2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "../quic/quic_local.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include "record_local.h"
21 #include "internal/packet.h"
23 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
28 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
31 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
32 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
38 if (rl
->rrlmethod
!= NULL
)
39 rl
->rrlmethod
->free(rl
->rrl
); /* Ignore return value */
40 if (rl
->wrlmethod
!= NULL
)
41 rl
->wrlmethod
->free(rl
->wrl
); /* Ignore return value */
42 BIO_free(rl
->rrlnext
);
50 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
53 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
54 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
56 return rl
->rrlmethod
->unprocessed_read_pending(rl
->rrl
);
59 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
60 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
62 return (rl
->curr_rec
< rl
->num_recs
)
63 || rl
->rrlmethod
->processed_read_pending(rl
->rrl
);
66 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
68 return rl
->wpend_tot
> 0;
71 static uint32_t ossl_get_max_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
73 uint32_t max_early_data
;
74 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
77 * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
78 * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
79 * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
81 if (!s
->server
&& sess
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0) {
82 if (!ossl_assert(s
->psksession
!= NULL
83 && s
->psksession
->ext
.max_early_data
> 0)) {
84 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
91 max_early_data
= sess
->ext
.max_early_data
;
92 else if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
)
93 max_early_data
= s
->recv_max_early_data
;
95 max_early_data
= s
->recv_max_early_data
< sess
->ext
.max_early_data
96 ? s
->recv_max_early_data
: sess
->ext
.max_early_data
;
98 return max_early_data
;
101 static int ossl_early_data_count_ok(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, size_t length
,
102 size_t overhead
, int send
)
104 uint32_t max_early_data
;
106 max_early_data
= ossl_get_max_early_data(s
);
108 if (max_early_data
== 0) {
109 SSLfatal(s
, send
? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
: SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
110 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA
);
114 /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
115 max_early_data
+= overhead
;
117 if (s
->early_data_count
+ length
> max_early_data
) {
118 SSLfatal(s
, send
? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
: SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
119 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA
);
122 s
->early_data_count
+= length
;
127 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
130 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
135 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc
)) {
139 iter
= pqueue_iterator(sc
->rlayer
.d
->buffered_app_data
.q
);
140 while ((item
= pqueue_next(&iter
)) != NULL
) {
142 num
+= rdata
->length
;
146 for (i
= 0; i
< sc
->rlayer
.num_recs
; i
++) {
147 if (sc
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[i
].type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
149 num
+= sc
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[i
].length
;
152 num
+= sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->app_data_pending(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
);
157 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
159 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
162 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
164 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
166 if (sc
== NULL
|| IS_QUIC(s
))
168 sc
->rlayer
.default_read_buf_len
= len
;
171 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
173 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
179 if (sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== NULL
|| sc
->rlayer
.rrl
== NULL
)
182 sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_state(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
, NULL
, &lng
);
187 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
189 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
195 if (sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== NULL
|| sc
->rlayer
.rrl
== NULL
)
198 sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_state(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
, &shrt
, NULL
);
203 static int tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint8_t type
,
204 const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
206 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== 0)
209 /* We have pending data, so do some sanity checks */
210 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
211 || (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
)
212 && (s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
))
213 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
214 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
221 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
222 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
224 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
227 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
229 size_t n
, max_send_fragment
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
231 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl
);
232 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpls
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
233 unsigned int recversion
;
238 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
239 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
241 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
242 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
243 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
244 * this in tls_write_check_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
245 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
246 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
247 * report the error in a way the user will notice
249 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
250 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
!= 0)
251 && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
252 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
256 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
257 && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, 1)) {
258 /* SSLfatal() already called */
265 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
266 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
269 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== 0 && (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
270 || s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0))
271 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
274 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
275 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
278 if (SSL_in_init(ssl
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
279 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
280 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
281 /* SSLfatal() already called */
289 i
= tls_write_check_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
);
291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
295 i
= HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s
,
296 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->retry_write_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
));
299 tot
+= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
300 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
301 } /* else no retry required */
305 * We've not previously sent any data for this write so memorize
306 * arguments so that we can detect bad write retries later
308 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
309 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
310 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
311 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= len
;
314 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
319 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
320 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
> 0) {
321 i
= ssl
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl
);
323 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
326 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
331 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
332 split_send_fragment
= ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s
);
334 if (max_send_fragment
== 0
335 || split_send_fragment
== 0
336 || split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
338 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
339 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
341 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
346 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
347 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
349 recversion
= (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
350 if (SSL_get_state(ssl
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
352 && TLS1_get_version(ssl
) > TLS1_VERSION
353 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
354 recversion
= TLS1_VERSION
;
357 size_t tmppipelen
, remain
;
358 size_t j
, lensofar
= 0;
361 * Ask the record layer how it would like to split the amount of data
362 * that we have, and how many of those records it would like in one go.
