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1 | /* | |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved | |
4 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
5 | * | |
6 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
7 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
8 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
9 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
10 | */ | |
11 | ||
12 | #include <stdio.h> | |
13 | #include <ctype.h> | |
14 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
15 | #include <openssl/comp.h> | |
16 | #include <openssl/engine.h> | |
17 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> | |
18 | #include <openssl/conf.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/trace.h> | |
20 | #include "internal/nelem.h" | |
21 | #include "ssl_local.h" | |
22 | #include "internal/thread_once.h" | |
23 | #include "internal/cryptlib.h" | |
24 | #include "internal/comp.h" | |
25 | #include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h" | |
26 | ||
27 | /* NB: make sure indices in these tables match values above */ | |
28 | ||
29 | typedef struct { | |
30 | uint32_t mask; | |
31 | int nid; | |
32 | } ssl_cipher_table; | |
33 | ||
34 | /* Table of NIDs for each cipher */ | |
35 | static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_cipher[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = { | |
36 | {SSL_DES, NID_des_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 */ | |
37 | {SSL_3DES, NID_des_ede3_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 */ | |
38 | {SSL_RC4, NID_rc4}, /* SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 */ | |
39 | {SSL_RC2, NID_rc2_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 */ | |
40 | {SSL_IDEA, NID_idea_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 */ | |
41 | {SSL_eNULL, NID_undef}, /* SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 */ | |
42 | {SSL_AES128, NID_aes_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 */ | |
43 | {SSL_AES256, NID_aes_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 */ | |
44 | {SSL_CAMELLIA128, NID_camellia_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 */ | |
45 | {SSL_CAMELLIA256, NID_camellia_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 */ | |
46 | {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, NID_gost89_cnt}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 */ | |
47 | {SSL_SEED, NID_seed_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 */ | |
48 | {SSL_AES128GCM, NID_aes_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 */ | |
49 | {SSL_AES256GCM, NID_aes_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 */ | |
50 | {SSL_AES128CCM, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 */ | |
51 | {SSL_AES256CCM, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 */ | |
52 | {SSL_AES128CCM8, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 */ | |
53 | {SSL_AES256CCM8, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 */ | |
54 | {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12, NID_gost89_cnt_12}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX 18 */ | |
55 | {SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, NID_chacha20_poly1305}, /* SSL_ENC_CHACHA_IDX 19 */ | |
56 | {SSL_ARIA128GCM, NID_aria_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_ARIA128GCM_IDX 20 */ | |
57 | {SSL_ARIA256GCM, NID_aria_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_ARIA256GCM_IDX 21 */ | |
58 | {SSL_MAGMA, NID_magma_ctr_acpkm}, /* SSL_ENC_MAGMA_IDX */ | |
59 | {SSL_KUZNYECHIK, NID_kuznyechik_ctr_acpkm}, /* SSL_ENC_KUZNYECHIK_IDX */ | |
60 | }; | |
61 | ||
62 | /* NB: make sure indices in this table matches values above */ | |
63 | static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_mac[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { | |
64 | {SSL_MD5, NID_md5}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0 */ | |
65 | {SSL_SHA1, NID_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1 */ | |
66 | {SSL_GOST94, NID_id_GostR3411_94}, /* SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2 */ | |
67 | {SSL_GOST89MAC, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 */ | |
68 | {SSL_SHA256, NID_sha256}, /* SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 */ | |
69 | {SSL_SHA384, NID_sha384}, /* SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 */ | |
70 | {SSL_GOST12_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 */ | |
71 | {SSL_GOST89MAC12, NID_gost_mac_12}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 */ | |
72 | {SSL_GOST12_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 */ | |
73 | {0, NID_md5_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9 */ | |
74 | {0, NID_sha224}, /* SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10 */ | |
75 | {0, NID_sha512}, /* SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11 */ | |
76 | {SSL_MAGMAOMAC, NID_magma_mac}, /* sSL_MD_MAGMAOMAC_IDX */ | |
77 | {SSL_KUZNYECHIKOMAC, NID_kuznyechik_mac} /* SSL_MD_KUZNYECHIKOMAC_IDX */ | |
78 | }; | |
79 | ||
80 | /* *INDENT-OFF* */ | |
81 | static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_kx[] = { | |
82 | {SSL_kRSA, NID_kx_rsa}, | |
83 | {SSL_kECDHE, NID_kx_ecdhe}, | |
84 | {SSL_kDHE, NID_kx_dhe}, | |
85 | {SSL_kECDHEPSK, NID_kx_ecdhe_psk}, | |
86 | {SSL_kDHEPSK, NID_kx_dhe_psk}, | |
87 | {SSL_kRSAPSK, NID_kx_rsa_psk}, | |
88 | {SSL_kPSK, NID_kx_psk}, | |
89 | {SSL_kSRP, NID_kx_srp}, | |
90 | {SSL_kGOST, NID_kx_gost}, | |
91 | {SSL_kGOST18, NID_kx_gost18}, | |
92 | {SSL_kANY, NID_kx_any} | |
93 | }; | |
94 | ||
95 | static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_auth[] = { | |
96 | {SSL_aRSA, NID_auth_rsa}, | |
97 | {SSL_aECDSA, NID_auth_ecdsa}, | |
98 | {SSL_aPSK, NID_auth_psk}, | |
99 | {SSL_aDSS, NID_auth_dss}, | |
100 | {SSL_aGOST01, NID_auth_gost01}, | |
101 | {SSL_aGOST12, NID_auth_gost12}, | |
102 | {SSL_aSRP, NID_auth_srp}, | |
103 | {SSL_aNULL, NID_auth_null}, | |
104 | {SSL_aANY, NID_auth_any} | |
105 | }; | |
106 | /* *INDENT-ON* */ | |
107 | ||
108 | /* Utility function for table lookup */ | |
109 | static int ssl_cipher_info_find(const ssl_cipher_table *table, | |
110 | size_t table_cnt, uint32_t mask) | |
111 | { | |
112 | size_t i; | |
113 | for (i = 0; i < table_cnt; i++, table++) { | |
114 | if (table->mask == mask) | |
115 | return (int)i; | |
116 | } | |
117 | return -1; | |
118 | } | |
119 | ||
120 | #define ssl_cipher_info_lookup(table, x) \ | |
121 | ssl_cipher_info_find(table, OSSL_NELEM(table), x) | |
122 | ||
123 | /* | |
124 | * PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because implementation | |
125 | * is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is | |
126 | * found | |
127 | */ | |
128 | static const int default_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { | |
129 | /* MD5, SHA, GOST94, MAC89 */ | |
130 | EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, | |
131 | /* SHA256, SHA384, GOST2012_256, MAC89-12 */ | |
132 | EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, | |
133 | /* GOST2012_512 */ | |
134 | EVP_PKEY_HMAC, | |
135 | /* MD5/SHA1, SHA224, SHA512, MAGMAOMAC, KUZNYECHIKOMAC */ | |
136 | NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef | |
137 | }; | |
138 | ||
139 | #define CIPHER_ADD 1 | |
140 | #define CIPHER_KILL 2 | |
141 | #define CIPHER_DEL 3 | |
142 | #define CIPHER_ORD 4 | |
143 | #define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5 | |
144 | /* | |
145 | * Bump the ciphers to the top of the list. | |
146 | * This rule isn't currently supported by the public cipherstring API. | |
147 | */ | |
148 | #define CIPHER_BUMP 6 | |
149 | ||
150 | typedef struct cipher_order_st { | |
151 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; | |
152 | int active; | |
153 | int dead; | |
154 | struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev; | |
155 | } CIPHER_ORDER; | |
156 | ||
157 | static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = { | |
158 | /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */ | |
159 | {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL}, | |
160 | /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */ | |
161 | {0, SSL_TXT_CMPALL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, | |
162 | ||
163 | /* | |
164 | * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in | |
165 | * ALL!) | |
166 | */ | |
167 | {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT}, | |
168 | ||
169 | /* | |
170 | * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here | |
171 | * combine multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, e.g. kDHE | |
172 | * combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) | |
173 | */ | |
174 | {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSA}, | |
175 | ||
176 | {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, | |
177 | {0, SSL_TXT_kDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, | |
178 | {0, SSL_TXT_DH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, | |
179 | ||
180 | {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, | |
181 | {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, | |
182 | {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, | |
183 | ||
184 | {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kPSK}, | |
185 | {0, SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSAPSK}, | |
186 | {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHEPSK}, | |
187 | {0, SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHEPSK}, | |
188 | {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, NULL, 0, SSL_kSRP}, | |
189 | {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, NULL, 0, SSL_kGOST}, | |
190 | {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST18, NULL, 0, SSL_kGOST18}, | |
191 | ||
192 | /* server authentication aliases */ | |
193 | {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA}, | |
194 | {0, SSL_TXT_aDSS, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, | |
195 | {0, SSL_TXT_DSS, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, | |
196 | {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL}, | |
197 | {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, | |
198 | {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, | |
199 | {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK}, | |
200 | {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST01, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01}, | |
201 | {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST12, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST12}, | |
202 | {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12}, | |
203 | {0, SSL_TXT_aSRP, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aSRP}, | |
204 | ||
205 | /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */ | |
206 | {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, | |
207 | {0, SSL_TXT_DHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, | |
208 | {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, | |
