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BN_BLINDING multi-threading fix.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / crypto / rsa / rsa_eay.c
1 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI
113
114 #include <stdio.h>
115 #include "cryptlib.h"
116 #include <openssl/bn.h>
117 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
119 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
120 #include <openssl/fips.h>
121 #endif
122
123 #ifndef RSA_NULL
124
125 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
126 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
127 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
128 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
129 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
130 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
131 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
132 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
133 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
134 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
135 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
136 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
137 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
138 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
139 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
140 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
141 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
142 RSA_eay_mod_exp,
143 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
144 RSA_eay_init,
145 RSA_eay_finish,
146 RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */
147 NULL,
148 0, /* rsa_sign */
149 0, /* rsa_verify */
150 NULL /* rsa_keygen */
151 };
152
153 const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
154 {
155 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
156 }
157
158 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
159 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
160 {
161 BIGNUM *f,*ret;
162 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
163 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
164 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
165
166 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
167 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
168 {
169 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
170 goto err;
171 }
172
173 if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
174 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
175 {
176 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
177 return -1;
178 }
179 #endif
180
181 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
182 {
183 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
184 return -1;
185 }
186
187 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
188 {
189 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
190 return -1;
191 }
192
193 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
194 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
195 {
196 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
197 {
198 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
199 return -1;
200 }
201 }
202
203 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
204 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
205 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
206 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
207 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
208 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
209 if (!f || !ret || !buf)
210 {
211 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
212 goto err;
213 }
214
215 switch (padding)
216 {
217 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
218 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
219 break;
220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
221 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
222 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
223 break;
224 #endif
225 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
226 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
227 break;
228 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
229 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
230 break;
231 default:
232 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
233 goto err;
234 }
235 if (i <= 0) goto err;
236
237 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
238
239 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
240 {
241 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
242 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
243 goto err;
244 }
245
246 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
247 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
248 goto err;
249
250 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
251 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
252
253 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
254 * length of the modulus */
255 j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
256 i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
257 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
258 to[k]=0;
259
260 r=num;
261 err:
262 if (ctx != NULL)
263 {
264 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
265 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
266 }
267 if (buf != NULL)
268 {
269 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
270 OPENSSL_free(buf);
271 }
272 return(r);
273 }
274
275 static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
276 {
277 BN_BLINDING *ret;
278 int got_write_lock = 0;
279 CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
280
281 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
282
283 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
284 {
285 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
286 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
287 got_write_lock = 1;
288
289 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
290 rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
291 }
292
293 ret = rsa->blinding;
294 if (ret == NULL)
295 goto err;
296
297 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
298 if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret)))
299 {
300 /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
301
302 *local = 1;
303 }
304 else
305 {
306 /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
307
308 *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
309 * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
310 * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
311 * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
312 */
313
314 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
315 {
316 if (!got_write_lock)
317 {
318 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
319 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
320 got_write_lock = 1;
321 }
322
323 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
324 rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
325 }
326 ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
327 }
328
329 err:
330 if (got_write_lock)
331 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
332 else
333 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
334 return ret;
335 }
336
337 static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
338 BN_CTX *ctx)
339 {
340 if (unblind == NULL)
341 /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
342 * in BN_BLINDING. */
343 return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
344 else
345 {
346 /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
347 * outside BN_BLINDING. */
348 int ret;
349 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
350 ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
351 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
352 return ret;
353 }
354 }
355
356 static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
357 BN_CTX *ctx)
358 {
359 /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
360 * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
361 * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
362 * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
363 * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
364 * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
365 */
366 return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
367 }
368
369 /* signing */
370 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
371 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
372 {
373 BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
374 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
375 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
376 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
377 int local_blinding = 0;
378 /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
379 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
380 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
381 BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
382 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
383
384 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
385 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
386 {
387 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
388 goto err;
389 }
390
391 if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
392 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
393 {
394 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
395 return -1;
396 }
397 #endif
398
399 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
400 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
401 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
402 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
403 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
404 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
405 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
406 {
407 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
408 goto err;
409 }
410
411 switch (padding)
412 {
413 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
414 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
415 break;
416 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
417 i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
418 break;
419 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
420 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
421 break;
422 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
423 default:
424 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
425 goto err;
426 }
427 if (i <= 0) goto err;
428
429 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
430
431 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
432 {
433 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
434 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
435 goto err;
436 }
437
438 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
439 {
440 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
441 if (blinding == NULL)
442 {
443 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
444 goto err;
445 }
446 }
447
448 if (blinding != NULL)
449 {
450 if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
451 {
452 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
453 goto err;
454 }
455 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
456 goto err;
457 }
458
459 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
460 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
461 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
462 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
463 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
464 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
465 {
466 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
467 }
468 else
469 {
470 BIGNUM local_d;
471 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
472
473 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
474 {
475 BN_init(&local_d);
476 d = &local_d;
477 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
478 }
479 else
480 d= rsa->d;
481
482 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
483 if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
484 goto err;
485
486 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
487 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
488 }
489
490 if (blinding)
491 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
492 goto err;
493
494 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
495 {
496 BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
497 if (BN_cmp(ret, f))
498 res = f;
499 else
500 res = ret;
501 }
502 else
503 res = ret;
504
505 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
506 * length of the modulus */
507 j=BN_num_bytes(res);
508 i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
509 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
510 to[k]=0;
511
512 r=num;
513 err:
514 if (ctx != NULL)
515 {
516 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
517 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
518 }
519 if (buf != NULL)
520 {
521 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
522 OPENSSL_free(buf);
523 }
524 return(r);
525 }
526
527 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
528 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
529 {
530 BIGNUM *f, *ret;
531 int j,num=0,r= -1;
532 unsigned char *p;
533 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
534 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
535 int local_blinding = 0;
536 /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
537 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
538 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
539 BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
540 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
541
542 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
