2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
18 #include "record_local.h"
19 #include "internal/packet.h"
21 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
26 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
29 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
30 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
36 if (rl
->rrlmethod
!= NULL
)
37 rl
->rrlmethod
->free(rl
->rrl
); /* Ignore return value */
38 if (rl
->wrlmethod
!= NULL
)
39 rl
->wrlmethod
->free(rl
->wrl
); /* Ignore return value */
40 BIO_free(rl
->rrlnext
);
48 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
51 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
52 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
54 return rl
->rrlmethod
->unprocessed_read_pending(rl
->rrl
);
57 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
58 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
60 return (rl
->curr_rec
< rl
->num_recs
)
61 || rl
->rrlmethod
->processed_read_pending(rl
->rrl
);
64 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
66 return rl
->wpend_tot
> 0;
69 static uint32_t ossl_get_max_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
71 uint32_t max_early_data
;
72 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
75 * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
76 * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
77 * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
79 if (!s
->server
&& sess
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0) {
80 if (!ossl_assert(s
->psksession
!= NULL
81 && s
->psksession
->ext
.max_early_data
> 0)) {
82 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
89 max_early_data
= sess
->ext
.max_early_data
;
90 else if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
)
91 max_early_data
= s
->recv_max_early_data
;
93 max_early_data
= s
->recv_max_early_data
< sess
->ext
.max_early_data
94 ? s
->recv_max_early_data
: sess
->ext
.max_early_data
;
96 return max_early_data
;
99 static int ossl_early_data_count_ok(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, size_t length
,
100 size_t overhead
, int send
)
102 uint32_t max_early_data
;
104 max_early_data
= ossl_get_max_early_data(s
);
106 if (max_early_data
== 0) {
107 SSLfatal(s
, send
? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
: SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
108 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA
);
112 /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
113 max_early_data
+= overhead
;
115 if (s
->early_data_count
+ length
> max_early_data
) {
116 SSLfatal(s
, send
? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
: SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
117 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA
);
120 s
->early_data_count
+= length
;
125 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
128 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
133 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc
)) {
137 iter
= pqueue_iterator(sc
->rlayer
.d
->buffered_app_data
.q
);
138 while ((item
= pqueue_next(&iter
)) != NULL
) {
140 num
+= rdata
->length
;
144 for (i
= 0; i
< sc
->rlayer
.num_recs
; i
++) {
145 if (sc
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[i
].type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
147 num
+= sc
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[i
].length
;
150 num
+= sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->app_data_pending(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
);
155 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
157 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
160 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
162 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
166 sc
->rlayer
.default_read_buf_len
= len
;
169 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
171 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
177 if (sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== NULL
|| sc
->rlayer
.rrl
== NULL
)
180 sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_state(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
, NULL
, &lng
);
185 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
187 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
193 if (sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== NULL
|| sc
->rlayer
.rrl
== NULL
)
196 sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_state(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
, &shrt
, NULL
);
201 static int tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int type
,
202 const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
204 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== 0)
207 /* We have pending data, so do some sanity checks */
208 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
209 || (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
)
210 && (s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
))
211 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
212 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
219 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
220 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
222 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*ssl
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
225 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
227 size_t n
, max_send_fragment
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
229 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl
);
230 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpls
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
231 unsigned int recversion
;
236 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
237 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
239 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
240 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
241 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
242 * this in tls_write_check_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
243 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
244 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
245 * report the error in a way the user will notice
247 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
248 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
!= 0)
249 && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
250 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
254 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
255 && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, 1)) {
256 /* SSLfatal() already called */
263 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
264 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
267 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== 0 && (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
268 || s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0))
269 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
272 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
273 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
276 if (SSL_in_init(ssl
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
277 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
278 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
279 /* SSLfatal() already called */
287 i
= tls_write_check_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
);
289 /* SSLfatal() already called */
293 i
= HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s
,
294 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->retry_write_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
));
297 tot
+= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
298 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
299 } /* else no retry required */
303 * We've not previously sent any data for this write so memorize
304 * arguments so that we can detect bad write retries later
306 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
307 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
308 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
309 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= len
;
312 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
317 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
318 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
> 0) {
319 i
= ssl
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl
);
321 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
324 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
329 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
330 split_send_fragment
= ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s
);
332 if (max_send_fragment
== 0
333 || split_send_fragment
== 0
334 || split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
336 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
337 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
339 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
344 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
345 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
347 recversion
= (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
348 if (SSL_get_state(ssl
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
350 && TLS1_get_version(ssl
) > TLS1_VERSION
351 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
352 recversion
= TLS1_VERSION
;
355 size_t tmppipelen
, remain
;
356 size_t j
, lensofar
= 0;
359 * Ask the record layer how it would like to split the amount of data
360 * that we have, and how many of those records it would like in one go.