209 | {0, SSL_TXT_ECDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, | |
210 | {0, SSL_TXT_NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, | |
211 | {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA}, | |
212 | {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL}, | |
213 | {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL}, | |
214 | {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, NULL, 0, SSL_PSK}, | |
215 | {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, NULL, 0, SSL_kSRP}, | |
216 | ||
217 | /* symmetric encryption aliases */ | |
218 | {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES}, | |
219 | {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4}, | |
220 | {0, SSL_TXT_RC2, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC2}, | |
221 | {0, SSL_TXT_IDEA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_IDEA}, | |
222 | {0, SSL_TXT_SEED, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SEED}, | |
223 | {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, | |
224 | {0, SSL_TXT_GOST, NULL, 0, 0, 0, | |
225 | SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12 | SSL_MAGMA | SSL_KUZNYECHIK}, | |
226 | {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, | |
227 | SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8}, | |
228 | {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, | |
229 | SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES256CCM8}, | |
230 | {0, SSL_TXT_AES, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES}, | |
231 | {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM}, | |
232 | {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, | |
233 | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, | |
234 | {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM_8, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, | |
235 | {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128}, | |
236 | {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256}, | |
237 | {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA}, | |
238 | {0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20}, | |
239 | {0, SSL_TXT_GOST2012_GOST8912_GOST8912, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12}, | |
240 | ||
241 | {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA}, | |
242 | {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA_GCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA128GCM | SSL_ARIA256GCM}, | |
243 | {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA128GCM}, | |
244 | {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA256GCM}, | |
245 | {0, SSL_TXT_CBC, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CBC}, | |
246 | ||
247 | /* MAC aliases */ | |
248 | {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5}, | |
249 | {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, | |
250 | {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, | |
251 | {0, SSL_TXT_GOST94, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST94}, | |
252 | {0, SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST89MAC | SSL_GOST89MAC12}, | |
253 | {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256}, | |
254 | {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384}, | |
255 | {0, SSL_TXT_GOST12, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST12_256}, | |
256 | ||
257 | /* protocol version aliases */ | |
258 | {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL3_VERSION}, | |
259 | {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, | |
260 | {0, "TLSv1.0", NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, | |
261 | {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION}, | |
262 | ||
263 | /* strength classes */ | |
264 | {0, SSL_TXT_LOW, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_LOW}, | |
265 | {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM}, | |
266 | {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH}, | |
267 | /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */ | |
268 | {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS}, | |
269 | ||
270 | /* "EDH-" aliases to "DHE-" labels (for backward compatibility) */ | |
271 | {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, NULL, 0, | |
272 | SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, | |
273 | {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, NULL, 0, | |
274 | SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, | |
275 | ||
276 | }; | |
277 | ||
278 | /* | |
279 | * Search for public key algorithm with given name and return its pkey_id if | |
280 | * it is available. Otherwise return 0 | |
281 | */ | |
282 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE | |
283 | ||
284 | static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) | |
285 | { | |
286 | const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; | |
287 | int pkey_id = 0; | |
288 | ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1); | |
289 | if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, | |
290 | ameth) > 0) | |
291 | return pkey_id; | |
292 | return 0; | |
293 | } | |
294 | ||
295 | #else | |
296 | ||
297 | static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) | |
298 | { | |
299 | const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; | |
300 | ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL; | |
301 | int pkey_id = 0; | |
302 | ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1); | |
303 | if (ameth) { | |
304 | if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, | |
305 | ameth) <= 0) | |
306 | pkey_id = 0; | |
307 | } | |
308 | tls_engine_finish(tmpeng); | |
309 | return pkey_id; | |
310 | } | |
311 | ||
312 | #endif | |
313 | ||
314 | int ssl_load_ciphers(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
315 | { | |
316 | size_t i; | |
317 | const ssl_cipher_table *t; | |
318 | EVP_KEYEXCH *kex = NULL; | |
319 | EVP_SIGNATURE *sig = NULL; | |
320 | ||
321 | ctx->disabled_enc_mask = 0; | |
322 | for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_cipher; i < SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { | |
323 | if (t->nid != NID_undef) { | |
324 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher | |
325 | = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, t->nid, ctx->propq); | |
326 | ||
327 | ctx->ssl_cipher_methods[i] = cipher; | |
328 | if (cipher == NULL) | |
329 | ctx->disabled_enc_mask |= t->mask; | |
330 | } | |
331 | } | |
332 | ctx->disabled_mac_mask = 0; | |
333 | for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_mac; i < SSL_MD_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { | |
334 | const EVP_MD *md | |
335 | = ssl_evp_md_fetch(ctx->libctx, t->nid, ctx->propq); | |
336 | ||
337 | ctx->ssl_digest_methods[i] = md; | |
338 | if (md == NULL) { | |
339 | ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= t->mask; | |
340 | } else { | |
341 | int tmpsize = EVP_MD_get_size(md); | |
342 | ||
343 | if (!ossl_assert(tmpsize > 0)) | |
344 | return 0; | |
345 | ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[i] = tmpsize; | |
346 | } | |
347 | } | |
348 | ||
349 | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask = 0; | |
350 | ctx->disabled_auth_mask = 0; | |
351 | ||
352 | /* | |
353 | * We ignore any errors from the fetches below. They are expected to fail | |
354 | * if these algorithms are not available. | |
355 | */ | |
356 | ERR_set_mark(); | |
357 | sig = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(ctx->libctx, "DSA", ctx->propq); | |
358 | if (sig == NULL) | |
359 | ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aDSS; | |
360 | else | |
361 | EVP_SIGNATURE_free(sig); | |
362 | kex = EVP_KEYEXCH_fetch(ctx->libctx, "DH", ctx->propq); | |
363 | if (kex == NULL) | |
364 | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK; | |
365 | else | |
366 | EVP_KEYEXCH_free(kex); | |
367 | kex = EVP_KEYEXCH_fetch(ctx->libctx, "ECDH", ctx->propq); | |
368 | if (kex == NULL) | |
369 | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK; | |
370 | else | |
371 | EVP_KEYEXCH_free(kex); | |
372 | sig = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(ctx->libctx, "ECDSA", ctx->propq); | |
373 | if (sig == NULL) | |
374 | ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aECDSA; | |
375 | else | |
376 | EVP_SIGNATURE_free(sig); | |
377 | ERR_pop_to_mark(); | |
378 | ||
379 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
380 | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_PSK; | |
381 | ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aPSK; | |
382 | #endif | |
383 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
384 | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kSRP; | |
385 | #endif | |
386 | ||
387 | /* | |
388 | * Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they are not | |
389 | * present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange | |
390 | */ | |
391 | memcpy(ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id, default_mac_pkey_id, | |
392 | sizeof(ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id)); | |
393 | ||
394 | ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = | |
395 | get_optional_pkey_id(SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC); | |
396 | if (ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) | |
397 | ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = 32; | |
398 | else | |
399 | ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC; | |
400 | ||
401 | ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = | |
402 | get_optional_pkey_id(SN_gost_mac_12); | |
403 | if (ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX]) | |
404 | ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = 32; | |
405 | else | |
406 | ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC12; | |
407 | ||
408 | ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_MAGMAOMAC_IDX] = | |
409 | get_optional_pkey_id(SN_magma_mac); | |
410 | if (ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_MAGMAOMAC_IDX]) | |
411 | ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MAGMAOMAC_IDX] = 32; | |
412 | else | |
413 | ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_MAGMAOMAC; | |
414 | ||
415 | ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_KUZNYECHIKOMAC_IDX] = | |
416 | get_optional_pkey_id(SN_kuznyechik_mac); | |
417 | if (ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_KUZNYECHIKOMAC_IDX]) | |
418 | ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_KUZNYECHIKOMAC_IDX] = 32; | |
419 | else | |
420 | ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_KUZNYECHIKOMAC; | |
421 | ||
422 | if (!get_optional_pkey_id(SN_id_GostR3410_2001)) | |
423 | ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12; | |
424 | if (!get_optional_pkey_id(SN_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) | |
425 | ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; | |
426 | if (!get_optional_pkey_id(SN_id_GostR3410_2012_512)) | |
427 | ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; | |
428 | /* | |
429 | * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available * | |
