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1 | /* | |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
10 | #include <stdio.h> | |
11 | #include <stdlib.h> | |
12 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
13 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
14 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> | |
15 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> | |
16 | #include <openssl/conf.h> | |
17 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
18 | #include <openssl/dh.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | |
20 | #include "internal/nelem.h" | |
21 | #include "ssl_locl.h" | |
22 | #include <openssl/ct.h> | |
23 | ||
24 | SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = { | |
25 | tls1_enc, | |
26 | tls1_mac, | |
27 | tls1_setup_key_block, | |
28 | tls1_generate_master_secret, | |
29 | tls1_change_cipher_state, | |
30 | tls1_final_finish_mac, | |
31 | TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
32 | TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
33 | tls1_alert_code, | |
34 | tls1_export_keying_material, | |
35 | 0, | |
36 | ssl3_set_handshake_header, | |
37 | tls_close_construct_packet, | |
38 | ssl3_handshake_write | |
39 | }; | |
40 | ||
41 | SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = { | |
42 | tls1_enc, | |
43 | tls1_mac, | |
44 | tls1_setup_key_block, | |
45 | tls1_generate_master_secret, | |
46 | tls1_change_cipher_state, | |
47 | tls1_final_finish_mac, | |
48 | TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
49 | TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
50 | tls1_alert_code, | |
51 | tls1_export_keying_material, | |
52 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, | |
53 | ssl3_set_handshake_header, | |
54 | tls_close_construct_packet, | |
55 | ssl3_handshake_write | |
56 | }; | |
57 | ||
58 | SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = { | |
59 | tls1_enc, | |
60 | tls1_mac, | |
61 | tls1_setup_key_block, | |
62 | tls1_generate_master_secret, | |
63 | tls1_change_cipher_state, | |
64 | tls1_final_finish_mac, | |
65 | TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
66 | TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
67 | tls1_alert_code, | |
68 | tls1_export_keying_material, | |
69 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | |
70 | | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, | |
71 | ssl3_set_handshake_header, | |
72 | tls_close_construct_packet, | |
73 | ssl3_handshake_write | |
74 | }; | |
75 | ||
76 | SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = { | |
77 | tls13_enc, | |
78 | tls1_mac, | |
79 | tls13_setup_key_block, | |
80 | tls13_generate_master_secret, | |
81 | tls13_change_cipher_state, | |
82 | tls13_final_finish_mac, | |
83 | TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
84 | TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
85 | tls13_alert_code, | |
86 | tls13_export_keying_material, | |
87 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF, | |
88 | ssl3_set_handshake_header, | |
89 | tls_close_construct_packet, | |
90 | ssl3_handshake_write | |
91 | }; | |
92 | ||
93 | long tls1_default_timeout(void) | |
94 | { | |
95 | /* | |
96 | * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for | |
97 | * http, the cache would over fill | |
98 | */ | |
99 | return (60 * 60 * 2); | |
100 | } | |
101 | ||
102 | int tls1_new(SSL *s) | |
103 | { | |
104 | if (!ssl3_new(s)) | |
105 | return 0; | |
106 | if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s)) | |
107 | return 0; | |
108 | ||
109 | return 1; | |
110 | } | |
111 | ||
112 | void tls1_free(SSL *s) | |
113 | { | |
114 | OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket); | |
115 | ssl3_free(s); | |
116 | } | |
117 | ||
118 | int tls1_clear(SSL *s) | |
119 | { | |
120 | if (!ssl3_clear(s)) | |
121 | return 0; | |
122 | ||
123 | if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) | |
124 | s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL; | |
125 | else | |
126 | s->version = s->method->version; | |
127 | ||
128 | return 1; | |
129 | } | |
130 | ||
131 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
132 | ||
133 | /* | |
134 | * Table of curve information. | |
135 | * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup | |
136 | * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id. | |
137 | */ | |
138 | static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = { | |
139 | {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */ | |
140 | {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */ | |
141 | {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */ | |
142 | {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */ | |
143 | {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */ | |
144 | {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */ | |
145 | {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */ | |
146 | {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */ | |
147 | {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */ | |
148 | {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */ | |
149 | {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */ | |
150 | {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */ | |
151 | {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */ | |
152 | {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */ | |
153 | {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */ | |
154 | {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */ | |
155 | {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */ | |
156 | {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */ | |
157 | {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */ | |
158 | {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */ | |
159 | {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */ | |
160 | {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */ | |
161 | {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */ | |
162 | {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */ | |
163 | {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */ | |
164 | {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ | |
165 | {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ | |
166 | {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ | |
167 | {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */ | |
168 | {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X448 (30) */ | |
169 | }; | |
170 | ||
171 | static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { | |
172 | TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, | |
173 | TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime, | |
174 | TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 | |
175 | }; | |
176 | ||
177 | /* The default curves */ | |
178 | static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = { | |
179 | 29, /* X25519 (29) */ | |
180 | 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ | |
181 | 30, /* X448 (30) */ | |
182 | 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ | |
183 | 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ | |
184 | }; | |
185 | ||
186 | static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = { | |
187 | TLSEXT_curve_P_256, | |
188 | TLSEXT_curve_P_384 | |
189 | }; | |
190 | ||
191 | const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id) | |
192 | { | |
193 | /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ | |
194 | if (group_id < 1 || group_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)) | |
195 | return NULL; | |
196 | return &nid_list[group_id - 1]; | |
197 | } | |
198 | ||
199 | static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid) | |
200 | { | |
201 | size_t i; | |
202 | for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) { | |
203 | if (nid_list[i].nid == nid) | |
204 | return (uint16_t)(i + 1); | |
205 | } | |
206 | return 0; | |
207 | } | |
208 | ||
209 | /* | |
210 | * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to | |
211 | * the number of groups supported. | |
212 | */ | |
213 | void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups, | |
214 | size_t *pgroupslen) | |
215 | { | |
216 | ||
217 | /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */ | |
218 | switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
219 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: | |
220 | *pgroups = suiteb_curves; | |
221 | *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves); | |
222 | break; | |
223 | ||
224 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: | |
225 | *pgroups = suiteb_curves; | |
226 | *pgroupslen = 1; | |
227 | break; | |
228 | ||
229 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: | |
230 | *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1; | |
231 | *pgroupslen = 1; | |
232 | break; | |
233 | ||
234 | default: | |
235 | if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) { | |
236 | *pgroups = eccurves_default; | |
237 | *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default); | |
238 | } else { | |
239 | *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups; | |
240 | *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len; | |
241 | } | |
242 | break; | |
243 | } | |
244 | } | |
245 | ||
246 | /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */ | |
247 | int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op) | |
248 | { | |
249 | const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(curve); | |
250 | unsigned char ctmp[2]; | |
251 | ||
252 | if (cinfo == NULL) | |
253 | return 0; | |
254 | # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M | |
255 | if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2) | |
256 | return 0; | |
257 | # endif | |
258 | ctmp[0] = curve >> 8; | |
259 | ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff; | |
260 | return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp); | |
261 | } | |
262 | ||
263 | /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */ | |
264 | static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen) | |
265 | { | |
266 | size_t i; | |
267 | for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++) | |
268 | if (list[i] == id) | |
269 | return 1; | |
270 | return 0; | |
271 | } | |
272 | ||
273 | /*- | |
274 | * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0 | |
275 | * if there is no match. | |
276 | * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches | |
277 | * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for | |
278 | * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match. | |
279 | */ | |
280 | uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch) | |
281 | { | |
282 | const uint16_t *pref, *supp; | |
283 | size_t num_pref, num_supp, i; | |
284 | int k; | |
285 | ||
286 | /* Can't do anything on client side */ | |
287 | if (s->server == 0) | |
288 | return 0; | |
289 | if (nmatch == -2) { | |
290 | if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
291 | /* | |
292 | * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know | |
293 | * these are acceptable due to previous checks. | |
294 | */ | |
295 | unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; | |
296 | ||
297 | if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) | |
298 | return TLSEXT_curve_P_256; | |
299 | if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) | |
300 | return TLSEXT_curve_P_384; | |
301 | /* Should never happen */ | |
302 | return 0; | |
303 | } | |
304 | /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */ | |
305 | nmatch = 0; | |
306 | } | |
307 | /* | |
308 | * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order | |
309 | * otherwise peer decides. | |
310 | */ | |
311 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) { | |
312 | tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref); | |
313 | tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp); | |
314 | } else { | |
315 | tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref); | |
316 | tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp); | |
317 | } | |
318 | ||
319 | for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) { | |
320 | uint16_t id = pref[i]; | |
321 | ||
322 | if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp) | |
323 | || !tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED)) | |
324 | continue; | |
325 | if (nmatch == k) | |
326 | return id; | |
327 | k++; | |
328 | } | |
329 | if (nmatch == -1) | |
330 | return k; | |
331 | /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */ | |
332 | return 0; | |
333 | } | |
334 | ||
335 | int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, | |
336 | int *groups, size_t ngroups) | |
337 | { | |
338 | uint16_t *glist; | |
339 | size_t i; | |
340 | /* | |
341 | * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group | |
342 | * ids < 32 | |
343 | */ | |
344 | unsigned long dup_list = 0; | |
345 | ||
346 | if (ngroups == 0) { | |
347 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
348 | return 0; | |
349 | } | |
350 | if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) { | |
351 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
352 | return 0; | |
353 | } | |
354 | for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) { | |
355 | unsigned long idmask; | |
356 | uint16_t id; | |
357 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */ | |
358 | id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]); | |
359 | idmask = 1L << id; | |
360 | if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) { | |
361 | OPENSSL_free(glist); | |
362 | return 0; | |
363 | } | |
364 | dup_list |= idmask; | |
365 | glist[i] = id; | |
366 | } | |
367 | OPENSSL_free(*pext); | |
368 | *pext = glist; | |
369 | *pextlen = ngroups; | |
370 | return 1; | |
371 | } | |
372 | ||
373 | # define MAX_CURVELIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list) | |
374 | ||
375 | typedef struct { | |
376 | size_t nidcnt; | |
377 | int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST]; | |
378 | } nid_cb_st; | |
379 | ||
380 | static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) | |
381 | { | |
382 | nid_cb_st *narg = arg; | |
383 | size_t i; | |
