for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { | |
1810 | ++seq[i]; | |
1811 | if (seq[i] != 0) | |
1812 | break; | |
1813 | } | |
1814 | } | |
1815 | ||
1816 | /* | |
1817 | * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible | |
1818 | * format and false otherwise. | |
1819 | */ | |
1820 | int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl) | |
1821 | { | |
1822 | return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]); | |
1823 | } | |
1824 | ||
1825 | /* | |
1826 | * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec | |
1827 | */ | |
1828 | size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl) | |
1829 | { | |
1830 | return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]); | |
1831 | } |