Support for multiple CRLs with same issuer name in X509_STORE. Modify

[thirdparty/openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c

/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
 * 
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 * 
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
 * the code are not to be removed.
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 * 
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <errno.h>

#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>

static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;


static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
        {
        return ok;
        }

#if 0
static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
        {
        return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
        }
#endif

int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
        X509_NAME *xn;
        int bad_chain = 0;
        X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
        int depth,i,ok=0;
        int num;
        int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
        STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
        if (ctx->cert == NULL)
                {
                X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
                return -1;
                }

        cb=ctx->verify_cb;

        /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
         * present and that the first entry is in place */
        if (ctx->chain == NULL)
                {
                if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
                        (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
                        {
                        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                        goto end;
                        }
                CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
                ctx->last_untrusted=1;
                }

        /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
        if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
            && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
                {
                X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                goto end;
                }

        num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
        x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
        depth=param->depth;


        for (;;)
                {
                /* If we have enough, we break */
                if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
                                         * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
                                         * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
                                         * code later.
                                         */

                /* If we are self signed, we break */
                xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
                if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;

                /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
                if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
                        {
                        xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
                        if (xtmp != NULL)
                                {
                                if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
                                        {
                                        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                                        goto end;
                                        }
                                CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
                                sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
                                ctx->last_untrusted++;
                                x=xtmp;
                                num++;
                                /* reparse the full chain for
                                 * the next one */
                                continue;
                                }
                        }
                break;
                }

        /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
         * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
         * if possible, otherwise we complain. */

        /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
         * is self signed.
         */

        i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
        x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
        xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
                {
                /* we have a self signed certificate */
                if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
                        {
                        /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
                         * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
                         * match to avoid possible impersonation.
                         */
                        ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
                        if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 
                                {
                                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
                                ctx->current_cert=x;
                                ctx->error_depth=i-1;
                                if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
                                bad_chain = 1;
                                ok=cb(0,ctx);
                                if (!ok) goto end;
                                }
                        else 
                                {
                                /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
                                 * so we get any trust settings.
                                 */
                                X509_free(x);
                                x = xtmp;
                                sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
                                ctx->last_untrusted=0;
                                }
                        }
                else
                        {
                        /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
                        chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
                        ctx->last_untrusted--;
                        num--;
                        x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
                        }
                }

        /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
        for (;;)
                {
                /* If we have enough, we break */
                if (depth < num) break;

                /* If we are self signed, we break */
                xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
                if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;

                ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);

                if (ok < 0) return ok;
                if (ok == 0) break;

                x = xtmp;
                if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
                        {
                        X509_free(xtmp);
                        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                        return 0;
                        }
                num++;
                }

        /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
        xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);

        /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
        if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
                {
                if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
                        {
                        if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
                                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
                        else
                                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
                        ctx->current_cert=x;
                        }
                else
                        {

                        sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
                        num++;
                        ctx->last_untrusted=num;
                        ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
                        chain_ss=NULL;
                        }

                ctx->error_depth=num-1;
                bad_chain = 1;
                ok=cb(0,ctx);
                if (!ok) goto end;
                }

        /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
        ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);

        if (!ok) goto end;

        /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */

        if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);

        if (!ok) goto end;

        /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
        X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);

        /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
         * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
         */

        ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
        if(!ok) goto end;

        /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
        if (ctx->verify != NULL)
                ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
        else
                ok=internal_verify(ctx);
        if(!ok) goto end;

        /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
        if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
                ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
        if(!ok) goto end;
        if (0)
                {
end:
                X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
                }
        if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
        if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
        return ok;
        }


/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
 */

static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
{
        int i;
        X509 *issuer;
        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
                {
                issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
                if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
                        return issuer;
                }
        return NULL;
}

/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */

static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
{
        int ret;
        ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
        if (ret == X509_V_OK)
                return 1;
        /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
        if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
                return 0;

        ctx->error = ret;
        ctx->current_cert = x;
        ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
        return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
        return 0;
}

