user_namespaces.7: wfix

[thirdparty/man-pages.git] / man7 / user_namespaces.7

.\" Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 by Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
.\" and Copyright (c) 2012, 2014 by Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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.\"
.TH USER_NAMESPACES 7 2014-09-21 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
.SH NAME
user_namespaces \- overview of Linux user namespaces
.SH DESCRIPTION
For an overview of namespaces, see
.BR namespaces (7).

User namespaces isolate security-related identifiers and attributes,
in particular,
user IDs and group IDs (see
.BR credentials (7)),
the root directory,
keys (see
.BR keyctl (2)),
.\" FIXME: This page says very little about the interaction
.\" of user namespaces and keys. Add something on this topic.
and capabilities (see
.BR capabilities (7)).
A process's user and group IDs can be different
inside and outside a user namespace.
In particular,
a process can have a normal unprivileged user ID outside a user namespace
while at the same time having a user ID of 0 inside the namespace;
in other words,
the process has full privileges for operations inside the user namespace,
but is unprivileged for operations outside the namespace.
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS Nested namespaces, namespace membership
User namespaces can be nested;
that is, each user namespace\(emexcept the initial ("root")
namespace\(emhas a parent user namespace,
and can have zero or more child user namespaces.
The parent user namespace is the user namespace
of the process that creates the user namespace via a call to
.BR unshare (2)
or
.BR clone (2)
with the
.BR CLONE_NEWUSER
flag.

The kernel imposes (since version 3.11) a limit of 32 nested levels of
.\" commit 8742f229b635bf1c1c84a3dfe5e47c814c20b5c8
user namespaces.
.\" FIXME Explain the rationale for this limit. (What is the rationale?)
Calls to
.BR unshare (2)
or
.BR clone (2)
that would cause this limit to be exceeded fail with the error
.BR EUSERS .

Each process is a member of exactly one user namespace.
A process created via
.BR fork (2)
or
.BR clone (2)
without the
.BR CLONE_NEWUSER
flag is a member of the same user namespace as its parent.
A single-threaded process can join another user namespace with
.BR setns (2)
if it has the
.BR CAP_SYS_ADMIN
in that namespace;
upon doing so, it gains a full set of capabilities in that namespace.

A call to
.BR clone (2)
or
.BR unshare (2)
with the
.BR CLONE_NEWUSER
flag makes the new child process (for
.BR clone (2))
or the caller (for
.BR unshare (2))
a member of the new user namespace created by the call.
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS Capabilities
The child process created by
.BR clone (2)
with the
.BR CLONE_NEWUSER
flag starts out with a complete set
of capabilities in the new user namespace.
Likewise, a process that creates a new user namespace using
.BR unshare (2)
or joins an existing user namespace using
.BR setns (2)
gains a full set of capabilities in that namespace.
On the other hand,
that process has no capabilities in the parent (in the case of
.BR clone (2))
or previous (in the case of
.BR unshare (2)
and
.BR setns (2))
user namespace,
even if the new namespace is created or joined by the root user
(i.e., a process with user ID 0 in the root namespace).

Note that a call to
.BR execve (2)
will cause a process's capabilities to be recalculated in the usual way (see
.BR capabilities (7)),
so that usually,
unless it has a user ID of 0 within the namespace or the executable file
has a nonempty inheritable capabilities mask,
it will lose all capabilities.
See the discussion of user and group ID mappings, below.

A call to
.BR clone (2),
.BR unshare (2),
or
.BR setns (2)
using the
.BR CLONE_NEWUSER
flag sets the "securebits" flags
(see
.BR capabilities (7))
to their default values (all flags disabled) in the child (for
.BR clone (2))
or caller (for
.BR unshare (2),
or
.BR setns (2)).
Note that because the caller no longer has capabilities
in its original user namespace after a call to
.BR setns (2),
it is not possible for a process to reset its "securebits" flags while
retaining its user namespace membership by using a pair of
.BR setns (2)
calls to move to another user namespace and then return to
its original user namespace.

