]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blob - ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
Consistent formatting for sizeof(foo)
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / record / rec_layer_s3.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <stdio.h>
11 #include <limits.h>
12 #include <errno.h>
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_locl.h"
18 #include "../packet_locl.h"
19
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
24 )
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
27 #endif
28
29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
30 {
31 rl->s = s;
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
34 }
35
36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
37 {
38 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
39
40 /*
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
43 * that right?
44 */
45
46 rl->packet = NULL;
47 rl->packet_length = 0;
48 rl->wnum = 0;
49 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
50 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
51 rl->wpend_tot = 0;
52 rl->wpend_type = 0;
53 rl->wpend_ret = 0;
54 rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
55
56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
58 rl->numrpipes = 0;
59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
60
61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
63
64 if (rl->d)
65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
66 }
67
68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
69 {
70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
72 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
75 }
76
77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
79 {
80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
81 }
82
83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
85 {
86 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
87 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
88
89 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
90 curr_rec++;
91
92 return curr_rec < num_recs;
93 }
94
95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
96 {
97 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
99 }
100
101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
102 {
103 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
104 }
105
106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
107 {
108 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
109 }
110
111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
112 {
113 size_t i, num = 0;
114
115 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
116 return 0;
117
118 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
121 return 0;
122 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
123 }
124
125 return num;
126 }
127
128 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
129 {
130 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
131 }
132
133 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
134 {
135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
136 }
137
138 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
139 {
140 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
142 return "read header";
143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
144 return "read body";
145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
146 return "read done";
147 default:
148 return "unknown";
149 }
150 }
151
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
153 {
154 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
156 return "RH";
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
158 return "RB";
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
160 return "RD";
161 default:
162 return "unknown";
163 }
164 }
165
166 /*
167 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
168 */
169 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
170 size_t *readbytes)
171 {
172 /*
173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
175 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
180 */
181 size_t len, left, align = 0;
182 unsigned char *pkt;
183 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
184
185 if (n == 0)
186 return 0;
187
188 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
189 if (rb->buf == NULL)
190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
191 return -1;
192
193 left = rb->left;
194 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
195 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
196 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
197 #endif
198
199 if (!extend) {
200 /* start with empty packet ... */
201 if (left == 0)
202 rb->offset = align;
203 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
204 /*
205 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
206 * alignment...
207 */
208 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
209 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
210 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
211 /*
212 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
213 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
214 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
215 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
216 * overrun can be triggered.
217 */
218 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
219 rb->offset = align;
220 }
221 }
222 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
223 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
224 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
225 }
226
227 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
228 pkt = rb->buf + align;
229 /*
230 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
231 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
232 */
233 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
234 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
235 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
236 rb->offset = len + align;
237 }
238
239 /*
240 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
241 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
242 * the buffer).
243 */
244 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
245 if (left == 0 && extend)
246 return 0;
247 if (left > 0 && n > left)
248 n = left;
249 }
250
251 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
252 if (left >= n) {
253 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
254 rb->left = left - n;
255 rb->offset += n;
256 *readbytes = n;
257 return 1;
258 }
259
260 /* else we need to read more data */
261
262 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
264 return -1;
265 }
266
267 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
268 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
269 /* ignore max parameter */
270 max = n;
271 else {
272 if (max < n)
273 max = n;
274 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
275 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
276 }
277
278 while (left < n) {
279 size_t bioread = 0;
280 int ret;
281
282 /*
283 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
284 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
285 * possible)
286 */
287
288 clear_sys_error();
289 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
290 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
291 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
292 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
293 if (ret >= 0)
294 bioread = ret;
295 } else {
296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
297 ret = -1;
298 }
299
300 if (ret <= 0) {
301 rb->left = left;
302 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
303 if (len + left == 0)
304 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
305 return ret;
306 }
307 left += bioread;
308 /*
309 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
310 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
311 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
312 */
313 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
314 if (n > left)
315 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
316 }
317 }
318
319 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
320 rb->offset += n;
321 rb->left = left - n;
322 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
323 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
324 *readbytes = n;
325 return 1;
326 }
327
328 /*
329 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
330 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
331 */
332 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
333 size_t *written)
334 {
335 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
336 size_t tot;
337 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
338 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
339 size_t nw;
340 #endif
341 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
342 int i;
343 size_t tmpwrit;
344
345 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
346 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
347 /*
348 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
349 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
350 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
351 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
352 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
353 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
354 * report the error in a way the user will notice
355 */
356 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
357 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
359 return -1;
360 }
361
362 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
363 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, NULL))
364 return -1;
365
366 s->rlayer.wnum = 0;
367
368 /*
369 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
370 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
371 * messages yet.
