ssl/record/methods/tls1_meth.c

   1 /*
   2  * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
   3  *
   4  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
   5  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
   6  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
   7  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
   8  */
   9
  10 #include <openssl/evp.h>
  11 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
  12 #include <openssl/rand.h>
  13 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
  14 #include "../../ssl_local.h"
  15 #include "../record_local.h"
  16 #include "recmethod_local.h"
  17
  18 static int tls1_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
  19                                  unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
  20                                  unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
  21                                  unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
  22                                  const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
  23                                  size_t taglen,
  24                                  int mactype,
  25                                  const EVP_MD *md,
  26                                  COMP_METHOD *comp)
  27 {
  28     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
  29     EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
  30     int enc = (rl->direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) ? 1 : 0;
  31
  32     if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION)
  33         return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
  34
  35     if ((rl->enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
  36         RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
  37         return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
  38     }
  39
  40     ciph_ctx = rl->enc_ctx;
  41
  42     rl->md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
  43     if (rl->md_ctx == NULL) {
  44         RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  45         return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
  46     }
  47 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
  48     if (comp != NULL) {
  49         rl->compctx = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
  50         if (rl->compctx == NULL) {
  51             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
  52             return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
  53         }
  54     }
  55 #endif
  56
  57     /*
  58      * If we have an AEAD Cipher, then there is no separate MAC, so we can skip
  59      * setting up the MAC key.
  60      */
  61     if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0) {
  62         if (mactype == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
  63             mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(rl->libctx, "HMAC",
  64                                                       rl->propq, mackey,
  65                                                       mackeylen);
  66         } else {
  67             /*
  68              * If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are
  69              * the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating
  70              * a MAC key.
  71              */
  72             mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mactype, NULL, mackey,
  73                                            (int)mackeylen);
  74         }
  75         if (mac_key == NULL
  76             || EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(rl->md_ctx, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
  77                                      rl->libctx, rl->propq, mac_key,
  78                                      NULL) <= 0) {
  79             EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
  80             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  81             return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
  82         }
  83         EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
  84     }
  85
  86     if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
  87         if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, NULL, enc)
  88                 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
  89                                        (int)ivlen, iv) <= 0) {
  90             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  91             return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
  92         }
  93     } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
  94         if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc)
  95                 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12,
  96                                        NULL) <= 0
  97                 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
  98                                        (int)taglen, NULL) <= 0
  99                 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
 100                                        (int)ivlen, iv) <= 0
 101                 || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, enc)) {
 102             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 103             return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
 104         }
 105     } else {
 106         if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv, enc)) {
 107             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 108             return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
 109         }
 110     }
 111     /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
 112     if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0
 113         && mackeylen != 0
 114         && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
 115                                (int)mackeylen, mackey) <= 0) {
 116         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 117         return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
 118     }
 119     if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(ciph) != NULL
 120             && !ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md))
 121         return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
 122
 123     /* Calculate the explict IV length */
 124     if (RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) {
 125         int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ciph_ctx);
 126         int eivlen = 0;
 127
 128         if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
 129             eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ciph_ctx);
 130             if (eivlen < 0) {
 131                 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
 132                 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
 133             }
 134             if (eivlen <= 1)
 135                 eivlen = 0;
 136         } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
 137             /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
 138             eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 139         } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
 140             eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 141         }
 142         rl->eivlen = (size_t)eivlen;
 143     }
 144
 145     return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS;
 146 }
 147
 148 #define MAX_PADDING 256
 149 /*-
 150  * tls1_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls RLAYERfatal on
 151  * internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to
 152  * report a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record).
 153  *
 154  * Returns:
 155  *    0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
 156  *       decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed.