/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */

static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
        *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
        if (*issuer)
                {
                CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
                return 1;
                }
        else
                return 0;
}
        

/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
 * with the supplied purpose
 */

static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
        return 1;
#else
        int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
        X509 *x;
        int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
        int proxy_path_length = 0;
        int allow_proxy_certs =
                !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
        cb=ctx->verify_cb;

        /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
           -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
               use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
           0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
               used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
           1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
               all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
        */
        must_be_ca = -1;

        /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
           happy */
        if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
                allow_proxy_certs = 1;

        /* Check all untrusted certificates */
        for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
                {
                int ret;
                x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
                if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
                        && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
                        {
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
                        ctx->error_depth = i;
                        ctx->current_cert = x;
                        ok=cb(0,ctx);
                        if (!ok) goto end;
                        }
                if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
                        {
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
                        ctx->error_depth = i;
                        ctx->current_cert = x;
                        ok=cb(0,ctx);
                        if (!ok) goto end;
                        }
                ret = X509_check_ca(x);
                switch(must_be_ca)
                        {
                case -1:
                        if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
                                && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
                                {
                                ret = 0;
                                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
                                }
                        else
                                ret = 1;
                        break;
                case 0:
                        if (ret != 0)
                                {
                                ret = 0;
                                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
                                }
                        else
                                ret = 1;
                        break;
                default:
                        if ((ret == 0)
                                || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
                                        && (ret != 1)))
                                {
                                ret = 0;
                                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
                                }
                        else
                                ret = 1;
                        break;
                        }
                if (ret == 0)
                        {
                        ctx->error_depth = i;
                        ctx->current_cert = x;
                        ok=cb(0,ctx);
                        if (!ok) goto end;
                        }
                if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
                        {
                        ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
                                must_be_ca > 0);
                        if ((ret == 0)
                                || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
                                        && (ret != 1)))
                                {
                                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
                                ctx->error_depth = i;
                                ctx->current_cert = x;
                                ok=cb(0,ctx);
                                if (!ok) goto end;
                                }
                        }
                /* Check pathlen */
                if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
                           && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
                        {
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
                        ctx->error_depth = i;
                        ctx->current_cert = x;
                        ok=cb(0,ctx);
                        if (!ok) goto end;
                        }
                /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
                   certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
                   certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
                   CA certificate.  */
                if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
                        {
                        if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
                                {
                                ctx->error =
                                        X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
                                ctx->error_depth = i;
                                ctx->current_cert = x;
                                ok=cb(0,ctx);
                                if (!ok) goto end;
                                }
                        proxy_path_length++;
                        must_be_ca = 0;
                        }
                else
                        must_be_ca = 1;
                }
        ok = 1;
 end:
        return ok;
#endif
}

static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
        return 1;
#else
        int i, ok;
        X509 *x;
        int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
        cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
        i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
        ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
        if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
                return 1;
        ctx->error_depth = i;
        ctx->current_cert = x;
        if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
        else
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
        ok = cb(0, ctx);
        return ok;
#endif
}

static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        int i, last, ok;
        if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
                return 1;
        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
                last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
        else
                last = 0;
        for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
                {
                ctx->error_depth = i;
                ok = check_cert(ctx);
                if (!ok) return ok;
                }
        return 1;
        }

static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
        X509 *x;
        int ok, cnum;
        cnum = ctx->error_depth;
        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
        ctx->current_cert = x;
        /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
        ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
        /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
         * notify callback
         */
        if(!ok)
                {
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                goto err;
                }
        ctx->current_crl = crl;
        ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
        if (!ok) goto err;
        ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
        err:
        ctx->current_crl = NULL;
        X509_CRL_free(crl);
        return ok;

