2 * Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
12 #include "internal/numbers.h"
13 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
14 #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
15 #include "crypto/x509.h"
16 #include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
17 #include "x509_local.h"
19 static int check_ssl_ca(const X509
*x
);
20 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
22 static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
24 static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
26 static int purpose_smime(const X509
*x
, int require_ca
);
27 static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
29 static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
31 static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
33 static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
35 static int check_purpose_code_sign(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
37 static int no_check_purpose(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
39 static int check_purpose_ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
42 static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE
*const *a
, const X509_PURPOSE
*const *b
);
43 static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE
*p
);
45 static X509_PURPOSE xstandard
[] = {
46 {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT
, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT
, 0,
47 check_purpose_ssl_client
, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL
},
48 {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER
, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER
, 0,
49 check_purpose_ssl_server
, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL
},
50 {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER
, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER
, 0,
51 check_purpose_ns_ssl_server
, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL
},
52 {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN
, X509_TRUST_EMAIL
, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign
,
53 "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL
},
54 {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT
, X509_TRUST_EMAIL
, 0,
55 check_purpose_smime_encrypt
, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL
},
56 {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
, X509_TRUST_COMPAT
, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign
,
57 "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL
},
58 {X509_PURPOSE_ANY
, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
, 0, no_check_purpose
,
61 {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER
, X509_TRUST_COMPAT
, 0, check_purpose_ocsp_helper
,
62 "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL
},
63 {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN
, X509_TRUST_TSA
, 0,
64 check_purpose_timestamp_sign
, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign",
66 {X509_PURPOSE_CODE_SIGN
, X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN
, 0,
67 check_purpose_code_sign
, "Code signing", "codesign",
71 #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT OSSL_NELEM(xstandard)
73 static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE
) *xptable
= NULL
;
75 static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE
*const *a
, const X509_PURPOSE
*const *b
)
77 return (*a
)->purpose
- (*b
)->purpose
;
81 * As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I really
82 * can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const things.
83 * If id == -1 it just calls x509v3_cache_extensions() for its side-effect.
84 * Returns 1 on success, 0 if x does not allow purpose, -1 on (internal) error.
86 int X509_check_purpose(X509
*x
, int id
, int require_ca
)
89 const X509_PURPOSE
*pt
;
91 if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(x
))
96 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id
);
99 pt
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
100 return pt
->check_purpose(pt
, x
, require_ca
);
103 int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p
, int purpose
)
105 if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
) == -1) {
106 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3
, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE
);
113 int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
116 return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT
;
117 return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable
) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT
;
120 X509_PURPOSE
*X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx
)
124 if (idx
< (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT
)
125 return xstandard
+ idx
;
126 return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable
, idx
- X509_PURPOSE_COUNT
);
129 int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname
)
134 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i
++) {
135 xptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(i
);
136 if (strcmp(xptmp
->sname
, sname
) == 0)
142 /* Returns -1 on error, else an index => 0 in standard/extended purpose table */
143 int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose
)
148 if (purpose
>= X509_PURPOSE_MIN
&& purpose
<= X509_PURPOSE_MAX
)
149 return purpose
- X509_PURPOSE_MIN
;
152 tmp
.purpose
= purpose
;
153 idx
= sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable
, &tmp
);
156 return idx
+ X509_PURPOSE_COUNT
;
159 int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id
, int trust
, int flags
,
160 int (*ck
) (const X509_PURPOSE
*, const X509
*, int),
161 const char *name
, const char *sname
, void *arg
)
166 /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
167 flags
&= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC
;
168 /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
169 flags
|= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME
;
170 /* Get existing entry if any */
171 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id
);
172 /* Need a new entry */
174 if ((ptmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ptmp
))) == NULL
)
176 ptmp
->flags
= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC
;
178 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
181 /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
182 if ((ptmp
->flags
& X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME
) != 0) {
183 OPENSSL_free(ptmp
->name
);
184 OPENSSL_free(ptmp
->sname
);
186 /* Dup supplied name */
187 ptmp
->name
= OPENSSL_strdup(name
);
188 ptmp
->sname
= OPENSSL_strdup(sname
);
189 if (ptmp
->name
== NULL
|| ptmp
->sname
== NULL
)
191 /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
192 ptmp
->flags
&= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC
;
193 /* Set all other flags */
194 ptmp
->flags
|= flags
;
198 ptmp
->check_purpose
= ck
;
199 ptmp
->usr_data
= arg
;
201 /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
204 && (xptable
= sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
205 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
208 if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable
, ptmp
)) {
209 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509V3
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
216 OPENSSL_free(ptmp
->name
);
217 OPENSSL_free(ptmp
->sname
);
223 static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE
*p
)
227 if ((p
->flags
& X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC
) != 0) {
228 if ((p
->flags
& X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME
) != 0) {
229 OPENSSL_free(p
->name
);
230 OPENSSL_free(p
->sname
);
236 void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
238 sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable
, xptable_free
);
242 int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
)
247 char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
)
252 char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
)
257 int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
)
262 static int nid_cmp(const int *a
, const int *b
)
267 DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid
);
268 IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid
);
270 int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION
*ex
)
273 * This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is
274 * those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is
275 * critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will
276 * normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
277 * order because it will be searched using bsearch.