430 | */ | |
431 | if ((ctx->disabled_auth_mask & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) == | |
432 | (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) | |
433 | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST; | |
434 | ||
435 | if ((ctx->disabled_auth_mask & SSL_aGOST12) == SSL_aGOST12) | |
436 | ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST18; | |
437 | ||
438 | return 1; | |
439 | } | |
440 | ||
441 | int ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_CIPHER *sslc, | |
442 | const EVP_CIPHER **enc) | |
443 | { | |
444 | int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, | |
445 | sslc->algorithm_enc); | |
446 | ||
447 | if (i == -1) { | |
448 | *enc = NULL; | |
449 | } else { | |
450 | if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX) { | |
451 | /* | |
452 | * We assume we don't care about this coming from an ENGINE so | |
453 | * just do a normal EVP_CIPHER_fetch instead of | |
454 | * ssl_evp_cipher_fetch() | |
455 | */ | |
456 | *enc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(ctx->libctx, "NULL", ctx->propq); | |
457 | if (*enc == NULL) | |
458 | return 0; | |
459 | } else { | |
460 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = ctx->ssl_cipher_methods[i]; | |
461 | ||
462 | if (cipher == NULL | |
463 | || !ssl_evp_cipher_up_ref(cipher)) | |
464 | return 0; | |
465 | *enc = ctx->ssl_cipher_methods[i]; | |
466 | } | |
467 | } | |
468 | return 1; | |
469 | } | |
470 | ||
471 | int ssl_cipher_get_evp_md_mac(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_CIPHER *sslc, | |
472 | const EVP_MD **md, | |
473 | int *mac_pkey_type, size_t *mac_secret_size) | |
474 | { | |
475 | int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, sslc->algorithm_mac); | |
476 | ||
477 | if (i == -1) { | |
478 | *md = NULL; | |
479 | if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) | |
480 | *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef; | |
481 | if (mac_secret_size != NULL) | |
482 | *mac_secret_size = 0; | |
483 | } else { | |
484 | const EVP_MD *digest = ctx->ssl_digest_methods[i]; | |
485 | ||
486 | if (digest == NULL || !ssl_evp_md_up_ref(digest)) | |
487 | return 0; | |
488 | ||
489 | *md = digest; | |
490 | if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) | |
491 | *mac_pkey_type = ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[i]; | |
492 | if (mac_secret_size != NULL) | |
493 | *mac_secret_size = ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[i]; | |
494 | } | |
495 | return 1; | |
496 | } | |
497 | ||
498 | int ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_SESSION *s, | |
499 | const EVP_CIPHER **enc, const EVP_MD **md, | |
500 | int *mac_pkey_type, size_t *mac_secret_size, | |
501 | SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm) | |
502 | { | |
503 | int i; | |
504 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
505 | ||
506 | c = s->cipher; | |
507 | if (c == NULL) | |
508 | return 0; | |
509 | if (comp != NULL) { | |
510 | SSL_COMP ctmp; | |
511 | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; | |
512 | ||
513 | *comp = NULL; | |
514 | ctmp.id = s->compress_meth; | |
515 | comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); | |
516 | if (comp_methods != NULL) { | |
517 | i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(comp_methods, &ctmp); | |
518 | if (i >= 0) | |
519 | *comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(comp_methods, i); | |
520 | } | |
521 | /* If were only interested in comp then return success */ | |
522 | if ((enc == NULL) && (md == NULL)) | |
523 | return 1; | |
524 | } | |
525 | ||
526 | if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL)) | |
527 | return 0; | |
528 | ||
529 | if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(ctx, c, enc)) | |
530 | return 0; | |
531 | ||
532 | if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_md_mac(ctx, c, md, mac_pkey_type, | |
533 | mac_secret_size)) { | |
534 | ssl_evp_cipher_free(*enc); | |
535 | return 0; | |
536 | } | |
537 | ||
538 | if ((*enc != NULL) | |
539 | && (*md != NULL | |
540 | || (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) | |
541 | && (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD | |
542 | || mac_pkey_type == NULL || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) { | |
543 | const EVP_CIPHER *evp = NULL; | |
544 | ||
545 | if (use_etm | |
546 | || s->ssl_version >> 8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR | |
547 | || s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION) | |
548 | return 1; | |
549 | ||
550 | if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 | |
551 | && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5) | |
552 | evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, NID_rc4_hmac_md5, | |
553 | ctx->propq); | |
554 | else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 | |
555 | && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1) | |
556 | evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, | |
557 | NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, | |
558 | ctx->propq); | |
559 | else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 | |
560 | && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1) | |
561 | evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, | |
562 | NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1, | |
563 | ctx->propq); | |
564 | else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 | |
565 | && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256) | |
566 | evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, | |
567 | NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256, | |
568 | ctx->propq); | |
569 | else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 | |
570 | && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256) | |
571 | evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, | |
572 | NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256, | |
573 | ctx->propq); | |
574 | ||
575 | if (evp != NULL) { | |
576 | ssl_evp_cipher_free(*enc); | |
577 | ssl_evp_md_free(*md); | |
578 | *enc = evp; | |
579 | *md = NULL; | |
580 | } | |
581 | return 1; | |
582 | } | |
583 | ||
584 | return 0; | |
585 | } | |
586 | ||
587 | const EVP_MD *ssl_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx) | |
588 | { | |
589 | idx &= SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK; | |
590 | if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) | |
591 | return NULL; | |
592 | return ctx->ssl_digest_methods[idx]; | |
593 | } | |
594 | ||
595 | const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL_CONNECTION *s) | |
596 | { | |
597 | return ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), ssl_get_algorithm2(s)); | |
598 | } | |
599 | ||
600 | const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL_CONNECTION *s) | |
601 | { | |
602 | return ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), | |
603 | ssl_get_algorithm2(s) >> TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT); | |
604 | } | |
605 | ||
606 | ||
607 | #define ITEM_SEP(a) \ | |
608 | (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ',')) | |
609 | ||
610 | static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, | |
611 | CIPHER_ORDER **tail) | |
612 | { | |
613 | if (curr == *tail) | |
614 | return; | |
615 | if (curr == *head) | |
616 | *head = curr->next; | |
617 | if (curr->prev != NULL) | |
618 | curr->prev->next = curr->next; | |
619 | if (curr->next != NULL) | |
620 | curr->next->prev = curr->prev; | |
621 | (*tail)->next = curr; | |
622 | curr->prev = *tail; | |
623 | curr->next = NULL; | |
624 | *tail = curr; | |
625 | } | |
626 | ||
627 | static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, | |
628 | CIPHER_ORDER **tail) | |
629 | { | |
630 | if (curr == *head) | |
631 | return; | |
632 | if (curr == *tail) | |
633 | *tail = curr->prev; | |
634 | if (curr->next != NULL) | |
635 | curr->next->prev = curr->prev; | |
636 | if (curr->prev != NULL) | |
637 | curr->prev->next = curr->next; | |
638 | (*head)->prev = curr; | |
639 | curr->next = *head; | |
640 | curr->prev = NULL; | |
641 | *head = curr; | |
642 | } | |
643 | ||
644 | static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, | |
645 | int num_of_ciphers, | |
646 | uint32_t disabled_mkey, | |
647 | uint32_t disabled_auth, | |
648 | uint32_t disabled_enc, | |
649 | uint32_t disabled_mac, | |
650 | CIPHER_ORDER *co_list, | |
651 | CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, | |
652 | CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) | |
653 | { | |
654 | int i, co_list_num; | |
655 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
656 | ||
657 | /* | |
658 | * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the | |
659 | * method selected (SSLv3, TLSv1 etc). | |
660 | * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num | |
661 | * entries. | |
662 | */ | |
663 | ||
664 | /* Get the initial list of ciphers */ | |
665 | co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */ | |
666 | for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) { | |
667 | c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i); | |
668 | /* drop those that use any of that is not available */ | |
669 | if (c == NULL || !c->valid) | |
670 | continue; | |
671 | if ((c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) || | |
672 | (c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) || | |
673 | (c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) || | |
674 | (c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac)) | |
675 | continue; | |
676 | if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) == 0) && | |
677 | c->min_tls == 0) | |
678 | continue; | |
679 | if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) != 0) && | |
680 | c->min_dtls == 0) | |
681 | continue; | |
682 | ||
683 | co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c; | |
684 | co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL; | |
685 | co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL; | |
686 | co_list[co_list_num].active = 0; | |
687 | co_list_num++; | |
688 | } | |
689 | ||
690 | /* | |
691 | * Prepare linked list from list entries | |
692 | */ | |
693 | if (co_list_num > 0) { | |
694 | co_list[0].prev = NULL; | |
695 | ||
696 | if (co_list_num > 1) { | |
697 | co_list[0].next = &co_list[1]; | |
698 | ||
699 | for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) { | |
700 | co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1]; | |
701 | co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1]; | |
702 | } | |
703 | ||
704 | co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2]; | |
705 | } | |
706 | ||
707 | co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL; | |
708 | ||
709 | *head_p = &co_list[0]; | |
710 | *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1]; | |
711 | } | |
712 | } | |
713 | ||
714 | static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, | |
715 | int num_of_group_aliases, | |
716 | uint32_t disabled_mkey, | |