        }

/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */

static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
        {
        time_t *ptime;
        int i;
        ctx->current_crl = crl;
        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
                ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
        else
                ptime = NULL;

        i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
        if (i == 0)
                {
                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
                if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                        return 0;
                }

        if (i > 0)
                {
                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
                if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                        return 0;
                }

        if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
                {
                i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);

                if (i == 0)
                        {
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
                        if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                                return 0;
                        }

                if (i < 0)
                        {
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
                        if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                                return 0;
                        }
                }

        ctx->current_crl = NULL;

        return 1;
        }

/* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name
 * and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one
 * with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise
 * we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but
 * was invalid.
 */

static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
                        X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
        {
        int i;
        X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
                {
                crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
                if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
                        continue;
                if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
                        {
                        *pcrl = crl;
                        CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
                        return 1;
                        }
                best_crl = crl;
                }
        if (best_crl)
                {
                *pcrl = best_crl;
                CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
                }
                
        return 0;
        }

/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
 */
static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
        {
        int ok;
        X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
        X509_OBJECT xobj;
        X509_NAME *nm;
        nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
        ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
        if (ok)
                {
                *pcrl = crl;
                return 1;
                }

        ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj);

        if (!ok)
                {
                /* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
                if (crl)
                        {
                        *pcrl = crl;
                        return 1;
                        }
                return 0;
                }

        /* If CRL times not valid look through store */
        if (!check_crl_time(ctx, xobj.data.crl, 0))
                {
                int idx, i;
                X509_OBJECT *pobj;
                X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&xobj);
                idx = X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject(ctx->ctx->objs,
                                                        X509_LU_CRL, nm);
                if (idx == -1)
                        return 0;
                *pcrl = NULL;
                for (i = idx; i < sk_X509_OBJECT_num(ctx->ctx->objs); i++)
                        {
                        pobj = sk_X509_OBJECT_value(ctx->ctx->objs, i);
                        /* Check to see if it is a CRL and issuer matches */
                        if (pobj->type != X509_LU_CRL)
                                break;
                        if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm,
                                        X509_CRL_get_issuer(pobj->data.crl)))
                                break;
                        /* Set *pcrl because the CRL will either be valid or
                         * a "best fit" CRL.
                         */
                        *pcrl = pobj->data.crl;
                        if (check_crl_time(ctx, *pcrl, 0))
                                break;
                        }
                if (*pcrl)
                        CRYPTO_add(&(*pcrl)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
                }
        else 
                *pcrl = xobj.data.crl;
        if (crl)
                X509_CRL_free(crl);
        return 1;
        }

/* Check CRL validity */
static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
        {
        X509 *issuer = NULL;
        EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
        int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
        cnum = ctx->error_depth;
        chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
        /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
         * is next certificate in chain.
         */
        if(cnum < chnum)
                issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
        else
                {
                issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
                /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
                if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
                        {
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
                        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                        if(!ok) goto err;
                        }
                }

        if(issuer)
                {
                /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
                if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
                        !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
                        {
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
                        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                        if(!ok) goto err;
                        }

                /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
                ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);

                if(!ikey)
                        {
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
                        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                        if (!ok) goto err;
                        }
                else
                        {
                        /* Verify CRL signature */
                        if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
                                {
                                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
                                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                                if (!ok) goto err;
                                }
                        }
                }

        ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
        if (!ok)
                goto err;

        ok = 1;

        err:
        EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
        return ok;
        }

/* Check certificate against CRL */
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
        {
        int idx, ok;
        X509_REVOKED rtmp;
        STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
        X509_EXTENSION *ext;
        /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
        rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
        /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
         * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
         */
        if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
                {
                CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
                sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
                }
        idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
        /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
         * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
         */
        if(idx >= 0)
                {
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
                ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                if (!ok) return 0;
                }

        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
                return 1;

        /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
         * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
         * rejected. 
         * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
         * shouldn't do this.
         */

        exts = crl->crl->extensions;

        for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
                {
                ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
                if (ext->critical > 0)
                        {
                        ctx->error =
                                X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
                        ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                        if(!ok) return 0;
                        break;
                        }
                }
        return 1;
        }

static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        int ret;
        ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
                                ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
        if (ret == 0)
                {
                X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                return 0;
                }
        /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
        if (ret == -1)
                {
                /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
                 * callback.
                 */
                X509 *x;
                int i;
                for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
                        {
                        x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
                        if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
                                continue;
                        ctx->current_cert = x;
                        ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
                        ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                        }
                return 1;
                }
        if (ret == -2)
                {
                ctx->current_cert = NULL;
                ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
                return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
                }

