crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c

   1 /*
   2  * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
   3  *
   4  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
   5  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
   6  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
   7  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
   8  */
   9
  10 #include <stdio.h>
  11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
  12 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
  13 #include <openssl/objects.h>
  14 #include <openssl/x509.h>
  15 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
  16 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
  17 #include "crypto/x509.h"
  18
  19 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
  20 {
  21     int i;
  22     const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
  23
  24     if (b == NULL)
  25         return a != NULL;
  26     if (a == NULL)
  27         return -1;
  28     ai = &a->cert_info;
  29     bi = &b->cert_info;
  30     i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
  31     if (i != 0)
  32         return i < 0 ? -1 : 1;
  33     return X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer);
  34 }
  35
  36 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
  37 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
  38 {
  39     unsigned long ret = 0;
  40     EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
  41     unsigned char md[16];
  42     char *f = NULL;
  43     EVP_MD *digest = NULL;
  44
  45     if (ctx == NULL)
  46         goto err;
  47     f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
  48     if (f == NULL)
  49         goto err;
  50     digest = EVP_MD_fetch(a->libctx, SN_md5, a->propq);
  51     if (digest == NULL)
  52         goto err;
  53
  54     if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, digest, NULL))
  55         goto err;
  56     if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
  57         goto err;
  58     if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
  59         (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
  60          (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
  61         goto err;
  62     if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
  63         goto err;
  64     ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
  65            ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
  66         ) & 0xffffffffL;
  67  err:
  68     OPENSSL_free(f);
  69     EVP_MD_free(digest);
  70     EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
  71     return ret;
  72 }
  73 #endif
  74
  75 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
  76 {
  77     return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer);
  78 }
  79
  80 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
  81 {
  82     return X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject);
  83 }
  84
  85 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
  86 {
  87     return X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer);
  88 }
  89
  90 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
  91 {
  92     int rv;
  93
  94     if ((a->flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0
  95             && (b->flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0)
  96         rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
  97     else
  98         return -2;
  99
 100     return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0;
 101 }
 102
 103 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
 104 {
 105     return a->cert_info.issuer;
 106 }
 107
 108 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
 109 {
 110     return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x->cert_info.issuer, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 111 }
 112
 113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 114 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
 115 {
 116     return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer);
 117 }
 118 #endif
 119
 120 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
 121 {
 122     return a->cert_info.subject;
 123 }
 124
 125 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
 126 {
 127     return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
 128 }
 129
 130 const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
 131 {
 132     return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
 133 }
 134
 135 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
 136 {
 137     return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x->cert_info.subject, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 138 }
 139
 140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 141 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
 142 {
 143     return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject);
 144 }
 145 #endif
 146
 147 /*
 148  * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
 149  * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
 150  * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
 151  * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
 152  * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
 153  * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
 154  */
 155 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 156 {
 157     int rv = 0;
 158
 159     if (a == b) /* for efficiency */
 160         return 0;
 161
 162     /* attempt to compute cert hash */
 163     (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
 164     (void)X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
 165
 166     if ((a->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0