279 static const int supported_nids
[] = {
280 NID_netscape_cert_type
, /* 71 */
281 NID_key_usage
, /* 83 */
282 NID_subject_alt_name
, /* 85 */
283 NID_basic_constraints
, /* 87 */
284 NID_certificate_policies
, /* 89 */
285 NID_crl_distribution_points
, /* 103 */
286 NID_ext_key_usage
, /* 126 */
287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
288 NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock
, /* 290 */
289 NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum
, /* 291 */
291 NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck
, /* 369 */
292 NID_policy_constraints
, /* 401 */
293 NID_proxyCertInfo
, /* 663 */
294 NID_name_constraints
, /* 666 */
295 NID_policy_mappings
, /* 747 */
296 NID_inhibit_any_policy
/* 748 */
299 int ex_nid
= OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex
));
301 if (ex_nid
== NID_undef
)
304 if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid
, supported_nids
, OSSL_NELEM(supported_nids
)))
309 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error. */
310 static int setup_dp(const X509
*x
, DIST_POINT
*dp
)
312 const X509_NAME
*iname
= NULL
;
315 if (dp
->distpoint
== NULL
&& sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
) <= 0) {
316 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_INVALID_DISTPOINT
);
319 if (dp
->reasons
!= NULL
) {
320 if (dp
->reasons
->length
> 0)
321 dp
->dp_reasons
= dp
->reasons
->data
[0];
322 if (dp
->reasons
->length
> 1)
323 dp
->dp_reasons
|= (dp
->reasons
->data
[1] << 8);
324 dp
->dp_reasons
&= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
;
326 dp
->dp_reasons
= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
;
328 if (dp
->distpoint
== NULL
|| dp
->distpoint
->type
!= 1)
331 /* Handle name fragment given by nameRelativeToCRLIssuer */
333 * Note that the below way of determining iname is not really compliant
334 * with https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.13
335 * According to it, sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer) MUST be <= 1
336 * and any CRLissuer could be of type different to GEN_DIRNAME.
338 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
339 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
341 if (gen
->type
== GEN_DIRNAME
) {
342 iname
= gen
->d
.directoryName
;
347 iname
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
348 return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp
->distpoint
, iname
) ? 1 : -1;
351 /* Return 1 on success, 0 if x is invalid, -1 on (internal) error. */
352 static int setup_crldp(X509
*x
)
356 x
->crldp
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_crl_distribution_points
, &i
, NULL
);
357 if (x
->crldp
== NULL
&& i
!= -1)
360 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
361 int res
= setup_dp(x
, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
));
369 /* Check that issuer public key algorithm matches subject signature algorithm */
370 static int check_sig_alg_match(const EVP_PKEY
*issuer_key
, const X509
*subject
)
374 if (issuer_key
== NULL
)
375 return X509_V_ERR_NO_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
376 if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(subject
->cert_info
.signature
.algorithm
),
377 NULL
, &subj_sig_nid
) == 0)
378 return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
;
379 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(issuer_key
, OBJ_nid2sn(subj_sig_nid
))
380 || (EVP_PKEY_is_a(issuer_key
, "RSA") && subj_sig_nid
== NID_rsassaPss
))
382 return X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH
;
385 #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1 | EXFLAG_SS)
386 #define ku_reject(x, usage) \
387 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 && ((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)) == 0)
388 #define xku_reject(x, usage) \
389 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) != 0 && ((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)) == 0)
390 #define ns_reject(x, usage) \
391 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) != 0 && ((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)) == 0)
394 * Cache info on various X.509v3 extensions and further derived information,
395 * e.g., if cert 'x' is self-issued, in x->ex_flags and other internal fields.
