1 .\" Copyright (C) 2014 Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
2 .\" and Copyright (C) 2014 David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
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21 .TH MEMFD_CREATE 2 2017-09-15 Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual"
23 memfd_create \- create an anonymous file
25 .B #include <sys/memfd.h>
27 .BI "int memfd_create(const char *" name ", unsigned int " flags ");"
30 There is no glibc wrapper for this system call; see NOTES.
33 creates an anonymous file and returns a file descriptor that refers to it.
34 The file behaves like a regular file, and so can be modified,
35 truncated, memory-mapped, and so on.
36 However, unlike a regular file,
37 it lives in RAM and has a volatile backing storage.
38 Once all references to the file are dropped, it is automatically released.
39 Anonymous memory is used for all backing pages of the file.
40 Therefore, files created by
42 have the same semantics as other anonymous
44 .\" memfd uses VM_NORESERVE so each page is accounted on first access.
45 .\" This means, the overcommit-limits (see __vm_enough_memory()) and the
46 .\" memory-cgroup limits (mem_cgroup_try_charge()) are applied. Note that
47 .\" those are accounted on "current" and "current->mm", that is, the
48 .\" process doing the first page access.
49 memory allocations such as those allocated using
55 The initial size of the file is set to 0.
56 Following the call, the file size should be set using
58 (Alternatively, the file may be populated by calls to
64 is used as a filename and will be displayed
65 as the target of the corresponding symbolic link in the directory
67 The displayed name is always prefixed with
69 and serves only for debugging purposes.
70 Names do not affect the behavior of the file descriptor,
71 and as such multiple files can have the same name without any side effects.
73 The following values may be bitwise ORed in
75 to change the behavior of
81 flag on the new file descriptor.
82 See the description of the
86 for reasons why this may be useful.
89 Allow sealing operations on this file.
90 See the discussion of the
96 and also NOTES, below.
97 The initial set of seals is empty.
98 If this flag is not set, the initial set of seals will be
100 meaning that no other seals can be set on the file.
101 .\" FIXME Why is the MFD_ALLOW_SEALING behavior not simply the default?
102 .\" Is it worth adding some text explaining this?
104 .BR MFD_HUGETLB " (since Linux 4.14)"
105 .\" commit 749df87bd7bee5a79cef073f5d032ddb2b211de8
106 The anonymous file will be created in the hugetlbfs filesystem using
108 See the Linux kernel source file
109 .I Documentation/vm/hugetlbpage.txt
110 for more information about hugetlbfs.
111 The hugetlbfs filesystem does not support file sealing operations.
112 Therefore, specifying both
116 will result in an error
120 .BR MFD_HUGE_2MB ", " MFD_HUGE_1GB ", " "..."
121 Used in conjunction with
123 to select alternative hugetlb page sizes (respectively, 2 MB, 1 GB, ...)
124 on systems that support multiple hugetlb page sizes.
125 Definitions for known
126 huge page sizes are included in the header file
129 For details on encoding huge page sizes not included in the header file,
130 see the discussion of the similarly named constants in
139 returns a new file descriptor that can be used to refer to the file.
140 This file descriptor is opened for both reading and writing
144 is set for the file descriptor.
150 the usual semantics apply for the file descriptor created by
152 A copy of the file descriptor is inherited by the child produced by
154 and refers to the same file.
155 The file descriptor is preserved across
157 unless the close-on-exec flag has been set.
161 returns a new file descriptor.
162 On error, \-1 is returned and
164 is set to indicate the error.
170 points to invalid memory.
173 An unsupported value was specified in one of the arguments:
175 included unknown bits, or
180 The per-process limit on the number of open file descriptors has been reached.
183 The system-wide limit on the total number of open files has been reached.
186 There was insufficient memory to create a new anonymous file.
190 system call first appeared in Linux 3.17.
194 system call is Linux-specific.
196 Glibc does not provide a wrapper for this system call; call it using
199 .\" See also http://lwn.net/Articles/593918/
200 .\" and http://lwn.net/Articles/594919/ and http://lwn.net/Articles/591108/
203 system call provides a simple alternative to manually mounting a
205 filesystem and creating and opening a file in that filesystem.
206 The primary purpose of
208 is to create files and associated file descriptors that are
209 used with the file-sealing APIs provided by
214 system call also has uses without file sealing
215 (which is why file-sealing is disabled, unless explicitly requested with the
216 .BR MFD_ALLOW_SEALING
218 In particular, it can be used as an alternative to creating files in
220 or as an alternative to using the
223 in cases where there is no intention to actually link the
224 resulting file into the filesystem.
226 In the absence of file sealing,
227 processes that communicate via shared memory must either trust each other,
228 or take measures to deal with the possibility that an untrusted peer
229 may manipulate the shared memory region in problematic ways.
230 For example, an untrusted peer might modify the contents of the
231 shared memory at any time, or shrink the shared memory region.
232 The former possibility leaves the local process vulnerable to
233 time-of-check-to-time-of-use race conditions
234 (typically dealt with by copying data from
235 the shared memory region before checking and using it).
236 The latter possibility leaves the local process vulnerable to
238 signals when an attempt is made to access a now-nonexistent
239 location in the shared memory region.
240 (Dealing with this possibility necessitates the use of a handler for the
244 Dealing with untrusted peers imposes extra complexity on
245 code that employs shared memory.