 157  *    1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
 158  */
 159 static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
 160                        int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize)
 161 {
 162     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 163     size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
 164     unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
 165     int pad = 0, tmpr, provided;
 166     size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop;
 167     unsigned char padval;
 168     const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 169
 170     if (n_recs == 0) {
 171         RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 172         return 0;
 173     }
 174
 175     if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->md_ctx)) {
 176         int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(rl->md_ctx);
 177
 178         if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
 179             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 180             return 0;
 181         }
 182     }
 183     ds = rl->enc_ctx;
 184     if (!ossl_assert(rl->enc_ctx != NULL)) {
 185         RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 186         return 0;
 187     }
 188
 189     enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_ctx);
 190
 191     if (sending) {
 192         int ivlen;
 193
 194         /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
 195         if (RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)
 196             && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 197             ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc);
 198         else
 199             ivlen = 0;
 200         if (ivlen > 1) {
 201             for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
 202                 if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
 203                     RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 204                     return 0;
 205                 } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(rl->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
 206                                          ivlen, 0) <= 0) {
 207                     RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 208                     return 0;
 209                 }
 210             }
 211         }
 212     }
 213     if (!ossl_assert(enc != NULL)) {
 214         RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 215         return 0;
 216     }
 217
 218     provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
 219
 220     bs = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds));
 221
 222     if (n_recs > 1) {
 223         if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
 224                  & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) {
 225             /*
 226              * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
 227              * cipher doesn't support pipelining
 228              */
 229             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
 230             return 0;
 231         }
 232     }
 233     for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
 234         reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
 235
 236         if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
 237                  & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) {
 238             unsigned char *seq;
 239
 240             seq = rl->sequence;
 241
 242             if (rl->isdtls) {
 243                 unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
 244
 245                 s2n(rl->epoch, p);
 246                 memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
 247                 memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
 248             } else {
 249                 memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
 250                 if (!tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl)) {
 251                     /* RLAYERfatal already called */
 252                     return 0;
 253                 }
 254             }
 255
 256             buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
 257             buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8);
 258             buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version);
 259             buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
 260             buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
 261             pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
 262                                       EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
 263             if (pad <= 0) {
 264                 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 265                 return 0;
 266             }
 267
 268             if (sending) {
 269                 reclen[ctr] += pad;
 270                 recs[ctr].length += pad;
 271             }
 272         } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
 273             /*
 274              * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
 275              * padding on the provider side.
 276              */
 277             padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
 278
 279             /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
 280
 281             if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
 282                 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 283                 return 0;
 284             }
 285             /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
 286             padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
 287             for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
 288                 recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
 289             reclen[ctr] += padnum;
 290             recs[ctr].length += padnum;
 291         }
 292
 293         if (!sending) {
 294             if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) {
 295                 /* Publicly invalid */
 296                 return 0;
 297             }
 298         }
 299     }
 300     if (n_recs > 1) {
 301         unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
 302
 303         /* Set the output buffers */
 304         for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++)
 305             data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
 306
 307         if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
 308                                 (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
 309             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
 310             return 0;
 311         }
 312         /* Set the input buffers */
 313         for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++)
 314             data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
 315
 316         if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
 317                                 (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
 318             || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
 319                                    (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
 320             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
 321             return 0;
 322         }
 323     }
 324
 325     if (!rl->isdtls && rl->tlstree) {
 326         int decrement_seq = 0;
 327
 328         /*
 329          * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
 330          * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
 331          * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
 332          */
 333         if (sending && !rl->use_etm)
 334             decrement_seq = 1;