Having a capability inside a user namespace
permits a process to perform operations (that require privilege)
only on resources governed by that namespace.
The rules for determining whether or not a process has a capability
in a particular user namespace are as follows:
.IP 1. 3
A process has a capability inside a user namespace
if it is a member of that namespace and
it has the capability in its effective capability set.
A process can gain capabilities in its effective capability
set in various ways.
For example, it may execute a set-user-ID program or an
executable with associated file capabilities.
In addition,
a process may gain capabilities via the effect of
.BR clone (2),
.BR unshare (2),
or
.BR setns (2),
as already described.
.\" In the 3.8 sources, see security/commoncap.c::cap_capable():
.IP 2.
If a process has a capability in a user namespace,
then it has that capability in all child (and further removed descendant)
namespaces as well.
.IP 3.
.\" * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the
.\" * user namespace has all caps.
When a user namespace is created, the kernel records the effective
user ID of the creating process as being the "owner" of the namespace.
.\" (and likewise associates the effective group ID of the creating process
.\" with the namespace).
A process that resides
in the parent of the user namespace
.\" See kernel commit 520d9eabce18edfef76a60b7b839d54facafe1f9 for a fix
.\" on this point
and whose effective user ID matches the owner of the namespace
has all capabilities in the namespace.
.\"     This includes the case where the process executes a set-user-ID
.\"     program that confers the effective UID of the creator of the namespace.
By virtue of the previous rule,
this means that the process has all capabilities in all
further removed descendant user namespaces as well.
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS Interaction of user namespaces and other types of namespaces
Starting in Linux 3.8, unprivileged processes can create user namespaces,
and mount, PID, IPC, network, and UTS namespaces can be created with just the
.B CAP_SYS_ADMIN
capability in the caller's user namespace.

When a non-user-namespace is created,
it is owned by the user namespace in which the creating process
was a member at the time of the creation of the namespace.
Actions on the non-user-namespace
require capabilities in the corresponding user namespace.

If
.BR CLONE_NEWUSER
is specified along with other
.B CLONE_NEW*
flags in a single
.BR clone (2)
or
.BR unshare (2)
call, the user namespace is guaranteed to be created first,
giving the child
.RB ( clone (2))
or caller
.RB ( unshare (2))
privileges over the remaining namespaces created by the call.
Thus, it is possible for an unprivileged caller to specify this combination
of flags.

When a new IPC, mount, network, PID, or UTS namespace is created via
.BR clone (2)
or
.BR unshare (2),
the kernel records the user namespace of the creating process against
the new namespace.
(This association can't be changed.)
When a process in the new namespace subsequently performs
privileged operations that operate on global
resources isolated by the namespace,
the permission checks are performed according to the process's capabilities
in the user namespace that the kernel associated with the new namespace.
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS Restrictions on mount namespaces

Note the following points with respect to mount namespaces:
.IP * 3
A mount namespace has an owner user namespace.
A mount namespace whose owner user namespace is different from
the owner user namespace of its parent mount namespace is
considered a less privileged mount namespace.
.IP *
When creating a less privileged mount namespace,
shared mounts are reduced to slave mounts.
This ensures that mappings performed in less
privileged mount namespaces will not propagate to more privileged
mount namespaces.
.IP *
.\" FIXME .
.\"     What does "come as a single unit from more privileged mount" mean?
Mounts that come as a single unit from more privileged mount are
locked together and may not be separated in a less privileged mount
namespace.
(The
.BR unshare (2)
.B CLONE_NEWNS
operation brings across all of the mounts from the original
mount namespace as a single unit,
and recursive mounts that propagate between
mount namespaces propagate as a single unit.)
.IP *
The
.BR mount (2)
flags
.BR MS_RDONLY ,
.BR MS_NOSUID ,
.BR MS_NOEXEC ,
and the "atime" flags
.RB ( MS_NOATIME ,
.BR MS_NODIRATIME ,
.BR MS_RELATIME )
settings become locked
.\" commit 9566d6742852c527bf5af38af5cbb878dad75705
.\" Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
.\" Date:   Mon Jul 28 17:26:07 2014 -0700
.\"
.\"      mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
.\"
when propagated from a more privileged to
a less privileged mount namespace,
and may not be changed in the less privileged mount namespace.
.IP *
.\" (As of 3.18-rc1 (in Al Viro's 2014-08-30 vfs.git#for-next tree))
A file or directory that is a mount point in one namespace that is not
a mount point in another namespace, may be renamed, unlinked, or removed
.RB ( rmdir (2))
in the mount namespace in which it is not a mount point
(subject to the usual permission checks).
.IP
Previously, attempting to unlink, rename, or remove a file or directory
that was a mount point in another mount namespace would result in the error
.BR EBUSY .
That behavior had technical problems of enforcement (e.g., for NFS)
and permitted denial-of-service attacks against more privileged users.
(i.e., preventing individual files from being updated
by bind mounting on top of them).
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS User and group ID mappings: uid_map and gid_map
When a user namespace is created,
it starts out without a mapping of user IDs (group IDs)
to the parent user namespace.
The
.IR /proc/[pid]/uid_map
and
.IR /proc/[pid]/gid_map
files (available since Linux 3.5)
.\" commit 22d917d80e842829d0ca0a561967d728eb1d6303
expose the mappings for user and group IDs
inside the user namespace for the process
.IR pid .
These files can be read to view the mappings in a user namespace and
written to (once) to define the mappings.

