1 /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
63 #include <openssl/rand.h>
67 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
68 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
,int padding
);
69 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
70 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
,int padding
);
71 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
72 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
,int padding
);
73 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
74 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
,int padding
);
75 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM
*r0
, const BIGNUM
*i
, RSA
*rsa
, BN_CTX
*ctx
);
76 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA
*rsa
);
77 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA
*rsa
);
78 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth
={
79 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
80 RSA_eay_public_encrypt
,
81 RSA_eay_public_decrypt
, /* signature verification */
82 RSA_eay_private_encrypt
, /* signing */
83 RSA_eay_private_decrypt
,
85 BN_mod_exp_mont
, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
95 const RSA_METHOD
*RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
97 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth
);
101 * MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
103 #define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \
104 if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \
105 !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \
110 static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
111 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
)
114 int i
,j
,k
,num
=0,r
= -1;
115 unsigned char *buf
=NULL
;
118 if ((ctx
=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) goto err
;
121 ret
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
122 num
=BN_num_bytes(rsa
->n
);
123 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(num
);
124 if (!f
|| !ret
|| !buf
)
126 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
132 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
:
133 i
=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf
,num
,from
,flen
);
135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
136 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
:
137 i
=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf
,num
,from
,flen
,NULL
,0);
140 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
:
141 i
=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf
,num
,from
,flen
);
144 i
=RSA_padding_add_none(buf
,num
,from
,flen
);
147 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE
);
150 if (i
<= 0) goto err
;
152 if (BN_bin2bn(buf
,num
,f
) == NULL
) goto err
;
154 if (BN_ucmp(f
, rsa
->n
) >= 0)
156 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
157 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS
);
161 MONT_HELPER(rsa
, ctx
, n
, rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
, goto err
);
163 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(ret
,f
,rsa
->e
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,
164 rsa
->_method_mod_n
)) goto err
;
166 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
167 * length of the modulus */
169 i
=BN_bn2bin(ret
,&(to
[num
-j
]));
170 for (k
=0; k
<(num
-i
); k
++)
182 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf
,num
);
188 static BN_BLINDING
*rsa_get_blinding(RSA
*rsa
, BIGNUM
**r
, int *local
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
192 if (rsa
->blinding
== NULL
)
194 if (rsa
->blinding
== NULL
)
196 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
197 if (rsa
->blinding
== NULL
)
198 rsa
->blinding
= RSA_setup_blinding(rsa
, ctx
);
199 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
207 if (BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(ret
) != CRYPTO_thread_id())
210 if (rsa
->mt_blinding
== NULL
)
212 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
213 if (rsa
->mt_blinding
== NULL
)
214 rsa
->mt_blinding
= RSA_setup_blinding(rsa
, ctx
);
215 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA
);
217 ret
= rsa
->mt_blinding
;
225 static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING
*b
, int local
, BIGNUM
*f
,
226 BIGNUM
*r
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
229 return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f
, NULL
, b
, ctx
);
233 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
);
234 ret
= BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f
, r
, b
, ctx
);
235 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
);
240 static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING
*b
, int local
, BIGNUM
*f
,
241 BIGNUM
*r
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
244 return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f
, NULL
, b
, ctx
);
248 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
);
249 ret
= BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f
, r
, b
, ctx
);
250 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
);
256 static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
257 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
)
259 BIGNUM
*f
, *ret
, *br
;
260 int i
,j
,k
,num
=0,r
= -1;
261 unsigned char *buf
=NULL
;
263 int local_blinding
= 0;
264 BN_BLINDING
*blinding
= NULL
;
266 if ((ctx
=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) goto err
;
269 br
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
270 ret
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
271 num
= BN_num_bytes(rsa
->n
);
272 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(num
);
273 if(!f
|| !ret
|| !buf
)
275 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
281 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
:
282 i
=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf
,num
,from
,flen
);
285 i
=RSA_padding_add_none(buf
,num
,from
,flen
);
287 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
:
289 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE
);
292 if (i
<= 0) goto err
;
294 if (BN_bin2bn(buf
,num
,f
) == NULL
) goto err
;
296 if (BN_ucmp(f
, rsa
->n
) >= 0)
298 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
299 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS
);
303 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING
))
305 blinding
= rsa_get_blinding(rsa
, &br
, &local_blinding
, ctx
);
306 if (blinding
== NULL
)
308 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
313 if (blinding
!= NULL
)
314 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding
, local_blinding
, f
, br
, ctx
))
317 if ( (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY
) ||
320 (rsa
->dmp1
!= NULL
) &&
321 (rsa
->dmq1
!= NULL
) &&
322 (rsa
->iqmp
!= NULL
)) )
323 { if (!rsa
->meth
->rsa_mod_exp(ret
,f
,rsa
,ctx
)) goto err
; }
326 MONT_HELPER(rsa
, ctx
, n
, rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
, goto err
);
327 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(ret
,f
,rsa
->d
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,
328 rsa
->_method_mod_n
)) goto err
;
332 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding
, local_blinding
, ret
, br
, ctx
))
335 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
336 * length of the modulus */
338 i
=BN_bn2bin(ret
,&(to
[num
-j
]));
339 for (k
=0; k
<(num
-i
); k
++)
351 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf
,num
);
357 static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