 335
 336         if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq,
 337                                 rl->sequence) <= 0) {
 338
 339             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 340             return 0;
 341         }
 342     }
 343
 344     if (provided) {
 345         int outlen;
 346
 347         /* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */
 348         if (n_recs > 1) {
 349             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 350             return 0;
 351         }
 352
 353         if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input,
 354                               (unsigned int)reclen[0]))
 355             return 0;
 356         recs[0].length = outlen;
 357
 358         /*
 359          * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
 360          * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
 361          * any explicit IV
 362          */
 363         if (!sending) {
 364             if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
 365                 recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 366                 recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 367             } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
 368                 recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 369                 recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 370             } else if (bs != 1 && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) {
 371                 recs[0].data += bs;
 372                 recs[0].input += bs;
 373                 recs[0].orig_len -= bs;
 374             }
 375
 376             /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */
 377             if (macs != NULL) {
 378                 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
 379
 380                 /* Get the MAC */
 381                 macs[0].alloced = 0;
 382
 383                 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
 384                                                       (void **)&macs[0].mac,
 385                                                       macsize);
 386                 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
 387
 388                 if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
 389                     /* Shouldn't normally happen */
 390                     RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
 391                                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 392                     return 0;
 393                 }
 394             }
 395         }
 396     } else {
 397         /* Legacy cipher */
 398
 399         tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
 400                           (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
 401         if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
 402                  & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) != 0
 403             ? (tmpr < 0)
 404             : (tmpr == 0)) {
 405             /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
 406             return 0;
 407         }
 408
 409         if (!sending) {
 410             for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
 411                 /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */
 412                 if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
 413                     recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 414                     recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 415                     recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 416                 } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
 417                     recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 418                     recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 419                     recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 420                 } else if (bs != 1 && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) {
 421                     if (recs[ctr].length < bs)
 422                         return 0;
 423                     recs[ctr].data += bs;
 424                     recs[ctr].input += bs;
 425                     recs[ctr].length -= bs;
 426                     recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs;
 427                 }
 428
 429                 /*
 430                  * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
 431                  * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
 432                  */
 433                 if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
 434                                         recs[ctr].orig_len,
 435                                         recs[ctr].data,
 436                                         (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL,
 437                                         (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced
 438                                                        : NULL,
 439                                         bs,
 440                                         pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize,
 441                                         (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc)
 442                                         & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0,
 443                                         rl->libctx))
 444                     return 0;
 445             }
 446         }
 447     }
 448     return 1;
 449 }
 450
 451 static int tls1_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
 452                     int sending)
 453 {
 454     unsigned char *seq = rl->sequence;
 455     EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
 456     size_t md_size;
 457     EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
 458     unsigned char header[13];
 459     int t;
 460     int ret = 0;
 461
 462     hash = rl->md_ctx;
 463
 464     t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
 465     if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
 466         return 0;
 467     md_size = t;
 468
 469     if (rl->stream_mac) {
 470         mac_ctx = hash;
 471     } else {
 472         hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
 473         if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
 474             goto end;
 475         }
 476         mac_ctx = hmac;
 477     }
 478
 479     if (!rl->isdtls
 480             && rl->tlstree
 481             && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0)
 482         goto end;
 483
 484     if (rl->isdtls) {
 485         unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
 486
 487         s2n(rl->epoch, p);
 488         memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
 489
 490         memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
 491     } else {
 492         memcpy(header, seq, 8);
 493     }
 494
 495     header[8] = rec->type;
 496     header[9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8);
 497     header[10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version);
 498     header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
 499     header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
 500
 501     if (!sending && !rl->use_etm
 502         && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
 503         && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
 504         OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;
 505
 506         *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE,
 507                                            &rec->orig_len);
 508         *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
 509
