1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
63 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
114 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
122 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
124 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
125 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
126 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
127 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
128 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
129 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
130 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
131 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
133 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
134 unsigned int *preasons
);
135 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
136 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
137 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
138 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
140 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
141 const char X509_version
[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT
;
143 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
148 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
149 static int cert_self_signed(X509
*x
)
151 X509_check_purpose(x
, -1, 0);
152 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
)
158 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
160 static X509
*lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
162 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
165 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
166 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
169 /* Look for exact match */
170 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
171 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
172 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
))
175 if (i
< sk_X509_num(certs
))
176 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
179 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
183 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
185 X509
*x
, *xtmp
, *xtmp2
, *chain_ss
= NULL
;
187 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
= ctx
->param
;
188 int depth
, i
, ok
= 0;
190 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
191 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
= NULL
;
192 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
193 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
200 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
201 * the first entry is in place
203 if (ctx
->chain
== NULL
) {
204 if (((ctx
->chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
205 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
))) {
206 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
209 CRYPTO_add(&ctx
->cert
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
210 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 1;
213 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
214 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
215 && (sktmp
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
) {
216 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
220 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
221 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
222 depth
= param
->depth
;
225 /* If we have enough, we break */
227 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
228 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
229 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
232 /* If we are self signed, we break */
233 if (cert_self_signed(x
))
236 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
238 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
) {
239 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
243 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
252 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
253 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
) {
254 xtmp
= find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
, x
);
256 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, xtmp
)) {
257 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
260 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
261 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
, xtmp
);
262 ctx
->last_untrusted
++;
266 * reparse the full chain for the next one
274 /* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
277 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
278 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
284 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
286 i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
287 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1);
288 if (cert_self_signed(x
)) {
289 /* we have a self signed certificate */
290 if (sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1) {
292 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can
293 * find it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid
294 * possible impersonation.
296 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
297 if ((ok
<= 0) || X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
)) {
298 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
;
299 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
300 ctx
->error_depth
= i
- 1;
309 * We have a match: replace certificate with store
310 * version so we get any trust settings.
314 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1, x
);
315 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
319 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
321 chain_ss
= sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
322 ctx
->last_untrusted
--;
325 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
328 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
330 /* If we have enough, we break */
333 /* If we are self signed, we break */
334 if (cert_self_signed(x
))
336 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
343 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, x
)) {
345 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
351 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
352 i
= check_trust(ctx
);
354 /* If explicitly rejected error */
355 if (i
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
358 * If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there is an alternative
359 * chain that could be used. We only do this if we haven't already
360 * checked via TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off alternate
364 if (i
!= X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
365 && !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
)
366 && !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
)) {
368 STACK_OF(X509
) *chtmp
= ctx
->chain
;
369 xtmp2
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
- 1);
371 * Temporarily set chain to NULL so we don't discount
372 * duplicates: the same certificate could be an untrusted
373 * CA found in the trusted store.
376 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, xtmp2
);
380 /* Check if we found an alternate chain */
383 * Free up the found cert we'll add it again later
388 * Dump all the certs above this point - we've found an
392 xtmp
= sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
395 ctx
->last_untrusted
--;
405 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
406 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
407 * and set bad_chain == 1
409 if (i
!= X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
&& !bad_chain
) {
410 if ((chain_ss
== NULL
) || !ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, chain_ss
)) {
411 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
>= num
)
412 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
;
414 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
;
415 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
418 sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, chain_ss
);
420 ctx
->last_untrusted
= num
;
421 ctx
->current_cert
= chain_ss
;
422 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
;
426 ctx
->error_depth
= num
- 1;
433 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
434 ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
);
439 /* Check name constraints */
441 ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
);
451 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
452 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
455 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
456 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
459 ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
);
463 i
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
465 if (i
!= X509_V_OK
) {
467 ctx
->current_cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, ctx
->error_depth
);
473 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
474 if (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
)
475 ok
= ctx
->verify(ctx
);
477 ok
= internal_verify(ctx
);
481 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
482 ok
= v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
);
485 ok
= v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
);
489 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
490 if (!bad_chain
&& (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
))
491 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
496 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
);
504 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
507 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
510 X509
*issuer
, *rv
= NULL
;;
511 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
512 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
513 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
)) {
515 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, rv
, 1))
522 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
524 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
528 return cert_self_signed(x
);
529 ret
= X509_check_issued(issuer
, x
);
530 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
) {
533 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
534 if (cert_self_signed(x
) && sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
536 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
537 ch
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
538 if (ch
== issuer
|| !X509_cmp(ch
, issuer
)) {
539 ret
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP
;
545 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
)
547 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
548 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK
))
552 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
553 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
554 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
557 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
559 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
561 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
563 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer
)->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
570 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
574 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
576 int i
, ok
= 0, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
578 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
579 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
581 int allow_proxy_certs
;
585 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
586 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
587 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
588 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
589 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
590 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
591 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
595 /* CRL path validation */
597 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
598 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
601 ! !(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
603 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
606 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
607 allow_proxy_certs
= 1;
608 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
611 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
612 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
++) {
614 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
615 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
616 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
617 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
;
618 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
619 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
624 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)) {
625 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
;
626 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
627 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
632 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
633 switch (must_be_ca
) {
635 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
636 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0)) {
638 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
645 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
651 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
654 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
660 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
661 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
666 if (ctx
->param
->purpose
> 0) {
667 ret
= X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0);
669 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
671 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
;
672 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
673 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
679 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
680 if ((i
> 1) && !(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
)
681 && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
682 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
+ 1))) {
683 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
684 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
685 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
690 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
