2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #include "record_local.h"
20 #include "internal/packet.h"
22 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
27 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
30 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
31 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
37 if (rl
->rrlmethod
!= NULL
)
38 rl
->rrlmethod
->free(rl
->rrl
); /* Ignore return value */
39 if (rl
->wrlmethod
!= NULL
)
40 rl
->wrlmethod
->free(rl
->wrl
); /* Ignore return value */
41 BIO_free(rl
->rrlnext
);
49 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
52 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
53 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
55 return rl
->rrlmethod
->unprocessed_read_pending(rl
->rrl
);
58 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
59 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
61 return (rl
->curr_rec
< rl
->num_recs
)
62 || rl
->rrlmethod
->processed_read_pending(rl
->rrl
);
65 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
67 return rl
->wpend_tot
> 0;
70 static uint32_t ossl_get_max_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
72 uint32_t max_early_data
;
73 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
76 * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
77 * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
78 * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
80 if (!s
->server
&& sess
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0) {
81 if (!ossl_assert(s
->psksession
!= NULL
82 && s
->psksession
->ext
.max_early_data
> 0)) {
83 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
90 max_early_data
= sess
->ext
.max_early_data
;
91 else if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
)
92 max_early_data
= s
->recv_max_early_data
;
94 max_early_data
= s
->recv_max_early_data
< sess
->ext
.max_early_data
95 ? s
->recv_max_early_data
: sess
->ext
.max_early_data
;
97 return max_early_data
;
100 static int ossl_early_data_count_ok(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, size_t length
,
101 size_t overhead
, int send
)
103 uint32_t max_early_data
;
105 max_early_data
= ossl_get_max_early_data(s
);
107 if (max_early_data
== 0) {
108 SSLfatal(s
, send
? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
: SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
109 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA
);
113 /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
114 max_early_data
+= overhead
;
116 if (s
->early_data_count
+ length
> max_early_data
) {
117 SSLfatal(s
, send
? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
: SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
118 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA
);
121 s
->early_data_count
+= length
;
126 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
129 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
134 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc
)) {
138 iter
= pqueue_iterator(sc
->rlayer
.d
->buffered_app_data
.q
);
139 while ((item
= pqueue_next(&iter
)) != NULL
) {
141 num
+= rdata
->length
;
145 for (i
= 0; i
< sc
->rlayer
.num_recs
; i
++) {
146 if (sc
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[i
].type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
148 num
+= sc
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[i
].length
;
151 num
+= sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->app_data_pending(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
);
156 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
158 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
161 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
163 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
167 sc
->rlayer
.default_read_buf_len
= len
;
170 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
172 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
178 if (sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== NULL
|| sc
->rlayer
.rrl
== NULL
)
181 sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_state(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
, NULL
, &lng
);
186 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
188 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
194 if (sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== NULL
|| sc
->rlayer
.rrl
== NULL
)
197 sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_state(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
, &shrt
, NULL
);
202 static int tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int type
,
203 const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
205 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== 0)
208 /* We have pending data, so do some sanity checks */
209 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
210 || (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
)
211 && (s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
))
212 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
213 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
220 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
221 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
223 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*ssl
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
226 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
228 size_t n
, max_send_fragment
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
230 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl
);
231 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpls
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
232 unsigned int recversion
;
237 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
238 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
240 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
241 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
242 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
243 * this in tls_write_check_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
244 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
245 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
246 * report the error in a way the user will notice
248 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
249 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
!= 0)
250 && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
251 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
255 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
256 && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, 1)) {
257 /* SSLfatal() already called */
264 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
265 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
268 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== 0 && (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
269 || s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0))
270 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
273 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
274 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
277 if (SSL_in_init(ssl
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
278 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
279 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
280 /* SSLfatal() already called */
288 i
= tls_write_check_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
);
290 /* SSLfatal() already called */
294 i
= HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s
,
295 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->retry_write_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
));
298 tot
+= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
299 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
300 } /* else no retry required */
304 * We've not previously sent any data for this write so memorize
305 * arguments so that we can detect bad write retries later
307 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
308 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
309 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
310 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= len
;
313 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
318 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
319 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
> 0) {
320 i
= ssl
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl
);
322 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
325 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
330 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
331 split_send_fragment
= ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s
);
333 if (max_send_fragment
== 0
334 || split_send_fragment
== 0
335 || split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
337 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
338 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
340 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
345 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
346 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
348 recversion
= (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
349 if (SSL_get_state(ssl
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
351 && TLS1_get_version(ssl
) > TLS1_VERSION
352 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
353 recversion
= TLS1_VERSION
;
356 size_t tmppipelen
, remain
;
357 size_t j
, lensofar
= 0;
360 * Ask the record layer how it would like to split the amount of data
361 * that we have, and how many of those records it would like in one go.