384 | int nid; | |
385 | char etmp[20]; | |
386 | if (elem == NULL) | |
387 | return 0; | |
388 | if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST) | |
389 | return 0; | |
390 | if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) | |
391 | return 0; | |
392 | memcpy(etmp, elem, len); | |
393 | etmp[len] = 0; | |
394 | nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp); | |
395 | if (nid == NID_undef) | |
396 | nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp); | |
397 | if (nid == NID_undef) | |
398 | nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp); | |
399 | if (nid == NID_undef) | |
400 | return 0; | |
401 | for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++) | |
402 | if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid) | |
403 | return 0; | |
404 | narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid; | |
405 | return 1; | |
406 | } | |
407 | ||
408 | /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */ | |
409 | int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str) | |
410 | { | |
411 | nid_cb_st ncb; | |
412 | ncb.nidcnt = 0; | |
413 | if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb)) | |
414 | return 0; | |
415 | if (pext == NULL) | |
416 | return 1; | |
417 | return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); | |
418 | } | |
419 | /* Return group id of a key */ | |
420 | static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey) | |
421 | { | |
422 | EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); | |
423 | const EC_GROUP *grp; | |
424 | ||
425 | if (ec == NULL) | |
426 | return 0; | |
427 | grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); | |
428 | return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp)); | |
429 | } | |
430 | ||
431 | /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */ | |
432 | static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey) | |
433 | { | |
434 | const EC_KEY *ec; | |
435 | const EC_GROUP *grp; | |
436 | unsigned char comp_id; | |
437 | size_t i; | |
438 | ||
439 | /* If not an EC key nothing to check */ | |
440 | if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC) | |
441 | return 1; | |
442 | ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); | |
443 | grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); | |
444 | ||
445 | /* Get required compression id */ | |
446 | if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { | |
447 | comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; | |
448 | } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
449 | /* | |
450 | * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore | |
451 | * this check. | |
452 | */ | |
453 | return 1; | |
454 | } else { | |
455 | int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp)); | |
456 | ||
457 | if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field) | |
458 | comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; | |
459 | else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) | |
460 | comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; | |
461 | else | |
462 | return 0; | |
463 | } | |
464 | /* | |
465 | * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is | |
466 | * supported (see RFC4492). | |
467 | */ | |
468 | if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) | |
469 | return 1; | |
470 | ||
471 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) { | |
472 | if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats[i] == comp_id) | |
473 | return 1; | |
474 | } | |
475 | return 0; | |
476 | } | |
477 | ||
478 | /* Check a group id matches preferences */ | |
479 | int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups) | |
480 | { | |
481 | const uint16_t *groups; | |
482 | size_t groups_len; | |
483 | ||
484 | if (group_id == 0) | |
485 | return 0; | |
486 | ||
487 | /* Check for Suite B compliance */ | |
488 | if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL) { | |
489 | unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; | |
490 | ||
491 | if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) { | |
492 | if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256) | |
493 | return 0; | |
494 | } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) { | |
495 | if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384) | |
496 | return 0; | |
497 | } else { | |
498 | /* Should never happen */ | |
499 | return 0; | |
500 | } | |
501 | } | |
502 | ||
503 | if (check_own_groups) { | |
504 | /* Check group is one of our preferences */ | |
505 | tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len); | |
506 | if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len)) | |
507 | return 0; | |
508 | } | |
509 | ||
510 | if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK)) | |
511 | return 0; | |
512 | ||
513 | /* For clients, nothing more to check */ | |
514 | if (!s->server) | |
515 | return 1; | |
516 | ||
517 | /* Check group is one of peers preferences */ | |
518 | tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len); | |
519 | ||
520 | /* | |
521 | * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension | |
522 | * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve. | |
523 | * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups | |
524 | * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension. | |
525 | */ | |
526 | if (groups_len == 0) | |
527 | return 1; | |
528 | return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len); | |
529 | } | |
530 | ||
531 | void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, | |
532 | size_t *num_formats) | |
533 | { | |
534 | /* | |
535 | * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default | |
536 | */ | |
537 | if (s->ext.ecpointformats) { | |
538 | *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats; | |
539 | *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len; | |
540 | } else { | |
541 | *pformats = ecformats_default; | |
542 | /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */ | |
543 | if (tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
544 | *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1; | |
545 | else | |
546 | *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default); | |
547 | } | |
548 | } | |
549 | ||
550 | /* | |
551 | * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC | |
552 | * certificates have compatible curves and compression. | |
553 | */ | |
554 | static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md) | |
555 | { | |
556 | uint16_t group_id; | |
557 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
558 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); | |
559 | if (pkey == NULL) | |
560 | return 0; | |
561 | /* If not EC nothing to do */ | |
562 | if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC) | |
563 | return 1; | |
564 | /* Check compression */ | |
565 | if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) | |
566 | return 0; | |
567 | group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey); | |
568 | /* | |
569 | * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported | |
570 | * groups. | |
571 | */ | |
572 | if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server)) | |
573 | return 0; | |
574 | /* | |
575 | * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or | |
576 | * SHA384+P-384. | |
577 | */ | |
578 | if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
579 | int check_md; | |
580 | size_t i; | |
581 | CERT *c = s->cert; | |
582 | ||
583 | /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */ | |
584 | if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) | |
585 | check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; | |
586 | else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) | |
587 | check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384; | |
588 | else | |
589 | return 0; /* Should never happen */ | |
590 | for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) { | |
591 | if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash) | |
592 | return 1;; | |
593 | } | |
594 | return 0; | |
595 | } | |
596 | return 1; | |
597 | } | |
598 | ||
599 | /* | |
600 | * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility | |
601 | * @s: SSL connection | |
602 | * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using | |
603 | * | |
604 | * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using | |
605 | * is compatible with the client extensions. | |
606 | * | |
607 | * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can. | |
608 | */ | |
609 | int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) | |
610 | { | |
611 | /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */ | |
612 | if (!tls1_suiteb(s)) | |
613 | return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0; | |
614 | /* | |
615 | * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other | |
616 | * curves permitted. | |
617 | */ | |
618 | if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) | |
619 | return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1); | |
620 | if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) | |
621 | return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1); | |
622 | ||
623 | return 0; | |
624 | } | |
625 | ||
626 | #else | |
627 | ||
628 | static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) | |
629 | { | |
630 | return 1; | |
631 | } | |
632 | ||
633 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
634 | ||
635 | /* Default sigalg schemes */ | |
636 | static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = { | |
637 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
638 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, | |
639 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, | |
640 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, | |
641 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519, | |
642 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448, | |
643 | #endif | |
644 | ||
645 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256, | |
646 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384, | |
647 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512, | |
648 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, | |
649 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, | |
650 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, | |
651 | ||
652 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, | |
653 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, | |
654 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, | |
655 | ||
656 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
657 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224, | |
658 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, | |
659 | #endif | |
660 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224, | |
661 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, | |
662 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA | |
663 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224, | |
664 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, | |
665 | ||
666 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256, | |
667 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384, | |
668 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512, | |
669 | #endif | |
670 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
671 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, | |
672 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, | |
673 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, | |
674 | #endif | |
675 | }; | |
676 | ||
677 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
678 | static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = { | |
679 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, | |
680 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 | |
681 | }; | |
682 | #endif | |
683 | ||
684 | static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = { | |
685 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
686 | {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, | |
687 | NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC, | |
688 | NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1}, | |
689 | {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, | |
690 | NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC, | |
691 | NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1}, | |
692 | {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, | |
693 | NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC, | |
694 | NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1}, | |
695 | {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519, | |
696 | NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519, | |
697 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
698 | {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448, | |
699 | NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448, | |
700 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
701 | {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224, | |
702 | NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC, | |
703 | NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef}, | |
704 | {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, | |
705 | NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC, | |
706 | NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef}, | |
707 | #endif | |
708 | {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, | |
709 | NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA, | |
710 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
711 | {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, | |
712 | NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA, | |
713 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
714 | {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, | |
715 | NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA, | |
716 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
717 | {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256, | |
718 | NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN, | |
719 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
