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1/*
2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
5 *
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12#include <stdio.h>
13#include <time.h>
14#include "../ssl_locl.h"
15#include "statem_locl.h"
16#include <openssl/buffer.h>
17#include <openssl/rand.h>
18#include <openssl/objects.h>
19#include <openssl/evp.h>
20#include <openssl/md5.h>
21#include <openssl/dh.h>
22#include <openssl/bn.h>
23#include <openssl/engine.h>
24
25static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
27
28static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
31 WPACKET *pkt);
32
33/*
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
35 *
36 * Return values are:
37 * 1: Yes
38 * 0: No
39 */
40static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
41{
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
46 return 0;
47
48 return 1;
49}
50
51/*
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
53 *
54 * Return values are:
55 * 1: Yes
56 * 0: No
57 */
58static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
59{
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
61
62 /*
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
65 */
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
67 | SSL_kSRP)) {
68 return 1;
69 }
70
71 return 0;
72}
73
74/*
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
79 *
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
82 */
83static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
84{
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
86
87 /*
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
91 */
92
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
94 default:
95 break;
96
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
98 /*
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
101 */
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
104 return 1;
105 }
106 break;
107
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
111 return 1;
112 }
113 break;
114
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
116 if (s->hit) {
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
119 return 1;
120 }
121 } else {
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
124 return 1;
125 }
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
128 return 1;
129 }
130 }
131 break;
132
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
136 return 1;
137 }
138 break;
139
140 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
143 return 1;
144 }
145 break;
146
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
150 return 1;
151 }
152 break;
153
154 case TLS_ST_OK:
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
157 return 1;
158 }
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
161 return 1;
162 }
163 break;
164 }
165
166 /* No valid transition found */
167 return 0;
168}
169
170/*
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
175 *
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
178 */
179int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
180{
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
182 int ske_expected;
183
184 /*
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
187 */
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
190 goto err;
191 return 1;
192 }
193
194 switch (st->hand_state) {
195 default:
196 break;
197
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
201 return 1;
202 }
203
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
205 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
206 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
207 return 1;
208 }
209 } else {
210 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
211 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
212 return 1;
213 }
214 }
215 break;
216
217 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
218 /*
219 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
220 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
221 * HelloRetryRequest.
222 */
223 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
224 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
225 return 1;
226 }
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
229 return 1;
230 }
231 break;
232
233 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
234 if (s->hit) {
235 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
237 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
238 return 1;
239 }
240 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
242 return 1;
243 }
244 } else {
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
246 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
247 return 1;
248 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
249 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
250 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
251 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
252 /*
253 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
254 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
255 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
256 * the server is resuming.
257 */
258 s->hit = 1;
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
260 return 1;
261 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
262 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
265 return 1;
266 }
267 } else {
268 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
269 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
270 if (ske_expected
271 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
272 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
275 return 1;
276 }
277 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
278 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
280 return 1;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
283 return 1;
284 }
285 }
286 }
287 break;
288
289 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
290 /*
291 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
292 * |ext.status_expected| is set
293 */
294 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
296 return 1;
297 }
298 /* Fall through */
299
300 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
301 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
303 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
304 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
307 return 1;
308 }
309 goto err;
310 }
311 /* Fall through */
312
313 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
314 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
315 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
317 return 1;
318 }
319 goto err;
320 }
321 /* Fall through */
322
323 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
324 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
326 return 1;
327 }
328 break;
329
330 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
331 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
332 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
333 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
334 return 1;
335 }
336 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
338 return 1;
339 }
340 break;
341
342 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
345 return 1;
346 }
347 break;
348
349 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
352 return 1;
353 }
354 break;
355
356 case TLS_ST_OK:
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
359 return 1;
360 }
361 break;
362 }
363
364 err:
365 /* No valid transition found */
366 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
368 return 0;
369}
370
371/*
372 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
373 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
374 * server.
375 */
376static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
377{
378 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
379
380 /*
381 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
382 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
383 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
384 */
385 switch (st->hand_state) {
386 default:
387 /* Shouldn't happen */
388 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
389
390 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
391 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
393
394 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
395 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
396 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
397
398 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
399 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
400 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
402 else
403 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
404 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406
407 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
408 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
411 }
412 /* Fall through */
413
414 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
415 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
416 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
418
419 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
420 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
421 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
422 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424
425 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
426 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
428
429 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
430 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
433 }
434 /* Fall through */
435
436 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
437 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
438 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441
442 case TLS_ST_OK:
443 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
446 }
447
448 /* Try to read from the server instead */
449 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
450 }
451}
452
453/*
454 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
455 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
456 */
457WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
458{
459 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
460
461 /*
462 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
463 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
464 * later
465 */
466 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
467 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
468
469 switch (st->hand_state) {
470 default:
471 /* Shouldn't happen */
472 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
473
474 case TLS_ST_OK:
475 if (!s->renegotiate) {
476 /*
477 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
478 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
479 */
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
481 }
482 /* Renegotiation */
483 /* fall thru */
484 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487
488 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
489 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
490 /*
491 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
492 * actually selected a version yet.
493 */
494 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
495 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
496 }
497 /*
498 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
499 * we will be sent
500 */
501 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
502
503 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
505
506 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
509
510 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
511 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
513 else
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
516
517 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520
521 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
522 /*
523 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
524 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
525 */
526 /*
527 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
528 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
529 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
530 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
531 */
532 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
534 } else {
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
536 }
537 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
539 }
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
541
542 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
544 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
545
546 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
547#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
548 st->
549 hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
550#else
551 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
553 else
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
555#endif
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
557
558#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
559 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
562#endif
563
564 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
565 if (s->hit) {
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
568 } else {
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
570 }
571
572 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
573 if (s->hit) {
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576 } else {
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579 }
580
581 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
582 /*
583 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
584 * convenient time.
