1 /* ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120 #include "record_locl.h"
122 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
123 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
126 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
127 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
128 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
129 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
130 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
132 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
133 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
136 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
139 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl
->rrec
);
140 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl
->wrec
);
143 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
145 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
147 /* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
148 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
153 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
155 memset(rl
->alert_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->alert_fragment
));
156 rl
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
157 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
158 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
162 rl
->wpend_buf
= NULL
;
164 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
165 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->wbuf
);
166 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl
->rrec
);
167 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl
->wrec
);
169 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
170 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
173 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
176 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
178 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
179 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
180 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->wbuf
))
181 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
182 SSL3_RECORD_release(&rl
->rrec
);
185 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
187 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
190 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
192 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
) != 0;
195 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, const unsigned char *buf
, int len
)
197 rl
->packet_length
= len
;
199 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
200 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
201 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl
->s
))
205 rl
->packet
= SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl
->rbuf
);
206 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl
->rbuf
, buf
, len
);
211 void RECORD_LAYER_dup(RECORD_LAYER
*dst
, RECORD_LAYER
*src
)
214 * Currently only called from SSL_dup...which only seems to expect the
215 * rstate to be duplicated and nothing else from the RECORD_LAYER???
217 dst
->rstate
= src
->rstate
;
220 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
222 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
225 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
227 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
230 int RECORD_LAYER_setup_comp_buffer(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
232 return SSL3_RECORD_setup(&(rl
)->rrec
);
235 int ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
237 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
240 return (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
241 ? SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
) : 0;
244 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
248 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
249 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
252 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
255 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
265 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
269 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
270 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
273 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
276 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
286 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, int n
, int max
, int extend
)
289 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
290 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
291 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
292 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
293 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
303 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
305 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
309 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
310 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
311 align
= (0-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
315 /* start with empty packet ... */
318 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
320 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
323 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
324 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
325 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
327 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
328 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
329 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
330 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
331 * overrun can be triggered.
333 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
337 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
338 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
339 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
343 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
344 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
347 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
348 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
350 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
354 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
356 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
362 /* else we need to read more data */
364 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
365 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
367 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
368 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
370 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
) { /* len > 0 */
371 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
372 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
373 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
376 if (n
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)) { /* does not happen */
377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
381 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
382 if (!s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
383 /* ignore max parameter */
388 if (max
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
))
389 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
394 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
395 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
400 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
401 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
402 i
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
410 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
412 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
417 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
418 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
419 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
421 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
423 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
427 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
430 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
431 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
437 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
438 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
440 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
442 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
445 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
446 unsigned int max_send_fragment
;
447 unsigned int u_len
= (unsigned int)len
;
449 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH
);
457 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
458 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
460 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
461 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
462 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
463 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
464 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
465 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
466 * report the error in a way the user will notice
468 if ((unsigned int)len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
) {
469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
476 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
477 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
487 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
488 * will happen with non blocking IO
491 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
);
493 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
494 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
497 tot
+= i
; /* this might be last fragment */
499 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
501 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
502 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
503 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
504 * compromise is considered worthy.
506 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
507 u_len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
508 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
509 !SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
510 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s
->enc_write_ctx
->cipher
) &
511 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
512 unsigned char aad
[13];
513 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
516 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
517 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
518 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
520 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
521 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
523 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
524 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
525 max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
527 if (u_len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
532 wb
->buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(packlen
);
533 if (wb
->buf
== NULL
) {
534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
538 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
539 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
546 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
547 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
552 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
553 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
555 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
560 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
561 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
563 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
565 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
567 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
568 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
575 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
576 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
577 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
579 if (packlen
<= 0 || packlen
> (int)wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
580 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
585 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
586 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
589 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
590 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
591 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
594 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
595 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
597 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
603 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
604 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
605 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
606 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
608 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
);
610 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
611 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
);
614 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
618 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
627 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
628 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
629 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
636 if (n
> s
->max_send_fragment
)
637 nw
= s
->max_send_fragment
;
641 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), nw
, 0);
643 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
644 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
649 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
650 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
652 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
653 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
655 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
657 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
659 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
669 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
670 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
672 unsigned char *p
, *plen
;
673 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
678 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
682 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
683 * will happen with non blocking IO
685 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb
) != 0)
686 return (ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
));
688 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
689 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
690 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
693 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
696 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(wb
))
697 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
))
700 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
703 wr
= &s
->rlayer
.wrec
;
706 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
707 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
708 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
709 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
712 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
718 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
720 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
722 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
723 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
726 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
728 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
729 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
730 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
733 prefix_len
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, 0, 1);
738 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
))
740 /* insufficient space */
741 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
746 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
749 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
750 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
752 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
753 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
754 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
756 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
757 align
= (0-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
759 p
= SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + align
;
760 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
761 } else if (prefix_len
) {
762 p
= SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
) + prefix_len
;
764 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
765 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
766 align
= (0-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
768 p
= SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + align
;
769 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
772 /* write the header */
774 *(p
++) = type
& 0xff;
775 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(wr
, type
);
777 *(p
++) = (s
->version
>> 8);
779 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
780 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
782 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
783 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
786 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
788 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
791 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
792 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
)) {
793 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
794 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
795 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
799 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
800 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
801 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
802 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
)
803 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
809 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
810 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(wr
, p
+ eivlen
);
811 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(wr
, (int)len
);
812 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(wr
, (unsigned char *)buf
);
816 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
819 /* first we compress */
820 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
821 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
)) {
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
826 memcpy(wr
->data
, wr
->input
, wr
->length
);
827 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(wr
);
831 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
832 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
836 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
837 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &(p
[wr
->length
+ eivlen
]), 1) < 0)
839 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr
, mac_size
);
842 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(wr
, p
);
843 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(wr
);
847 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
849 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr
, eivlen
);
852 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, 1) < 1)
855 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
856 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, p
+ wr
->length
, 1) < 0)
858 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr
, mac_size
);
861 /* record length after mac and block padding */
862 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr
), plen
);
865 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, plen
- 5, 5, s
,
866 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
869 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
872 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(wr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
873 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
875 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
877 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
880 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr
);
883 /* now let's set up wb */
884 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb
, prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr
));
887 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
890 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= len
;
891 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
892 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
893 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= len
;
895 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
896 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
);
901 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
902 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
906 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
909 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> (int)len
)
910 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
911 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
912 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
919 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
920 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
921 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
,
922 (char *)&(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
)[SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)]),
923 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb
));
925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
928 if (i
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb
)) {
929 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb
, 0);
930 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(wb
, i
);
931 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
932 return (s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
);
934 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
936 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
937 * using a datagram service
939 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb
, 0);
943 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(wb
, i
);
944 SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(wb
, -i
);
949 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
950 * 'type' is one of the following:
952 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
953 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
954 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
956 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
957 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
959 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
960 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
961 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
962 * argument is non NULL.
