2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
20 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
21 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
24 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
25 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
26 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
27 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
29 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
30 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
33 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
36 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
37 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
40 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
44 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
47 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
48 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
53 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
55 memset(rl
->alert_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->alert_fragment
));
56 rl
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
57 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
58 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
64 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
65 for (pipes
= 0; pipes
< rl
->numwpipes
; pipes
++)
66 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->wbuf
[pipes
]);
69 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
71 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
72 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
75 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
78 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
80 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
81 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
82 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
83 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
84 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
87 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
89 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
92 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
94 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
95 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
98 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, const unsigned char *buf
,
101 rl
->packet_length
= len
;
103 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
104 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
105 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl
->s
))
109 rl
->packet
= SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl
->rbuf
);
110 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl
->rbuf
, buf
, len
);
115 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
117 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
120 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
122 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
125 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
129 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
132 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
133 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
134 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
136 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
142 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
144 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
147 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
149 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
154 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
156 return "read header";
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
166 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
168 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
169 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
171 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
173 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
181 * Return values are as per SSL_read(), i.e.
183 * 0 Failure (not retryable)
184 * <0 Failure (may be retryable)
186 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
190 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
191 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
192 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
193 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
194 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
195 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
196 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
198 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
205 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
207 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
211 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
212 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
213 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
217 /* start with empty packet ... */
220 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
222 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
225 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
226 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
227 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
229 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
230 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
231 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
232 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
233 * overrun can be triggered.
235 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
239 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
240 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
241 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
244 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
245 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
247 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
248 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
250 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
251 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
252 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
253 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
257 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
258 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
261 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
262 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
264 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
268 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
270 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
277 /* else we need to read more data */
279 if (n
> (rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)) { /* does not happen */
280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
284 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
285 if (!s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
286 /* ignore max parameter */
291 if (max
> (rb
->len
- rb
->offset
))
292 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
300 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
301 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
306 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
307 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
308 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
309 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
319 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
321 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
326 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
327 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
328 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
330 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
332 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
336 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
339 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
340 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
346 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
347 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
349 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
352 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
354 size_t n
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
355 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
356 size_t max_send_fragment
, nw
;
358 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
362 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
363 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
365 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
366 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
367 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
368 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
369 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
370 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
371 * report the error in a way the user will notice
373 if (len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
) {
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
380 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
381 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
391 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
392 * will happen with non blocking IO
395 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
398 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
399 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
402 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
404 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
406 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
407 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
408 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
409 * compromise is considered worthy.
411 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
412 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
413 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
414 !SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
415 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
416 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
417 unsigned char aad
[13];
418 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
422 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
423 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
424 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
426 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
427 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
429 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
430 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
431 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
433 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
438 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
442 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
443 /* free jumbo buffer */
444 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
451 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
452 /* free jumbo buffer */
453 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
457 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
458 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
460 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
465 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
466 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
468 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
470 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
472 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
473 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
480 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
481 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
482 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
483 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
484 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
485 /* free jumbo buffer */
486 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
490 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
491 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
494 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
495 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
496 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
499 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
500 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
502 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
508 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
509 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
510 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
511 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
513 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
515 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
516 /* free jumbo buffer */
517 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
519 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
523 /* free jumbo buffer */
524 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
525 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
533 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
534 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
535 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
543 split_send_fragment
= s
->split_send_fragment
;
545 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
546 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
547 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
550 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
551 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
553 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
560 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
561 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
562 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
563 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
565 if (s
->max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
> s
->max_send_fragment
566 || split_send_fragment
== 0) {
568 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
569 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
576 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
582 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
583 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
586 if (n
/ numpipes
>= s
->max_send_fragment
) {
588 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
591 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
592 pipelens
[j
] = s
->max_send_fragment
;
595 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
596 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
597 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
598 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
599 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
605 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
608 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
609 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
613 if ((tmpwrit
== n
) ||
614 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
615 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
617 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
618 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
620 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
622 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
624 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
626 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
635 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
636 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
637 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
639 unsigned char *outbuf
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], *plen
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
640 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
641 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
642 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
650 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
651 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
653 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
654 * will happen with non blocking IO
656 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
))
657 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
659 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
660 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
661 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
664 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
667 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
)
668 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0))
671 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
676 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
677 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
678 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
681 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
682 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
688 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
690 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
692 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
693 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
696 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
698 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
699 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
700 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
703 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
706 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
711 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
712 /* insufficient space */
713 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
718 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
721 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
722 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
723 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
725 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
726 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
727 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
729 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
730 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
732 outbuf
[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + align
;
733 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
734 } else if (prefix_len
) {
735 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
736 outbuf
[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
739 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
740 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
741 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
742 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
743 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
745 outbuf
[j
] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + align
;
746 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
750 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
751 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
)) {
752 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
753 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
754 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
755 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
759 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
760 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
761 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
762 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
)
763 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
770 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
771 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof wr
);
772 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
773 /* write the header */
774 *(outbuf
[j
]++) = type
& 0xff;
775 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr
[j
], type
);
777 *(outbuf
[j
]++) = (s
->version
>> 8);
779 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
780 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
782 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
783 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
784 *(outbuf
[j
]++) = 0x1;
786 *(outbuf
[j
]++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
788 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
792 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
793 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr
[j
], outbuf
[j
] + eivlen
);
794 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr
[j
], pipelens
[j
]);
795 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr
[j
], (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
796 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
799 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
802 /* first we compress */
803 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
804 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, &wr
[j
])) {
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
809 memcpy(wr
[j
].data
, wr
[j
].input
, wr
[j
].length
);
810 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
814 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
815 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
819 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
820 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &wr
[j
],
821 &(outbuf
[j
][wr
[j
].length
+ eivlen
]),
824 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], mac_size
);
827 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr
[j
], outbuf
[j
]);
828 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
832 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
834 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], eivlen
);
838 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
841 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
842 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
843 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &wr
[j
],
844 outbuf
[j
] + wr
[j
].length
, 1))
846 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], mac_size
);
849 /* record length after mac and block padding */
850 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr
[j
]), plen
[j
]);
853 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, plen
[j
] - 5, 5, s
,
854 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
857 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
860 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr
[j
], type
); /* not needed but helps for
862 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr
[j
], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
864 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
866 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
870 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
874 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr
);
878 /* now let's set up wb */
879 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
880 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr
[j
]));
884 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
887 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
888 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
889 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
890 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
892 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
893 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
898 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
900 * Return values are as per SSL_read(), i.e.