358 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
)
360 BIGNUM
*f
, *ret
, *br
;
363 unsigned char *buf
=NULL
;
365 int local_blinding
= 0;
366 BN_BLINDING
*blinding
= NULL
;
368 if((ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) goto err
;
371 br
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
372 ret
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
373 num
= BN_num_bytes(rsa
->n
);
374 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(num
);
375 if(!f
|| !ret
|| !buf
)
377 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
381 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
382 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
385 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN
);
389 /* make data into a big number */
390 if (BN_bin2bn(from
,(int)flen
,f
) == NULL
) goto err
;
392 if (BN_ucmp(f
, rsa
->n
) >= 0)
394 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS
);
398 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING
))
400 blinding
= rsa_get_blinding(rsa
, &br
, &local_blinding
, ctx
);
401 if (blinding
== NULL
)
403 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
408 if (blinding
!= NULL
)
409 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding
, local_blinding
, f
, br
, ctx
))
413 if ( (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY
) ||
416 (rsa
->dmp1
!= NULL
) &&
417 (rsa
->dmq1
!= NULL
) &&
418 (rsa
->iqmp
!= NULL
)) )
419 { if (!rsa
->meth
->rsa_mod_exp(ret
,f
,rsa
,ctx
)) goto err
; }
422 MONT_HELPER(rsa
, ctx
, n
, rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
, goto err
);
423 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(ret
,f
,rsa
->d
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,
429 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding
, local_blinding
, ret
, br
, ctx
))
433 j
=BN_bn2bin(ret
,p
); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
437 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
:
438 r
=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to
,num
,buf
,j
,num
);
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
441 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
:
442 r
=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to
,num
,buf
,j
,num
,NULL
,0);
445 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
:
446 r
=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to
,num
,buf
,j
,num
);
449 r
=RSA_padding_check_none(to
,num
,buf
,j
,num
);
452 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE
);
456 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED
);
466 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf
,num
);
472 /* signature verification */
473 static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
474 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
)
479 unsigned char *buf
=NULL
;
482 if((ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) goto err
;
485 ret
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
486 num
=BN_num_bytes(rsa
->n
);
487 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(num
);
488 if(!f
|| !ret
|| !buf
)
490 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
494 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
495 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
498 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN
);
502 if (BN_bin2bn(from
,flen
,f
) == NULL
) goto err
;
504 if (BN_ucmp(f
, rsa
->n
) >= 0)
506 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS
);
510 MONT_HELPER(rsa
, ctx
, n
, rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
, goto err
);
512 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(ret
,f
,rsa
->e
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,
513 rsa
->_method_mod_n
)) goto err
;
520 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
:
521 r
=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to
,num
,buf
,i
,num
);
524 r
=RSA_padding_check_none(to
,num
,buf
,i
,num
);
527 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE
);
531 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED
);
541 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf
,num
);
547 static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM
*r0
, const BIGNUM
*I
, RSA
*rsa
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
549 BIGNUM
*r1
,*m1
,*vrfy
;
553 r1
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
554 m1
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
555 vrfy
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
557 MONT_HELPER(rsa
, ctx
, p
, rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE
, goto err
);
558 MONT_HELPER(rsa
, ctx
, q
, rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE
, goto err
);
559 MONT_HELPER(rsa
, ctx
, n
, rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
, goto err
);
561 if (!BN_mod(r1
,I
,rsa
->q
,ctx
)) goto err
;
562 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(m1
,r1
,rsa
->dmq1
,rsa
->q
,ctx
,
563 rsa
->_method_mod_q
)) goto err
;
565 if (!BN_mod(r1
,I
,rsa
->p
,ctx
)) goto err
;
566 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(r0
,r1
,rsa
->dmp1
,rsa
->p
,ctx
,
567 rsa
->_method_mod_p
)) goto err
;
569 if (!BN_sub(r0
,r0
,m1
)) goto err
;
570 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
571 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
572 if (BN_is_negative(r0
))
573 if (!BN_add(r0
,r0
,rsa
->p
)) goto err
;
575 if (!BN_mul(r1
,r0
,rsa
->iqmp
,ctx
)) goto err
;
576 if (!BN_mod(r0
,r1
,rsa
->p
,ctx
)) goto err
;
577 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
578 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
579 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
580 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
581 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
582 * they ensure p > q [steve]
584 if (BN_is_negative(r0
))
585 if (!BN_add(r0
,r0
,rsa
->p
)) goto err
;
586 if (!BN_mul(r1
,r0
,rsa
->q
,ctx
)) goto err
;
587 if (!BN_add(r0
,r1
,m1
)) goto err
;
589 if (rsa
->e
&& rsa
->n
)
591 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(vrfy
,r0
,rsa
->e
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,rsa
->_method_mod_n
)) goto err
;
592 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
593 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
594 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
595 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
596 if (!BN_sub(vrfy
, vrfy
, I
)) goto err
;
597 if (!BN_mod(vrfy
, vrfy
, rsa
->n
, ctx
)) goto err
;
598 if (BN_is_negative(vrfy
))
599 if (!BN_add(vrfy
, vrfy
, rsa
->n
)) goto err
;
600 if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy
))
601 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
602 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
603 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
604 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(r0
,I
,rsa
->d
,rsa
->n
,ctx
,
605 rsa
->_method_mod_n
)) goto err
;
613 static int RSA_eay_init(RSA
*rsa
)
615 rsa
->flags
|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE
;
619 static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA
*rsa
)
621 if (rsa
->_method_mod_n
!= NULL
)
622 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa
->_method_mod_n
);
623 if (rsa
->_method_mod_p
!= NULL
)
624 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa
->_method_mod_p
);
625 if (rsa
->_method_mod_q
!= NULL
)
626 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa
->_method_mod_q
);