2 * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
15 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
20 #include "internal/refcount.h"
21 #include <openssl/err.h>
22 #include <openssl/engine.h>
23 #include <openssl/self_test.h>
24 #include "crypto/bn.h"
26 static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY
*eckey
, OSSL_CALLBACK
*cb
,
30 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_new(void)
32 return ec_key_new_method_int(NULL
, NULL
);
36 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX
*ctx
)
38 return ec_key_new_method_int(ctx
, NULL
);
41 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(OPENSSL_CTX
*ctx
, int nid
)
43 EC_KEY
*ret
= EC_KEY_new_ex(ctx
);
46 ret
->group
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name_ex(ctx
, nid
);
47 if (ret
->group
== NULL
) {
51 if (ret
->meth
->set_group
!= NULL
52 && ret
->meth
->set_group(ret
, ret
->group
) == 0) {
60 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid
)
62 return EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name_ex(NULL
, nid
);
66 void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY
*r
)
73 CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r
->references
, &i
, r
->lock
);
74 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r
);
77 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i
< 0);
79 if (r
->meth
!= NULL
&& r
->meth
->finish
!= NULL
)
82 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
83 ENGINE_finish(r
->engine
);
86 if (r
->group
&& r
->group
->meth
->keyfinish
)
87 r
->group
->meth
->keyfinish(r
);
90 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY
, r
, &r
->ex_data
);
92 CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r
->lock
);
93 EC_GROUP_free(r
->group
);
94 EC_POINT_free(r
->pub_key
);
95 BN_clear_free(r
->priv_key
);
97 OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r
, sizeof(EC_KEY
));
100 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY
*dest
, const EC_KEY
*src
)
102 if (dest
== NULL
|| src
== NULL
) {
103 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
106 if (src
->meth
!= dest
->meth
) {
107 if (dest
->meth
->finish
!= NULL
)
108 dest
->meth
->finish(dest
);
109 if (dest
->group
&& dest
->group
->meth
->keyfinish
)
110 dest
->group
->meth
->keyfinish(dest
);
111 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
112 if (ENGINE_finish(dest
->engine
) == 0)
117 dest
->libctx
= src
->libctx
;
118 /* copy the parameters */
119 if (src
->group
!= NULL
) {
120 const EC_METHOD
*meth
= EC_GROUP_method_of(src
->group
);
121 /* clear the old group */
122 EC_GROUP_free(dest
->group
);
123 dest
->group
= EC_GROUP_new_ex(src
->libctx
, meth
);
124 if (dest
->group
== NULL
)
126 if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest
->group
, src
->group
))
129 /* copy the public key */
130 if (src
->pub_key
!= NULL
) {
131 EC_POINT_free(dest
->pub_key
);
132 dest
->pub_key
= EC_POINT_new(src
->group
);
133 if (dest
->pub_key
== NULL
)
135 if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest
->pub_key
, src
->pub_key
))
138 /* copy the private key */
139 if (src
->priv_key
!= NULL
) {
140 if (dest
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
141 dest
->priv_key
= BN_new();
142 if (dest
->priv_key
== NULL
)
145 if (!BN_copy(dest
->priv_key
, src
->priv_key
))
147 if (src
->group
->meth
->keycopy
148 && src
->group
->meth
->keycopy(dest
, src
) == 0)
155 dest
->enc_flag
= src
->enc_flag
;
156 dest
->conv_form
= src
->conv_form
;
157 dest
->version
= src
->version
;
158 dest
->flags
= src
->flags
;
160 if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY
,
161 &dest
->ex_data
, &src
->ex_data
))
165 if (src
->meth
!= dest
->meth
) {
166 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
167 if (src
->engine
!= NULL
&& ENGINE_init(src
->engine
) == 0)
169 dest
->engine
= src
->engine
;
171 dest
->meth
= src
->meth
;
174 if (src
->meth
->copy
!= NULL
&& src
->meth
->copy(dest
, src
) == 0)
182 EC_KEY
*EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY
*ec_key
)
184 EC_KEY
*ret
= ec_key_new_method_int(ec_key
->libctx
, ec_key
->engine
);
189 if (EC_KEY_copy(ret
, ec_key
) == NULL
) {
196 int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY
*r
)
200 if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r
->references
, &i
, r
->lock
) <= 0)
203 REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r
);
204 REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i
< 2);
205 return ((i
> 1) ? 1 : 0);
208 ENGINE
*EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
210 return eckey
->engine
;
213 int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY
*eckey
)
215 if (eckey
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
== NULL
) {
216 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
219 if (eckey
->meth
->keygen
!= NULL
) {
222 ret
= eckey
->meth
->keygen(eckey
);
228 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY
, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED
);
232 int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY
*eckey
)
236 ret
= eckey
->group
->meth
->keygen(eckey
);
244 * ECC Key generation.