717 | uint32_t disabled_auth, | |
718 | uint32_t disabled_enc, | |
719 | uint32_t disabled_mac, | |
720 | CIPHER_ORDER *head) | |
721 | { | |
722 | CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr; | |
723 | const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr; | |
724 | int i; | |
725 | uint32_t mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey; | |
726 | uint32_t mask_auth = ~disabled_auth; | |
727 | uint32_t mask_enc = ~disabled_enc; | |
728 | uint32_t mask_mac = ~disabled_mac; | |
729 | ||
730 | /* | |
731 | * First, add the real ciphers as already collected | |
732 | */ | |
733 | ciph_curr = head; | |
734 | ca_curr = ca_list; | |
735 | while (ciph_curr != NULL) { | |
736 | *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher; | |
737 | ca_curr++; | |
738 | ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next; | |
739 | } | |
740 | ||
741 | /* | |
742 | * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table. | |
743 | * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which | |
744 | * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask), | |
745 | * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0). | |
746 | */ | |
747 | for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) { | |
748 | uint32_t algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey; | |
749 | uint32_t algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth; | |
750 | uint32_t algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc; | |
751 | uint32_t algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac; | |
752 | ||
753 | if (algorithm_mkey) | |
754 | if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0) | |
755 | continue; | |
756 | ||
757 | if (algorithm_auth) | |
758 | if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0) | |
759 | continue; | |
760 | ||
761 | if (algorithm_enc) | |
762 | if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0) | |
763 | continue; | |
764 | ||
765 | if (algorithm_mac) | |
766 | if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0) | |
767 | continue; | |
768 | ||
769 | *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i); | |
770 | ca_curr++; | |
771 | } | |
772 | ||
773 | *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */ | |
774 | } | |
775 | ||
776 | static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, | |
777 | uint32_t alg_auth, uint32_t alg_enc, | |
778 | uint32_t alg_mac, int min_tls, | |
779 | uint32_t algo_strength, int rule, | |
780 | int32_t strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, | |
781 | CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) | |
782 | { | |
783 | CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last; | |
784 | const SSL_CIPHER *cp; | |
785 | int reverse = 0; | |
786 | ||
787 | OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) { | |
788 | BIO_printf(trc_out, | |
789 | "Applying rule %d with %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x %08x (%d)\n", | |
790 | rule, (unsigned int)alg_mkey, (unsigned int)alg_auth, | |
791 | (unsigned int)alg_enc, (unsigned int)alg_mac, min_tls, | |
792 | (unsigned int)algo_strength, (int)strength_bits); | |
793 | } | |
794 | ||
795 | if (rule == CIPHER_DEL || rule == CIPHER_BUMP) | |
796 | reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between currently | |
797 | * deleted ciphers */ | |
798 | ||
799 | head = *head_p; | |
800 | tail = *tail_p; | |
801 | ||
802 | if (reverse) { | |
803 | next = tail; | |
804 | last = head; | |
805 | } else { | |
806 | next = head; | |
807 | last = tail; | |
808 | } | |
809 | ||
810 | curr = NULL; | |
811 | for (;;) { | |
812 | if (curr == last) | |
813 | break; | |
814 | ||
815 | curr = next; | |
816 | ||
817 | if (curr == NULL) | |
818 | break; | |
819 | ||
820 | next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next; | |
821 | ||
822 | cp = curr->cipher; | |
823 | ||
824 | /* | |
825 | * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits | |
826 | * or the algorithms used. | |
827 | */ | |
828 | if (strength_bits >= 0) { | |
829 | if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits) | |
830 | continue; | |
831 | } else { | |
832 | if (trc_out != NULL) { | |
833 | BIO_printf(trc_out, | |
834 | "\nName: %s:" | |
835 | "\nAlgo = %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x Algo_strength = %08x\n", | |
836 | cp->name, | |
837 | (unsigned int)cp->algorithm_mkey, | |
838 | (unsigned int)cp->algorithm_auth, | |
839 | (unsigned int)cp->algorithm_enc, | |
840 | (unsigned int)cp->algorithm_mac, | |
841 | cp->min_tls, | |
842 | (unsigned int)cp->algo_strength); | |
843 | } | |
844 | if (cipher_id != 0 && (cipher_id != cp->id)) | |
845 | continue; | |
846 | if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey)) | |
847 | continue; | |
848 | if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth)) | |
849 | continue; | |
850 | if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc)) | |
851 | continue; | |
852 | if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac)) | |
853 | continue; | |
854 | if (min_tls && (min_tls != cp->min_tls)) | |
855 | continue; | |
856 | if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) | |
857 | && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) | |
858 | continue; | |
859 | if ((algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) | |
860 | && !(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) | |
861 | continue; | |
862 | } | |
863 | ||
864 | if (trc_out != NULL) | |
865 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "Action = %d\n", rule); | |
866 | ||
867 | /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */ | |
868 | if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) { | |
869 | /* reverse == 0 */ | |
870 | if (!curr->active) { | |
871 | ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); | |
872 | curr->active = 1; | |
873 | } | |
874 | } | |
875 | /* Move the added cipher to this location */ | |
876 | else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) { | |
877 | /* reverse == 0 */ | |
878 | if (curr->active) { | |
879 | ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); | |
880 | } | |
881 | } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) { | |
882 | /* reverse == 1 */ | |
883 | if (curr->active) { | |
884 | /* | |
885 | * most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions for | |
886 | * any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop works | |
887 | * in reverse to maintain the order) | |
888 | */ | |
889 | ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); | |
890 | curr->active = 0; | |
891 | } | |
892 | } else if (rule == CIPHER_BUMP) { | |
893 | if (curr->active) | |
894 | ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); | |
895 | } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) { | |
896 | /* reverse == 0 */ | |
897 | if (head == curr) | |
898 | head = curr->next; | |
899 | else | |
900 | curr->prev->next = curr->next; | |
901 | if (tail == curr) | |
902 | tail = curr->prev; | |
903 | curr->active = 0; | |
904 | if (curr->next != NULL) | |
905 | curr->next->prev = curr->prev; | |
906 | if (curr->prev != NULL) | |
907 | curr->prev->next = curr->next; | |
908 | curr->next = NULL; | |
909 | curr->prev = NULL; | |
910 | } | |
911 | } | |
912 | ||
913 | *head_p = head; | |
914 | *tail_p = tail; | |
915 | ||
916 | OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER); | |
917 | } | |
918 | ||
919 | static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, | |
920 | CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) | |
921 | { | |
922 | int32_t max_strength_bits; | |
923 | int i, *number_uses; | |
924 | CIPHER_ORDER *curr; | |
925 | ||
926 | /* | |
927 | * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting | |
928 | * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting | |
929 | * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list. | |
930 | */ | |
931 | max_strength_bits = 0; | |
932 | curr = *head_p; | |
933 | while (curr != NULL) { | |
934 | if (curr->active && (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits)) | |
935 | max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits; | |
936 | curr = curr->next; | |
937 | } | |
938 | ||
939 | number_uses = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(int) * (max_strength_bits + 1)); | |
940 | if (number_uses == NULL) | |
941 | return 0; | |
942 | ||
943 | /* | |
944 | * Now find the strength_bits values actually used | |
945 | */ | |
946 | curr = *head_p; | |
947 | while (curr != NULL) { | |
948 | if (curr->active) | |
949 | number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++; | |
950 | curr = curr->next; | |
951 | } | |
952 | /* | |
953 | * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending | |
954 | * order. | |
955 | */ | |
956 | for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) | |
957 | if (number_uses[i] > 0) | |
958 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p, | |
959 | tail_p); | |
960 | ||
961 | OPENSSL_free(number_uses); | |
962 | return 1; | |
963 | } | |
964 | ||
965 | static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str, | |
966 | CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, | |
967 | CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, | |
968 | const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, CERT *c) | |
969 | { | |
970 | uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, algo_strength; | |
971 | int min_tls; | |
972 | const char *l, *buf; | |
973 | int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen; | |
974 | uint32_t cipher_id = 0; | |
975 | char ch; | |
976 | ||
977 | retval = 1; | |
978 | l = rule_str; | |
979 | for (;;) { | |
980 | ch = *l; | |
981 | ||
982 | if (ch == '\0') | |
983 | break; /* done */ | |
984 | if (ch == '-') { | |
985 | rule = CIPHER_DEL; | |
986 | l++; | |
987 | } else if (ch == '+') { | |
988 | rule = CIPHER_ORD; | |
989 | l++; | |
990 | } else if (ch == '!') { | |
991 | rule = CIPHER_KILL; | |
992 | l++; | |
993 | } else if (ch == '@') { | |
994 | rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL; | |
995 | l++; | |
996 | } else { | |
997 | rule = CIPHER_ADD; | |
998 | } | |
999 | ||
1000 | if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) { | |
1001 | l++; | |
1002 | continue; | |
1003 | } | |
1004 | ||
1005 | alg_mkey = 0; | |
1006 | alg_auth = 0; | |
1007 | alg_enc = 0; | |
1008 | alg_mac = 0; | |
1009 | min_tls = 0; | |
1010 | algo_strength = 0; | |
1011 | ||
1012 | for (;;) { | |
1013 | ch = *l; | |
1014 | buf = l; | |
1015 | buflen = 0; | |
1016 | #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC | |
1017 | while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) || | |
1018 | ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) || | |
1019 | ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || | |
1020 | (ch == '-') || (ch == '_') || (ch == '.') || (ch == '=')) | |
1021 | #else | |
1022 | while (isalnum((unsigned char)ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '_') || (ch == '.') | |
1023 | || (ch == '=')) | |
1024 | #endif | |