902 * 0 Failure (not retryable)
903 * <0 Failure (may be retryable)
905 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
909 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
913 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
914 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
915 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
916 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
922 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
923 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
924 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
929 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
930 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
931 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
932 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
933 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
934 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
935 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
942 if (i
> 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
943 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
944 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
945 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
947 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
948 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
951 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
953 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
954 * using a datagram service
956 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
960 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
961 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
966 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
967 * 'type' is one of the following:
969 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
970 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
971 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
973 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
974 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
976 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
977 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
978 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
979 * argument is non NULL.
980 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
981 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
982 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
983 * Change cipher spec protocol
984 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
986 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
988 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
989 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
990 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
991 * Application data protocol
992 * none of our business
994 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
995 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *read
)
998 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, read_bytes
;
1001 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1003 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1005 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1006 /* Not initialized yet */
1007 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1011 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1012 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1014 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1019 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1020 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1022 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1023 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1028 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1031 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1034 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1035 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1036 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1038 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1039 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1046 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1049 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1050 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1051 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1060 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1063 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1064 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1065 * rr[i].data, - data
1066 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1067 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1069 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1070 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1073 /* get new records if necessary */
1074 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1075 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1078 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1079 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1080 /* Shouldn't happen */
1081 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1086 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1088 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1090 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1091 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1095 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1099 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1100 * record that isn't an alert.
1102 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1103 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1104 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1106 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1108 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1109 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1110 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1111 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1117 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1120 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1121 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1122 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1126 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1127 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1128 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
)) {
1130 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1131 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1132 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1135 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1136 * doing a handshake for the first time
1138 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1139 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1140 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1145 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1146 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1147 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1148 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1153 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1154 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1161 if (len
- read_bytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1162 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1164 n
= len
- read_bytes
;
1166 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1169 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1170 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1171 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1173 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1174 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1175 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1176 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1177 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1178 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1181 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1182 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1187 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1188 && read_bytes
< len
);
1189 if (read_bytes
== 0) {
1190 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1193 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1194 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1195 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1196 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1202 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1203 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1204 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1208 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1210 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1212 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1213 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1214 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1215 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1217 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1222 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1223 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1225 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1226 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1227 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1228 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1230 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1231 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1237 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1238 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1241 size_t dest_maxlen
= 0;
1242 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1243 size_t *dest_len
= NULL
;
1245 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1246 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1247 dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1248 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1249 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1250 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1251 dest
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1252 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
;
1255 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1256 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1257 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1258 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1260 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1262 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] =
1263 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
)];
1264 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, 1);
1265 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -1);
1268 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
) {
1269 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1270 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1276 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1277 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1278 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1281 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1283 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1284 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1285 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)) {
1286 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1288 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1289 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1290 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[3] != 0)) {
1291 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1296 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1297 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1298 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
, 4, s
,
1299 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1301 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1302 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1303 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
) {
1304 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1305 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
)) {
1306 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1314 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1315 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1316 /* no read-ahead left? */
1319 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1320 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1321 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1322 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1324 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1325 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1326 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1327 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1334 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1335 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1340 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1341 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1342 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1345 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1346 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1347 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1348 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1349 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1350 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1351 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1352 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1353 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1354 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1357 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
>= 2) {
1358 int alert_level
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[0];
1359 int alert_descr
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[1];
1361 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1363 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1364 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1365 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
, 2, s
,
1366 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1368 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1369 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1370 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1371 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1374 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1375 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1378 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1379 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1380 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1382 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1383 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1384 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1389 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1390 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1394 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1395 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1396 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1397 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1398 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1399 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1401 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1402 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1406 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1407 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1410 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1413 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1414 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1416 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1417 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1418 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1419 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1420 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1423 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1431 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1433 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1434 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1435 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1439 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1440 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1446 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1448 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1449 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1450 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1451 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
)) {
1452 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1456 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1464 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1465 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1466 /* no read-ahead left? */
1469 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1470 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1471 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1472 * problems in the blocking world
1474 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1475 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1476 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1477 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1484 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1487 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1488 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1489 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1490 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1491 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1493 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1496 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1498 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1500 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1501 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1502 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1504 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1507 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1509 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1510 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1511 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1512 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1513 * started), we will indulge it.
1515 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1516 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1519 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1527 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1531 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1535 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1543 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1544 * format and false otherwise.
1546 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1548 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1552 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1554 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1556 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);