363 maxpipes
= s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->get_max_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, type
, n
,
365 &split_send_fragment
);
367 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
368 * whatever the record layer wants to do. Otherwise we use the smallest
369 * value from the number requested by the record layer, and max number
370 * configured by the user.
372 if (s
->max_pipelines
> 0 && maxpipes
> s
->max_pipelines
)
373 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
375 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
)
376 maxpipes
= SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
;
378 if (split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
379 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
383 if (n
/ maxpipes
>= split_send_fragment
) {
385 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
388 for (j
= 0; j
< maxpipes
; j
++) {
389 tmpls
[j
].type
= type
;
390 tmpls
[j
].version
= recversion
;
391 tmpls
[j
].buf
= &(buf
[tot
]) + (j
* split_send_fragment
);
392 tmpls
[j
].buflen
= split_send_fragment
;
394 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
395 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= maxpipes
* split_send_fragment
;
397 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
398 tmppipelen
= n
/ maxpipes
;
399 remain
= n
% maxpipes
;
401 * If there is a remainder we add an extra byte to the first few
406 for (j
= 0; j
< maxpipes
; j
++) {
407 tmpls
[j
].type
= type
;
408 tmpls
[j
].version
= recversion
;
409 tmpls
[j
].buf
= &(buf
[tot
]) + lensofar
;
410 tmpls
[j
].buflen
= tmppipelen
;
411 lensofar
+= tmppipelen
;
415 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
416 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= n
;
419 i
= HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s
,
420 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->write_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, tmpls
, maxpipes
));
422 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
423 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
427 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== n
428 || (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
429 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
) != 0)) {
430 *written
= tot
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
431 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
435 n
-= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
436 tot
+= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
440 int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int writing
, int ret
,
441 char *file
, int line
)
443 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
445 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY
) {
446 s
->rwstate
= writing
? SSL_WRITING
: SSL_READING
;
449 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
450 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF
) {
453 * This shouldn't happen with a writing operation. We treat it
457 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
458 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
459 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
, NULL
);
460 ret
= OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
;
461 } else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF
) != 0) {
462 SSL_set_shutdown(ssl
, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
);
463 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
;
466 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
467 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
468 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING
, NULL
);
470 } else if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
) {
471 int al
= s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_alert_code(s
->rlayer
.rrl
);
473 if (al
!= SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
) {
475 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
476 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, al
, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE
, NULL
);
479 * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an
480 * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error
481 * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be
482 * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno.
486 * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal
487 * err and retry. Upper layers do not.
488 * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct,
489 * otherwise we need to convert the return value.
491 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
|| ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF
)
493 else if (ret
< OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
)
500 int ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, TLS_RECORD
*rr
, size_t length
)
502 assert(rr
->length
>= length
);
503 if (rr
->rechandle
!= NULL
) {
506 /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */
507 if (HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s
,
508 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->release_record(s
->rlayer
.rrl
,
511 /* RLAYER_fatal already called */
515 if (length
== rr
->length
)
516 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
++;
517 } else if (length
== 0 || length
== rr
->length
) {
518 /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */
519 OPENSSL_free(rr
->allocdata
);
520 rr
->allocdata
= NULL
;
522 rr
->length
-= length
;
532 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
533 * 'type' is one of the following:
535 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
536 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
537 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
539 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
540 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
542 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
543 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
544 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
545 * argument is non NULL.