The description in the following paragraphs explains the details for
.IR uid_map ;
.IR gid_map
is exactly the same,
but each instance of "user ID" is replaced by "group ID".

The
.I uid_map
file exposes the mapping of user IDs from the user namespace
of the process
.IR pid
to the user namespace of the process that opened
.IR uid_map
(but see a qualification to this point below).
In other words, processes that are in different user namespaces
will potentially see different values when reading from a particular
.I uid_map
file, depending on the user ID mappings for the user namespaces
of the reading processes.

Each line in the
.I uid_map
file specifies a 1-to-1 mapping of a range of contiguous
user IDs between two user namespaces.
(When a user namespace is first created, this file is empty.)
The specification in each line takes the form of
three numbers delimited by white space.
The first two numbers specify the starting user ID in
each of the two user namespaces.
The third number specifies the length of the mapped range.
In detail, the fields are interpreted as follows:
.IP (1) 4
The start of the range of user IDs in
the user namespace of the process
.IR pid .
.IP (2)
The start of the range of user
IDs to which the user IDs specified by field one map.
How field two is interpreted depends on whether the process that opened
.I uid_map
and the process
.IR pid
are in the same user namespace, as follows:
.RS
.IP a) 3
If the two processes are in different user namespaces:
field two is the start of a range of
user IDs in the user namespace of the process that opened
.IR uid_map .
.IP b)
If the two processes are in the same user namespace:
field two is the start of the range of
user IDs in the parent user namespace of the process
.IR pid .
This case enables the opener of
.I uid_map
(the common case here is opening
.IR /proc/self/uid_map )
to see the mapping of user IDs into the user namespace of the process
that created this user namespace.
.RE
.IP (3)
The length of the range of user IDs that is mapped between the two
user namespaces.
.PP
System calls that return user IDs (group IDs)\(emfor example,
.BR getuid (2),
.BR getgid (2),
and the credential fields in the structure returned by
.BR stat (2)\(emreturn
the user ID (group ID) mapped into the caller's user namespace.

When a process accesses a file, its user and group IDs
are mapped into the initial user namespace for the purpose of permission
checking and assigning IDs when creating a file.
When a process retrieves file user and group IDs via
.BR stat (2),
the IDs are mapped in the opposite direction,
to produce values relative to the process user and group ID mappings.

The initial user namespace has no parent namespace,
but, for consistency, the kernel provides dummy user and group
ID mapping files for this namespace.
Looking at the
.I uid_map
file
.RI ( gid_map
is the same) from a shell in the initial namespace shows:

.in +4n
.nf
$ \fBcat /proc/$$/uid_map\fP
         0          0 4294967295
.fi
.in

This mapping tells us
that the range starting at user ID 0 in this namespace
maps to a range starting at 0 in the (nonexistent) parent namespace,
and the length of the range is the largest 32-bit unsigned integer.
This leaves 4294967295 (the 32-bit signed \-1 value) unmapped.
This is deliberate:
.IR "(uid_t)\ \-1"
is used in several interfaces (e.g.,
.BR setreuid (2))
as a way to specify "no user ID".
Leaving
.IR "(uid_t)\ \-1"
unmapped and unusable guarantees that there will be no
confusion when using these interfaces.
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS Defining user and group ID mappings: writing to uid_map and gid_map
.PP
After the creation of a new user namespace, the
.I uid_map
file of
.I one
of the processes in the namespace may be written to
.I once
to define the mapping of user IDs in the new user namespace.
An attempt to write more than once to a
.I uid_map
file in a user namespace fails with the error
.BR EPERM .
Similar rules apply for
.I gid_map
files.

The lines written to
.IR uid_map
.RI ( gid_map )
must conform to the following rules:
.IP * 3
The three fields must be valid numbers,
and the last field must be greater than 0.
.IP *
Lines are terminated by newline characters.
.IP *
There is an (arbitrary) limit on the number of lines in the file.
As at Linux 3.18, the limit is five lines.
In addition, the number of bytes written to
the file must be less than the system page size,
.\" FIXME(Eric): the restriction "less than" rather than "less than or equal"
.\" seems strangely arbitrary. Furthermore, the comment does not agree
.\" with the code in kernel/user_namespace.c. Which is correct?
and the write must be performed at the start of the file (i.e.,
.BR lseek (2)
and
.BR pwrite (2)
can't be used to write to nonzero offsets in the file).
.IP *
The range of user IDs (group IDs)
specified in each line cannot overlap with the ranges
in any other lines.
In the initial implementation (Linux 3.8), this requirement was
satisfied by a simplistic implementation that imposed the further
requirement that
the values in both field 1 and field 2 of successive lines must be
in ascending numerical order,
which prevented some otherwise valid maps from being created.
Linux 3.9 and later
.\" commit 0bd14b4fd72afd5df41e9fd59f356740f22fceba
fix this limitation, allowing any valid set of nonoverlapping maps.
.IP *
At least one line must be written to the file.
.PP
Writes that violate the above rules fail with the error
.BR EINVAL .

