2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include "crypto/bn.h"
14 #include "crypto/dh.h"
16 static int generate_key(DH
*dh
);
17 static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH
*dh
, BIGNUM
*r
,
18 const BIGNUM
*a
, const BIGNUM
*p
,
19 const BIGNUM
*m
, BN_CTX
*ctx
, BN_MONT_CTX
*m_ctx
);
20 static int dh_init(DH
*dh
);
21 static int dh_finish(DH
*dh
);
23 int dh_compute_key(OPENSSL_CTX
*libctx
, unsigned char *key
,
24 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
, DH
*dh
)
27 BN_MONT_CTX
*mont
= NULL
;
34 if (BN_num_bits(dh
->params
.p
) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
) {
35 DHerr(0, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
);
39 if (BN_num_bits(dh
->params
.p
) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS
) {
40 DHerr(0, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL
);
44 ctx
= BN_CTX_new_ex(libctx
);
48 tmp
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
52 if (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
53 DHerr(0, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE
);
57 if (dh
->flags
& DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P
) {
58 mont
= BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh
->method_mont_p
,
59 dh
->lock
, dh
->params
.p
, ctx
);
60 BN_set_flags(dh
->priv_key
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
64 /* TODO(3.0) : Solve in a PR related to Key validation for DH */
66 if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh
, pub_key
, &check_result
) || check_result
) {
67 DHerr(0, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY
);
71 if (!dh
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(dh
, tmp
, pub_key
, dh
->priv_key
, dh
->params
.p
, ctx
,
73 DHerr(0, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
77 ret
= BN_bn2bin(tmp
, key
);
84 static int compute_key(unsigned char *key
, const BIGNUM
*pub_key
, DH
*dh
)
86 return dh_compute_key(NULL
, key
, pub_key
, dh
);
89 int dh_compute_key_padded(OPENSSL_CTX
*libctx
, unsigned char *key
,
90 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
, DH
*dh
)
95 rv
= dh_compute_key(libctx
, key
, pub_key
, dh
);
97 rv
= dh
->meth
->compute_key(key
, pub_key
, dh
);
101 pad
= BN_num_bytes(dh
->params
.p
) - rv
;
103 memmove(key
+ pad
, key
, rv
);
110 int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key
, const BIGNUM
*pub_key
, DH
*dh
)
112 return dh
->meth
->compute_key(key
, pub_key
, dh
);
115 int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *key
, const BIGNUM
*pub_key
, DH
*dh
)
117 return dh_compute_key_padded(NULL
, key
, pub_key
, dh
);
121 static DH_METHOD dh_ossl
= {
133 static const DH_METHOD
*default_DH_method
= &dh_ossl
;
135 const DH_METHOD
*DH_OpenSSL(void)
140 const DH_METHOD
*DH_get_default_method(void)
142 return default_DH_method
;
145 static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH
*dh
, BIGNUM
*r
,
146 const BIGNUM
*a
, const BIGNUM
*p
,
147 const BIGNUM
*m
, BN_CTX
*ctx
, BN_MONT_CTX
*m_ctx
)
149 return BN_mod_exp_mont(r
, a
, p
, m
, ctx
, m_ctx
);
152 static int dh_init(DH
*dh
)
154 dh
->flags
|= DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P
;
155 ffc_params_init(&dh
->params
);
160 static int dh_finish(DH
*dh
)
162 BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh
->method_mont_p
);
167 void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD
*meth
)
169 default_DH_method
= meth
;
172 int DH_generate_key(DH
*dh
)
174 return dh
->meth
->generate_key(dh
);
176 #endif /* FIPS_MODE */
178 static int dh_generate_key(OPENSSL_CTX
*libctx
, DH
*dh
)
181 int generate_new_key
= 0;
186 BN_MONT_CTX
*mont
= NULL
;
187 BIGNUM
*pub_key
= NULL
, *priv_key
= NULL
;
189 if (BN_num_bits(dh
->params
.p
) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
) {
190 DHerr(0, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
);
194 if (BN_num_bits(dh
->params
.p
) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS
) {
195 DHerr(0, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL
);
199 ctx
= BN_CTX_new_ex(libctx
);
203 if (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
204 priv_key
= BN_secure_new();
205 if (priv_key
== NULL
)
207 generate_new_key
= 1;
209 priv_key
= dh
->priv_key
;
211 if (dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) {
216 pub_key
= dh
->pub_key
;
218 if (dh
->flags
& DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P
) {
219 mont
= BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh
->method_mont_p
,
220 dh
->lock
, dh
->params
.p
, ctx
);
225 if (generate_new_key
) {
226 /* Is it an approved safe prime ?*/
227 if (DH_get_nid(dh
) != NID_undef
) {
229 * The safe prime group code sets N = 2*s
230 * (where s = max security strength supported).