1025 | { | |
1026 | ch = *(++l); | |
1027 | buflen++; | |
1028 | } | |
1029 | ||
1030 | if (buflen == 0) { | |
1031 | /* | |
1032 | * We hit something we cannot deal with, | |
1033 | * it is no command or separator nor | |
1034 | * alphanumeric, so we call this an error. | |
1035 | */ | |
1036 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); | |
1037 | return 0; | |
1038 | } | |
1039 | ||
1040 | if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { | |
1041 | found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */ | |
1042 | break; /* special treatment */ | |
1043 | } | |
1044 | ||
1045 | /* check for multi-part specification */ | |
1046 | if (ch == '+') { | |
1047 | multi = 1; | |
1048 | l++; | |
1049 | } else { | |
1050 | multi = 0; | |
1051 | } | |
1052 | ||
1053 | /* | |
1054 | * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful | |
1055 | * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation | |
1056 | * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher | |
1057 | * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3. | |
1058 | * So additionally check whether the cipher name found | |
1059 | * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call: | |
1060 | * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is | |
1061 | * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot | |
1062 | * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.) | |
1063 | */ | |
1064 | j = found = 0; | |
1065 | cipher_id = 0; | |
1066 | while (ca_list[j]) { | |
1067 | if (strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) == 0 | |
1068 | && (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) { | |
1069 | found = 1; | |
1070 | break; | |
1071 | } else if (ca_list[j]->stdname != NULL | |
1072 | && strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->stdname, buflen) == 0 | |
1073 | && ca_list[j]->stdname[buflen] == '\0') { | |
1074 | found = 1; | |
1075 | break; | |
1076 | } else | |
1077 | j++; | |
1078 | } | |
1079 | ||
1080 | if (!found) | |
1081 | break; /* ignore this entry */ | |
1082 | ||
1083 | if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) { | |
1084 | if (alg_mkey) { | |
1085 | alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; | |
1086 | if (!alg_mkey) { | |
1087 | found = 0; | |
1088 | break; | |
1089 | } | |
1090 | } else { | |
1091 | alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; | |
1092 | } | |
1093 | } | |
1094 | ||
1095 | if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) { | |
1096 | if (alg_auth) { | |
1097 | alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; | |
1098 | if (!alg_auth) { | |
1099 | found = 0; | |
1100 | break; | |
1101 | } | |
1102 | } else { | |
1103 | alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; | |
1104 | } | |
1105 | } | |
1106 | ||
1107 | if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) { | |
1108 | if (alg_enc) { | |
1109 | alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; | |
1110 | if (!alg_enc) { | |
1111 | found = 0; | |
1112 | break; | |
1113 | } | |
1114 | } else { | |
1115 | alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; | |
1116 | } | |
1117 | } | |
1118 | ||
1119 | if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) { | |
1120 | if (alg_mac) { | |
1121 | alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; | |
1122 | if (!alg_mac) { | |
1123 | found = 0; | |
1124 | break; | |
1125 | } | |
1126 | } else { | |
1127 | alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; | |
1128 | } | |
1129 | } | |
1130 | ||
1131 | if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { | |
1132 | if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { | |
1133 | algo_strength &= | |
1134 | (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) | | |
1135 | ~SSL_STRONG_MASK; | |
1136 | if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) { | |
1137 | found = 0; | |
1138 | break; | |
1139 | } | |
1140 | } else { | |
1141 | algo_strength = ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK; | |
1142 | } | |
1143 | } | |
1144 | ||
1145 | if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { | |
1146 | if (algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { | |
1147 | algo_strength &= | |
1148 | (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) | | |
1149 | ~SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; | |
1150 | if (!(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK)) { | |
1151 | found = 0; | |
1152 | break; | |
1153 | } | |
1154 | } else { | |
1155 | algo_strength |= | |
1156 | ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; | |
1157 | } | |
1158 | } | |
1159 | ||
1160 | if (ca_list[j]->valid) { | |
1161 | /* | |
1162 | * explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not | |
1163 | * become part of the search pattern! | |
1164 | */ | |
1165 | ||
1166 | cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id; | |
1167 | } else { | |
1168 | /* | |
1169 | * not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the | |
1170 | * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern | |
1171 | */ | |
1172 | ||
1173 | if (ca_list[j]->min_tls) { | |
1174 | if (min_tls != 0 && min_tls != ca_list[j]->min_tls) { | |
1175 | found = 0; | |
1176 | break; | |
1177 | } else { | |
1178 | min_tls = ca_list[j]->min_tls; | |
1179 | } | |
1180 | } | |
1181 | } | |
1182 | ||
1183 | if (!multi) | |
1184 | break; | |
1185 | } | |
1186 | ||
1187 | /* | |
1188 | * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it | |
1189 | */ | |
1190 | if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { /* special command */ | |
1191 | ok = 0; | |
1192 | if ((buflen == 8) && HAS_PREFIX(buf, "STRENGTH")) { | |
1193 | ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p); | |
1194 | } else if (buflen == 10 && CHECK_AND_SKIP_PREFIX(buf, "SECLEVEL=")) { | |
1195 | int level = *buf - '0'; | |
1196 | if (level < 0 || level > 5) { | |
1197 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); | |
1198 | } else { | |
1199 | c->sec_level = level; | |
1200 | ok = 1; | |
1201 | } | |
1202 | } else { | |
1203 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); | |
1204 | } | |
1205 | if (ok == 0) | |
1206 | retval = 0; | |
1207 | /* | |
1208 | * We do not support any "multi" options | |
1209 | * together with "@", so throw away the | |
1210 | * rest of the command, if any left, until | |
1211 | * end or ':' is found. | |
1212 | */ | |
1213 | while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) | |
1214 | l++; | |
1215 | } else if (found) { | |
1216 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, | |
1217 | alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, | |
1218 | min_tls, algo_strength, rule, -1, head_p, | |
1219 | tail_p); | |
1220 | } else { | |
1221 | while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) | |
1222 | l++; | |
1223 | } | |
1224 | if (*l == '\0') | |
1225 | break; /* done */ | |
1226 | } | |
1227 | ||
1228 | return retval; | |
1229 | } | |
1230 | ||
1231 | static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c, | |
1232 | const char **prule_str) | |
1233 | { | |
1234 | unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0; | |
1235 | if (HAS_PREFIX(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY")) { | |
1236 | suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; | |
1237 | } else if (HAS_PREFIX(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2")) { | |
1238 | suiteb_comb2 = 1; | |
1239 | suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; | |
1240 | } else if (HAS_PREFIX(*prule_str, "SUITEB128")) { | |
1241 | suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; | |
1242 | } else if (HAS_PREFIX(*prule_str, "SUITEB192")) { | |
1243 | suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS; | |
1244 | } | |
1245 | ||
1246 | if (suiteb_flags) { | |
1247 | c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; | |
1248 | c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags; | |
1249 | } else { | |
1250 | suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; | |
1251 | } | |
1252 | ||
1253 | if (!suiteb_flags) | |
1254 | return 1; | |
1255 | /* Check version: if TLS 1.2 ciphers allowed we can use Suite B */ | |
1256 | ||
1257 | if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS)) { | |
1258 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); | |
1259 | return 0; | |
1260 | } | |
1261 | ||
1262 | switch (suiteb_flags) { | |
1263 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: | |
1264 | if (suiteb_comb2) | |
1265 | *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; | |
1266 | else | |
1267 | *prule_str = | |
1268 | "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; | |
1269 | break; | |
1270 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: | |
1271 | *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; | |
1272 | break; | |
1273 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: | |
1274 | *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; | |
1275 | break; | |
1276 | } | |
1277 | return 1; | |
1278 | } | |
1279 | ||
1280 | static int ciphersuite_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) | |
1281 | { | |
1282 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphersuites = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)arg; | |
1283 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; | |
1284 | /* Arbitrary sized temp buffer for the cipher name. Should be big enough */ | |
1285 | char name[80]; | |
1286 | ||
1287 | if (len > (int)(sizeof(name) - 1)) | |
1288 | /* Anyway return 1 so we can parse rest of the list */ | |
1289 | return 1; | |
1290 | ||
1291 | memcpy(name, elem, len); | |
1292 | name[len] = '\0'; | |
1293 | ||
1294 | cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(name); | |
1295 | if (cipher == NULL) | |
1296 | /* Ciphersuite not found but return 1 to parse rest of the list */ | |
1297 | return 1; | |
1298 | ||
1299 | if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphersuites, cipher)) { | |
1300 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1301 | return 0; | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
1304 | return 1; | |
1305 | } | |
1306 | ||
1307 | static __owur int set_ciphersuites(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **currciphers, const char *str) | |
1308 | { | |
1309 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *newciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); | |
1310 | ||
1311 | if (newciphers == NULL) | |
1312 | return 0; | |
1313 | ||
1314 | /* Parse the list. We explicitly allow an empty list */ | |
1315 | if (*str != '\0' | |
1316 | && (CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, ciphersuite_cb, newciphers) <= 0 | |
1317 | || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(newciphers) == 0)) { | |
1318 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); | |
1319 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(newciphers); | |
1320 | return 0; | |
1321 | } | |
1322 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*currciphers); | |
1323 | *currciphers = newciphers; | |