691 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
694 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
695 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
696 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
698 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
699 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1 && i
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
) {
700 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
701 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
702 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
717 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
721 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
722 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
723 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
724 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
725 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
728 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
729 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
730 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
733 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
734 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
736 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
737 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
739 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
740 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
741 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
750 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
752 ctx
->error
= errcode
;
753 ctx
->current_cert
= ctx
->cert
;
754 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
755 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
758 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
*id
)
761 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id
->hosts
);
764 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
765 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id
->hosts
, i
);
766 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, id
->hostflags
, &id
->peername
) > 0)
772 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
774 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
775 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID
*id
= vpm
->id
;
777 if (id
->hosts
&& check_hosts(x
, id
) <= 0) {
778 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
781 if (id
->email
&& X509_check_email(x
, id
->email
, id
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
782 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
785 if (id
->ip
&& X509_check_ip(x
, id
->ip
, id
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
786 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
792 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
796 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
798 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
799 for (i
= ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
800 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
801 ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
802 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
803 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
804 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
806 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
809 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
810 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
811 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
812 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
;
815 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED
;
819 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
822 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
824 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
))
825 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
826 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, 0);
827 mx
= lookup_cert_match(ctx
, x
);
829 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
831 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
832 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
837 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
838 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
840 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
843 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
845 int i
= 0, last
= 0, ok
= 0;
846 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
848 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
849 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
851 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
856 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
857 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
858 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
865 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
867 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
869 int ok
= 0, cnum
= 0;
870 unsigned int last_reasons
= 0;
871 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
872 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
873 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
874 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
875 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
876 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
877 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
878 last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
879 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
881 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
883 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
885 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
888 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
889 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
892 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
893 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
898 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
901 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
907 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
909 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
919 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
922 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
923 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
924 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
932 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
937 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
939 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
944 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
945 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
946 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
950 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
954 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
;
955 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
962 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
;
963 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
967 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
968 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
973 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
;
974 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
977 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
978 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
)) {
981 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
;
982 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
988 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
993 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
994 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
995 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
997 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
998 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
999 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
1000 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
1001 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1003 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1004 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1005 reasons
= *preasons
;
1006 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
1008 if (crl_score
> best_score
) {
1010 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
1011 best_score
= crl_score
;
1012 best_reasons
= reasons
;
1017 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
1019 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
1020 *pscore
= best_score
;
1021 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
1022 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
1023 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
1025 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
1028 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1035 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1036 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1039 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1041 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
1043 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1045 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1046 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1048 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1052 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1056 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1058 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1068 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
1074 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1076 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1078 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1079 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
1081 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1082 if (!base
->crl_number
)
1084 /* Issuer names must match */
1085 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
1087 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1088 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1090 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1092 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1093 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1095 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1096 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1102 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1103 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1106 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1107 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1111 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
1113 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
1115 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1116 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1117 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1118 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1119 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1120 CRYPTO_add(&delta
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
1129 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1130 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1131 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1132 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1133 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1136 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1137 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1141 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1143 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1145 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1146 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1148 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1149 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
)) {
1150 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1152 } else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) {
1153 /* If no new reasons reject */
1154 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1157 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1158 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1160 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1161 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
))) {
1162 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1165 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1167 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1168 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1171 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1172 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1174 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1175 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1177 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1179 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1182 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1184 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1185 /* If no new reasons reject */
1186 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1188 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1189 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1192 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1198 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1199 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1201 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1202 X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1203 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1206 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1209 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1211 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1212 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1213 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1214 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1219 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1220 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1221 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1223 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1224 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1225 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1230 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1232 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1236 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1237 * untrusted certificates.
