2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "../quic/quic_local.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include "record_local.h"
21 #include "internal/packet.h"
23 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
28 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
31 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
32 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
37 if (rl
->rrlmethod
!= NULL
)
38 rl
->rrlmethod
->free(rl
->rrl
); /* Ignore return value */
39 if (rl
->wrlmethod
!= NULL
)
40 rl
->wrlmethod
->free(rl
->wrl
); /* Ignore return value */
41 BIO_free(rl
->rrlnext
);
49 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
52 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
53 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
55 return rl
->rrlmethod
->unprocessed_read_pending(rl
->rrl
);
58 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
59 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
61 return (rl
->curr_rec
< rl
->num_recs
)
62 || rl
->rrlmethod
->processed_read_pending(rl
->rrl
);
65 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
67 return rl
->wpend_tot
> 0;
70 static uint32_t ossl_get_max_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
72 uint32_t max_early_data
;
73 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
76 * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
77 * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
78 * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
80 if (!s
->server
&& sess
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0) {
81 if (!ossl_assert(s
->psksession
!= NULL
82 && s
->psksession
->ext
.max_early_data
> 0)) {
83 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
90 max_early_data
= sess
->ext
.max_early_data
;
91 else if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
)
92 max_early_data
= s
->recv_max_early_data
;
94 max_early_data
= s
->recv_max_early_data
< sess
->ext
.max_early_data
95 ? s
->recv_max_early_data
: sess
->ext
.max_early_data
;
97 return max_early_data
;
100 static int ossl_early_data_count_ok(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, size_t length
,
101 size_t overhead
, int send
)
103 uint32_t max_early_data
;
105 max_early_data
= ossl_get_max_early_data(s
);
107 if (max_early_data
== 0) {
108 SSLfatal(s
, send
? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
: SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
109 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA
);
113 /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
114 max_early_data
+= overhead
;
116 if (s
->early_data_count
+ length
> max_early_data
) {
117 SSLfatal(s
, send
? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
: SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
118 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA
);
121 s
->early_data_count
+= length
;
126 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
129 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
134 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc
)) {
138 iter
= pqueue_iterator(sc
->rlayer
.d
->buffered_app_data
.q
);
139 while ((item
= pqueue_next(&iter
)) != NULL
) {
141 num
+= rdata
->length
;
145 for (i
= 0; i
< sc
->rlayer
.num_recs
; i
++) {
146 if (sc
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[i
].type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
148 num
+= sc
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[i
].length
;
151 num
+= sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->app_data_pending(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
);
156 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
158 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
161 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
163 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
165 if (sc
== NULL
|| IS_QUIC(s
))
167 sc
->rlayer
.default_read_buf_len
= len
;
170 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
172 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
178 if (sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== NULL
|| sc
->rlayer
.rrl
== NULL
)
181 sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_state(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
, NULL
, &lng
);
186 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
188 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
194 if (sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== NULL
|| sc
->rlayer
.rrl
== NULL
)
197 sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_state(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
, &shrt
, NULL
);
202 static int tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint8_t type
,
203 const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
205 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== 0)
208 /* We have pending data, so do some sanity checks */
209 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
210 || (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
)
211 && (s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
))
212 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
213 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
220 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
221 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
223 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
226 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
228 size_t n
, max_send_fragment
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
230 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl
);
231 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpls
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
232 unsigned int recversion
;
237 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
238 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
240 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
241 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
242 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
243 * this in tls_write_check_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
244 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
245 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
246 * report the error in a way the user will notice
248 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
249 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
!= 0)
250 && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
251 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
255 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
256 && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, 1)) {
257 /* SSLfatal() already called */
264 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
265 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
268 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== 0 && (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
269 || s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0))
270 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
273 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
274 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
277 if (SSL_in_init(ssl
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
278 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
279 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
280 /* SSLfatal() already called */
288 i
= tls_write_check_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
);
290 /* SSLfatal() already called */
294 i
= HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s
,
295 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->retry_write_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
));
297 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
300 tot
+= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
301 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
302 } /* else no retry required */
306 * We've not previously sent any data for this write so memorize
307 * arguments so that we can detect bad write retries later
309 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
310 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
311 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
314 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
319 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
320 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
> 0) {
321 i
= ssl
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl
);
323 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
324 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
327 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
332 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
333 split_send_fragment
= ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s
);
335 if (max_send_fragment
== 0
336 || split_send_fragment
== 0
337 || split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
339 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
340 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
342 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
347 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
348 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
350 recversion
= (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
351 if (SSL_get_state(ssl
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
353 && TLS1_get_version(ssl
) > TLS1_VERSION
354 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
355 recversion
= TLS1_VERSION
;
358 size_t tmppipelen
, remain
;
359 size_t j
, lensofar
= 0;
362 * Ask the record layer how it would like to split the amount of data
363 * that we have, and how many of those records it would like in one go.