1324 | ||
1325 | return 1; | |
1326 | } | |
1327 | ||
1328 | static int update_cipher_list_by_id(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, | |
1329 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack) | |
1330 | { | |
1331 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack); | |
1332 | ||
1333 | if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) { | |
1334 | return 0; | |
1335 | } | |
1336 | ||
1337 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id); | |
1338 | *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list; | |
1339 | ||
1340 | (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); | |
1341 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id); | |
1342 | ||
1343 | return 1; | |
1344 | } | |
1345 | ||
1346 | static int update_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
1347 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list, | |
1348 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, | |
1349 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites) | |
1350 | { | |
1351 | int i; | |
1352 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(*cipher_list); | |
1353 | ||
1354 | if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) | |
1355 | return 0; | |
1356 | ||
1357 | /* | |
1358 | * Delete any existing TLSv1.3 ciphersuites. These are always first in the | |
1359 | * list. | |
1360 | */ | |
1361 | while (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tmp_cipher_list) > 0 | |
1362 | && sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tmp_cipher_list, 0)->min_tls | |
1363 | == TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1364 | (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(tmp_cipher_list, 0); | |
1365 | ||
1366 | /* Insert the new TLSv1.3 ciphersuites */ | |
1367 | for (i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
1368 | const SSL_CIPHER *sslc = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i); | |
1369 | ||
1370 | /* Don't include any TLSv1.3 ciphersuites that are disabled */ | |
1371 | if ((sslc->algorithm_enc & ctx->disabled_enc_mask) == 0 | |
1372 | && (ssl_cipher_table_mac[sslc->algorithm2 | |
1373 | & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK].mask | |
1374 | & ctx->disabled_mac_mask) == 0) { | |
1375 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_unshift(tmp_cipher_list, sslc); | |
1376 | } | |
1377 | } | |
1378 | ||
1379 | if (!update_cipher_list_by_id(cipher_list_by_id, tmp_cipher_list)) { | |
1380 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(tmp_cipher_list); | |
1381 | return 0; | |
1382 | } | |
1383 | ||
1384 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); | |
1385 | *cipher_list = tmp_cipher_list; | |
1386 | ||
1387 | return 1; | |
1388 | } | |
1389 | ||
1390 | int SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) | |
1391 | { | |
1392 | int ret = set_ciphersuites(&(ctx->tls13_ciphersuites), str); | |
1393 | ||
1394 | if (ret && ctx->cipher_list != NULL) | |
1395 | return update_cipher_list(ctx, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, | |
1396 | ctx->tls13_ciphersuites); | |
1397 | ||
1398 | return ret; | |
1399 | } | |
1400 | ||
1401 | int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const char *str) | |
1402 | { | |
1403 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; | |
1404 | SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); | |
1405 | int ret; | |
1406 | ||
1407 | if (sc == NULL) | |
1408 | return 0; | |
1409 | ||
1410 | ret = set_ciphersuites(&(sc->tls13_ciphersuites), str); | |
1411 | ||
1412 | if (sc->cipher_list == NULL) { | |
1413 | if ((cipher_list = SSL_get_ciphers(s)) != NULL) | |
1414 | sc->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list); | |
1415 | } | |
1416 | if (ret && sc->cipher_list != NULL) | |
1417 | return update_cipher_list(s->ctx, &sc->cipher_list, | |
1418 | &sc->cipher_list_by_id, | |
1419 | sc->tls13_ciphersuites); | |
1420 | ||
1421 | return ret; | |
1422 | } | |
1423 | ||
1424 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, | |
1425 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites, | |
1426 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list, | |
1427 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, | |
1428 | const char *rule_str, | |
1429 | CERT *c) | |
1430 | { | |
1431 | int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases, i; | |
1432 | uint32_t disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac; | |
1433 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack; | |
1434 | const char *rule_p; | |
1435 | CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr; | |
1436 | const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL; | |
1437 | const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method = ctx->method; | |
1438 | ||
1439 | /* | |
1440 | * Return with error if nothing to do. | |
1441 | */ | |
1442 | if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL) | |
1443 | return NULL; | |
1444 | ||
1445 | if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str)) | |
1446 | return NULL; | |
1447 | ||
1448 | /* | |
1449 | * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled | |
1450 | * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers. | |
1451 | */ | |
1452 | ||
1453 | disabled_mkey = ctx->disabled_mkey_mask; | |
1454 | disabled_auth = ctx->disabled_auth_mask; | |
1455 | disabled_enc = ctx->disabled_enc_mask; | |
1456 | disabled_mac = ctx->disabled_mac_mask; | |
1457 | ||
1458 | /* | |
1459 | * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled | |
1460 | * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so | |
1461 | * it is used for allocation. | |
1462 | */ | |
1463 | num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers(); | |
1464 | ||
1465 | if (num_of_ciphers > 0) { | |
1466 | co_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*co_list) * num_of_ciphers); | |
1467 | if (co_list == NULL) | |
1468 | return NULL; /* Failure */ | |
1469 | } | |
1470 | ||
1471 | ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers, | |
1472 | disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, | |
1473 | disabled_mac, co_list, &head, &tail); | |
1474 | ||
1475 | /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference. */ | |
1476 | ||
1477 | /* | |
1478 | * Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key | |
1479 | * exchange mechanisms. | |
1480 | * For consistency, prefer ECDSA over RSA (though this only matters if the | |
1481 | * server has both certificates, and is using the DEFAULT, or a client | |
1482 | * preference). | |
1483 | */ | |
1484 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, | |
1485 | -1, &head, &tail); | |
1486 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, | |
1487 | &tail); | |
1488 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, | |
1489 | &tail); | |
1490 | ||
1491 | /* Within each strength group, we prefer GCM over CHACHA... */ | |
1492 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, | |
1493 | &head, &tail); | |
1494 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, | |
1495 | &head, &tail); | |
1496 | ||
1497 | /* | |
1498 | * ...and generally, our preferred cipher is AES. | |
1499 | * Note that AEADs will be bumped to take preference after sorting by | |
1500 | * strength. | |
1501 | */ | |
1502 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES ^ SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, | |
1503 | -1, &head, &tail); | |
1504 | ||
1505 | /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */ | |
1506 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); | |
1507 | ||
1508 | /* Low priority for MD5 */ | |
1509 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, | |
1510 | &tail); | |
1511 | ||
1512 | /* | |
1513 | * Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain | |
1514 | * disabled. (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but | |
1515 | * we prefer authenticated ciphers.) | |
1516 | */ | |
1517 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, | |
1518 | &tail); | |
1519 | ||
1520 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, | |
1521 | &tail); | |
1522 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, | |
1523 | &tail); | |
1524 | ||
1525 | /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move to the end */ | |
1526 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, | |
1527 | &tail); | |
1528 | ||
1529 | /* | |
1530 | * Now sort by symmetric encryption strength. The above ordering remains | |
1531 | * in force within each class | |
1532 | */ | |
1533 | if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) { | |
1534 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); | |
1535 | return NULL; | |
1536 | } | |
1537 | ||
1538 | /* | |
1539 | * Partially overrule strength sort to prefer TLS 1.2 ciphers/PRFs. | |
1540 | */ | |
1541 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, | |
1542 | &head, &tail); | |
1543 | ||
1544 | /* | |
1545 | * Irrespective of strength, enforce the following order: | |
1546 | * (EC)DHE + AEAD > (EC)DHE > rest of AEAD > rest. | |
1547 | * Within each group, ciphers remain sorted by strength and previous | |
1548 | * preference, i.e., | |
1549 | * 1) ECDHE > DHE | |
1550 | * 2) GCM > CHACHA | |
1551 | * 3) AES > rest | |
1552 | * 4) TLS 1.2 > legacy | |
1553 | * | |
1554 | * Because we now bump ciphers to the top of the list, we proceed in | |
1555 | * reverse order of preference. | |
1556 | */ | |
1557 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, | |
1558 | &head, &tail); | |
1559 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, | |
1560 | CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); | |
1561 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, | |
1562 | CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); | |
1563 | ||
1564 | /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */ | |
1565 | ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail); | |
1566 | ||
1567 | /* | |
1568 | * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str. | |
1569 | * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names | |
1570 | * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers. | |
1571 | * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher | |
1572 | * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise | |
1573 | * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table). | |
1574 | */ | |
1575 | num_of_group_aliases = OSSL_NELEM(cipher_aliases); | |
1576 | num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1; | |
1577 | ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ca_list) * num_of_alias_max); | |
1578 | if (ca_list == NULL) { | |
1579 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); | |
1580 | return NULL; /* Failure */ | |
1581 | } | |
1582 | ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases, | |
1583 | disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, | |
1584 | disabled_mac, head); | |
1585 | ||
1586 | /* | |
1587 | * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule | |
1588 | * before using the (possibly available) additional rules. | |
1589 | */ | |
1590 | ok = 1; | |
1591 | rule_p = rule_str; | |
1592 | if (HAS_PREFIX(rule_str, "DEFAULT")) { | |
1593 | ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(OSSL_default_cipher_list(), | |
1594 | &head, &tail, ca_list, c); | |
1595 | rule_p += 7; | |
1596 | if (*rule_p == ':') | |
1597 | rule_p++; | |
1598 | } | |
1599 | ||
1600 | if (ok && (rule_p[0] != '\0')) | |
1601 | ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list, c); | |
1602 | ||
1603 | OPENSSL_free(ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */ | |
1604 | ||
1605 | if (!ok) { /* Rule processing failure */ | |
1606 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); | |
1607 | return NULL; | |
1608 | } | |
1609 | ||
1610 | /* | |
1611 | * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error | |
1612 | * if we cannot get one. | |
1613 | */ | |
1614 | if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
1615 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); | |
1616 | return NULL; | |
1617 | } | |
1618 | ||
1619 | /* Add TLSv1.3 ciphers first - we always prefer those if possible */ | |
1620 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites); i++) { | |
1621 | const SSL_CIPHER *sslc = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i); | |
1622 | ||
1623 | /* Don't include any TLSv1.3 ciphers that are disabled */ | |
1624 | if ((sslc->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) != 0 | |
1625 | || (ssl_cipher_table_mac[sslc->algorithm2 | |
1626 | & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK].mask | |
1627 | & ctx->disabled_mac_mask) != 0) { | |
1628 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(tls13_ciphersuites, i); | |
1629 | i--; | |
1630 | continue; | |
1631 | } | |
1632 | ||
1633 | if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, sslc)) { | |
1634 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); | |
1635 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); | |
1636 | return NULL; | |
1637 | } | |
1638 | } | |
1639 | ||
1640 | OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) { | |
1641 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "cipher selection:\n"); | |
1642 | } | |
1643 | /* | |
1644 | * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added | |
1645 | * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER). | |
1646 | */ | |
1647 | for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) { | |
1648 | if (curr->active) { | |
1649 | if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) { | |
1650 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); | |
1651 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); | |
1652 | OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER); | |
1653 | return NULL; | |
1654 | } | |
1655 | if (trc_out != NULL) | |
1656 | BIO_printf(trc_out, "<%s>\n", curr->cipher->name); | |
1657 | } | |
1658 | } | |
1659 | OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */ | |
1660 | OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER); | |
1661 | ||
1662 | if (!update_cipher_list_by_id(cipher_list_by_id, cipherstack)) { | |
1663 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); | |
1664 | return NULL; | |
1665 | } | |
1666 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); | |
1667 | *cipher_list = cipherstack; | |
1668 | ||
1669 | return cipherstack; | |
1670 | } | |
1671 | ||
1672 | char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len) | |
1673 | { | |
1674 | const char *ver; | |
1675 | const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac; | |
1676 | uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac; | |
1677 | static const char *const format = "%-30s %-7s Kx=%-8s Au=%-5s Enc=%-22s Mac=%-4s\n"; | |
1678 | ||
1679 | if (buf == NULL) { | |
1680 | len = 128; | |
1681 | if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) | |
1682 | return NULL; | |
1683 | } else if (len < 128) { | |
1684 | return NULL; | |
1685 | } | |
1686 | ||
1687 | alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
1688 | alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
1689 | alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc; | |
1690 | alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac; | |
1691 | ||
1692 | ver = ssl_protocol_to_string(cipher->min_tls); | |
1693 | ||
1694 | switch (alg_mkey) { | |
1695 | case SSL_kRSA: | |
1696 | kx = "RSA"; | |
1697 | break; | |
1698 | case SSL_kDHE: | |
1699 | kx = "DH"; | |
1700 | break; | |
1701 | case SSL_kECDHE: | |
1702 | kx = "ECDH"; | |
1703 | break; | |
1704 | case SSL_kPSK: | |
1705 | kx = "PSK"; | |
1706 | break; | |
1707 | case SSL_kRSAPSK: | |
1708 | kx = "RSAPSK"; | |
1709 | break; | |
1710 | case SSL_kECDHEPSK: | |
1711 | kx = "ECDHEPSK"; | |
1712 | break; | |
1713 | case SSL_kDHEPSK: | |
1714 | kx = "DHEPSK"; | |
1715 | break; | |
1716 | case SSL_kSRP: | |
1717 | kx = "SRP"; | |
1718 | break; | |
1719 | case SSL_kGOST: | |
1720 | kx = "GOST"; | |
1721 | break; | |
1722 | case SSL_kGOST18: | |
1723 | kx = "GOST18"; | |
1724 | break; | |
1725 | case SSL_kANY: | |
1726 | kx = "any"; | |
1727 | break; | |
1728 | default: | |
1729 | kx = "unknown"; | |
1730 | } | |
1731 | ||
1732 | switch (alg_auth) { | |
1733 | case SSL_aRSA: | |
1734 | au = "RSA"; | |
1735 | break; | |
1736 | case SSL_aDSS: | |
1737 | au = "DSS"; | |
1738 | break; | |
1739 | case SSL_aNULL: | |
1740 | au = "None"; | |
1741 | break; | |
1742 | case SSL_aECDSA: | |
1743 | au = "ECDSA"; | |
1744 | break; | |
1745 | case SSL_aPSK: | |
1746 | au = "PSK"; | |
1747 | break; | |
1748 | case SSL_aSRP: | |
1749 | au = "SRP"; | |
1750 | break; | |
1751 | case SSL_aGOST01: | |
1752 | au = "GOST01"; | |
1753 | break; | |
1754 | /* New GOST ciphersuites have both SSL_aGOST12 and SSL_aGOST01 bits */ | |
1755 | case (SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01): | |
1756 | au = "GOST12"; | |
1757 | break; | |
1758 | case SSL_aANY: | |
1759 | au = "any"; | |
1760 | break; | |
1761 | default: | |
1762 | au = "unknown"; | |
1763 | break; | |
1764 | } | |
1765 | ||
1766 | switch (alg_enc) { | |
1767 | case SSL_DES: | |
1768 | enc = "DES(56)"; | |
1769 | break; | |
1770 | case SSL_3DES: | |
1771 | enc = "3DES(168)"; | |
1772 | break; | |
1773 | case SSL_RC4: | |
1774 | enc = "RC4(128)"; | |
1775 | break; | |
1776 | case SSL_RC2: | |
1777 | enc = "RC2(128)"; | |
1778 | break; | |
1779 | case SSL_IDEA: | |
1780 | enc = "IDEA(128)"; | |
1781 | break; | |
1782 | case SSL_eNULL: | |
1783 | enc = "None"; | |
1784 | break; | |
1785 | case SSL_AES128: | |
1786 | enc = "AES(128)"; | |
1787 | break; | |
1788 | case SSL_AES256: | |
1789 | enc = "AES(256)"; | |
1790 | break; | |
1791 | case SSL_AES128GCM: | |
1792 | enc = "AESGCM(128)"; | |
1793 | break; | |
1794 | case SSL_AES256GCM: | |
1795 | enc = "AESGCM(256)"; | |
1796 | break; | |
1797 | case SSL_AES128CCM: | |
1798 | enc = "AESCCM(128)"; | |
1799 | break; | |
1800 | case SSL_AES256CCM: | |
1801 | enc = "AESCCM(256)"; | |
1802 | break; | |
1803 | case SSL_AES128CCM8: | |
1804 | enc = "AESCCM8(128)"; | |
1805 | break; | |
1806 | case SSL_AES256CCM8: | |
1807 | enc = "AESCCM8(256)"; | |
1808 | break; | |
1809 | case SSL_CAMELLIA128: | |
1810 | enc = "Camellia(128)"; | |
1811 | break; | |
1812 | case SSL_CAMELLIA256: | |
1813 | enc = "Camellia(256)"; | |
1814 | break; | |
1815 | case SSL_ARIA128GCM: | |
1816 | enc = "ARIAGCM(128)"; | |
1817 | break; | |
1818 | case SSL_ARIA256GCM: | |
1819 | enc = "ARIAGCM(256)"; | |
1820 | break; | |
1821 | case SSL_SEED: | |
1822 | enc = "SEED(128)"; | |
1823 | break; | |
1824 | case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT: | |
1825 | case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12: | |
1826 | enc = "GOST89(256)"; | |
1827 | break; | |
1828 | case SSL_MAGMA: | |
1829 | enc = "MAGMA"; | |
1830 | break; | |
1831 | case SSL_KUZNYECHIK: | |
1832 | enc = "KUZNYECHIK"; | |
1833 | break; | |
1834 | case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305: | |
1835 | enc = "CHACHA20/POLY1305(256)"; | |
1836 | break; | |
1837 | default: | |
1838 | enc = "unknown"; | |
1839 | break; | |
1840 | } | |
1841 | ||
1842 | switch (alg_mac) { | |
1843 | case SSL_MD5: | |
1844 | mac = "MD5"; | |
1845 | break; | |
1846 | case SSL_SHA1: | |
1847 | mac = "SHA1"; | |
1848 | break; | |
1849 | case SSL_SHA256: | |
1850 | mac = "SHA256"; | |
1851 | break; | |
1852 | case SSL_SHA384: | |
1853 | mac = "SHA384"; | |
1854 | break; | |
1855 | case SSL_AEAD: | |
1856 | mac = "AEAD"; | |
1857 | break; | |
1858 | case SSL_GOST89MAC: | |
1859 | case SSL_GOST89MAC12: | |
1860 | mac = "GOST89"; | |
1861 | break; | |
1862 | case SSL_GOST94: | |
1863 | mac = "GOST94"; | |
1864 | break; | |
1865 | case SSL_GOST12_256: | |
1866 | case SSL_GOST12_512: | |
1867 | mac = "GOST2012"; | |
1868 | break; | |
1869 | default: | |
1870 | mac = "unknown"; | |
1871 | break; | |
1872 | } | |
1873 | ||
1874 | BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac); | |
1875 | ||
1876 | return buf; | |
1877 | } | |
1878 | ||
1879 | const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c) | |
1880 | { | |
1881 | if (c == NULL) | |
1882 | return "(NONE)"; | |
1883 | ||
1884 | /* | |
1885 | * Backwards-compatibility crutch. In almost all contexts we report TLS | |
1886 | * 1.0 as "TLSv1", but for ciphers we report "TLSv1.0". | |
1887 | */ | |
1888 | if (c->min_tls == TLS1_VERSION) | |
1889 | return "TLSv1.0"; | |
1890 | return ssl_protocol_to_string(c->min_tls); | |
1891 | } | |
1892 | ||
1893 | /* return the actual cipher being used */ | |
1894 | const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) | |
1895 | { | |
1896 | if (c != NULL) | |
1897 | return c->name; | |
1898 | return "(NONE)"; | |
1899 | } | |
1900 | ||
1901 | /* return the actual cipher being used in RFC standard name */ | |
1902 | const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) | |
1903 | { | |
1904 | if (c != NULL) | |
1905 | return c->stdname; | |
1906 | return "(NONE)"; | |
1907 | } | |
1908 | ||
1909 | /* return the OpenSSL name based on given RFC standard name */ | |
1910 | const char *OPENSSL_cipher_name(const char *stdname) | |
1911 | { | |
1912 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
1913 | ||
1914 | if (stdname == NULL) | |
1915 | return "(NONE)"; | |
1916 | c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(stdname); | |
1917 | return SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c); | |
1918 | } | |
1919 | ||
1920 | /* number of bits for symmetric cipher */ | |
1921 | int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits) | |
1922 | { | |
1923 | int ret = 0; | |
1924 | ||
1925 | if (c != NULL) { | |
1926 | if (alg_bits != NULL) | |
1927 | *alg_bits = (int)c->alg_bits; | |
1928 | ret = (int)c->strength_bits; | |
1929 | } | |
1930 | return ret; | |
1931 | } | |
1932 | ||
1933 | uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) | |
1934 | { | |
1935 | return c->id; | |
1936 | } | |
1937 | ||
1938 | uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) | |
1939 | { | |
1940 | return c->id & 0xFFFF; | |
