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Fix mac-then-encrypt test with enable-tls1_3
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
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1/*
2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10#include <stdio.h>
11#include <stdlib.h>
12#include <openssl/objects.h>
13#include <openssl/evp.h>
14#include <openssl/hmac.h>
15#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16#include <openssl/conf.h>
17#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18#include <openssl/dh.h>
19#include <openssl/bn.h>
20#include "ssl_locl.h"
21#include <openssl/ct.h>
22
23static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
25 SSL_SESSION **psess);
26static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
28
29SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
30 tls1_enc,
31 tls1_mac,
32 tls1_setup_key_block,
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 tls1_alert_code,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
40 0,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
43 ssl3_handshake_write
44};
45
46SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
47 tls1_enc,
48 tls1_mac,
49 tls1_setup_key_block,
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
55 tls1_alert_code,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
60 ssl3_handshake_write
61};
62
63SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
64 tls1_enc,
65 tls1_mac,
66 tls1_setup_key_block,
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
72 tls1_alert_code,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
78 ssl3_handshake_write
79};
80
81SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
82 tls1_enc,
83 tls1_mac,
84 tls13_setup_key_block,
85 tls13_generate_master_secret,
86 tls13_change_cipher_state,
87 tls13_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
90 tls1_alert_code,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
96 ssl3_handshake_write
97};
98
99long tls1_default_timeout(void)
100{
101 /*
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
104 */
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
106}
107
108int tls1_new(SSL *s)
109{
110 if (!ssl3_new(s))
111 return (0);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
113 return (1);
114}
115
116void tls1_free(SSL *s)
117{
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
119 ssl3_free(s);
120}
121
122void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123{
124 ssl3_clear(s);
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
127 else
128 s->version = s->method->version;
129}
130
131#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
132
133typedef struct {
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
137} tls_curve_info;
138
139/*
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
143 */
144static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
174};
175
176static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
180};
181
182/* The default curves */
183static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
188};
189
190static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
198
199 /*
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
202 */
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
225};
226
227static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
230};
231
232int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
233{
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
237 return 0;
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
239 if (pflags)
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
241 return cinfo->nid;
242}
243
244int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
245{
246 size_t i;
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
249 return (int)(i + 1);
250 }
251 return 0;
252}
253
254/*
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
256 * preferred list.
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
265 */
266static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
268{
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
270 if (sess) {
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
273 } else {
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
279 break;
280
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
283 pcurveslen = 2;
284 break;
285
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
288 pcurveslen = 2;
289 break;
290 default:
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
293 }
294 if (!*pcurves) {
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
297 }
298 }
299
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
303 *num_curves = 0;
304 return 0;
305 } else {
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
307 return 1;
308 }
309}
310
311/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
313{
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
315 if (curve[0])
316 return 1;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
318 return 0;
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
322 return 0;
323# endif
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
325}
326
327/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
329{
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
334 return 0;
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
336 if (suiteb_flags) {
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
338 if (p[1])
339 return 0;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
342 return 0;
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
345 return 0;
346 } else /* Should never happen */
347 return 0;
348 }
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
350 return 0;
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
354 }
355 return 0;
356}
357
358/*-
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
364 */
365int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
366{
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
369 int k;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
371 if (s->server == 0)
372 return -1;
373 if (nmatch == -2) {
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
375 /*
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
378 */
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
385 return NID_undef;
386 }
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
388 nmatch = 0;
389 }
390 /*
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
393 */
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
396 &num_supp))
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
402
403 /*
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
405 * are allowed.
406 */
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
408 supp = eccurves_all;
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
412 pref = eccurves_all;
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
414 }
415
416 k = 0;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
422 continue;
423 if (nmatch == k) {
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
426 }
427 k++;
428 }
429 }
430 }
431 if (nmatch == -1)
432 return k;
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
434 return NID_undef;
435}
436
437int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
439{
440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
441 size_t i;
442 /*
443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
444 * ids < 32
445 */
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
448 if (glist == NULL)
449 return 0;
450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
452 int id;
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
455 idmask = 1L << id;
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
457 OPENSSL_free(glist);
458 return 0;
459 }
460 dup_list |= idmask;
461 s2n(id, p);
462 }
463 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
464 *pext = glist;
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
466 return 1;
467}
468
469# define MAX_CURVELIST 28
470
471typedef struct {
472 size_t nidcnt;
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
474} nid_cb_st;
475
476static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
477{
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
479 size_t i;
480 int nid;
481 char etmp[20];
482 if (elem == NULL)
483 return 0;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
485 return 0;
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
487 return 0;
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
489 etmp[len] = 0;
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
496 return 0;
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
499 return 0;
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
501 return 1;
502}
503
504/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
506{
507 nid_cb_st ncb;
508 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
510 return 0;
511 if (pext == NULL)
512 return 1;
513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
514}
515
516/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
518 EC_KEY *ec)
519{
520 int id;
521 const EC_GROUP *grp;
522 if (!ec)
523 return 0;
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
526 if (!grp)
527 return 0;
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
532 if (id == 0)
533 return 0;
534 curve_id[0] = 0;
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
536 if (comp_id) {
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
538 return 0;
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
541 } else {
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
544 else
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
546 }
547 }
548 return 1;
549}
550
551/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
554{
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
557 int j;
558 /*
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
561 */
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
567 break;
568 }
569 if (i == num_formats)
570 return 0;
571 }
572 if (!curve_id)
573 return 1;
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
577 return 0;
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
579 /*
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
585 */
586 break;
587 }
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
590 break;
591 }
592 if (i == num_curves)
593 return 0;
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
595 if (!s->server)
596 break;
597 }
598 return 1;
599}
600
601static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
602 size_t *num_formats)
603{
604 /*
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
606 */
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
610 } else {
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
613 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
615 else
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
617 }
618}
619
620/*
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
623 */
624static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
625{
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
627 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
628 int rv;
629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
630 if (!pkey)
631 return 0;
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
634 return 1;
635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
636 if (!rv)
637 return 0;
638 /*
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
640 * curves extension.
641 */
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
643 if (!rv)
644 return 0;
645 /*
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
648 */
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
650 int check_md;
651 size_t i;
652 CERT *c = s->cert;
653 if (curve_id[0])
654 return 0;
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
660 else
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
664 break;
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
666 return 0;
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
670 else
671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
672 }
673 }
674 return rv;
675}
676
677# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
678/*
679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
680 * @s: SSL connection
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
682 *
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
685 *
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
687 */
688int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
689{
690 /*
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
692 * curves permitted.
