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PROV & SIGNATURE: Adapt the RSA signature code for PSS-parameters
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / providers / implementations / signature / rsa.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 /*
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
12 * internal use.
13 */
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
15
16 #include <string.h>
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include <openssl/err.h>
21 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
22 #include <openssl/params.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/sizes.h"
27 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
28 #include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
29 #include "prov/implementations.h"
30 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
31 #include "prov/der_rsa.h"
32
33 static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
34 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
35 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
36 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
37 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
38 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
39 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
40 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
41 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
42 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
43 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
44 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
45 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
46 static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
47 static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
48 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
49 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
50 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
51 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
52 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
53 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
54 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
55 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
56
57 static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
58 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
59 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
60 { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
61 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
62 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
63 { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
64 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
65 { 0, NULL }
66 };
67
68 /*
69 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
70 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
71 * we use that here too.
72 */
73
74 typedef struct {
75 OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
76 char *propq;
77 RSA *rsa;
78 int operation;
79
80 /*
81 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
82 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
83 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
84 * by their Final function.
85 */
86 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
87
88 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
89 unsigned char aid_buf[128];
90 unsigned char *aid;
91 size_t aid_len;
92
93 /* main digest */
94 EVP_MD *md;
95 EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
96 int mdnid;
97 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
98
99 /* RSA padding mode */
100 int pad_mode;
101 /* message digest for MGF1 */
102 EVP_MD *mgf1_md;
103 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
104 /* PSS salt length */
105 int saltlen;
106 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
107 int min_saltlen;
108
109 /* Temp buffer */
110 unsigned char *tbuf;
111
112 } PROV_RSA_CTX;
113
114 static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
115 {
116 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
117 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
118 return 0;
119 }
120
121 static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
122 {
123 /*
124 * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
125 * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
126 * map.
127 */
128 static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
129 { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
130 { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
131 { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
132 { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
133 { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
134 { NID_sha512_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_224 },
135 { NID_sha512_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_256 },
136 { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
137 { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
138 { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
139 { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
140 { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
141 { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
142 { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
143 { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
144 { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
145 { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
146 };
147 size_t i;
148 int mdnid = NID_undef;
149
150 if (md == NULL)
151 goto end;
152
153 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
154 if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
155 mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
156 break;
157 }
158 }
159
160 end:
161 return mdnid;
162 }
163
164 static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
165 {
166 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
167 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
168 return 0;
169 }
170
171 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
172 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
173 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
174 return 0;
175 }
176 }
177
178 return 1;
179 }
180
181 static int rsa_check_parameters(EVP_MD *md, PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
182 {
183 if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
184 int max_saltlen;
185
186 /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
187 max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md);
188 if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
189 max_saltlen--;
190 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
191 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
192 return 0;
193 }
194 }
195 return 1;
196 }
197
198 static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
199 {
200 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
201 char *propq_copy = NULL;
202
203 if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL
204 || (propq != NULL
205 && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) {
206 OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
207 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
208 return NULL;
209 }
210
211 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
212 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
213 prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
214 return prsactx;
215 }
216
217 /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
218 #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
219
220 static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
221 const char *mdprops)
222 {
223 if (mdprops == NULL)
224 mdprops = ctx->propq;
225
226 if (mdname != NULL) {
227 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
228 int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
229 WPACKET pkt;
230
231 if (md == NULL
232 || md_nid == NID_undef
233 || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
234 || !rsa_check_parameters(md, ctx)) {
235 if (md == NULL)
236 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
237 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
238 if (md_nid == NID_undef)
239 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
240 "digest=%s", mdname);
241 EVP_MD_free(md);
242 return 0;
243 }
244
245 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
246 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
247
248 /*
249 * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
250 * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
251 * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
252 * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
253 * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
254 */
255 ctx->aid_len = 0;
256 if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
257 && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_RSA_with(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa, md_nid)
258 && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
259 WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
260 ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
261 }
262 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
263
264 ctx->mdctx = NULL;
265 ctx->md = md;
266 ctx->mdnid = md_nid;
267 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
268 }
269
270 return 1;
271 }
272
273 static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
274 const char *mdprops)
275 {
276 if (mdprops == NULL)
277 mdprops = ctx->propq;
278
279 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
280 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
281
282 if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
283 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
284 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
285 return 0;
286 }
287 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
288
289 return 1;
290 }
291
292 static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
293 {
294 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
295
296 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
297 return 0;
298
299 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
300 prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
301 prsactx->operation = operation;
302
303 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
304 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
305 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
306
307 switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
308 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
309 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
310 break;
311 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
312 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