1941 | } | |
1942 | ||
1943 | SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n) | |
1944 | { | |
1945 | SSL_COMP *ctmp; | |
1946 | SSL_COMP srch_key; | |
1947 | int i; | |
1948 | ||
1949 | if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL)) | |
1950 | return NULL; | |
1951 | srch_key.id = n; | |
1952 | i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(sk, &srch_key); | |
1953 | if (i >= 0) | |
1954 | ctmp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk, i); | |
1955 | else | |
1956 | ctmp = NULL; | |
1957 | ||
1958 | return ctmp; | |
1959 | } | |
1960 | ||
1961 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1962 | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) | |
1963 | { | |
1964 | return NULL; | |
1965 | } | |
1966 | ||
1967 | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) | |
1968 | *meths) | |
1969 | { | |
1970 | return meths; | |
1971 | } | |
1972 | ||
1973 | int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) | |
1974 | { | |
1975 | return 1; | |
1976 | } | |
1977 | ||
1978 | #else | |
1979 | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) | |
1980 | { | |
1981 | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) **rv; | |
1982 | ||
1983 | rv = (STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) **)OSSL_LIB_CTX_get_data(NULL, | |
1984 | OSSL_LIB_CTX_COMP_METHODS); | |
1985 | if (rv != NULL) | |
1986 | return *rv; | |
1987 | else | |
1988 | return NULL; | |
1989 | } | |
1990 | ||
1991 | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) | |
1992 | *meths) | |
1993 | { | |
1994 | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) **comp_methods; | |
1995 | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths; | |
1996 | ||
1997 | comp_methods = (STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) **)OSSL_LIB_CTX_get_data(NULL, | |
1998 | OSSL_LIB_CTX_COMP_METHODS); | |
1999 | if (comp_methods == NULL) { | |
2000 | old_meths = meths; | |
2001 | } else { | |
2002 | old_meths = *comp_methods; | |
2003 | *comp_methods = meths; | |
2004 | } | |
2005 | ||
2006 | return old_meths; | |
2007 | } | |
2008 | ||
2009 | int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) | |
2010 | { | |
2011 | STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; | |
2012 | SSL_COMP *comp; | |
2013 | ||
2014 | comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); | |
2015 | ||
2016 | if (comp_methods == NULL) | |
2017 | return 1; | |
2018 | ||
2019 | if (cm == NULL || COMP_get_type(cm) == NID_undef) | |
2020 | return 1; | |
2021 | ||
2022 | /*- | |
2023 | * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the | |
2024 | * compression number ranges should be the following: | |
2025 | * | |
2026 | * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF | |
2027 | * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA | |
2028 | * 193 to 255: reserved for private use | |
2029 | */ | |
2030 | if (id < 193 || id > 255) { | |
2031 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE); | |
2032 | return 1; | |
2033 | } | |
2034 | ||
2035 | comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); | |
2036 | if (comp == NULL) | |
2037 | return 1; | |
2038 | ||
2039 | comp->id = id; | |
2040 | if (sk_SSL_COMP_find(comp_methods, comp) >= 0) { | |
2041 | OPENSSL_free(comp); | |
2042 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID); | |
2043 | return 1; | |
2044 | } | |
2045 | if (!sk_SSL_COMP_push(comp_methods, comp)) { | |
2046 | OPENSSL_free(comp); | |
2047 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); | |
2048 | return 1; | |
2049 | } | |
2050 | ||
2051 | return 0; | |
2052 | } | |
2053 | #endif | |
2054 | ||
2055 | const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) | |
2056 | { | |
2057 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
2058 | return comp ? COMP_get_name(comp) : NULL; | |
2059 | #else | |
2060 | return NULL; | |
2061 | #endif | |
2062 | } | |
2063 | ||
2064 | const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp) | |
2065 | { | |
2066 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
2067 | return comp->name; | |
2068 | #else | |
2069 | return NULL; | |
2070 | #endif | |
2071 | } | |
2072 | ||
2073 | int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp) | |
2074 | { | |
2075 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
2076 | return comp->id; | |
2077 | #else | |
2078 | return -1; | |
2079 | #endif | |
2080 | } | |
2081 | ||
2082 | const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL_CONNECTION *s, | |
2083 | const unsigned char *ptr, | |
2084 | int all) | |
2085 | { | |
2086 | const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); | |
2087 | ||
2088 | if (c == NULL || (!all && c->valid == 0)) | |
2089 | return NULL; | |
2090 | return c; | |
2091 | } | |
2092 | ||
2093 | const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr) | |
2094 | { | |
2095 | return ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); | |
2096 | } | |
2097 | ||
2098 | int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) | |
2099 | { | |
2100 | int i; | |
2101 | if (c == NULL) | |
2102 | return NID_undef; | |
2103 | i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc); | |
2104 | if (i == -1) | |
2105 | return NID_undef; | |
2106 | return ssl_cipher_table_cipher[i].nid; | |
2107 | } | |
2108 | ||
2109 | int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) | |
2110 | { | |
2111 | int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); | |
2112 | ||
2113 | if (i == -1) | |
2114 | return NID_undef; | |
2115 | return ssl_cipher_table_mac[i].nid; | |
2116 | } | |
2117 | ||
2118 | int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) | |
2119 | { | |
2120 | int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_kx, c->algorithm_mkey); | |
2121 | ||
2122 | if (i == -1) | |
2123 | return NID_undef; | |
2124 | return ssl_cipher_table_kx[i].nid; | |
2125 | } | |
2126 | ||
2127 | int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) | |
2128 | { | |
2129 | int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_auth, c->algorithm_auth); | |
2130 | ||
2131 | if (i == -1) | |
2132 | return NID_undef; | |
2133 | return ssl_cipher_table_auth[i].nid; | |
2134 | } | |
2135 | ||
2136 | int ssl_get_md_idx(int md_nid) { | |
2137 | int i; | |
2138 | ||
2139 | for(i = 0; i < SSL_MD_NUM_IDX; i++) { | |
2140 | if (md_nid == ssl_cipher_table_mac[i].nid) | |
2141 | return i; | |
2142 | } | |
2143 | return -1; | |
2144 | } | |
2145 | ||
2146 | const EVP_MD *SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(const SSL_CIPHER *c) | |
2147 | { | |
2148 | int idx = c->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK; | |
2149 | ||
2150 | if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) | |
2151 | return NULL; | |
2152 | return EVP_get_digestbynid(ssl_cipher_table_mac[idx].nid); | |
2153 | } | |
2154 | ||
2155 | int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *c) | |
2156 | { | |
2157 | return (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) ? 1 : 0; | |
2158 | } | |
2159 | ||
2160 | int ssl_cipher_get_overhead(const SSL_CIPHER *c, size_t *mac_overhead, | |
2161 | size_t *int_overhead, size_t *blocksize, | |
2162 | size_t *ext_overhead) | |
2163 | { | |
2164 | int mac = 0, in = 0, blk = 0, out = 0; | |
2165 | ||
2166 | /* Some hard-coded numbers for the CCM/Poly1305 MAC overhead | |
2167 | * because there are no handy #defines for those. */ | |
2168 | if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AESGCM | SSL_ARIAGCM)) { | |
2169 | out = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
2170 | } else if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM)) { | |
2171 | out = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + 16; | |
2172 | } else if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) { | |
2173 | out = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + 8; | |
2174 | } else if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) { | |
2175 | out = 16; | |
2176 | } else if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) { | |
2177 | /* We're supposed to have handled all the AEAD modes above */ | |
2178 | return 0; | |
2179 | } else { | |
2180 | /* Non-AEAD modes. Calculate MAC/cipher overhead separately */ | |
2181 | int digest_nid = SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(c); | |
2182 | const EVP_MD *e_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid); | |
2183 | ||
2184 | if (e_md == NULL) | |
2185 | return 0; | |
2186 | ||
2187 | mac = EVP_MD_get_size(e_md); | |
2188 | if (mac <= 0) | |
2189 | return 0; | |
2190 | if (c->algorithm_enc != SSL_eNULL) { | |
2191 | int cipher_nid = SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(c); | |
2192 | const EVP_CIPHER *e_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher_nid); | |
2193 | ||
2194 | /* If it wasn't AEAD or SSL_eNULL, we expect it to be a | |
2195 | known CBC cipher. */ | |
2196 | if (e_ciph == NULL || | |
2197 | EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(e_ciph) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) | |
2198 | return 0; | |
2199 | ||
2200 | in = 1; /* padding length byte */ | |
2201 | out = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(e_ciph); | |
2202 | if (out < 0) | |
2203 | return 0; | |
2204 | blk = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(e_ciph); | |
2205 | if (blk <= 0) | |
2206 | return 0; | |
2207 | } | |
2208 | } | |
2209 | ||
2210 | *mac_overhead = (size_t)mac; | |
2211 | *int_overhead = (size_t)in; | |
2212 | *blocksize = (size_t)blk; | |
2213 | *ext_overhead = (size_t)out; | |
2214 | ||
2215 | return 1; | |
2216 | } | |
2217 | ||
2218 | int ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t idx) | |
2219 | { | |
2220 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *cl; | |
2221 | ||
2222 | /* A provider-loaded key type is always enabled */ | |
2223 | if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM) | |
2224 | return 0; | |
2225 | ||
2226 | cl = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(idx, ctx); | |
2227 | if (cl == NULL || (cl->amask & ctx->disabled_auth_mask) != 0) | |
2228 | return 1; | |
2229 | return 0; | |
2230 | } | |
2231 | ||
2232 | /* | |
2233 | * Default list of TLSv1.2 (and earlier) ciphers | |
2234 | * SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST deprecated in 3.0.0 | |
2235 | * Update both macro and function simultaneously | |
2236 | */ | |
2237 | const char *OSSL_default_cipher_list(void) | |
2238 | { | |
2239 | return "ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL"; | |
2240 | } | |
2241 | ||
2242 | /* | |
2243 | * Default list of TLSv1.3 (and later) ciphers | |
2244 | * TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES deprecated in 3.0.0 | |
2245 | * Update both macro and function simultaneously | |
2246 | */ | |
2247 | const char *OSSL_default_ciphersuites(void) | |
2248 | { | |
2249 | return "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:" | |
2250 | "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:" | |
2251 | "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"; | |
2252 | } |