693 */
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
701 else
702 return 0;
703 curve_id[0] = 0;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
706 return 0;
707 return 1;
708 }
709 /* Need a shared curve */
710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
711 return 1;
712 return 0;
713}
714# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
715
716#else
717
718static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
719{
720 return 1;
721}
722
723#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
724
725/*
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
728 */
729
730#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
731# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
732#else
733# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
734#endif
735
736#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
738#else
739# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
740#endif
741
742#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
743# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
744#else
745# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
746#endif
747
748#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
752
753static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
759#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
763#endif
764};
765
766#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
770};
771#endif
772size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
773{
774 /*
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
776 * preferences.
777 */
778#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
783
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
786 return 2;
787
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
790 return 2;
791 }
792#endif
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
800 } else {
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
803 }
804}
805
806/*
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
809 */
810int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
812{
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
817 if (sigalg == -1)
818 return -1;
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
822 return 0;
823 }
824#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
829 return 0;
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
832 return 0;
833 }
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
836 if (curve_id[0])
837 return 0;
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
842 return 0;
843 }
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
848 return 0;
849 }
850 } else
851 return 0;
852 }
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
854 return 0;
855#endif
856
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
861 break;
862 }
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
868 return 0;
869 }
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
871 if (*pmd == NULL) {
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
873 return 0;
874 }
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
879 return 0;
880 }
881 /*
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
883 */
884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
885 return 1;
886}
887
888/*
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
892 *
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
894 * by the client.
895 *
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
897 */
898void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
899{
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
904#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
909 }
910#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
911#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
915 }
916#endif
917}
918
919/*
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
924 *
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
926 */
927int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
928{
929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
931 return 1;
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
933 return 1;
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
936 return 1;
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
939 return 1;
940
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
942}
943
944static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
945{
946 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
947 return 0;
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
949}
950
951static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
952{
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
955 if (u1 < u2)
956 return -1;
957 else if (u1 > u2)
958 return 1;
959 else
960 return 0;
961}
962
963/*
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
969 * occurred.
970 */
971static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
972{
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
976 int ret = 0;
977
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
980 unsigned int type;
981 PACKET extension;
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
984 goto done;
985 }
986 num_extensions++;
987 }
988
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
990 return 1;
991
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
995 goto done;
996 }
997
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1001 PACKET extension;
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1006 goto done;
1007 }
1008 }
1009
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1012 goto done;
1013 }
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1018 goto done;
1019 }
1020 ret = 1;
1021 done:
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1023 return ret;
1024}
1025
1026int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1027{
1028#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1030 size_t num_curves = 0;
1031 int using_ecc = 0;
1032 int min_version, max_version, reason;
1033
1034 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1035 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1036 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1037 int i;
1038 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1039 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1040
1041 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1042 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1043
1044 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1045 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1046 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1047 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1048 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1049 using_ecc = 1;
1050 break;
1051 }
1052 }
1053 }
1054#else
1055 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1056 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1058 return 0;
1059 }
1060#endif
1061
1062 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1063 if (s->renegotiate) {
1064 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1065 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1066 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1067 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1068 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1070 return 0;
1071 }
1072 }
1073 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1074 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1075 goto done;
1076
1077 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1078 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1079 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1080 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1081 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1082 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1083 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1084 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1085 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1086 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1087 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1088 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 return 0;
1091 }
1092 }
1093#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1094 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1095 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1096 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1097 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1098 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1099 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1100 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1101 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1102 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1103 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1104 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1107 return 0;
1108 }
1109 }
1110#endif
1111
1112#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1113 if (using_ecc) {
1114 /*
1115 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1116 */
1117 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1118 size_t num_formats;
1119 size_t i;
1120
1121 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1122
1123 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1124 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1125 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1126 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1127 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1129 return 0;
1130 }
1131
1132 /*
1133 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1134 */
1135 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1136 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1137 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 return 0;
1140 }
1141 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
1142
1143 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1144 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1145 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1146 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 return 0;
1149 }
1150 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1151 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
1152 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1153 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1154 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1156 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1157 return 0;
1158 }
1159 }
1160 }
1161 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1163 return 0;
1164 }
1165 }
1166#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1167
1168 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1169 size_t ticklen;
1170 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1171 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1172 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1173 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1174 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1175 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1176 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 return 0;
1179 }
1180 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1181 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1182 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1183 } else
1184 ticklen = 0;
1185 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1186 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1187 goto skip_ext;
1188
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1190 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1191 ticklen)) {
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1193 return 0;
1194 }
1195 }
1196 skip_ext:
1197
1198 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1199 size_t salglen;
1200 const unsigned char *salg;
1201
1202 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1203
1204 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1205 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1206 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1207 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1208 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1209 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1210 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1211 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1213 return 0;
1214 }
1215 }
1216#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1217 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1218 int i;
1219
1220 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1221 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1222 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1223 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1224 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1225 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1227 return 0;
1228 }
1229 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1230 unsigned char *idbytes;
1231 int idlen;
1232 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1233
1234 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1235 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1236 if (idlen <= 0
1237 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1238 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1239 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1241 return 0;
1242 }
1243 }
1244 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1245 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 return 0;
1248 }
1249 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1250 unsigned char *extbytes;
1251 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1252
1253 if (extlen < 0) {
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 return 0;
1256 }
1257 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1258 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1259 != extlen) {
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 return 0;
1262 }
1263 }
1264 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1266 return 0;
1267 }
1268 }
1269#endif
1270
1271#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1272 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1273 /*
1274 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1275 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1276 */
1277 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1278 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1280 return 0;
1281 }
1282 }
1283#endif
1284
1285 /*
1286 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1287 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1288 * (see longer comment below)
1289 */
1290 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1291 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1292 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1293 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1294 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1295 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1296 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1297 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1299 return 0;
1300 }
1301 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1302 }
1303#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1304 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1305 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1306 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1307 int i, ct;
1308
1309 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1310 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1311 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1312 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1313 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1315 return 0;
1316 }
1317 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1318 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1319 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1320 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 return 0;
1323 }
1324 }
1325 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1326 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1327 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1328 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1330 return 0;
1331 }
1332 }
1333#endif
1334 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1335 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1336 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 return 0;
1339 }
1340
1341 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1342 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1343 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 return 0;
1346 }
1347 }
1348
1349#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1350 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1351 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1352 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1354 return 0;
1355 }
1356 }
1357#endif
1358
1359 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1360 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1362 return 0;
1363 }
1364
1365 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1366 if (reason != 0) {
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1368 return 0;
1369 }
1370
1371 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
1372 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1373 int currv;
1374 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1375
1376 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1377 /* supported_versions extension */
1378 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1379 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1380 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 return 0;
1383 }
1384
1385 /*
1386 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1387 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1388 * reviewed later.
