2 * Copyright 2005-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include "../ssl_local.h"
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
15 #include "record_local.h"
16 #include "internal/packet.h"
17 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
19 int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
23 if ((d
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d
))) == NULL
) {
24 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
30 d
->buffered_app_data
.q
= pqueue_new();
32 if (d
->buffered_app_data
.q
== NULL
) {
41 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
46 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
47 pqueue_free(rl
->d
->buffered_app_data
.q
);
52 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
57 pqueue
*buffered_app_data
;
61 while ((item
= pqueue_pop(d
->buffered_app_data
.q
)) != NULL
) {
62 rec
= (TLS_RECORD
*)item
->data
;
63 if (rl
->s
->options
& SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT
)
64 OPENSSL_cleanse(rec
->data
, rec
->length
);
65 OPENSSL_free(rec
->data
);
66 OPENSSL_free(item
->data
);
70 buffered_app_data
= d
->buffered_app_data
.q
;
71 memset(d
, 0, sizeof(*d
));
72 d
->buffered_app_data
.q
= buffered_app_data
;
75 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, unsigned short e
)
77 if (e
== rl
->d
->w_epoch
- 1) {
78 memcpy(rl
->d
->curr_write_sequence
,
79 rl
->write_sequence
, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
80 memcpy(rl
->write_sequence
,
81 rl
->d
->last_write_sequence
, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
82 } else if (e
== rl
->d
->w_epoch
+ 1) {
83 memcpy(rl
->d
->last_write_sequence
,
84 rl
->write_sequence
, sizeof(unsigned char[8]));
85 memcpy(rl
->write_sequence
,
86 rl
->d
->curr_write_sequence
, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
91 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, unsigned char *seq
)
93 memcpy(rl
->write_sequence
, seq
, SEQ_NUM_SIZE
);
96 int dtls_buffer_record(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, TLS_RECORD
*rec
)
100 record_pqueue
*queue
= &(s
->rlayer
.d
->buffered_app_data
);
102 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
103 if (pqueue_size(queue
->q
) >= 100)
106 /* We don't buffer partially read records */
107 if (!ossl_assert(rec
->off
== 0))
110 rdata
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata
));
111 item
= pitem_new(rec
->seq_num
, rdata
);
112 if (rdata
== NULL
|| item
== NULL
) {
115 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
121 * We will release the record from the record layer soon, so we take a copy
122 * now. Copying data isn't good - but this should be infrequent so we
125 rdata
->data
= OPENSSL_memdup(rec
->data
, rec
->length
);
126 if (rdata
->data
== NULL
) {
129 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
133 * We use a NULL rechandle to indicate that the data field has been
136 rdata
->rechandle
= NULL
;
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
141 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
142 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(ssl
)) &&
143 (SSL_get_state(ssl
) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
144 || SSL_get_state(ssl
) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
)) {
145 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO
,
146 sizeof(rdata
->recordinfo
), &rdata
->recordinfo
);
150 if (pqueue_insert(queue
->q
, item
) == NULL
) {
151 /* Must be a duplicate so ignore it */
152 OPENSSL_free(rdata
->data
);
160 /* Unbuffer a previously buffered TLS_RECORD structure if any */
161 static void dtls_unbuffer_record(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
166 /* If we already have records to handle then do nothing */
167 if (s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
< s
->rlayer
.num_recs
)
170 item
= pqueue_pop(s
->rlayer
.d
->buffered_app_data
.q
);
172 rdata
= (TLS_RECORD
*)item
->data
;
174 s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[0] = *rdata
;
175 s
->rlayer
.num_recs
= 1;
176 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
= 0;
178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
179 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
180 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
181 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
= (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*)item
->data
;
182 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO
,
183 sizeof(rdata
->recordinfo
), &rdata
->recordinfo
);
187 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
188 memcpy(&(s
->rlayer
.read_sequence
[2]), &(rdata
->seq_num
[2]), 6);
190 OPENSSL_free(item
->data
);
196 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
197 * 'type' is one of the following:
199 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
200 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
201 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
203 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
204 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
206 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
207 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
208 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
209 * argument is non NULL.
210 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
211 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
212 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
213 * Change cipher spec protocol
214 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
216 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
218 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
219 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
220 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
221 * Application data protocol
222 * none of our business
224 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
225 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
230 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
231 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
236 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
237 (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) ||
238 (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
239 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
243 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(sc
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
244 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
245 i
= sc
->handshake_func(s
);
246 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
254 sc
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
257 * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
258 * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
260 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
))
261 dtls_unbuffer_record(sc
);
263 /* Check for timeout */
264 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(sc
) > 0) {
266 } else if (ossl_statem_in_error(sc
)) {
267 /* dtls1_handle_timeout() has failed with a fatal error */
271 /* get new packet if necessary */
272 if (sc
->rlayer
.curr_rec
>= sc
->rlayer
.num_recs
) {
273 sc
->rlayer
.curr_rec
= sc
->rlayer
.num_recs
= 0;
275 rr
= &sc
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[sc
->rlayer
.num_recs
];
277 /* TODO(RECLAYER): Check HANDLE_RLAYER_RETURN for DTLS */
278 ret
= HANDLE_RLAYER_RETURN(sc
,
279 sc
->rrlmethod
->read_record(sc
->rrl
, &rr
->rechandle
,
280 &rr
->version
, &rr
->type
,
281 &rr
->data
, &rr
->length
,
282 &rr
->epoch
, rr
->seq_num
));
284 ret
= dtls1_read_failed(sc
, ret
);
286 * Anything other than a timeout is an error. SSLfatal() already
287 * called if appropriate.