396 * x->sha1_hash is filled in, or else EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT is set in x->flags.
397 * X509_SIG_INFO_VALID is set in x->flags if x->siginf was filled successfully.
398 * Set EXFLAG_INVALID and return 0 in case the certificate is invalid.
400 int ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(X509
*x
)
402 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
*bs
;
403 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION
*pci
;
404 ASN1_BIT_STRING
*usage
;
406 EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE
*extusage
;
411 /* Fast lock-free check, see end of the function for details. */
412 if (tsan_ld_acq((TSAN_QUALIFIER
int *)&x
->ex_cached
))
413 return (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID
) == 0;
416 if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x
->lock
))
418 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SET
) != 0) { /* Cert has already been processed */
419 CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x
->lock
);
420 return (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID
) == 0;
425 /* Cache the SHA1 digest of the cert */
426 if (!X509_digest(x
, EVP_sha1(), x
->sha1_hash
, NULL
))
427 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT
;
429 /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
430 if (X509_get_version(x
) == X509_VERSION_1
)
431 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_V1
;
433 /* Handle basic constraints */
435 if ((bs
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_basic_constraints
, &i
, NULL
)) != NULL
) {
437 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_CA
;
438 if (bs
->pathlen
!= NULL
) {
440 * The error case !bs->ca is checked by check_chain()
441 * in case ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
443 if (bs
->pathlen
->type
== V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER
) {
444 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509V3_R_NEGATIVE_PATHLEN
);
445 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
447 x
->ex_pathlen
= ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs
->pathlen
);
450 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs
);
451 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_BCONS
;
452 } else if (i
!= -1) {
453 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
456 /* Handle proxy certificates */
457 if ((pci
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_proxyCertInfo
, &i
, NULL
)) != NULL
) {
458 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0
459 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x
, NID_subject_alt_name
, -1) >= 0
460 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x
, NID_issuer_alt_name
, -1) >= 0) {
461 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
463 if (pci
->pcPathLengthConstraint
!= NULL
)
464 x
->ex_pcpathlen
= ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci
->pcPathLengthConstraint
);
466 x
->ex_pcpathlen
= -1;
467 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci
);
468 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_PROXY
;
469 } else if (i
!= -1) {
470 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
473 /* Handle (basic) key usage */
474 if ((usage
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_key_usage
, &i
, NULL
)) != NULL
) {
476 if (usage
->length
> 0) {
477 x
->ex_kusage
= usage
->data
[0];
478 if (usage
->length
> 1)
479 x
->ex_kusage
|= usage
->data
[1] << 8;
481 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_KUSAGE
;
482 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage
);
483 /* Check for empty key usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */
484 if (x
->ex_kusage
== 0) {
485 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509V3_R_EMPTY_KEY_USAGE
);
486 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
488 } else if (i
!= -1) {
489 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
492 /* Handle extended key usage */
494 if ((extusage
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_ext_key_usage
, &i
, NULL
)) != NULL
) {
495 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE
;
496 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage
); i
++) {
497 switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage
, i
))) {
498 case NID_server_auth
:
499 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_SSL_SERVER
;
501 case NID_client_auth
:
502 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_SSL_CLIENT
;
504 case NID_email_protect
:
505 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_SMIME
;
508 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_CODE_SIGN
;
512 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_SGC
;
515 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_OCSP_SIGN
;
518 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_TIMESTAMP