1389 */
1390 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1391 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1392 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1393 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1396 return 0;
1397 }
1398 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 return 0;
1401 }
1402 }
1403 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 return 0;
1406 }
1407
1408
1409 /* key_share extension */
1410 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1411 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1412 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1413 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1414 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1416 return 0;
1417 }
1418
1419 /*
1420 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1421 * now, just send one
1422 */
1423 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1424 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1425 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1426 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1427 size_t encodedlen;
1428
1429 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1430 continue;
1431
1432 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1433 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1436 return 0;
1437 }
1438
1439 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1440 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1441 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1442 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1444 return 0;
1445 }
1446
1447 /* Encode the public key. */
1448 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1449 &encodedPoint);
1450 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1452 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1453 return 0;
1454 }
1455
1456 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1457 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1458 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1460 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1461 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1462 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1463 return 0;
1464 }
1465
1466 /*
1467 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
1468 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
1469 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1470 */
1471 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1472 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1473 sharessent++;
1474 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1475 }
1476 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 return 0;
1479 }
1480 }
1481
1482 /*
1483 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1484 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1485 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1486 * appear last.
1487 */
1488 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1489 unsigned char *padbytes;
1490 size_t hlen;
1491
1492 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1494 return 0;
1495 }
1496
1497 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1498 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1499 if (hlen >= 4)
1500 hlen -= 4;
1501 else
1502 hlen = 0;
1503
1504 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1505 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1507 return 0;
1508 }
1509 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1510 }
1511 }
1512
1513 done:
1514 return 1;
1515}
1516
1517/*
1518 * Add the key_share extension.
1519 *
1520 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1521 */
1522static int add_client_key_share_ext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1523{
1524 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1525 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1526 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1527
1528 if (ckey == NULL) {
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 return 0;
1531 }
1532
1533 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1534 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1535 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 return 0;
1538 }
1539
1540 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1541 if (skey == NULL) {
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1543 return 0;
1544 }
1545
1546 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1547 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1548 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1550 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1551 return 0;
1552 }
1553
1554 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1555 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1557 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1558 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1559 return 0;
1560 }
1561 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1562
1563 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1564 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1565 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1566 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1568 return 0;
1569 }
1570
1571 return 1;
1572}
1573
1574int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1575{
1576#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1577 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1578#endif
1579#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1580 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1581 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1582 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1583 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1584#endif
1585
1586 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1587 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 return 0;
1590 }
1591
1592 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1593 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1595 return 0;
1596 }
1597
1598 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1599 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1600 goto done;
1601
1602 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1603 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1604 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1605 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1607 return 0;
1608 }
1609 }
1610#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1611 if (using_ecc) {
1612 const unsigned char *plist;
1613 size_t plistlen;
1614 /*
1615 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1616 */
1617 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1618
1619 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1620 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1621 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1622 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1624 return 0;
1625 }
1626 }
1627 /*
1628 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1629 * extension
1630 */
1631#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1632
1633 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1634 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1635 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1637 return 0;
1638 }
1639 } else {
1640 /*
1641 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1642 * later
1643 */
1644 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1645 }
1646
1647 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1648 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1649 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1651 return 0;
1652 }
1653 }
1654#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1655 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1656 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1657 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1658 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1659 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1660 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1661 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 return 0;
1664 }
1665 }
1666#endif
1667
1668 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1669 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1670 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1671 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1672 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1673 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1674 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1675 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1676 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1677 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1678 };
1679 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1681 return 0;
1682 }
1683 }
1684
1685#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1686 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1687 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1688 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1689 const unsigned char *npa;
1690 unsigned int npalen;
1691 int r;
1692
1693 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1694 s->
1695 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1696 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1697 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1698 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1700 return 0;
1701 }
1702 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1703 }
1704 }
1705#endif
1706
1707 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit && !add_client_key_share_ext(s, pkt, al))
1708 return 0;
1709
1710 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1712 return 0;
1713 }
1714
1715 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1716 /*
1717 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1718 * for other cases too.
1719 */
1720 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1721 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1722 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1723 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1724 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1725 else {
1726 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1727 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1729 return 0;
1730 }
1731 }
1732 }
1733 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1734 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1735 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1737 return 0;
1738 }
1739 }
1740
1741 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1742 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1743 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1744 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1745 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1746 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1747 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1748 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1749 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1751 return 0;
1752 }
1753 }
1754
1755 done:
1756 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1758 return 0;
1759 }
1760 return 1;
1761}
1762
1763/*
1764 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1765 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1766 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1767 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1768 */
1769static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1770{
1771 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1772
1773 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1774
1775 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1776 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1777 return 0;
1778 }
1779
1780 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1781 do {
1782 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1783 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1784 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1785 return 0;
1786 }
1787 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1788
1789 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1790 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1791 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1792 return 0;
1793 }
1794
1795 return 1;
1796}
1797
1798/*
1799 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1800 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1801 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1802 */
1803static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1804{
1805 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1806 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1807
1808 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1809 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1810 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1811 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1812 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1813
1814 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1815 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1816 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1817 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1818 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1819 return 0;
1820 }
1821 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1822#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1823 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1824 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1825#endif
1826 } else {
1827 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1828 return 0;
1829 }
1830 }
1831
1832 return 1;
1833}
1834
1835#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1836/*-
1837 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1838 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1839 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1840 * SNI,
1841 * elliptic_curves
1842 * ec_point_formats
1843 *
1844 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1845 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1846 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1847 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1848 */
1849static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1850{
1851 unsigned int type;
1852 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1853 size_t ext_len;
1854
1855 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1856 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1857 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1858 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1859 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1860 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1861 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1862
1863 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1864 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1865 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1866 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1867 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1868 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1869 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1870 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1871 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1872 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1873 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1874 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1875 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1876 };
1877
1878 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1879 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1880
1881 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1882
1883 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1884 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1885 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1886 return;
1887 }
1888
1889 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1890 return;
1891
1892 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1893 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1894
1895 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1896 ext_len);
1897}
1898#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1899
1900
1901/*
1902 * Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
1903 * extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
1904 *
1905 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
1906 */
1907static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1908{
1909#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1910 PACKET supported_groups_list;
1911 RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1912 hello->num_extensions,
1913 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
1914
1915 if (suppgroups == NULL)
1916 return 1;
1917
1918 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1919 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
1920 &supported_groups_list)
1921 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
1922 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
1923 return 0;
1924 }
1925
1926 if (!s->hit
1927 && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
1928 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
1929 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
1930 return 0;
1931 }
1932#endif
1933 return 1;
1934}
1935
1936/*
1937 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1938 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1939 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1940 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1941 */
1942static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
1943 const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
1944 int checkallow)
1945{
1946 size_t i;
1947
1948 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1949 return 0;
1950
1951 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1952 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
1953
1954 if (group_id == share_id
1955 && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
1956 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1957 break;
1958 }
1959 }
1960
1961 /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
1962 return i < num_groups;
1963}
1964
1965/*
1966 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
1967 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1968 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
1969 */
1970static int process_key_share_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1971{
1972 unsigned int group_id;
1973 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
1974 const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
1975 size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
1976 int group_nid, found = 0;
1977 unsigned int curve_flags;
1978
1979 /* Sanity check */
1980 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1981 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1983 return 0;
1984 }
1985
1986 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
1987 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1989 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1990 return 0;
1991 }
1992
1993 /* Get our list of supported curves */
1994 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
1995 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1997 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1998 return 0;
1999 }
2000
2001 /* Get the clients list of supported curves */
2002 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
2003 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2005 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2006 return 0;
2007 }
2008
2009 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
2010 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
2011 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
2012 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2013 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2015 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2016 return 0;
2017 }
2018
2019 /*
2020 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
2021 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
2022 */
2023 if (found)
2024 continue;
2025
2026 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
2027 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
2028 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2030 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2031 return 0;
2032 }
2033
2034 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
2035 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
2036 /* Share not suitable */
2037 continue;
2038 }
2039
2040 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2041
2042 if (group_nid == 0) {
2043 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2045 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2046 return 0;
2047 }
2048
2049 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2050 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2051 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2052
2053 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2054 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2056 EVP_PKEY_free(key);
2057 return 0;
2058 }
2059 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2060 } else {
2061 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2062 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2063 if (pctx == NULL
2064 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2065 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2066 group_nid) <= 0
2067 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2068 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2070 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2071 return 0;
2072 }
2073 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2074 pctx = NULL;
2075 }
2076 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
2077
2078 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2079 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2080 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2083 return 0;
2084 }
2085
2086 found = 1;
2087 }
2088
2089 return 1;
2090}
2091
2092/*
2093 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
2094 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
2095 * object as required.