365 maxpipes
= s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->get_max_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, type
, n
,
367 &split_send_fragment
);
369 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
370 * whatever the record layer wants to do. Otherwise we use the smallest
371 * value from the number requested by the record layer, and max number
372 * configured by the user.
374 if (s
->max_pipelines
> 0 && maxpipes
> s
->max_pipelines
)
375 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
377 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
)
378 maxpipes
= SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
;
380 if (split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
381 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
385 if (n
/ maxpipes
>= split_send_fragment
) {
387 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
390 for (j
= 0; j
< maxpipes
; j
++) {
391 tmpls
[j
].type
= type
;
392 tmpls
[j
].version
= recversion
;
393 tmpls
[j
].buf
= &(buf
[tot
]) + (j
* split_send_fragment
);
394 tmpls
[j
].buflen
= split_send_fragment
;
396 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
397 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= maxpipes
* split_send_fragment
;
399 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
400 tmppipelen
= n
/ maxpipes
;
401 remain
= n
% maxpipes
;
403 * If there is a remainder we add an extra byte to the first few
408 for (j
= 0; j
< maxpipes
; j
++) {
409 tmpls
[j
].type
= type
;
410 tmpls
[j
].version
= recversion
;
411 tmpls
[j
].buf
= &(buf
[tot
]) + lensofar
;
412 tmpls
[j
].buflen
= tmppipelen
;
413 lensofar
+= tmppipelen
;
417 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
418 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= n
;
421 i
= HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s
,
422 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->write_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, tmpls
, maxpipes
));
424 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
425 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
429 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== n
430 || (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
431 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
) != 0)) {
432 *written
= tot
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
433 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
437 n
-= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
438 tot
+= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
442 int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int writing
, int ret
,
443 char *file
, int line
)
445 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
447 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY
) {
448 s
->rwstate
= writing
? SSL_WRITING
: SSL_READING
;
451 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
452 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF
) {
455 * This shouldn't happen with a writing operation. We treat it
459 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
460 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
461 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
, NULL
);
462 ret
= OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
;
463 } else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF
) != 0) {
464 SSL_set_shutdown(ssl
, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
);
465 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
;
468 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
469 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
470 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING
, NULL
);
472 } else if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
) {
473 int al
= s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_alert_code(s
->rlayer
.rrl
);
475 if (al
!= SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
) {
477 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
478 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, al
, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE
, NULL
);
481 * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an
482 * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error
483 * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be
484 * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno.
488 * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal
489 * err and retry. Upper layers do not.
490 * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct,
491 * otherwise we need to convert the return value.
493 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
|| ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF
)
495 else if (ret
< OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
)
502 int ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, TLS_RECORD
*rr
, size_t length
)
504 assert(rr
->length
>= length
);
505 if (rr
->rechandle
!= NULL
) {
508 /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */
509 if (HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s
,
510 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->release_record(s
->rlayer
.rrl
,
513 /* RLAYER_fatal already called */
517 if (length
== rr
->length
)
518 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
++;
519 } else if (length
== 0 || length
== rr
->length
) {
520 /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */
521 OPENSSL_free(rr
->allocdata
);
522 rr
->allocdata
= NULL
;
524 rr
->length
-= length
;
534 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
535 * 'type' is one of the following:
537 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when tls_get_message_header and tls_get_message_body
539 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
540 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
542 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
543 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
545 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
546 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
547 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
548 * argument is non NULL.