362 maxpipes
= s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->get_max_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, type
, n
,
364 &split_send_fragment
);
366 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
367 * whatever the record layer wants to do. Otherwise we use the smallest
368 * value from the number requested by the record layer, and max number
369 * configured by the user.
371 if (s
->max_pipelines
> 0 && maxpipes
> s
->max_pipelines
)
372 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
374 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
)
375 maxpipes
= SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
;
377 if (split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
382 if (n
/ maxpipes
>= split_send_fragment
) {
384 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
387 for (j
= 0; j
< maxpipes
; j
++) {
388 tmpls
[j
].type
= type
;
389 tmpls
[j
].version
= recversion
;
390 tmpls
[j
].buf
= &(buf
[tot
]) + (j
* split_send_fragment
);
391 tmpls
[j
].buflen
= split_send_fragment
;
393 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
394 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= maxpipes
* split_send_fragment
;
396 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
397 tmppipelen
= n
/ maxpipes
;
398 remain
= n
% maxpipes
;
400 * If there is a remainder we add an extra byte to the first few
405 for (j
= 0; j
< maxpipes
; j
++) {
406 tmpls
[j
].type
= type
;
407 tmpls
[j
].version
= recversion
;
408 tmpls
[j
].buf
= &(buf
[tot
]) + lensofar
;
409 tmpls
[j
].buflen
= tmppipelen
;
410 lensofar
+= tmppipelen
;
414 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
415 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= n
;
418 i
= HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s
,
419 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->write_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, tmpls
, maxpipes
));
421 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
422 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
426 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== n
427 || (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
428 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
) != 0)) {
429 *written
= tot
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
430 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
434 n
-= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
435 tot
+= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
439 int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int writing
, int ret
,
440 char *file
, int line
)
442 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
444 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY
) {
445 s
->rwstate
= writing
? SSL_WRITING
: SSL_READING
;
448 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
449 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF
) {
452 * This shouldn't happen with a writing operation. We treat it
456 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
457 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
458 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
, NULL
);
459 ret
= OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
;
460 } else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF
) != 0) {
461 SSL_set_shutdown(ssl
, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
);
462 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
;
465 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
466 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
467 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING
, NULL
);
469 } else if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
) {
470 int al
= s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_alert_code(s
->rlayer
.rrl
);
472 if (al
!= SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
) {
474 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
475 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, al
, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE
, NULL
);
478 * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an
479 * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error
480 * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be
481 * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno.
485 * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal
486 * err and retry. Upper layers do not.
487 * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct,
488 * otherwise we need to convert the return value.
490 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
|| ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF
)
492 else if (ret
< OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
)
499 void ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, TLS_RECORD
*rr
)
501 if (rr
->rechandle
!= NULL
) {
502 /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */
503 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->release_record(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, rr
->rechandle
);
505 /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */
506 OPENSSL_free(rr
->allocdata
);
507 rr
->allocdata
= NULL
;
509 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
++;
513 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
514 * 'type' is one of the following:
516 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
517 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
518 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
520 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
521 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
523 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
524 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
525 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
526 * argument is non NULL.