313
314 {
315 const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss =
316 rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
317
318 if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
319 int md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
320 int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
321 int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
322 const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
323
324 mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
325 mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
326 prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
327
328 if (mdname == NULL) {
329 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
330 "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm");
331 return 0;
332 }
333 if (mgf1mdname == NULL) {
334 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
335 "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm");
336 return 0;
337 }
338
339 strncpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
340 strncpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
341 sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
342 prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
343
344 return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
345 && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq);
346 }
347 }
348
349 break;
350 default:
351 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
352 return 0;
353 }
354
355 return 1;
356 }
357
358 static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
359 {
360 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
361 return 1;
362 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
363 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
364 return 0;
365 }
366 return 1;
367 }
368
369 static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
370 {
371 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
372 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
373 }
374
375 static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
376 {
377 clean_tbuf(ctx);
378 OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf);
379 ctx->tbuf = NULL;
380 }
381
382 static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
383 {
384 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
385 }
386
387 static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
388 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
389 {
390 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
391 int ret;
392 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
393 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
394
395 if (sig == NULL) {
396 *siglen = rsasize;
397 return 1;
398 }
399
400 if (sigsize < rsasize) {
401 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
402 "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize);
403 return 0;
404 }
405
406 if (mdsize != 0) {
407 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
408 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
409 return 0;
410 }
411
412 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
413 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
414 unsigned int sltmp;
415
416 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
417 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
418 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
419 return 0;
420 }
421 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
422 prsactx->rsa);
423
424 if (ret <= 0) {
425 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
426 return 0;
427 }
428 ret = sltmp;
429 goto end;
430 }
431 #endif
432 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
433 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
434 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
435 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL,
436 "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d",
437 RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1);
438 return 0;
439 }
440 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
441 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
442 return 0;
443 }
444 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
445 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
446 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
447 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
448 clean_tbuf(prsactx);
449 break;
450
451 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
452 {
453 unsigned int sltmp;
454
455 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
456 prsactx->rsa);
457 if (ret <= 0) {
458 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
459 return 0;
460 }
461 ret = sltmp;
462 }
463 break;
464
465 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
466 /* Check PSS restrictions */
467 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
468 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
469 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
470 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
471 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
472 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
473 "minimum salt length set to %d, "
474 "but the digest only gives %d",
475 prsactx->min_saltlen,
476 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
477 return 0;
478 }
479 /* FALLTHRU */
480 default:
481 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
482 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
483 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
484 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
485 "minimum salt length set to %d, but the"
486 "actual salt length is only set to %d",
487 prsactx->min_saltlen,
488 prsactx->saltlen);
489 return 0;
490 }
491 break;
492 }
493 }
494 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
495 return 0;
496 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
497 prsactx->tbuf, tbs,
498 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
499 prsactx->saltlen)) {
500 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
501 return 0;
502 }
503 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
504 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
505 clean_tbuf(prsactx);
506 break;
507
508 default:
509 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
510 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
511 return 0;
512 }
513 } else {
514 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
515 prsactx->pad_mode);
516 }
517
518 #ifndef FIPS_MODULE
519 end:
520 #endif
521 if (ret <= 0) {
522 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
523 return 0;
524 }
525
526 *siglen = ret;
527 return 1;
528 }
529
530 static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
531 {
532 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
533 }
534
535 static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
536 unsigned char *rout,
537 size_t *routlen,
538 size_t routsize,
539 const unsigned char *sig,
540 size_t siglen)
541 {
542 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
543 int ret;
544
545 if (rout == NULL) {
546 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
547 return 1;
548 }
549
550 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
551 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
552 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
553 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
554 return 0;
555 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
556 RSA_X931_PADDING);
557 if (ret < 1) {
558 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
559 return 0;
560 }
561 ret--;
562 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
563 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
564 return 0;
565 }
566 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
567 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
568 "Should be %d, but got %d",
569 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
570 return 0;
571 }
572
573 *routlen = ret;
574 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
575 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
576 "buffer size is %d, should be %d",
577 routsize, ret);
578 return 0;
579 }
580 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
581 break;
582
583 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
584 {
585 size_t sltmp;
586
587 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
588 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
589 if (ret <= 0) {
590 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
591 return 0;
592 }
593 ret = sltmp;
594 }
595 break;
596
597 default:
598 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
599 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
600 return 0;
601 }
602 } else {
603 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
604 prsactx->pad_mode);
605 if (ret < 0) {
606 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
607 return 0;
608 }
609 }
610 *routlen = ret;
611 return 1;
612 }
613
614 static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
615 {
616 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
617 }
618
619 static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
620 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
621 {
622 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
623 size_t rslen;
624
625 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
626 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
627 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
628 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
629 prsactx->rsa)) {
630 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
631 return 0;
632 }
633 return 1;
634 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
635 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
636 return 0;
637 break;
638 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
639 {
640 int ret;
641 size_t mdsize;
642
643 /*
644 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
645 * call
646 */
647 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
648 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
649 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
650 "Should be %d, but got %d",
651 mdsize, tbslen);
652 return 0;
653 }
654
655 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
656 return 0;
657 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
658 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
659 if (ret <= 0) {
660 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
661 return 0;
662 }
663 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
664 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
665 prsactx->tbuf,
666 prsactx->saltlen);
667 if (ret <= 0) {
668 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
