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1 | /* | |
2 | * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
10 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> | |
11 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" | |
12 | #include "statem_locl.h" | |
13 | ||
14 | /* | |
15 | * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right | |
16 | */ | |
17 | int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
18 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
19 | { | |
20 | unsigned int ilen; | |
21 | const unsigned char *data; | |
22 | ||
23 | /* Parse the length byte */ | |
24 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen) | |
25 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) { | |
26 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, | |
27 | SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); | |
28 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
29 | return 0; | |
30 | } | |
31 | ||
32 | /* Check that the extension matches */ | |
33 | if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) { | |
34 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, | |
35 | SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); | |
36 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
37 | return 0; | |
38 | } | |
39 | ||
40 | if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, | |
41 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { | |
42 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, | |
43 | SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); | |
44 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
45 | return 0; | |
46 | } | |
47 | ||
48 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
49 | ||
50 | return 1; | |
51 | } | |
52 | ||
53 | /*- | |
54 | * The servername extension is treated as follows: | |
55 | * | |
56 | * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. | |
57 | * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, | |
58 | * in which case an fatal alert is generated. | |
59 | * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. | |
60 | * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order | |
61 | * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. | |
62 | * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when | |
63 | * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. | |
64 | * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time | |
65 | * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the | |
66 | * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and | |
67 | * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername | |
68 | * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches | |
69 | * the value of the Host: field. | |
70 | * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION | |
71 | * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the | |
72 | * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername | |
73 | * extension. | |
74 | * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. | |
75 | */ | |
76 | int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
77 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
78 | { | |
79 | unsigned int servname_type; | |
80 | PACKET sni, hostname; | |
81 | ||
82 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni) | |
83 | /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ | |
84 | || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { | |
85 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
86 | return 0; | |
87 | } | |
88 | ||
89 | /* | |
90 | * Although the server_name extension was intended to be | |
91 | * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the | |
92 | * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as | |
93 | * such. | |
94 | * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types | |
95 | * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other | |
96 | * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. | |
97 | * | |
98 | * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, | |
99 | * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. | |
100 | */ | |
101 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) | |
102 | || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name | |
103 | || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { | |
104 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
105 | return 0; | |
106 | } | |
107 | ||
108 | if (!s->hit) { | |
109 | if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { | |
110 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
111 | return 0; | |
112 | } | |
113 | ||
114 | if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { | |
115 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
116 | return 0; | |
117 | } | |
118 | ||
119 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname); | |
120 | s->session->ext.hostname = NULL; | |
121 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) { | |
122 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
123 | return 0; | |
124 | } | |
125 | ||
126 | s->servername_done = 1; | |
127 | } else { | |
128 | /* | |
129 | * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST | |
130 | * fall back to a full handshake. | |
131 | */ | |
132 | s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname | |
133 | && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname, | |
134 | strlen(s->session->ext.hostname)); | |
135 | } | |
136 | ||
137 | return 1; | |
138 | } | |
139 | ||
140 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
141 | int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
142 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
143 | { | |
144 | PACKET srp_I; | |
145 | ||
146 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I) | |
147 | || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) { | |
148 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
149 | return 0; | |
150 | } | |
151 | ||
152 | /* | |
153 | * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user | |
154 | * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. | |
155 | */ | |
156 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { | |
157 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
158 | return 0; | |
159 | } | |
160 | ||
161 | return 1; | |
162 | } | |
163 | #endif | |
164 | ||
165 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
166 | int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
167 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
168 | { | |
169 | PACKET ec_point_format_list; | |
170 | ||
171 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list) | |
172 | || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { | |
173 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
174 | return 0; | |
175 | } | |
176 | ||
177 | if (!s->hit) { | |
178 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, | |
179 | &s->session->ext.ecpointformats, | |
180 | &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) { | |
181 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
182 | return 0; | |
183 | } | |
184 | } | |
185 | ||
186 | return 1; | |
187 | } | |
188 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
189 | ||
190 | int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
191 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
192 | { | |
193 | if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb && | |
194 | !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), | |
195 | PACKET_remaining(pkt), | |
196 | s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { | |
197 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
198 | return 0; | |
199 | } | |
200 | ||
201 | return 1; | |
202 | } | |
203 | ||
204 | int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