372 */
373 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
374 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
375 i = s->handshake_func(s);
376 if (i < 0)
377 return i;
378 if (i == 0) {
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
380 return -1;
381 }
382 }
383
384 /*
385 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
386 * will happen with non blocking IO
387 */
388 if (wb->left != 0) {
389 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
390 &tmpwrit);
391 if (i <= 0) {
392 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
393 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
394 return i;
395 }
396 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
397 }
398 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
399 /*
400 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
401 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
402 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
403 * compromise is considered worthy.
404 */
405 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
406 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) &&
407 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
408 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
409 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
410 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
411 unsigned char aad[13];
412 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
413 size_t packlen;
414 int packleni;
415
416 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
417 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
418 max_send_fragment -= 512;
419
420 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
421 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
422
423 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
424 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
425 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
426
427 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
428 packlen *= 8;
429 else
430 packlen *= 4;
431
432 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
434 return -1;
435 }
436 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
437 /* free jumbo buffer */
438 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
439 *written = tot;
440 return 1;
441 }
442
443 n = (len - tot);
444 for (;;) {
445 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
446 /* free jumbo buffer */
447 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
448 break;
449 }
450
451 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
452 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
453 if (i <= 0) {
454 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
455 return i;
456 }
457 }
458
459 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
460 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
461 else
462 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
463
464 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
465 aad[8] = type;
466 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
467 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
468 aad[11] = 0;
469 aad[12] = 0;
470 mb_param.out = NULL;
471 mb_param.inp = aad;
472 mb_param.len = nw;
473
474 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
475 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
476 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
477 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
478 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
479 /* free jumbo buffer */
480 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
481 break;
482 }
483
484 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
485 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
486 mb_param.len = nw;
487
488 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
489 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
490 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
491 return -1;
492
493 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
494 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
495 int j = 6;
496 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
497 }
498
499 wb->offset = 0;
500 wb->left = packlen;
501
502 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
503 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
504 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
505 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
506
507 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
508 if (i <= 0) {
509 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
510 /* free jumbo buffer */
511 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
512 }
513 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
514 return i;
515 }
516 if (tmpwrit == n) {
517 /* free jumbo buffer */
518 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
519 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
520 return 1;
521 }
522 n -= tmpwrit;
523 tot += tmpwrit;
524 }
525 } else
526 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
527 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
528 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
529 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
530
531 *written = tot;
532 return 1;
533 }
534
535 n = (len - tot);
536
537 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
538 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
539 /*
540 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
541 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
542 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
543 * explicit IVs
544 */
545 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
546 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
547 /*
548 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
549 * shouldn't get here
550 */
551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
552 return -1;
553 }
554 if (maxpipes == 0
555 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
556 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
557 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
558 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
559 maxpipes = 1;
560 if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0
561 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
562 /*
563 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
564 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
565 */
566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
567 return -1;
568 }
569
570 for (;;) {
571 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
572 size_t numpipes, j;
573
574 if (n == 0)
575 numpipes = 1;
576 else
577 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
578 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
579 numpipes = maxpipes;
580
581 if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) {
582 /*
583 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
584 * pipelines
585 */
586 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
587 pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment;
588 }
589 } else {
590 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
591 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
592 remain = n % numpipes;
593 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
594 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
595 if (j < remain)
596 pipelens[j]++;
597 }
598 }
599
600 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
601 &tmpwrit);
602 if (i <= 0) {
603 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
604 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
605 return i;
606 }
607
608 if (tmpwrit == n ||
609 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
610 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
611 /*
612 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
613 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
614 */
615 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
616
617 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
618 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
619 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
620
621 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
622 return 1;
623 }
624
625 n -= tmpwrit;
626 tot += tmpwrit;
627 }
628 }
629
630 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
631 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
632 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
633 {
634 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
635 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
636 WPACKET *thispkt;
637 SSL3_RECORD *thiswr;
638 unsigned char *recordstart;
639 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
640 size_t prefix_len = 0;
641 int eivlen = 0;
642 size_t align = 0;
643 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
644 SSL_SESSION *sess;
645 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
646 size_t j;
647
648 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
649 totlen += pipelens[j];
650 /*
651 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
652 * will happen with non blocking IO
653 */
654 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
655 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
656
657 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
658 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
659 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
660 if (i <= 0)
661 return i;
662 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
663 }
664
665 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
666 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