364 maxpipes
= s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->get_max_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, type
, n
,
366 &split_send_fragment
);
368 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
369 * whatever the record layer wants to do. Otherwise we use the smallest
370 * value from the number requested by the record layer, and max number
371 * configured by the user.
373 if (s
->max_pipelines
> 0 && maxpipes
> s
->max_pipelines
)
374 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
376 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
)
377 maxpipes
= SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
;
379 if (split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
380 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
384 if (n
/ maxpipes
>= split_send_fragment
) {
386 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
389 for (j
= 0; j
< maxpipes
; j
++) {
390 tmpls
[j
].type
= type
;
391 tmpls
[j
].version
= recversion
;
392 tmpls
[j
].buf
= &(buf
[tot
]) + (j
* split_send_fragment
);
393 tmpls
[j
].buflen
= split_send_fragment
;
395 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
396 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= maxpipes
* split_send_fragment
;
398 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
399 tmppipelen
= n
/ maxpipes
;
400 remain
= n
% maxpipes
;
402 * If there is a remainder we add an extra byte to the first few
407 for (j
= 0; j
< maxpipes
; j
++) {
408 tmpls
[j
].type
= type
;
409 tmpls
[j
].version
= recversion
;
410 tmpls
[j
].buf
= &(buf
[tot
]) + lensofar
;
411 tmpls
[j
].buflen
= tmppipelen
;
412 lensofar
+= tmppipelen
;
416 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
417 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= n
;
420 i
= HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s
,
421 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->write_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, tmpls
, maxpipes
));
423 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
424 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
428 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== n
429 || (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
430 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
) != 0)) {
431 *written
= tot
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
432 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
436 n
-= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
437 tot
+= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
441 int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int writing
, int ret
,
442 char *file
, int line
)
444 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
446 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY
) {
447 s
->rwstate
= writing
? SSL_WRITING
: SSL_READING
;
450 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
451 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF
) {
454 * This shouldn't happen with a writing operation. We treat it
458 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
459 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
460 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
, NULL
);
461 ret
= OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
;
462 } else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF
) != 0) {
463 SSL_set_shutdown(ssl
, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
);
464 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
;
467 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
468 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
469 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING
, NULL
);
471 } else if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
) {
472 int al
= s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_alert_code(s
->rlayer
.rrl
);
474 if (al
!= SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
) {
476 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
477 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, al
, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE
, NULL
);
480 * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an
481 * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error
482 * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be
483 * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno.
487 * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal
488 * err and retry. Upper layers do not.
489 * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct,
490 * otherwise we need to convert the return value.
492 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
|| ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF
)
494 else if (ret
< OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
)
501 int ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, TLS_RECORD
*rr
, size_t length
)
503 assert(rr
->length
>= length
);
504 if (rr
->rechandle
!= NULL
) {
507 /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */
508 if (HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s
,
509 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->release_record(s
->rlayer
.rrl
,
512 /* RLAYER_fatal already called */
516 if (length
== rr
->length
)
517 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
++;
518 } else if (length
== 0 || length
== rr
->length
) {
519 /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */
520 OPENSSL_free(rr
->allocdata
);
521 rr
->allocdata
= NULL
;
523 rr
->length
-= length
;
533 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
534 * 'type' is one of the following:
536 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
537 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
538 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
540 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
541 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
543 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
544 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
545 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
546 * argument is non NULL.
