]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blob - crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c
Fix safestack issues in x509.h
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / crypto / cmp / cmp_protect.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
4 * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
5 *
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 */
11
12 #include "cmp_local.h"
13
14 /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
15 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
16 #include <openssl/cmp.h>
17 #include <openssl/crmf.h>
18 #include <openssl/err.h>
19 #include <openssl/x509.h>
20
21 /*
22 * This function is also used by the internal verify_PBMAC() in cmp_vfy.c.
23 *
24 * Calculate protection for given PKImessage according to
25 * the algorithm and parameters in the message header's protectionAlg
26 * using the credentials, library context, and property criteria in the ctx.
27 *
28 * returns ASN1_BIT_STRING representing the protection on success, else NULL
29 */
30 ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
31 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
32 {
33 ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL;
34 OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
35 const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
36 const void *ppval = NULL;
37 int pptype = 0;
38
39 if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
40 return NULL;
41
42 /* construct data to be signed */
43 prot_part.header = msg->header;
44 prot_part.body = msg->body;
45
46 if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL) {
47 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
48 return NULL;
49 }
50 X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg);
51
52 if (OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) {
53 int len;
54 size_t prot_part_der_len;
55 unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
56 size_t sig_len;
57 unsigned char *protection = NULL;
58 OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
59 ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
60 const unsigned char *pbm_str_uc = NULL;
61
62 if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) {
63 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PBM_SECRET);
64 return NULL;
65 }
66 if (ppval == NULL) {
67 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
68 return NULL;
69 }
70
71 len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
72 if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL) {
73 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
74 goto end;
75 }
76 prot_part_der_len = (size_t)len;
77
78 pbm_str = (ASN1_STRING *)ppval;
79 pbm_str_uc = pbm_str->data;
80 pbm = d2i_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(NULL, &pbm_str_uc, pbm_str->length);
81 if (pbm == NULL) {
82 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
83 goto end;
84 }
85
86 if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq,
87 pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len,
88 ctx->secretValue->data, ctx->secretValue->length,
89 &protection, &sig_len))
90 goto end;
91
92 if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
93 return NULL;
94 /* OpenSSL defaults all bit strings to be encoded as ASN.1 NamedBitList */
95 prot->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
96 prot->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
97 if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(prot, protection, sig_len)) {
98 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
99 prot = NULL;
100 }
101 end:
102 OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
103 OPENSSL_free(protection);
104 OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
105 return prot;
106 } else {
107 int md_nid;
108 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
109
110 if (ctx->pkey == NULL) {
111 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
112 return NULL;
113 }
114 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID), &md_nid, NULL)
115 || (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)) == NULL) {
116 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
117 return NULL;
118 }
119
120 if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
121 return NULL;
122 if (ASN1_item_sign_with_libctx(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART),
123 NULL, NULL, prot, &prot_part, NULL,
124 ctx->pkey, md, ctx->libctx, ctx->propq))
125 return prot;
126 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
127 return NULL;
128 }
129 }
130
131 int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
132 {
133 if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
134 return 0;
135
136 if (msg->extraCerts == NULL
137 && (msg->extraCerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
138 return 0;
139
140 /* Add first ctx->cert and its chain if using signature-based protection */
141 if (!ctx->unprotectedSend && ctx->secretValue == NULL
142 && ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
143 int flags_prepend = X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
144 | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS;
145
146 /* if not yet done try to build chain using available untrusted certs */
147 if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
148 ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
149 "trying to build chain for own CMP signer cert");
150 ctx->chain =
151 ossl_cmp_build_cert_chain(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq, NULL,
152 ctx->untrusted, ctx->cert);
153 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
154 ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
155 "success building chain for own CMP signer cert");
156 } else {
157 /* dump errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
158 OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
159 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
160 "could not build chain for own CMP signer cert");
161 }
162 }
163 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
164 if (!X509_add_certs(msg->extraCerts, ctx->chain, flags_prepend))
165 return 0;
166 } else {
167 /* make sure that at least our own signer cert is included first */