585 */
586 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
587 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
588 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
589 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
590 }
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
593 }
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 }
597}
598
599/*
600 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
601 * the client to the server.
602 */
603WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
604{
605 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
606
607 switch (st->hand_state) {
608 default:
609 /* No pre work to be done */
610 break;
611
612 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
613 s->shutdown = 0;
614 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
615 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
616 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
617 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
618 return WORK_ERROR;
619 }
620 }
621 break;
622
623 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
624 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
625 if (s->hit) {
626 /*
627 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
628 * messages unless we need to.
629 */
630 st->use_timer = 0;
631 }
632#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
633 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
634 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
635#endif
636 }
637 break;
638
639 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
640 /*
641 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
642 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
643 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
644 */
645 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
646 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
647 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
648 /* Fall through */
649
650 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
651 case TLS_ST_OK:
652 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
653 }
654
655 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
656}
657
658/*
659 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
660 * client to the server.
661 */
662WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
663{
664 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
665
666 s->init_num = 0;
667
668 switch (st->hand_state) {
669 default:
670 /* No post work to be done */
671 break;
672
673 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
674 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
675 return WORK_MORE_A;
676
677 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
678 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
679 s->first_packet = 1;
680 }
681
682 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
683 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
684 /*
685 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
686 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
687 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
688 */
689 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
690 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
691 return WORK_ERROR;
692 }
693 break;
694
695 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
696 /*
697 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
698 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
699 */
700 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
701 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
702 break;
703
704 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
705 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
706 return WORK_ERROR;
707 break;
708
709 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
710 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
711#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
712 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
713#else
714 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
715 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
716 else
717 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
718#endif
719 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
720 return WORK_ERROR;
721
722 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
723 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
724 return WORK_ERROR;
725
726 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
727#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
728 if (s->hit) {
729 /*
730 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
731 * no SCTP used.
732 */
733 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
734 0, NULL);
735 }
736#endif
737
738 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
739 }
740 break;
741
742 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
743#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
744 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
745 /*
746 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
747 * no SCTP used.
748 */
749 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
750 0, NULL);
751 }
752#endif
753 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
754 return WORK_MORE_B;
755
756 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
757 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
758 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
759 return WORK_ERROR;
760 }
761 break;
762
763 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
764 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
765 return WORK_MORE_A;
766 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
767 return WORK_ERROR;
768 break;
769 }
770
771 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
772}
773
774/*
775 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
776 * client
777 *
778 * Valid return values are:
779 * 1: Success
780 * 0: Error
781 */
782int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
783 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
784{
785 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
786
787 switch (st->hand_state) {
788 default:
789 /* Shouldn't happen */
790 return 0;
791
792 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
793 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
794 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
795 else
796 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
797 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
798 break;
799
800 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
801 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
802 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
803 break;
804
805 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
806 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
807 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
808 break;
809
810 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
811 *confunc = NULL;
812 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
813 break;
814
815 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
816 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
817 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
818 break;
819
820 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
821 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
822 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
823 break;
824
825 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
826 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
827 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
828 break;
829
830#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
831 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
832 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
833 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
834 break;
835#endif
836 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
837 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
838 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
839 break;
840
841 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
842 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
843 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
844 break;
845 }
846
847 return 1;
848}
849
850/*
851 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
852 * reading. Excludes the message header.
853 */
854size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
855{
856 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
857
858 switch (st->hand_state) {
859 default:
860 /* Shouldn't happen */
861 return 0;
862
863 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
864 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
865
866 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
867 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
868
869 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
870 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
871
872 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
873 return s->max_cert_list;
874
875 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
876 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
877
878 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
879 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
880
881 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
882 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
883
884 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
885 /*
886 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
887 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
888 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
889 */
890 return s->max_cert_list;
891
892 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
893 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
894
895 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
896 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
897 return 3;
898 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
899
900 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
901 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
902
903 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
904 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
905
906 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
907 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
908
909 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
910 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
911 }
912}
913
914/*
915 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
916 */
917MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
918{
919 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
920
921 switch (st->hand_state) {
922 default:
923 /* Shouldn't happen */
924 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
925
926 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
927 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
928
929 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
930 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
931
932 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
933 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
934
935 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
936 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
937
938 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
939 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
940
941 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
942 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
943
944 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
945 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
946
947 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
948 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
949
950 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
951 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
952
953 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
954 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
955
956 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
957 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
958
959 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
960 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
961
962 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
963 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
964
965 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
966 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
967
968 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
969 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
970 }
971}
972
973/*
974 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
975 * from the server
976 */
977WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
978{
979 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
980
981 switch (st->hand_state) {
982 default:
983 /* Shouldn't happen */
984 return WORK_ERROR;
985
986 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
987 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
988 }
989}
990
991int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
992{
993 unsigned char *p;
994 size_t sess_id_len;
995 int i, protverr;
996 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
997#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
998 SSL_COMP *comp;
999#endif
1000 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1001
1002 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1003 /* Should not happen */
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1005 return 0;
1006 }
1007
1008 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1009 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1010 if (protverr != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1012 return 0;
1013 }
1014
1015 if (sess == NULL
1016 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1017 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1018 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1019 return 0;
1020 }
1021 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1022
1023 p = s->s3->client_random;
1024
1025 /*
1026 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1027 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1028 */
1029 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1030 size_t idx;
1031 i = 1;
1032 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1033 if (p[idx]) {
1034 i = 0;
1035 break;
1036 }
1037 }
1038 } else
1039 i = 1;
1040
1041 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1042 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0)
1043 return 0;
1044
1045 /*-
1046 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1047 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1048 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1049 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1050 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1051 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1052 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1053 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1054 * 1.0.