546 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
547 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
548 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
549 * Change cipher spec protocol
550 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
552 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
554 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
555 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
556 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
557 * Application data protocol
558 * none of our business
560 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
561 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
564 size_t n
, curr_rec
, totalbytes
;
566 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
568 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl
);
570 is_tls13
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
);
573 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
574 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
))
575 || (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
576 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
580 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
581 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
583 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
584 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
589 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
592 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
595 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
596 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
597 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
599 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
600 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
607 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
610 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(ssl
)) {
611 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
612 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
613 /* SSLfatal() already called */
620 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
623 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
624 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
626 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
627 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
629 /* get new records if necessary */
630 if (s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
>= s
->rlayer
.num_recs
) {
631 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
= s
->rlayer
.num_recs
= 0;
633 rr
= &s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[s
->rlayer
.num_recs
];
635 ret
= HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s
,
636 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->read_record(s
->rlayer
.rrl
,
638 &rr
->version
, &rr
->type
,
639 &rr
->data
, &rr
->length
,
642 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
646 s
->rlayer
.num_recs
++;
647 } while (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->processed_read_pending(s
->rlayer
.rrl
)
648 && s
->rlayer
.num_recs
< SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
650 rr
= &s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
];
652 if (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0
653 && rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
654 && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
655 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
656 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA
);
661 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
662 * record that isn't an alert.
664 if (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& rr
->length
!= 0)
665 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
667 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
669 if (s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
670 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
671 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
672 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
673 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
678 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
681 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
682 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
++;
683 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
688 || (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
689 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
692 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
693 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
694 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
697 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
698 * doing a handshake for the first time
700 if (SSL_in_init(ssl
) && type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
701 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
702 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
706 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
707 && rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
708 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
709 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
713 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
714 *recvd_type
= rr
->type
;
718 * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
719 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
720 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
722 if (rr
->length
== 0 && !ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
729 curr_rec
= s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
;
731 if (len
- totalbytes
> rr
->length
)
734 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
736 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
739 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
740 if (rr
->length
== 0 && !ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
743 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, n
))
747 || (peek
&& n
== rr
->length
)) {
752 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
753 && curr_rec
< s
->rlayer
.num_recs
754 && totalbytes
< len
);
755 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
756 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
759 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
764 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
765 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
766 * were actually expecting a CCS).
770 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
772 if (rr
->version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
774 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
775 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
776 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
777 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
779 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
783 if (ssl
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
784 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
786 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
787 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
788 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
789 * if we are a server.
791 s
->version
= rr
->version
;
792 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
797 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
798 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
801 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
802 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
803 const unsigned char *alert_bytes
= rr
->data
+ rr
->off
;
806 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, rr
->length
)
807 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
808 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
809 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
810 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
815 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, ssl
,
816 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
818 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
819 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
820 else if (ssl
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
821 cb
= ssl
->ctx
->info_callback
;
824 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
825 cb(ssl
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
828 if ((!is_tls13
&& alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)
829 || (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
)) {
830 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
831 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
834 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
835 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
836 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
837 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
843 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
844 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
846 if (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
848 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
849 && (is_tls13
|| alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)) {
850 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
852 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
|| is_tls13
) {
853 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
854 s
->s3
.fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
855 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
856 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
,
857 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr
);
858 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
859 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
861 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
863 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
865 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
866 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
867 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
868 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
869 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
870 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
872 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
874 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
875 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
879 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
883 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
884 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
888 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
889 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
890 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
891 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
894 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
895 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
898 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
) != 0)
901 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
902 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(ssl
);
903 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
904 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
909 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
910 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
911 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
913 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
915 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
917 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
918 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY
);
924 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
925 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
926 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
927 * that we're just going to discard.
929 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
930 size_t dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
);
931 unsigned char *dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
932 size_t *dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
934 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
936 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
938 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
940 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
, rr
->data
+ rr
->off
, n
);
942 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, n
))
946 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
947 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
950 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
951 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
956 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
957 * protocol violation)
959 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
960 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
961 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
963 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
964 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
966 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
967 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
975 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
976 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
977 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
982 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
983 if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
986 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
987 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
988 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
989 * problems in the blocking world
991 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
992 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(ssl
);
993 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
994 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1004 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1005 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1006 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1007 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1008 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1010 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1012 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1014 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1016 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1017 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1018 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1020 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1022 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1024 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1025 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1026 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1027 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1028 * started), we will indulge it.