720 | {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384, | |
721 | NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN, | |
722 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
723 | {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512, | |
724 | NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN, | |
725 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
726 | {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, | |
727 | NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA, | |
728 | NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef}, | |
729 | {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, | |
730 | NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA, | |
731 | NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef}, | |
732 | {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, | |
733 | NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA, | |
734 | NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef}, | |
735 | {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224, | |
736 | NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA, | |
737 | NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef}, | |
738 | {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, | |
739 | NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA, | |
740 | NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef}, | |
741 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA | |
742 | {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256, | |
743 | NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN, | |
744 | NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef}, | |
745 | {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384, | |
746 | NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN, | |
747 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
748 | {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512, | |
749 | NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN, | |
750 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
751 | {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224, | |
752 | NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN, | |
753 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
754 | {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, | |
755 | NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN, | |
756 | NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef}, | |
757 | #endif | |
758 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
759 | {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, | |
760 | NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, | |
761 | NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256, | |
762 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
763 | {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, | |
764 | NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, | |
765 | NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512, | |
766 | NID_undef, NID_undef}, | |
767 | {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, | |
768 | NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, | |
769 | NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01, | |
770 | NID_undef, NID_undef} | |
771 | #endif | |
772 | }; | |
773 | /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */ | |
774 | static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = { | |
775 | "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0, | |
776 | NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX, | |
777 | EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA, | |
778 | NID_undef, NID_undef | |
779 | }; | |
780 | ||
781 | /* | |
782 | * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present. | |
783 | * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order. | |
784 | */ | |
785 | static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = { | |
786 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */ | |
787 | 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */ | |
788 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */ | |
789 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */ | |
790 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */ | |
791 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */ | |
792 | TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */ | |
793 | 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */ | |
794 | 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */ | |
795 | }; | |
796 | ||
797 | /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */ | |
798 | static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg) | |
799 | { | |
800 | size_t i; | |
801 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s; | |
802 | ||
803 | for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); | |
804 | i++, s++) { | |
805 | if (s->sigalg == sigalg) | |
806 | return s; | |
807 | } | |
808 | return NULL; | |
809 | } | |
810 | /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */ | |
811 | int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd) | |
812 | { | |
813 | const EVP_MD *md; | |
814 | if (lu == NULL) | |
815 | return 0; | |
816 | /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */ | |
817 | if (lu->hash == NID_undef) { | |
818 | md = NULL; | |
819 | } else { | |
820 | md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx); | |
821 | if (md == NULL) | |
822 | return 0; | |
823 | } | |
824 | if (pmd) | |
825 | *pmd = md; | |
826 | return 1; | |
827 | } | |
828 | ||
829 | /* | |
830 | * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature. | |
831 | * | |
832 | * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2. | |
833 | * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible | |
834 | * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key. | |
835 | */ | |
836 | #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2) | |
837 | static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu) | |
838 | { | |
839 | const EVP_MD *md; | |
840 | ||
841 | if (rsa == NULL) | |
842 | return 0; | |
843 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL) | |
844 | return 0; | |
845 | if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md)) | |
846 | return 0; | |
847 | return 1; | |
848 | } | |
849 | ||
850 | /* | |
851 | * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type | |
852 | * is fixed by the certificate type. | |
853 | */ | |
854 | static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx) | |
855 | { | |
856 | if (idx == -1) { | |
857 | if (s->server) { | |
858 | size_t i; | |
859 | ||
860 | /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */ | |
861 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { | |
862 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i); | |
863 | ||
864 | if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) { | |
865 | idx = i; | |
866 | break; | |
867 | } | |
868 | } | |
869 | ||
870 | /* | |
871 | * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms | |
872 | * */ | |
873 | if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) { | |
874 | int real_idx; | |
875 | ||
876 | for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01; | |
877 | real_idx--) { | |
878 | if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) { | |
879 | idx = real_idx; | |
880 | break; | |
881 | } | |
882 | } | |
883 | } | |
884 | } else { | |
885 | idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys; | |
886 | } | |
887 | } | |
888 | if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg)) | |
889 | return NULL; | |
890 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) { | |
891 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]); | |
892 | ||
893 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL)) | |
894 | return NULL; | |
895 | return lu; | |
896 | } | |
897 | return &legacy_rsa_sigalg; | |
898 | } | |
899 | /* Set peer sigalg based key type */ | |
900 | int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) | |
901 | { | |
902 | size_t idx; | |
903 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu; | |
904 | ||
905 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL) | |
906 | return 0; | |
907 | lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx); | |
908 | if (lu == NULL) | |
909 | return 0; | |
910 | s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu; | |
911 | return 1; | |
912 | } | |
913 | ||
914 | size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs) | |
915 | { | |
916 | /* | |
917 | * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other | |
918 | * preferences. | |
919 | */ | |
920 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
921 | switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
922 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: | |
923 | *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; | |
924 | return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs); | |
925 | ||
926 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: | |
927 | *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; | |
928 | return 1; | |
929 | ||
930 | case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: | |
931 | *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1; | |
932 | return 1; | |
933 | } | |
934 | #endif | |
935 | /* | |
936 | * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server | |
937 | * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and | |
938 | * determining which shared algorithm to use. | |
939 | */ | |
940 | if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) { | |
941 | *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; | |
942 | return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; | |
943 | } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { | |
944 | *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; | |
945 | return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; | |
946 | } else { | |
947 | *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; | |
948 | return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs); | |
949 | } | |
950 | } | |
951 | ||
952 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
953 | /* | |
954 | * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the | |
955 | * specified EC curve. | |
956 | */ | |
957 | int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve) | |
958 | { | |
959 | const uint16_t *sigs; | |
960 | size_t siglen, i; | |
961 | ||
962 | if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { | |
963 | sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; | |
964 | siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; | |
965 | } else { | |
966 | sigs = tls12_sigalgs; | |
967 | siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs); | |
968 | } | |
969 | ||
970 | for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) { | |
971 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]); | |
972 | ||
973 | if (lu == NULL) | |
974 | continue; | |
975 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC | |
976 | && lu->curve != NID_undef | |
977 | && curve == lu->curve) | |
978 | return 1; | |
979 | } | |
980 | ||
981 | return 0; | |
982 | } | |
983 | #endif | |
984 | ||
985 | /* | |
986 | * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature | |
987 | * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in | |
988 | * s. | |
989 | */ | |
990 | int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) | |
991 | { | |
992 | const uint16_t *sent_sigs; | |
993 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
994 | char sigalgstr[2]; | |
995 | size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx; | |
996 | int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); | |
997 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu; | |
998 | ||
999 | /* Should never happen */ | |
1000 | if (pkeyid == -1) | |
1001 | return -1; | |
1002 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1003 | /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */ | |
1004 | if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { | |
1005 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, | |
1006 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
1007 | return 0; | |
1008 | } | |
1009 | /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */ | |
1010 | if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA) | |
1011 | pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS; | |
1012 | } | |
1013 | lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig); | |
1014 | /* | |
1015 | * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type | |
1016 | * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS | |
1017 | */ | |
1018 | if (lu == NULL | |
1019 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224)) | |
1020 | || (pkeyid != lu->sig | |
1021 | && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) { | |
1022 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, | |
1023 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
1024 | return 0; | |
1025 | } | |
1026 | /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */ | |
1027 | if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx) | |
1028 | || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) { | |
1029 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, | |
1030 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
1031 | return 0; | |
1032 | } | |
1033 | ||
1034 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
1035 | if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) { | |
1036 | ||
1037 | /* Check point compression is permitted */ | |
1038 | if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) { | |
1039 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1040 | SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, | |
1041 | SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION); | |
1042 | return 0; | |
1043 | } | |
1044 | ||
1045 | /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */ | |
1046 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
1047 | EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); | |
1048 | int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)); | |
1049 | ||
1050 | if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) { | |