547 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
548 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
549 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
550 * Change cipher spec protocol
551 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
553 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
555 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
556 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
557 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
558 * Application data protocol
559 * none of our business
561 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t type
, uint8_t *recvd_type
,
562 unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
563 int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
566 size_t n
, curr_rec
, totalbytes
;
568 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
570 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl
);
572 is_tls13
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
);
575 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
576 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
))
577 || (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
578 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
582 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
583 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
585 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
586 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
591 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
594 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
597 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
598 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
599 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
601 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
602 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
609 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
612 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(ssl
)) {
613 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
614 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
615 /* SSLfatal() already called */
622 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
625 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
626 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
628 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
629 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
631 /* get new records if necessary */
632 if (s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
>= s
->rlayer
.num_recs
) {
633 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
= s
->rlayer
.num_recs
= 0;
635 rr
= &s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[s
->rlayer
.num_recs
];
637 ret
= HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s
,
638 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->read_record(s
->rlayer
.rrl
,
640 &rr
->version
, &rr
->type
,
641 &rr
->data
, &rr
->length
,
644 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
648 s
->rlayer
.num_recs
++;
649 } while (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->processed_read_pending(s
->rlayer
.rrl
)
650 && s
->rlayer
.num_recs
< SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
652 rr
= &s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
];
654 if (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0
655 && rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
656 && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
657 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
658 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA
);
663 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
664 * record that isn't an alert.
666 if (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& rr
->length
!= 0)
667 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
669 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
671 if (s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
672 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
673 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
674 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
675 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
680 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
683 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
684 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
++;
685 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
690 || (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
691 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
694 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
695 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
696 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
699 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
700 * doing a handshake for the first time
702 if (SSL_in_init(ssl
) && type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
703 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
704 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
708 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
709 && rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
710 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
711 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
715 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
716 *recvd_type
= rr
->type
;
720 * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
721 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
722 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
724 if (rr
->length
== 0 && !ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
731 curr_rec
= s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
;
733 if (len
- totalbytes
> rr
->length
)
736 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
738 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
741 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
742 if (rr
->length
== 0 && !ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
745 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, n
))
749 || (peek
&& n
== rr
->length
)) {
754 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
755 && curr_rec
< s
->rlayer
.num_recs
756 && totalbytes
< len
);
757 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
758 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
761 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
766 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
767 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
768 * were actually expecting a CCS).
772 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
774 if (rr
->version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
776 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
777 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
778 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
779 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
781 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
785 if (ssl
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
786 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
788 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
789 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
790 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
791 * if we are a server.
793 s
->version
= rr
->version
;
794 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
799 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
800 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
803 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
804 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
805 const unsigned char *alert_bytes
= rr
->data
+ rr
->off
;
808 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, rr
->length
)
809 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
810 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
811 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
812 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
817 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, ssl
,
818 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
820 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
821 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
822 else if (ssl
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
823 cb
= ssl
->ctx
->info_callback
;
826 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
827 cb(ssl
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
830 if ((!is_tls13
&& alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)
831 || (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
)) {
832 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
833 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
836 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
837 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
838 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
839 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
845 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
846 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
848 if (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
850 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
851 && (is_tls13
|| alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)) {
852 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
854 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
|| is_tls13
) {
855 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
856 s
->s3
.fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
857 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
858 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
,
859 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr
);
860 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
861 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
863 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
865 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
867 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
868 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
869 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
870 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
871 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
872 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
874 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
876 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
877 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
881 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
885 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
886 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
890 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
891 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
892 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
893 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
896 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
897 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
900 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
) != 0)
903 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
904 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(ssl
);
905 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
906 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
911 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
912 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
913 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
915 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
917 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
919 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
920 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY
);
926 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
927 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
928 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
929 * that we're just going to discard.
931 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
932 size_t dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
);
933 unsigned char *dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
934 size_t *dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
936 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
938 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
940 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
942 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
, rr
->data
+ rr
->off
, n
);
946 * We release the number of bytes consumed, or the whole record if it
949 if ((n
> 0 || rr
->length
== 0) && !ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, n
))
952 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
953 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
956 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
957 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
962 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
963 * protocol violation)
965 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
966 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
967 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
969 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
970 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
972 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
973 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
981 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
982 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
983 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
988 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
989 if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
992 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
993 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
994 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
995 * problems in the blocking world
997 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
998 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(ssl
);
999 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1000 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1010 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1011 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1012 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1013 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1014 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1016 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1018 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1020 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1022 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1023 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1024 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1026 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1028 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1030 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1031 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1032 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1033 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1034 * started), we will indulge it.