1055 *
1056 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1057 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1058 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1059 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1060 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1061 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1062 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1063 * know that is maximum server supports.
1064 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1065 * containing version 1.0.
1066 *
1067 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1068 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1069 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1070 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1071 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1072 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1073 * the negotiated version.
1074 *
1075 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1076 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1077 */
1078 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1079 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1081 return 0;
1082 }
1083
1084 /* Session ID */
1085 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1086 sess_id_len = 0;
1087 else
1088 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1089 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1090 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1091 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1092 sess_id_len))
1093 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1095 return 0;
1096 }
1097
1098 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1099 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1100 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1101 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1102 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1104 return 0;
1105 }
1106 }
1107
1108 /* Ciphers supported */
1109 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1111 return 0;
1112 }
1113 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1114 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1115 return 0;
1116 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1118 return 0;
1119 }
1120
1121 /* COMPRESSION */
1122 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1124 return 0;
1125 }
1126#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1127 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1128 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1129 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1130 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1131 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1132 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1133 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1135 return 0;
1136 }
1137 }
1138 }
1139#endif
1140 /* Add the NULL method */
1141 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1143 return 0;
1144 }
1145
1146 /* TLS extensions */
1147 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1149 return 0;
1150 }
1151
1152 return 1;
1153}
1154
1155MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1156{
1157 int al;
1158 size_t cookie_len;
1159 PACKET cookiepkt;
1160
1161 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1162 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1163 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1165 goto f_err;
1166 }
1167
1168 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1169 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1170 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1172 goto f_err;
1173 }
1174
1175 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1176 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1178 goto f_err;
1179 }
1180 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1181
1182 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1183 f_err:
1184 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1185 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1186 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1187}
1188
1189static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1190{
1191 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1192 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1193 int i;
1194
1195 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1196 if (c == NULL) {
1197 /* unknown cipher */
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1199 return 0;
1200 }
1201 /*
1202 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1203 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1204 */
1205 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1207 return 0;
1208 }
1209
1210 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1211 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1212 if (i < 0) {
1213 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1215 return 0;
1216 }
1217
1218 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1219 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1220 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1222 return 0;
1223 }
1224
1225 /*
1226 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1227 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1228 * set and use it for comparison.
1229 */
1230 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1231 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1232 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1233 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1234 /*
1235 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1236 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1237 */
1238 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1239 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1241 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1242 return 0;
1243 }
1244 } else {
1245 /*
1246 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1247 * ciphersuite.
1248 */
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1250 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1251 return 0;
1252 }
1253 }
1254 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1255
1256 return 1;
1257}
1258
1259MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1260{
1261 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1262 size_t session_id_len;
1263 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1264 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1265 unsigned int compression;
1266 unsigned int sversion;
1267 unsigned int context;
1268 int protverr;
1269 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1270#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1271 SSL_COMP *comp;
1272#endif
1273
1274 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1275 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1277 goto f_err;
1278 }
1279
1280 /* load the server random */
1281 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1282 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1284 goto f_err;
1285 }
1286
1287 /*
1288 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1289 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1290 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1291 */
1292 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 1, &al);
1293 if (protverr != 0) {
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1295 goto f_err;
1296 }
1297
1298 /*
1299 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1300 * message must be on a record boundary.
1301 */
1302 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1303 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1305 goto f_err;
1306 }
1307
1308 /* Get the session-id. */
1309 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1310 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1311 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1313 goto f_err;
1314 }
1315 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1316 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1317 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1318 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1320 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1321 goto f_err;
1322 }
1323 } else {
1324 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1325 session_id_len = 0;
1326 }
1327
1328 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1330 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1331 goto f_err;
1332 }
1333
1334 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1335 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1337 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1338 goto f_err;
1339 }
1340 } else {
1341 compression = 0;
1342 }
1343
1344 /* TLS extensions */
1345 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1346 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1347 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1348 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1349 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1351 goto f_err;
1352 }
1353
1354 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1355 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1356 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL, 1))
1357 goto f_err;
1358
1359 s->hit = 0;
1360
1361 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1362 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1363 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1364 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1365 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1366 goto f_err;
1367 } else {
1368 /*
1369 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1370 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1371 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1372 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1373 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1374 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1375 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1376 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1377 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1378 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1379 */
1380 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1381 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1382 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1383 /*
1384 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1385 * backwards compat reasons
1386 */
1387 int master_key_length;
1388 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1389 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1390 &master_key_length,
1391 NULL, &pref_cipher,
1392 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1393 && master_key_length > 0) {
1394 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1395 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1396 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1397 } else {
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1399 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1400 goto f_err;
1401 }
1402 }
1403
1404 if (session_id_len != 0
1405 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1406 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1407 session_id_len) == 0)
1408 s->hit = 1;
1409 }
1410
1411 if (s->hit) {
1412 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1413 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1414 /* actually a client application bug */
1415 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1417 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1418 goto f_err;
1419 }
1420 } else {
1421 /*
1422 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1423 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1424 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1425 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1426 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1427 */
1428 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1429 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1430 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1431 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1432 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1433 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1434 goto f_err;
1435 }
1436 }
1437
1438 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1439 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1440 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1441 if (session_id_len > 0)
1442 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1443 session_id_len);
1444 }
1445
1446 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1447 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1448 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1449
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1451 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1452 goto f_err;
1453 }
1454 /*
1455 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1456 * version.