1051 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1052 | SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); | |
1053 | return 0; | |
1054 | } | |
1055 | } | |
1056 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1057 | /* Check curve matches extensions */ | |
1058 | if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) { | |
1059 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1060 | SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); | |
1061 | return 0; | |
1062 | } | |
1063 | if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
1064 | /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */ | |
1065 | if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 | |
1066 | && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) { | |
1067 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, | |
1068 | SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, | |
1069 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
1070 | return 0; | |
1071 | } | |
1072 | } | |
1073 | } | |
1074 | } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
1075 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, | |
1076 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
1077 | return 0; | |
1078 | } | |
1079 | #endif | |
1080 | ||
1081 | /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ | |
1082 | sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs); | |
1083 | for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) { | |
1084 | if (sig == *sent_sigs) | |
1085 | break; | |
1086 | } | |
1087 | /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */ | |
1088 | if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1 | |
1089 | || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { | |
1090 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, | |
1091 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
1092 | return 0; | |
1093 | } | |
1094 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { | |
1095 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, | |
1096 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); | |
1097 | return 0; | |
1098 | } | |
1099 | if (md != NULL) { | |
1100 | /* | |
1101 | * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical | |
1102 | * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array. | |
1103 | */ | |
1104 | sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff; | |
1105 | sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff; | |
1106 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, | |
1107 | EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md), | |
1108 | (void *)sigalgstr)) { | |
1109 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, | |
1110 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
1111 | return 0; | |
1112 | } | |
1113 | } | |
1114 | /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */ | |
1115 | s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu; | |
1116 | return 1; | |
1117 | } | |
1118 | ||
1119 | int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid) | |
1120 | { | |
1121 | if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL) | |
1122 | return 0; | |
1123 | *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig; | |
1124 | return 1; | |
1125 | } | |
1126 | ||
1127 | int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid) | |
1128 | { | |
1129 | if (s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL) | |
1130 | return 0; | |
1131 | *pnid = s->s3->tmp.sigalg->sig; | |
1132 | return 1; | |
1133 | } | |
1134 | ||
1135 | /* | |
1136 | * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't | |
1137 | * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported | |
1138 | * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level. | |
1139 | * | |
1140 | * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported | |
1141 | * by the client. | |
1142 | * | |
1143 | * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not. | |
1144 | */ | |
1145 | int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) | |
1146 | { | |
1147 | s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0; | |
1148 | s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0; | |
1149 | ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK); | |
1150 | if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, | |
1151 | &s->s3->tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0) | |
1152 | return 0; | |
1153 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
1154 | /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ | |
1155 | if (!s->psk_client_callback) { | |
1156 | s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; | |
1157 | s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK; | |
1158 | } | |
1159 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ | |
1160 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
1161 | if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { | |
1162 | s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; | |
1163 | s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; | |
1164 | } | |
1165 | #endif | |
1166 | return 1; | |
1167 | } | |
1168 | ||
1169 | /* | |
1170 | * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not | |
1171 | * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on | |
1172 | * @c: cipher to check | |
1173 | * @op: Security check that you want to do | |
1174 | * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3 | |
1175 | * | |
1176 | * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled. | |
1177 | */ | |
1178 | int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe) | |
1179 | { | |
1180 | if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k | |
1181 | || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a) | |
1182 | return 1; | |
1183 | if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0) | |
1184 | return 1; | |
1185 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1186 | int min_tls = c->min_tls; | |
1187 | ||
1188 | /* | |
1189 | * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server | |
1190 | * in SSLv3 if we are a client | |
1191 | */ | |
1192 | if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe | |
1193 | && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0) | |
1194 | min_tls = SSL3_VERSION; | |
1195 | ||
1196 | if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)) | |
1197 | return 1; | |
1198 | } | |
1199 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) | |
1200 | || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) | |
1201 | return 1; | |
1202 | ||
1203 | return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c); | |
1204 | } | |
1205 | ||
1206 | int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s) | |
1207 | { | |
1208 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) | |
1209 | return 0; | |
1210 | return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL); | |
1211 | } | |
1212 | ||
1213 | int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) | |
1214 | { | |
1215 | size_t i; | |
1216 | ||
1217 | /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */ | |
1218 | OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); | |
1219 | s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; | |
1220 | s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; | |
1221 | /* Clear certificate validity flags */ | |
1222 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) | |
1223 | s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; | |
1224 | /* | |
1225 | * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support | |
1226 | * the default algorithm for each certificate type | |
1227 | */ | |
1228 | if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL | |
1229 | && s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) { | |
1230 | const uint16_t *sent_sigs; | |
1231 | size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs); | |
1232 | ||
1233 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { | |
1234 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i); | |
1235 | size_t j; | |
1236 | ||
1237 | if (lu == NULL) | |
1238 | continue; | |
1239 | /* Check default matches a type we sent */ | |
1240 | for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) { | |
1241 | if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) { | |
1242 | s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN; | |
1243 | break; | |
1244 | } | |
1245 | } | |
1246 | } | |
1247 | return 1; | |
1248 | } | |
1249 | ||
1250 | if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { | |
1251 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
1252 | SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1253 | return 0; | |
1254 | } | |
1255 | if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL) | |
1256 | return 1; | |
1257 | ||
1258 | /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */ | |
1259 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, | |
1260 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS); | |
1261 | return 0; | |
1262 | } | |
1263 | ||
1264 | /*- | |
1265 | * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any. | |
1266 | * | |
1267 | * hello: The parsed ClientHello data | |
1268 | * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to | |
1269 | * point to the resulting session. | |
1270 | */ | |
1271 | SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, | |
1272 | SSL_SESSION **ret) | |
1273 | { | |
1274 | size_t size; | |
1275 | RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext; | |
1276 | ||
1277 | *ret = NULL; | |
1278 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; | |
1279 | ||
1280 | /* | |
1281 | * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version | |
1282 | * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful | |
1283 | * resumption. | |
1284 | */ | |
1285 | if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s)) | |
1286 | return SSL_TICKET_NONE; | |
1287 | ||
1288 | ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket]; | |
1289 | if (!ticketext->present) | |
1290 | return SSL_TICKET_NONE; | |
1291 | ||
1292 | size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data); | |
1293 | ||
1294 | return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size, | |
1295 | hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret); | |
1296 | } | |
1297 | ||
1298 | /*- | |
1299 | * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. | |
1300 | * | |
1301 | * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are | |
1302 | * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for | |
1303 | * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will | |
1304 | * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1. | |
1305 | * | |
1306 | * Side effects: | |
1307 | * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue | |
1308 | * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support | |
1309 | * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have | |
1310 | * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if | |
1311 | * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. | |
1312 | * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0. | |
1313 | * | |
1314 | * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. | |
1315 | * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension. | |
1316 | * sess_id: points at the session ID. | |
1317 | * sesslen: the length of the session ID. | |
1318 | * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to | |
1319 | * point to the resulting session. | |
1320 | */ | |
1321 | SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, | |
1322 | size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, | |
1323 | size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) | |
1324 | { | |
1325 | SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; | |
1326 | unsigned char *sdec; | |
1327 | const unsigned char *p; | |
1328 | int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen; | |
1329 | SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER; | |
1330 | size_t mlen; | |
1331 | unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
1332 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; | |
1333 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; | |
1334 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; | |
1335 | ||
1336 | if (eticklen == 0) { | |
1337 | /* | |
1338 | * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have | |
1339 | * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3 | |
1340 | */ | |
1341 | ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY; | |
1342 | goto end; | |
1343 | } | |
1344 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { | |
1345 | /* | |
1346 | * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than | |
1347 | * generating the session from ticket now, trigger | |
1348 | * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to | |
1349 | * calculate the master secret later. | |
1350 | */ | |
1351 | ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; | |
1352 | goto end; | |
1353 | } | |
1354 | ||
1355 | /* Need at least keyname + iv */ | |
1356 | if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) { | |
1357 | ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; | |
1358 | goto end; | |
1359 | } | |
1360 | ||
1361 | /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ | |
1362 | hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); | |
1363 | if (hctx == NULL) { | |
1364 | ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC; | |
1365 | goto end; | |
1366 | } | |
1367 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); | |
1368 | if (ctx == NULL) { | |
1369 | ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC; | |
1370 | goto end; | |
1371 | } | |
1372 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { | |
1373 | unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; | |
1374 | int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, | |
1375 | nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH, | |
1376 | ctx, hctx, 0); | |
1377 | if (rv < 0) { | |
1378 | ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER; | |
1379 | goto end; | |
1380 | } | |
1381 | if (rv == 0) { | |
1382 | ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; | |
