1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
73 /* CRL score values */
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
111 static int null_callback(int ok
,X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
113 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
122 unsigned int *preasons
,
123 X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
125 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pcrl_score
,
127 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
129 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
);
130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
131 unsigned int *preasons
);
132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
134 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
135 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
138 const char X509_version
[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT
;
141 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509
**a
, X509
**b
)
149 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a
,*b
);
153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
155 X509
*x
,*xtmp
,*chain_ss
=NULL
;
158 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
= ctx
->param
;
161 int (*cb
)(int xok
,X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
162 STACK_OF(X509
) *sktmp
=NULL
;
163 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
)
165 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
171 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
172 * present and that the first entry is in place */
173 if (ctx
->chain
== NULL
)
175 if ( ((ctx
->chain
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) ||
176 (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
,ctx
->cert
)))
178 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
181 CRYPTO_add(&ctx
->cert
->references
,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
182 ctx
->last_untrusted
=1;
185 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
186 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
187 && (sktmp
=sk_X509_dup(ctx
->untrusted
)) == NULL
)
189 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
193 num
=sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
194 x
=sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
,num
-1);
200 /* If we have enough, we break */
201 if (depth
< num
) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
202 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
203 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
207 /* If we are self signed, we break */
208 xn
=X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
209 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
,x
)) break;
211 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
212 if (ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
)
214 xtmp
=find_issuer(ctx
, sktmp
,x
);
217 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
,xtmp
))
219 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
222 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp
->references
,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
223 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp
,xtmp
);
224 ctx
->last_untrusted
++;
227 /* reparse the full chain for
235 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
236 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
237 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
239 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
243 i
=sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
244 x
=sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
,i
-1);
245 xn
= X509_get_subject_name(x
);
246 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, x
))
248 /* we have a self signed certificate */
249 if (sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
251 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
252 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
253 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
255 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
256 if ((ok
<= 0) || X509_cmp(x
, xtmp
))
258 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
;
260 ctx
->error_depth
=i
-1;
261 if (ok
== 1) X509_free(xtmp
);
268 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
269 * so we get any trust settings.
273 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1, x
);
274 ctx
->last_untrusted
=0;
279 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
280 chain_ss
=sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
281 ctx
->last_untrusted
--;
283 x
=sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
,num
-1);
287 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
290 /* If we have enough, we break */
291 if (depth
< num
) break;
293 /* If we are self signed, we break */
294 xn
=X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
295 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
,x
,x
)) break;
297 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(&xtmp
, ctx
, x
);
299 if (ok
< 0) return ok
;
303 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
,x
))
306 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
312 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
313 xn
=X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
315 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
316 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
,x
,x
))
318 if ((chain_ss
== NULL
) || !ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, chain_ss
))
320 if (ctx
->last_untrusted
>= num
)
321 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
;
323 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
;
329 sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
,chain_ss
);
331 ctx
->last_untrusted
=num
;
332 ctx
->current_cert
=chain_ss
;
333 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
;
337 ctx
->error_depth
=num
-1;
343 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
344 ok
= check_chain_extensions(ctx
);
348 /* Check name constraints */
350 ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
);
354 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
356 if (param
->trust
> 0) ok
= check_trust(ctx
);
360 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
361 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
,ctx
->chain
);
363 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
364 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
367 ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
);
370 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
371 if (ctx
->verify
!= NULL
)
374 ok
=internal_verify(ctx
);
377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
378 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
379 ok
= v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
);
381 ok
= v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
);
385 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
386 if (!bad_chain
&& (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
))
387 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
392 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
,ctx
->chain
);
394 if (sktmp
!= NULL
) sk_X509_free(sktmp
);
395 if (chain_ss
!= NULL
) X509_free(chain_ss
);
400 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
403 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
407 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++)
409 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
410 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
))
416 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
418 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
421 ret
= X509_check_issued(issuer
, x
);
422 if (ret
== X509_V_OK
)
424 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
425 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK
))
429 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
430 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
431 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
435 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
437 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
439 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
442 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer
)->references
,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
450 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
451 * with the supplied purpose
454 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
456 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
459 int i
, ok
=0, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
461 int (*cb
)(int xok
,X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
462 int proxy_path_length
= 0;
464 int allow_proxy_certs
;
467 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
468 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
469 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
470 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
471 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
472 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
473 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
477 /* CRL path validation */
480 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
481 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
486 !!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
);
487 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
489 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
490 allow_proxy_certs
= 1;
491 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
494 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
495 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->last_untrusted
; i
++)
498 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
499 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
500 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
502 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
;
503 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
504 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
508 if (!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
))
510 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
;
511 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
512 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
516 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
520 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
521 && (ret
!= 1) && (ret
!= 0))
524 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
533 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
;
540 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
544 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
;
552 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
553 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
557 if (ctx
->param
->purpose
> 0)
559 ret
= X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0);
561 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
)
564 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
;
565 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
566 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
571 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
572 if ((i
> 1) && !(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
)
573 && (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1)
574 && (plen
> (x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
+ 1)))
576 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
577 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
578 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
582 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
583 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
585 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
586 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
587 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
589 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
)
591 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1 && i
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
)
594 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
;
595 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
596 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
612 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
616 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
617 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--)
619 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
620 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
621 if (i
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
))
623 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
624 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
625 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
626 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
628 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--)
630 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
633 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
637 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
638 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
639 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0,ctx
))
648 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
650 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
655 int (*cb
)(int xok
,X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
657 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
658 i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
659 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
660 ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
661 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
663 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
664 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
665 if (ok
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
666 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
;
668 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
;
674 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
677 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
))
679 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
)
680 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
683 for(i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++)
685 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
686 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
692 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
694 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
697 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
698 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
699 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
700 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
701 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
702 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
)
704 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
706 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
708 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
709 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
714 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
;
715 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
718 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
719 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