2096 *
2097 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
2098 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
2099 * ignored.
2100 *
2101 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
2102 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
2103 */
2104static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
2105{
2106 size_t loop;
2107 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2108
2109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2110 s->servername_done = 0;
2111 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2112#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2113 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2114#endif
2115
2116 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2117 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2118 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2119 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
2120 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
2121 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
2122
2123#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2124 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2125 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
2126#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2127
2128 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2129 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
2130 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2131 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2132
2133#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2134 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2135 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2136#endif
2137
2138 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2139
2140 /*
2141 * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
2142 * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
2143 */
2144 if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
2145 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2146 return 0;
2147 }
2148
2149 /*
2150 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
2151 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
2152 * resumption.
2153 */
2154 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
2155 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
2156
2157 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2158 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
2159 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2160 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2161 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2162
2163 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2164 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
2165 &currext->data, al))
2166 return 0;
2167 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2168 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2169 }
2170/*-
2171 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2172 *
2173 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2174 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2175 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2176 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2177 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2178 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2179 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2180 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2181 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2182 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2183 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2184 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2185 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2186 * the value of the Host: field.
2187 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2188 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2189 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2190 * extension.
2191 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2192 *
2193 */
2194
2195 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2196 unsigned int servname_type;
2197 PACKET sni, hostname;
2198
2199 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
2200 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2201 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2202 return 0;
2203 }
2204
2205 /*
2206 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2207 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2208 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2209 * such.
2210 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2211 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2212 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2213 *
2214 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2215 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2216 */
2217 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2218 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2219 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2220 return 0;
2221 }
2222
2223 if (!s->hit) {
2224 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2225 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2226 return 0;
2227 }
2228
2229 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2230 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2231 return 0;
2232 }
2233
2234 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2235 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2236 return 0;
2237 }
2238
2239 s->servername_done = 1;
2240 } else {
2241 /*
2242 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2243 * fall back to a full handshake.
2244 */
2245 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2246 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2247 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2248 }
2249 }
2250#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2251 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2252 PACKET srp_I;
2253
2254 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
2255 return 0;
2256
2257 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2258 return 0;
2259
2260 /*
2261 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2262 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2263 */
2264 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2265 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2266 return 0;
2267 }
2268 }
2269#endif
2270
2271#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2272 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2273 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2274
2275 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
2276 &ec_point_format_list)
2277 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2278 return 0;
2279 }
2280
2281 if (!s->hit) {
2282 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2283 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2284 &s->
2285 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2286 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2287 return 0;
2288 }
2289 }
2290 }
2291#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2292 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
2293 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2294 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2295 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
2296 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2297 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2298 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2299 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2300 return 0;
2301 }
2302 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2303 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2304
2305 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2306 &supported_sig_algs)
2307 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2308 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2309 return 0;
2310 }
2311
2312 if (!s->hit) {
2313 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2314 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2315 return 0;
2316 }
2317 }
2318 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2319 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
2320 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2321 return 0;
2322 }
2323#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2324 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2325 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2326 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2327 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2328 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2329 return 0;
2330
2331 /*
2332 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2333 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2334 */
2335 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2336 OCSP_RESPID_free);
2337 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2338 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2339 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2340 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2341 return 0;
2342 }
2343 } else {
2344 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2345 }
2346
2347 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2348 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2349 PACKET responder_id;
2350 const unsigned char *id_data;
2351
2352 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2353 &responder_id)
2354 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2355 return 0;
2356 }
2357
2358 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2359 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2360 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2361 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2362 if (id == NULL)
2363 return 0;
2364
2365 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2366 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2367 return 0;
2368 }
2369
2370 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2371 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2372 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2373 return 0;
2374 }
2375 }
2376
2377 /* Read in request_extensions */
2378 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2379 &currext->data, &exts))
2380 return 0;
2381
2382 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2383 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2384 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2385 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2386 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2387 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2388 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2389 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2390 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2391 return 0;
2392 }
2393 }
2394 } else
2395#endif
2396 {
2397 /*
2398 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2399 */
2400 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2401 }
2402 }
2403#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2404 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2405 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2406 /*-
2407 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2408 * renegotiation.
2409 *
2410 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2411 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2412 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2413 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2414 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2415 * anything like that, but this might change).
2416 *
2417 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2418 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2419 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2420 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2421 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2422 */
2423 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2424 }
2425#endif
2426
2427 else if (currext->type
2428 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2429 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2430 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2431 &currext->data, al))
2432 return 0;
2433 }
2434
2435 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2436#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2437 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2438 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2439 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2440 &currext->data, al))
2441 return 0;
2442 }
2443#endif
2444 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2445 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
2446 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2447 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2448 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit
2449 && !process_key_share_ext(s, &currext->data, al)) {
2450 return 0;
2451 }
2452 /*
2453 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2454 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2455 */
2456
2457 /*
2458 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2459 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2460 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2461 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2462 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2463 */
2464 else if (!s->hit) {
2465 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2466 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2467 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2468 return 0;
2469 }
2470 }
2471
2472 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2473
2474 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2475 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2476 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2478 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2479 return 0;
2480 }
2481
2482 /*
2483 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2484 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2485 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2486 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2487 */
2488 return 1;
2489}
2490
2491int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2492{
2493 int al = -1;
2494 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2495 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2496 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2497 return 0;
2498 }
2499 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2501 return 0;
2502 }
2503 return 1;
2504}
2505
2506#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2507/*
2508 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2509 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2510 * fill the length of the block.