In order for a process to write to the
.I /proc/[pid]/uid_map
.RI ( /proc/[pid]/gid_map )
file, all of the following requirements must be met:
.IP 1. 3
The writing process must have the
.BR CAP_SETUID
.RB ( CAP_SETGID )
capability in the user namespace of the process
.IR pid .
.IP 2.
The writing process must either be in the user namespace of the process
.I pid
or be in the parent user namespace of the process
.IR pid .
.IP 3.
The mapped user IDs (group IDs) must in turn have a mapping
in the parent user namespace.
.IP 4.
One of the following two cases applies:
.RS
.IP * 3
.IR Either
the writing process has the
.BR CAP_SETUID
.RB ( CAP_SETGID )
capability in the
.I parent
user namespace.
.RS
.IP + 3
No further restrictions apply:
the process can make mappings to arbitrary user IDs (group IDs)
in the parent user namespace.
.RE
.IP * 3
.IR Or
otherwise all of the following restrictions apply:
.RS
.IP + 3
The data written to
.I uid_map
.RI ( gid_map )
must consist of a single line that maps
the writing process's effective user ID
(group ID) in the parent user namespace to a user ID (group ID)
in the user namespace.
.IP +
The writing process must have the same effective user ID as the process
that created the user namespace.
.IP +
In the case of
.IR gid_map ,
use of the
.BR setgroups (2)
system call must first be denied by writing
.RI \(dq deny \(dq
to the
.I /proc/[pid]/setgroups
file (see below) before writing to
.IR gid_map .
.RE
.RE
.PP
Writes that violate the above rules fail with the error
.BR EPERM .
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS Interaction with system calls that change process UIDs or GIDs
In a user namespace where the
.I uid_map
file has not been written, the system calls that change user IDs will fail.
Similarly, if the
.I gid_map
file has not been written, the system calls that change group IDs will fail.
After the
.I uid_map
and
.I gid_map
files have been written, only the mapped values may be used in
system calls that change user and group IDs.

For user IDs, the relevant system calls include
.BR setuid (2),
.BR setfsuid (2),
.BR setreuid (2),
and
.BR setresuid (2).
For group IDs, the relevant system calls include
.BR setgid (2),
.BR setfsgid (2),
.BR setregid (2),
.BR setresgid (2),
and
.BR setgroups (2).

Writing
.RI \(dq deny \(dq
to the
.I /proc/[pid]/setgroups
file before writing to
.I /proc/[pid]/gid_map
.\" Things changed in Linux 3.19
.\" commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8
.\" commit 66d2f338ee4c449396b6f99f5e75cd18eb6df272
.\" http://lwn.net/Articles/626665/
will permanently disable
.BR setgroups (2)
in a user namespace and allow writing to
.I /proc/[pid]/gid_map
without having the
.BR CAP_SETGID
capability in the parent user namespace.
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS The /proc/[pid]/setgroups file
.\" 
.\" commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8
.\" commit 66d2f338ee4c449396b6f99f5e75cd18eb6df272
.\" http://lwn.net/Articles/626665/
.\" http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2014-8989
.\"
The
.I /proc/[pid]/setgroups
file displays the string
.RI \(dq allow \(dq
if processes in the user namespace that contains the process
.I pid
are permitted to employ the
.BR setgroups (2)
system call; it displays
.RI \(dq deny \(dq
if
.BR setgroups (2)
is not permitted in that user namespace.

A privileged process (one with the
.BR CAP_SYS_ADMIN
capability in the namespace) may write either of the strings
.RI \(dq allow \(dq
or
.RI \(dq deny \(dq
to this file
.I before
writing a group ID mapping
for this user namespace to the file
.IR /proc/[pid]/gid_map .
Writing the string
.RI \(dq deny \(dq
prevents any process in the user namespace from employing
.BR setgroups (2).
Note that regardless of the value in the
.I /proc/[pid]/setgroups
file, calls to
.BR setgroups (2)
are also not permitted if
.IR /proc/[pid]/gid_map
has not yet been set.