295 sc
->rlayer
.num_recs
++;
296 } while (sc
->rrlmethod
->processed_read_pending(sc
->rrl
)
297 && sc
->rlayer
.num_recs
< SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
299 rr
= &sc
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[sc
->rlayer
.curr_rec
];
302 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
303 * record that isn't an alert.
305 if (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& rr
->length
!= 0)
306 sc
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
308 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
310 if (sc
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
311 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
312 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
314 * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
315 * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
316 * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
318 if (dtls_buffer_record(sc
, rr
) < 0) {
319 /* SSLfatal() already called */
322 ssl_release_record(sc
, rr
);
327 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
330 if (sc
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
331 ssl_release_record(sc
, rr
);
332 sc
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
337 || (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
338 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
)) {
340 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
341 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
342 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
345 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
346 * doing a handshake for the first time
348 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
349 (sc
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
350 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
351 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
355 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
356 *recvd_type
= rr
->type
;
360 * Release a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
361 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
362 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
365 ssl_release_record(sc
, rr
);
369 if (len
> rr
->length
)
374 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
377 ssl_release_record(sc
, rr
);
379 if (sc
->options
& SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT
)
380 OPENSSL_cleanse(&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
383 if (rr
->length
== 0) {
384 /* TODO(RECLAYER): Do something with this? */
385 sc
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
386 ssl_release_record(sc
, rr
);
389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
391 * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
392 * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
393 * anymore, finally set shutdown.
395 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s
)) &&
396 sc
->d1
->shutdown_received
397 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
)) <= 0) {
398 sc
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
407 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
408 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
411 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
412 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
413 unsigned char *alert_bytes
= rr
->data
+ rr
->off
;
416 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, rr
->length
)
417 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
418 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
419 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
420 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
424 if (sc
->msg_callback
)
425 sc
->msg_callback(0, sc
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, s
,
426 sc
->msg_callback_arg
);
428 if (sc
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
429 cb
= sc
->info_callback
;
430 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
431 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
434 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
435 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
438 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
439 sc
->s3
.warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
440 ssl_release_record(sc
, rr
);
442 sc
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
443 if (sc
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
444 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
445 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
449 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
452 * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
453 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
454 * that nothing gets discarded.
456 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s
)) &&
457 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
)) > 0) {
458 sc
->d1
->shutdown_received
= 1;
459 sc
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
460 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
461 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
465 sc
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
468 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
469 sc
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
470 sc
->s3
.fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
471 SSLfatal_data(sc
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
472 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
,
473 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr
);
474 sc
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
475 ssl_release_record(sc
, rr
);
476 SSL_CTX_remove_session(sc
->session_ctx
, sc
->session
);
479 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
486 if (sc
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
488 sc
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
489 ssl_release_record(sc
, rr
);
493 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
495 * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
496 * are still missing, so just drop it.
498 ssl_release_record(sc
, rr
);
503 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
505 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(sc
)) {
506 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr
;
509 * This may just be a stale retransmit. Also sanity check that we have
510 * at least enough record bytes for a message header
512 if (rr
->epoch
!= sc
->rlayer
.d
->r_epoch
513 || rr
->length
< DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
514 ssl_release_record(sc
, rr
);
518 dtls1_get_message_header(rr
->data
, &msg_hdr
);
521 * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
522 * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
524 if (msg_hdr
.type
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
525 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(sc
) < 0) {
526 /* SSLfatal) already called */
530 if (dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(sc
) <= 0) {
531 /* Fail if we encountered a fatal error */
532 if (ossl_statem_in_error(sc
))
535 ssl_release_record(sc
, rr
);
536 if (!(sc
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
537 if (!sc
->rrlmethod
->unprocessed_read_pending(sc
->rrl
)) {
538 /* no read-ahead left? */
541 sc
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
542 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
543 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
544 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
552 * To get here we must be trying to read app data but found handshake
553 * data. But if we're trying to read app data, and we're not in init
554 * (which is tested for at the top of this function) then init must be
557 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_is_init_finished(s
))) {
558 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
562 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
563 ossl_statem_set_in_init(sc
, 1);
565 i
= sc
->handshake_func(s
);
566 /* SSLfatal() called if appropriate */
572 if (!(sc
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
573 if (!sc
->rrlmethod
->unprocessed_read_pending(sc
->rrl
)) {
574 /* no read-ahead left? */
577 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
578 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
579 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
580 * problems in the blocking world
582 sc
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
583 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
584 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
585 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
594 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
596 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
598 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
600 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
601 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
602 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
604 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
606 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
608 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
609 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
610 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
611 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
612 * started), we will indulge it.
