2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_locl.h"
18 #include "internal/packet.h"
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
38 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
47 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
49 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
50 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
72 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
86 size_t curr_rec
= 0, num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl
);
87 const SSL3_RECORD
*rr
= rl
->rrec
;
89 while (curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]))
92 return curr_rec
< num_recs
;
95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
97 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
103 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
108 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
115 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
118 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
122 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
128 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
130 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
133 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
138 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
140 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
142 return "read header";
143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
154 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
167 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
169 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
175 * s->s3.rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
181 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
188 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
)) {
191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
196 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
197 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
198 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
202 /* start with empty packet ... */
205 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
210 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
211 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
212 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
218 * overrun can be triggered.
220 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
224 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
225 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
229 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
230 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
235 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
236 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
237 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
238 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
247 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
249 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
255 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
262 /* else we need to read more data */
264 if (n
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
) {
265 /* does not happen */
266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,
267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
272 * Ktls always reads full records.
273 * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS.
275 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s
->rbio
) && !s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
276 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
277 /* ignore max parameter */
282 if (max
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)
283 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
291 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3.rbuf.buf and
292 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
297 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
298 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
299 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
300 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
304 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,
305 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
311 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
313 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
318 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
319 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
320 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
322 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
324 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
328 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
331 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
332 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
338 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
339 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
341 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
344 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
346 size_t n
, max_send_fragment
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
347 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
350 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
354 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
355 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
357 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
358 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
359 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
360 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
361 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
362 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
363 * report the error in a way the user will notice
365 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
366 || ((wb
->left
!= 0) && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
367 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
372 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
373 && !early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, 1)) {
374 /* SSLfatal() already called */
381 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate then go into init unless we
382 * have writes pending - in which case we should finish doing that first.
384 if (wb
->left
== 0 && s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
)
385 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
388 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
389 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
392 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
393 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
394 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
395 /* SSLfatal() already called */
404 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
405 * will happen with non blocking IO
408 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
409 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
412 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
413 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
416 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
418 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
420 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
421 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
422 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
423 * compromise is considered worthy.
425 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
426 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
)) &&
427 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
428 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
429 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
430 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
431 unsigned char aad
[13];
432 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
436 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
437 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
438 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
440 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
441 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
443 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
444 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
445 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
447 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
452 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
453 /* SSLfatal() already called */
456 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
457 /* free jumbo buffer */
458 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
465 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
466 /* free jumbo buffer */
467 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
471 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
) {
472 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
474 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
475 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
480 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
481 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
483 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
485 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
487 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
488 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
495 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
496 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
497 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
498 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
499 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
500 /* free jumbo buffer */
501 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
505 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
506 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
509 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
510 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
511 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
514 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
515 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
517 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
523 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
524 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
525 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
526 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
528 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
530 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
531 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
532 /* free jumbo buffer */
533 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
535 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
539 /* free jumbo buffer */
540 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
541 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
548 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
549 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
550 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
551 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
559 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
560 split_send_fragment
= ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s
);
562 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
563 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
564 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
567 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
568 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
570 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
573 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
574 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
578 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
579 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
580 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
581 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
583 if (max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
== 0
584 || split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
586 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
587 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
589 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,
590 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
595 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
601 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
602 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
605 if (n
/ numpipes
>= max_send_fragment
) {
607 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
610 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
611 pipelens
[j
] = max_send_fragment
;
614 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
615 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
616 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
617 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
618 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
624 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
627 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
628 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
629 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
634 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
635 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
637 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
638 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
640 s
->s3
.empty_fragment_done
= 0;
643 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
) != 0
645 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
647 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
656 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
657 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
658 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
660 WPACKET pkt
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
661 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
664 unsigned char *recordstart
;
665 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
666 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
671 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, wpinited
= 0;
674 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
675 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
677 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
678 * will happen with non blocking IO
680 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
681 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
682 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
685 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
686 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
) {
687 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
689 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
692 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
695 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
) {
696 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0)) {
697 /* SSLfatal() already called */
702 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
707 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
708 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
709 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
712 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
713 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
715 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
716 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
722 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
724 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
.empty_fragment_done
) {
726 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
727 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
730 if (s
->s3
.need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
732 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
733 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
734 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
737 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
740 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
742 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
747 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
748 /* insufficient space */
749 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
750 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
755 s
->s3
.empty_fragment_done
= 1;
758 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
760 * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to
761 * discard the const qualifier.