        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
                {
                ctx->current_cert = NULL;
                ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
                if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
                        return 0;
                }

        return 1;
        }

static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
        {
        time_t *ptime;
        int i;

        if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
                ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
        else
                ptime = NULL;

        i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
        if (i == 0)
                {
                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
                ctx->current_cert=x;
                if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                        return 0;
                }

        if (i > 0)
                {
                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
                ctx->current_cert=x;
                if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                        return 0;
                }

        i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
        if (i == 0)
                {
                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
                ctx->current_cert=x;
                if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                        return 0;
                }

        if (i < 0)
                {
                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
                ctx->current_cert=x;
                if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
                        return 0;
                }

        return 1;
        }

static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        int ok=0,n;
        X509 *xs,*xi;
        EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
        int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);

        cb=ctx->verify_cb;

        n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
        ctx->error_depth=n-1;
        n--;
        xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);

        if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
                xs=xi;
        else
                {
                if (n <= 0)
                        {
                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
                        ctx->current_cert=xi;
                        ok=cb(0,ctx);
                        goto end;
                        }
                else
                        {
                        n--;
                        ctx->error_depth=n;
                        xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
                        }
                }

/*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
        while (n >= 0)
                {
                ctx->error_depth=n;
                if (!xs->valid)
                        {
                        if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
                                {
                                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
                                ctx->current_cert=xi;
                                ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
                                if (!ok) goto end;
                                }
                        else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
                                /* XXX  For the final trusted self-signed cert,
                                 * this is a waste of time.  That check should
                                 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
                                 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
                                 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
                                 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
                                 * been declared trusted. */
                                {
                                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
                                ctx->current_cert=xs;
                                ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
                                if (!ok)
                                        {
                                        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
                                        goto end;
                                        }
                                }
                        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
                        pkey=NULL;
                        }

                xs->valid = 1;

                ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
                if (!ok)
                        goto end;

                /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
                ctx->current_issuer=xi;
                ctx->current_cert=xs;
                ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
                if (!ok) goto end;

                n--;
                if (n >= 0)
                        {
                        xi=xs;
                        xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
                        }
                }
        ok=1;
end:
        return ok;
        }

int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
{
        return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
}

int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
        {
        char *str;
        ASN1_TIME atm;
        long offset;
        char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
        int i,j;

        p=buff1;
        i=ctm->length;
        str=(char *)ctm->data;
        if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
                {
                if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
                memcpy(p,str,10);
                p+=10;
                str+=10;
                }
        else
                {
                if (i < 13) return 0;
                memcpy(p,str,12);
                p+=12;
                str+=12;
                }

        if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
                { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
        else
                { 
                *(p++)= *(str++);
                *(p++)= *(str++);
                /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
                if (*str == '.')
                        {
                        str++;
                        while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
                        }
                
                }
        *(p++)='Z';
        *(p++)='\0';

        if (*str == 'Z')
                offset=0;
        else
                {
                if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
                        return 0;
                offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
                offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
                if (*str == '-')
                        offset= -offset;
                }
        atm.type=ctm->type;
        atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
        atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;

        if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
                return 0;

        if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
                {
                i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
                if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
                j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
                if (j < 50) j+=100;

                if (i < j) return -1;
                if (i > j) return 1;
                }
        i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
        if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
                return -1;
        else
                return i;
        }

ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
{
        return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
}

ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
        {
        time_t t;
        int type = -1;

        if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
        else time(&t);

        t+=adj;
        if (s) type = s->type;
        if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
        if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
        return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
        }

int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
        {
        EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
        int i,j;

        if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;

        for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
                {
                ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
                if (ktmp == NULL)
                        {
                        X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
                        return 0;
                        }
                if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
                        break;
                else
                        {
                        EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
                        ktmp=NULL;
                        }
                }
        if (ktmp == NULL)
                {
                X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
                return 0;
                }