1383 | goto end; | |
1384 | } | |
1385 | if (rv == 2) | |
1386 | renew_ticket = 1; | |
1387 | } else { | |
1388 | /* Check key name matches */ | |
1389 | if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, | |
1390 | TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) { | |
1391 | ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; | |
1392 | goto end; | |
1393 | } | |
1394 | if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, | |
1395 | sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key), | |
1396 | EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0 | |
1397 | || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, | |
1398 | tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, | |
1399 | etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) { | |
1400 | ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER; | |
1401 | goto end; | |
1402 | } | |
1403 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1404 | renew_ticket = 1; | |
1405 | } | |
1406 | /* | |
1407 | * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity | |
1408 | * checks on ticket. | |
1409 | */ | |
1410 | mlen = HMAC_size(hctx); | |
1411 | if (mlen == 0) { | |
1412 | ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER; | |
1413 | goto end; | |
1414 | } | |
1415 | ||
1416 | /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ | |
1417 | if (eticklen <= | |
1418 | TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) { | |
1419 | ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; | |
1420 | goto end; | |
1421 | } | |
1422 | eticklen -= mlen; | |
1423 | /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ | |
1424 | if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 | |
1425 | || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { | |
1426 | ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER; | |
1427 | goto end; | |
1428 | } | |
1429 | ||
1430 | if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { | |
1431 | ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; | |
1432 | goto end; | |
1433 | } | |
1434 | /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ | |
1435 | /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ | |
1436 | p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); | |
1437 | eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); | |
1438 | sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); | |
1439 | if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, | |
1440 | (int)eticklen) <= 0) { | |
1441 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); | |
1442 | ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER; | |
1443 | goto end; | |
1444 | } | |
1445 | if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) { | |
1446 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); | |
1447 | ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; | |
1448 | goto end; | |
1449 | } | |
1450 | slen += declen; | |
1451 | p = sdec; | |
1452 | ||
1453 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); | |
1454 | slen -= p - sdec; | |
1455 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); | |
1456 | if (sess) { | |
1457 | /* Some additional consistency checks */ | |
1458 | if (slen != 0) { | |
1459 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
1460 | sess = NULL; | |
1461 | ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; | |
1462 | goto end; | |
1463 | } | |
1464 | /* | |
1465 | * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect | |
1466 | * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session | |
1467 | * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by | |
1468 | * standard. | |
1469 | */ | |
1470 | if (sesslen) { | |
1471 | memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); | |
1472 | sess->session_id_length = sesslen; | |
1473 | } | |
1474 | if (renew_ticket) | |
1475 | ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW; | |
1476 | else | |
1477 | ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS; | |
1478 | goto end; | |
1479 | } | |
1480 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
1481 | /* | |
1482 | * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. | |
1483 | */ | |
1484 | ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; | |
1485 | ||
1486 | end: | |
1487 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
1488 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
1489 | ||
1490 | /* | |
1491 | * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was | |
1492 | * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it | |
1493 | * performs any action | |
1494 | */ | |
1495 | if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL | |
1496 | && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY | |
1497 | || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT | |
1498 | || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS | |
1499 | || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) { | |
1500 | size_t keyname_len = eticklen; | |
1501 | int retcb; | |
1502 | ||
1503 | if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) | |
1504 | keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH; | |
1505 | retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len, | |
1506 | ret, | |
1507 | s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data); | |
1508 | switch (retcb) { | |
1509 | case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT: | |
1510 | ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER; | |
1511 | break; | |
1512 | ||
1513 | case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE: | |
1514 | ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE; | |
1515 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
1516 | sess = NULL; | |
1517 | break; | |
1518 | ||
1519 | case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW: | |
1520 | if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT) | |
1521 | ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; | |
1522 | /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */ | |
1523 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
1524 | sess = NULL; | |
1525 | break; | |
1526 | ||
1527 | case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE: | |
1528 | case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW: | |
1529 | if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS | |
1530 | && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW) | |
1531 | ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER; | |
1532 | else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE) | |
1533 | ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS; | |
1534 | else | |
1535 | ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW; | |
1536 | break; | |
1537 | ||
1538 | default: | |
1539 | ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER; | |
1540 | } | |
1541 | } | |
1542 | ||
1543 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1544 | switch (ret) { | |
1545 | case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT: | |
1546 | case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW: | |
1547 | case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY: | |
1548 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; | |
1549 | } | |
1550 | } | |
1551 | ||
1552 | *psess = sess; | |
1553 | ||
1554 | return ret; | |
1555 | } | |
1556 | ||
1557 | /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */ | |
1558 | static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu) | |
1559 | { | |
1560 | unsigned char sigalgstr[2]; | |
1561 | int secbits; | |
1562 | ||
1563 | /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */ | |
1564 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL)) | |
1565 | return 0; | |
1566 | /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */ | |
1567 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA) | |
1568 | return 0; | |
1569 | /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */ | |
1570 | if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1571 | && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX | |
1572 | || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX | |
1573 | || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX)) | |
1574 | return 0; | |
1575 | ||
1576 | /* See if public key algorithm allowed */ | |
1577 | if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx)) | |
1578 | return 0; | |
1579 | ||
1580 | if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 | |
1581 | || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512 | |
1582 | || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { | |
1583 | /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */ | |
1584 | if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
1585 | return 0; | |
1586 | if (!s->server | |
1587 | && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION | |
1588 | && s->s3->tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
1589 | int i, num; | |
1590 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
1591 | ||
1592 | /* | |
1593 | * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST | |
1594 | * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST | |
1595 | * ciphersuites enabled. | |
1596 | */ | |
1597 | ||
1598 | if (s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1599 | return 0; | |
1600 | ||
1601 | sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); | |
1602 | num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0; | |
1603 | for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { | |
1604 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
1605 | ||
1606 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); | |
1607 | /* Skip disabled ciphers */ | |
1608 | if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) | |
1609 | continue; | |
1610 | ||
1611 | if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0) | |
1612 | break; | |
1613 | } | |
1614 | if (i == num) | |
1615 | return 0; | |
1616 | } | |
1617 | } | |
1618 | ||
1619 | if (lu->hash == NID_undef) | |
1620 | return 1; | |
1621 | /* Security bits: half digest bits */ | |
1622 | secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4; | |
1623 | /* Finally see if security callback allows it */ | |
1624 | sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff; | |
1625 | sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff; | |
1626 | return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr); | |
1627 | } | |
1628 | ||
1629 | /* | |
1630 | * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature | |
1631 | * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is | |
1632 | * disabled. | |
1633 | */ | |
1634 | ||
1635 | void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op) | |
1636 | { | |
1637 | const uint16_t *sigalgs; | |
1638 | size_t i, sigalgslen; | |
1639 | uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA; | |
1640 | /* | |
1641 | * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any | |
1642 | * in disabled_mask. | |
1643 | */ | |
1644 | sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs); | |
1645 | for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) { | |
1646 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs); | |
1647 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; | |
1648 | ||
1649 | if (lu == NULL) | |
1650 | continue; | |
1651 | ||
1652 | clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx); | |
1653 | if (clu == NULL) | |
1654 | continue; | |
1655 | ||
1656 | /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */ | |
1657 | if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0 | |
1658 | && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu)) | |
1659 | disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask; | |
1660 | } | |
1661 | *pmask_a |= disabled_mask; | |
1662 | } | |
1663 | ||
1664 | int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, | |
1665 | const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen) | |
1666 | { | |
1667 | size_t i; | |
1668 | int rv = 0; | |
1669 | ||
1670 | for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) { | |
1671 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig); | |
1672 | ||
1673 | if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu)) | |
1674 | continue; | |
1675 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig)) | |
1676 | return 0; | |
1677 | /* | |
1678 | * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message | |
1679 | * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224 | |
1680 | */ | |
1681 | if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1682 | || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA | |
1683 | && lu->hash != NID_sha1 | |
1684 | && lu->hash != NID_sha224))) | |
1685 | rv = 1; | |
1686 | } | |
1687 | if (rv == 0) | |
1688 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); | |
1689 | return rv; | |
1690 | } | |
1691 | ||
1692 | /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ | |
1693 | static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig, | |
1694 | const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen, | |
1695 | const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen) | |
1696 | { | |
1697 | const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp; | |
1698 | size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; | |
1699 | for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) { | |
1700 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp); | |
1701 | ||
1702 | /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ | |
1703 | if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu)) | |
1704 | continue; | |
1705 | for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) { | |
1706 | if (*ptmp == *atmp) { | |
1707 | nmatch++; | |
1708 | if (shsig) | |
1709 | *shsig++ = lu; | |
1710 | break; | |
1711 | } | |
1712 | } | |
1713 | } | |
1714 | return nmatch; | |
1715 | } | |
1716 | ||
1717 | /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ | |
1718 | static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) | |
1719 | { | |
1720 | const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf; | |
1721 | size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; | |
1722 | size_t nmatch; | |