2511 */
2512static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2513{
2514 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2515
2516 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2517 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2518 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2519 return 0;
2520 }
2521
2522 return 1;
2523}
2524#endif
2525
2526static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2527{
2528 unsigned int length, type, size;
2529 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2530 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2531
2532#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2533 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2534#endif
2535 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2536
2537 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2538 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2539
2540 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2541
2542 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2543
2544 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2545 goto ri_check;
2546
2547 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2548 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2549 return 0;
2550 }
2551
2552 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2553 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2554 return 0;
2555 }
2556
2557 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2558 const unsigned char *data;
2559 PACKET spkt;
2560
2561 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2562 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2563 goto ri_check;
2564
2565 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2566 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2567
2568 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2569 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2570 return 0;
2571 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2572 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2573 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2574 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2575 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2576 return 0;
2577 }
2578 tlsext_servername = 1;
2579 }
2580#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2581 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2582 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2583 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2584 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2585 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2586 return 0;
2587 }
2588 if (!s->hit) {
2589 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2590 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2591 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2592 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2593 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2594 return 0;
2595 }
2596 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2597 ecpointformatlist_length;
2598 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2599 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2600 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2602 return 0;
2603 }
2604
2605 }
2606 }
2607#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2608
2609 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2610 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2611 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2612 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2613 {
2614 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2615 return 0;
2616 }
2617 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2618 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2619 return 0;
2620 }
2621 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2622 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2623 /*
2624 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2625 * request message.
2626 */
2627 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2628 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2629 return 0;
2630 }
2631 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2632 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2633 }
2634#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2635 /*
2636 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2637 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2638 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2639 */
2640 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2641 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2642 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2643 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2644 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2645 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2646 }
2647 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2648 if (size > 0) {
2649 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2650 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2651 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2652 return 0;
2653 }
2654 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2655 }
2656 }
2657#endif
2658#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2659 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2660 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2661 unsigned char *selected;
2662 unsigned char selected_len;
2663 /* We must have requested it. */
2664 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2665 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2666 return 0;
2667 }
2668 /* The data must be valid */
2669 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2670 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2671 return 0;
2672 }
2673 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2674 size,
2675 s->
2676 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2677 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2678 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2679 return 0;
2680 }
2681 /*
2682 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2683 * a single Serverhello
2684 */
2685 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2686 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2687 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2688 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2689 return 0;
2690 }
2691 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2692 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2693 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2694 }
2695#endif
2696
2697 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2698 unsigned len;
2699 /* We must have requested it. */
2700 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2701 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2702 return 0;
2703 }
2704 /*-
2705 * The extension data consists of:
2706 * uint16 list_length
2707 * uint8 proto_length;
2708 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2709 */
2710 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2711 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2712 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2713 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2714 return 0;
2715 }
2716 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2717 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2718 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2719 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2720 return 0;
2721 }
2722 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2724 return 0;
2725 }
2726 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2727 }
2728#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2729 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2730 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2731 return 0;
2732 }
2733#endif
2734 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2735 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2736 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2737 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2738 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2739 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2740 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
2741 (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
2742 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2743 if (!s->hit)
2744 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2745 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2746 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2747 unsigned int group_id;
2748 PACKET encoded_pt;
2749 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
2750
2751 /* Sanity check */
2752 if (ckey == NULL) {
2753 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2755 return 0;
2756 }
2757
2758 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
2759 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2761 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2762 return 0;
2763 }
2764
2765 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
2766 /*
2767 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
2768 * key_share!
2769 */
2770 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2772 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2773 return 0;
2774 }
2775
2776 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
2777 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2778 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2780 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2781 return 0;
2782 }
2783
2784 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
2785 if (skey == NULL) {
2786 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2788 return 0;
2789 }
2790 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2791 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2792 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2794 return 0;
2795 }
2796
2797 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
2798 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2800 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2801 return 0;
2802 }
2803 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2804 /*
2805 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2806 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2807 */
2808 } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2809 return 0;
2810 }
2811
2812 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2813 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2814 return 0;
2815 }
2816
2817 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2818 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2819 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2820 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2821 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2822 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2823 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2824 return 0;
2825 }
2826 } else {
2827 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2828 return 0;
2829 }
2830 }
2831 }
2832
2833 ri_check:
2834
2835 /*
2836 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2837 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2838 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2839 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2840 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2841 */
2842 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2843 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2844 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2846 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2847 return 0;
2848 }
2849
2850 if (s->hit) {
2851 /*
2852 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2853 * original session.
2854 */
2855 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2856 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2857 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2859 return 0;
2860 }
2861 }
2862
2863 return 1;
2864}
2865
2866int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2867{
2868 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2869 return 1;
2870}
2871
2872int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2873{
2874 return 1;
2875}
2876
2877static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2878{
2879 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2880 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2881
2882#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2883 /*
2884 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2885 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2886 */
2887 /*
2888 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2889 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2890 */
2891#endif
2892
2893 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2894 ret =
2895 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2896 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2897 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2898 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2899 ret =
2900 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2901 s->
2902 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2903
2904 switch (ret) {
2905 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2906 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2907 return -1;
2908
2909 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2910 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2911 return 1;
2912
2913 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2914 s->servername_done = 0;
2915 default:
2916 return 1;
2917 }
2918}
2919
2920/* Initialise digests to default values */
2921void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2922{
2923 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2924#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2925 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2926#endif
2927#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2928 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2929 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2930 else
2931 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2932 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2933#endif
2934#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2935 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2936#endif
2937#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2938 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2939 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2940 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2941#endif
2942}
2943
2944int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2945{
2946 int al;
2947 size_t i;
2948
2949 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2950 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2951 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2952 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2953 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2954 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2955 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2956 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2957 }
2958
2959 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2960 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2961 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2963 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2964 goto err;
2965 }
2966 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2967 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2969 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2970 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2971 goto err;
2972 }
2973 } else {
2974 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2975 }
2976 return 1;
2977 err:
2978 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2979 return 0;
2980}
2981
2982/*
2983 * Upon success, returns 1.
2984 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2985 */
2986int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2987{
2988 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2989
2990 /*
2991 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2992 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2993 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2994 * influence which certificate is sent
2995 */
2996 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2997 int ret;
2998 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2999 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3000 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3001 if (certpkey != NULL) {
3002 /*
3003 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
3004 * et al can pick it up.