527 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
528 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
529 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
530 * Change cipher spec protocol
531 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
533 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
535 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
536 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
537 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
538 * Application data protocol
539 * none of our business
541 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
542 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
545 size_t n
, curr_rec
, totalbytes
;
547 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
549 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl
);
551 is_tls13
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
);
554 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
555 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
))
556 || (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
557 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
561 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
562 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
564 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
565 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
570 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
573 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
576 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
577 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
578 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
580 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
581 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
588 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
591 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(ssl
)) {
592 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
593 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
594 /* SSLfatal() already called */
601 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
604 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
605 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
607 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
608 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
610 /* get new records if necessary */
611 if (s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
>= s
->rlayer
.num_recs
) {
612 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
= s
->rlayer
.num_recs
= 0;
614 rr
= &s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[s
->rlayer
.num_recs
];
616 ret
= HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s
,
617 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->read_record(s
->rlayer
.rrl
,
619 &rr
->version
, &rr
->type
,
620 &rr
->data
, &rr
->length
,
623 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
627 s
->rlayer
.num_recs
++;
628 } while (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->processed_read_pending(s
->rlayer
.rrl
)
629 && s
->rlayer
.num_recs
< SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
631 rr
= &s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
];
633 if (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0
634 && rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
635 && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
636 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
637 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA
);
642 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
643 * record that isn't an alert.
645 if (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& rr
->length
!= 0)
646 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
648 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
650 if (s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
651 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
652 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
653 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
654 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
659 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
662 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
663 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
++;
664 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
669 || (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
670 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
673 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
674 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
675 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
678 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
679 * doing a handshake for the first time
681 if (SSL_in_init(ssl
) && type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
682 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
683 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
687 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
688 && rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
689 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
690 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
694 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
695 *recvd_type
= rr
->type
;
699 * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
700 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
701 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
704 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
710 curr_rec
= s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
;
712 if (len
- totalbytes
> rr
->length
)
715 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
717 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
720 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
722 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
724 /* TODO(RECLAYER) Casting away the const here is wrong! FIX ME */
725 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT
)
726 OPENSSL_cleanse((unsigned char *)&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
730 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
733 || (peek
&& n
== rr
->length
)) {
738 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
739 && curr_rec
< s
->rlayer
.num_recs
740 && totalbytes
< len
);
741 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
742 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
745 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
750 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
751 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
752 * were actually expecting a CCS).
756 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
758 if (rr
->version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
760 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
761 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
762 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
763 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
765 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
769 if (ssl
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
770 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
772 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
773 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
774 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
775 * if we are a server.
777 s
->version
= rr
->version
;
778 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
783 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
784 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
787 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
788 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
789 const unsigned char *alert_bytes
= rr
->data
+ rr
->off
;
792 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, rr
->length
)
793 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
794 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
795 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
796 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
801 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, ssl
,
802 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
804 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
805 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
806 else if (ssl
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
807 cb
= ssl
->ctx
->info_callback
;
810 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
811 cb(ssl
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
814 if ((!is_tls13
&& alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)
815 || (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
)) {
816 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
817 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
819 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
820 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
821 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
822 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
828 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
829 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
831 if (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
833 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
834 && (is_tls13
|| alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)) {
835 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
837 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
|| is_tls13
) {
838 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
839 s
->s3
.fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
840 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
841 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
,
842 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr
);
843 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
844 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
845 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
847 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
849 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
850 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
851 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
852 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
853 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
854 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
856 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
858 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
859 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
863 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
867 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
868 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
872 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
873 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
874 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
875 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
878 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
879 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
881 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
) != 0)
884 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
885 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(ssl
);
886 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
887 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
892 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
893 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
894 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
896 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
898 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
899 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
900 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY
);
906 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
907 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
908 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
909 * that we're just going to discard.
911 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
912 size_t dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
);
913 unsigned char *dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
914 size_t *dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
916 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
918 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
920 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
921 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
, rr
->data
+ rr
->off
, n
);
926 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
928 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
929 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
932 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
933 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
938 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
939 * protocol violation)
941 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
942 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
943 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
945 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
946 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
948 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
949 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
957 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
958 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
959 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
964 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
965 if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
968 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
969 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
970 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
971 * problems in the blocking world
973 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
974 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(ssl
);
975 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
976 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
986 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
987 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
988 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
989 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
990 * record types, using up resources processing them.
992 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
994 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
996 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
998 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
999 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1000 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1002 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1004 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1006 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1007 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1008 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1009 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1010 * started), we will indulge it.
