2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
12 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
13 #include <openssl/objects.h>
14 #include <openssl/x509.h>
15 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
16 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
17 #include "crypto/x509.h"
19 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509
*a
, const X509
*b
)
22 const X509_CINF
*ai
, *bi
;
30 i
= ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai
->serialNumber
, &bi
->serialNumber
);
32 return i
< 0 ? -1 : 1;
33 return X509_NAME_cmp(ai
->issuer
, bi
->issuer
);
36 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
37 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509
*a
)
39 unsigned long ret
= 0;
40 EVP_MD_CTX
*ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
43 EVP_MD
*digest
= NULL
;
47 f
= X509_NAME_oneline(a
->cert_info
.issuer
, NULL
, 0);
50 digest
= EVP_MD_fetch(a
->libctx
, SN_md5
, a
->propq
);
54 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx
, digest
, NULL
))
56 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx
, (unsigned char *)f
, strlen(f
)))
59 (ctx
, (unsigned char *)a
->cert_info
.serialNumber
.data
,
60 (unsigned long)a
->cert_info
.serialNumber
.length
))
62 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx
, &(md
[0]), NULL
))
64 ret
= (((unsigned long)md
[0]) | ((unsigned long)md
[1] << 8L) |
65 ((unsigned long)md
[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md
[3] << 24L)
75 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509
*a
, const X509
*b
)
77 return X509_NAME_cmp(a
->cert_info
.issuer
, b
->cert_info
.issuer
);
80 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509
*a
, const X509
*b
)
82 return X509_NAME_cmp(a
->cert_info
.subject
, b
->cert_info
.subject
);
85 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL
*a
, const X509_CRL
*b
)
87 return X509_NAME_cmp(a
->crl
.issuer
, b
->crl
.issuer
);
90 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL
*a
, const X509_CRL
*b
)
94 if ((a
->flags
& EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT
) == 0
95 && (b
->flags
& EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT
) == 0)
96 rv
= memcmp(a
->sha1_hash
, b
->sha1_hash
, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
100 return rv
< 0 ? -1 : rv
> 0;
103 X509_NAME
*X509_get_issuer_name(const X509
*a
)
105 return a
->cert_info
.issuer
;
108 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509
*x
)
110 return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x
->cert_info
.issuer
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
114 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509
*x
)
116 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x
->cert_info
.issuer
);
120 X509_NAME
*X509_get_subject_name(const X509
*a
)
122 return a
->cert_info
.subject
;
125 ASN1_INTEGER
*X509_get_serialNumber(X509
*a
)
127 return &a
->cert_info
.serialNumber
;
130 const ASN1_INTEGER
*X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509
*a
)
132 return &a
->cert_info
.serialNumber
;
135 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509
*x
)
137 return X509_NAME_hash_ex(x
->cert_info
.subject
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
141 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509
*x
)
143 return X509_NAME_hash_old(x
->cert_info
.subject
);
148 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
149 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
150 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
151 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
152 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
153 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
155 int X509_cmp(const X509
*a
, const X509
*b
)
159 if (a
== b
) /* for efficiency */
162 /* attempt to compute cert hash */
163 (void)X509_check_purpose((X509
*)a
, -1, 0);
164 (void)X509_check_purpose((X509
*)b
, -1, 0);
166 if ((a
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT
) == 0
167 && (b
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_NO_FINGERPRINT
) == 0)
168 rv
= memcmp(a
->sha1_hash
, b
->sha1_hash
, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
170 return rv
< 0 ? -1 : 1;
172 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
173 if (!a
->cert_info
.enc
.modified
&& !b
->cert_info
.enc
.modified
) {
174 if (a
->cert_info
.enc
.len
< b
->cert_info
.enc
.len
)
176 if (a
->cert_info
.enc
.len
> b
->cert_info
.enc
.len
)
178 rv
= memcmp(a
->cert_info
.enc
.enc
,
179 b
->cert_info
.enc
.enc
, a
->cert_info
.enc
.len
);
181 return rv
< 0 ? -1 : rv
> 0;
184 int ossl_x509_add_cert_new(STACK_OF(X509
) **p_sk
, X509
*cert
, int flags
)
186 if (*p_sk
== NULL
&& (*p_sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
187 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
190 return X509_add_cert(*p_sk
, cert
, flags
);
193 int X509_add_cert(STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*cert
, int flags
)
196 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
199 if ((flags
& X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
) != 0) {
201 * not using sk_X509_set_cmp_func() and sk_X509_find()
202 * because this re-orders the certs on the stack
206 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
207 if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk
, i
), cert
) == 0)
211 if ((flags
& X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS
) != 0) {
212 int ret
= X509_self_signed(cert
, 0);
215 return ret
> 0 ? 1 : 0;
217 if (!sk_X509_insert(sk
, cert
,
218 (flags
& X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND
) != 0 ? 0 : -1)) {
219 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
222 if ((flags
& X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
) != 0)
223 (void)X509_up_ref(cert
);
227 int X509_add_certs(STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
, int flags
)
228 /* compiler would allow 'const' for the certs, yet they may get up-ref'ed */
231 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
234 return ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&sk
, certs
, flags
);
237 int ossl_x509_add_certs_new(STACK_OF(X509
) **p_sk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
,
239 /* compiler would allow 'const' for the certs, yet they may get up-ref'ed */
241 int n
= sk_X509_num(certs
/* may be NULL */);
244 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
245 int j
= (flags
& X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND
) == 0 ? i
: n
- 1 - i
;
246 /* if prepend, add certs in reverse order to keep original order */
248 if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(p_sk
, sk_X509_value(certs
, j
), flags
))
254 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME
*a
, const X509_NAME
*b
)
263 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
264 if (a
->canon_enc
== NULL
|| a
->modified
) {
265 ret
= i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME
*)a
, NULL
);
270 if (b
->canon_enc
== NULL
|| b
->modified
) {
271 ret
= i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME
*)b
, NULL
);
276 ret
= a
->canon_enclen
- b
->canon_enclen
;
277 if (ret
== 0 && a
->canon_enclen
== 0)
280 if (a
->canon_enc
== NULL
|| b
->canon_enc
== NULL
)
284 ret
= memcmp(a
->canon_enc
, b
->canon_enc
, a
->canon_enclen
);
286 return ret
< 0 ? -1 : ret
> 0;
289 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_ex(const X509_NAME
*x
, OSSL_LIB_CTX
*libctx
,
290 const char *propq
, int *ok
)
292 unsigned long ret
= 0;
293 unsigned char md
[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
294 EVP_MD
*sha1
= EVP_MD_fetch(libctx
, "SHA1", propq
);
296 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
297 i2d_X509_NAME(x
, NULL
);
301 && EVP_Digest(x
->canon_enc
, x
->canon_enclen
, md
, NULL
, sha1
, NULL
)) {
302 ret
= (((unsigned long)md
[0]) | ((unsigned long)md
[1] << 8L) |
303 ((unsigned long)md
[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md
[3] << 24L)
312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
314 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
315 * this is reasonably efficient.
