2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
20 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
21 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
24 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
25 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
26 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
27 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
29 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
30 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
33 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
36 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
37 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
40 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
44 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
47 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
48 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
53 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
55 memset(rl
->alert_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->alert_fragment
));
56 rl
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
57 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
58 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
64 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
65 for (pipes
= 0; pipes
< rl
->numwpipes
; pipes
++)
66 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->wbuf
[pipes
]);
69 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
71 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
72 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
75 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
78 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
80 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
81 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
82 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
83 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
84 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
87 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
89 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
92 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
94 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
95 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
98 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, const unsigned char *buf
,
101 rl
->packet_length
= len
;
103 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
104 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
105 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl
->s
))
109 rl
->packet
= SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl
->rbuf
);
110 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl
->rbuf
, buf
, len
);
115 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
117 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
120 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
122 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
125 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
129 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
132 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
133 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
134 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
136 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
142 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
144 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
147 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
149 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
154 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
156 return "read header";
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
166 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
168 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
169 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
171 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
173 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
181 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
183 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
187 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
188 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
189 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
190 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
191 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
192 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
193 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
195 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
202 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
204 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
208 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
209 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
210 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
214 /* start with empty packet ... */
217 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
219 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
222 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
223 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
224 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
226 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
227 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
228 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
229 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
230 * overrun can be triggered.
232 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
236 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
237 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
238 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
241 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
242 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
244 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
245 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
247 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
248 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
249 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
250 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
254 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
255 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
259 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
261 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
265 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
267 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
274 /* else we need to read more data */
276 if (n
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
) { /* does not happen */
277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
281 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
282 if (!s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
283 /* ignore max parameter */
288 if (max
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)
289 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
297 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
298 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
303 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
304 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
305 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
306 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
316 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
318 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
323 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
324 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
325 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
327 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
329 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
333 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
336 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
337 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
343 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
344 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
346 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
349 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
351 size_t n
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
352 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
353 size_t max_send_fragment
, nw
;
355 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
359 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
360 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
362 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
363 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
364 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
365 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
366 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
367 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
368 * report the error in a way the user will notice
370 if (len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
) {
371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
377 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
378 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
388 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
389 * will happen with non blocking IO
392 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
395 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
396 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
399 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
401 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
403 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
404 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
405 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
406 * compromise is considered worthy.
408 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
409 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
410 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
411 !SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
412 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
413 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
414 unsigned char aad
[13];
415 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
419 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
420 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
421 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
423 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
424 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
426 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
427 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
428 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
430 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
435 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
439 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
440 /* free jumbo buffer */
441 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
448 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
449 /* free jumbo buffer */
450 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
454 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
455 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
457 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
462 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
463 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
465 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
467 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
469 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
470 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
477 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
478 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
479 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
480 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
481 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
482 /* free jumbo buffer */
483 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
487 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
488 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
491 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
492 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
493 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
496 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
497 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
499 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
505 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
506 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
507 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
508 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
510 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
512 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
513 /* free jumbo buffer */
514 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
516 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
520 /* free jumbo buffer */
521 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
522 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
530 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
531 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
532 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
540 split_send_fragment
= s
->split_send_fragment
;
542 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
543 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
544 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
547 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
548 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
550 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
557 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
558 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
559 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
560 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
562 if (s
->max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
> s
->max_send_fragment
563 || split_send_fragment
== 0) {
565 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
566 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
573 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
579 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
580 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
583 if (n
/ numpipes
>= s
->max_send_fragment
) {
585 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
588 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
589 pipelens
[j
] = s
->max_send_fragment
;
592 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
593 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