1723 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL; | |
1724 | CERT *c = s->cert; | |
1725 | unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s); | |
1726 | ||
1727 | OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); | |
1728 | c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; | |
1729 | c->shared_sigalgslen = 0; | |
1730 | /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ | |
1731 | if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { | |
1732 | conf = c->client_sigalgs; | |
1733 | conflen = c->client_sigalgslen; | |
1734 | } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { | |
1735 | conf = c->conf_sigalgs; | |
1736 | conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; | |
1737 | } else | |
1738 | conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf); | |
1739 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) { | |
1740 | pref = conf; | |
1741 | preflen = conflen; | |
1742 | allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs; | |
1743 | allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen; | |
1744 | } else { | |
1745 | allow = conf; | |
1746 | allowlen = conflen; | |
1747 | pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs; | |
1748 | preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen; | |
1749 | } | |
1750 | nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); | |
1751 | if (nmatch) { | |
1752 | if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) { | |
1753 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1754 | return 0; | |
1755 | } | |
1756 | nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); | |
1757 | } else { | |
1758 | salgs = NULL; | |
1759 | } | |
1760 | c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; | |
1761 | c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; | |
1762 | return 1; | |
1763 | } | |
1764 | ||
1765 | int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen) | |
1766 | { | |
1767 | unsigned int stmp; | |
1768 | size_t size, i; | |
1769 | uint16_t *buf; | |
1770 | ||
1771 | size = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
1772 | ||
1773 | /* Invalid data length */ | |
1774 | if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0) | |
1775 | return 0; | |
1776 | ||
1777 | size >>= 1; | |
1778 | ||
1779 | if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) { | |
1780 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1781 | return 0; | |
1782 | } | |
1783 | for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++) | |
1784 | buf[i] = stmp; | |
1785 | ||
1786 | if (i != size) { | |
1787 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | |
1788 | return 0; | |
1789 | } | |
1790 | ||
1791 | OPENSSL_free(*pdest); | |
1792 | *pdest = buf; | |
1793 | *pdestlen = size; | |
1794 | ||
1795 | return 1; | |
1796 | } | |
1797 | ||
1798 | int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert) | |
1799 | { | |
1800 | /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ | |
1801 | if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) | |
1802 | return 1; | |
1803 | /* Should never happen */ | |
1804 | if (s->cert == NULL) | |
1805 | return 0; | |
1806 | ||
1807 | if (cert) | |
1808 | return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs, | |
1809 | &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen); | |
1810 | else | |
1811 | return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, | |
1812 | &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen); | |
1813 | ||
1814 | } | |
1815 | ||
1816 | /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ | |
1817 | ||
1818 | int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) | |
1819 | { | |
1820 | size_t i; | |
1821 | uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags; | |
1822 | CERT *c = s->cert; | |
1823 | ||
1824 | if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) | |
1825 | return 0; | |
1826 | ||
1827 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) | |
1828 | pvalid[i] = 0; | |
1829 | ||
1830 | for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) { | |
1831 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i]; | |
1832 | int idx = sigptr->sig_idx; | |
1833 | ||
1834 | /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */ | |
1835 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA) | |
1836 | continue; | |
1837 | /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */ | |
1838 | if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx)) | |
1839 | pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; | |
1840 | } | |
1841 | return 1; | |
1842 | } | |
1843 | ||
1844 | int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, | |
1845 | int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, | |
1846 | unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) | |
1847 | { | |
1848 | uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs; | |
1849 | size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen; | |
1850 | if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX) | |
1851 | return 0; | |
1852 | if (idx >= 0) { | |
1853 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu; | |
1854 | ||
1855 | if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs) | |
1856 | return 0; | |
1857 | psig += idx; | |
1858 | if (rhash != NULL) | |
1859 | *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff); | |
1860 | if (rsig != NULL) | |
1861 | *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff); | |
1862 | lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig); | |
1863 | if (psign != NULL) | |
1864 | *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef; | |
1865 | if (phash != NULL) | |
1866 | *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef; | |
1867 | if (psignhash != NULL) | |
1868 | *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef; | |
1869 | } | |
1870 | return (int)numsigalgs; | |
1871 | } | |
1872 | ||
1873 | int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, | |
1874 | int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, | |
1875 | unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) | |
1876 | { | |
1877 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs; | |
1878 | if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL | |
1879 | || idx < 0 | |
1880 | || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen | |
1881 | || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX) | |
1882 | return 0; | |
1883 | shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx]; | |
1884 | if (phash != NULL) | |
1885 | *phash = shsigalgs->hash; | |
1886 | if (psign != NULL) | |
1887 | *psign = shsigalgs->sig; | |
1888 | if (psignhash != NULL) | |
1889 | *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash; | |
1890 | if (rsig != NULL) | |
1891 | *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff); | |
1892 | if (rhash != NULL) | |
1893 | *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff); | |
1894 | return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; | |
1895 | } | |
1896 | ||
1897 | /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */ | |
1898 | #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2) | |
1899 | ||
1900 | typedef struct { | |
1901 | size_t sigalgcnt; | |
1902 | /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */ | |
1903 | uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT]; | |
1904 | } sig_cb_st; | |
1905 | ||
1906 | static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str) | |
1907 | { | |
1908 | if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) { | |
1909 | *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA; | |
1910 | } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) { | |
1911 | *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS; | |
1912 | } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) { | |
1913 | *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA; | |
1914 | } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) { | |
1915 | *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC; | |
1916 | } else { | |
1917 | *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str); | |
1918 | if (*phash == NID_undef) | |
1919 | *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str); | |
1920 | } | |
1921 | } | |
1922 | /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */ | |
1923 | #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40 | |
1924 | ||
1925 | static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) | |
1926 | { | |
1927 | sig_cb_st *sarg = arg; | |
1928 | size_t i; | |
1929 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s; | |
1930 | char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p; | |
1931 | int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef; | |
1932 | if (elem == NULL) | |
1933 | return 0; | |
1934 | if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT) | |
1935 | return 0; | |
1936 | if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) | |
1937 | return 0; | |
1938 | memcpy(etmp, elem, len); | |
1939 | etmp[len] = 0; | |
1940 | p = strchr(etmp, '+'); | |
1941 | /* | |
1942 | * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl; | |
1943 | * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined | |
1944 | * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP. | |
1945 | * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and | |
1946 | * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases | |
1947 | * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier | |
1948 | * in the table. | |
1949 | */ | |
1950 | if (p == NULL) { | |
1951 | for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); | |
1952 | i++, s++) { | |
1953 | if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) { | |
1954 | sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg; | |
1955 | break; | |
1956 | } | |
1957 | } | |
1958 | if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) | |
1959 | return 0; | |
1960 | } else { | |
1961 | *p = 0; | |
1962 | p++; | |
1963 | if (*p == 0) | |
1964 | return 0; | |
1965 | get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp); | |
1966 | get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p); | |
1967 | if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef) | |
1968 | return 0; | |
1969 | for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); | |
1970 | i++, s++) { | |
1971 | if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) { | |
1972 | sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg; | |
1973 | break; | |
1974 | } | |
1975 | } | |
1976 | if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) | |
1977 | return 0; | |
1978 | } | |
1979 | ||
1980 | /* Reject duplicates */ | |
1981 | for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) { | |
1982 | if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) { | |
1983 | sarg->sigalgcnt--; | |
1984 | return 0; | |
1985 | } | |
1986 | } | |
1987 | return 1; | |
1988 | } | |
1989 | ||
1990 | /* | |
1991 | * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the | |
1992 | * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 | |
1993 | */ | |
1994 | int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) | |
1995 | { | |
1996 | sig_cb_st sig; | |
1997 | sig.sigalgcnt = 0; | |
1998 | if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig)) | |
1999 | return 0; | |
2000 | if (c == NULL) | |
2001 | return 1; | |
2002 | return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); | |
2003 | } | |
2004 | ||
2005 | int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen, | |
2006 | int client) | |
2007 | { | |
2008 | uint16_t *sigalgs; | |
2009 | ||
2010 | if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) { | |
2011 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2012 | return 0; | |
2013 | } | |
2014 | memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs)); | |
2015 | ||
2016 | if (client) { | |
2017 | OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); | |
2018 | c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; | |
2019 | c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; | |
2020 | } else { | |
2021 | OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); | |
2022 | c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; | |
2023 | c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; | |
2024 | } | |
2025 | ||
2026 | return 1; | |
2027 | } | |
2028 | ||
2029 | int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client) | |
2030 | { | |
2031 | uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr; | |
2032 | size_t i; | |
2033 | ||
2034 | if (salglen & 1) | |
2035 | return 0; | |
2036 | if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) { | |
2037 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2038 | return 0; | |
2039 | } | |
2040 | for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) { | |
2041 | size_t j; | |
2042 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr; | |
2043 | int md_id = *psig_nids++; | |
2044 | int sig_id = *psig_nids++; | |
2045 | ||
2046 | for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); | |
2047 | j++, curr++) { | |
2048 | if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) { | |
2049 | *sptr++ = curr->sigalg; | |
2050 | break; | |
2051 | } | |
2052 | } | |
2053 | ||
2054 | if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) | |
2055 | goto err; | |
2056 | } | |
2057 | ||
2058 | if (client) { | |
2059 | OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); | |
2060 | c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; | |
2061 | c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2; | |
2062 | } else { | |
2063 | OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); | |
2064 | c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; | |
2065 | c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2; | |
2066 | } | |
2067 | ||
2068 | return 1; | |
2069 | ||
2070 | err: | |
2071 | OPENSSL_free(sigalgs); | |
2072 | return 0; | |
2073 | } | |
2074 | ||
2075 | static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid) | |
2076 | { | |
2077 | int sig_nid; | |
2078 | size_t i; | |
2079 | if (default_nid == -1) | |
2080 | return 1; | |
2081 | sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); | |