1457 */
1458 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1459 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1460
1461 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1462 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1463 goto f_err;
1464 }
1465
1466#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1467 if (compression != 0) {
1468 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1470 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1471 goto f_err;
1472 }
1473 /*
1474 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1475 * using compression.
1476 */
1477 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1479 goto f_err;
1480 }
1481#else
1482 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1483 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1485 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1486 goto f_err;
1487 }
1488 if (compression == 0)
1489 comp = NULL;
1490 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1491 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1493 goto f_err;
1494 } else {
1495 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1496 }
1497
1498 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1499 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1501 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1502 goto f_err;
1503 } else {
1504 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1505 }
1506#endif
1507
1508 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
1509 goto f_err;
1510
1511#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1512 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1513 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1514 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1515
1516 /*
1517 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1518 * no SCTP used.
1519 */
1520 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1521 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1522
1523 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1524 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1525 labelbuffer,
1526 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1527 goto f_err;
1528
1529 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1530 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1531 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1532 }
1533#endif
1534
1535 /*
1536 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1537 * we're done with this message
1538 */
1539 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1540 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1541 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1542 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1543 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1545 goto f_err;
1546 }
1547
1548 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1549 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1550 f_err:
1551 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1552 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1553 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1554 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1555}
1556
1557static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1558{
1559 unsigned int sversion;
1560 int errorcode;
1561 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1562 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1563 int al;
1564 PACKET extpkt;
1565
1566 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1567 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1569 goto f_err;
1570 }
1571
1572 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1573
1574 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1575 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 0, &al);
1576 if (errorcode != 0) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1578 goto f_err;
1579 }
1580
1581 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1583 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1584 goto f_err;
1585 }
1586
1587 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1588 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1589 goto f_err;
1590 }
1591
1592 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1593 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1594 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0
1595 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1596 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1597 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1599 goto f_err;
1600 }
1601
1602 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1603 &extensions, &al, NULL, 1)
1604 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1605 extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
1606 goto f_err;
1607
1608 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1609 extensions = NULL;
1610
1611 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1612 /*
1613 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1614 * ClientHello will not change
1615 */
1616 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1618 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1619 goto f_err;
1620 }
1621
1622 /*
1623 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1624 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1625 */
1626 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1627 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1628 goto f_err;
1629 }
1630
1631 /*
1632 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1633 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1634 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1635 * for HRR messages.
1636 */
1637 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1638 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1639 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1641 goto f_err;
1642 }
1643
1644 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1645 f_err:
1646 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1647 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1648 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1649 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1650}
1651
1652MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1653{
1654 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1655 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1656 X509 *x = NULL;
1657 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1658 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1659 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1660 size_t chainidx;
1661 unsigned int context = 0;
1662
1663 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1665 goto err;
1666 }
1667
1668 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1669 || context != 0
1670 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1671 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1672 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1673 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1675 goto f_err;
1676 }
1677 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1678 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1679 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1680 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1682 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1683 goto f_err;
1684 }
1685
1686 certstart = certbytes;
1687 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1688 if (x == NULL) {
1689 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1691 goto f_err;
1692 }
1693 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1694 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1696 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1697 goto f_err;
1698 }
1699
1700 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1701 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1702 PACKET extensions;
1703
1704 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1705 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1707 goto f_err;
1708 }
1709 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1710 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1711 &al, NULL, chainidx == 0)
1712 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1713 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al,
1714 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1715 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1716 goto f_err;
1717 }
1718 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1719 }
1720
1721 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1723 goto err;
1724 }
1725 x = NULL;
1726 }
1727
1728 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1729 /*
1730 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1731 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1732 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1733 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1734 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1735 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1736 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1737 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1738 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1739 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1740 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1741 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1742 */
1743 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1744 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1746 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1747 goto f_err;
1748 }
1749 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1750 if (i > 1) {
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1752 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1753 goto f_err;
1754 }
1755
1756 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1757 /*
1758 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1759 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1760 */
1761 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1762 sk = NULL;
1763 /*
1764 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1765 */
1766
1767 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1768
1769 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1770 x = NULL;
1771 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1773 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1774 goto f_err;
1775 }
1776
1777 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1778 if (i < 0) {
1779 x = NULL;
1780 al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1782 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1783 goto f_err;
1784 }
1785 /*
1786 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1787 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1788 * type.
1789 */
1790 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1791 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1792 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1793 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_ECC || i != SSL_PKEY_ED25519)
1794 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1795 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1796 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1797 x = NULL;
1798 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1800 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1801 goto f_err;
1802 }
1803 }
1804 s->session->peer_type = i;
1805
1806 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1807 X509_up_ref(x);
1808 s->session->peer = x;
1809 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1810 x = NULL;
1811
1812 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1813 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1814 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1815 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1816 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1817 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1819 goto f_err;
1820 }
1821
1822 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1823 goto done;
1824
1825 f_err:
1826 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1827 err:
1828 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1829 done:
1830 X509_free(x);
1831 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1832 return ret;
1833}
1834
1835static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1836{
1837#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1838 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1839
1840 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1841
1842 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1843 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1845 return 0;
1846 }
1847
1848 /*
1849 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1850 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1851 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1852 * identity.
