1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
112 #include "internal/bn_int.h"
113 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
114 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
119 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
);
120 static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
121 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
);
122 static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
123 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
);
124 static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
125 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
);
126 static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM
*r0
, const BIGNUM
*i
, RSA
*rsa
,
128 static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA
*rsa
);
129 static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA
*rsa
);
130 static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth
= {
131 "OpenSSL PKCS#1 RSA (from Eric Young)",
132 rsa_ossl_public_encrypt
,
133 rsa_ossl_public_decrypt
, /* signature verification */
134 rsa_ossl_private_encrypt
, /* signing */
135 rsa_ossl_private_decrypt
,
137 BN_mod_exp_mont
, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery
141 RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD
, /* flags */
145 NULL
/* rsa_keygen */
148 const RSA_METHOD
*RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void)
150 return &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth
;
153 static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
154 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
)
157 int i
, j
, k
, num
= 0, r
= -1;
158 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
161 if (BN_num_bits(rsa
->n
) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
) {
162 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
);
166 if (BN_ucmp(rsa
->n
, rsa
->e
) <= 0) {
167 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE
);
171 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
172 if (BN_num_bits(rsa
->n
) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS
) {
173 if (BN_num_bits(rsa
->e
) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS
) {
174 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE
);
179 if ((ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
183 ret
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
184 num
= BN_num_bytes(rsa
->n
);
185 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(num
);
186 if (f
== NULL
|| ret
== NULL
|| buf
== NULL
) {
187 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
192 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
:
193 i
= RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf
, num
, from
, flen
);
195 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
:
196 i
= RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf
, num
, from
, flen
, NULL
, 0);
198 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
:
199 i
= RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf
, num
, from
, flen
);
202 i
= RSA_padding_add_none(buf
, num
, from
, flen
);
205 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE
);
211 if (BN_bin2bn(buf
, num
, f
) == NULL
)
214 if (BN_ucmp(f
, rsa
->n
) >= 0) {
215 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
216 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT
,
217 RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS
);
221 if (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
)
222 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
223 (&rsa
->_method_mod_n
, rsa
->lock
, rsa
->n
, ctx
))
226 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(ret
, f
, rsa
->e
, rsa
->n
, ctx
,
231 * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
234 j
= BN_num_bytes(ret
);
235 i
= BN_bn2bin(ret
, &(to
[num
- j
]));
236 for (k
= 0; k
< (num
- i
); k
++)
244 OPENSSL_clear_free(buf
, num
);
248 static BN_BLINDING
*rsa_get_blinding(RSA
*rsa
, int *local
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
253 CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rsa
->lock
);
255 if (rsa
->blinding
== NULL
) {
256 rsa
->blinding
= RSA_setup_blinding(rsa
, ctx
);
263 CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur
);
264 if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur
, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret
))) {
265 /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
269 /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
272 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the
273 * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and
274 * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING
278 if (rsa
->mt_blinding
== NULL
) {
279 rsa
->mt_blinding
= RSA_setup_blinding(rsa
, ctx
);
281 ret
= rsa
->mt_blinding
;
285 CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rsa
->lock
);
289 static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING
*b
, BIGNUM
*f
, BIGNUM
*unblind
,
294 * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING.
296 return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f
, NULL
, b
, ctx
);
299 * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING.
302 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
);
303 ret
= BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f
, unblind
, b
, ctx
);
304 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING
);
309 static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING
*b
, BIGNUM
*f
, BIGNUM
*unblind
,
313 * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
314 * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING
315 * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
316 * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and
317 * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe
318 * to access the blinding without a lock.