245 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
248 * libctx A context containing an optional self test callback.
249 * eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
250 * is stored in this object.
251 * pairwise_test Set to non zero to perform a pairwise test. If the test
252 * fails then the keypair is not generated,
253 * Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
255 int ec_generate_key(OPENSSL_CTX
*libctx
, EC_KEY
*eckey
, int pairwise_test
)
258 BIGNUM
*priv_key
= NULL
;
259 const BIGNUM
*order
= NULL
;
260 EC_POINT
*pub_key
= NULL
;
261 const EC_GROUP
*group
= eckey
->group
;
262 BN_CTX
*ctx
= BN_CTX_secure_new_ex(eckey
->libctx
);
267 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
268 priv_key
= BN_secure_new();
269 if (priv_key
== NULL
)
272 priv_key
= eckey
->priv_key
;
275 * Steps (1-2): Check domain parameters and security strength.
276 * These steps must be done by the user. This would need to be
277 * stated in the security policy.
280 order
= EC_GROUP_get0_order(group
);
285 * Steps (3-7): priv_key = DRBG_RAND(order_n_bits) (range [1, n-1]).
286 * Although this is slightly different from the standard, it is effectively
287 * equivalent as it gives an unbiased result ranging from 1..n-1. It is also
288 * faster as the standard needs to retry more often. Also doing
289 * 1 + rand[0..n-2] would effect the way that tests feed dummy entropy into
290 * rand so the simpler backward compatible method has been used here.
293 if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(priv_key
, order
, ctx
))
295 while (BN_is_zero(priv_key
)) ;
297 if (eckey
->pub_key
== NULL
) {
298 pub_key
= EC_POINT_new(group
);
302 pub_key
= eckey
->pub_key
;
304 /* Step (8) : pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */
305 if (!EC_POINT_mul(group
, pub_key
, priv_key
, NULL
, NULL
, ctx
))
308 eckey
->priv_key
= priv_key
;
309 eckey
->pub_key
= pub_key
;
317 #endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
321 OSSL_CALLBACK
*cb
= NULL
;
324 OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(libctx
, &cb
, &cbarg
);
325 ok
= ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(eckey
, cb
, cbarg
);
328 /* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
330 BN_clear(eckey
->priv_key
);
331 if (eckey
->pub_key
!= NULL
)
332 EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group
, eckey
->pub_key
);
335 EC_POINT_free(pub_key
);
336 BN_clear_free(priv_key
);
341 int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY
*eckey
)
343 return ec_generate_key(NULL
, eckey
, 0);
346 int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY
*eckey
)
351 * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8)
352 * pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve)
354 ret
= EC_POINT_mul(eckey
->group
, eckey
->pub_key
, eckey
->priv_key
, NULL
,
363 int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
365 if (eckey
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->pub_key
== NULL
) {
366 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
370 if (eckey
->group
->meth
->keycheck
== NULL
) {
371 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
375 return eckey
->group
->meth
->keycheck(eckey
);
379 * Check the range of the EC public key.
380 * See SP800-56A R3 Section 5.6.2.3.3 (Part 2)
382 * - If q = odd prime p: Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the
383 * interval[0, p - 1], OR
384 * - If q = 2m: Verify that xQ and yQ are bit strings of length m bits.
385 * Returns 1 if the public key has a valid range, otherwise it returns 0.
387 static int ec_key_public_range_check(BN_CTX
*ctx
, const EC_KEY
*key
)
398 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key
->group
, key
->pub_key
, x
, y
, ctx
))
401 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(key
->group
->meth
) == NID_X9_62_prime_field
) {
402 if (BN_is_negative(x
)
403 || BN_cmp(x
, key
->group
->field
) >= 0
405 || BN_cmp(y
, key
->group
->field
) >= 0) {
409 int m
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(key
->group
);
410 if (BN_num_bits(x
) > m
|| BN_num_bits(y
) > m
) {
421 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
422 * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation.