1853 */
1854 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1855 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1857 return 0;
1858 }
1859
1860 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1861 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1862 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1863 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1864 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1865 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1866 return 0;
1867 }
1868
1869 return 1;
1870#else
1871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1872 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1873 return 0;
1874#endif
1875}
1876
1877static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1878{
1879#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1880 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1881
1882 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1883 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1884 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1885 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1886 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1888 return 0;
1889 }
1890
1891 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1892 if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
1893 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1894 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1895 || (s->srp_ctx.g =
1896 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1897 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1898 || (s->srp_ctx.s =
1899 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1900 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1901 || (s->srp_ctx.B =
1902 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1903 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1904 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1906 return 0;
1907 }
1908
1909 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1911 return 0;
1912 }
1913
1914 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1915 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1916 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1917
1918 return 1;
1919#else
1920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1921 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1922 return 0;
1923#endif
1924}
1925
1926static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1927{
1928#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1929 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1930 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1931
1932 DH *dh = NULL;
1933 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1934
1935 int check_bits = 0;
1936
1937 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1938 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1939 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1940 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1942 return 0;
1943 }
1944
1945 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1946 dh = DH_new();
1947
1948 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1949 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1951 goto err;
1952 }
1953
1954 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1955 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1956 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1957 NULL);
1958 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1959 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1960 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1961 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1963 goto err;
1964 }
1965
1966 /* test non-zero pubkey */
1967 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1968 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1970 goto err;
1971 }
1972
1973 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1974 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1976 goto err;
1977 }
1978 p = g = NULL;
1979
1980 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1981 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1983 goto err;
1984 }
1985
1986 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1987 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1989 goto err;
1990 }
1991 bnpub_key = NULL;
1992
1993 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1994 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1996 goto err;
1997 }
1998
1999 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2000 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2002 goto err;
2003 }
2004
2005 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2006
2007 /*
2008 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2009 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2010 */
2011 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2012 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2013 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2014
2015 return 1;
2016
2017 err:
2018 BN_free(p);
2019 BN_free(g);
2020 BN_free(bnpub_key);
2021 DH_free(dh);
2022 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2023
2024 return 0;
2025#else
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2027 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2028 return 0;
2029#endif
2030}
2031
2032static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
2033{
2034#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2035 PACKET encoded_pt;
2036 const unsigned char *ecparams;
2037 int curve_nid;
2038 unsigned int curve_flags;
2039 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2040
2041 /*
2042 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2043 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
2044 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2045 */
2046 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
2047 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2049 return 0;
2050 }
2051 /*
2052 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
2053 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
2054 */
2055 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
2056 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2058 return 0;
2059 }
2060
2061 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
2062
2063 if (curve_nid == 0) {
2064 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2066 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2067 return 0;
2068 }
2069
2070 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2071 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2072
2073 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
2074 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2076 EVP_PKEY_free(key);
2077 return 0;
2078 }
2079 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2080 } else {
2081 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2082 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2083 if (pctx == NULL
2084 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2085 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2086 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2087 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2089 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2090 return 0;
2091 }
2092 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2093 pctx = NULL;
2094 }
2095
2096 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2097 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2099 return 0;
2100 }
2101
2102 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2103 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2104 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2105 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2107 return 0;
2108 }
2109
2110 /*
2111 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2112 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2113 * and ECDSA.
2114 */
2115 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2116 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2117 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2118 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2119 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2120
2121 return 1;
2122#else
2123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2124 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2125 return 0;
2126#endif
2127}
2128
2129MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2130{
2131 int al = -1;
2132 long alg_k;
2133 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2134 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2135 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2136 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2137
2138 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2139
2140 save_param_start = *pkt;
2141
2142#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2143 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2144 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2145#endif
2146
2147 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2148 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2149 goto err;
2150 }
2151
2152 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2153 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2154 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2155 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2156 goto err;
2157 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2158 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2159 goto err;
2160 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2161 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2162 goto err;
2163 } else if (alg_k) {
2164 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2166 goto err;
2167 }
2168
2169 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2170 if (pkey != NULL) {
2171 PACKET params;
2172 int maxsig;
2173 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2174 unsigned char *tbs;
2175 size_t tbslen;
2176 int rv;
2177
2178 /*
2179 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2180 * equals the length of the parameters.