762 * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when
765 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0], (unsigned char *)buf
);
766 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0], 0);
767 goto wpacket_init_complete
;
770 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
771 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
772 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
774 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
775 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
776 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
778 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
779 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
781 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
782 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
783 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
784 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], align
, NULL
)) {
785 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
786 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
790 } else if (prefix_len
) {
791 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
792 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0],
793 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
794 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
795 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
796 + prefix_len
, NULL
)) {
797 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
798 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
803 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
806 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
807 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
808 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
809 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
811 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
812 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt
, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
813 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
814 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, align
, NULL
)) {
815 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
816 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
823 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
824 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)) {
825 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
826 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
827 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
828 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
831 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
) {
832 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
833 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
834 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
835 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
839 wpacket_init_complete
:
842 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
843 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof(wr
));
844 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
845 unsigned int version
= (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
847 unsigned char *compressdata
= NULL
;
849 unsigned int rectype
;
855 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
858 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)
859 && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
860 && (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
!= ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
861 || type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
))
862 rectype
= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
;
865 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, rectype
);
868 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
869 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
871 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
873 && TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
874 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
875 version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
876 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr
, version
);
878 maxcomplen
= pipelens
[j
];
879 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
880 maxcomplen
+= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
;
883 * When using offload kernel will write the header.
884 * Otherwise write the header now
886 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)
887 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, rectype
)
888 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, version
)
889 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt
)
891 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, eivlen
, NULL
))
893 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, maxcomplen
,
895 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
896 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
900 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
901 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, compressdata
);
902 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, pipelens
[j
]);
903 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr
, (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
904 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
907 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
911 /* first we compress */
912 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
913 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, thiswr
)
914 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, thiswr
->length
, NULL
)) {
915 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
916 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
920 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
921 SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr
[j
]);
923 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt
, thiswr
->input
, thiswr
->length
)) {
924 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
925 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
928 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
932 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)
933 && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
934 && (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
!= ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
935 || type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
936 size_t rlen
, max_send_fragment
;
938 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, type
)) {
939 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
943 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, 1);
945 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
946 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
947 rlen
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
948 if (rlen
< max_send_fragment
) {
950 size_t max_padding
= max_send_fragment
- rlen
;
951 if (s
->record_padding_cb
!= NULL
) {
952 padding
= s
->record_padding_cb(s
, type
, rlen
, s
->record_padding_arg
);
953 } else if (s
->block_padding
> 0) {
954 size_t mask
= s
->block_padding
- 1;
957 /* optimize for power of 2 */
958 if ((s
->block_padding
& mask
) == 0)
959 remainder
= rlen
& mask
;
961 remainder
= rlen
% s
->block_padding
;
962 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
966 padding
= s
->block_padding
- remainder
;
969 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
970 if (padding
> max_padding
)
971 padding
= max_padding
;
972 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt
, 0, padding
)) {
973 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
977 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, padding
);
983 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
984 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
988 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
991 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
992 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
993 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
994 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1000 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
1001 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
1002 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
1004 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
1005 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
,
1006 SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
,
1009 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
1012 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)) {
1013 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1014 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1018 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
1019 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
;
1020 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, recordstart
);
1021 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr
);
1022 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, len
);
1026 if (s
->statem
.enc_write_state
== ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
) {
1028 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
1029 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
1031 if (tls13_enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1) {
1032 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s
)) {
1033 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1034 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1039 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)) {
1040 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1) {
1041 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s
)) {
1042 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1043 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1050 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
1056 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
))
1059 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
1060 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &origlen
)
1061 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
1062 || origlen
> thiswr
->length
1063 || (thiswr
->length
> origlen
1064 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
,
1065 thiswr
->length
- origlen
,
1067 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1068 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1071 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
1074 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
1075 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
1076 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1080 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, mac_size
);
1083 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)
1084 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt
)) {
1085 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1086 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1090 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
1091 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
1092 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1093 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, recordstart
,
1094 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1095 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1097 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
1098 unsigned char ctype
= type
;
1100 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
,
1101 &ctype
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1105 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt
)) {
1106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1111 /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */
1112 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
1114 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1116 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1120 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1121 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,
1122 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1125 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
1131 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1132 * is thiswr->length long
1134 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for
1137 /* now let's set up wb */
1138 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
1139 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
));
1143 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1146 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
1147 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
1148 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
1149 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
1151 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1152 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
1154 for (j
= 0; j
< wpinited
; j
++)
1155 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
[j
]);
1159 /* if s->s3.wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1161 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1163 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
1167 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
1171 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
1172 || (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
)
1173 && (s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
))
1174 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1175 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,
1176 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1181 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1182 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1183 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1188 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1189 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1192 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages,
1193 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO
1195 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
) && type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
1196 i
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1201 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s
->wbio
)
1202 && type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
1203 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s
->wbio
, type
);
1205 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1206 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
1207 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
1208 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1209 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1213 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,
1217 if (i
> 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1218 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1219 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1220 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1222 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1223 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
1225 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1226 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1228 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1229 * using a datagram service
1231 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1235 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1236 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1241 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1242 * 'type' is one of the following:
1244 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1245 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1246 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1248 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1249 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1251 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1252 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1253 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1254 * argument is non NULL.