;
521 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_DVCS
;
523 case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage
:
524 x
->ex_xkusage
|= XKU_ANYEKU
;
527 /* Ignore unknown extended key usage */
531 sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage
, ASN1_OBJECT_free
);
532 } else if (i
!= -1) {
533 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
536 /* Handle legacy Netscape extension */
537 if ((ns
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_netscape_cert_type
, &i
, NULL
)) != NULL
) {
539 x
->ex_nscert
= ns
->data
[0];
542 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_NSCERT
;
543 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns
);
544 } else if (i
!= -1) {
545 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
548 /* Handle subject key identifier and issuer/authority key identifier */
549 x
->skid
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_subject_key_identifier
, &i
, NULL
);
550 if (x
->skid
== NULL
&& i
!= -1)
551 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
553 x
->akid
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_authority_key_identifier
, &i
, NULL
);
554 if (x
->akid
== NULL
&& i
!= -1)
555 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
557 /* Check if subject name matches issuer */
558 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x
), X509_get_issuer_name(x
)) == 0) {
559 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_SI
; /* Cert is self-issued */
560 if (X509_check_akid(x
, x
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
/* SKID matches AKID */
561 /* .. and the signature alg matches the PUBKEY alg: */
562 && check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(x
), x
) == X509_V_OK
)
563 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_SS
; /* indicate self-signed */
564 /* This is very related to ossl_x509_likely_issued(x, x) == X509_V_OK */
567 /* Handle subject alternative names and various other extensions */
568 x
->altname
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_subject_alt_name
, &i
, NULL
);
569 if (x
->altname
== NULL
&& i
!= -1)
570 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
571 x
->nc
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_name_constraints
, &i
, NULL
);
572 if (x
->nc
== NULL
&& i
!= -1)
573 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
575 /* Handle CRL distribution point entries */
576 res
= setup_crldp(x
);
578 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
581 x
->rfc3779_addr
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock
, &i
, NULL
);
582 if (x
->rfc3779_addr
== NULL
&& i
!= -1)
583 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
584 x
->rfc3779_asid
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum
, &i
, NULL
);
585 if (x
->rfc3779_asid
== NULL
&& i
!= -1)
586 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_INVALID
;
588 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_get_ext_count(x
); i
++) {
589 X509_EXTENSION
*ex
= X509_get_ext(x
, i
);
590 int nid
= OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex
));
592 if (nid
== NID_freshest_crl
)
593 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_FRESHEST
;
594 if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex
))
596 if (!X509_supported_extension(ex
)) {
597 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_CRITICAL
;
601 case NID_basic_constraints
:
602 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL
;
604 case NID_authority_key_identifier
:
605 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL
;
607 case NID_subject_key_identifier
:
608 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL
;
610 case NID_subject_alt_name
:
611 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL
;
618 /* Set x->siginf, ignoring errors due to unsupported algos */
619 (void)ossl_x509_init_sig_info(x
);
621 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_SET
; /* Indicate that cert has been processed */
623 tsan_st_rel((TSAN_QUALIFIER
int *)&x
->ex_cached
, 1);
625 * Above store triggers fast lock-free check in the beginning of the
626 * function. But one has to ensure that the structure is "stable", i.e.
627 * all stores are visible on all processors. Hence the release fence.
632 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID
) == 0) {
633 CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x
->lock
);
636 CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x
->lock
);
637 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509V3_R_INVALID_CERTIFICATE
);
642 * CA checks common to all purposes
646 * 2 Only possible in older versions of openSSL when basicConstraints are absent
647 * new versions will not return this value. May be a CA
648 * 3 basicConstraints absent but self-signed V1.