1012 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1013 s
->s3
.in_read_app_data
= 2;
1015 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1017 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1018 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1019 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1020 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1021 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1022 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1025 if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1026 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, 0)) {
1027 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1030 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
1033 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1040 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1041 * format and false otherwise.
1043 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1045 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl
->s
))
1047 return rl
->tlsrecs
[0].version
== SSL2_VERSION
;
1050 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper
;
1051 static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p
, int version
,
1052 int content_type
, const void *buf
,
1053 size_t len
, void *cbarg
)
1055 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1056 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1058 if (s
->msg_callback
!= NULL
)
1059 s
->msg_callback(write_p
, version
, content_type
, buf
, len
, ssl
,
1060 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1063 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper
;
1064 static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg
, int op
, int bits
, int nid
,
1067 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1069 return ssl_security(s
, op
, bits
, nid
, other
);
1072 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding_fn rlayer_padding_wrapper
;
1073 static size_t rlayer_padding_wrapper(void *cbarg
, int type
, size_t len
)
1075 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1076 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1078 return s
->rlayer
.record_padding_cb(ssl
, type
, len
,
1079 s
->rlayer
.record_padding_arg
);
1082 static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch
[] = {
1083 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA
, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data
},
1084 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper
},
1085 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper
},
1086 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_padding_wrapper
},
1090 void ossl_ssl_set_custom_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1091 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*meth
,
1094 s
->rlayer
.custom_rlmethod
= meth
;
1095 s
->rlayer
.rlarg
= rlarg
;
1098 static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1102 if (s
->rlayer
.custom_rlmethod
!= NULL
)
1103 return s
->rlayer
.custom_rlmethod
;
1105 if (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
) {
1106 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
1107 return &ossl_dtls_record_method
;
1109 return &ossl_tls_record_method
;
1112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1113 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */
1114 if (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION
1115 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS
) != 0
1116 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)))
1117 return &ossl_ktls_record_method
;
1120 /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */
1121 return direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
? s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
1122 : s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1125 static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int direction
)
1127 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*thismethod
;
1128 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*thisrl
;
1130 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1131 thismethod
= s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
;
1132 thisrl
= s
->rlayer
.rrl
;
1134 thismethod
= s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1135 thisrl
= s
->rlayer
.wrl
;
1138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1140 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1142 if (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== &ossl_ktls_record_method
) {
1143 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */
1144 SSL_set_options(ssl
, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1148 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
) && thismethod
->set_first_handshake
!= NULL
)
1149 thismethod
->set_first_handshake(thisrl
, 1);
1151 if (s
->max_pipelines
!= 0 && thismethod
->set_max_pipelines
!= NULL
)
1152 thismethod
->set_max_pipelines(thisrl
, s
->max_pipelines
);
1157 int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int version
,
1158 int direction
, int level
,
1159 unsigned char *secret
, size_t secretlen
,
1160 unsigned char *key
, size_t keylen
,
1161 unsigned char *iv
, size_t ivlen
,
1162 unsigned char *mackey
, size_t mackeylen
,
1163 const EVP_CIPHER
*ciph
, size_t taglen
,
1164 int mactype
, const EVP_MD
*md
,
1165 const SSL_COMP
*comp
, const EVP_MD
*kdfdigest
)
1167 OSSL_PARAM options
[5], *opts
= options
;
1168 OSSL_PARAM settings
[6], *set
= settings
;
1169 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
**thismethod
;
1170 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
**thisrl
, *newrl
= NULL
;
1172 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1173 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*meth
;
1174 int use_etm
, stream_mac
= 0, tlstree
= 0;
1175 unsigned int maxfrag
= (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
)
1176 ? ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
)
1177 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1178 int use_early_data
= 0;
1179 uint32_t max_early_data
;
1180 COMP_METHOD
*compm
= (comp
== NULL
) ? NULL
: comp
->method
;
1182 meth
= ssl_select_next_record_layer(s
, direction
, level
);
1184 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1185 thismethod
= &s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
;
1186 thisrl
= &s
->rlayer
.rrl
;
1189 thismethod
= &s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1190 thisrl
= &s
->rlayer
.wrl
;
1197 if (!ossl_assert(meth
!= NULL
)) {
1198 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1202 /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1203 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS
,
1205 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE
,
1207 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1208 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN
,
1209 &s
->rlayer
.default_read_buf_len
);
1210 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD
,
1211 &s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
);
1213 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_BLOCK_PADDING
,
1214 &s
->rlayer
.block_padding
);
1216 *opts
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1218 /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1219 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1220 use_etm
= SSL_READ_ETM(s
) ? 1 : 0;
1221 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM
) != 0)
1224 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE
) != 0)
1227 use_etm
= SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) ? 1 : 0;
1228 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM
) != 0)
1231 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE
) != 0)
1236 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM
,
1240 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC
,
1244 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE
,
1248 * We only need to do this for the read side. The write side should already
1249 * have the correct value due to the ssl_get_max_send_fragment() call above
1251 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1252 && s
->session
!= NULL
1253 && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s
->session
))
1254 maxfrag
= GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s
->session
);
1257 if (maxfrag
!= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)
1258 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN
,
1262 * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received
1263 * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early
1264 * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force.