205 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
206 | { | |
207 | PACKET supported_sig_algs; | |
208 | ||
209 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) | |
210 | || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { | |
211 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
212 | return 0; | |
213 | } | |
214 | ||
215 | if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) { | |
216 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
217 | return 0; | |
218 | } | |
219 | ||
220 | return 1; | |
221 | } | |
222 | ||
223 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP | |
224 | int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
225 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
226 | { | |
227 | PACKET responder_id_list, exts; | |
228 | ||
229 | /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */ | |
230 | if (x != NULL) | |
231 | return 1; | |
232 | ||
233 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) { | |
234 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
235 | return 0; | |
236 | } | |
237 | ||
238 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { | |
239 | /* | |
240 | * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. | |
241 | */ | |
242 | s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing; | |
243 | return 1; | |
244 | } | |
245 | ||
246 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) { | |
247 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
248 | return 0; | |
249 | } | |
250 | ||
251 | /* | |
252 | * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake | |
253 | * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 | |
254 | */ | |
255 | sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); | |
256 | if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { | |
257 | s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); | |
258 | if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) { | |
259 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
260 | return 0; | |
261 | } | |
262 | } else { | |
263 | s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL; | |
264 | } | |
265 | ||
266 | while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { | |
267 | OCSP_RESPID *id; | |
268 | PACKET responder_id; | |
269 | const unsigned char *id_data; | |
270 | ||
271 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id) | |
272 | || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { | |
273 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
274 | return 0; | |
275 | } | |
276 | ||
277 | id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); | |
278 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */ | |
279 | id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, | |
280 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); | |
281 | if (id == NULL) { | |
282 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
283 | return 0; | |
284 | } | |
285 | ||
286 | if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { | |
287 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
288 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
289 | return 0; | |
290 | } | |
291 | ||
292 | if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) { | |
293 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | |
294 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
295 | return 0; | |
296 | } | |
297 | } | |
298 | ||
299 | /* Read in request_extensions */ | |
300 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) { | |
301 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
302 | return 0; | |
303 | } | |
304 | ||
305 | if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { | |
306 | const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); | |
307 | ||
308 | sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts, | |
309 | X509_EXTENSION_free); | |
310 | s->ext.ocsp.exts = | |
311 | d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts)); | |
312 | if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { | |
313 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
314 | return 0; | |
315 | } | |
316 | } | |
317 | ||
318 | return 1; | |
319 | } | |
320 | #endif | |
321 | ||
322 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
323 | int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
324 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
325 | { | |
326 | /* | |
327 | * We shouldn't accept this extension on a | |
328 | * renegotiation. | |
329 | */ | |
330 | if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
331 | s->s3->npn_seen = 1; | |
332 | ||
333 | return 1; | |
334 | } | |
335 | #endif | |
336 | ||
337 | /* | |
338 | * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN | |
339 | * extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert | |
340 | * value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. | |
341 | */ | |
342 | int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
343 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
344 | { | |
345 | PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; | |
346 | ||
347 | if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) | |
348 | return 1; | |
349 | ||
350 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) | |
351 | || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { | |
352 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
353 | return 0; | |
354 | } | |
355 | ||
356 | save_protocol_list = protocol_list; | |
357 | do { | |
358 | /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ | |
359 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) | |
360 | || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { | |
361 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
362 | return 0; | |
363 | } | |
364 | } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); | |
365 | ||
366 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); | |
367 | s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; | |
368 | s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; | |
369 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, | |
370 | &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { | |
371 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
372 | return 0; | |
373 | } | |
374 | ||
375 | return 1; | |
376 | } | |
377 | ||
378 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
379 | int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
380 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
381 | { | |
382 | STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; | |
383 | unsigned int ct, mki_len, id; | |
384 | int i, srtp_pref; | |
385 | PACKET subpkt; | |
386 | ||
387 | /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */ | |
388 | if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL) | |
389 | return 1; | |
390 | ||
391 | /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */ | |
392 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0 | |
393 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { | |
394 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, | |
395 | SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); | |
396 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
397 | return 0; | |
398 | } | |
399 | ||
400 | srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); | |
401 | s->srtp_profile = NULL; | |
402 | /* Search all profiles for a match initially */ | |
403 | srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr); | |
404 | ||
405 | while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { | |
406 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) { | |
407 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, | |
408 | SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); | |
409 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