669 return 0;
670 }
671 return 1;
672 }
673 default:
674 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
675 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
676 return 0;
677 }
678 } else {
679 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
680 return 0;
681 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
682 prsactx->pad_mode);
683 if (rslen == 0) {
684 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
685 return 0;
686 }
687 }
688
689 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
690 return 0;
691
692 return 1;
693 }
694
695 static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
696 void *vrsa, int operation)
697 {
698 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
699
700 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
701 if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
702 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
703 return 0;
704
705 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
706 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) {
707 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
708 goto error;
709 }
710
711 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
712 goto error;
713
714 return 1;
715
716 error:
717 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
718 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
719 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
720 prsactx->md = NULL;
721 return 0;
722 }
723
724 static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx,
725 const unsigned char *data,
726 size_t datalen)
727 {
728 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
729
730 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
731 return 0;
732
733 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
734 }
735
736 static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
737 void *vrsa)
738 {
739 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
740 EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
741 }
742
743 static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig,
744 size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize)
745 {
746 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
747 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
748 unsigned int dlen = 0;
749
750 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
751 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
752 return 0;
753
754 /*
755 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
756 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
757 */
758 if (sig != NULL) {
759 /*
760 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
761 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
762 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
763 */
764 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
765 return 0;
766 }
767
768 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
769 }
770
771 static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
772 void *vrsa)
773 {
774 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
775 EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
776 }
777
778 int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
779 size_t siglen)
780 {
781 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
782 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
783 unsigned int dlen = 0;
784
785 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
786 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
787 return 0;
788
789 /*
790 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
791 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
792 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
793 */
794 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
795 return 0;
796
797 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
798 }
799
800 static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
801 {
802 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
803
804 if (prsactx == NULL)
805 return;
806
807 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
808 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
809 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
810 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
811 OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
812 free_tbuf(prsactx);
813
814 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
815 }
816
817 static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
818 {
819 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
820 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
821
822 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
823 if (dstctx == NULL) {
824 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
825 return NULL;
826 }
827
828 *dstctx = *srcctx;
829 dstctx->rsa = NULL;
830 dstctx->md = NULL;
831 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
832 dstctx->tbuf = NULL;
833
834 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
835 goto err;
836 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
837
838 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
839 goto err;
840 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
841
842 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
843 goto err;
844 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
845
846 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
847 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
848 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
849 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
850 goto err;
851 }
852
853 return dstctx;
854 err:
855 rsa_freectx(dstctx);
856 return NULL;
857 }
858
859 static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
860 {
861 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
862 OSSL_PARAM *p;
863
864 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
865 return 0;
866
867 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
868 if (p != NULL
869 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
870 return 0;
871
872 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
873 if (p != NULL)
874 switch (p->data_type) {
875 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
876 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
877 return 0;
878 break;
879 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
880 {
881 int i;
882 const char *word = NULL;
883
884 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
885 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
886 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
887 break;
888 }
889 }
890
891 if (word != NULL) {
892 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
893 return 0;
894 } else {
895 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
896 }
897 }
898 break;
899 default:
900 return 0;
901 }
902
903 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
904 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
905 return 0;
906
907 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
908 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
909 return 0;
910
911 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
912 if (p != NULL) {
913 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
914 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
915 return 0;
916 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
917 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
918 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
919 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
920 return 0;
921 break;
922 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
923 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
924 return 0;
925 break;
926 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
927 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
928 return 0;
929 break;
930 default:
931 if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
932 <= 0)
933 return 0;
934 break;
935 }
936 }
937 }
938
939 return 1;
940 }
941
942 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
943 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
944 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
945 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
946 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
947 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
948 OSSL_PARAM_END
949 };
950
951 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
952 {
953 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
954 }
955
956 static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
957 {
958 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
959 const OSSL_PARAM *p;
960
961 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
962 return 0;
963
964 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
965 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
966 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
967 return 0;
968 if (p != NULL) {
969 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
970 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
971 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
972 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
973 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
974
975 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
976 return 0;
977
978 if (propsp == NULL)
979 pmdprops = NULL;
980 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
981 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
982 return 0;
983
984 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
985 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
986 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
987 return 1;
988 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
989 return 0;
990 }
991
992 /* non-PSS code follows */
993 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
994 return 0;
995 }
996
997 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
998 if (p != NULL) {
999 int pad_mode = 0;
1000 const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
1001
1002 switch (p->data_type) {
1003 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1004 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
1005 return 0;
1006 break;
1007 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1008 {
1009 int i;
1010
1011 if (p->data == NULL)
1012 return 0;
1013
1014 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
1015 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
1016 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
1017 break;
1018 }
1019 }
1020 }
1021 break;
1022 default:
1023 return 0;
1024 }
1025
1026 switch (pad_mode) {
1027 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
1028 /*
1029 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
1030 * with signature use.