1030 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1031 s
->s3
.in_read_app_data
= 2;
1033 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1035 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1036 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1037 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1038 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1039 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1040 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1043 if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1044 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, 0)) {
1045 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1048 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
1052 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1059 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1060 * format and false otherwise.
1062 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1064 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl
->s
))
1066 return rl
->tlsrecs
[0].version
== SSL2_VERSION
;
1069 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper
;
1070 static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p
, int version
,
1071 int content_type
, const void *buf
,
1072 size_t len
, void *cbarg
)
1074 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1075 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1077 if (s
->msg_callback
!= NULL
)
1078 s
->msg_callback(write_p
, version
, content_type
, buf
, len
, ssl
,
1079 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1082 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper
;
1083 static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg
, int op
, int bits
, int nid
,
1086 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1088 return ssl_security(s
, op
, bits
, nid
, other
);
1091 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding_fn rlayer_padding_wrapper
;
1092 static size_t rlayer_padding_wrapper(void *cbarg
, int type
, size_t len
)
1094 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1095 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1097 return s
->rlayer
.record_padding_cb(ssl
, type
, len
,
1098 s
->rlayer
.record_padding_arg
);
1101 static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch
[] = {
1102 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA
, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data
},
1103 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper
},
1104 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper
},
1105 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_padding_wrapper
},
1109 void ossl_ssl_set_custom_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1110 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*meth
,
1113 s
->rlayer
.custom_rlmethod
= meth
;
1114 s
->rlayer
.rlarg
= rlarg
;
1117 static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1121 if (s
->rlayer
.custom_rlmethod
!= NULL
)
1122 return s
->rlayer
.custom_rlmethod
;
1124 if (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
) {
1125 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
1126 return &ossl_dtls_record_method
;
1128 return &ossl_tls_record_method
;
1131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1132 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */
1133 if (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION
1134 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS
) != 0
1135 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)))
1136 return &ossl_ktls_record_method
;
1139 /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */
1140 return direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
? s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
1141 : s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1144 static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int direction
)
1146 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*thismethod
;
1147 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*thisrl
;
1149 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1150 thismethod
= s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
;
1151 thisrl
= s
->rlayer
.rrl
;
1153 thismethod
= s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1154 thisrl
= s
->rlayer
.wrl
;
1157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1159 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1161 if (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== &ossl_ktls_record_method
) {
1162 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */
1163 SSL_set_options(ssl
, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1167 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
) && thismethod
->set_first_handshake
!= NULL
)
1168 thismethod
->set_first_handshake(thisrl
, 1);
1170 if (s
->max_pipelines
!= 0 && thismethod
->set_max_pipelines
!= NULL
)
1171 thismethod
->set_max_pipelines(thisrl
, s
->max_pipelines
);
1176 int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int version
,
1177 int direction
, int level
,
1178 unsigned char *secret
, size_t secretlen
,
1179 unsigned char *key
, size_t keylen
,
1180 unsigned char *iv
, size_t ivlen
,
1181 unsigned char *mackey
, size_t mackeylen
,
1182 const EVP_CIPHER
*ciph
, size_t taglen
,
1183 int mactype
, const EVP_MD
*md
,
1184 const SSL_COMP
*comp
, const EVP_MD
*kdfdigest
)
1186 OSSL_PARAM options
[5], *opts
= options
;
1187 OSSL_PARAM settings
[6], *set
= settings
;
1188 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
**thismethod
;
1189 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
**thisrl
, *newrl
= NULL
;
1191 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1192 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*meth
;
1193 int use_etm
, stream_mac
= 0, tlstree
= 0;
1194 unsigned int maxfrag
= (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
)
1195 ? ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
)
1196 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1197 int use_early_data
= 0;
1198 uint32_t max_early_data
;
1199 COMP_METHOD
*compm
= (comp
== NULL
) ? NULL
: comp
->method
;
1201 meth
= ssl_select_next_record_layer(s
, direction
, level
);
1203 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1204 thismethod
= &s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
;
1205 thisrl
= &s
->rlayer
.rrl
;
1208 thismethod
= &s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1209 thisrl
= &s
->rlayer
.wrl
;
1216 if (!ossl_assert(meth
!= NULL
)) {
1217 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1221 /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1222 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS
,
1224 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE
,
1226 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1227 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN
,
1228 &s
->rlayer
.default_read_buf_len
);
1229 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD
,
1230 &s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
);
1232 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_BLOCK_PADDING
,
1233 &s
->rlayer
.block_padding
);
1235 *opts
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1237 /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1238 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1239 use_etm
= SSL_READ_ETM(s
) ? 1 : 0;
1240 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM
) != 0)
1243 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE
) != 0)
1246 use_etm
= SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) ? 1 : 0;
1247 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM
) != 0)
1250 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE
) != 0)
1255 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM
,
1259 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC
,
1263 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE
,
1267 * We only need to do this for the read side. The write side should already
1268 * have the correct value due to the ssl_get_max_send_fragment() call above
1270 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1271 && s
->session
!= NULL
1272 && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s
->session
))
1273 maxfrag
= GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s
->session
);
1276 if (maxfrag
!= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)
1277 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN
,
1281 * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received
1282 * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early
1283 * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force.
