crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c

   1 /*
   2  * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
   3  *
   4  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
   5  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
   6  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
   7  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
   8  */
   9
  10 #include <stdio.h>
  11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
  12 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
  13 #include <openssl/objects.h>
  14 #include <openssl/x509.h>
  15 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
  16 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
  17 #include "crypto/x509.h"
  18
  19 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
  20
  21 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
  22 {
  23     int i;
  24     const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
  25
  26     if (b == NULL)
  27         return a != NULL;
  28     if (a == NULL)
  29         return -1;
  30     ai = &a->cert_info;
  31     bi = &b->cert_info;
  32     i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
  33     if (i)
  34         return i;
  35     return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer);
  36 }
  37
  38 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
  39 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
  40 {
  41     unsigned long ret = 0;
  42     EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
  43     unsigned char md[16];
  44     char *f;
  45
  46     if (ctx == NULL)
  47         goto err;
  48     f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
  49     if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
  50         goto err;
  51     if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
  52         goto err;
  53     OPENSSL_free(f);
  54     if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
  55         (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
  56          (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
  57         goto err;
  58     if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
  59         goto err;
  60     ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
  61            ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
  62         ) & 0xffffffffL;
  63  err:
  64     EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
  65     return ret;
  66 }
  67 #endif
  68
  69 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
  70 {
  71     return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer);
  72 }
  73
  74 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
  75 {
  76     return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject);
  77 }
  78
  79 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
  80 {
  81     return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer);
  82 }
  83
  84 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
  85 {
  86     return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
  87 }
  88
  89 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
  90 {
  91     return a->cert_info.issuer;
  92 }
  93
  94 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
  95 {
  96     return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer);
  97 }
  98
  99 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 100 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
 101 {
 102     return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer);
 103 }
 104 #endif
 105
 106 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
 107 {
 108     return a->cert_info.subject;
 109 }
 110
 111 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
 112 {
 113     return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
 114 }
 115
 116 const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
 117 {
 118     return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
 119 }
 120
 121 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
 122 {
 123     return X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject);
 124 }
 125
 126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 127 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
 128 {
 129     return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject);
 130 }
 131 #endif
 132
 133 /*
 134  * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
 135  * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
 136  * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
 137  * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
 138  * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
 139  * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
 140  */
 141 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 142 {
 143     int rv;
 144
 145     /* ensure hash is valid */
 146     if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0) != 1)
 147         return -2;
 148     if (X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0) != 1)
 149         return -2;
 150
 151     rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
 152     if (rv)
 153         return rv;
 154     /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
 155     if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
 156         if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
 157             return -1;
 158         if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
 159             return 1;
 160         return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
 161                       a->cert_info.enc.len);
 162     }
 163     return rv;
 164 }
 165
 166 int X509_add_cert_new(STACK_OF(X509) **sk, X509 *cert, int flags)
 167 {
 168     if (*sk == NULL
 169             && (*sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
 170         X509err(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 171         return 0;
 172     }
 173     return X509_add_cert(*sk, cert, flags);
 174 }
 175
 176 int X509_add_cert(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert, int flags)
 177 {
 178     if (sk == NULL) {
 179         X509err(0, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
 180         return 0;
 181     }
 182     if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP) != 0) {
 183         /*
 184          * not using sk_X509_set_cmp_func() and sk_X509_find()
 185          * because this re-orders the certs on the stack
 186          */
 187         int i;
 188
 189         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
 190             if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
 191                 return 1;
 192         }
 193     }
 194     if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS) != 0 && X509_self_signed(cert, 0))
 195         return 1;
 196     if (!sk_X509_insert(sk, cert,
 197                         (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) != 0 ? 0 : -1)) {
 198         X509err(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 199         return 0;
 200     }
 201     if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF) != 0)
 202         (void)X509_up_ref(cert);
 203     return 1;
 204 }
 205
 206 int X509_add_certs(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags)
 207 /* compiler would allow 'const' for the list of certs, yet they are up-ref'ed */
 208 {
 209     int n = sk_X509_num(certs); /* certs may be NULL */
 210     int i;
 211
 212     for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
 213         int j = (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) == 0 ? i : n - 1 - i;
 214         /* if prepend, add certs in reverse order to keep original order */
 215
 216         if (!X509_add_cert(sk, sk_X509_value(certs, j), flags))
 217             return 0;
 218     }
 219     return 1;
 220 }
 221
 222 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
 223 {
 224     int ret;
 225
 226     if (b == NULL)
 227         return a != NULL;
 228     if (a == NULL)
 229         return -1;
 230
 231     /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
 232     if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
 233         ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
 234         if (ret < 0)
 235             return -2;
 236     }
 237
 238     if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
 239         ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
 240         if (ret < 0)
 241             return -2;
 242     }
 243
 244     ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
 245
 246     if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0)
 247         return ret;
 248
 249     return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
 250
 251 }
 252
 253 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(const X509_NAME *x)
 254 {
 255     unsigned long ret = 0;
 256     unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 257
 258     /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
 259     i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
 260     if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
 261                     NULL))
 262         return 0;
 263
 264     ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
 265            ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
 266         ) & 0xffffffffL;
 267     return ret;
 268 }
 269
 270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 271 /*
 272  * I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
 273  * this is reasonably efficient.
