2 * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_locl.h"
18 #include "../packet_locl.h"
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
38 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
47 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
49 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
50 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
72 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
86 size_t curr_rec
= 0, num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl
);
87 const SSL3_RECORD
*rr
= rl
->rrec
;
89 while (curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]))
92 return curr_rec
< num_recs
;
95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
97 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
103 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
108 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
115 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
118 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
122 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
128 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
130 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
133 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
138 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
140 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
142 return "read header";
143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
154 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
167 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
169 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
175 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
181 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
188 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
194 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
195 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
196 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
200 /* start with empty packet ... */
203 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
205 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
208 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
209 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
210 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
212 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
213 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
214 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
215 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
216 * overrun can be triggered.
218 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
222 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
223 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
224 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
227 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
228 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
230 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
231 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
233 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
234 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
235 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
236 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
240 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
241 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
244 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
245 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
247 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
251 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
253 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
260 /* else we need to read more data */
262 if (n
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
) { /* does not happen */
263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
267 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
268 if (!s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
269 /* ignore max parameter */
274 if (max
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)
275 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
283 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
284 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
289 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
290 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
291 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
292 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
302 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
304 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
309 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
310 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
311 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
313 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
315 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
319 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
322 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
323 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
329 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
330 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
332 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
335 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
337 size_t n
, max_send_fragment
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
338 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
341 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
345 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
346 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
348 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
349 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
350 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
351 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
352 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
353 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
354 * report the error in a way the user will notice
356 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
357 || ((wb
->left
!= 0) && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
362 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
363 && !early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, NULL
))
369 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
370 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
373 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
374 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
375 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
385 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
386 * will happen with non blocking IO
389 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
392 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
393 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
396 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
398 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
400 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
401 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
402 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
403 * compromise is considered worthy.
405 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
406 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
)) &&
407 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
408 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
409 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
410 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
411 unsigned char aad
[13];
412 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
416 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
417 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
418 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
420 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
421 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
423 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
424 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
425 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
427 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
432 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
436 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
437 /* free jumbo buffer */
438 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
445 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
446 /* free jumbo buffer */
447 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
451 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
452 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
454 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
459 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
460 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
462 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
464 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
466 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
467 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
474 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
475 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
476 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
477 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
478 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
479 /* free jumbo buffer */
480 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
484 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
485 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
488 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
489 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
490 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
493 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
494 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
496 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
502 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
503 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
504 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
505 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
507 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
509 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
510 /* free jumbo buffer */
511 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
513 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
517 /* free jumbo buffer */
518 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
519 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
526 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
527 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
528 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
529 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
537 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
538 split_send_fragment
= ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s
);
540 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
541 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
542 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
545 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
546 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
548 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
555 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
556 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
557 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
558 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
560 if (max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
== 0
561 || split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
563 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
564 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
571 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
577 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
578 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
581 if (n
/ numpipes
>= max_send_fragment
) {
583 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
586 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
587 pipelens
[j
] = max_send_fragment
;
590 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
591 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
592 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
593 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
594 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
600 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
603 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
604 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
609 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
610 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
612 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
613 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
615 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
617 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
619 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
621 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
630 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
631 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
632 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
634 WPACKET pkt
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
635 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
638 unsigned char *recordstart
;
639 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
640 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
645 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, wpinited
= 0;
648 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
649 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
651 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
652 * will happen with non blocking IO
654 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
))
655 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
657 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
658 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
659 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
662 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
665 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
)
666 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0))
669 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
674 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
675 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
676 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
679 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
680 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
686 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
688 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
690 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
691 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
694 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
696 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
697 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
698 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
701 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
704 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
709 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
710 /* insufficient space */
711 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
716 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
719 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
720 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
721 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
723 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
724 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
725 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
727 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
728 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
730 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
731 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
732 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
733 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], align
, NULL
)) {
734 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
738 } else if (prefix_len
) {
739 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
740 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0],
741 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
742 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
743 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
744 + prefix_len
, NULL
)) {
745 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
750 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
753 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
754 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
755 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
756 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
758 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
759 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt
, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
760 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
761 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, align
, NULL
)) {
762 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
769 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
770 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)) {
771 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
772 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
773 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
774 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
777 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
) {
778 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
779 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
780 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
781 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
786 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
787 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof(wr
));
788 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
789 unsigned int version
= SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) ? TLS1_VERSION
: s
->version
;
790 unsigned char *compressdata
= NULL
;
792 unsigned int rectype
;
797 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
);
799 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
802 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
)
803 rectype
= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
;
807 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
808 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
810 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
811 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
812 version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
814 maxcomplen
= pipelens
[j
];
815 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
816 maxcomplen
+= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
;
818 /* write the header */
819 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, rectype
)
820 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, version
)
821 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt
)
823 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, eivlen
, NULL
))
825 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, maxcomplen
,
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
831 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
832 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, compressdata
);
833 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, pipelens
[j
]);
834 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr
, (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
835 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
838 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
842 /* first we compress */
843 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
844 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, thiswr
)
845 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, thiswr
->length
, NULL
)) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
850 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt
, thiswr
->input
, thiswr
->length
)) {
851 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
854 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
857 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
858 size_t rlen
, max_send_fragment
;
860 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, type
)) {
861 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
864 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, 1);
866 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
867 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
868 rlen
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
869 if (rlen
< max_send_fragment
) {
871 size_t max_padding
= max_send_fragment
- rlen
;
872 if (s
->record_padding_cb
!= NULL
) {
873 padding
= s
->record_padding_cb(s
, type
, rlen
, s
->record_padding_arg
);
874 } else if (s
->block_padding
> 0) {
875 size_t mask
= s
->block_padding
- 1;
878 /* optimize for power of 2 */
879 if ((s
->block_padding
& mask
) == 0)
880 remainder
= rlen
& mask
;
882 remainder
= rlen
% s
->block_padding
;
883 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
887 padding
= s
->block_padding
- remainder
;
890 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
891 if (padding
> max_padding
)
892 padding
= max_padding
;
893 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt
, 0, padding
)) {
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
897 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, padding
);
903 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
904 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
908 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
911 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
912 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
919 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
920 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
921 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
923 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
,
926 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
929 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)) {
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
934 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
935 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
;
937 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, recordstart