594 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
595 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
596 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
602 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
605 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
606 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
611 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
612 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
614 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
615 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
617 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
619 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
621 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
623 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
632 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
633 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
634 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
636 WPACKET pkt
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
637 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
638 unsigned char *recordstart
;
639 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
640 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
645 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, wpinited
= 0;
648 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
649 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
651 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
652 * will happen with non blocking IO
654 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
))
655 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
657 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
658 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
659 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
662 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
665 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
)
666 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0))
669 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
674 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
675 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
676 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
679 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
680 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
686 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
688 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
690 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
691 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
694 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
696 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
697 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
698 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
701 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
704 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
709 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
710 /* insufficient space */
711 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
716 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
719 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
720 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
721 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
723 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
724 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
725 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
727 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
728 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
730 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
731 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
732 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
733 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], align
, NULL
)) {
734 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
738 } else if (prefix_len
) {
739 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
740 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
741 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
742 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
743 + prefix_len
, NULL
)) {
744 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
749 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
750 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
751 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
752 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
753 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
755 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
756 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[j
], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
757 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
758 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[j
], align
, NULL
)) {
759 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
766 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
767 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
)) {
768 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
769 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
770 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
771 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
774 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
) {
775 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
776 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
777 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
778 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
783 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
784 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof wr
);
785 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
786 unsigned int version
= s
->version
;
787 unsigned char *compressdata
= NULL
;
789 unsigned int rectype
;
791 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr
[j
], type
);
793 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
796 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
)
797 rectype
= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
;
801 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
802 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
804 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
805 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
806 version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
808 maxcomplen
= pipelens
[j
] + (s
->compress
!= NULL
809 ? SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
: 0);
810 /* write the header */
811 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt
[j
], rectype
)
812 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt
[j
], version
)
813 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&pkt
[j
])
815 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[j
], eivlen
, NULL
))
817 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(&pkt
[j
], maxcomplen
,
819 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
823 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
824 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr
[j
], compressdata
);
825 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr
[j
], pipelens
[j
]);
826 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr
[j
], (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
827 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
830 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
833 /* first we compress */
834 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
836 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
838 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, &wr
[j
])
839 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[j
], wr
[j
].length
, NULL
)) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
844 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt
[j
], wr
[j
].input
, wr
[j
].length
)) {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
848 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
851 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
852 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt
[j
], type
)) {
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
856 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], 1);
858 * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
859 * For now, use no padding
864 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
865 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
869 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
872 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[j
], mac_size
, &mac
)
873 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &wr
[j
], mac
, 1)) {
874 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
880 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
881 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
882 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
884 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(&pkt
[j
], SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
,
887 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
890 || !WPACKET_get_length(&pkt
[j
], &len
)) {
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
895 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
896 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt
[j
]) - len
;
898 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr
[j
], recordstart
);
899 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
900 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr
[j
], len
);
903 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
906 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
909 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
910 if (!WPACKET_get_length(&pkt
[j
], &origlen
)
911 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
912 || origlen
> wr
[j
].length
913 || (wr
[j
].length
> origlen
914 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[j
],
915 wr
[j
].length
- origlen
, NULL
))) {
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
919 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
922 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[j
], mac_size
, &mac
)
923 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &wr
[j
], mac
, 1)) {
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
927 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], mac_size
);
930 if (!WPACKET_get_length(&pkt
[j
], &len
)
931 || !WPACKET_close(&pkt
[j
])) {
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
936 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
937 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt
[j
]) - len
938 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
939 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, recordstart
,
940 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
941 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
944 if (!WPACKET_finish(&pkt
[j
])) {
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
950 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
953 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr
[j
], type
); /* not needed but helps for
955 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
957 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
959 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
963 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
967 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr
);
971 /* now let's set up wb */
972 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
973 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr
[j
]));
977 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
980 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
981 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
982 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
983 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
985 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
986 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
988 for (j
= 0; j
< wpinited
; j
++)
989 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
[j
]);
993 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
995 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
997 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
1001 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
1005 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
1006 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
1007 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
1008 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1014 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1015 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1016 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1021 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1022 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1023 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1024 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
1025 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
1026 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1027 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1034 if (i
> 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1035 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1036 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1037 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1039 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1040 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
1042 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1043 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1045 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1046 * using a datagram service
1048 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1052 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1053 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1058 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1059 * 'type' is one of the following:
1061 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1062 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1063 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1065 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1066 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1068 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1069 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1070 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1071 * argument is non NULL.