The essence of the restrictions described in the preceding
paragraph is that it is permitted to write to
.I /proc/[pid]/setgroups
only so long as calling
.BR setgroups (2)
is disallowed because
.I /proc/[pid]gid_map
has not been set.
This ensures that a process cannot transition from a state where
.BR setgroups (2)
is allowed to a state where
.BR setgroups (2)
is denied;
a process can only transition from
.BR setgroups (2)
being disallowed to
.BR setgroups (2)
being allowed.

The default value of this file in the initial user namespace is
.RI \(dq allow \(dq.

Once
.IR /proc/[pid]/gid_map
has been written to
(which has the effect of enabling
.BR setgroups (2)
in the user namespace),
it is no longer possible to deny
.BR setgroups (2)
by writing to
.IR /proc/[pid]/setgroups .

A child user namespace inherits the
.IR /proc/[pid]/gid_map
setting from its parent.

If the
.I setgroups
file has the value
.RI \(dq deny \(dq,
then the
.BR setgroups (2)
system call can't subsequently be reenabled (by writing
.RI \(dq allow \(dq
to the file) in this user namespace.
(Attempts to do so will fail with the error
.BR EPERM .)
This restriction also propagates down to all child user namespaces of
this user namespace.

The
.I /proc/[pid]/setgroups
file was added in Linux 3.19,
but was backported to many earlier stable kernel series,
because it addresses a security issue.
The issue concerned files with permissions such as "rwx\-\-\-rwx".
Such files give fewer permissions to "group" than they do to "other".
This means that dropping groups using
.BR setgroups (2)
might allow a process file access that it did not formerly have.
Before the existence of user namespaces this was not a concern,
since only a privileged process (one with the
.BR CAP_SETGID
capability) could call
.BR setgroups (2).
However, with the introduction of user namespaces,
it became possible for an unprivileged process to create
a new namespace in which the user had all privileges.
This then allowed formerly unprivileged
users to drop groups and thus gain file access
that they did not previously have.
The
.I /proc/[pid]/setgroups
file was added to address this security issue,
by denying any pathway for an unprivileged process to drop groups with
.BR setgroups (2).
.\"
.\" /proc/PID/setgroups
.\"     [allow == setgroups() is allowed, "deny" == setgroups() is disallowed]
.\"     * Can write if have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in NS
.\"     * Must write BEFORE writing to /proc/PID/gid_map
.\"
.\" setgroups()
.\"     * Must already have written to gid_maps
.\"     * /proc/PID/setgroups must be "allow"
.\"
.\" /proc/PID/gid_map -- writing
.\"     * Must already have written "deny" to /proc/PID/setgroups
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS Unmapped user and group IDs
.PP
There are various places where an unmapped user ID (group ID)
may be exposed to user space.
For example, the first process in a new user namespace may call
.BR getuid ()
before a user ID mapping has been defined for the namespace.
In most such cases, an unmapped user ID is converted
.\" from_kuid_munged(), from_kgid_munged()
to the overflow user ID (group ID);
the default value for the overflow user ID (group ID) is 65534.
See the descriptions of
.IR /proc/sys/kernel/overflowuid
and
.IR /proc/sys/kernel/overflowgid
in
.BR proc (5).

The cases where unmapped IDs are mapped in this fashion include
system calls that return user IDs
.RB ( getuid (2),
.BR getgid (2),
and similar),
credentials passed over a UNIX domain socket,
.\" also SO_PEERCRED
credentials returned by
.BR stat (2),
.BR waitid (2),
and the System V IPC "ctl"
.B IPC_STAT
operations,
credentials exposed by
.IR /proc/PID/status
and the files in
.IR /proc/sysvipc/* ,
credentials returned via the
.I si_uid
field in the
.I siginfo_t
received with a signal (see
.BR sigaction (2)),
credentials written to the process accounting file (see
.BR acct (5)),
and credentials returned with POSIX message queue notifications (see
.BR mq_notify (3)).