);
938 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr
);
939 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, len
);
942 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
943 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
) {
945 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
946 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
948 if (tls13_enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
951 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
955 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
961 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
962 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &origlen
)
963 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
964 || origlen
> thiswr
->length
965 || (thiswr
->length
> origlen
966 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
,
967 thiswr
->length
- origlen
, NULL
))) {
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
971 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
974 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
975 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
976 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
979 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, mac_size
);
982 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)
983 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt
)) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
988 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
989 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
990 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
991 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, recordstart
,
992 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
993 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
995 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
996 unsigned char ctype
= type
;
998 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
,
999 &ctype
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1003 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt
)) {
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1009 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1010 * is thiswr->length long
1012 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for
1014 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
1016 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1018 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1022 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1026 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
1030 /* now let's set up wb */
1031 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
1032 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
));
1036 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1039 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
1040 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
1041 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
1042 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
1044 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1045 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
1047 for (j
= 0; j
< wpinited
; j
++)
1048 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
[j
]);
1052 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1054 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1056 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
1060 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
1064 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
1065 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
1066 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
1067 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1073 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1074 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1075 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1080 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1081 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1082 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1083 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
1084 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
1085 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1086 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1093 if (i
> 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1094 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1095 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1096 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1098 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1099 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
1101 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1102 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1104 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1105 * using a datagram service
1107 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1111 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1112 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1117 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1118 * 'type' is one of the following:
1120 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1121 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1122 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1124 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1125 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1127 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1128 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1129 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1130 * argument is non NULL.
1131 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1132 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1133 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1134 * Change cipher spec protocol
1135 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1137 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1138 * Handshake protocol
1139 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1140 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1141 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1142 * Application data protocol
1143 * none of our business
1145 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1146 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
1149 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, totalbytes
;
1152 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1154 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1156 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1157 /* Not initialized yet */
1158 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1162 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1163 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1165 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1170 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1171 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1173 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1174 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1179 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1182 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1185 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1186 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1187 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1189 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1190 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1197 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1200 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1201 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1202 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1211 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1214 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1215 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1216 * rr[i].data, - data
1217 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1218 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1220 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1221 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1224 /* get new records if necessary */
1225 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1226 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1229 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1230 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1231 /* Shouldn't happen */
1232 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1237 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1239 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1241 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1242 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1246 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1250 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1251 * record that isn't an alert.
1253 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1254 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1255 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1257 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1259 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1260 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1261 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1262 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1268 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1271 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1272 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1273 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1277 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1278 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1279 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
1280 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1282 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1283 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1284 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1287 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1288 * doing a handshake for the first time
1290 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1291 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1292 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1297 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1298 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1299 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1300 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1305 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1306 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1310 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1311 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1312 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1314 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1315 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1321 if (len
- totalbytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1322 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1324 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
1326 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1329 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1330 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1331 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1333 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1334 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1335 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1336 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1337 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1338 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1341 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1342 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1347 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1348 && totalbytes
< len
);
1349 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
1350 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1353 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1354 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1355 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1356 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1357 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
1362 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1363 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1364 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1368 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1370 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1372 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1373 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1374 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1375 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1377 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1382 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1383 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1385 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1386 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1387 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1388 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1390 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1391 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1397 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1398 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1401 size_t dest_maxlen
= 0;
1402 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1403 size_t *dest_len
= NULL
;
1405 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1406 dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
);
1407 dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1408 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1411 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1412 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1413 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1414 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1416 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1417 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
,
1418 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
), n
);
1419 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1420 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1422 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1423 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1425 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1426 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1431 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1432 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1436 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1437 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1438 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1441 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1442 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1444 (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) &&
1445 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1446 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1447 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1448 ((!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1449 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) ||
1450 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1451 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1452 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1453 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1456 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1457 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
1458 unsigned char *alert_bytes
= SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)
1459 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
);
1462 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1463 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
1464 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
1465 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
1466 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
1471 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1472 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, s
,
1473 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1475 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1476 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1477 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1478 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1481 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1482 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1485 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1486 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1487 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1489 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1490 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1491 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1496 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1497 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1501 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1502 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1504 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && alert_descr
!= SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
1505 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1510 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1511 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1512 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1513 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1514 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1515 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1517 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1518 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1522 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1525 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1526 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1528 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof(tmp
), "%d", alert_descr
);
1529 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1530 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1531 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1532 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1535 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1543 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1545 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1546 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1547 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1551 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1552 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1558 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1559 * protocol violation)
1561 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1562 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1563 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
1565 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1566 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1568 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1577 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1578 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1579 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1584 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1585 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1586 /* no read-ahead left? */
1589 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1590 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1591 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1592 * problems in the blocking world
1594 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1595 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1596 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1597 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1604 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1607 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1608 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1609 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1610 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1611 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1613 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1616 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1618 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1620 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1621 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1622 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1624 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1627 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1629 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1630 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1631 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1632 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1633 * started), we will indulge it.
1635 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1636 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1638 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1640 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1641 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1642 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1643 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1644 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1645 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1648 if (!early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1649 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, &al
))
1651 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1654 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1662 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1666 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1670 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1678 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1679 * format and false otherwise.
1681 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1683 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1687 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1689 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1691 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);