410 | return 0; | |
411 | } | |
412 | ||
413 | /* | |
414 | * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than | |
415 | * current match. | |
416 | * If no profiles have been have been configured then this | |
417 | * does nothing. | |
418 | */ | |
419 | for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) { | |
420 | SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof = | |
421 | sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i); | |
422 | ||
423 | if (sprof->id == id) { | |
424 | s->srtp_profile = sprof; | |
425 | srtp_pref = i; | |
426 | break; | |
427 | } | |
428 | } | |
429 | } | |
430 | ||
431 | /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */ | |
432 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) { | |
433 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, | |
434 | SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); | |
435 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
436 | return 0; | |
437 | } | |
438 | ||
439 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len) | |
440 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { | |
441 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); | |
442 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
443 | return 0; | |
444 | } | |
445 | ||
446 | return 1; | |
447 | } | |
448 | #endif | |
449 | ||
450 | int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
451 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
452 | { | |
453 | if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) | |
454 | s->ext.use_etm = 1; | |
455 | ||
456 | return 1; | |
457 | } | |
458 | ||
459 | /* | |
460 | * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains | |
461 | * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
462 | * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value. | |
463 | */ | |
464 | int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
465 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
466 | { | |
467 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 | |
468 | PACKET psk_kex_modes; | |
469 | unsigned int mode; | |
470 | ||
471 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes) | |
472 | || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) { | |
473 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
474 | return 0; | |
475 | } | |
476 | ||
477 | while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) { | |
478 | if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) | |
479 | s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; | |
480 | else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE) | |
481 | s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; | |
482 | } | |
483 | #endif | |
484 | ||
485 | return 1; | |
486 | } | |
487 | ||
488 | /* | |
489 | * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains | |
490 | * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
491 | * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value. | |
492 | */ | |
493 | int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
494 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
495 | { | |
496 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 | |
497 | unsigned int group_id; | |
498 | PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt; | |
499 | const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves; | |
500 | size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves; | |
501 | int group_nid, found = 0; | |
502 | unsigned int curve_flags; | |
503 | ||
504 | if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0) | |
505 | return 1; | |
506 | ||
507 | /* Sanity check */ | |
508 | if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { | |
509 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
510 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
511 | return 0; | |
512 | } | |
513 | ||
514 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) { | |
515 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
516 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
517 | return 0; | |
518 | } | |
519 | ||
520 | /* Get our list of supported curves */ | |
521 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) { | |
522 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
523 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
524 | return 0; | |
525 | } | |
526 | ||
527 | /* | |
528 | * Get the clients list of supported curves. | |
529 | * TODO(TLS1.3): We should validate that we actually received | |
530 | * supported_groups! | |
531 | */ | |
532 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) { | |
533 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
534 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
535 | return 0; | |
536 | } | |
537 | ||
538 | while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) { | |
539 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id) | |
540 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt) | |
541 | || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { | |
542 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
543 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, | |
544 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
545 | return 0; | |
546 | } | |
547 | ||
548 | /* | |
549 | * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the | |
550 | * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them. | |
551 | */ | |
552 | if (found) | |
553 | continue; | |
554 | ||
555 | /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */ | |
556 | if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) { | |
557 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
558 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); | |
559 | return 0; | |
560 | } | |
561 | ||
562 | /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */ | |
563 | if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) { | |
564 | /* Share not suitable */ | |
565 | continue; | |
566 | } | |
567 | ||
568 | group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags); | |
569 | ||
570 | if (group_nid == 0) { | |
571 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
572 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, | |
573 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); | |
574 | return 0; | |
575 | } | |
576 | ||
577 | if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) { | |
578 | /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */ | |
579 | EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
580 | ||
581 | if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) { | |
582 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
583 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
584 | EVP_PKEY_free(key); | |
585 | return 0; | |
586 | } | |
587 | s->s3->peer_tmp = key; | |
588 | } else { | |
589 | /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */ | |
590 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); | |
591 | ||
592 | if (pctx == NULL | |
593 | || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0 | |
594 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, | |
595 | group_nid) <= 0 | |
596 | || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) { | |
597 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
598 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
599 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
600 | return 0; | |
601 | } | |
602 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
603 | pctx = NULL; | |
604 | } | |
605 | s->s3->group_id = group_id; | |
606 | ||
607 | if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, | |
608 | PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), | |
609 | PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { | |
610 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