320 return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f
, unblind
, b
, ctx
);
324 static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
325 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
)
327 BIGNUM
*f
, *ret
, *res
;
328 int i
, j
, k
, num
= 0, r
= -1;
329 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
331 int local_blinding
= 0;
333 * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
334 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
335 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
337 BIGNUM
*unblind
= NULL
;
338 BN_BLINDING
*blinding
= NULL
;
340 if ((ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
344 ret
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
345 num
= BN_num_bytes(rsa
->n
);
346 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(num
);
347 if (f
== NULL
|| ret
== NULL
|| buf
== NULL
) {
348 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
353 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
:
354 i
= RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf
, num
, from
, flen
);
356 case RSA_X931_PADDING
:
357 i
= RSA_padding_add_X931(buf
, num
, from
, flen
);
360 i
= RSA_padding_add_none(buf
, num
, from
, flen
);
362 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
:
364 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE
);
370 if (BN_bin2bn(buf
, num
, f
) == NULL
)
373 if (BN_ucmp(f
, rsa
->n
) >= 0) {
374 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
375 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
,
376 RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS
);
380 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING
)) {
381 blinding
= rsa_get_blinding(rsa
, &local_blinding
, ctx
);
382 if (blinding
== NULL
) {
383 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
388 if (blinding
!= NULL
) {
389 if (!local_blinding
&& ((unblind
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
)) == NULL
)) {
390 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
393 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding
, f
, unblind
, ctx
))
397 if ((rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY
) ||
400 (rsa
->dmp1
!= NULL
) && (rsa
->dmq1
!= NULL
) && (rsa
->iqmp
!= NULL
))) {
401 if (!rsa
->meth
->rsa_mod_exp(ret
, f
, rsa
, ctx
))
404 BIGNUM
*d
= NULL
, *local_d
= NULL
;
406 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME
)) {
407 local_d
= d
= BN_new();
409 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
412 BN_with_flags(d
, rsa
->d
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
417 if (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
)
418 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
419 (&rsa
->_method_mod_n
, rsa
->lock
, rsa
->n
, ctx
)) {
424 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(ret
, f
, d
, rsa
->n
, ctx
,
425 rsa
->_method_mod_n
)) {
429 /* We MUST free local_d before any further use of rsa->d */
434 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding
, ret
, unblind
, ctx
))
437 if (padding
== RSA_X931_PADDING
) {
438 BN_sub(f
, rsa
->n
, ret
);
439 if (BN_cmp(ret
, f
) > 0)
447 * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
450 j
= BN_num_bytes(res
);
451 i
= BN_bn2bin(res
, &(to
[num
- j
]));
452 for (k
= 0; k
< (num
- i
); k
++)
460 OPENSSL_clear_free(buf
, num
);
464 static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
465 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
)
468 int j
, num
= 0, r
= -1;
470 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
472 int local_blinding
= 0;
474 * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
475 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
476 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
478 BIGNUM
*unblind
= NULL
;
479 BN_BLINDING
*blinding
= NULL
;
481 if ((ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
485 ret
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
486 num
= BN_num_bytes(rsa
->n
);
487 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(num
);
488 if (f
== NULL
|| ret
== NULL
|| buf
== NULL
) {
489 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
494 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
498 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
,
499 RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN
);
503 /* make data into a big number */
504 if (BN_bin2bn(from
, (int)flen
, f
) == NULL
)
507 if (BN_ucmp(f
, rsa
->n
) >= 0) {
508 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
,
509 RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS
);
513 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING
)) {
514 blinding
= rsa_get_blinding(rsa
, &local_blinding
, ctx
);
515 if (blinding
== NULL
) {
516 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
521 if (blinding
!= NULL
) {
522 if (!local_blinding
&& ((unblind
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
)) == NULL
)) {
523 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
526 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding
, f
, unblind
, ctx
))
531 if ((rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY
) ||
534 (rsa
->dmp1
!= NULL
) && (rsa
->dmq1
!= NULL
) && (rsa
->iqmp
!= NULL
))) {
535 if (!rsa
->meth
->rsa_mod_exp(ret
, f
, rsa
, ctx
))
538 BIGNUM
*d
= NULL
, *local_d
= NULL
;
540 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME
)) {
541 local_d
= d
= BN_new();
543 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
546 BN_with_flags(d
, rsa
->d
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
551 if (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
)
552 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
553 (&rsa
->_method_mod_n
, rsa
->lock
, rsa
->n
, ctx
)) {
557 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(ret
, f
, d
, rsa
->n
, ctx
,
558 rsa
->_method_mod_n
)) {
562 /* We MUST free local_d before any further use of rsa->d */
567 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding
, ret
, unblind
, ctx
))
571 j
= BN_bn2bin(ret
, p
); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
574 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
:
575 r
= RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to
, num
, buf
, j
, num
);
577 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING
:
578 r
= RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to
, num
, buf
, j
, num
, NULL
, 0);
580 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
:
581 r
= RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to
, num
, buf
, j
, num
);
584 r
= RSA_padding_check_none(to
, num
, buf
, j
, num
);
587 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE
);
591 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT
, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED
);
597 OPENSSL_clear_free(buf
, num
);
601 /* signature verification */
602 static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen
, const unsigned char *from
,
603 unsigned char *to
, RSA
*rsa
, int padding
)
606 int i
, num
= 0, r
= -1;
608 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
611 if (BN_num_bits(rsa
->n
) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
) {
612 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE
);
616 if (BN_ucmp(rsa
->n
, rsa
->e
) <= 0) {
617 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE
);