1255 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1256 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1257 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1258 * Change cipher spec protocol
1259 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1261 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1262 * Handshake protocol
1263 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1264 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1265 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1266 * Application data protocol
1267 * none of our business
1269 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1270 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
1273 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, totalbytes
;
1276 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1277 int is_tls13
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
);
1279 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1281 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1282 /* Not initialized yet */
1283 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
)) {
1284 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1289 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1290 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1292 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1293 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1294 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1298 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1299 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1301 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1302 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1307 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1310 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1313 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1314 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1315 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1317 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1318 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1325 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1328 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1329 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1330 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1331 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1338 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1341 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1342 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1343 * rr[i].data, - data
1344 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1345 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1347 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1348 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1351 /* get new records if necessary */
1352 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1353 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1355 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1358 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1359 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1360 /* Shouldn't happen */
1361 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1362 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1366 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1368 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1370 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1371 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1375 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1378 if (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0
1379 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1380 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1381 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1382 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA
);
1387 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1388 * record that isn't an alert.
1390 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1391 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1392 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1394 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1396 if (s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1397 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1398 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1399 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1400 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1405 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1408 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1409 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1410 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1414 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1415 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1416 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
1419 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1420 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1421 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1424 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1425 * doing a handshake for the first time
1427 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1428 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1429 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1430 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1434 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1435 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1436 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1437 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1438 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1442 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1443 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1447 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1448 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1449 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1451 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1452 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1458 if (len
- totalbytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1459 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1461 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
1463 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1466 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1467 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1468 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1470 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1471 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1472 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1473 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1474 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1475 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1478 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1479 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1484 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1485 && totalbytes
< len
);
1486 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
1487 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1490 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1491 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1492 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1493 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1494 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
1499 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1500 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1501 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1505 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1507 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1509 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1510 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1511 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1512 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1514 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1519 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1520 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1522 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1523 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
1524 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
1525 * if we are a server.
1527 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1528 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1529 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1534 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1535 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1538 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1539 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
1540 unsigned char *alert_bytes
= SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)
1541 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
);
1544 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1545 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
1546 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
1547 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
1548 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1549 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
1553 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1554 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, s
,
1555 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1557 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1558 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1559 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1560 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1563 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1564 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1567 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
1568 || (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
)) {
1569 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1570 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1572 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1573 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1574 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1575 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1581 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1582 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1584 if (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
1586 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
1587 && (is_tls13
|| alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)) {
1588 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1590 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
|| is_tls13
) {
1593 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1594 s
->s3
.fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1595 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1596 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1597 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1598 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1599 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1600 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1601 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1603 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1605 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1606 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1607 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1608 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1609 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1610 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1612 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1613 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1615 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1616 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
1620 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1621 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1625 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
1626 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1630 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
1631 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
1632 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
1633 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
1634 * sent close_notify.
1636 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1637 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1638 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1640 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
) != 0)
1643 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1644 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1645 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
1646 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
1651 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
1652 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
1653 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
1655 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
1657 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1658 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1659 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1660 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY
);
1666 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
1667 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
1668 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
1669 * that we're just going to discard.
1671 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1672 size_t dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
);
1673 unsigned char *dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1674 size_t *dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1676 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1677 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1678 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1680 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1681 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
,
1682 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
), n
);
1683 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1684 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1686 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1687 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1689 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1690 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1693 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1694 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1695 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1700 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1701 * protocol violation)
1703 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1704 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1705 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
1707 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1708 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1710 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1711 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1719 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1720 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1721 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1726 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1727 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1728 /* no read-ahead left? */
1731 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1732 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1733 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1734 * problems in the blocking world
1736 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1737 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1738 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1739 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1746 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1749 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1750 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1751 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1752 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1753 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1755 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1756 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1758 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1760 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1762 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1763 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1764 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1766 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1767 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1769 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1771 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1772 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1773 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1774 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1775 * started), we will indulge it.
1777 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1778 s
->s3
.in_read_app_data
= 2;
1780 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1782 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1783 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1784 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1785 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1786 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1787 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1790 if (!early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1791 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, 0)) {
1792 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1795 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1798 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1799 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1805 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1809 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1817 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1818 * format and false otherwise.
1820 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1822 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1826 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1828 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1830 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);