543 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
544 {
545 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
546 goto err;
547 }
548
549 if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
550 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
551 {
552 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
553 return -1;
554 }
555 #endif
556
557 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
558 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
559 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
560 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
561 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
562 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
563 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
564 {
565 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
566 goto err;
567 }
568
569 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
570 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
571 if (flen > num)
572 {
573 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
574 goto err;
575 }
576
577 /* make data into a big number */
578 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
579
580 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
581 {
582 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
583 goto err;
584 }
585
586 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
587 {
588 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
589 if (blinding == NULL)
590 {
591 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
592 goto err;
593 }
594 }
595
596 if (blinding != NULL)
597 {
598 if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
599 {
600 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
601 goto err;
602 }
603 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
604 goto err;
605 }
606
607 /* do the decrypt */
608 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
609 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
610 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
611 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
612 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
613 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
614 {
615 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
616 }
617 else
618 {
619 BIGNUM local_d;
620 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
621
622 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
623 {
624 d = &local_d;
625 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
626 }
627 else
628 d = rsa->d;
629
630 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
631 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
632 goto err;
633 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
634 rsa->_method_mod_n))
635 goto err;
636 }
637
638 if (blinding)
639 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
640 goto err;
641
642 p=buf;
643 j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
644
645 switch (padding)
646 {
647 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
648 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
649 break;
650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
651 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
652 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
653 break;
654 #endif
655 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
656 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
657 break;
658 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
659 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
660 break;
661 default:
662 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
663 goto err;
664 }
665 if (r < 0)
666 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
667
668 err:
669 if (ctx != NULL)
670 {
671 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
672 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
673 }
674 if (buf != NULL)
675 {
676 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
677 OPENSSL_free(buf);
678 }
679 return(r);
680 }
681
682 /* signature verification */
683 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
684 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
685 {
686 BIGNUM *f,*ret;
687 int i,num=0,r= -1;
688 unsigned char *p;
689 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
690 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
691
692 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
693 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
694 {
695 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
696 goto err;
697 }
698
699 if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
700 && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
701 {
702 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
703 return -1;
704 }
705 #endif
706
707 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
708 {
709 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
710 return -1;
711 }
712
713 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
714 {
715 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
716 return -1;
717 }
718
719 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
720 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
721 {
722 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
723 {
724 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
725 return -1;
726 }
727 }
728
729 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
730 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
731 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
732 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
733 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
734 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
735 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
736 {
737 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
738 goto err;
739 }
740
741 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
742 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
743 if (flen > num)
744 {
745 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
746 goto err;
747 }
748
749 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
750
751 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
752 {
753 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
754 goto err;
755 }
756
757 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
758 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
759 goto err;
760
761 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
762 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
763
764 if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
765 if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err;
766
767 p=buf;
768 i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);
769
770 switch (padding)
771 {
772 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
773 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
774 break;
775 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
776 r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
777 break;
778 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
779 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
780 break;
781 default:
782 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
783 goto err;
784 }
785 if (r < 0)
786 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
787
788 err:
789 if (ctx != NULL)
790 {
791 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
792 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
793 }
794 if (buf != NULL)
795 {
796 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
797 OPENSSL_free(buf);
798 }
799 return(r);
800 }
801
802 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
803 {
804 BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
805 BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
806 BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
807 int ret=0;
808
809 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
810 r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
811 m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
812 vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
813
814 {
815 BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
816 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
817
818 /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
819 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
820 */
821 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
822 {
823 BN_init(&local_p);
824 p = &local_p;
825 BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
826
827 BN_init(&local_q);
828 q = &local_q;
829 BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
830 }
831 else
832 {
833 p = rsa->p;
834 q = rsa->q;
835 }
836
837 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
838 {
839 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
840 goto err;
841 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
842 goto err;
843 }
844 }
845
846 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
847 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
848 goto err;
849
850 /* compute I mod q */
851 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
852 {
853 c = &local_c;
854 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
855 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
856 }
857 else
858 {
859 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
860 }
861
862 /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
863 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
864 {
865 dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
866 BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
867 }
868 else
869 dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
870 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
871 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
872
873 /* compute I mod p */
874 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
875 {
876 c = &local_c;
877 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
878 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
879 }
880 else
881 {
882 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
883 }
884
885 /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
886 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
887 {
888 dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
889 BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
890 }
891 else
892 dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
893 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
894 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
895
896 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
897 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
898 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
899 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
900 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
901
902 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
903
904 /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
905 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
906 {
907 pr1 = &local_r1;
908 BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
909 }
910 else
911 pr1 = r1;
912 if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
913
914 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
915 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
916 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
917 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
918 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
919 * they ensure p > q [steve]
920 */
921 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
922 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
923 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
924 if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
925
926 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
927 {
928 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
929 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
930 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
931 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
932 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
933 if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
934 if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
935 if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
936 if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
937 if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
938 {
939 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
940 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
941 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
942
943 BIGNUM local_d;
944 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
945
946 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
947 {
948 d = &local_d;
949 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
950 }
951 else
952 d = rsa->d;
953 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
954 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
955 }
956 }
957 ret=1;
958 err:
959 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
960 return(ret);
961 }
962
963 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
964 {
965 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
966 if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
967 {
968 FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_INIT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
969 return 0;
970 }
971 #endif
972 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
973 return(1);
974 }
975
976 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
977 {
978 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
979 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
980 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
981 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
982 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
983 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
984 return(1);
985 }
986
987 #endif