231 * N = dh->length (N = maximum bit length of private key)
234 || dh
->params
.q
== NULL
235 || dh
->length
> BN_num_bits(dh
->params
.q
))
237 if (!ffc_generate_private_key(ctx
, &dh
->params
, dh
->length
,
238 dh
->length
/ 2, priv_key
))
242 if (dh
->params
.q
== NULL
)
245 if (dh
->params
.q
== NULL
) {
246 /* secret exponent length */
247 l
= dh
->length
? dh
->length
: BN_num_bits(dh
->params
.p
) - 1;
248 if (!BN_priv_rand_ex(priv_key
, l
, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE
,
249 BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY
, ctx
))
252 * We handle just one known case where g is a quadratic non-residue:
253 * for g = 2: p % 8 == 3
255 if (BN_is_word(dh
->params
.g
, DH_GENERATOR_2
)
256 && !BN_is_bit_set(dh
->params
.p
, 2)) {
257 /* clear bit 0, since it won't be a secret anyway */
258 if (!BN_clear_bit(priv_key
, 0))
265 * For FFC FIPS 186-4 keygen
266 * security strength s = 112,
267 * Max Private key size N = len(q)
269 if (!ffc_generate_private_key(ctx
, &dh
->params
,
270 BN_num_bits(dh
->params
.q
), 112,
278 BIGNUM
*prk
= BN_new();
282 BN_with_flags(prk
, priv_key
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
284 /* pub_key = g^priv_key mod p */
285 if (!dh
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(dh
, pub_key
, dh
->params
.g
, prk
, dh
->params
.p
,
290 /* We MUST free prk before any further use of priv_key */
294 dh
->pub_key
= pub_key
;
295 dh
->priv_key
= priv_key
;
300 DHerr(0, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
302 if (pub_key
!= dh
->pub_key
)
304 if (priv_key
!= dh
->priv_key
)
310 static int generate_key(DH
*dh
)
312 return dh_generate_key(NULL
, dh
);
315 int dh_buf2key(DH
*dh
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
317 int err_reason
= DH_R_BN_ERROR
;
318 BIGNUM
*pubkey
= NULL
;
322 if ((pubkey
= BN_bin2bn(buf
, len
, NULL
)) == NULL
)
324 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &p
, NULL
, NULL
);
325 if (p
== NULL
|| (p_size
= BN_num_bytes(p
)) == 0) {
326 err_reason
= DH_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET
;
330 * As per Section 4.2.8.1 of RFC 8446 fail if DHE's
331 * public key is of size not equal to size of p
333 if (BN_is_zero(pubkey
) || p_size
!= len
) {
334 err_reason
= DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY
;
337 if (DH_set0_key(dh
, pubkey
, NULL
) != 1)
341 DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUF2KEY
, err_reason
);
346 size_t dh_key2buf(const DH
*dh
, unsigned char **pbuf_out
)
348 const BIGNUM
*pubkey
;
353 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &p
, NULL
, NULL
);
354 DH_get0_key(dh
, &pubkey
, NULL
);
355 if (p
== NULL
|| pubkey
== NULL
356 || (p_size
= BN_num_bytes(p
)) == 0
357 || BN_num_bytes(pubkey
) == 0) {
358 DHerr(DH_F_DH_KEY2BUF
, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY
);
361 if ((pbuf
= OPENSSL_malloc(p_size
)) == NULL
) {
362 DHerr(DH_F_DH_KEY2BUF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
366 * As per Section 4.2.8.1 of RFC 8446 left pad public
367 * key with zeros to the size of p
369 if (BN_bn2binpad(pubkey
, pbuf
, p_size
) < 0) {
371 DHerr(DH_F_DH_KEY2BUF
, DH_R_BN_ERROR
);