667 return -1;
668
669 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
670 return 0;
671
672 sess = s->session;
673
674 if ((sess == NULL) ||
675 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
676 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
677 mac_size = 0;
678 } else {
679 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
680 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
681 if (mac_size < 0)
682 goto err;
683 }
684
685 /*
686 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
687 */
688 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
689 /*
690 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
691 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
692 */
693
694 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
695 /*
696 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
697 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
698 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
699 * payload)
700 */
701 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
702 int ret;
703
704 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
705 if (ret <= 0)
706 goto err;
707
708 if (prefix_len >
709 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
710 /* insufficient space */
711 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
712 goto err;
713 }
714 }
715
716 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
717 }
718
719 if (create_empty_fragment) {
720 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
721 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
722 /*
723 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
724 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
725 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
726 */
727 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
728 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
729 #endif
730 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
731 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
732 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
733 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
734 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
735 goto err;
736 }
737 wpinited = 1;
738 } else if (prefix_len) {
739 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
740 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
741 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
742 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
743 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
744 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
745 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
746 goto err;
747 }
748 wpinited = 1;
749 } else {
750 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
751 thispkt = &pkt[j];
752
753 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
754 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
755 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
756 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
757 #endif
758 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
759 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
760 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
761 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
762 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
763 goto err;
764 }
765 wpinited++;
766 }
767 }
768
769 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
770 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
771 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
772 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
773 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
774 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
775 if (eivlen <= 1)
776 eivlen = 0;
777 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
778 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
779 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
780 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
781 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
782 }
783 }
784
785 totlen = 0;
786 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
787 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
788 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
789 unsigned int version = SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_VERSION : s->version;
790 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
791 size_t maxcomplen;
792 unsigned int rectype;
793
794 thispkt = &pkt[j];
795 thiswr = &wr[j];
796
797 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type);
798 /*
799 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
800 * record type
801 */
802 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
803 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
804 else
805 rectype = type;
806 /*
807 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
808 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
809 */
810 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
811 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
812 version = TLS1_VERSION;
813
814 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
815 if (s->compress != NULL)
816 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
817
818 /* write the header */
819 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
820 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
821 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
822 || (eivlen > 0
823 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
824 || (maxcomplen > 0
825 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
826 &compressdata))) {
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
828 goto err;
829 }
830
831 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
832 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
833 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
834 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
835 totlen += pipelens[j];
836
837 /*
838 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
839 * thiswr->data
840 */
841
842 /* first we compress */
843 if (s->compress != NULL) {
844 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
845 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
847 goto err;
848 }
849 } else {
850 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
852 goto err;
853 }
854 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
855 }
856
857 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
858 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment;
859
860 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
861 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
862 goto err;
863 }
864 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
865
866 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
867 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
868 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
869 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) {
870 size_t padding = 0;
871 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen;
872 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
873 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
874 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
875 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
876 size_t remainder;
877
878 /* optimize for power of 2 */
879 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
880 remainder = rlen & mask;
881 else
882 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
883 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
884 if (remainder == 0)
885 padding = 0;
886 else
887 padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
888 }
889 if (padding > 0) {
890 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
891 if (padding > max_padding)
892 padding = max_padding;
893 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
895 goto err;
896 }
897 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
898 }
899 }
900 }
901
902 /*
903 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
904 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
905 * in the wb->buf
906 */
907
908 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
909 unsigned char *mac;
910
911 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
912 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
914 goto err;
915 }
916 }
917
918 /*
919 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
920 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
921 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
922 */
923 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
924 NULL)
925 /*
926 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
927 * sub-packet
928 */
929 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
931 goto err;
932 }
933
934 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
935 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
936
937 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
938 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
939 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
940 }
941
942 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
943 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
944 /*
945 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
946 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
947 */
948 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
949 goto err;
950 } else {
951 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
952 goto err;
953 }
954
955 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
956 size_t origlen;
957
958 thispkt = &pkt[j];