        /* first, populate the other certs */
        for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
                {
                ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
                EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
                EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
                }
        
        if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
        EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
        return 1;
        }

int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
             CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
        {
        /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
         * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
        return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
                        new_func, dup_func, free_func);
        }

int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
        {
        return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
        }

void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
        {
        return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
        }

int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        return ctx->error;
        }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
        {
        ctx->error=err;
        }

int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        return ctx->error_depth;
        }

X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        return ctx->current_cert;
        }

STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        return ctx->chain;
        }

STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        int i;
        X509 *x;
        STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
        if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
                {
                x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
                CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
                }
        return chain;
        }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
        {
        ctx->cert=x;
        }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
        {
        ctx->untrusted=sk;
        }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
        {
        ctx->crls=sk;
        }

int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
        {
        return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
        }

int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
        {
        return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
        }

/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
 */

int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
                                int purpose, int trust)
{
        int idx;
        /* If purpose not set use default */
        if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
        /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
        if (purpose)
                {
                X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
                idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
                if (idx == -1)
                        {
                        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
                                                X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
                        return 0;
                        }
                ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
                if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
                        {
                        idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
                        if (idx == -1)
                                {
                                X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
                                                X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
                                return 0;
                                }
                        ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
                        }
                /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
                if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
                }
        if (trust)
                {
                idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
                if (idx == -1)
                        {
                        X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
                                                X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
                        return 0;
                        }
                }

        if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
        if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
        return 1;
}

X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
{
        X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
        ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
        if (!ctx)
                {
                X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                return NULL;
                }
        memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
        return ctx;
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
        X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
        OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}

int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
             STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
        {
        int ret = 1;
        ctx->ctx=store;
        ctx->current_method=0;
        ctx->cert=x509;
        ctx->untrusted=chain;
        ctx->crls = NULL;
        ctx->last_untrusted=0;
        ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
        ctx->valid=0;
        ctx->chain=NULL;
        ctx->error=0;
        ctx->explicit_policy=0;
        ctx->error_depth=0;
        ctx->current_cert=NULL;
        ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
        ctx->tree = NULL;

        ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();

        if (!ctx->param)
                {
                X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                return 0;
                }

        /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
         * use defaults.
         */


        if (store)
                ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
        else
                ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;

        if (store)
                {
                ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
                ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
                }
        else
                ctx->cleanup = 0;

        if (ret)
                ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
                                        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));

        if (ret == 0)
                {
                X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                return 0;
                }

        if (store && store->check_issued)
                ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
        else
                ctx->check_issued = check_issued;

        if (store && store->get_issuer)
                ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
        else
                ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;

        if (store && store->verify_cb)
                ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
        else
                ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;

        if (store && store->verify)
                ctx->verify = store->verify;
        else
                ctx->verify = internal_verify;

        if (store && store->check_revocation)
                ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
        else
                ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;

        if (store && store->get_crl)
                ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
        else
                ctx->get_crl = get_crl;

        if (store && store->check_crl)
                ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
        else
                ctx->check_crl = check_crl;

        if (store && store->cert_crl)
                ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
        else
                ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;

        ctx->check_policy = check_policy;


        /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
         * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
         * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
        /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
        if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
                                &(ctx->ex_data)))
                {
                OPENSSL_free(ctx);
                X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
                return 0;
                }
        return 1;
        }

/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
 */

void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
        ctx->other_ctx = sk;
        ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
}

void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
        if (ctx->tree)
                X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
        if (ctx->chain != NULL)
                {
                sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
                ctx->chain=NULL;
                }
        CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
        memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
        }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
        {
        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
        }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
        {
        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
        }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
        {
        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
        }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
                                  int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
        {
        ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
        }

X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        return ctx->tree;
        }

int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        return ctx->explicit_policy;
        }

int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
        {
        const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
        param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
        if (!param)
                return 0;
        return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
        }

X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        {
        return ctx->param;
        }

void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
        {
        if (ctx->param)
                X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
        ctx->param = param;
        }

IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)

IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)

IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)