1072 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1073 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1074 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1075 * Change cipher spec protocol
1076 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1078 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1079 * Handshake protocol
1080 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1081 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1082 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1083 * Application data protocol
1084 * none of our business
1086 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1087 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
1090 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, totalbytes
;
1093 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1095 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1097 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1098 /* Not initialized yet */
1099 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1103 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1104 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1106 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1111 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1112 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1114 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1115 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1120 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1123 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1126 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1127 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1128 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1130 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1131 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1138 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1141 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1142 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1143 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1152 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1155 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1156 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1157 * rr[i].data, - data
1158 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1159 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1161 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1162 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1165 /* get new records if necessary */
1166 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1167 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1170 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1171 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1172 /* Shouldn't happen */
1173 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1178 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1180 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1182 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1183 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1187 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1191 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1192 * record that isn't an alert.
1194 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1195 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1196 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1198 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1200 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1201 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1202 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1203 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1209 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1212 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1213 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1214 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1218 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1219 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1220 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
)) {
1222 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1223 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1224 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1227 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1228 * doing a handshake for the first time
1230 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1231 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1232 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1237 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1238 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1239 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1240 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1245 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1246 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1253 if (len
- totalbytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1254 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1256 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
1258 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1261 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1262 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1263 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1265 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1266 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1267 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1268 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1269 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1270 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1273 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1274 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1279 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1280 && totalbytes
< len
);
1281 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
1282 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1285 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1286 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1287 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1288 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1289 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
1294 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1295 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1296 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1300 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1302 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1304 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1305 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1306 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1307 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1309 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1314 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1315 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1317 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1318 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1319 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1320 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1322 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1323 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1329 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1330 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1333 size_t dest_maxlen
= 0;
1334 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1335 size_t *dest_len
= NULL
;
1337 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1338 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1339 dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1340 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1341 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1342 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1343 dest
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1344 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
;
1347 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1348 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1349 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1350 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1352 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1354 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] =
1355 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
)];
1356 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, 1);
1357 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -1);
1360 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
) {
1361 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1362 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1368 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1369 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1370 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1373 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1375 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1376 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1377 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)) {
1378 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1380 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1381 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1382 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[3] != 0)) {
1383 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1388 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1389 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1390 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
, 4, s
,
1391 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1393 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1394 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1395 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
) {
1396 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1397 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
)) {
1398 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1406 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1407 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1408 /* no read-ahead left? */
1411 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1412 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1413 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1414 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1416 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1417 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1418 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1419 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1426 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1427 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1432 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1433 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1434 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1437 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1438 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1439 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1440 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1441 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1442 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1443 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1444 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1445 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1446 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1449 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
>= 2) {
1450 int alert_level
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[0];
1451 int alert_descr
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[1];
1453 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1455 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1456 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1457 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
, 2, s
,
1458 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1460 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1461 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1462 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1463 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1466 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1467 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1470 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1471 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1472 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1474 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1475 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1476 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1481 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1482 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1486 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1487 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1488 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1489 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1490 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1491 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1493 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1494 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1498 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1499 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1502 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1505 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1506 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1508 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1509 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1510 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1511 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1512 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1515 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1523 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1525 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1526 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1527 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1531 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1532 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1538 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1540 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1541 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1542 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1543 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
)) {
1544 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1548 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1556 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1557 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1558 /* no read-ahead left? */
1561 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1562 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1563 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1564 * problems in the blocking world
1566 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1567 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1568 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1569 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1576 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1579 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1580 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1581 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1582 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1583 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1585 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1588 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1590 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1592 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1593 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1594 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1596 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1599 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1601 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1602 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1603 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1604 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1605 * started), we will indulge it.
1607 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1608 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1611 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1619 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1623 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1627 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1635 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1636 * format and false otherwise.
1638 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1640 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1644 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1646 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1648 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);