424 int ec_key_public_check(const EC_KEY
*eckey
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
427 EC_POINT
*point
= NULL
;
428 const BIGNUM
*order
= NULL
;
430 if (eckey
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->pub_key
== NULL
) {
431 ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
435 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
436 if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey
->group
, eckey
->pub_key
)) {
437 ECerr(0, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY
);
441 point
= EC_POINT_new(eckey
->group
);
445 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
446 if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx
, eckey
)) {
447 ECerr(0, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE
);
451 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
452 if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey
->group
, eckey
->pub_key
, ctx
) <= 0) {
453 ECerr(0, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE
);
457 order
= eckey
->group
->order
;
458 if (BN_is_zero(order
)) {
459 ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER
);
462 /* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
463 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey
->group
, point
, NULL
, eckey
->pub_key
, order
, ctx
)) {
464 ECerr(0, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
467 if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey
->group
, point
)) {
468 ECerr(0, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER
);
473 EC_POINT_free(point
);
478 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
479 * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
480 * The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
482 int ec_key_private_check(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
484 if (eckey
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
485 ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
488 if (BN_cmp(eckey
->priv_key
, BN_value_one()) < 0
489 || BN_cmp(eckey
->priv_key
, eckey
->group
->order
) >= 0) {
490 ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY
);
497 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
498 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
499 * Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
501 int ec_key_pairwise_check(const EC_KEY
*eckey
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
504 EC_POINT
*point
= NULL
;
507 || eckey
->group
== NULL
508 || eckey
->pub_key
== NULL
509 || eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
510 ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
514 point
= EC_POINT_new(eckey
->group
);
519 if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey
->group
, point
, eckey
->priv_key
, NULL
, NULL
, ctx
)) {
520 ECerr(0, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
523 if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey
->group
, point
, eckey
->pub_key
, ctx
) != 0) {
524 ECerr(0, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY
);
529 EC_POINT_free(point
);
535 * ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
536 * Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
537 * Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
538 * Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
540 * Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
541 * an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
542 * Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
544 int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
550 ECerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
553 if ((ctx
= BN_CTX_new_ex(eckey
->libctx
)) == NULL
)
556 if (!ec_key_public_check(eckey
, ctx
))
559 if (eckey
->priv_key
!= NULL
) {
560 if (!ec_key_private_check(eckey
)
561 || !ec_key_pairwise_check(eckey
, ctx
))
570 int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY
*key
, BIGNUM
*x
,
575 EC_POINT
*point
= NULL
;
578 if (key
== NULL
|| key
->group
== NULL
|| x
== NULL
|| y
== NULL
) {
579 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES
,
580 ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
583 ctx
= BN_CTX_new_ex(key
->libctx
);
588 point
= EC_POINT_new(key
->group
);
593 tx
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
594 ty
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
598 if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key
->group
, point
, x
, y
, ctx
))
600 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key
->group
, point
, tx
, ty
, ctx
))
604 * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals. The range check is done
605 * inside EC_KEY_check_key().
607 if (BN_cmp(x
, tx
) || BN_cmp(y
, ty
)) {
608 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES
,
609 EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE
);
613 /* EC_KEY_set_public_key updates dirty_cnt */
614 if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key
, point
))
617 if (EC_KEY_check_key(key
) == 0)
625 EC_POINT_free(point
);
630 OPENSSL_CTX
*ec_key_get_libctx(const EC_KEY
*key
)
635 const EC_GROUP
*EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY
*key
)
640 int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY
*key
, const EC_GROUP
*group
)
642 if (key
->meth
->set_group
!= NULL
&& key
->meth
->set_group(key
, group
) == 0)
644 EC_GROUP_free(key
->group
);
645 key
->group
= EC_GROUP_dup(group
);
647 return (key
->group
== NULL
) ? 0 : 1;
650 const BIGNUM
*EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY
*key
)
652 return key
->priv_key
;
655 int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY
*key
, const BIGNUM
*priv_key
)
658 const BIGNUM
*order
= NULL
;
659 BIGNUM
*tmp_key
= NULL
;
661 if (key
->group
== NULL
|| key
->group
->meth
== NULL
)
665 * Not only should key->group be set, but it should also be in a valid
666 * fully initialized state.
668 * Specifically, to operate in constant time, we need that the group order
669 * is set, as we use its length as the fixed public size of any scalar used
670 * as an EC private key.
672 order
= EC_GROUP_get0_order(key
->group
);
673 if (order
== NULL
|| BN_is_zero(order
))
674 return 0; /* This should never happen */
676 if (key
->group
->meth
->set_private
!= NULL
677 && key
->group
->meth
->set_private(key
, priv_key
) == 0)
679 if (key
->meth
->set_private
!= NULL
680 && key
->meth
->set_private(key
, priv_key
) == 0)
684 * We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key,
685 * so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM`
686 * holding the secret scalar.
688 * This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
689 * propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
690 * this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
691 * the caller specifically set it.
693 * The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
694 * years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
695 * some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer.
697 * In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by
698 * manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that
699 * inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated
700 * correctly and should not generate unintended consequences.
702 * Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
703 * to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
704 * enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
705 * a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
711 * The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
712 * a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
713 * generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
716 * For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
717 * required for the internal representation of the order, and we
718 * preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
719 * might temporarily overflow the order length.