3005 */
3006 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3007 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3008 switch (ret) {
3009 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3010 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3011 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3012 break;
3013 /* status request response should be sent */
3014 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3015 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3016 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3017 break;
3018 /* something bad happened */
3019 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3020 default:
3021 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3022 return 0;
3023 }
3024 }
3025 }
3026
3027 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
3028 return 0;
3029 }
3030
3031 return 1;
3032}
3033
3034int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3035{
3036 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3037 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3038
3039#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3040 /*
3041 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3042 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3043 * must contain uncompressed.
3044 */
3045 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3046 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3047 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3048 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3049 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3050 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3051 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3052 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3053 size_t i;
3054 unsigned char *list;
3055 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3056 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3057 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3058 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3059 found_uncompressed = 1;
3060 break;
3061 }
3062 }
3063 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3065 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3066 return -1;
3067 }
3068 }
3069 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3070#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3071
3072 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3073 ret =
3074 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3075 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3076 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3077 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3078 ret =
3079 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3080 s->
3081 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3082
3083 /*
3084 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
3085 * that we don't receive a status message
3086 */
3087 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3088 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3089 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
3090
3091 switch (ret) {
3092 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3093 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3094 return -1;
3095
3096 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3097 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3098 return 1;
3099
3100 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3101 s->servername_done = 0;
3102 default:
3103 return 1;
3104 }
3105}
3106
3107int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3108{
3109 int al = -1;
3110 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3111 return 1;
3112 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
3113 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3114 return 0;
3115 }
3116
3117 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3119 return 0;
3120 }
3121 return 1;
3122}
3123
3124/*
3125 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
3126 * type and return it.
3127 *
3128 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
3129 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
3130 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
3131 *
3132 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
3133 */
3134RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
3135 unsigned int type)
3136{
3137 size_t loop;
3138
3139 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
3140 if (exts[loop].type == type)
3141 return &exts[loop];
3142 }
3143
3144 return NULL;
3145}
3146
3147/*-
3148 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
3149 *
3150 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
3151 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3152 * point to the resulting session.
3153 *
3154 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3155 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3156 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3157 *
3158 * Returns:
3159 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3160 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3161 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3162 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3163 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3164 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3165 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3166 *
3167 * Side effects:
3168 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3169 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3170 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3171 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3172 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3173 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3174 */
3175int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3176 SSL_SESSION **ret)
3177{
3178 int retv;
3179 const unsigned char *etick;
3180 size_t size;
3181 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
3182
3183 *ret = NULL;
3184 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3185
3186 /*
3187 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
3188 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3189 * resumption.
3190 */
3191 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
3192 return 0;
3193
3194 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3195 hello->num_extensions,
3196 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
3197 if (ticketext == NULL)
3198 return 0;
3199
3200 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3201 if (size == 0) {
3202 /*
3203 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3204 * one.
3205 */
3206 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3207 return 1;
3208 }
3209 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3210 /*
3211 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3212 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3213 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3214 * calculate the master secret later.
3215 */
3216 return 2;
3217 }
3218 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3219 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3220 return -1;
3221 }
3222 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3223 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3224 switch (retv) {
3225 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3226 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3227 return 2;
3228
3229 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3230 return 3;
3231
3232 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3233 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3234 return 3;
3235
3236 default: /* fatal error */
3237 return -1;
3238 }
3239}
3240
3241/*
3242 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
3243 * ClientHello and we can support it
3244 * Returns:
3245 * 1 on success
3246 * 0 on error
3247 */
3248int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
3249{
3250 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3251
3252 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3253
3254 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
3255 || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
3256 return 1;
3257
3258 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3259 hello->num_extensions,
3260 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
3261
3262 /*
3263 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3264 * client doesn't support EMS.
3265 */
3266 if (emsext == NULL)
3267 return 1;
3268
3269 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3270 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3271 return 0;
3272
3273 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3274
3275 return 1;
3276}
3277
3278/*-
3279 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3280 *
3281 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3282 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3283 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3284 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3285 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3286 * point to the resulting session.
3287 *
3288 * Returns:
3289 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3290 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3291 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3292 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3293 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3294 */
3295static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3296 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3297 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3298{
3299 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3300 unsigned char *sdec;
3301 const unsigned char *p;
3302 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3303 size_t mlen;
3304 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3305 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3306 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3307 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3308
3309 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3310 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3311 if (hctx == NULL)
3312 return -2;
3313 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3314 if (ctx == NULL) {
3315 ret = -2;
3316 goto err;
3317 }
3318 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3319 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3320 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3321 ctx, hctx, 0);
3322 if (rv < 0)
3323 goto err;
3324 if (rv == 0) {
3325 ret = 2;
3326 goto err;
3327 }
3328 if (rv == 2)
3329 renew_ticket = 1;
3330 } else {
3331 /* Check key name matches */
3332 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3333 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3334 ret = 2;
3335 goto err;
3336 }
3337 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3338 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3339 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3340 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3341 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3342 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3343 0) {
3344 goto err;
3345 }
3346 }
3347 /*
3348 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3349 * checks on ticket.
3350 */
3351 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3352 if (mlen == 0) {
3353 goto err;
3354 }
3355 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3356 if (eticklen <=
3357 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3358 ret = 2;
3359 goto err;
3360 }
3361 eticklen -= mlen;
3362 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3363 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3364 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3365 goto err;
3366 }
3367 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3368 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3369 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3370 return 2;
3371 }
3372 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3373 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3374 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3375 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3376 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3377 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3378 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3379 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3380 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3381 return -1;
3382 }
3383 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3384 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3385 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3386 return 2;
3387 }
3388 slen += declen;
3389 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3390 ctx = NULL;
3391 p = sdec;
3392
3393 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3394 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3395 if (sess) {
3396 /*
3397 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3398 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3399 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3400 * standard.