725 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
728 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
735 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
738 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
752 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
757 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
759 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
764 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
765 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
766 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
770 i
=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
775 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
;
776 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
784 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
;
785 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
789 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
))
791 i
=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
797 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
;
798 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
801 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
802 if ((i
< 0) && !(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
))
806 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
;
807 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
813 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
818 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
819 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
820 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
822 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
823 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
824 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
825 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
826 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
828 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++)
830 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
832 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
834 if (crl_score
> best_score
)
837 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
838 best_score
= crl_score
;
839 best_reasons
= reasons
;
846 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
848 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
849 *pscore
= best_score
;
850 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
851 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
854 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
857 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
860 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
866 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
867 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
870 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
872 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
, *extb
;
874 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, 0);
877 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
878 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
880 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
885 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, 0);
890 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
892 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
904 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
))
910 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
912 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
914 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
915 if (!delta
->base_crl_number
)
917 /* Base must have a CRL number */
918 if (!base
->crl_number
)
920 /* Issuer names must match */
921 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
),
922 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)))
924 /* AKID and IDP must match */
925 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
927 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
929 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
930 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
932 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
933 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
938 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
939 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
942 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
943 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
947 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
))
949 if (!((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
))
951 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++)
953 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
954 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
))
956 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
957 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
958 CRYPTO_add(&delta
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL
);
966 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
967 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
968 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
969 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
970 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
973 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
974 unsigned int *preasons
,
975 X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
979 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
981 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
983 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
984 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
986 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
987 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
989 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
992 else if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
)
994 /* If no new reasons reject */
995 if (!(crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
998 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
999 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
)
1001 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1002 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
)))
1004 if (!(crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
))
1008 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1010 if (!(crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
))
1011 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1014 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1015 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1017 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1018 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1020 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1022 if (!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
))
1025 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1027 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
))
1029 /* If no new reasons reject */
1030 if (!(crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
))
1032 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1033 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1036 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1042 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1043 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1045 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1046 X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1047 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1050 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1053 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1055 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
)
1057 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
)
1059 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1060 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1065 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++)
1067 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1068 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1070 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
)
1072 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1073 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1078 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1080 if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
))
1083 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1084 * set of untrusted certificates.
1086 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++)
1088 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1089 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1091 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
)
1093 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1094 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1100 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1101 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1102 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1103 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1107 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1109 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
;
1111 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1114 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->ctx
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1117 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1118 /* Copy verify params across */
1119 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1121 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1122 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1124 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1125 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1130 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1132 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1134 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1138 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1139 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1140 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1141 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1142 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1143 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1146 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1147 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1148 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1150 X509
*cert_ta
, *crl_ta
;
1151 cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1152 crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1153 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
))
1158 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1159 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1160 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1161 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1162 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1166 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1168 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1169 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1170 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1178 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1183 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
))
1188 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1190 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1192 else if (b
->type
== 1)
1196 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1197 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1201 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1204 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++)
1206 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1207 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1209 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
))
1215 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1217 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++)
1219 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1220 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++)
1222 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1223 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
))
1232 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1235 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1236 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1238 return !!(crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
);
1239 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++)
1241 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1242 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1244 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
))
1250 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1252 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1253 unsigned int *preasons
)
1256 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
)
1258 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
)
1260 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
)
1265 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
)
1268 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1269 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++)
1271 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1272 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
))
1275 idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
))
1277 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1282 if ((!crl
->idp
|| !crl
->idp
->distpoint
) && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
))
1287 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1288 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1291 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1292 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1295 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1297 unsigned int reasons
;
1298 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1299 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1300 X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1301 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1302 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1303 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1308 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1310 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1312 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1316 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1318 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1322 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1325 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1326 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1327 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1336 /* Check CRL validity */
1337 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1339 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1340 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1341 int ok
= 0, chnum
, cnum
;
1342 cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1343 chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1344 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1345 if (ctx
->current_issuer
)
1346 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1348 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1349 * is next certificate in chain.