1036 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1037 s
->s3
.in_read_app_data
= 2;
1039 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1041 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1042 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1043 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1044 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1045 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1046 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1049 if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1050 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, 0)) {
1051 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1054 if (!ssl_release_record(s
, rr
, 0))
1058 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1065 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1066 * format and false otherwise.
1068 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1070 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl
->s
))
1072 return rl
->tlsrecs
[0].version
== SSL2_VERSION
;
1075 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper
;
1076 static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p
, int version
,
1077 int content_type
, const void *buf
,
1078 size_t len
, void *cbarg
)
1080 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1081 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1083 if (s
->msg_callback
!= NULL
)
1084 s
->msg_callback(write_p
, version
, content_type
, buf
, len
, ssl
,
1085 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1088 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper
;
1089 static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg
, int op
, int bits
, int nid
,
1092 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1094 return ssl_security(s
, op
, bits
, nid
, other
);
1097 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding_fn rlayer_padding_wrapper
;
1098 static size_t rlayer_padding_wrapper(void *cbarg
, int type
, size_t len
)
1100 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1101 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1103 return s
->rlayer
.record_padding_cb(ssl
, type
, len
,
1104 s
->rlayer
.record_padding_arg
);
1107 static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch
[] = {
1108 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA
, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data
},
1109 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper
},
1110 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper
},
1111 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_padding_wrapper
},
1115 void ossl_ssl_set_custom_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1116 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*meth
,
1119 s
->rlayer
.custom_rlmethod
= meth
;
1120 s
->rlayer
.rlarg
= rlarg
;
1123 static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1127 if (s
->rlayer
.custom_rlmethod
!= NULL
)
1128 return s
->rlayer
.custom_rlmethod
;
1130 if (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
) {
1131 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
1132 return &ossl_dtls_record_method
;
1134 return &ossl_tls_record_method
;
1137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1138 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */
1139 if (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION
1140 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS
) != 0
1141 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)))
1142 return &ossl_ktls_record_method
;
1145 /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */
1146 return direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
? s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
1147 : s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1150 static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int direction
)
1152 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*thismethod
;
1153 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*thisrl
;
1155 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1156 thismethod
= s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
;
1157 thisrl
= s
->rlayer
.rrl
;
1159 thismethod
= s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1160 thisrl
= s
->rlayer
.wrl
;
1163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1165 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1167 if (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== &ossl_ktls_record_method
) {
1168 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */
1169 SSL_set_options(ssl
, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1173 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
) && thismethod
->set_first_handshake
!= NULL
)
1174 thismethod
->set_first_handshake(thisrl
, 1);
1176 if (s
->max_pipelines
!= 0 && thismethod
->set_max_pipelines
!= NULL
)
1177 thismethod
->set_max_pipelines(thisrl
, s
->max_pipelines
);
1182 int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int version
,
1183 int direction
, int level
,
1184 unsigned char *secret
, size_t secretlen
,
1185 unsigned char *key
, size_t keylen
,
1186 unsigned char *iv
, size_t ivlen
,
1187 unsigned char *mackey
, size_t mackeylen
,
1188 const EVP_CIPHER
*ciph
, size_t taglen
,
1189 int mactype
, const EVP_MD
*md
,
1190 const SSL_COMP
*comp
, const EVP_MD
*kdfdigest
)
1192 OSSL_PARAM options
[5], *opts
= options
;
1193 OSSL_PARAM settings
[6], *set
= settings
;
1194 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
**thismethod
;
1195 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
**thisrl
, *newrl
= NULL
;
1197 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1198 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*meth
;
1199 int use_etm
, stream_mac
= 0, tlstree
= 0;
1200 unsigned int maxfrag
= (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
)
1201 ? ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
)
1202 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1203 int use_early_data
= 0;
1204 uint32_t max_early_data
;
1205 COMP_METHOD
*compm
= (comp
== NULL
) ? NULL
: comp
->method
;
1207 meth
= ssl_select_next_record_layer(s
, direction
, level
);
1209 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1210 thismethod
= &s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
;
1211 thisrl
= &s
->rlayer
.rrl
;
1214 thismethod
= &s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1215 thisrl
= &s
->rlayer
.wrl
;
1222 if (!ossl_assert(meth
!= NULL
)) {
1223 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1227 /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1228 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS
,
1230 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE
,
1232 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1233 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN
,
1234 &s
->rlayer
.default_read_buf_len
);
1235 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD
,
1236 &s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
);
1238 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_BLOCK_PADDING
,
1239 &s
->rlayer
.block_padding
);
1241 *opts
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1243 /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1244 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1245 use_etm
= SSL_READ_ETM(s
) ? 1 : 0;
1246 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM
) != 0)
1249 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE
) != 0)
1252 use_etm
= SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) ? 1 : 0;
1253 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM
) != 0)
1256 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE
) != 0)
1261 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM
,
1265 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC
,
1269 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE
,
1273 * We only need to do this for the read side. The write side should already
1274 * have the correct value due to the ssl_get_max_send_fragment() call above
1276 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1277 && s
->session
!= NULL
1278 && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s
->session
))
1279 maxfrag
= GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s
->session
);
1282 if (maxfrag
!= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)
1283 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN
,
1287 * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received
1288 * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early
1289 * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force.