611 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); | |
612 | return 0; | |
613 | } | |
614 | ||
615 | found = 1; | |
616 | } | |
617 | #endif | |
618 | ||
619 | return 1; | |
620 | } | |
621 | ||
622 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
623 | int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
624 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
625 | { | |
626 | PACKET supported_groups_list; | |
627 | ||
628 | /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ | |
629 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list) | |
630 | || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0 | |
631 | || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) { | |
632 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
633 | return 0; | |
634 | } | |
635 | ||
636 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups); | |
637 | s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL; | |
638 | s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0; | |
639 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list, | |
640 | &s->session->ext.supportedgroups, | |
641 | &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) { | |
642 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
643 | return 0; | |
644 | } | |
645 | ||
646 | return 1; | |
647 | } | |
648 | #endif | |
649 | ||
650 | int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
651 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
652 | { | |
653 | /* The extension must always be empty */ | |
654 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
655 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
656 | return 0; | |
657 | } | |
658 | ||
659 | s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; | |
660 | ||
661 | return 1; | |
662 | } | |
663 | ||
664 | ||
665 | int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
666 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
667 | { | |
668 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
669 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
670 | return 0; | |
671 | } | |
672 | ||
673 | return 1; | |
674 | } | |
675 | ||
676 | int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
677 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
678 | { | |
679 | PACKET identities, binders, binder; | |
680 | size_t binderoffset, hashsize; | |
681 | SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; | |
682 | unsigned int id, i; | |
683 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
684 | uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems; | |
685 | ||
686 | /* | |
687 | * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so | |
688 | * ignore this extension | |
689 | */ | |
690 | if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode | |
691 | & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0) | |
692 | return 1; | |
693 | ||
694 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) { | |
695 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
696 | return 0; | |
697 | } | |
698 | ||
699 | for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) { | |
700 | PACKET identity; | |
701 | unsigned long ticket_agel; | |
702 | int ret; | |
703 | ||
704 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity) | |
705 | || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) { | |
706 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
707 | return 0; | |
708 | } | |
709 | ||
710 | ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel; | |
711 | ||
712 | ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity), | |
713 | PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, &sess); | |
714 | if (ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC || ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) { | |
715 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
716 | return 0; | |
717 | } | |
718 | if (ret == TICKET_NO_DECRYPT) | |
719 | continue; | |
720 | ||
721 | md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2); | |
722 | if (md == NULL) { | |
723 | /* | |
724 | * Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session. | |
725 | * Ignore it | |
726 | */ | |
727 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
728 | sess = NULL; | |
729 | continue; | |
730 | } | |
731 | ||
732 | /* | |
733 | * TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to handle the case of a ticket renewal. | |
734 | * Ignored for now | |
735 | */ | |
736 | ||
737 | break; | |
738 | } | |
739 | ||
740 | if (sess == NULL) | |
741 | return 1; | |
742 | ||
743 | binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; | |
744 | hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); | |
745 | ||
746 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) { | |
747 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
748 | goto err; | |
749 | } | |
750 | ||
751 | for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) { | |
752 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) { | |
753 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
754 | goto err; | |
755 | } | |
756 | } | |
757 | ||
758 | if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize | |
759 | || tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, | |
760 | (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
761 | binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, | |
762 | sess, 0) != 1) { | |
763 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
764 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
765 | goto err; | |
766 | } | |
767 | ||
768 | sess->ext.tick_identity = id; | |
769 | ||
770 | now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); | |
771 | agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time; | |
772 | agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; | |
773 | ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add; | |
774 | ||
775 | ||
776 | /* | |
777 | * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the client does | |
778 | * it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age is longer than ours | |
779 | * (our ticket age calculation should always be slightly longer than the | |
780 | * client's due to the network latency). Therefore we add 1000ms to our age | |
781 | * calculation to adjust for rounding errors. | |
782 | */ | |
783 | if (sess->timeout >= (long)agesec | |
784 | && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec | |
785 | && ticket_age <= agems + 1000 | |
786 | && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) { | |
787 | /* | |
788 | * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it for early | |
789 | * data | |
790 | */ | |
791 | s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; | |
792 | } | |
793 | ||
794 | ||
795 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
796 | s->session = sess; | |
797 | return 1; | |
798 | err: | |
799 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
800 | return 0; | |
801 | } | |
802 | ||
803 | /* | |
804 | * Add the server's renegotiation binding | |
805 | */ | |
806 | int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
807 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
808 | { | |
809 | if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding) | |
810 | return 1; | |
811 | ||
812 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) | |
813 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
814 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) | |
815 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, | |
816 | s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) | |
817 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished, | |
818 | s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) | |