614 if (sc
->s3
.in_read_app_data
&&
615 (sc
->s3
.total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
616 ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(sc
)) {
617 sc
->s3
.in_read_app_data
= 2;
620 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
628 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
629 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
631 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int type
, const void *buf
,
632 size_t len
, size_t *written
)
636 if (!ossl_assert(len
<= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
637 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
640 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
641 i
= do_dtls1_write(s
, type
, buf
, len
, 0, written
);
645 int do_dtls1_write(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
646 size_t len
, int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
648 unsigned char *p
, *pseq
;
649 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
650 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
655 SSL
*s
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc
);
657 wb
= &sc
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
660 * DTLS writes whole datagrams, so there can't be anything left in
663 if (!ossl_assert(SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb
) == 0)) {
664 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
668 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
669 if (sc
->s3
.alert_dispatch
) {
670 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
673 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
676 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
679 if (len
> ssl_get_max_send_fragment(sc
)) {
680 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE
);
687 || (sc
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
)
688 || (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(sc
->write_hash
) == NULL
))
694 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(sc
->write_hash
);
696 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
697 SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE
);
702 p
= SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + prefix_len
;
704 /* write the header */
706 *(p
++) = type
& 0xff;
707 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr
, type
);
709 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
710 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
711 * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
713 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
714 sc
->max_proto_version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
715 *(p
++) = DTLS1_VERSION
>> 8;
716 *(p
++) = DTLS1_VERSION
& 0xff;
718 *(p
++) = sc
->version
>> 8;
719 *(p
++) = sc
->version
& 0xff;
722 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
726 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
727 if (sc
->enc_write_ctx
) {
728 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(sc
->enc_write_ctx
);
729 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
730 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(sc
->enc_write_ctx
);
732 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
738 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
739 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
740 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
741 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
)
742 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
748 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
749 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr
, p
+ eivlen
); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
750 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr
, len
);
751 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr
, (unsigned char *)buf
);
754 * we now 'read' from wr.input, wr.length bytes into wr.data
757 /* first we compress */
758 if (sc
->compress
!= NULL
) {
759 if (!ssl3_do_compress(sc
, &wr
)) {
760 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
764 memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&wr
), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(&wr
),
765 SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr
));
766 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
);
770 * we should still have the output to wr.data and the input from
771 * wr.input. Length should be wr.length. wr.data still points in the
775 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(sc
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
776 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(sc
, &wr
,
777 &(p
[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr
) + eivlen
]),
779 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
782 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
, mac_size
);
785 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
786 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr
, p
);
787 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
);
790 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
, eivlen
);
792 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(sc
, &wr
, 1, 1, NULL
, mac_size
) < 1) {
793 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(sc
)) {
794 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
799 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(sc
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
800 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(sc
, &wr
,
801 &(p
[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr
)]), 1)) {
802 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
805 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
, mac_size
);
808 /* record length after mac and block padding */
810 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
812 s2n(sc
->rlayer
.d
->w_epoch
, pseq
);
814 memcpy(pseq
, &(sc
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[2]), 6);
816 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr
), pseq
);
818 if (sc
->msg_callback
)
819 sc
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, pseq
- DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
,
820 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
, sc
->msg_callback_arg
);
823 * we should now have wr.data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
826 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
827 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
829 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(sc
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[0]));
831 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
833 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
836 *written
= wr
.length
;
840 /* now let's set up wb */
841 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb
, prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr
));
842 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, 0);
845 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
848 sc
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= len
;
849 sc
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
850 sc
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
851 sc
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= len
;
853 /* we now just need to write the buffer. Calls SSLfatal() as required. */
854 return ssl3_write_pending(sc
, type
, buf
, len
, written
);
857 void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int rw
)
860 unsigned int seq_bytes
= sizeof(s
->rlayer
.read_sequence
);
862 if (rw
& SSL3_CC_READ
) {
863 seq
= s
->rlayer
.read_sequence
;
864 s
->rlayer
.d
->r_epoch
++;
865 memcpy(&s
->rlayer
.d
->bitmap
, &s
->rlayer
.d
->next_bitmap
,
866 sizeof(s
->rlayer
.d
->bitmap
));
867 memset(&s
->rlayer
.d
->next_bitmap
, 0, sizeof(s
->rlayer
.d
->next_bitmap
));
870 * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous
873 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
875 seq
= s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
;
876 memcpy(s
->rlayer
.d
->last_write_sequence
, seq
,
877 sizeof(s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
));
878 s
->rlayer
.d
->w_epoch
++;
881 memset(seq
, 0, seq_bytes
);