2181 */
2182 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, &params,
2183 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2184 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2185 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2187 goto err;
2188 }
2189
2190 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2191 unsigned int sigalg;
2192
2193 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2194 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2196 goto err;
2197 }
2198 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2199 if (rv == -1) {
2200 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2201 goto err;
2202 } else if (rv == 0) {
2203 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2204 goto err;
2205 }
2206#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2207 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2208#endif
2209 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2210 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2211 goto err;
2212 }
2213
2214 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2215 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2216 goto err;
2217 }
2218
2219 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2220 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2221 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2223 goto err;
2224 }
2225 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2226 if (maxsig < 0) {
2227 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2229 goto err;
2230 }
2231
2232 /*
2233 * Check signature length
2234 */
2235 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2236 /* wrong packet length */
2237 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2239 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2240 goto err;
2241 }
2242
2243 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2244 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2245 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2247 goto err;
2248 }
2249
2250 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2251 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2253 goto err;
2254 }
2255 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2256 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2257 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2258 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2259 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2261 goto err;
2262 }
2263 }
2264 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(&params),
2265 PACKET_remaining(&params));
2266 if (tbslen == 0) {
2267 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2269 goto err;
2270 }
2271
2272 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2273 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2274 OPENSSL_free(tbs);
2275 if (rv <= 0) {
2276 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2278 goto err;
2279 }
2280 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2281 md_ctx = NULL;
2282 } else {
2283 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2284 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2285 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2286 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2287 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2288 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2289 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2291 } else {
2292 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2293 }
2294 goto err;
2295 }
2296 /* still data left over */
2297 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2298 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2300 goto err;
2301 }
2302 }
2303
2304 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2305 err:
2306 if (al != -1)
2307 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2308 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2309 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2310 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2311}
2312
2313MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2314{
2315 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2316 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2317 size_t i;
2318
2319 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2320 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2321 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2322
2323 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2324 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2325 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2326
2327 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2328 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2329 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2330 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2331
2332 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2333 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2335 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2336 goto err;
2337 }
2338
2339 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2341 goto err;
2342 }
2343 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2344 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2345 &rawexts, &al, NULL, 1)
2346 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2347 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
2348 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2349 goto err;
2350 }
2351 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2352 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2353 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2355 goto err;
2356 }
2357 } else {
2358 PACKET ctypes;
2359
2360 /* get the certificate types */
2361 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2363 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2364 goto err;
2365 }
2366
2367 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2368 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2370 goto err;
2371 }
2372
2373 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2374 PACKET sigalgs;
2375
2376 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2378 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2379 goto err;
2380 }
2381
2382 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2384 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2385 goto err;
2386 }
2387 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2388 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2390 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2391 goto err;
2392 }
2393 }
2394
2395 /* get the CA RDNs */
2396 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt, &al))
2397 goto err;
2398 }
2399
2400 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2402 goto err;
2403 }
2404
2405 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2406 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2407
2408 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2409 goto done;
2410 err:
2411 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2412 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2413 done:
2414 return ret;
2415}
2416
2417MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2418{
2419 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2420 unsigned int ticklen;
2421 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2422 unsigned int sess_len;
2423 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2424 PACKET nonce;
2425
2426 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2427 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2428 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2429 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2430 || PACKET_remaining(&nonce) == 0
2431 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2432 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2433 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2434 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2435 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2436 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2438 goto f_err;
2439 }
2440
2441 /*
2442 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2443 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2444 * be 0 here in that instance
2445 */
2446 if (ticklen == 0)
2447 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2448
2449 /*
2450 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2451 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2452 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2453 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2454 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2455 * cache.
2456 */
2457 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2458 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2459 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2460 /*
2461 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2462 * one
2463 */
2464 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2465 /*
2466 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2467 */
2468 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2469 }
2470
2471 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2472 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2474 goto f_err;
2475 }
2476
2477 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2478 s->session = new_sess;
2479 }
2480
2481 /*
2482 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2483 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2484 */
2485 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2486
2487 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2488 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2489 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2490
2491 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2492 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2494 goto err;
2495 }
2496 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2497 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2499 goto f_err;
2500 }
2501
2502 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2503 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2504 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2505
2506 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2507 PACKET extpkt;
2508
2509 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2510 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2511 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2512 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2513 &exts, &al, NULL, 1)
2514 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2515 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2516 exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2518 goto f_err;
2519 }
2520 }
2521
2522 /*
2523 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2524 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2525 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2526 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2527 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2528 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2529 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2530 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2531 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2532 */
2533 /*
2534 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2535 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2536 */
2537 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2538 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2539 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2541 goto err;
2542 }
2543 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2544
2545 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2546 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2547 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2548 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2549 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2550 }
2551
2552 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2553 f_err:
2554 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2555 err:
2556 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2557 OPENSSL_free(exts);
2558 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2559}
2560
2561/*
2562 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2563 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2564 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2565 */
2566int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2567{
2568 size_t resplen;
2569 unsigned int type;
2570
2571 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2572 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2573 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2575 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2576 return 0;
2577 }
2578 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2579 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2580 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2582 return 0;
2583 }
2584 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2585 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2586 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2588 return 0;
2589 }
2590 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2591 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2593 return 0;
2594 }
2595 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2596
2597 return 1;
2598}
2599
2600
2601MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2602{
2603 int al;
2604
2605 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2606 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2607 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2608 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2609 }
2610
2611 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2612}
2613
2614/*
2615 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2616 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2617 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2618 * on failure.
2619 */
2620int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2621{
2622 /*
2623 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2624 * the server
2625 */
2626 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2627 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2628 return 0;
2629 }
2630
2631 /*
2632 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2633 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2634 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2635 */
2636 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2637 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2638 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2639
2640 if (ret == 0) {
2641 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2643 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2644 return 0;
2645 }
2646 if (ret < 0) {
2647 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2649 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2650 return 0;
2651 }
2652 }
2653#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2654 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2655 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2656 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2657 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2658 return 0;
2659 }
2660 }
2661#endif
2662
2663 return 1;
2664}
2665
2666MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2667{
2668 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2669
2670 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2671 /* should contain no data */
2672 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2674 goto err;
2675 }
2676#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2677 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2678 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2680 goto err;
2681 }
2682 }
2683#endif
2684
2685 /*
2686 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2687 */
2688 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2689 goto err;
2690
2691 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2692
2693 err:
2694 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2695 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2696 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2697}
2698
2699static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2700{
2701#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2702 int ret = 0;
2703 /*
2704 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2705 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2706 * strnlen.