1239 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1240 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1241 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1243 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1244 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1245 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1252 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1253 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1254 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1255 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1258 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1260 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1262 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1265 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->ctx
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1268 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1269 /* Copy verify params across */
1270 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1272 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1273 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1275 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1276 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1281 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1283 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1285 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1290 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1291 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1292 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1293 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1294 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1298 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1299 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1300 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1302 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1303 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1304 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1305 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1311 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1312 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1313 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1314 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1315 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1318 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1320 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1321 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1322 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1329 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1333 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1338 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1340 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1341 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1344 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1345 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1349 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1351 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1352 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1353 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1355 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1361 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1363 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1364 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1365 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1366 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1367 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1376 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1379 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1380 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1382 return ! !(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1383 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1384 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1385 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1387 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1393 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1395 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1396 unsigned int *preasons
)
1399 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1401 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) {
1402 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1405 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1408 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1409 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1410 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1411 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1412 if (!crl
->idp
|| idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1413 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1418 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
)
1419 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1425 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1426 * to find a delta CRL too
1429 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1430 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1433 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1435 unsigned int reasons
;
1436 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1437 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1438 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1439 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1440 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1441 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1446 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1448 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1450 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1454 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1456 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1460 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1462 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1463 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1464 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1473 /* Check CRL validity */
1474 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1476 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1477 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1478 int ok
= 0, chnum
, cnum
;
1479 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1480 chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1481 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1482 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1483 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1486 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1487 * certificate in chain.
1489 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1490 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1492 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1493 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1494 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
)) {
1495 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
;
1496 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1504 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1506 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
) {
1507 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1508 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1509 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
)) {
1510 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
;
1511 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1516 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
)) {
1517 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
;
1518 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1523 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
)) {
1524 if (check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0) {
1525 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
;
1526 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1532 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) {
1533 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1534 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1541 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
)) {
1542 ok
= check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1);
1547 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1548 ikey
= X509_get_pubkey(issuer
);
1551 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1552 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1557 rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1558 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
1560 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1564 /* Verify CRL signature */
1565 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0) {
1566 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1567 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1577 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey
);
1581 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1582 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1587 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1588 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1589 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1590 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1592 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1593 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)) {
1594 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
;
1595 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1600 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1601 * is not removeFromCRL.
1603 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1604 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1606 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
;
1607 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1615 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1620 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1621 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1623 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1626 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1629 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1633 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1634 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1635 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1637 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1638 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
;
1639 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1645 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1646 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1647 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1650 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) {
1651 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1652 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
1653 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1660 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int quiet
)
1665 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1666 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1670 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1674 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
;
1675 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1676 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1683 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
;
1684 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1685 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1689 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1693 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
;
1694 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1695 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1702 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
;
1703 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1704 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1711 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1715 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1716 int (*cb
) (int xok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
1718 cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1720 n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
1721 ctx
->error_depth
= n
- 1;
1723 xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1725 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1728 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) {
1733 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
;
1734 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1739 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1740 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1744 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1746 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1749 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1750 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1755 || (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
))) {
1756 if ((pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1757 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1758 ctx
->current_cert
= xi
;
1759 ok
= (*cb
) (0, ctx
);
1762 } else if (X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1763 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1764 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1765 ok
= (*cb
) (0, ctx
);
1767 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1771 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1778 ok
= x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
, 0);
1782 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1783 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1784 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1785 ok
= (*cb
) (1, ctx
);
1792 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1800 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1802 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1805 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1810 char buff1
[24], buff2
[24], *p
;
1815 str
= (char *)ctm
->data
;
1816 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1817 if ((i
< 11) || (i
> 17))
1830 if ((*str
== 'Z') || (*str
== '-') || (*str
== '+')) {
1836 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1839 while ((*str
>= '0') && (*str
<= '9'))
1850 if ((*str
!= '+') && (*str
!= '-'))
1852 offset
= ((str
[1] - '0') * 10 + (str
[2] - '0')) * 60;
1853 offset
+= (str