168 if (!X509_add_cert(msg->extraCerts, ctx->cert, flags_prepend))
169 return 0;
170 ossl_cmp_debug(ctx,
171 "fallback: adding just own CMP signer cert");
172 }
173 }
174
175 /* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */
176 if (!X509_add_certs(msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut,
177 X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP))
178 return 0;
179
180 /* in case extraCerts are empty list avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */
181 if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) == 0) {
182 sk_X509_free(msg->extraCerts);
183 msg->extraCerts = NULL;
184 }
185 return 1;
186 }
187
188 /*
189 * Create an X509_ALGOR structure for PasswordBasedMAC protection based on
190 * the pbm settings in the context
191 */
192 static int set_pbmac_algor(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR **alg)
193 {
194 OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
195 unsigned char *pbm_der = NULL;
196 int pbm_der_len;
197 ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
198
199 if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
200 return 0;
201
202 pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->pbm_slen,
203 EVP_MD_type(ctx->pbm_owf), ctx->pbm_itercnt,
204 ctx->pbm_mac);
205 pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
206 if (pbm == NULL || pbm_str == NULL)
207 goto err;
208
209 if ((pbm_der_len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(pbm, &pbm_der)) < 0)
210 goto err;
211
212 if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len))
213 goto err;
214 if (*alg == NULL && (*alg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
215 goto err;
216 OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
217
218 X509_ALGOR_set0(*alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC),
219 V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str);
220 OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
221 return 1;
222
223 err:
224 ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str);
225 OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
226 OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
227 return 0;
228 }
229
230 static int set_sig_algor(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR **alg)
231 {
232 int nid = 0;
233 ASN1_OBJECT *algo = NULL;
234
235 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&nid, EVP_MD_type(ctx->digest),
236 EVP_PKEY_id(ctx->pkey))) {
237 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE);
238 return 0;
239 }
240 if ((algo = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL)
241 return 0;
242 if (*alg == NULL && (*alg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
243 return 0;
244
245 if (X509_ALGOR_set0(*alg, algo, V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL))
246 return 1;
247 ASN1_OBJECT_free(algo);
248 return 0;
249 }
250
251 static int set_senderKID(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
252 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *id)
253 {
254 if (id == NULL)
255 id = ctx->referenceValue; /* standard for PBM, fallback for sig-based */
256 return id == NULL || ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header, id);
257 }
258
259 int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
260 {
261 if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
262 return 0;
263
264 /*
265 * For the case of re-protection remove pre-existing protection.
266 * TODO: Consider also removing any pre-existing extraCerts.
267 */
268 X509_ALGOR_free(msg->header->protectionAlg);
269 msg->header->protectionAlg = NULL;
270 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(msg->protection);
271 msg->protection = NULL;
272
273 if (ctx->unprotectedSend) {
274 if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, NULL))
275 goto err;
276 } else if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
277 /* use PasswordBasedMac according to 5.1.3.1 if secretValue is given */
278 if (!set_pbmac_algor(ctx, &msg->header->protectionAlg))
279 goto err;
280 if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, NULL))
281 goto err;
282
283 /*
284 * will add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut
285 * while not needed to validate the protection certificate,
286 * the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases
287 */
288 } else if (ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
289 /* use MSG_SIG_ALG according to 5.1.3.3 if client cert and key given */
290
291 /* make sure that key and certificate match */
292 if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert, ctx->pkey)) {
293 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH);
294 goto err;
295 }
296
297 if (!set_sig_algor(ctx, &msg->header->protectionAlg))
298 goto err;
299 /* set senderKID to keyIdentifier of the cert according to 5.1.1 */
300 if (!set_senderKID(ctx, msg, X509_get0_subject_key_id(ctx->cert)))
301 goto err;
302
303 /*
304 * will add ctx->cert followed, if possible, by its chain built
305 * from ctx->untrusted, and then ctx->extraCertsOut
306 */
307 } else {
308 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
309 goto err;
310 }
311 if (!ctx->unprotectedSend
312 && ((msg->protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL))
313 goto err;
314
315 /*
316 * For signature-based protection add ctx->cert followed by its chain.
317 * Finally add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut;
318 * even if not needed to validate the protection
319 * the option to do this might be handy for certain use cases.
320 */
321 if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
322 goto err;
323
324 /*
325 * As required by RFC 4210 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known
326 * to the client it set to NULL-DN. In this case for identification at least
327 * the senderKID must be set, where we took the referenceValue as fallback.
328 */
329 if (!(ossl_cmp_general_name_is_NULL_DN(msg->header->sender)
330 && msg->header->senderKID == NULL))
331 return 1;
332 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION);
333
334 err:
335 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE);
336 return 0;
337 }