963 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
964 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
965 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
966 * Change cipher spec protocol
967 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
969 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
971 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
972 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
973 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
974 * Application data protocol
975 * none of our business
977 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
983 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
985 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s
->rlayer
.rbuf
)) {
986 /* Not initialized yet */
987 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
991 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
992 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
994 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
999 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1000 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1002 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1003 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1008 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1011 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1014 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1015 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1016 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1018 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1019 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1025 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1028 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1029 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1030 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1039 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1042 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1043 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1044 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1045 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1047 rr
= &s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1049 /* get new packet if necessary */
1050 if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1051 || (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)) {
1052 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1057 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1059 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1060 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1061 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1062 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1068 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1071 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1072 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1073 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1077 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1078 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1079 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
)) {
1081 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1082 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1083 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1086 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1087 * doing a handshake for the first time
1089 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1090 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1091 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1096 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1097 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1098 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1099 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1104 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1105 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1110 if ((unsigned int)len
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1111 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1113 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
1115 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1117 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -n
);
1118 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1120 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1121 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1122 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1123 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s
->rlayer
.rbuf
) == 0)
1124 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1131 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1132 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1133 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1136 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1137 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1143 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1145 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1147 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1148 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1149 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1150 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1152 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1157 if(s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1158 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1160 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1161 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1162 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1163 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1165 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1166 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1172 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1173 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1176 unsigned int dest_maxlen
= 0;
1177 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1178 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
1180 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1181 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1182 dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1183 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1184 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1185 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1186 dest
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1187 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
;
1189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1190 else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)== TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
) {
1191 /* We can ignore 0 return values */
1192 if (tls1_process_heartbeat(s
, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
),
1193 SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
)) < 0) {
1197 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1198 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1199 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1200 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1201 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1206 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1207 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1208 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1209 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1211 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1213 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] =
1214 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
)];
1215 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, 1);
1216 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -1);
1219 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1220 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1225 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1226 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1227 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1230 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1232 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1233 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1234 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)) {
1235 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1237 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1238 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1239 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[3] != 0)) {
1240 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1245 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1246 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1247 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
, 4, s
,
1248 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1250 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1251 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1252 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
) {
1253 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1254 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
)) {
1255 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1260 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1264 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1265 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s
->rlayer
.rbuf
) == 0) {
1266 /* no read-ahead left? */
1269 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1270 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1271 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1272 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1274 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1275 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1276 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1277 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1284 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1285 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1290 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1291 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1292 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1295 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1296 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1297 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1298 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1299 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1300 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1301 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1302 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1303 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1306 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
>= 2) {
1307 int alert_level
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[0];
1308 int alert_descr
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[1];
1310 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1312 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1313 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1314 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
, 2, s
,
1315 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1317 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1318 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1319 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1320 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1323 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1324 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1327 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1328 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1329 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1330 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1334 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1335 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1336 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1337 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1338 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1339 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1341 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1342 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1346 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1347 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1350 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1353 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1354 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1356 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1357 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1358 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1359 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
, s
->session
);
1362 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1370 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1372 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1373 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1377 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1378 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1384 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1386 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1387 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1388 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1389 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
)) {
1390 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1394 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1402 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1403 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s
->rlayer
.rbuf
) == 0) {
1404 /* no read-ahead left? */
1407 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1408 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1409 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1410 * problems in the blocking world
1412 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1413 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1414 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1415 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1422 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1425 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1426 * an unexpected message alert.
1428 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->version
<= TLS1_1_VERSION
) {
1429 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1432 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1435 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1437 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1439 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1440 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1441 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1443 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1446 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1448 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1449 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1450 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1451 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1452 * started), we will indulge it.
1454 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1455 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1458 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1466 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1470 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1474 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1482 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1483 * format and false otherwise.
1485 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1487 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
);
1491 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1493 unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1495 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
);