721 tmp_key
= BN_dup(priv_key
);
725 BN_set_flags(tmp_key
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
727 fixed_top
= bn_get_top(order
) + 2;
728 if (bn_wexpand(tmp_key
, fixed_top
) == NULL
) {
729 BN_clear_free(tmp_key
);
733 BN_clear_free(key
->priv_key
);
734 key
->priv_key
= tmp_key
;
740 const EC_POINT
*EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY
*key
)
745 int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY
*key
, const EC_POINT
*pub_key
)
747 if (key
->meth
->set_public
!= NULL
748 && key
->meth
->set_public(key
, pub_key
) == 0)
750 EC_POINT_free(key
->pub_key
);
751 key
->pub_key
= EC_POINT_dup(pub_key
, key
->group
);
753 return (key
->pub_key
== NULL
) ? 0 : 1;
756 unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY
*key
)
758 return key
->enc_flag
;
761 void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY
*key
, unsigned int flags
)
763 key
->enc_flag
= flags
;
766 point_conversion_form_t
EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY
*key
)
768 return key
->conv_form
;
771 void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY
*key
, point_conversion_form_t cform
)
773 key
->conv_form
= cform
;
774 if (key
->group
!= NULL
)
775 EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key
->group
, cform
);
778 void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY
*key
, int flag
)
780 if (key
->group
!= NULL
)
781 EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(key
->group
, flag
);
784 int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY
*key
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
786 if (key
->group
== NULL
)
788 return EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(key
->group
, ctx
);
791 int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY
*key
)
796 void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY
*key
, int flags
)
802 void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY
*key
, int flags
)
804 key
->flags
&= ~flags
;
808 size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY
*key
, point_conversion_form_t form
,
809 unsigned char **pbuf
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
811 if (key
== NULL
|| key
->pub_key
== NULL
|| key
->group
== NULL
)
813 return EC_POINT_point2buf(key
->group
, key
->pub_key
, form
, pbuf
, ctx
);
816 int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY
*key
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
819 if (key
== NULL
|| key
->group
== NULL
)
821 if (key
->pub_key
== NULL
)
822 key
->pub_key
= EC_POINT_new(key
->group
);
823 if (key
->pub_key
== NULL
)
825 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key
->group
, key
->pub_key
, buf
, len
, ctx
) == 0)
829 * Save the point conversion form.
830 * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
831 * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form.
832 * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of
833 * the buffer so we know it is valid.
835 if ((key
->group
->meth
->flags
& EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE
) == 0)
836 key
->conv_form
= (point_conversion_form_t
)(buf
[0] & ~0x01);
840 size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY
*eckey
,
841 unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
843 if (eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
->meth
== NULL
)
845 if (eckey
->group
->meth
->priv2oct
== NULL
) {
846 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
850 return eckey
->group
->meth
->priv2oct(eckey
, buf
, len
);
853 size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY
*eckey
,
854 unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
858 buf_len
= (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey
->group
) + 7) / 8;
859 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
)
863 else if (len
< buf_len
)
866 /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */
868 if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey
->priv_key
, buf
, buf_len
) == -1) {
869 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT
, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
);
876 int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY
*eckey
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
880 if (eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
->meth
== NULL
)
882 if (eckey
->group
->meth
->oct2priv
== NULL
) {
883 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
886 ret
= eckey
->group
->meth
->oct2priv(eckey
, buf
, len
);
892 int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY
*eckey
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
894 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
)
895 eckey
->priv_key
= BN_secure_new();
896 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
897 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
900 eckey
->priv_key
= BN_bin2bn(buf
, len
, eckey
->priv_key
);
901 if (eckey
->priv_key
== NULL
) {
902 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
909 size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY
*eckey
, unsigned char **pbuf
)
914 len
= EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey
, NULL
, 0);
917 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
918 ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2BUF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
921 len
= EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey
, buf
, len
);
930 int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY
*eckey
)
932 if (eckey
->group
== NULL
|| eckey
->group
->meth
== NULL
933 || (eckey
->group
->meth
->flags
& EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN
))
939 * FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9 AS09.33
940 * Perform a sign/verify operation.
942 * NOTE: When generating keys for key-agreement schemes - FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9
943 * states that no additional pairwise tests are required (apart from the tests
944 * specified in SP800-56A) when generating keys. Hence pairwise ECDH tests are
947 static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY
*eckey
, OSSL_CALLBACK
*cb
,
951 unsigned char dgst
[16] = {0};
952 int dgst_len
= (int)sizeof(dgst
);
953 ECDSA_SIG
*sig
= NULL
;
954 OSSL_SELF_TEST
*st
= NULL
;
956 st
= OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb
, cbarg
);
960 OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st
, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT
,
961 OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_ECDSA
);
963 sig
= ECDSA_do_sign(dgst
, dgst_len
, eckey
);
967 OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st
, dgst
);
969 if (ECDSA_do_verify(dgst
, dgst_len
, sig
, eckey
) != 1)
974 OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st
, ret
);
975 OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st
);