649 * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
650 * 5 Netscape specific CA Flags present
653 static int check_ca(const X509
*x
)
655 /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
656 if (ku_reject(x
, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
))
658 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_BCONS
) != 0) {
659 /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
660 return (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0;
662 /* We support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
663 if ((x
->ex_flags
& V1_ROOT
) == V1_ROOT
)
666 * If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it
668 else if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) != 0)
670 /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
671 else if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_NSCERT
) != 0
672 && (x
->ex_nscert
& NS_ANY_CA
) != 0)
674 /* Can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it. */
679 void X509_set_proxy_flag(X509
*x
)
681 if (CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(x
->lock
)) {
682 x
->ex_flags
|= EXFLAG_PROXY
;
683 CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(x
->lock
);
687 void X509_set_proxy_pathlen(X509
*x
, long l
)
692 int X509_check_ca(X509
*x
)
694 /* Note 0 normally means "not a CA" - but in this case means error. */
695 if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(x
))
701 /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server. */
702 static int check_ssl_ca(const X509
*x
)
704 int ca_ret
= check_ca(x
);
708 /* Check nsCertType if present */
709 return ca_ret
!= 5 || (x
->ex_nscert
& NS_SSL_CA
) != 0;
712 static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
715 if (xku_reject(x
, XKU_SSL_CLIENT
))
718 return check_ssl_ca(x
);
719 /* We need to do digital signatures or key agreement */
720 if (ku_reject(x
, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
| KU_KEY_AGREEMENT
))
722 /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
723 if (ns_reject(x
, NS_SSL_CLIENT
))
729 * Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
730 * key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
734 KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT
736 static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
739 if (xku_reject(x
, XKU_SSL_SERVER
| XKU_SGC
))
742 return check_ssl_ca(x
);
744 if (ns_reject(x
, NS_SSL_SERVER
))
746 if (ku_reject(x
, KU_TLS
))
753 static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
756 int ret
= check_purpose_ssl_server(xp
, x
, require_ca
);
758 if (!ret
|| require_ca
)
760 /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
761 return ku_reject(x
, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT
) ? 0 : ret
;
764 /* common S/MIME checks */
765 static int purpose_smime(const X509
*x
, int require_ca
)
767 if (xku_reject(x
, XKU_SMIME
))
770 int ca_ret
= check_ca(x
);
774 /* Check nsCertType if present */
775 if (ca_ret
!= 5 || (x
->ex_nscert
& NS_SMIME_CA
) != 0)
780 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_NSCERT
) != 0) {
781 if ((x
->ex_nscert
& NS_SMIME
) != 0)
783 /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
784 return (x
->ex_nscert
& NS_SSL_CLIENT
) != 0 ? 2 : 0;
789 static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
792 int ret
= purpose_smime(x
, require_ca
);
794 if (!ret
|| require_ca
)
796 return ku_reject(x
, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
| KU_NON_REPUDIATION
) ? 0 : ret
;
799 static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
802 int ret
= purpose_smime(x
, require_ca
);
804 if (!ret
|| require_ca
)
806 return ku_reject(x
, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT
) ? 0 : ret
;
809 static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
813 int ca_ret
= check_ca(x
);
815 return ca_ret
== 2 ? 0 : ca_ret
;
817 return !ku_reject(x
, KU_CRL_SIGN
);
821 * OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
822 * is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
824 static int check_purpose_ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
828 * Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" value
833 /* Leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
837 static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
842 /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
847 * Check the optional key usage field:
848 * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
849 * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
852 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) != 0
853 && ((x
->ex_kusage
& ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION
| KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
)) ||
854 !(x
->ex_kusage
& (KU_NON_REPUDIATION
| KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
))))
857 /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
858 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_XKUSAGE
) == 0 || x
->ex_xkusage
!= XKU_TIMESTAMP
)
861 /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
862 i_ext
= X509_get_ext_by_NID(x
, NID_ext_key_usage
, -1);
864 && !X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_get_ext((X509
*)x
, i_ext
)))
869 static int check_purpose_code_sign(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
874 /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
879 * Check the key usage and extended key usage fields:
881 * Reference: CA Browser Forum,
882 * Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of
883 * Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates, Version 3.0.0,
884 * Section 7.1.2.3: Code signing and Timestamp Certificate
886 * Checking covers Key Usage and Extended Key Usage attributes.
887 * Other properties like CRL Distribution Points and Authoriy
888 * Information Access (AIA) are not checked.
891 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) == 0)
893 if ((x
->ex_kusage
& KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
) == 0)
895 if ((x
->ex_kusage
& (KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
| KU_CRL_SIGN
)) != 0)
898 /* Key Usage MUST be critical */
899 i_ext
= X509_get_ext_by_NID(x
, NID_key_usage
, -1);
903 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
= X509_get_ext((X509
*)x
, i_ext
);
904 if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext
))
908 /* Extended Key Usage */
909 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_XKUSAGE
) == 0)
911 if ((x
->ex_xkusage
& XKU_CODE_SIGN
) == 0)
913 if ((x
->ex_xkusage
& (XKU_ANYEKU
| XKU_SSL_SERVER
)) != 0)
920 static int no_check_purpose(const X509_PURPOSE
*xp
, const X509
*x
,
927 * Various checks to see if one certificate potentially issued the second.