549 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
550 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
551 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
552 * Change cipher spec protocol
553 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
555 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
557 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
558 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
559 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
560 * Application data protocol
561 * none of our business
563 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t type
, uint8_t *recvd_type
,
564 unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
565 int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
568 size_t n
, curr_rec
, totalbytes
;
570 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
572 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl
);
574 is_tls13
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
);
577 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
578 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
))
579 || (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
580 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
584 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
585 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
587 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
588 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
593 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
596 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
599 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
600 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
601 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
603 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
604 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
611 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
614 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(ssl
)) {
615 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
616 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
617 /* SSLfatal() already called */
624 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
627 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
628 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
630 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
631 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
633 /* get new records if necessary */
634 if (s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
>= s
->rlayer
.num_recs
) {
635 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
= s
->rlayer
.num_recs
= 0;
637 rr
= &s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[s
->rlayer
.num_recs
];
639 ret
= HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s
,
640 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->read_record(s
->rlayer
.rrl
,
642 &rr
->version
, &rr
->type
,
643 &rr
->data
, &rr
->length
,
646 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
650 s
->rlayer
.num_recs
++;
651 } while (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->processed_read_pending(s
->rlayer
.rrl
)
652 && s
->rlayer
.num_recs
< SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
654 rr
= &s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
];
656 if (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0
657 && rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
658 && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
659 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
660 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA
);
665 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
666 * record that isn't an alert.
668 if (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& rr
->length
!= 0)
669 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
671 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
673 if (s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
674 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
675 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
676 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
677 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
682 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
685 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
686 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
++;
687 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
692 || (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
693 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
696 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
697 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
698 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
701 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
702 * doing a handshake for the first time
704 if (SSL_in_init(ssl
) && type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
705 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
706 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
710 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
711 && rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
712 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
713 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
717 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
718 *recvd_type
= rr
->type
;
722 * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
723 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
724 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
726 if (rr
->length
== 0 && !ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
733 curr_rec
= s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
;
735 if (len
- totalbytes
> rr
->length
)
738 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
740 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
743 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
744 if (rr
->length
== 0 && !ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
747 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, n
))
751 || (peek
&& n
== rr
->length
)) {
756 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
757 && curr_rec
< s
->rlayer
.num_recs
758 && totalbytes
< len
);
759 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
760 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
763 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
768 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
769 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
770 * were actually expecting a CCS).
774 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
776 if (rr
->version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
778 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
779 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
780 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
781 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
783 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
787 if (ssl
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
788 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
790 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
791 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
792 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
793 * if we are a server.
795 s
->version
= rr
->version
;
796 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
801 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
802 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
805 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
806 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
807 const unsigned char *alert_bytes
= rr
->data
+ rr
->off
;
810 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, rr
->length
)
811 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
812 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
813 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
814 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
819 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, ssl
,
820 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
822 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
823 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
824 else if (ssl
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
825 cb
= ssl
->ctx
->info_callback
;
828 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
829 cb(ssl
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
832 if ((!is_tls13
&& alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)
833 || (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
)) {
834 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
835 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
838 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
839 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
840 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
841 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
847 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
848 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
850 if (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
852 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
853 && (is_tls13
|| alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)) {
854 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
856 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
|| is_tls13
) {
857 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
858 s
->s3
.fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
859 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
860 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
,
861 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr
);
862 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
863 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
865 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
867 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
869 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
870 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
871 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
872 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
873 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
874 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
876 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
878 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
879 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
883 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
887 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
888 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
892 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
893 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
894 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
895 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
898 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
899 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
902 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
) != 0)
905 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
906 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(ssl
);
907 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
908 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
913 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
914 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
915 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
917 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
919 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
921 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
922 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY
);
928 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
929 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
930 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
931 * that we're just going to discard.
933 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
934 size_t dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
);
935 unsigned char *dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
936 size_t *dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
938 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
940 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
942 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
944 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
, rr
->data
+ rr
->off
, n
);
948 * We release the number of bytes consumed, or the whole record if it
951 if ((n
> 0 || rr
->length
== 0) && !ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, n
))
954 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
955 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
958 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
964 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
965 * protocol violation)
967 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
968 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
969 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
971 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
972 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
974 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
975 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
983 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
984 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
985 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
990 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
991 if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
994 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
995 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
996 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
997 * problems in the blocking world
999 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1000 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(ssl
);
1001 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1002 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1012 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1013 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1014 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1015 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1016 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1018 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1020 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1022 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1024 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1025 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1026 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1028 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1030 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1032 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1033 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1034 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1035 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1036 * started), we will indulge it.