[3] - '0') * 10 + (str
[4] - '0');
1857 atm
.type
= ctm
->type
;
1859 atm
.length
= sizeof(buff2
);
1860 atm
.data
= (unsigned char *)buff2
;
1862 if (X509_time_adj(&atm
, offset
* 60, cmp_time
) == NULL
)
1865 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
) {
1866 i
= (buff1
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1
[1] - '0');
1868 i
+= 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1869 j
= (buff2
[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2
[1] - '0');
1878 i
= strcmp(buff1
, buff2
);
1879 if (i
== 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1885 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1887 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1890 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1892 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1895 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1896 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1905 if (s
&& !(s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
)) {
1906 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1907 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1908 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1909 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1911 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1914 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1916 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1919 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1922 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1923 ktmp
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1925 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1926 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1929 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1931 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1935 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,
1936 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1940 /* first, populate the other certs */
1941 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
1942 ktmp2
= X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
1943 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
);
1944 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2
);
1948 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
1949 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1953 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1955 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
1956 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
1958 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
1960 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
1961 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1962 if (base
->base_crl_number
|| newer
->base_crl_number
) {
1963 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
1966 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1967 if (!base
->crl_number
|| !newer
->crl_number
) {
1968 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
1971 /* Issuer names must match */
1972 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
))) {
1973 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
1976 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1977 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
1978 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
1981 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
1982 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
1985 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1986 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
1987 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
1990 /* CRLs must verify */
1991 if (skey
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
1992 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
1993 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
1996 /* Create new CRL */
1997 crl
= X509_CRL_new();
1998 if (!crl
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, 1))
2000 /* Set issuer name */
2001 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
2004 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer
)))
2006 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer
)))
2009 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2011 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
2015 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2016 * number to correct value too.
2019 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
2020 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
;
2021 ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
2022 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
2026 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2028 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
2030 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
2031 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
2032 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
2034 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2035 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2037 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2038 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2041 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2042 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2047 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2049 if (skey
&& md
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2055 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2060 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl
, void *argp
,
2061 CRYPTO_EX_new
*new_func
,
2062 CRYPTO_EX_dup
*dup_func
,
2063 CRYPTO_EX_free
*free_func
)
2066 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2067 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2069 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, argl
, argp
,
2070 new_func
, dup_func
, free_func
);
2073 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2075 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2078 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2080 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2083 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2088 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2093 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2095 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2098 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2100 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2103 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2108 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2112 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2115 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2117 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2120 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2122 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2125 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2130 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2135 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2137 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2140 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2145 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2147 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2150 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2152 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2156 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2157 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2158 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2159 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2160 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2161 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2162 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2166 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2167 int purpose
, int trust
)
2170 /* If purpose not set use default */
2172 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2173 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2176 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2178 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2179 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2182 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2183 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2184 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2186 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2187 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2190 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2192 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2194 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2197 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2199 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
2200 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2205 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
)
2206 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2207 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
)
2208 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2212 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2214 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ctx
));
2217 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2220 memset(ctx
, 0, sizeof(*ctx
));
2224 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2228 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2232 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2233 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2237 ctx
->current_method
= 0;
2239 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2241 ctx
->last_untrusted
= 0;
2242 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2246 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2247 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2248 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2249 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2250 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2251 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2252 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2256 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2259 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2264 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2268 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2270 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2273 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2274 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2279 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2280 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2283 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2287 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2288 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2290 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2292 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2293 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2295 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2297 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2298 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2300 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2302 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2303 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2305 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2307 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2308 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2310 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2312 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2313 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2315 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2317 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2318 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2320 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2322 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2323 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2325 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2327 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2328 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2330 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_get1_certs
;
2332 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2333 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2335 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_get1_crls
;
2337 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2340 * Since X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we
2341 * put a corresponding "new" here.
2343 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2346 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2353 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2354 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2357 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2359 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2360 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2363 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2367 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2368 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2369 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2372 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2374 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2376 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2377 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2380 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2382 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2385 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2387 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2390 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2393 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2396 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2397 int (*verify_cb
) (int, X509_STORE_CTX
*))
2399 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2402 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2407 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2409 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2412 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2414 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2415 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2418 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2421 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2426 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2428 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);