1031 */
1032 err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying";
1033 goto bad_pad;
1034 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
1035 if ((prsactx->operation
1036 & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) {
1037 err_extra_text =
1038 "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
1039 goto bad_pad;
1040 }
1041 if (prsactx->md == NULL
1042 && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1, NULL)) {
1043 return 0;
1044 }
1045 break;
1046 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
1047 err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1048 goto cont;
1049 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
1050 err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1051 goto cont;
1052 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
1053 err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1054 goto cont;
1055 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
1056 err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1057 cont:
1058 if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
1059 RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
1060 break;
1061 /* FALLTHRU */
1062 default:
1063 bad_pad:
1064 if (err_extra_text == NULL)
1065 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1066 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
1067 else
1068 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1069 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
1070 err_extra_text);
1071 return 0;
1072 }
1073 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
1074 return 0;
1075 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
1076 }
1077
1078 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
1079 if (p != NULL) {
1080 int saltlen;
1081
1082 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1083 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
1084 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
1085 "PSS padding has been specified first");
1086 return 0;
1087 }
1088
1089 switch (p->data_type) {
1090 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1091 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
1092 return 0;
1093 break;
1094 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1095 if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
1096 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
1097 else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
1098 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
1099 else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
1100 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
1101 else
1102 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
1103 break;
1104 default:
1105 return 0;
1106 }
1107
1108 /*
1109 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
1110 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
1111 * lowest saltlen number possible.
1112 */
1113 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
1114 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1115 return 0;
1116 }
1117
1118 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1119 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
1120 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
1121 if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
1122 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1123 return 0;
1124 }
1125 break;
1126 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
1127 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
1128 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1129 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1130 "Should be more than %d, but would be "
1131 "set to match digest size (%d)",
1132 prsactx->min_saltlen,
1133 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
1134 return 0;
1135 }
1136 /* FALLTHRU */
1137 default:
1138 if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
1139 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1140 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1141 "Should be more than %d, "
1142 "but would be set to %d",
1143 prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
1144 return 0;
1145 }
1146 }
1147 }
1148
1149 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
1150 }
1151
1152 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
1153 if (p != NULL) {
1154 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1155 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1156 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1157 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1158 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
1159
1160 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1161 return 0;
1162
1163 if (propsp == NULL)
1164 pmdprops = NULL;
1165 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1166 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1167 return 0;
1168
1169 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1170 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
1171 return 0;
1172 }
1173
1174 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1175 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
1176 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1177 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1178 return 1;
1179 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1180 return 0;
1181 }
1182
1183 /* non-PSS code follows */
1184 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
1185 return 0;
1186 }
1187
1188 return 1;
1189 }
1190
1191 static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1192 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1193 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1194 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1195 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1196 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1197 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1198 OSSL_PARAM_END
1199 };
1200
1201 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
1202 {
1203 /*
1204 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1205 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1206 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1207 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1208 */
1209 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1210 }
1211
1212 static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1213 {
1214 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1215
1216 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1217 return 0;
1218
1219 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1220 }
1221
1222 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1223 {
1224 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1225
1226 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1227 return 0;
1228
1229 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1230 }
1231
1232 static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1233 {
1234 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1235
1236 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1237 return 0;
1238
1239 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1240 }
1241
1242 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1243 {
1244 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1245
1246 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1247 return 0;
1248
1249 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1250 }
1251
1252 const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1253 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
1254 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
1255 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
1256 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init },
1257 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
1258 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
1259 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init },
1260 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER,
1261 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
1262 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
1263 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init },
1264 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1265 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1266 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1267 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1268 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
1269 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init },
1270 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1271 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1272 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1273 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1274 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1275 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1276 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1277 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1278 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1279 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1280 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1281 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1282 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1283 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1284 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1285 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1286 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1287 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1288 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1289 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },
1290 { 0, NULL }
1291 };
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