3401 */
3402 if (sesslen)
3403 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3404 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3405 *psess = sess;
3406 if (renew_ticket)
3407 return 4;
3408 else
3409 return 3;
3410 }
3411 ERR_clear_error();
3412 /*
3413 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3414 */
3415 return 2;
3416 err:
3417 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3418 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3419 return ret;
3420}
3421
3422/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3423
3424typedef struct {
3425 int nid;
3426 int id;
3427} tls12_lookup;
3428
3429static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3430 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3431 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3432 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3433 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3434 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3435 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3436 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3437 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3438 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3439};
3440
3441static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3442 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3443 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3444 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3445 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3446 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3447 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3448};
3449
3450static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3451{
3452 size_t i;
3453 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3454 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3455 return table[i].id;
3456 }
3457 return -1;
3458}
3459
3460static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3461{
3462 size_t i;
3463 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3464 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3465 return table[i].nid;
3466 }
3467 return NID_undef;
3468}
3469
3470int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3471{
3472 int sig_id, md_id;
3473
3474 if (md == NULL)
3475 return 0;
3476 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3477 if (md_id == -1)
3478 return 0;
3479 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3480 if (sig_id == -1)
3481 return 0;
3482 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3483 return 0;
3484
3485 return 1;
3486}
3487
3488int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3489{
3490 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3491}
3492
3493typedef struct {
3494 int nid;
3495 int secbits;
3496 int md_idx;
3497 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3498} tls12_hash_info;
3499
3500static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3501 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3502 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3503 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3504 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3505 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3506 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3507 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3508 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3509 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3510 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3511 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3512};
3513
3514static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3515{
3516 unsigned int i;
3517 if (hash_alg == 0)
3518 return NULL;
3519
3520 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3521 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3522 return tls12_md_info + i;
3523 }
3524
3525 return NULL;
3526}
3527
3528const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3529{
3530 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3531 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3532 return NULL;
3533 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3534 if (!inf)
3535 return NULL;
3536 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3537}
3538
3539static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3540{
3541 switch (sig_alg) {
3542#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3543 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3544 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3545#endif
3546#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3547 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3548 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3549#endif
3550#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3551 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3552 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3553#endif
3554#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3555 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3556 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3557
3558 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3559 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3560
3561 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3562 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3563#endif
3564 }
3565 return -1;
3566}
3567
3568/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3569static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3570 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3571{
3572 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3573 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3574 return;
3575 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3576 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3577 if (phash_nid)
3578 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3579 }
3580 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3581 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3582 if (psign_nid)
3583 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3584 }
3585 if (psignhash_nid) {
3586 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3587 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3588 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3589 }
3590}
3591
3592/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3593static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3594{
3595 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3596 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3597 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3598 return 0;
3599 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3600 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3601 return 0;
3602 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3603 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3604}
3605
3606/*
3607 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3608 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3609 * disabled.
3610 */
3611
3612void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3613{
3614 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3615 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3616 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3617 /*
3618 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3619 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3620 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3621 */
3622 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3623 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3624 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3625#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3626 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3627 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3628 have_rsa = 1;
3629 break;
3630#endif
3631#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3632 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3633 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3634 have_dsa = 1;
3635 break;
3636#endif
3637#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3638 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3639 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3640 have_ecdsa = 1;
3641 break;
3642#endif
3643 }
3644 }
3645 if (!have_rsa)
3646 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3647 if (!have_dsa)
3648 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3649 if (!have_ecdsa)
3650 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3651}
3652
3653int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3654 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3655{
3656 size_t i;
3657
3658 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3659 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3660 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3661 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3662 return 0;
3663 }
3664 }
3665 return 1;
3666}
3667
3668/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3669static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3670 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3671 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3672{
3673 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3674 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3675 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3676 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3677 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3678 continue;
3679 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3680 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3681 nmatch++;
3682 if (shsig) {
3683 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3684 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3685 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3686 &shsig->sign_nid,
3687 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3688 shsig++;
3689 }
3690 break;
3691 }
3692 }
3693 }
3694 return nmatch;
3695}
3696
3697/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3698static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3699{
3700 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3701 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3702 size_t nmatch;
3703 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3704 CERT *c = s->cert;
3705 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3706
3707 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3708 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3709 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3710 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3711 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3712 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3713 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3714 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3715 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3716 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3717 } else
3718 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3719 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3720 pref = conf;
3721 preflen = conflen;
3722 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3723 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3724 } else {
3725 allow = conf;
3726 allowlen = conflen;
3727 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3728 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3729 }
3730 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3731 if (nmatch) {
3732 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3733 if (salgs == NULL)
3734 return 0;
3735 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3736 } else {
3737 salgs = NULL;
3738 }
3739 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3740 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3741 return 1;
3742}
3743
3744/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3745
3746int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3747{
3748 CERT *c = s->cert;
3749 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3750 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3751 return 1;
3752 /* Should never happen */
3753 if (!c)
3754 return 0;
3755
3756 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3757 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3758 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3759 return 0;
3760 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3761 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3762 return 1;
3763}
3764
3765int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3766{
3767 int idx;
3768 size_t i;
3769 const EVP_MD *md;
3770 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3771 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3772 CERT *c = s->cert;
3773 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3774 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3775 return 0;
3776
3777 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3778 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3779 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3780 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3781 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3782 pmd[idx] = md;
3783 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3784 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3785 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3786 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3787 }
3788 }
3789
3790 }
3791 /*
3792 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3793 * the certificate for signing.
3794 */
3795 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3796 /*
3797 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3798 * supported it stays as NULL.
3799 */
3800#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3801 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3802 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3803#endif
3804#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3805 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3806 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3807 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3808 }
3809#endif
3810#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3811 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3812 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3813#endif
3814#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3815 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3816 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3817 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3818 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3819 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3820 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3821 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3822 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3823#endif
3824 }
3825 return 1;
3826}
3827
3828int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3829 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3830 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3831{
3832 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3833 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3834 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3835 return 0;
3836 if (idx >= 0) {
3837 idx <<= 1;
3838 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3839 return 0;
3840 psig += idx;
3841 if (rhash)
3842 *rhash = psig[0];
3843 if (rsig)
3844 *rsig = psig[1];
3845 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3846 }
3847 return (int)numsigalgs;
3848}
3849
3850int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3851 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3852 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3853{
3854 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3855 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3856 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3857 return 0;
3858 shsigalgs += idx;
3859 if (phash)
3860 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3861 if (psign)
3862 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3863 if (psignhash)
3864 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3865 if (rsig)
3866 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3867 if (rhash)
3868 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3869 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3870}
3871
3872#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3873
3874typedef struct {
3875 size_t sigalgcnt;
3876 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3877} sig_cb_st;
3878
3879static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3880{
3881 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3882 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3883 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3884 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3885 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3886 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3887 } else {
3888 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3889 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3890 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3891 }
3892}
3893
3894static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3895{
3896 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3897 size_t i;
3898 char etmp[20], *p;
3899 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3900 if (elem == NULL)
3901 return 0;
3902 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3903 return 0;
3904 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3905 return 0;
3906 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3907 etmp[len] = 0;
3908 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3909 if (!p)
3910 return 0;
3911 *p = 0;
3912 p++;
3913 if (!*p)
3914 return 0;
3915
3916 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3917 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3918
3919 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3920 return 0;
3921
3922 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3923 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3924 return 0;
3925 }
3926 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3927 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3928 return 1;
3929}
3930
3931/*
3932 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3933 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3934 */
3935int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3936{
3937 sig_cb_st sig;
3938 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
3939 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3940 return 0;
3941 if (c == NULL)
3942 return 1;
3943 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3944}
3945
3946int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3947{
3948 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3949 int rhash, rsign;
3950 size_t i;
3951 if (salglen & 1)
3952 return 0;
3953 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3954 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3955 return 0;
3956 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3957 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3958 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3959
3960 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3961 goto err;
3962 *sptr++ = rhash;
3963 *sptr++ = rsign;
3964 }
3965
3966 if (client) {
3967 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3968 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3969 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3970 } else {
3971 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3972 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3973 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3974 }
3975
3976 return 1;
3977
3978 err:
3979 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3980 return 0;
3981}
3982
3983static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3984{
3985 int sig_nid;
3986 size_t i;
3987 if (default_nid == -1)
3988 return 1;
3989 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3990 if (default_nid)
3991 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3992 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3993 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3994 return 1;
3995 return 0;
3996}
3997
3998/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3999static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4000{
4001 X509_NAME *nm;
4002 int i;
4003 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4004 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
4005 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4006 return 1;
4007 }
4008 return 0;
4009}
4010
4011/*
4012 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4013 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4014 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4015 * attempting to use them.