1038 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1039 s
->s3
.in_read_app_data
= 2;
1041 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1043 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1044 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1045 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1046 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1047 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1048 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1051 if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1052 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, 0)) {
1053 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1056 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
1060 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1067 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1068 * format and false otherwise.
1070 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1072 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl
->s
))
1074 return rl
->tlsrecs
[0].version
== SSL2_VERSION
;
1077 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper
;
1078 static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p
, int version
,
1079 int content_type
, const void *buf
,
1080 size_t len
, void *cbarg
)
1082 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1083 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1085 if (s
->msg_callback
!= NULL
)
1086 s
->msg_callback(write_p
, version
, content_type
, buf
, len
, ssl
,
1087 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1090 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper
;
1091 static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg
, int op
, int bits
, int nid
,
1094 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1096 return ssl_security(s
, op
, bits
, nid
, other
);
1099 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding_fn rlayer_padding_wrapper
;
1100 static size_t rlayer_padding_wrapper(void *cbarg
, int type
, size_t len
)
1102 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1103 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1105 return s
->rlayer
.record_padding_cb(ssl
, type
, len
,
1106 s
->rlayer
.record_padding_arg
);
1109 static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch
[] = {
1110 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA
, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data
},
1111 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper
},
1112 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper
},
1113 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_padding_wrapper
},
1117 void ossl_ssl_set_custom_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1118 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*meth
,
1121 s
->rlayer
.custom_rlmethod
= meth
;
1122 s
->rlayer
.rlarg
= rlarg
;
1125 static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1129 if (s
->rlayer
.custom_rlmethod
!= NULL
)
1130 return s
->rlayer
.custom_rlmethod
;
1132 if (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
) {
1133 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
1134 return &ossl_dtls_record_method
;
1136 return &ossl_tls_record_method
;
1139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1140 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */
1141 if (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION
1142 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS
) != 0
1143 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)))
1144 return &ossl_ktls_record_method
;
1147 /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */
1148 return direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
? s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
1149 : s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1152 static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int direction
)
1154 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*thismethod
;
1155 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*thisrl
;
1157 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1158 thismethod
= s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
;
1159 thisrl
= s
->rlayer
.rrl
;
1161 thismethod
= s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1162 thisrl
= s
->rlayer
.wrl
;
1165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1167 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1169 if (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== &ossl_ktls_record_method
) {
1170 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */
1171 SSL_set_options(ssl
, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1175 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
) && thismethod
->set_first_handshake
!= NULL
)
1176 thismethod
->set_first_handshake(thisrl
, 1);
1178 if (s
->max_pipelines
!= 0 && thismethod
->set_max_pipelines
!= NULL
)
1179 thismethod
->set_max_pipelines(thisrl
, s
->max_pipelines
);
1184 int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int version
,
1185 int direction
, int level
,
1186 unsigned char *secret
, size_t secretlen
,
1187 unsigned char *key
, size_t keylen
,
1188 unsigned char *iv
, size_t ivlen
,
1189 unsigned char *mackey
, size_t mackeylen
,
1190 const EVP_CIPHER
*ciph
, size_t taglen
,
1191 int mactype
, const EVP_MD
*md
,
1192 const SSL_COMP
*comp
, const EVP_MD
*kdfdigest
)
1194 OSSL_PARAM options
[5], *opts
= options
;
1195 OSSL_PARAM settings
[6], *set
= settings
;
1196 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
**thismethod
;
1197 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
**thisrl
, *newrl
= NULL
;
1199 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1200 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*meth
;
1201 int use_etm
, stream_mac
= 0, tlstree
= 0;
1202 unsigned int maxfrag
= (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
)
1203 ? ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
)
1204 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1205 int use_early_data
= 0;
1206 uint32_t max_early_data
;
1207 COMP_METHOD
*compm
= (comp
== NULL
) ? NULL
: comp
->method
;
1209 meth
= ssl_select_next_record_layer(s
, direction
, level
);
1211 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1212 thismethod
= &s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
;
1213 thisrl
= &s
->rlayer
.rrl
;
1216 thismethod
= &s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1217 thisrl
= &s
->rlayer
.wrl
;
1224 if (!ossl_assert(meth
!= NULL
)) {
1225 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1229 /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1230 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS
,
1232 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE
,
1234 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1235 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN
,
1236 &s
->rlayer
.default_read_buf_len
);
1237 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD
,
1238 &s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
);
1240 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_BLOCK_PADDING
,
1241 &s
->rlayer
.block_padding
);
1243 *opts
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1245 /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1246 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1247 use_etm
= SSL_READ_ETM(s
) ? 1 : 0;
1248 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM
) != 0)
1251 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE
) != 0)
1254 use_etm
= SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) ? 1 : 0;
1255 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM
) != 0)
1258 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE
) != 0)
1263 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM
,
1267 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC
,
1271 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE
,
1275 * We only need to do this for the read side. The write side should already
1276 * have the correct value due to the ssl_get_max_send_fragment() call above
1278 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1279 && s
->session
!= NULL
1280 && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s
->session
))
1281 maxfrag
= GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s
->session
);
1284 if (maxfrag
!= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)
1285 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN
,
1289 * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received
1290 * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early
1291 * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force.