246 Memory sealing enables that extra complexity to be eliminated,
247 by allowing a process to operate secure in the knowledge that
248 its peer can't modify the shared memory in an undesired fashion.
250 An example of the usage of the sealing mechanism is as follows:
252 The first process creates a
256 The call yields a file descriptor used in subsequent steps.
259 sizes the file created in the previous step using
263 and populates the shared memory with the desired data.
265 The first process uses the
268 operation to place one or more seals on the file,
269 in order to restrict further modifications on the file.
272 then it will be necessary to first unmap the shared writable mapping
273 created in the previous step.)
275 A second process obtains a file descriptor for the
278 Among the possible ways in which this could happen are the following:
281 The process that called
283 could transfer the resulting file descriptor to the second process
284 via a UNIX domain socket (see
288 The second process then maps the file using
291 The second process is created via
293 and thus automatically inherits the file descriptor and mapping.
294 (Note that in this case and the next,
295 there is a natural trust relationship between the two processes,
296 since they are running under the same user ID.
297 Therefore, file sealing would not normally be necessary.)
299 The second process opens the file
300 .IR /proc/<pid>/fd/<fd> ,
303 is the PID of the first process (the one that called
304 .BR memfd_create ()),
307 is the number of the file descriptor returned by the call to
310 The second process then maps the file using
314 The second process uses the
317 operation to retrieve the bit mask of seals
318 that has been applied to the file.
319 This bit mask can be inspected in order to determine
320 what kinds of restrictions have been placed on file modifications.
321 If desired, the second process can apply further seals
322 to impose additional restrictions (so long as the
324 seal has not yet been applied).
326 Below are shown two example programs that demonstrate the use of
328 and the file sealing API.
331 .IR t_memfd_create.c ,
336 sets a size for the file, maps it into memory,
337 and optionally places some seals on the file.
338 The program accepts up to three command-line arguments,
339 of which the first two are required.
340 The first argument is the name to associate with the file,
341 the second argument is the size to be set for the file,
342 and the optional third argument is a string of characters that specify
343 seals to be set on file.
347 can be used to open an existing file that was created via
349 and inspect the set of seals that have been applied to that file.
351 The following shell session demonstrates the use of these programs.
354 file and set some seals on it:
358 $ \fB./t_memfd_create my_memfd_file 4096 sw &\fP
360 PID: 11775; fd: 3; /proc/11775/fd/3
366 program continues to run in the background.
367 From another program, we can obtain a file descriptor for the
372 file that corresponds to the file descriptor opened by
374 Using that pathname, we inspect the content of the
376 symbolic link, and use our
378 program to view the seals that have been placed on the file:
382 $ \fBreadlink /proc/11775/fd/3\fP
383 /memfd:my_memfd_file (deleted)
384 $ \fB./t_get_seals /proc/11775/fd/3\fP
385 Existing seals: WRITE SHRINK
388 .SS Program source: t_memfd_create.c
391 #include <sys/memfd.h>
398 #define errExit(msg) do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \\
402 main(int argc, char *argv[])
407 char *name, *seals_arg;
411 fprintf(stderr, "%s name size [seals]\\n", argv[0]);
412 fprintf(stderr, "\\t\(aqseals\(aq can contain any of the "
413 "following characters:\\n");
414 fprintf(stderr, "\\t\\tg \- F_SEAL_GROW\\n");
415 fprintf(stderr, "\\t\\ts \- F_SEAL_SHRINK\\n");
416 fprintf(stderr, "\\t\\tw \- F_SEAL_WRITE\\n");
417 fprintf(stderr, "\\t\\tS \- F_SEAL_SEAL\\n");
425 /* Create an anonymous file in tmpfs; allow seals to be
426 placed on the file */
428 fd = memfd_create(name, MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
430 errExit("memfd_create");
432 /* Size the file as specified on the command line */
434 if (ftruncate(fd, len) == \-1)
437 printf("PID: %ld; fd: %d; /proc/%ld/fd/%d\\n",
438 (long) getpid(), fd, (long) getpid(), fd);
440 /* Code to map the file and populate the mapping with data
443 /* If a \(aqseals\(aq command\-line argument was supplied, set some
446 if (seals_arg != NULL) {
449 if (strchr(seals_arg, \(aqg\(aq) != NULL)
450 seals |= F_SEAL_GROW;
451 if (strchr(seals_arg, \(aqs\(aq) != NULL)
452 seals |= F_SEAL_SHRINK;
453 if (strchr(seals_arg, \(aqw\(aq) != NULL)
454 seals |= F_SEAL_WRITE;
455 if (strchr(seals_arg, \(aqS\(aq) != NULL)
456 seals |= F_SEAL_SEAL;
458 if (fcntl(fd, F_ADD_SEALS, seals) == \-1)
462 /* Keep running, so that the file created by memfd_create()
463 continues to exist */
470 .SS Program source: t_get_seals.c
473 #include <sys/memfd.h>
480 #define errExit(msg) do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \\
484 main(int argc, char *argv[])
490 fprintf(stderr, "%s /proc/PID/fd/FD\\n", argv[0]);
494 fd = open(argv[1], O_RDWR);
498 seals = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
502 printf("Existing seals:");
503 if (seals & F_SEAL_SEAL)
505 if (seals & F_SEAL_GROW)
507 if (seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)
509 if (seals & F_SEAL_SHRINK)
513 /* Code to map the file and access the contents of the
514 resulting mapping omitted */