2707 */
2708 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2709 size_t identitylen = 0;
2710 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2711 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2712 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2713 size_t psklen = 0;
2714
2715 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2717 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2718 goto err;
2719 }
2720
2721 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2722
2723 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2724 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2725 psk, sizeof(psk));
2726
2727 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2729 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2730 goto err;
2731 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2733 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2734 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2735 goto err;
2736 }
2737
2738 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2739 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2741 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2742 goto err;
2743 }
2744
2745 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2746 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2747 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2749 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2750 goto err;
2751 }
2752
2753 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2754 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2755 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2756 tmppsk = NULL;
2757 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2758 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2759 tmpidentity = NULL;
2760
2761 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2763 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2764 goto err;
2765 }
2766
2767 ret = 1;
2768
2769 err:
2770 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2771 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2772 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2773 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2774
2775 return ret;
2776#else
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2778 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2779 return 0;
2780#endif
2781}
2782
2783static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2784{
2785#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2786 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2787 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2788 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2789 size_t enclen;
2790 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2791 size_t pmslen = 0;
2792
2793 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2794 /*
2795 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2796 */
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2798 return 0;
2799 }
2800
2801 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2802 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2804 return 0;
2805 }
2806
2807 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2808 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2809 if (pms == NULL) {
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2811 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2812 return 0;
2813 }
2814
2815 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2816 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2817 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2818 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2819 goto err;
2820 }
2821
2822 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2823 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2825 goto err;
2826 }
2827 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2828 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2829 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2831 goto err;
2832 }
2833 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2834 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2836 goto err;
2837 }
2838 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2839 pctx = NULL;
2840
2841 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2842 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2844 goto err;
2845 }
2846
2847 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2848 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2849 goto err;
2850
2851 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2852 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2853
2854 return 1;
2855 err:
2856 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2857 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2858
2859 return 0;
2860#else
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2862 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2863 return 0;
2864#endif
2865}
2866
2867static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2868{
2869#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2870 DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
2871 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2872 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2873 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2874
2875 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2876 if (skey == NULL)
2877 goto err;
2878
2879 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2880 if (ckey == NULL)
2881 goto err;
2882
2883 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2884
2885 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2886 goto err;
2887
2888 /* send off the data */
2889 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2890 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2891 goto err;
2892
2893 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2894 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2895
2896 return 1;
2897 err:
2898 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2899#endif
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2901 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2902 return 0;
2903}
2904
2905static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2906{
2907#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2908 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2909 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2910 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2911 int ret = 0;
2912
2913 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2914 if (skey == NULL) {
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2916 return 0;
2917 }
2918
2919 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2920 if (ckey == NULL) {
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2922 goto err;
2923 }
2924
2925 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2927 goto err;
2928 }
2929
2930 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2931 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2932
2933 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2935 goto err;
2936 }
2937
2938 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2940 goto err;
2941 }
2942
2943 ret = 1;
2944 err:
2945 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2946 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2947 return ret;
2948#else
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2950 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2951 return 0;
2952#endif
2953}
2954
2955static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2956{
2957#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2958 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2959 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2960 X509 *peer_cert;
2961 size_t msglen;
2962 unsigned int md_len;
2963 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2964 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2965 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2966 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2967 size_t pmslen = 0;
2968
2969 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2970 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2971
2972 /*
2973 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2974 */
2975 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2976 if (!peer_cert) {
2977 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2979 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2980 return 0;
2981 }
2982
2983 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2984 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2985 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2987 return 0;
2988 }
2989 /*
2990 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2991 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2992 * certificate key for key exchange
2993 */
2994
2995 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2996 pmslen = 32;
2997 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2998 if (pms == NULL) {
2999 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3001 goto err;
3002 }
3003
3004 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3005 /* Generate session key
3006 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3007 */
3008 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3009 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3011 goto err;
3012 };
3013 /*
3014 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3015 * data
3016 */
3017 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3018 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3019 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3020 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3021 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3022 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3023 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3024 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3025 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3027 goto err;
3028 }
3029 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3030 ukm_hash = NULL;
3031 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3032 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3033 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3035 goto err;
3036 }
3037 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3038 /*
3039 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3040 */
3041 msglen = 255;
3042 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3043 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3045 goto err;
3046 }
3047
3048 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3049 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3050 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3051 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3053 goto err;
3054 }
3055
3056 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3057 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3058 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3059
3060 return 1;
3061 err:
3062 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3063 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3064 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3065 return 0;
3066#else
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3068 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3069 return 0;
3070#endif
3071}
3072
3073static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3074{
3075#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3076 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3077
3078 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3079 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3080 &abytes)) {
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3082 return 0;
3083 }
3084 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3085
3086 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3087 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3088 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3090 return 0;
3091 }
3092
3093 return 1;
3094#else
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3096 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3097 return 0;
3098#endif
3099}
3100
3101int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3102{
3103 unsigned long alg_k;
3104 int al = -1;
3105
3106 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3107
3108 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3109 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3110 goto err;
3111
3112 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3113 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3114 goto err;
3115 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3116 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3117 goto err;
3118 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3119 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3120 goto err;
3121 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3122 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3123 goto err;
3124 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3125 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3126 goto err;
3127 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3130 goto err;
3131 }
3132
3133 return 1;
3134 err:
3135 if (al != -1)
3136 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3137 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3138 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3139#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3140 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3141 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3142#endif
3143 return 0;
3144}
3145
3146int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3147{
3148 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3149 size_t pmslen = 0;
3150
3151 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3152 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3153
3154#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3155 /* Check for SRP */
3156 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3157 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3159 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3160 goto err;
3161 }
3162 return 1;
3163 }
3164#endif
3165
3166 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3167 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3169 goto err;
3170 }
3171 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3172 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3174 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3175 pms = NULL;
3176 pmslen = 0;
3177 goto err;
3178 }
3179 pms = NULL;
3180 pmslen = 0;
3181
3182#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3183 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3184 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3185 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3186
3187 /*
3188 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3189 * used.