1266 if (s
->server
&& direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1267 use_early_data
= (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
1268 || level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
);
1269 } else if (!s
->server
&& direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
) {
1270 use_early_data
= (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
);
1272 if (use_early_data
) {
1273 max_early_data
= ossl_get_max_early_data(s
);
1275 if (max_early_data
!= 0)
1276 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA
,
1280 *set
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1286 unsigned int epoch
= 0;
1287 OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch_tmp
[OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch
)];
1290 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1291 prev
= s
->rlayer
.rrlnext
;
1292 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1293 && level
!= OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
)
1294 epoch
= DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s
->rlayer
) + 1; /* new epoch */
1296 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
1297 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
1298 next
= BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem());
1301 next
= BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1305 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1308 s
->rlayer
.rrlnext
= next
;
1310 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1311 && level
!= OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
)
1312 epoch
= DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s
->rlayer
) + 1; /* new epoch */
1316 * Create a copy of the dispatch array, missing out wrappers for
1317 * callbacks that we don't need.
1319 for (i
= 0, j
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch
); i
++) {
1320 switch (rlayer_dispatch
[i
].function_id
) {
1321 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK
:
1322 if (s
->msg_callback
== NULL
)
1325 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING
:
1326 if (s
->rlayer
.record_padding_cb
== NULL
)
1332 rlayer_dispatch_tmp
[j
++] = rlayer_dispatch
[i
];
1335 rlret
= meth
->new_record_layer(sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, version
,
1336 s
->server
, direction
, level
, epoch
,
1337 secret
, secretlen
, key
, keylen
, iv
,
1338 ivlen
, mackey
, mackeylen
, ciph
, taglen
,
1339 mactype
, md
, compm
, kdfdigest
, prev
,
1340 thisbio
, next
, NULL
, NULL
, settings
,
1341 options
, rlayer_dispatch_tmp
, s
,
1342 s
->rlayer
.rlarg
, &newrl
);
1345 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
:
1346 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE
);
1349 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
:
1350 if (*thismethod
!= meth
&& *thismethod
!= NULL
) {
1352 * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out,
1353 * so we fallback to the original method and try again
1358 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER
);
1361 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS
:
1365 /* Should not happen */
1366 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1373 * Free the old record layer if we have one except in the case of DTLS when
1374 * writing and there are still buffered sent messages in our queue. In that
1375 * case the record layer is still referenced by those buffered messages for
1376 * potential retransmit. Only when those buffered messages get freed do we
1377 * free the record layer object (see dtls1_hm_fragment_free)
1379 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1380 || direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1381 || pqueue_peek(s
->d1
->sent_messages
) == NULL
) {
1382 if (*thismethod
!= NULL
&& !(*thismethod
)->free(*thisrl
)) {
1383 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1391 return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s
, direction
);
1394 int ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int vers
)
1396 if (!ossl_assert(s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
!= NULL
)
1397 || !ossl_assert(s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
!= NULL
))
1399 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, s
->version
);
1400 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, s
->version
);