621 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
622 if (BN_num_bits(rsa
->n
) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS
) {
623 if (BN_num_bits(rsa
->e
) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS
) {
624 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE
);
629 if ((ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
633 ret
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
634 num
= BN_num_bytes(rsa
->n
);
635 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(num
);
636 if (f
== NULL
|| ret
== NULL
|| buf
== NULL
) {
637 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
642 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
646 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN
);
650 if (BN_bin2bn(from
, flen
, f
) == NULL
)
653 if (BN_ucmp(f
, rsa
->n
) >= 0) {
654 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
,
655 RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS
);
659 if (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
)
660 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
661 (&rsa
->_method_mod_n
, rsa
->lock
, rsa
->n
, ctx
))
664 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(ret
, f
, rsa
->e
, rsa
->n
, ctx
,
668 if ((padding
== RSA_X931_PADDING
) && ((bn_get_words(ret
)[0] & 0xf) != 12))
669 if (!BN_sub(ret
, rsa
->n
, ret
))
673 i
= BN_bn2bin(ret
, p
);
676 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
:
677 r
= RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to
, num
, buf
, i
, num
);
679 case RSA_X931_PADDING
:
680 r
= RSA_padding_check_X931(to
, num
, buf
, i
, num
);
683 r
= RSA_padding_check_none(to
, num
, buf
, i
, num
);
686 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE
);
690 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED
);
696 OPENSSL_clear_free(buf
, num
);
700 static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM
*r0
, const BIGNUM
*I
, RSA
*rsa
, BN_CTX
*ctx
)
702 BIGNUM
*r1
, *m1
, *vrfy
;
707 r1
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
708 m1
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
709 vrfy
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
712 BIGNUM
*local_p
= NULL
, *local_q
= NULL
;
713 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *q
= NULL
;
716 * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery initialization uses the
717 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
719 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME
)) {
720 local_p
= p
= BN_new();
723 BN_with_flags(p
, rsa
->p
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
725 local_q
= q
= BN_new();
730 BN_with_flags(q
, rsa
->q
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
736 if (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE
) {
737 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
738 (&rsa
->_method_mod_p
, rsa
->lock
, p
, ctx
)
739 || !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa
->_method_mod_q
,
740 rsa
->lock
, q
, ctx
)) {
747 * We MUST free local_p and local_q before any further use of rsa->p and
754 if (rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
)
755 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
756 (&rsa
->_method_mod_n
, rsa
->lock
, rsa
->n
, ctx
))
759 /* compute I mod q */
761 BIGNUM
*local_c
= NULL
;
763 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME
)) {
767 BN_with_flags(local_c
, I
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
772 if (!BN_mod(r1
, c
, rsa
->q
, ctx
)) {
778 BIGNUM
*local_dmq1
= NULL
, *dmq1
;
779 /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
780 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME
)) {
781 dmq1
= local_dmq1
= BN_new();
782 if (local_dmq1
== NULL
) {
786 BN_with_flags(dmq1
, rsa
->dmq1
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
790 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(m1
, r1
, dmq1
, rsa
->q
, ctx
,
791 rsa
->_method_mod_q
)) {
796 /* We MUST free local_dmq1 before any further use of rsa->dmq1 */
800 /* compute I mod p */
801 if (!BN_mod(r1
, c
, rsa
->p
, ctx
)) {
805 /* We MUST free local_c before any further use of I */
810 BIGNUM
*local_dmp1
= NULL
, *dmp1
;
811 /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
812 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME
)) {
813 dmp1
= local_dmp1
= BN_new();
814 if (local_dmp1
== NULL
)
816 BN_with_flags(dmp1
, rsa
->dmp1
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
820 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(r0
, r1
, dmp1
, rsa
->p
, ctx
,
821 rsa
->_method_mod_p
)) {
825 /* We MUST free local_dmp1 before any further use of rsa->dmp1 */
829 if (!BN_sub(r0
, r0
, m1
))
832 * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the
833 * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
835 if (BN_is_negative(r0
))
836 if (!BN_add(r0
, r0
, rsa
->p
))
839 if (!BN_mul(r1
, r0
, rsa
->iqmp
, ctx
))
843 BIGNUM
*local_r1
= NULL
, *pr1
;
844 /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
845 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME
)) {
846 pr1
= local_r1
= BN_new();
847 if (local_r1
== NULL
)
849 BN_with_flags(pr1
, r1
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
853 if (!BN_mod(r0
, pr1
, rsa
->p
, ctx
)) {
857 /* We MUST free local_r1 before any further use of r1 */
862 * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p'
863 * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can
864 * break the private key operations: the following second correction
865 * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen
866 * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve]
868 if (BN_is_negative(r0
))
869 if (!BN_add(r0
, r0
, rsa
->p
))
871 if (!BN_mul(r1
, r0
, rsa
->q
, ctx
))
873 if (!BN_add(r0
, r1
, m1
))
876 if (rsa
->e
&& rsa
->n
) {
877 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(vrfy
, r0
, rsa
->e
, rsa
->n
, ctx
,
881 * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
882 * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
883 * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for
884 * absolute equality, just congruency.
886 if (!BN_sub(vrfy
, vrfy
, I
))
888 if (!BN_mod(vrfy
, vrfy
, rsa
->n
, ctx
))
890 if (BN_is_negative(vrfy
))
891 if (!BN_add(vrfy
, vrfy
, rsa
->n
))
893 if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy
)) {
895 * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
896 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and
897 * return that instead.
900 BIGNUM
*local_d
= NULL
;
903 if (!(rsa
->flags
& RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME
)) {
904 local_d
= d
= BN_new();
907 BN_with_flags(d
, rsa
->d
, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
);
911 if (!rsa
->meth
->bn_mod_exp(r0
, I
, d
, rsa
->n
, ctx
,
912 rsa
->_method_mod_n
)) {
916 /* We MUST free local_d before any further use of rsa->d */
926 static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA
*rsa
)
928 rsa
->flags
|= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC
| RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE
;
932 static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA
*rsa
)
934 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa
->_method_mod_n
);
935 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa
->_method_mod_p
);
936 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa
->_method_mod_q
);