3190 */
3191 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3192 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3193
3194 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3195 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3196 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3197 goto err;
3198
3199 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3200 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3201 }
3202#endif
3203
3204 return 1;
3205 err:
3206 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3207 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3208 return 0;
3209}
3210
3211/*
3212 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3213 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3214 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3215 */
3216static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3217{
3218 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3219 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3220 return 0;
3221 /*
3222 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3223 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3224 */
3225 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3226 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3227 return 0;
3228 return 1;
3229}
3230
3231WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3232{
3233 X509 *x509 = NULL;
3234 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3235 int i;
3236
3237 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3238 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3239 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3240 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3241 if (i < 0) {
3242 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3243 return WORK_MORE_A;
3244 }
3245 if (i == 0) {
3246 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3247 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3248 return 0;
3249 }
3250 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3251 }
3252 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3253 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3254
3255 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3256 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3257 }
3258
3259 /* We need to get a client cert */
3260 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3261 /*
3262 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3263 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3264 */
3265 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3266 if (i < 0) {
3267 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3268 return WORK_MORE_B;
3269 }
3270 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3271 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3272 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3273 i = 0;
3274 } else if (i == 1) {
3275 i = 0;
3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3277 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3278 }
3279
3280 X509_free(x509);
3281 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3282 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3283 i = 0;
3284 if (i == 0) {
3285 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3286 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3287 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3288 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3289 } else {
3290 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3291 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3292 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3293 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3294 return 0;
3295 }
3296 }
3297 }
3298
3299 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3300 }
3301
3302 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3303 return WORK_ERROR;
3304}
3305
3306int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3307{
3308 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3309
3310 /*
3311 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3312 * later
3313 */
3314 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3315 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3316 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3317 : s->cert->key,
3318 &al)) {
3319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3320 goto err;
3321 }
3322
3323 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3324 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3325 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3326 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3328 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3329 /*
3330 * This is a fatal error, which leaves
3331 * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state
3332 * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3333 */
3334 return 0;
3335 }
3336
3337 return 1;
3338 err:
3339 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3340 return 0;
3341}
3342
3343#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3344
3345int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3346{
3347 int i;
3348#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3349 int idx;
3350#endif
3351 long alg_k, alg_a;
3352 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3353 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3354
3355 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3356 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3357
3358 /* we don't have a certificate */
3359 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3360 return (1);
3361
3362 /* This is the passed certificate */
3363
3364#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3365 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3366 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC || idx == SSL_PKEY_ED25519) {
3367 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3368 /* check failed */
3369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3370 goto f_err;
3371 } else {
3372 return 1;
3373 }
3374 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3376 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3377 goto f_err;
3378 }
3379#endif
3380 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3381 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3382
3383 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3384 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3386 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3387 goto f_err;
3388 }
3389#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3390 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3392 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3393 goto f_err;
3394 }
3395#endif
3396#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3397 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3398 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3400 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3401 goto f_err;
3402 }
3403#endif
3404#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3405 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3406 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3408 goto f_err;
3409 }
3410#endif
3411
3412 return (1);
3413 f_err:
3414 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3415 return (0);
3416}
3417
3418#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3419int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3420{
3421 size_t len, padding_len;
3422 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3423
3424 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3425 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3426
3427 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3428 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3430 goto err;
3431 }
3432
3433 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3434
3435 return 1;
3436 err:
3437 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3438 return 0;
3439}
3440#endif
3441
3442MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3443{
3444 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3445 /* should contain no data */
3446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3447 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3448 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3449 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3450 }
3451
3452 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3453 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3454 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3455 }
3456
3457 /*
3458 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3459 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3460 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3461 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3462 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3463 */
3464 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3465 SSL_renegotiate(s);
3466 else
3467 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3468
3469 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3470}
3471
3472static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3473{
3474 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3475 PACKET extensions;
3476 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3477
3478 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3479 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3480 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3482 goto err;
3483 }
3484
3485 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3486 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3487 &al, NULL, 1)
3488 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3489 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
3490 goto err;
3491
3492 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3493 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3494
3495 err:
3496 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3497 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3498 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3499 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3500}
3501
3502int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3503{
3504 int i = 0;
3505#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3506 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3507 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3508 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3509 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3510 if (i != 0)
3511 return i;
3512 }
3513#endif
3514 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3515 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3516 return i;
3517}
3518
3519int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3520{
3521 int i;
3522 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3523 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3524 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3525 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3526
3527 if (sk == NULL)
3528 return (0);
3529
3530#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3531# if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3532# error Max cipher length too short
3533# endif
3534 /*
3535 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3536 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3537 * use TLS v1.2
3538 */
3539 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3540 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3541 else
3542#endif
3543 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3544 maxlen = 0xfffe;
3545
3546 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3547 maxlen -= 2;
3548 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3549 maxlen -= 2;
3550
3551 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3552 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3553
3554 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3555 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3556 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3557 continue;
3558
3559 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3561 return 0;
3562 }
3563
3564 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3565 if (!maxverok) {
3566 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3567 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3568 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3569 maxverok = 1;
3570 } else {
3571 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3572 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3573 maxverok = 1;
3574 }
3575 }
3576
3577 totlen += len;
3578 }
3579
3580 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3582
3583 if (!maxverok)
3584 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3585 "SSL/TLS version");
3586
3587 return 0;
3588 }
3589
3590 if (totlen != 0) {
3591 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3592 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3593 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3594 };
3595 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3597 return 0;
3598 }
3599 }
3600 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3601 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3602 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3603 };
3604 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3606 return 0;
3607 }
3608 }
3609 }
3610
3611 return 1;
3612}
3613
3614int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3615{
3616 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3617 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3619 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3620 return 0;
3621 }
3622
3623 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;
3624 return 1;
3625}
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