317 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(const X509_NAME
*x
)
319 EVP_MD
*md5
= EVP_MD_fetch(NULL
, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5
, "-fips");
320 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
321 unsigned long ret
= 0;
322 unsigned char md
[16];
324 if (md5
== NULL
|| md_ctx
== NULL
)
327 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
328 i2d_X509_NAME(x
, NULL
);
329 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx
, md5
, NULL
)
330 && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx
, x
->bytes
->data
, x
->bytes
->length
)
331 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
))
332 ret
= (((unsigned long)md
[0]) | ((unsigned long)md
[1] << 8L) |
333 ((unsigned long)md
[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md
[3] << 24L)
337 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
344 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
345 X509
*X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, const X509_NAME
*name
,
346 const ASN1_INTEGER
*serial
)
349 X509 x
, *x509
= NULL
;
354 x
.cert_info
.serialNumber
= *serial
;
355 x
.cert_info
.issuer
= (X509_NAME
*)name
; /* won't modify it */
357 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
358 x509
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
359 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509
, &x
) == 0)
365 X509
*X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, const X509_NAME
*name
)
370 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
371 x509
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
372 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509
), name
) == 0)
378 EVP_PKEY
*X509_get0_pubkey(const X509
*x
)
382 return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x
->cert_info
.key
);
385 EVP_PKEY
*X509_get_pubkey(X509
*x
)
389 return X509_PUBKEY_get(x
->cert_info
.key
);
392 int X509_check_private_key(const X509
*x
, const EVP_PKEY
*k
)
397 xk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
399 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
403 switch (ret
= EVP_PKEY_eq(xk
, k
)) {
405 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH
);
408 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH
);
411 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE
);
419 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
420 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
421 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
426 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, int sign_nid
, unsigned long *pflags
)
429 size_t curve_name_len
;
432 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
433 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM
;
435 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey
, curve_name
, sizeof(curve_name
),
437 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE
;
439 curve_nid
= OBJ_txt2nid(curve_name
);
440 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
441 if (curve_nid
== NID_secp384r1
) { /* P-384 */
443 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
445 if (sign_nid
!= -1 && sign_nid
!= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
)
446 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
;
447 if (!(*pflags
& X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
))
448 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED
;
449 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
450 *pflags
&= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
;
451 } else if (curve_nid
== NID_X9_62_prime256v1
) { /* P-256 */
452 if (sign_nid
!= -1 && sign_nid
!= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
)
453 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
;
454 if (!(*pflags
& X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
))
455 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED
;
457 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE
;
462 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth
, X509
*x
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
467 unsigned long tflags
= flags
;
469 if (!(flags
& X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
))
472 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
474 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, 0);
479 pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
482 * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
483 * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
484 * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
485 * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
488 return check_suite_b(pk
, -1, &tflags
);
490 if (X509_get_version(x
) != X509_VERSION_3
) {
491 rv
= X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION
;
492 /* Correct error depth */
497 /* Check EE key only */
498 rv
= check_suite_b(pk
, -1, &tflags
);
499 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
500 /* Correct error depth */
504 for (; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
505 sign_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
506 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
507 if (X509_get_version(x
) != X509_VERSION_3
) {
508 rv
= X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION
;
511 pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
512 rv
= check_suite_b(pk
, sign_nid
, &tflags
);
517 /* Final check: root CA signature */
518 rv
= check_suite_b(pk
, X509_get_signature_nid(x
), &tflags
);
520 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
521 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
522 if ((rv
== X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
523 || rv
== X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED
) && i
)
526 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
527 * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
529 if (rv
== X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED
&& flags
!= tflags
)
530 rv
= X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256
;
537 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL
*crl
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, unsigned long flags
)
540 if (!(flags
& X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
))
542 sign_nid
= OBJ_obj2nid(crl
->crl
.sig_alg
.algorithm
);
543 return check_suite_b(pk
, sign_nid
, &flags
);
547 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth
, X509
*x
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
553 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL
*crl
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, unsigned long flags
)
561 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
562 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
563 * each X509 structure.
565 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
567 STACK_OF(X509
) *ret
= sk_X509_dup(chain
);
572 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ret
); i
++) {
573 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ret
, i
);
582 X509_free(sk_X509_value(ret
, i
));