There is one notable case where unmapped user and group IDs are
.I not
.\" from_kuid(), from_kgid()
.\" Also F_GETOWNER_UIDS is an exception
converted to the corresponding overflow ID value.
When viewing a
.I uid_map
or
.I gid_map
file in which there is no mapping for the second field,
that field is displayed as 4294967295 (\-1 as an unsigned integer);
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS Set-user-ID and set-group-ID programs
.PP
When a process inside a user namespace executes
a set-user-ID (set-group-ID) program,
the process's effective user (group) ID inside the namespace is changed
to whatever value is mapped for the user (group) ID of the file.
However, if either the user
.I or
the group ID of the file has no mapping inside the namespace,
the set-user-ID (set-group-ID) bit is silently ignored:
the new program is executed,
but the process's effective user (group) ID is left unchanged.
(This mirrors the semantics of executing a set-user-ID or set-group-ID
program that resides on a filesystem that was mounted with the
.BR MS_NOSUID
flag, as described in
.BR mount (2).)
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS Miscellaneous
.PP
When a process's user and group IDs are passed over a UNIX domain socket
to a process in a different user namespace (see the description of
.B SCM_CREDENTIALS
in
.BR unix (7)),
they are translated into the corresponding values as per the
receiving process's user and group ID mappings.
.\"
.SH CONFORMING TO
Namespaces are a Linux-specific feature.
.\"
.SH NOTES
Over the years, there have been a lot of features that have been added
to the Linux kernel that have been made available only to privileged users
because of their potential to confuse set-user-ID-root applications.
In general, it becomes safe to allow the root user in a user namespace to
use those features because it is impossible, while in a user namespace,
to gain more privilege than the root user of a user namespace has.
.\"
.\" ============================================================
.\"
.SS Availability
Use of user namespaces requires a kernel that is configured with the
.B CONFIG_USER_NS
option.
User namespaces require support in a range of subsystems across
the kernel.
When an unsupported subsystem is configured into the kernel,
it is not possible to configure user namespaces support.

As at Linux 3.8, most relevant subsystems supported user namespaces,
but a number of filesystems did not have the infrastructure needed
to map user and group IDs between user namespaces.
Linux 3.9 added the required infrastructure support for many of
the remaining unsupported filesystems
(Plan 9 (9P), Andrew File System (AFS), Ceph, CIFS, CODA, NFS, and OCFS2).
Linux 3.11 added support the last of the unsupported major filesystems,
.\" commit d6970d4b726cea6d7a9bc4120814f95c09571fc3
XFS.
.\"
.SH EXAMPLE
The program below is designed to allow experimenting with
user namespaces, as well as other types of namespaces.
It creates namespaces as specified by command-line options and then executes
a command inside those namespaces.
The comments and
.I usage()
function inside the program provide a full explanation of the program.
The following shell session demonstrates its use.

First, we look at the run-time environment:

.in +4n
.nf
$ \fBuname -rs\fP     # Need Linux 3.8 or later
Linux 3.8.0
$ \fBid -u\fP         # Running as unprivileged user
1000
$ \fBid -g\fP
1000
.fi
.in

Now start a new shell in new user
.RI ( \-U ),
mount
.RI ( \-m ),
and PID
.RI ( \-p )
namespaces, with user ID
.RI ( \-M )
and group ID
.RI ( \-G )
1000 mapped to 0 inside the user namespace:

.in +4n
.nf
$ \fB./userns_child_exec -p -m -U -M '0 1000 1' -G '0 1000 1' bash\fP
.fi
.in

The shell has PID 1, because it is the first process in the new
PID namespace:

.in +4n
.nf
bash$ \fBecho $$\fP
1
.fi
.in

Inside the user namespace, the shell has user and group ID 0,
and a full set of permitted and effective capabilities:

.in +4n
.nf
bash$ \fBcat /proc/$$/status | egrep '^[UG]id'\fP
Uid:    0       0       0       0
Gid:    0       0       0       0
bash$ \fBcat /proc/$$/status | egrep '^Cap(Prm|Inh|Eff)'\fP
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000001fffffffff
CapEff: 0000001fffffffff
.fi
.in

Mounting a new
.I /proc
filesystem and listing all of the processes visible
in the new PID namespace shows that the shell can't see
any processes outside the PID namespace:

.in +4n
.nf
bash$ \fBmount -t proc proc /proc\fP
bash$ \fBps ax\fP
  PID TTY      STAT   TIME COMMAND
    1 pts/3    S      0:00 bash
   22 pts/3    R+     0:00 ps ax
.fi
.in
.SS Program source
\&
.nf
/* userns_child_exec.c

   Licensed under GNU General Public License v2 or later

   Create a child process that executes a shell command in new
   namespace(s); allow UID and GID mappings to be specified when
   creating a user namespace.
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sched.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <errno.h>

/* A simple error\-handling function: print an error message based
   on the value in \(aqerrno\(aq and terminate the calling process */