4016 */
4017
4018/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4019
4020#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4021 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4022/* Strict mode flags */
4023#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4024 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4025 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4026
4027int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4028 int idx)
4029{
4030 int i;
4031 int rv = 0;
4032 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4033 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4034 CERT *c = s->cert;
4035 uint32_t *pvalid;
4036 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4037 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4038 if (idx != -1) {
4039 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4040 if (idx == -2) {
4041 cpk = c->key;
4042 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
4043 } else
4044 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4045 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4046 x = cpk->x509;
4047 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4048 chain = cpk->chain;
4049 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4050 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4051 if (!x || !pk)
4052 goto end;
4053 } else {
4054 if (!x || !pk)
4055 return 0;
4056 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4057 if (idx == -1)
4058 return 0;
4059 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4060
4061 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4062 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4063 else
4064 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4065 strict_mode = 1;
4066 }
4067
4068 if (suiteb_flags) {
4069 int ok;
4070 if (check_flags)
4071 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4072 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4073 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4074 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4075 else if (!check_flags)
4076 goto end;
4077 }
4078
4079 /*
4080 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4081 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4082 */
4083 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4084 int default_nid;
4085 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4086 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4087 default_nid = 0;
4088 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4089 else {
4090 switch (idx) {
4091 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4092 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4093 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4094 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4095 break;
4096
4097 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4098 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4099 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4100 break;
4101
4102 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4103 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4104 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4105 break;
4106
4107 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4108 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4109 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4110 break;
4111
4112 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4113 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4114 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4115 break;
4116
4117 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4118 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4119 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4120 break;
4121
4122 default:
4123 default_nid = -1;
4124 break;
4125 }
4126 }
4127 /*
4128 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4129 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4130 */
4131 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4132 size_t j;
4133 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4134 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4135 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4136 break;
4137 }
4138 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4139 if (check_flags)
4140 goto skip_sigs;
4141 else
4142 goto end;
4143 }
4144 }
4145 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4146 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4147 if (!check_flags)
4148 goto end;
4149 } else
4150 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4151 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4152 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4153 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4154 if (check_flags) {
4155 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4156 break;
4157 } else
4158 goto end;
4159 }
4160 }
4161 }
4162 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4163 else if (check_flags)
4164 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4165 skip_sigs:
4166 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4167 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4168 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4169 else if (!check_flags)
4170 goto end;
4171 if (!s->server)
4172 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4173 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4174 else if (strict_mode) {
4175 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4176 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4177 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4178 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4179 if (check_flags) {
4180 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4181 break;
4182 } else
4183 goto end;
4184 }
4185 }
4186 }
4187 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4188 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4189 int check_type = 0;
4190 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
4191 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4192 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4193 break;
4194 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4195 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4196 break;
4197 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4198 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4199 break;
4200 }
4201 if (check_type) {
4202 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4203 int ctypelen;
4204 if (c->ctypes) {
4205 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4206 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4207 } else {
4208 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4209 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4210 }
4211 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4212 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4213 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4214 break;
4215 }
4216 }
4217 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4218 goto end;
4219 } else
4220 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4221
4222 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4223
4224 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4225 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4226
4227 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4228 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4229 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4230 }
4231 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4232 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4233 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4234 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4235 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4236 break;
4237 }
4238 }
4239 }
4240 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4241 goto end;
4242 } else
4243 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4244
4245 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4246 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4247
4248 end:
4249
4250 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4251 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4252 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4253 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4254 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4255 } else
4256 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4257
4258 /*
4259 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4260 * chain is invalid.
4261 */
4262 if (!check_flags) {
4263 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4264 *pvalid = rv;
4265 else {
4266 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4267 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4268 return 0;
4269 }
4270 }
4271 return rv;
4272}
4273
4274/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4275void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4276{
4277 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4278 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4279 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4280 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4281 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4282 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4283 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4284}
4285
4286/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4287int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4288{
4289 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4290}
4291
4292#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4293DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4294{
4295 int dh_secbits = 80;
4296 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4297 return DH_get_1024_160();
4298 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4299 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4300 dh_secbits = 128;
4301 else
4302 dh_secbits = 80;
4303 } else {
4304 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4305 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4306 }
4307
4308 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4309 DH *dhp = DH_new();
4310 BIGNUM *p, *g;
4311 if (dhp == NULL)
4312 return NULL;
4313 g = BN_new();
4314 if (g != NULL)
4315 BN_set_word(g, 2);
4316 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4317 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4318 else
4319 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4320 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4321 DH_free(dhp);
4322 BN_free(p);
4323 BN_free(g);
4324 return NULL;
4325 }
4326 return dhp;
4327 }
4328 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4329 return DH_get_2048_224();
4330 return DH_get_1024_160();
4331}
4332#endif
4333
4334static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4335{
4336 int secbits = -1;
4337 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4338 if (pkey) {
4339 /*
4340 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4341 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4342 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4343 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4344 */
4345 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4346 }
4347 if (s)
4348 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4349 else
4350 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4351}
4352
4353static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4354{
4355 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4356 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4357 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4358 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4359 return 1;
4360 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4361 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4362 const EVP_MD *md;
4363 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4364 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4365 }
4366 if (s)
4367 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4368 else
4369 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4370}
4371
4372int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4373{
4374 if (vfy)
4375 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4376 if (is_ee) {
4377 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4378 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4379 } else {
4380 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4381 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4382 }
4383 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4384 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4385 return 1;
4386}
4387
4388/*
4389 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4390 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4391 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4392 */
4393
4394int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4395{
4396 int rv, start_idx, i;
4397 if (x == NULL) {
4398 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4399 start_idx = 1;
4400 } else
4401 start_idx = 0;
4402
4403 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4404 if (rv != 1)
4405 return rv;
4406
4407 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4408 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4409 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4410 if (rv != 1)
4411 return rv;
4412 }
4413 return 1;
4414}
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