1293 if (s
->server
&& direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1294 use_early_data
= (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
1295 || level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
);
1296 } else if (!s
->server
&& direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
) {
1297 use_early_data
= (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
);
1299 if (use_early_data
) {
1300 max_early_data
= ossl_get_max_early_data(s
);
1302 if (max_early_data
!= 0)
1303 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA
,
1307 *set
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1313 unsigned int epoch
= 0;
1314 OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch_tmp
[OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch
)];
1317 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1318 prev
= s
->rlayer
.rrlnext
;
1319 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1320 && level
!= OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
)
1321 epoch
= DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s
->rlayer
) + 1; /* new epoch */
1323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
1324 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
1325 next
= BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem());
1328 next
= BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1331 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1334 s
->rlayer
.rrlnext
= next
;
1336 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1337 && level
!= OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
)
1338 epoch
= DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s
->rlayer
) + 1; /* new epoch */
1342 * Create a copy of the dispatch array, missing out wrappers for
1343 * callbacks that we don't need.
1345 for (i
= 0, j
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch
); i
++) {
1346 switch (rlayer_dispatch
[i
].function_id
) {
1347 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK
:
1348 if (s
->msg_callback
== NULL
)
1351 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING
:
1352 if (s
->rlayer
.record_padding_cb
== NULL
)
1358 rlayer_dispatch_tmp
[j
++] = rlayer_dispatch
[i
];
1361 rlret
= meth
->new_record_layer(sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, version
,
1362 s
->server
, direction
, level
, epoch
,
1363 secret
, secretlen
, key
, keylen
, iv
,
1364 ivlen
, mackey
, mackeylen
, ciph
, taglen
,
1365 mactype
, md
, compm
, kdfdigest
, prev
,
1366 thisbio
, next
, NULL
, NULL
, settings
,
1367 options
, rlayer_dispatch_tmp
, s
,
1368 s
->rlayer
.rlarg
, &newrl
);
1371 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
:
1372 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE
);
1375 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
:
1376 if (*thismethod
!= meth
&& *thismethod
!= NULL
) {
1378 * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out,
1379 * so we fallback to the original method and try again
1384 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER
);
1387 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS
:
1391 /* Should not happen */
1392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1399 * Free the old record layer if we have one except in the case of DTLS when
1400 * writing and there are still buffered sent messages in our queue. In that
1401 * case the record layer is still referenced by those buffered messages for
1402 * potential retransmit. Only when those buffered messages get freed do we
1403 * free the record layer object (see dtls1_hm_fragment_free)
1405 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1406 || direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1407 || pqueue_peek(s
->d1
->sent_messages
) == NULL
) {
1408 if (*thismethod
!= NULL
&& !(*thismethod
)->free(*thisrl
)) {
1409 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1417 return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s
, direction
);
1420 int ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int vers
)
1422 if (!ossl_assert(s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
!= NULL
)
1423 || !ossl_assert(s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
!= NULL
))
1425 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, s
->version
);
1426 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, s
->version
);