2082 | if (default_nid) | |
2083 | return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0; | |
2084 | for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) | |
2085 | if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash) | |
2086 | return 1; | |
2087 | return 0; | |
2088 | } | |
2089 | ||
2090 | /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */ | |
2091 | static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x) | |
2092 | { | |
2093 | X509_NAME *nm; | |
2094 | int i; | |
2095 | nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
2096 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) { | |
2097 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i))) | |
2098 | return 1; | |
2099 | } | |
2100 | return 0; | |
2101 | } | |
2102 | ||
2103 | /* | |
2104 | * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by | |
2105 | * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before | |
2106 | * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before | |
2107 | * attempting to use them. | |
2108 | */ | |
2109 | ||
2110 | /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */ | |
2111 | ||
2112 | #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ | |
2113 | (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM) | |
2114 | /* Strict mode flags */ | |
2115 | #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ | |
2116 | (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \ | |
2117 | | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) | |
2118 | ||
2119 | int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, | |
2120 | int idx) | |
2121 | { | |
2122 | int i; | |
2123 | int rv = 0; | |
2124 | int check_flags = 0, strict_mode; | |
2125 | CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; | |
2126 | CERT *c = s->cert; | |
2127 | uint32_t *pvalid; | |
2128 | unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); | |
2129 | /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */ | |
2130 | if (idx != -1) { | |
2131 | /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */ | |
2132 | if (idx == -2) { | |
2133 | cpk = c->key; | |
2134 | idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys); | |
2135 | } else | |
2136 | cpk = c->pkeys + idx; | |
2137 | pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx; | |
2138 | x = cpk->x509; | |
2139 | pk = cpk->privatekey; | |
2140 | chain = cpk->chain; | |
2141 | strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT; | |
2142 | /* If no cert or key, forget it */ | |
2143 | if (!x || !pk) | |
2144 | goto end; | |
2145 | } else { | |
2146 | size_t certidx; | |
2147 | ||
2148 | if (!x || !pk) | |
2149 | return 0; | |
2150 | ||
2151 | if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL) | |
2152 | return 0; | |
2153 | idx = certidx; | |
2154 | pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx; | |
2155 | ||
2156 | if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) | |
2157 | check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; | |
2158 | else | |
2159 | check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS; | |
2160 | strict_mode = 1; | |
2161 | } | |
2162 | ||
2163 | if (suiteb_flags) { | |
2164 | int ok; | |
2165 | if (check_flags) | |
2166 | check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; | |
2167 | ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags); | |
2168 | if (ok == X509_V_OK) | |
2169 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; | |
2170 | else if (!check_flags) | |
2171 | goto end; | |
2172 | } | |
2173 | ||
2174 | /* | |
2175 | * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature | |
2176 | * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode. | |
2177 | */ | |
2178 | if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) { | |
2179 | int default_nid; | |
2180 | int rsign = 0; | |
2181 | if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL | |
2182 | || s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) { | |
2183 | default_nid = 0; | |
2184 | /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */ | |
2185 | } else { | |
2186 | switch (idx) { | |
2187 | case SSL_PKEY_RSA: | |
2188 | rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA; | |
2189 | default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; | |
2190 | break; | |
2191 | ||
2192 | case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: | |
2193 | rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA; | |
2194 | default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; | |
2195 | break; | |
2196 | ||
2197 | case SSL_PKEY_ECC: | |
2198 | rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC; | |
2199 | default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; | |
2200 | break; | |
2201 | ||
2202 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: | |
2203 | rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001; | |
2204 | default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001; | |
2205 | break; | |
2206 | ||
2207 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: | |
2208 | rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256; | |
2209 | default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256; | |
2210 | break; | |
2211 | ||
2212 | case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: | |
2213 | rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512; | |
2214 | default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512; | |
2215 | break; | |
2216 | ||
2217 | default: | |
2218 | default_nid = -1; | |
2219 | break; | |
2220 | } | |
2221 | } | |
2222 | /* | |
2223 | * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set | |
2224 | * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1. | |
2225 | */ | |
2226 | if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) { | |
2227 | size_t j; | |
2228 | const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs; | |
2229 | for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) { | |
2230 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p); | |
2231 | ||
2232 | if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign) | |
2233 | break; | |
2234 | } | |
2235 | if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) { | |
2236 | if (check_flags) | |
2237 | goto skip_sigs; | |
2238 | else | |
2239 | goto end; | |
2240 | } | |
2241 | } | |
2242 | /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */ | |
2243 | if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) { | |
2244 | if (!check_flags) | |
2245 | goto end; | |
2246 | } else | |
2247 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE; | |
2248 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; | |
2249 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
2250 | if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) { | |
2251 | if (check_flags) { | |
2252 | rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; | |
2253 | break; | |
2254 | } else | |
2255 | goto end; | |
2256 | } | |
2257 | } | |
2258 | } | |
2259 | /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */ | |
2260 | else if (check_flags) | |
2261 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; | |
2262 | skip_sigs: | |
2263 | /* Check cert parameters are consistent */ | |
2264 | if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1)) | |
2265 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM; | |
2266 | else if (!check_flags) | |
2267 | goto end; | |
2268 | if (!s->server) | |
2269 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; | |
2270 | /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */ | |
2271 | else if (strict_mode) { | |
2272 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; | |
2273 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
2274 | X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
2275 | if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) { | |
2276 | if (check_flags) { | |
2277 | rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; | |
2278 | break; | |
2279 | } else | |
2280 | goto end; | |
2281 | } | |
2282 | } | |
2283 | } | |
2284 | if (!s->server && strict_mode) { | |
2285 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; | |
2286 | int check_type = 0; | |
2287 | switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { | |
2288 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
2289 | check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; | |
2290 | break; | |
2291 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: | |
2292 | check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN; | |
2293 | break; | |
2294 | case EVP_PKEY_EC: | |
2295 | check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; | |
2296 | break; | |
2297 | } | |
2298 | if (check_type) { | |
2299 | const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype; | |
2300 | size_t j; | |
2301 | ||
2302 | for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) { | |
2303 | if (*ctypes == check_type) { | |
2304 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; | |
2305 | break; | |
2306 | } | |
2307 | } | |
2308 | if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags) | |
2309 | goto end; | |
2310 | } else { | |
2311 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; | |
2312 | } | |
2313 | ||
2314 | ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names; | |
2315 | ||
2316 | if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn)) | |
2317 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; | |
2318 | ||
2319 | if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { | |
2320 | if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x)) | |
2321 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; | |
2322 | } | |
2323 | if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { | |
2324 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | |
2325 | X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | |
2326 | if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) { | |
2327 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; | |
2328 | break; | |
2329 | } | |
2330 | } | |
2331 | } | |
2332 | if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) | |
2333 | goto end; | |
2334 | } else | |
2335 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; | |
2336 | ||
2337 | if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags) | |
2338 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID; | |
2339 | ||
2340 | end: | |
2341 | ||
2342 | if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
2343 | rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN); | |
2344 | else | |
2345 | rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; | |
2346 | ||
2347 | /* | |
2348 | * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the | |
2349 | * chain is invalid. | |
2350 | */ | |
2351 | if (!check_flags) { | |
2352 | if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) { | |
2353 | *pvalid = rv; | |
2354 | } else { | |
2355 | /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */ | |
2356 | *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; | |
2357 | return 0; | |
2358 | } | |
2359 | } | |
2360 | return rv; | |
2361 | } | |
2362 | ||
2363 | /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */ | |
2364 | void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) | |
2365 | { | |
2366 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA); | |
2367 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN); | |
2368 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN); | |
2369 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); | |
2370 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01); | |
2371 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256); | |
2372 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512); | |
2373 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519); | |
2374 | tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448); | |
2375 | } | |
2376 | ||
2377 | /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */ | |
2378 | int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | |
2379 | { | |
2380 | return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); | |
2381 | } | |
2382 | ||
2383 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2384 | DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) | |
2385 | { | |
2386 | int dh_secbits = 80; | |
2387 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2) | |
2388 | return DH_get_1024_160(); | |
2389 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) { | |
2390 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256) | |
2391 | dh_secbits = 128; | |
2392 | else | |
2393 | dh_secbits = 80; | |
2394 | } else { | |
2395 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) | |
2396 | return NULL; | |
2397 | dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey); | |
2398 | } | |
2399 | ||
2400 | if (dh_secbits >= 128) { | |
2401 | DH *dhp = DH_new(); | |
2402 | BIGNUM *p, *g; | |
2403 | if (dhp == NULL) | |
2404 | return NULL; | |
2405 | g = BN_new(); | |
2406 | if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) { | |
2407 | DH_free(dhp); | |
2408 | BN_free(g); | |
2409 | return NULL; | |
2410 | } | |
2411 | if (dh_secbits >= 192) | |
2412 | p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL); | |
2413 | else | |
2414 | p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL); | |
2415 | if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) { | |
2416 | DH_free(dhp); | |
2417 | BN_free(p); | |
2418 | BN_free(g); | |
2419 | return NULL; | |
2420 | } | |
2421 | return dhp; | |
2422 | } | |
2423 | if (dh_secbits >= 112) | |
2424 | return DH_get_2048_224(); | |
2425 | return DH_get_1024_160(); | |
2426 | } | |
2427 | #endif | |
2428 | ||
2429 | static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op) | |
2430 | { | |
2431 | int secbits = -1; | |
2432 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); | |
2433 | if (pkey) { | |
2434 | /* | |
2435 | * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default | |
2436 | * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will | |
2437 | * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and | |
2438 | * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice. | |