819 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt) | |
820 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
821 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
822 | return 0; | |
823 | } | |
824 | ||
825 | return 1; | |
826 | } | |
827 | ||
828 | int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
829 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
830 | { | |
831 | if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1 | |
832 | || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) | |
833 | return 1; | |
834 | ||
835 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) | |
836 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
837 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
838 | return 0; | |
839 | } | |
840 | ||
841 | return 1; | |
842 | } | |
843 | ||
844 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
845 | int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
846 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
847 | { | |
848 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
849 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
850 | int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) | |
851 | && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL); | |
852 | const unsigned char *plist; | |
853 | size_t plistlen; | |
854 | ||
855 | if (!using_ecc) | |
856 | return 1; | |
857 | ||
858 | tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); | |
859 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) | |
860 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
861 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen) | |
862 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
863 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
864 | return 0; | |
865 | } | |
866 | ||
867 | return 1; | |
868 | } | |
869 | #endif | |
870 | ||
871 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
872 | int tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, | |
873 | unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
874 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
875 | { | |
876 | const unsigned char *groups; | |
877 | size_t numgroups, i, first = 1; | |
878 | ||
879 | /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */ | |
880 | if (s->s3->group_id == 0) | |
881 | return 1; | |
882 | ||
883 | /* Get our list of supported groups */ | |
884 | if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &groups, &numgroups) || numgroups == 0) { | |
885 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
886 | return 0; | |
887 | } | |
888 | ||
889 | /* Copy group ID if supported */ | |
890 | for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++, groups += 2) { | |
891 | if (tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { | |
892 | if (first) { | |
893 | /* | |
894 | * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If | |
895 | * so we don't need to add this extension | |
896 | */ | |
897 | if (s->s3->group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0)) | |
898 | return 1; | |
899 | ||
900 | /* Add extension header */ | |
901 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) | |
902 | /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ | |
903 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
904 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { | |
905 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, | |
906 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
907 | return 0; | |
908 | } | |
909 | ||
910 | first = 0; | |
911 | } | |
912 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0))) { | |
913 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, | |
914 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
915 | return 0; | |
916 | } | |
917 | } | |
918 | } | |
919 | ||
920 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
921 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
922 | return 0; | |
923 | } | |
924 | ||
925 | return 1; | |
926 | } | |
927 | #endif | |
928 | ||
929 | int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, | |
930 | unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
931 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
932 | { | |
933 | if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) { | |
934 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; | |
935 | return 1; | |
936 | } | |
937 | ||
938 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) | |
939 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
940 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
941 | return 0; | |
942 | } | |
943 | ||
944 | return 1; | |
945 | } | |
946 | ||
947 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP | |
948 | int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, | |
949 | unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
950 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
951 | { | |
952 | if (!s->ext.status_expected) | |
953 | return 1; | |
954 | ||
955 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0) | |
956 | return 1; | |
957 | ||
958 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) | |
959 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { | |
960 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
961 | return 0; | |
962 | } | |
963 | ||
964 | /* | |
965 | * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we | |
966 | * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a | |
967 | * separate message | |
968 | */ | |
969 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) | |
970 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
971 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
972 | return 0; | |
973 | } | |
974 | ||
975 | return 1; | |
976 | } | |
977 | #endif | |
978 | ||
979 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
980 | int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, | |
981 | unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
982 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
983 | { | |
984 | const unsigned char *npa; | |
985 | unsigned int npalen; | |
986 | int ret; | |
987 | int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen; | |
988 | ||
989 | s->s3->npn_seen = 0; | |
990 | if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL) | |
991 | return 1; | |
992 | ||
993 | ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, | |
994 | s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg); | |
995 | if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
996 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) | |
997 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) { | |
998 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG, | |
999 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1000 | return 0; | |
1001 | } | |
1002 | s->s3->npn_seen = 1; | |
1003 | } | |
1004 | ||
1005 | return 1; | |
1006 | } | |
1007 | #endif | |
1008 | ||
1009 | int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
1010 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
1011 | { | |
1012 | if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) | |
1013 | return 1; | |
1014 | ||
1015 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, | |
1016 | TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) | |
1017 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
1018 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
1019 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, | |
1020 | s->s3->alpn_selected_len) | |
1021 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt) | |
1022 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1023 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1024 | return 0; | |
1025 | } | |
1026 | ||
1027 | return 1; | |
1028 | } | |
1029 | ||
1030 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP | |
1031 | int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
1032 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
1033 | { | |
1034 | if (s->srtp_profile == NULL) | |
1035 | return 1; | |
1036 | ||
1037 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) | |
1038 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
1039 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2) | |
1040 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id) | |
1041 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
1042 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1043 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1044 | return 0; | |
1045 | } | |
1046 | ||
1047 | return 1; | |
1048 | } | |
1049 | #endif | |
1050 | ||
1051 | int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
1052 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
1053 | { | |
1054 | if (!s->ext.use_etm) | |
1055 | return 1; | |
1056 | ||
1057 | /* | |
1058 | * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable | |
1059 | * for other cases too. | |
1060 | */ | |
1061 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD | |
1062 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 | |
1063 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | |
1064 | || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) { | |
1065 | s->ext.use_etm = 0; | |
1066 | return 1; | |
1067 | } | |
1068 | ||
1069 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) | |
1070 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
1071 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1072 | return 0; | |
1073 | } | |
1074 | ||
1075 | return 1; | |
1076 | } | |
1077 | ||
1078 | int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
1079 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
1080 | { | |
1081 | if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) | |
1082 | return 1; | |
1083 | ||
1084 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) | |
1085 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { | |
1086 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1087 | return 0; | |
1088 | } | |
1089 | ||
1090 | return 1; | |
1091 | } | |
1092 | ||
1093 | int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
1094 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
1095 | { | |
1096 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 | |
1097 | unsigned char *encodedPoint; | |
1098 | size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; | |
1099 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL; | |
1100 | ||
1101 | if (ckey == NULL) { | |
1102 | /* No key_share received from client */ | |
1103 | if (s->hello_retry_request) { | |
1104 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) | |
1105 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
1106 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id) | |
1107 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1108 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, | |
1109 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1110 | return 0; | |
1111 | } | |
1112 | ||
1113 | return 1; | |
1114 | } | |
1115 | ||
1116 | /* Must be resuming. */ | |
1117 | if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) { | |
1118 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1119 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1120 | return 0; | |
1121 | } | |
1122 | return 1; | |
1123 | } | |
1124 | ||
1125 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) | |
1126 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
1127 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) { | |
1128 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1129 | return 0; | |
1130 | } | |
1131 | ||
1132 | skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); | |
1133 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
1134 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1135 | return 0; | |
1136 | } | |
1137 | ||
1138 | /* Generate encoding of server key */ | |
1139 | encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint); | |
1140 | if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { | |
1141 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
1142 | EVP_PKEY_free(skey); | |
1143 | return 0; | |
1144 | } | |
1145 | ||
1146 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len) | |
1147 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1148 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1149 | EVP_PKEY_free(skey); | |
1150 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
1151 | return 0; | |
1152 | } | |
1153 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
1154 | ||
1155 | /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */ | |
1156 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey; | |
1157 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { | |
1158 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1159 | return 0; | |
1160 | } | |
1161 | #endif | |
1162 | ||
1163 | return 1; | |
1164 | } | |
1165 | ||
1166 | int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
1167 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
1168 | { | |
1169 | const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { | |
1170 | 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ | |
1171 | 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ | |
1172 | 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, | |
1173 | 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, | |
1174 | 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, | |
1175 | 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 | |
1176 | }; | |
1177 | ||
1178 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80 | |
1179 | && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81) | |
1180 | || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0) | |
1181 | return 1; | |
1182 | ||
1183 | if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) { | |
1184 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1185 | return 0; | |
1186 | } | |
1187 | ||
1188 | return 1; | |
1189 | } | |
1190 | ||
1191 | int tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, | |
1192 | X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
1193 | { | |
1194 | if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { | |
1195 | if (s->max_early_data == 0) | |
1196 | return 1; | |
1197 | ||
1198 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) | |
1199 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
1200 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data) | |
1201 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1202 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1203 | return 0; | |
1204 | } | |
1205 | ||
1206 | return 1; | |
1207 | } | |
1208 | ||
1209 | if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) | |
1210 | return 1; | |
1211 | ||
1212 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) | |
1213 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
1214 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1215 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1216 | return 0; | |
1217 | } | |
1218 | ||
1219 | return 1; | |
1220 | } | |
1221 | ||
1222 | int tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, | |
1223 | size_t chainidx, int *al) | |
1224 | { | |
1225 | if (!s->hit) | |
1226 | return 1; | |
1227 | ||
1228 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) | |
1229 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) | |
1230 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity) | |
1231 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1232 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1233 | return 0; | |
1234 | } | |
1235 | ||
1236 | return 1; | |
1237 | } |