 167             && (b->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT) == 0)
 168         rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
 169     if (rv != 0)
 170         return rv < 0 ? -1 : 1;
 171
 172     /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
 173     if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
 174         if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
 175             return -1;
 176         if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
 177             return 1;
 178         rv = memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc,
 179                     b->cert_info.enc.enc, a->cert_info.enc.len);
 180     }
 181     return rv < 0 ? -1 : rv > 0;
 182 }
 183
 184 int ossl_x509_add_cert_new(STACK_OF(X509) **p_sk, X509 *cert, int flags)
 185 {
 186     if (*p_sk == NULL && (*p_sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
 187         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
 188         return 0;
 189     }
 190     return X509_add_cert(*p_sk, cert, flags);
 191 }
 192
 193 int X509_add_cert(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert, int flags)
 194 {
 195     if (sk == NULL) {
 196         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
 197         return 0;
 198     }
 199     if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP) != 0) {
 200         /*
 201          * not using sk_X509_set_cmp_func() and sk_X509_find()
 202          * because this re-orders the certs on the stack
 203          */
 204         int i;
 205
 206         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
 207             if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0)
 208                 return 1;
 209         }
 210     }
 211     if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS) != 0) {
 212         int ret = X509_self_signed(cert, 0);
 213
 214         if (ret != 0)
 215             return ret > 0 ? 1 : 0;
 216     }
 217     if (!sk_X509_insert(sk, cert,
 218                         (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) != 0 ? 0 : -1)) {
 219         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
 220         return 0;
 221     }
 222     if ((flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF) != 0)
 223         (void)X509_up_ref(cert);
 224     return 1;
 225 }
 226
 227 int X509_add_certs(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags)
 228 /* compiler would allow 'const' for the certs, yet they may get up-ref'ed */
 229 {
 230     if (sk == NULL) {
 231         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
 232         return 0;
 233     }
 234     return ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&sk, certs, flags);
 235 }
 236
 237 int ossl_x509_add_certs_new(STACK_OF(X509) **p_sk, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
 238                             int flags)
 239 /* compiler would allow 'const' for the certs, yet they may get up-ref'ed */
 240 {
 241     int n = sk_X509_num(certs /* may be NULL */);
 242     int i;
 243
 244     for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
 245         int j = (flags & X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND) == 0 ? i : n - 1 - i;
 246         /* if prepend, add certs in reverse order to keep original order */
 247
 248         if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(p_sk, sk_X509_value(certs, j), flags))
 249             return 0;
 250     }
 251     return 1;
 252 }
 253
 254 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
 255 {
 256     int ret;
 257
 258     if (b == NULL)
 259         return a != NULL;
 260     if (a == NULL)
 261         return -1;
 262
 263     /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
 264     if (a->canon_enc == NULL || a->modified) {
 265         ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
 266         if (ret < 0)
 267             return -2;
 268     }
 269
 270     if (b->canon_enc == NULL || b->modified) {
 271         ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
 272         if (ret < 0)
 273             return -2;
 274     }
 275
 276     ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
 277     if (ret == 0 && a->canon_enclen == 0)
 278         return 0;
 279
 280     if (ret == 0) {
 281         if (a->canon_enc == NULL || b->canon_enc == NULL)
 282             return -2;
 283         ret = memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
 284     }
 285
 286     return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret > 0;
 287 }
 288
 289 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_ex(const X509_NAME *x, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
 290                                 const char *propq, int *ok)
 291 {
 292     unsigned long ret = 0;
 293     unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 294     EVP_MD *sha1 = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, "SHA1", propq);
 295     int i2d_ret;
 296
 297     /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
 298     i2d_ret = i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
 299     if (ok != NULL)
 300         *ok = 0;
 301     if (i2d_ret >= 0 && sha1 != NULL
 302         && EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, sha1, NULL)) {
 303         ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
 304                ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
 305                ) & 0xffffffffL;
 306         if (ok != NULL)
 307             *ok = 1;
 308     }
 309     EVP_MD_free(sha1);
 310     return ret;
 311 }
 312
 313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 314 /*
 315  * I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
 316  * this is reasonably efficient.