1351 else if (cnum
< chnum
)
1352 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1355 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1356 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1357 if(!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
))
1359 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
;
1360 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1367 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1370 if (!crl
->base_crl_number
)
1372 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1373 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) &&
1374 !(issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
))
1376 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
;
1377 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1381 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
))
1383 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
;
1384 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1388 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
))
1390 if (!check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
))
1392 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
;
1393 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1398 if (crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
)
1400 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
;
1401 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1408 if (!(ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
))
1410 ok
= check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1);
1415 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1416 ikey
= X509_get_pubkey(issuer
);
1420 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1421 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1426 /* Verify CRL signature */
1427 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0)
1429 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1430 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1439 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey
);
1443 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1444 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1448 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1449 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1450 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1451 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1453 if (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
)
1455 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
)
1457 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
;
1458 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1462 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1463 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1465 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
))
1467 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1469 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
;
1470 ok
= ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1478 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1483 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1484 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1487 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1490 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1493 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1498 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++)
1500 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1501 if (!(x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
))
1503 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
1504 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
;
1505 if(!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1512 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1513 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1514 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1517 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
)
1519 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1520 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
1521 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1528 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1533 if (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
)
1534 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1538 i
=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1541 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
;
1542 ctx
->current_cert
=x
;
1543 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1549 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
;
1550 ctx
->current_cert
=x
;
1551 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1555 i
=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1558 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
;
1559 ctx
->current_cert
=x
;
1560 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1566 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
;
1567 ctx
->current_cert
=x
;
1568 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
))
1575 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1579 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
1580 int (*cb
)(int xok
,X509_STORE_CTX
*xctx
);
1584 n
=sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
1585 ctx
->error_depth
=n
-1;
1587 xi
=sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
,n
);
1589 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, xi
, xi
))
1595 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
;
1596 ctx
->current_cert
=xi
;
1604 xs
=sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
,n
);
1608 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1614 if ((pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
)
1616 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
;
1617 ctx
->current_cert
=xi
;
1621 else if (X509_verify(xs
,pkey
) <= 0)
1622 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
1623 * this is a waste of time. That check should
1624 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
1625 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
1626 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
1627 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
1628 * been declared trusted. */
1630 ctx
->error
=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
;
1631 ctx
->current_cert
=xs
;
1635 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1639 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1645 ok
= check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
);
1649 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1650 ctx
->current_issuer
=xi
;
1651 ctx
->current_cert
=xs
;
1659 xs
=sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
,n
);
1667 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1669 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1672 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1677 char buff1
[24],buff2
[24],*p
;
1682 str
=(char *)ctm
->data
;
1683 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1685 if ((i
< 11) || (i
> 17)) return 0;
1692 if (i
< 13) return 0;
1698 if ((*str
== 'Z') || (*str
== '-') || (*str
== '+'))
1699 { *(p
++)='0'; *(p
++)='0'; }
1704 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1708 while ((*str
>= '0') && (*str
<= '9')) str
++;
1719 if ((*str
!= '+') && (*str
!= '-'))
1721 offset
=((str
[1]-'0')*10+(str
[2]-'0'))*60;
1722 offset
+=(str
[3]-'0')*10+(str
[4]-'0');
1727 atm
.length
=sizeof(buff2
);
1728 atm
.data
=(unsigned char *)buff2
;
1730 if (X509_time_adj(&atm
,-offset
*60, cmp_time
) == NULL
)
1733 if (ctm
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1735 i
=(buff1
[0]-'0')*10+(buff1
[1]-'0');
1736 if (i
< 50) i
+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1737 j
=(buff2
[0]-'0')*10+(buff2
[1]-'0');
1740 if (i
< j
) return -1;
1741 if (i
> j
) return 1;
1743 i
=strcmp(buff1
,buff2
);
1744 if (i
== 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1750 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1752 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1755 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1757 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1760 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1761 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1766 if (in_tm
) t
= *in_tm
;
1769 if (s
) type
= s
->type
;
1770 if (type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1771 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
,t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1772 if (type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1773 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1774 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1777 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1779 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
=NULL
,*ktmp2
;
1782 if ((pkey
!= NULL
) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) return 1;
1784 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++)
1786 ktmp
=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
,i
));
1789 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1792 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1796 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1802 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS
,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1806 /* first, populate the other certs */
1807 for (j
=i
-1; j
>= 0; j
--)
1809 ktmp2
=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
,j
));