 510         if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
 511                                      tls_hmac_params))
 512             goto end;
 513     }
 514
 515     if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
 516         || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
 517         || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0)
 518         goto end;
 519
 520     OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
 521         BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n");
 522         BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4);
 523         BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n");
 524         BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4);
 525     } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
 526
 527     if (!rl->isdtls && !tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl)) {
 528         /* RLAYERfatal already called */
 529         goto end;
 530     }
 531
 532     OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
 533         BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n");
 534         BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4);
 535     } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
 536     ret = 1;
 537  end:
 538     EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
 539     return ret;
 540 }
 541
 542 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
 543 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 544 #  define MAX_PREFIX_LEN ((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) \
 545                            + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
 546                            + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH \
 547                            + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
 548 # else
 549 #  define MAX_PREFIX_LEN ((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) \
 550                            + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
 551                            + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 552 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
 553 #else
 554 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 555 #  define MAX_PREFIX_LEN (SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
 556                            + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH \
 557                            + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
 558 # else
 559 #  define MAX_PREFIX_LEN (SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
 560                            + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 561 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
 562 #endif
 563
 564 /* This function is also used by the SSLv3 implementation */
 565 int tls1_allocate_write_buffers(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
 566                                 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates,
 567                                 size_t numtempl, size_t *prefix)
 568 {
 569     /* Do we need to add an empty record prefix? */
 570     *prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments
 571               && templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
 572
 573     /*
 574      * In the prefix case we can allocate a much smaller buffer. Otherwise we
 575      * just allocate the default buffer size
 576      */
 577     if (!tls_setup_write_buffer(rl, numtempl + *prefix,
 578                                 *prefix ? MAX_PREFIX_LEN : 0, 0)) {
 579         /* RLAYERfatal() already called */
 580         return 0;
 581     }
 582
 583     return 1;
 584 }
 585
 586 /* This function is also used by the SSLv3 implementation */
 587 int tls1_initialise_write_packets(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
 588                                   OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates,
 589                                   size_t numtempl,
 590                                   OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *prefixtempl,
 591                                   WPACKET *pkt,
 592                                   SSL3_BUFFER *bufs,
 593                                   size_t *wpinited)
 594 {
 595     size_t align = 0;
 596     SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
 597     size_t prefix;
 598
 599     /* Do we need to add an empty record prefix? */
 600     prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments
 601              && templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
 602
 603     if (prefix) {
 604         /*
 605          * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
 606          * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
 607          */
 608         prefixtempl->buf = NULL;
 609         prefixtempl->version = templates[0].version;
 610         prefixtempl->buflen = 0;
 611         prefixtempl->type = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
 612
 613         wb = &bufs[0];
 614
 615 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
 616         align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
 617         align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1
 618                 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
 619 #endif
 620         SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
 621
 622         if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
 623                                      SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)) {
 624             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 625             return 0;
 626         }
 627         *wpinited = 1;
 628         if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
 629             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 630             return 0;
 631         }
 632     }
 633
 634     return tls_initialise_write_packets_default(rl, templates, numtempl,
 635                                                 NULL,
 636                                                 pkt + prefix, bufs + prefix,
 637                                                 wpinited);
 638 }
 639
 640 /* TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 all use the same funcs */
 641 struct record_functions_st tls_1_funcs = {
 642     tls1_set_crypto_state,
 643     tls1_cipher,
 644     tls1_mac,
 645     tls_default_set_protocol_version,
 646     tls_default_read_n,
 647     tls_get_more_records,
 648     tls_default_validate_record_header,
 649     tls_default_post_process_record,
 650     tls_get_max_records_multiblock,
 651     tls_write_records_multiblock, /* Defined in tls_multib.c */
 652     tls1_allocate_write_buffers,
 653     tls1_initialise_write_packets,
 654     NULL,
 655     tls_prepare_record_header_default,
 656     NULL,
 657     tls_prepare_for_encryption_default,
 658     tls_post_encryption_processing_default,
 659     NULL
 660 };
 661
 662 struct record_functions_st dtls_1_funcs = {
 663     tls1_set_crypto_state,
 664     tls1_cipher,
 665     tls1_mac,
 666     tls_default_set_protocol_version,
 667     tls_default_read_n,
 668     dtls_get_more_records,
 669     NULL,
 670     NULL,
 671     NULL,
 672     dtls_write_records,
 673     /*
 674      * Don't use tls1_allocate_write_buffers since that handles empty fragment
 675      * records which aren't needed in DTLS. We just use the default allocation
 676      * instead.
 677      */
 678     tls_allocate_write_buffers_default,
 679     /* Don't use tls1_initialise_write_packets for same reason as above */
 680     tls_initialise_write_packets_default,
 681     NULL,
 682     dtls_prepare_record_header,
 683     NULL,
 684     tls_prepare_for_encryption_default,
 685     tls_post_encryption_processing_default,
 686     NULL
 687 };