 317  */
 318 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(const X509_NAME *x)
 319 {
 320     EVP_MD *md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5, "-fips");
 321     EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
 322     unsigned long ret = 0;
 323     unsigned char md[16];
 324
 325     if (md5 == NULL || md_ctx == NULL)
 326         goto end;
 327
 328     /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
 329     if (i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL) < 0)
 330         goto end;
 331
 332     if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md5, NULL)
 333         && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
 334         && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
 335         ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
 336                ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
 337             ) & 0xffffffffL;
 338
 339  end:
 340     EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
 341     EVP_MD_free(md5);
 342
 343     return ret;
 344 }
 345 #endif
 346
 347 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
 348 X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name,
 349                                      const ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
 350 {
 351     int i;
 352     X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
 353
 354     if (!sk)
 355         return NULL;
 356
 357     x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
 358     x.cert_info.issuer = (X509_NAME *)name; /* won't modify it */
 359
 360     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
 361         x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
 362         if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
 363             return x509;
 364     }
 365     return NULL;
 366 }
 367
 368 X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name)
 369 {
 370     X509 *x509;
 371     int i;
 372
 373     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
 374         x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
 375         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
 376             return x509;
 377     }
 378     return NULL;
 379 }
 380
 381 EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
 382 {
 383     if (x == NULL)
 384         return NULL;
 385     return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
 386 }
 387
 388 EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
 389 {
 390     if (x == NULL)
 391         return NULL;
 392     return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
 393 }
 394
 395 int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *cert, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 396 {
 397     const EVP_PKEY *xk = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
 398
 399     if (xk == NULL) {
 400         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
 401         return 0;
 402     }
 403     return ossl_x509_check_private_key(xk, pkey);
 404 }
 405
 406 int ossl_x509_check_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 407 {
 408     if (x == NULL) {
 409         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
 410         return 0;
 411     }
 412     switch (EVP_PKEY_eq(x, pkey)) {
 413     case 1:
 414         return 1;
 415     case 0:
 416         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
 417         return 0;
 418     case -1:
 419         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
 420         return 0;
 421     case -2:
 422         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
 423         /* fall thru */
 424     default:
 425         return 0;
 426     }
 427 }
 428
 429 /*
 430  * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
 431  * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
 432  * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
 433  */
 434
 435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 436
 437 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
 438 {
 439     char curve_name[80];
 440     size_t curve_name_len;
 441     int curve_nid;
 442
 443     if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
 444         return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
 445
 446     if (!EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey, curve_name, sizeof(curve_name),
 447                                  &curve_name_len))
 448         return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
 449
 450     curve_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(curve_name);
 451     /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
 452     if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
 453         /*
 454          * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
 455          */
 456         if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
 457             return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
 458         if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
 459             return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
 460         /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
 461         *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
 462     } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
 463         if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
 464             return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
 465         if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
 466             return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
 467     } else {
 468         return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
 469     }
 470     return X509_V_OK;
 471 }
 472
 473 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
 474                             unsigned long flags)
 475 {
 476     int rv, i, sign_nid;
 477     EVP_PKEY *pk;
 478     unsigned long tflags = flags;
 479
 480     if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
 481         return X509_V_OK;
 482
 483     /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
 484     if (x == NULL) {
 485         x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
 486         i = 1;
 487     } else {
 488         i = 0;
 489     }
 490     pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
 491
 492     /*
 493      * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
 494      * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
 495      * Suite-B errors if applicable.  This is indicated via a NULL chain
 496      * pointer.  All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
 497      */
 498     if (chain == NULL)
 499         return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
 500
 501     if (X509_get_version(x) != X509_VERSION_3) {
 502         rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
 503         /* Correct error depth */
 504         i = 0;
 505         goto end;
 506     }
 507
 508     /* Check EE key only */
 509     rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
 510     if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
 511         /* Correct error depth */
 512         i = 0;
 513         goto end;
 514     }
 515     for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
 516         sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
 517         x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
 518         if (X509_get_version(x) != X509_VERSION_3) {
 519             rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
 520             goto end;
 521         }
 522         pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
 523         rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
 524         if (rv != X509_V_OK)
 525             goto end;
 526     }
 527
 528     /* Final check: root CA signature */
 529     rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
 530  end:
 531     if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
 532         /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
 533         if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
 534              || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
 535             i--;
 536         /*
 537          * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
 538          * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
 539          */
 540         if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
 541             rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
 542         if (perror_depth)
 543             *perror_depth = i;
 544     }
 545     return rv;
 546 }
 547
 548 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
 549 {
 550     int sign_nid;
 551     if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
 552         return X509_V_OK;
 553     sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
 554     return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
 555 }
 556
 557 #else
 558 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
 559                             unsigned long flags)
 560 {
 561     return 0;
 562 }
 563
 564 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
 565 {
 566     return 0;
 567 }
 568
 569 #endif
 570
 571 /*
 572  * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
 573  * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
 574  * each X509 structure.
 575  */
 576 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
 577 {
 578     STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
 579     int i;
 580
 581     if (ret == NULL)
 582         return NULL;
 583     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
 584         X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
 585
 586         if (!X509_up_ref(x))
 587             goto err;
 588     }
 589     return ret;
 590
 591  err:
 592     while (i-- > 0)
 593         X509_free(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
 594     sk_X509_free(ret);
 595     return NULL;
 596 }