959 thiswr = &wr[j];
960
961 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
962 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
963 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
964 || origlen > thiswr->length
965 || (thiswr->length > origlen
966 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
967 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
969 goto err;
970 }
971 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
972 unsigned char *mac;
973
974 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
975 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
976 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
977 goto err;
978 }
979 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
980 }
981
982 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
983 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
985 goto err;
986 }
987
988 if (s->msg_callback) {
989 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
990 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
991 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
992 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
993 s->msg_callback_arg);
994
995 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
996 unsigned char ctype = type;
997
998 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
999 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1000 }
1001 }
1002
1003 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1005 goto err;
1006 }
1007
1008 /*
1009 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1010 * is thiswr->length long
1011 */
1012 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
1013 * debugging */
1014 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
1015
1016 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1017 /*
1018 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1019 * out anything here
1020 */
1021 if (j > 0) {
1022 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1024 goto err;
1025 }
1026 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
1027 return 1;
1028 }
1029
1030 /* now let's set up wb */
1031 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
1032 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
1033 }
1034
1035 /*
1036 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1037 * retries later
1038 */
1039 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
1040 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1041 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1042 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
1043
1044 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1045 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
1046 err:
1047 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
1048 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1049 return -1;
1050 }
1051
1052 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1053 *
1054 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1055 */
1056 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1057 size_t *written)
1058 {
1059 int i;
1060 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1061 size_t currbuf = 0;
1062 size_t tmpwrit = 0;
1063
1064 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1065 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
1066 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1067 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1069 return -1;
1070 }
1071
1072 for (;;) {
1073 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1074 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1075 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1076 currbuf++;
1077 continue;
1078 }
1079 clear_sys_error();
1080 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1081 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1082 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1083 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1084 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1085 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1086 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1087 if (i >= 0)
1088 tmpwrit = i;
1089 } else {
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1091 i = -1;
1092 }
1093 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1094 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1095 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1096 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1097 continue;
1098 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1099 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1100 return 1;
1101 } else if (i <= 0) {
1102 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1103 /*
1104 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1105 * using a datagram service
1106 */
1107 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1108 }
1109 return i;
1110 }
1111 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1112 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1113 }
1114 }
1115
1116 /*-
1117 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1118 * 'type' is one of the following:
1119 *
1120 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1121 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1122 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1123 *
1124 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1125 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1126 *
1127 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1128 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1129 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1130 * argument is non NULL.
1131 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1132 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1133 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1134 * Change cipher spec protocol
1135 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1136 * Alert protocol
1137 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1138 * Handshake protocol
1139 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1140 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1141 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1142 * Application data protocol
1143 * none of our business
1144 */
1145 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1146 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1147 {
1148 int al, i, j, ret;
1149 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1150 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1151 SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
1152 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1153
1154 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1155
1156 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1157 /* Not initialized yet */
1158 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1159 return -1;
1160 }
1161
1162 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1163 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1164 && (type !=
1165 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1167 return -1;
1168 }
1169
1170 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1171 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1172 {
1173 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1174 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1175 unsigned int k;
1176
1177 /* peek == 0 */
1178 n = 0;
1179 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1180 *dst++ = *src++;
1181 len--;
1182 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1183 n++;
1184 }
1185 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1186 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1187 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1188
1189 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1190 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1191
1192 *readbytes = n;
1193 return 1;
1194 }
1195
1196 /*
1197 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1198 */
1199
1200 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1201 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1202 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1203 if (i < 0)
1204 return i;
1205 if (i == 0) {
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1207 return -1;
1208 }
1209 }
1210 start:
1211 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1212
1213 /*-
1214 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1215 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1216 * rr[i].data, - data
1217 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1218 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1219 */
1220 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1221 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1222
1223 do {
1224 /* get new records if necessary */
1225 if (num_recs == 0) {
1226 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1227 if (ret <= 0)
1228 return ret;
1229 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1230 if (num_recs == 0) {
1231 /* Shouldn't happen */
1232 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1234 goto f_err;
1235 }
1236 }
1237 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1238 for (curr_rec = 0;
1239 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1240 curr_rec++) ;
1241 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1242 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1243 num_recs = 0;
1244 curr_rec = 0;
1245 }
1246 } while (num_recs == 0);
1247 rr = &rr[curr_rec];
1248
1249 /*
1250 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1251 * record that isn't an alert.