1291 if (s
->server
&& direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1292 use_early_data
= (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
1293 || level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
);
1294 } else if (!s
->server
&& direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
) {
1295 use_early_data
= (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
);
1297 if (use_early_data
) {
1298 max_early_data
= ossl_get_max_early_data(s
);
1300 if (max_early_data
!= 0)
1301 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA
,
1305 *set
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1311 unsigned int epoch
= 0;
1312 OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch_tmp
[OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch
)];
1315 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1316 prev
= s
->rlayer
.rrlnext
;
1317 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1318 && level
!= OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
)
1319 epoch
= DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s
->rlayer
) + 1; /* new epoch */
1321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
1322 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
1323 next
= BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem());
1326 next
= BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1329 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1332 s
->rlayer
.rrlnext
= next
;
1334 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1335 && level
!= OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
)
1336 epoch
= DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s
->rlayer
) + 1; /* new epoch */
1340 * Create a copy of the dispatch array, missing out wrappers for
1341 * callbacks that we don't need.
1343 for (i
= 0, j
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch
); i
++) {
1344 switch (rlayer_dispatch
[i
].function_id
) {
1345 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK
:
1346 if (s
->msg_callback
== NULL
)
1349 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING
:
1350 if (s
->rlayer
.record_padding_cb
== NULL
)
1356 rlayer_dispatch_tmp
[j
++] = rlayer_dispatch
[i
];
1359 rlret
= meth
->new_record_layer(sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, version
,
1360 s
->server
, direction
, level
, epoch
,
1361 secret
, secretlen
, key
, keylen
, iv
,
1362 ivlen
, mackey
, mackeylen
, ciph
, taglen
,
1363 mactype
, md
, compm
, kdfdigest
, prev
,
1364 thisbio
, next
, NULL
, NULL
, settings
,
1365 options
, rlayer_dispatch_tmp
, s
,
1366 s
->rlayer
.rlarg
, &newrl
);
1369 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
:
1370 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE
);
1373 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
:
1374 if (*thismethod
!= meth
&& *thismethod
!= NULL
) {
1376 * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out,
1377 * so we fallback to the original method and try again
1382 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER
);
1385 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS
:
1389 /* Should not happen */
1390 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1397 * Free the old record layer if we have one except in the case of DTLS when
1398 * writing and there are still buffered sent messages in our queue. In that
1399 * case the record layer is still referenced by those buffered messages for
1400 * potential retransmit. Only when those buffered messages get freed do we
1401 * free the record layer object (see dtls1_hm_fragment_free)
1403 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1404 || direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1405 || pqueue_peek(s
->d1
->sent_messages
) == NULL
) {
1406 if (*thismethod
!= NULL
&& !(*thismethod
)->free(*thisrl
)) {
1407 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1415 return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s
, direction
);
1418 int ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int vers
)
1420 if (!ossl_assert(s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
!= NULL
)
1421 || !ossl_assert(s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
!= NULL
))
1423 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, s
->version
);
1424 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, s
->version
);