#define errExit(msg)    do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \\
                        } while (0)

struct child_args {
    char **argv;        /* Command to be executed by child, with args */
    int    pipe_fd[2];  /* Pipe used to synchronize parent and child */
};

static int verbose;

static void
usage(char *pname)
{
    fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [options] cmd [arg...]\\n\\n", pname);
    fprintf(stderr, "Create a child process that executes a shell "
            "command in a new user namespace,\\n"
            "and possibly also other new namespace(s).\\n\\n");
    fprintf(stderr, "Options can be:\\n\\n");
#define fpe(str) fprintf(stderr, "    %s", str);
    fpe("\-i          New IPC namespace\\n");
    fpe("\-m          New mount namespace\\n");
    fpe("\-n          New network namespace\\n");
    fpe("\-p          New PID namespace\\n");
    fpe("\-u          New UTS namespace\\n");
    fpe("\-U          New user namespace\\n");
    fpe("\-M uid_map  Specify UID map for user namespace\\n");
    fpe("\-G gid_map  Specify GID map for user namespace\\n");
    fpe("\-z          Map user\(aqs UID and GID to 0 in user namespace\\n");
    fpe("            (equivalent to: \-M \(aq0 <uid> 1\(aq \-G \(aq0 <gid> 1\(aq)\\n");
    fpe("\-v          Display verbose messages\\n");
    fpe("\\n");
    fpe("If \-z, \-M, or \-G is specified, \-U is required.\\n");
    fpe("It is not permitted to specify both \-z and either \-M or \-G.\\n");
    fpe("\\n");
    fpe("Map strings for \-M and \-G consist of records of the form:\\n");
    fpe("\\n");
    fpe("    ID\-inside\-ns   ID\-outside\-ns   len\\n");
    fpe("\\n");
    fpe("A map string can contain multiple records, separated"
        " by commas;\\n");
    fpe("the commas are replaced by newlines before writing"
        " to map files.\\n");

    exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}

/* Update the mapping file \(aqmap_file\(aq, with the value provided in
   \(aqmapping\(aq, a string that defines a UID or GID mapping. A UID or
   GID mapping consists of one or more newline\-delimited records
   of the form:

       ID_inside\-ns    ID\-outside\-ns   length

   Requiring the user to supply a string that contains newlines is
   of course inconvenient for command\-line use. Thus, we permit the
   use of commas to delimit records in this string, and replace them
   with newlines before writing the string to the file. */

static void
update_map(char *mapping, char *map_file)
{
    int fd, j;
    size_t map_len;     /* Length of \(aqmapping\(aq */

    /* Replace commas in mapping string with newlines */

    map_len = strlen(mapping);
    for (j = 0; j < map_len; j++)
        if (mapping[j] == \(aq,\(aq)
            mapping[j] = \(aq\\n\(aq;

    fd = open(map_file, O_RDWR);
    if (fd == \-1) {
        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: open %s: %s\\n", map_file,
                strerror(errno));
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    if (write(fd, mapping, map_len) != map_len) {
        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: write %s: %s\\n", map_file,
                strerror(errno));
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    close(fd);
}

/* Linux 3.19 made a change in the handling of setgroups(2) and the
   \(aqgid_map\(aq file to address a security issue. The issue allowed
   *unprivileged* users to employ user namespaces in order to drop
   The upshot of the 3.19 changes is that in order to update the
   \(aqgid_maps\(aq file, use of the setgroups() system call in this
   user namespace must first be disabled by writing "deny" to one of
   the /proc/PID/setgroups files for this namespace.  That is the
   purpose of the following function. */

static void
proc_setgroups_write(pid_t child_pid, char *str)
{
    char setgroups_path[PATH_MAX];
    int fd;

    snprintf(setgroups_path, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%ld/setgroups",
            (long) child_pid);

    fd = open(setgroups_path, O_RDWR);
    if (fd == \-1) {

        /* We may be on a system that doesn\(aqt support
           /proc/PID/setgroups. In that case, the file won\(aqt exist,
           and the system won\(aqt impose the restrictions that Linux 3.19
           added. That\(aqs fine: we don\(aqt need to do anything in order
           to permit \(aqgid_map\(aq to be updated.

           However, if the error from open() was something other than
           the ENOENT error that is expected for that case,  let the
           user know. */

        if (errno != ENOENT)
            fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: open %s: %s\\n", setgroups_path,
                strerror(errno));
        return;
    }

    if (write(fd, str, strlen(str)) == \-1)
        fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: write %s: %s\\n", setgroups_path,
            strerror(errno));

    close(fd);
}

static int              /* Start function for cloned child */
childFunc(void *arg)
{
    struct child_args *args = (struct child_args *) arg;
    char ch;

    /* Wait until the parent has updated the UID and GID mappings.
       See the comment in main(). We wait for end of file on a
       pipe that will be closed by the parent process once it has
       updated the mappings. */

    close(args\->pipe_fd[1]);    /* Close our descriptor for the write
                                   end of the pipe so that we see EOF
                                   when parent closes its descriptor */
    if (read(args\->pipe_fd[0], &ch, 1) != 0) {
        fprintf(stderr,
                "Failure in child: read from pipe returned != 0\\n");
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }

    /* Execute a shell command */

    printf("About to exec %s\\n", args\->argv[0]);
    execvp(args\->argv[0], args\->argv);
    errExit("execvp");
}