1252 */
1253 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1254 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1255 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1256
1257 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1258
1259 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1260 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1261 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1262 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1264 goto f_err;
1265 }
1266
1267 /*
1268 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1269 * 'peek' mode)
1270 */
1271 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1272 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1273 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1274 return 0;
1275 }
1276
1277 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1278 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1279 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1280 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1281 /*
1282 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1283 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1284 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1285 */
1286 /*
1287 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1288 * doing a handshake for the first time
1289 */
1290 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1291 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1292 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1294 goto f_err;
1295 }
1296
1297 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1298 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1299 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1300 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1302 goto f_err;
1303 }
1304
1305 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1306 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1307
1308 if (len == 0) {
1309 /*
1310 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1311 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1312 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1313 */
1314 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1315 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1316 return 0;
1317 }
1318
1319 totalbytes = 0;
1320 do {
1321 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1322 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1323 else
1324 n = len - totalbytes;
1325
1326 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1327 buf += n;
1328 if (peek) {
1329 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1330 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1331 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1332 } else {
1333 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1334 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1335 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1336 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1337 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1338 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1339 }
1340 }
1341 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1342 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1343 curr_rec++;
1344 rr++;
1345 }
1346 totalbytes += n;
1347 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1348 && totalbytes < len);
1349 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1350 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1351 goto start;
1352 }
1353 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1354 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1355 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1356 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1357 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1358 return 1;
1359 }
1360
1361 /*
1362 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1363 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1364 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1365 */
1366
1367 /*
1368 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1369 */
1370 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1371 /*
1372 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1373 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1374 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1375 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1376 */
1377 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1379 goto f_err;
1380 }
1381
1382 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1383 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1384 /*
1385 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1386 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1387 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1388 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1389 */
1390 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1391 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1393 goto f_err;
1394 }
1395
1396 /*
1397 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1398 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1399 */
1400 {
1401 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1402 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1403 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1404
1405 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1406 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
1407 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1408 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1409 }
1410
1411 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1412 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1413 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1414 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1415
1416 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1417 memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
1418 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
1419 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1420 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1421 *dest_len += n;
1422 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1423 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1424
1425 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1426 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1427 }
1428 }
1429
1430 /*-
1431 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1432 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1433 */
1434
1435 /*
1436 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1437 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1438 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1439 */
1440 if (s->server &&
1441 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1442 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1443 !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) &&
1444 (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
1445 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1446 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1447 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1448 ((!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1449 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) ||
1450 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1451 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1452 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1453 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1454 goto start;
1455 }
1456 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1457 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
1458 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
1459 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
1460 PACKET alert;
1461
1462 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1463 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
1464 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
1465 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
1466 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
1468 goto f_err;
1469 }
1470
1471 if (s->msg_callback)
1472 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
1473 s->msg_callback_arg);
1474
1475 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1476 cb = s->info_callback;
1477 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1478 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1479
1480 if (cb != NULL) {
1481 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1482 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1483 }
1484
1485 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1486 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1487 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1488
1489 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1490 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1491 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1493 goto f_err;
1494 }
1495
1496 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1497 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1498 return 0;
1499 }
1500 /*
1501 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1502 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1503 */
1504 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && alert_descr != SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
1505 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1507 goto f_err;
1508 }
1509 /*
1510 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1511 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1512 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1513 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1514 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1515 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1516 */
1517 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1518 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1520 goto f_err;
1521 }
1522 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1523 char tmp[16];
1524
1525 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1526 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1528 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr);
1529 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1530 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1531 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1532 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1533 return 0;
1534 } else {
1535 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1537 goto f_err;
1538 }
1539
1540 goto start;
1541 }
1542
1543 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1544 * shutdown */
1545 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1546 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1547 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1548 return 0;
1549 }
1550
1551 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1552 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1554 goto f_err;
1555 }
1556
1557 /*
1558 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1559 * protocol violation)
1560 */
1561 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1562 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1563 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1564
1565 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1566 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1567
1568 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1569 if (i < 0)
1570 return i;
1571 if (i == 0) {
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1573 return -1;
1574 }
1575
1576 /*
1577 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1578 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1579 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1580 */
1581 if (ined)
1582 return -1;
1583
1584 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1585 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1586 /* no read-ahead left? */
1587 BIO *bio;
1588 /*
1589 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1590 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1591 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1592 * problems in the blocking world
1593 */
1594 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1595 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1596 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1597 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1598 return -1;
1599 }
1600 }
1601 goto start;
1602 }
1603
1604 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1605 default:
1606 /*
1607 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1608 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1609 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1610 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1611 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1612 */
1613 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1615 goto f_err;
1616 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1617 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1618 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1619 /*
1620 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1621 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1622 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1623 */
1624 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1626 goto f_err;
1627 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1628 /*
1629 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1630 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1631 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1632 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1633 * started), we will indulge it.
1634 */
1635 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1636 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1637 return -1;
1638 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1639 /*
1640 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1641 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1642 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1643 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1644 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1645 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1646 * record.
1647 */
1648 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1649 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al))
1650 goto f_err;
1651 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1652 goto start;
1653 } else {
1654 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1656 goto f_err;
1657 }
1658 }
1659 /* not reached */
1660
1661 f_err:
1662 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1663 return -1;
1664 }
1665
1666 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1667 {
1668 int i;
1669
1670 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1671 ++seq[i];
1672 if (seq[i] != 0)
1673 break;
1674 }
1675 }
1676
1677 /*
1678 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1679 * format and false otherwise.
1680 */
1681 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1682 {
1683 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1684 }
1685
1686 /*
1687 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1688 */
1689 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1690 {
1691 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);
1692 }