1810 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
,ktmp
);
1811 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2
);
1814 if (pkey
!= NULL
) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
,ktmp
);
1815 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp
);
1819 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl
, void *argp
, CRYPTO_EX_new
*new_func
,
1820 CRYPTO_EX_dup
*dup_func
, CRYPTO_EX_free
*free_func
)
1822 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1823 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1824 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, argl
, argp
,
1825 new_func
, dup_func
, free_func
);
1828 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
1830 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
,idx
,data
);
1833 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
1835 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
,idx
);
1838 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1843 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
1848 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1850 return ctx
->error_depth
;
1853 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1855 return ctx
->current_cert
;
1858 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1863 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1867 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
;
1868 if (!ctx
->chain
|| !(chain
= sk_X509_dup(ctx
->chain
))) return NULL
;
1869 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++)
1871 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
1872 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1877 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1882 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
1887 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
1892 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
1894 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
1897 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
1899 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
1902 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1903 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1904 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1905 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1906 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1907 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1908 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1909 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1912 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
1913 int purpose
, int trust
)
1916 /* If purpose not set use default */
1917 if (!purpose
) purpose
= def_purpose
;
1918 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1922 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
1925 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
1926 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
1929 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
1930 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
)
1932 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
1935 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
1936 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
1939 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
1941 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1942 if (!trust
) trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
1946 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
1949 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT
,
1950 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
1955 if (purpose
&& !ctx
->param
->purpose
) ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
1956 if (trust
&& !ctx
->param
->trust
) ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
1960 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1962 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
;
1963 ctx
= (X509_STORE_CTX
*)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX
));
1966 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1969 memset(ctx
, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX
));
1973 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1975 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
1979 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
1980 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1984 ctx
->current_method
=0;
1986 ctx
->untrusted
=chain
;
1988 ctx
->last_untrusted
=0;
1989 ctx
->other_ctx
=NULL
;
1993 ctx
->explicit_policy
=0;
1995 ctx
->current_cert
=NULL
;
1996 ctx
->current_issuer
=NULL
;
2000 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2004 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2008 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2014 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2016 ctx
->param
->flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2020 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2021 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2027 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2028 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2032 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2036 if (store
&& store
->check_issued
)
2037 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2039 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2041 if (store
&& store
->get_issuer
)
2042 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2044 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2046 if (store
&& store
->verify_cb
)
2047 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2049 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2051 if (store
&& store
->verify
)
2052 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2054 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2056 if (store
&& store
->check_revocation
)
2057 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2059 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2061 if (store
&& store
->get_crl
)
2062 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2064 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2066 if (store
&& store
->check_crl
)
2067 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2069 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2071 if (store
&& store
->cert_crl
)
2072 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2074 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2076 if (store
&& store
->lookup_certs
)
2077 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2079 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_get1_certs
;
2081 if (store
&& store
->lookup_crls
)
2082 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2084 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_get1_crls
;
2086 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2089 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2090 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2091 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2092 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2093 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2097 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2103 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2104 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2107 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2109 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2110 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2113 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2115 if (ctx
->cleanup
) ctx
->cleanup(ctx
);
2116 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
)
2118 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2119 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2122 if (ctx
->tree
!= NULL
)
2124 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2127 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
)
2129 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
,X509_free
);
2132 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2133 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA
));
2136 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2138 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2141 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2143 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2146 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
, time_t t
)
2148 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2151 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2152 int (*verify_cb
)(int, X509_STORE_CTX
*))
2154 ctx
->verify_cb
=verify_cb
;
2157 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2162 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2164 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2167 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2169 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2170 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2173 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2176 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2181 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2184 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2188 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509
)
2189 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509
)
2191 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME
)
2193 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE
)
2194 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE
)