928 * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which
929 * have been looked up using some simple method such as by subject name.
931 * 1. issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
932 * 2. If akid(subject) exists, it matches the respective issuer fields.
933 * 3. subject signature algorithm == issuer public key algorithm
934 * 4. If key_usage(issuer) exists, it allows for signing subject.
935 * Note that this does not include actually checking the signature.
936 * Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for mismatch
937 * where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert().
939 int X509_check_issued(X509
*issuer
, X509
*subject
)
943 if ((ret
= ossl_x509_likely_issued(issuer
, subject
)) != X509_V_OK
)
945 return ossl_x509_signing_allowed(issuer
, subject
);
948 /* do the checks 1., 2., and 3. as described above for X509_check_issued() */
949 int ossl_x509_likely_issued(X509
*issuer
, X509
*subject
)
953 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer
),
954 X509_get_issuer_name(subject
)) != 0)
955 return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH
;
957 /* set issuer->skid and subject->akid */
958 if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer
)
959 || !ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(subject
))
960 return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
962 ret
= X509_check_akid(issuer
, subject
->akid
);
963 if (ret
!= X509_V_OK
)
966 /* Check if the subject signature alg matches the issuer's PUBKEY alg */
967 return check_sig_alg_match(X509_get0_pubkey(issuer
), subject
);
971 * Check if certificate I<issuer> is allowed to issue certificate I<subject>
972 * according to the B<keyUsage> field of I<issuer> if present
973 * depending on any proxyCertInfo extension of I<subject>.
974 * Returns 0 for OK, or positive for reason for rejection
975 * where reason codes match those for X509_verify_cert().
977 int ossl_x509_signing_allowed(const X509
*issuer
, const X509
*subject
)
979 if ((subject
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) != 0) {
980 if (ku_reject(issuer
, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
))
981 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
;
982 } else if (ku_reject(issuer
, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
)) {
983 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN
;
988 int X509_check_akid(const X509
*issuer
, const AUTHORITY_KEYID
*akid
)
993 /* Check key ids (if present) */
994 if (akid
->keyid
&& issuer
->skid
&&
995 ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid
->keyid
, issuer
->skid
))
996 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH
;
997 /* Check serial number */
999 ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get0_serialNumber(issuer
), akid
->serial
))
1000 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH
;
1001 /* Check issuer name */
1004 * Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF
1005 * GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
1006 * we only take any notice of the first.
1008 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= akid
->issuer
;
1010 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1013 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1014 gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1015 if (gen
->type
== GEN_DIRNAME
) {
1020 if (nm
!= NULL
&& X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer
)) != 0)
1021 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH
;
1026 uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509
*x
)
1028 /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
1029 X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0);
1033 uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509
*x
)
1035 /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
1036 if (X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0) != 1)
1038 return (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) != 0 ? x
->ex_kusage
: UINT32_MAX
;
1041 uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509
*x
)
1043 /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
1044 if (X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0) != 1)
1046 return (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_XKUSAGE
) != 0 ? x
->ex_xkusage
: UINT32_MAX
;
1049 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509
*x
)
1051 /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
1052 if (X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0) != 1)
1057 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509
*x
)
1059 /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
1060 if (X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0) != 1)
1062 return (x
->akid
!= NULL
? x
->akid
->keyid
: NULL
);
1065 const GENERAL_NAMES
*X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509
*x
)
1067 /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
1068 if (X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0) != 1)
1070 return (x
->akid
!= NULL
? x
->akid
->issuer
: NULL
);
1073 const ASN1_INTEGER
*X509_get0_authority_serial(X509
*x
)
1075 /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
1076 if (X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0) != 1)
1078 return (x
->akid
!= NULL
? x
->akid
->serial
: NULL
);
1081 long X509_get_pathlen(X509
*x
)
1083 /* Called for side effect of caching extensions */
1084 if (X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0) != 1
1085 || (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_BCONS
) == 0)
1087 return x
->ex_pathlen
;
1090 long X509_get_proxy_pathlen(X509
*x
)
1092 /* Called for side effect of caching extensions */
1093 if (X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0) != 1
1094 || (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) == 0)
1096 return x
->ex_pcpathlen
;