2439 | */ | |
2440 | secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey); | |
2441 | } | |
2442 | if (s) | |
2443 | return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x); | |
2444 | else | |
2445 | return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x); | |
2446 | } | |
2447 | ||
2448 | static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op) | |
2449 | { | |
2450 | /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */ | |
2451 | int secbits, nid, pknid; | |
2452 | /* Don't check signature if self signed */ | |
2453 | if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0) | |
2454 | return 1; | |
2455 | if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL)) | |
2456 | secbits = -1; | |
2457 | /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */ | |
2458 | if (nid == NID_undef) | |
2459 | nid = pknid; | |
2460 | if (s) | |
2461 | return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x); | |
2462 | else | |
2463 | return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x); | |
2464 | } | |
2465 | ||
2466 | int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee) | |
2467 | { | |
2468 | if (vfy) | |
2469 | vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER; | |
2470 | if (is_ee) { | |
2471 | if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy)) | |
2472 | return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL; | |
2473 | } else { | |
2474 | if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy)) | |
2475 | return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL; | |
2476 | } | |
2477 | if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy)) | |
2478 | return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK; | |
2479 | return 1; | |
2480 | } | |
2481 | ||
2482 | /* | |
2483 | * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then | |
2484 | * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending | |
2485 | * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use | |
2486 | */ | |
2487 | ||
2488 | int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy) | |
2489 | { | |
2490 | int rv, start_idx, i; | |
2491 | if (x == NULL) { | |
2492 | x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); | |
2493 | start_idx = 1; | |
2494 | } else | |
2495 | start_idx = 0; | |
2496 | ||
2497 | rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1); | |
2498 | if (rv != 1) | |
2499 | return rv; | |
2500 | ||
2501 | for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | |
2502 | x = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | |
2503 | rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0); | |
2504 | if (rv != 1) | |
2505 | return rv; | |
2506 | } | |
2507 | return 1; | |
2508 | } | |
2509 | ||
2510 | /* | |
2511 | * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used | |
2512 | * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate. | |
2513 | */ | |
2514 | ||
2515 | static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu) | |
2516 | { | |
2517 | int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx; | |
2518 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx); | |
2519 | ||
2520 | /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */ | |
2521 | if (clu == NULL | |
2522 | || (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0 | |
2523 | || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS | |
2524 | && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0)) | |
2525 | return -1; | |
2526 | ||
2527 | return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1; | |
2528 | } | |
2529 | ||
2530 | /* | |
2531 | * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use | |
2532 | * with signature scheme |sig|. | |
2533 | * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying | |
2534 | * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any). | |
2535 | * Returns false if no usable certificate is found. | |
2536 | */ | |
2537 | static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx) | |
2538 | { | |
2539 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu; | |
2540 | int mdnid, pknid, supported; | |
2541 | size_t i; | |
2542 | ||
2543 | /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */ | |
2544 | if (idx == -1) | |
2545 | idx = sig->sig_idx; | |
2546 | if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx)) | |
2547 | return 0; | |
2548 | if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) { | |
2549 | for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) { | |
2550 | lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]); | |
2551 | if (lu == NULL | |
2552 | || !X509_get_signature_info(s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509, &mdnid, | |
2553 | &pknid, NULL, NULL) | |
2554 | /* | |
2555 | * TODO this does not differentiate between the | |
2556 | * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not | |
2557 | * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the | |
2558 | * signing certificate. | |
2559 | */ | |
2560 | || mdnid != lu->hash | |
2561 | || pknid != lu->sig) | |
2562 | continue; | |
2563 | ||
2564 | ERR_set_mark(); | |
2565 | supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey, | |
2566 | mdnid); | |
2567 | if (supported == 0) | |
2568 | continue; | |
2569 | else if (supported < 0) | |
2570 | { | |
2571 | /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons, | |
2572 | * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */ | |
2573 | ERR_pop_to_mark(); | |
2574 | } | |
2575 | return 1; | |
2576 | } | |
2577 | return 0; | |
2578 | } | |
2579 | supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey, | |
2580 | sig->hash); | |
2581 | if (supported == 0) | |
2582 | return 0; | |
2583 | else if (supported < 0) | |
2584 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
2585 | ||
2586 | return 1; | |
2587 | } | |
2588 | ||
2589 | /* | |
2590 | * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates | |
2591 | * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm. | |
2592 | * | |
2593 | * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error, | |
2594 | * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent. | |
2595 | * | |
2596 | * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not | |
2597 | * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one | |
2598 | * to the server. In this case no error is set. | |
2599 | */ | |
2600 | int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs) | |
2601 | { | |
2602 | const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL; | |
2603 | int sig_idx = -1; | |
2604 | ||
2605 | s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL; | |
2606 | s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL; | |
2607 | ||
2608 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2609 | size_t i; | |
2610 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2611 | int curve = -1; | |
2612 | #endif | |
2613 | ||
2614 | /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */ | |
2615 | for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) { | |
2616 | lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i]; | |
2617 | sig_idx = -1; | |
2618 | ||
2619 | /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */ | |
2620 | if (lu->hash == NID_sha1 | |
2621 | || lu->hash == NID_sha224 | |
2622 | || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA | |
2623 | || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA) | |
2624 | continue; | |
2625 | /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */ | |
2626 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL) || !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1)) | |
2627 | continue; | |
2628 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) { | |
2629 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2630 | if (curve == -1) { | |
2631 | EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); | |
2632 | ||
2633 | curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)); | |
2634 | } | |
2635 | if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) | |
2636 | continue; | |
2637 | #else | |
2638 | continue; | |
2639 | #endif | |
2640 | } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | |
2641 | /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */ | |
2642 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
2643 | ||
2644 | pkey = s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey; | |
2645 | if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu)) | |
2646 | continue; | |
2647 | } | |
2648 | break; | |
2649 | } | |
2650 | if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) { | |
2651 | if (!fatalerrs) | |
2652 | return 1; | |
2653 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, | |
2654 | SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); | |
2655 | return 0; | |
2656 | } | |
2657 | } else { | |
2658 | /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */ | |
2659 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT)) | |
2660 | return 1; | |
2661 | if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys)) | |
2662 | return 1; | |
2663 | ||
2664 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
2665 | size_t i; | |
2666 | if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) { | |
2667 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2668 | int curve; | |
2669 | ||
2670 | /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */ | |
2671 | if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { | |
2672 | EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); | |
2673 | curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)); | |
2674 | } else { | |
2675 | curve = -1; | |
2676 | } | |
2677 | #endif | |
2678 | ||
2679 | /* | |
2680 | * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching | |
2681 | * cert type | |
2682 | */ | |
2683 | for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) { | |
2684 | lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i]; | |
2685 | ||
2686 | if (s->server) { | |
2687 | if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1) | |
2688 | continue; | |
2689 | } else { | |
2690 | int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys; | |
2691 | ||
2692 | sig_idx = lu->sig_idx; | |
2693 | if (cc_idx != sig_idx) | |
2694 | continue; | |
2695 | } | |
2696 | /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */ | |
2697 | if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx)) | |
2698 | continue; | |
2699 | if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | |
2700 | /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */ | |
2701 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey; | |
2702 | ||
2703 | if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu)) | |
2704 | continue; | |
2705 | } | |
2706 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2707 | if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve) | |
2708 | #endif | |
2709 | break; | |
2710 | } | |
2711 | if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) { | |
2712 | if (!fatalerrs) | |
2713 | return 1; | |
2714 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, | |
2715 | SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, | |
2716 | SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM); | |
2717 | return 0; | |
2718 | } | |
2719 | } else { | |
2720 | /* | |
2721 | * If we have no sigalg use defaults | |
2722 | */ | |
2723 | const uint16_t *sent_sigs; | |
2724 | size_t sent_sigslen; | |
2725 | ||
2726 | if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) { | |
2727 | if (!fatalerrs) | |
2728 | return 1; | |
2729 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, | |
2730 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2731 | return 0; | |
2732 | } | |
2733 | ||
2734 | /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ | |
2735 | sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs); | |
2736 | for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) { | |
2737 | if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs | |
2738 | && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx)) | |
2739 | break; | |
2740 | } | |
2741 | if (i == sent_sigslen) { | |
2742 | if (!fatalerrs) | |
2743 | return 1; | |
2744 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
2745 | SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, | |
2746 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
2747 | return 0; | |
2748 | } | |
2749 | } | |
2750 | } else { | |
2751 | if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) { | |
2752 | if (!fatalerrs) | |
2753 | return 1; | |
2754 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, | |
2755 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2756 | return 0; | |
2757 | } | |
2758 | } | |
2759 | } | |
2760 | if (sig_idx == -1) | |
2761 | sig_idx = lu->sig_idx; | |
2762 | s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx]; | |
2763 | s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert; | |
2764 | s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu; | |
2765 | return 1; | |
2766 | } | |
2767 | ||
2768 | int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode) | |
2769 | { | |
2770 | if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED | |
2771 | && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) { | |
2772 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, | |
2773 | SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); | |
2774 | return 0; | |
2775 | } | |
2776 | ||
2777 | ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode; | |
2778 | return 1; | |
2779 | } | |
2780 | ||
2781 | int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode) | |
2782 | { | |
2783 | if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED | |
2784 | && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) { | |
2785 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, | |
2786 | SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); | |
2787 | return 0; | |
2788 | } | |
2789 | ||
2790 | ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode; | |
2791 | return 1; | |
2792 | } | |
2793 | ||
2794 | uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session) | |
2795 | { | |
2796 | return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode; | |
2797 | } |