#define STACK_SIZE (1024 * 1024)

static char child_stack[STACK_SIZE];    /* Space for child\(aqs stack */

int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int flags, opt, map_zero;
    pid_t child_pid;
    struct child_args args;
    char *uid_map, *gid_map;
    const int MAP_BUF_SIZE = 100;
    char map_buf[MAP_BUF_SIZE];
    char map_path[PATH_MAX];

    /* Parse command\-line options. The initial \(aq+\(aq character in
       the final getopt() argument prevents GNU\-style permutation
       of command\-line options. That\(aqs useful, since sometimes
       the \(aqcommand\(aq to be executed by this program itself
       has command\-line options. We don\(aqt want getopt() to treat
       those as options to this program. */

    flags = 0;
    verbose = 0;
    gid_map = NULL;
    uid_map = NULL;
    map_zero = 0;
    while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "+imnpuUM:G:zv")) != \-1) {
        switch (opt) {
        case \(aqi\(aq: flags |= CLONE_NEWIPC;        break;
        case \(aqm\(aq: flags |= CLONE_NEWNS;         break;
        case \(aqn\(aq: flags |= CLONE_NEWNET;        break;
        case \(aqp\(aq: flags |= CLONE_NEWPID;        break;
        case \(aqu\(aq: flags |= CLONE_NEWUTS;        break;
        case \(aqv\(aq: verbose = 1;                  break;
        case \(aqz\(aq: map_zero = 1;                 break;
        case \(aqM\(aq: uid_map = optarg;             break;
        case \(aqG\(aq: gid_map = optarg;             break;
        case \(aqU\(aq: flags |= CLONE_NEWUSER;       break;
        default:  usage(argv[0]);
        }
    }

    /* \-M or \-G without \-U is nonsensical */

    if (((uid_map != NULL || gid_map != NULL || map_zero) &&
                !(flags & CLONE_NEWUSER)) ||
            (map_zero && (uid_map != NULL || gid_map != NULL)))
        usage(argv[0]);

    args.argv = &argv[optind];

    /* We use a pipe to synchronize the parent and child, in order to
       ensure that the parent sets the UID and GID maps before the child
       calls execve(). This ensures that the child maintains its
       capabilities during the execve() in the common case where we
       want to map the child\(aqs effective user ID to 0 in the new user
       namespace. Without this synchronization, the child would lose
       its capabilities if it performed an execve() with nonzero
       user IDs (see the capabilities(7) man page for details of the
       transformation of a process\(aqs capabilities during execve()). */

    if (pipe(args.pipe_fd) == \-1)
        errExit("pipe");

    /* Create the child in new namespace(s) */

    child_pid = clone(childFunc, child_stack + STACK_SIZE,
                      flags | SIGCHLD, &args);
    if (child_pid == \-1)
        errExit("clone");

    /* Parent falls through to here */

    if (verbose)
        printf("%s: PID of child created by clone() is %ld\\n",
                argv[0], (long) child_pid);

    /* Update the UID and GID maps in the child */

    if (uid_map != NULL || map_zero) {
        snprintf(map_path, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%ld/uid_map",
                (long) child_pid);
        if (map_zero) {
            snprintf(map_buf, MAP_BUF_SIZE, "0 %ld 1", (long) getuid());
            uid_map = map_buf;
        }
        update_map(uid_map, map_path);
    }

    if (gid_map != NULL || map_zero) {
        proc_setgroups_write(child_pid, "deny");

        snprintf(map_path, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%ld/gid_map",
                (long) child_pid);
        if (map_zero) {
            snprintf(map_buf, MAP_BUF_SIZE, "0 %ld 1", (long) getgid());
            gid_map = map_buf;
        }
        update_map(gid_map, map_path);
    }

    /* Close the write end of the pipe, to signal to the child that we
       have updated the UID and GID maps */

    close(args.pipe_fd[1]);

    if (waitpid(child_pid, NULL, 0) == \-1)      /* Wait for child */
        errExit("waitpid");

    if (verbose)
        printf("%s: terminating\\n", argv[0]);

    exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
.fi
.SH SEE ALSO
.BR newgidmap (1),      \" From the shadow package
.BR newuidmap (1),      \" From the shadow package
.BR clone (2),
.BR setns (2),
.BR unshare (2),
.BR proc (5),
.BR subgid (5),         \" From the shadow package
.BR subuid (5),         \" From the shadow package
.BR credentials (7),
.BR capabilities (7),
.BR namespaces (7),
.BR pid_namespaces (7)
.sp
The kernel source file
.IR Documentation/namespaces/resource-control.txt .