 274  */
 275
 276 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(const X509_NAME *x)
 277 {
 278     EVP_MD *md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5, "-fips");
 279     EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
 280     unsigned long ret = 0;
 281     unsigned char md[16];
 282
 283     if (md5 == NULL || md_ctx == NULL)
 284         goto end;
 285
 286     /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
 287     i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
 288     if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md5, NULL)
 289         && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
 290         && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
 291         ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
 292                ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
 293             ) & 0xffffffffL;
 294
 295  end:
 296     EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
 297     EVP_MD_free(md5);
 298
 299     return ret;
 300 }
 301 #endif
 302
 303 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
 304 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name,
 305                                      const ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
 306 {
 307     int i;
 308     X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
 309
 310     if (!sk)
 311         return NULL;
 312
 313     x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
 314     x.cert_info.issuer = (X509_NAME *)name; /* won't modify it */
 315
 316     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
 317         x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
 318         if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
 319             return x509;
 320     }
 321     return NULL;
 322 }
 323
 324 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name)
 325 {
 326     X509 *x509;
 327     int i;
 328
 329     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
 330         x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
 331         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
 332             return x509;
 333     }
 334     return NULL;
 335 }
 336
 337 EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
 338 {
 339     if (x == NULL)
 340         return NULL;
 341     return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
 342 }
 343
 344 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
 345 {
 346     if (x == NULL)
 347         return NULL;
 348     return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
 349 }
 350
 351 int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
 352 {
 353     const EVP_PKEY *xk;
 354     int ret;
 355
 356     xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
 357
 358     if (xk)
 359         ret = EVP_PKEY_eq(xk, k);
 360     else
 361         ret = -2;
 362
 363     switch (ret) {
 364     case 1:
 365         break;
 366     case 0:
 367         X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
 368         break;
 369     case -1:
 370         X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
 371         break;
 372     case -2:
 373         X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
 374     }
 375     if (ret > 0)
 376         return 1;
 377     return 0;
 378 }
 379
 380 /*
 381  * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
 382  * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
 383  * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
 384  */
 385
 386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 387
 388 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
 389 {
 390     const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
 391     int curve_nid;
 392     if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
 393         grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
 394     if (!grp)
 395         return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
 396     curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
 397     /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
 398     if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
 399         /*
 400          * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
 401          */
 402         if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
 403             return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
 404         if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
 405             return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
 406         /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
 407         *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
 408     } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
 409         if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
 410             return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
 411         if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
 412             return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
 413     } else
 414         return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
 415
 416     return X509_V_OK;
 417 }
 418
 419 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
 420                             unsigned long flags)
 421 {
 422     int rv, i, sign_nid;
 423     EVP_PKEY *pk;
 424     unsigned long tflags = flags;
 425
 426     if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
 427         return X509_V_OK;
 428
 429     /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
 430     if (x == NULL) {
 431         x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
 432         i = 1;
 433     } else
 434         i = 0;
 435
 436     pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
 437
 438     /*
 439      * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
 440      * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
 441      * Suite-B errors if applicable.  This is indicated via a NULL chain
 442      * pointer.  All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
 443      */
 444     if (chain == NULL)
 445         return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
 446
 447     if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
 448         rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
 449         /* Correct error depth */
 450         i = 0;
 451         goto end;
 452     }
 453
 454     /* Check EE key only */
 455     rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
 456     if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
 457         /* Correct error depth */
 458         i = 0;
 459         goto end;
 460     }
 461     for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
 462         sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
 463         x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
 464         if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
 465             rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
 466             goto end;
 467         }
 468         pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
 469         rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
 470         if (rv != X509_V_OK)
 471             goto end;
 472     }
 473
 474     /* Final check: root CA signature */
 475     rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
 476  end:
 477     if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
 478         /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
 479         if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
 480              || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
 481             i--;
 482         /*
 483          * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
 484          * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
 485          */
 486         if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
 487             rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
 488         if (perror_depth)
 489             *perror_depth = i;
 490     }
 491     return rv;
 492 }
 493
 494 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
 495 {
 496     int sign_nid;
 497     if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
 498         return X509_V_OK;
 499     sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
 500     return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
 501 }
 502
 503 #else
 504 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
 505                             unsigned long flags)
 506 {
 507     return 0;
 508 }
 509
 510 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
 511 {
 512     return 0;
 513 }
 514
 515 #endif
 516 /*
 517  * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
 518  * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
 519  * each X509 structure.
 520  */
 521 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
 522 {
 523     STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
 524     int i;
 525     ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
 526     if (ret == NULL)
 527         return NULL;
 528     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
 529         X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
 530         if (!X509_up_ref(x))
 531             goto err;
 532     }
 533     return ret;
 534  err:
 535     while (i-- > 0)
 536         X509_free (sk_X509_value(ret, i));
 537     sk_X509_free(ret);
 538     return NULL;
 539 }