1285 if (s
->server
&& direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1286 use_early_data
= (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
1287 || level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
);
1288 } else if (!s
->server
&& direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
) {
1289 use_early_data
= (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
);
1291 if (use_early_data
) {
1292 max_early_data
= ossl_get_max_early_data(s
);
1294 if (max_early_data
!= 0)
1295 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA
,
1299 *set
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1305 unsigned int epoch
= 0;
1306 OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch_tmp
[OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch
)];
1309 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1310 prev
= s
->rlayer
.rrlnext
;
1311 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1312 && level
!= OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
)
1313 epoch
= DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s
->rlayer
) + 1; /* new epoch */
1315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
1316 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
1317 next
= BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem());
1320 next
= BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1324 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1327 s
->rlayer
.rrlnext
= next
;
1329 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1330 && level
!= OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
)
1331 epoch
= DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s
->rlayer
) + 1; /* new epoch */
1335 * Create a copy of the dispatch array, missing out wrappers for
1336 * callbacks that we don't need.
1338 for (i
= 0, j
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch
); i
++) {
1339 switch (rlayer_dispatch
[i
].function_id
) {
1340 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK
:
1341 if (s
->msg_callback
== NULL
)
1344 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING
:
1345 if (s
->rlayer
.record_padding_cb
== NULL
)
1351 rlayer_dispatch_tmp
[j
++] = rlayer_dispatch
[i
];
1354 rlret
= meth
->new_record_layer(sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, version
,
1355 s
->server
, direction
, level
, epoch
,
1356 secret
, secretlen
, key
, keylen
, iv
,
1357 ivlen
, mackey
, mackeylen
, ciph
, taglen
,
1358 mactype
, md
, compm
, kdfdigest
, prev
,
1359 thisbio
, next
, NULL
, NULL
, settings
,
1360 options
, rlayer_dispatch_tmp
, s
,
1361 s
->rlayer
.rlarg
, &newrl
);
1364 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
:
1365 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE
);
1368 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
:
1369 if (*thismethod
!= meth
&& *thismethod
!= NULL
) {
1371 * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out,
1372 * so we fallback to the original method and try again
1377 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER
);
1380 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS
:
1384 /* Should not happen */
1385 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1392 * Free the old record layer if we have one except in the case of DTLS when
1393 * writing and there are still buffered sent messages in our queue. In that
1394 * case the record layer is still referenced by those buffered messages for
1395 * potential retransmit. Only when those buffered messages get freed do we
1396 * free the record layer object (see dtls1_hm_fragment_free)
1398 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1399 || direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1400 || pqueue_peek(s
->d1
->sent_messages
) == NULL
) {
1401 if (*thismethod
!= NULL
&& !(*thismethod
)->free(*thisrl
)) {
1402 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1410 return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s
, direction
);
1413 int ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int vers
)
1415 if (!ossl_assert(s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
!= NULL
)
1416 || !ossl_assert(s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
!= NULL
))
1418 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, s
->version
);
1419 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, s
->version
);