2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include "record_locl.h"
21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
22 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
39 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
48 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
50 memset(rl
->alert_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->alert_fragment
));
51 rl
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
52 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
53 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
59 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
60 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
62 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
64 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
65 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
68 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
71 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
73 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
74 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
75 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
76 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
77 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
80 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
82 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
85 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
87 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
88 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
91 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
93 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
96 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
98 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
101 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
105 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
108 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
109 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
110 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
112 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
118 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
120 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
123 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
125 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
128 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
130 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
131 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
132 return "read header";
133 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
135 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
142 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
144 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
145 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
147 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
149 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
157 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
159 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
163 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
164 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
165 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
166 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
167 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
168 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
169 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
171 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
178 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
180 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
184 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
185 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
186 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
190 /* start with empty packet ... */
193 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
195 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
198 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
199 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
200 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
202 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
203 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
204 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
205 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
206 * overrun can be triggered.
208 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
212 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
213 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
214 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
217 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
218 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
220 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
221 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
223 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
224 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
225 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
226 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
230 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
231 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
234 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
235 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
237 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
241 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
243 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
250 /* else we need to read more data */
252 if (n
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
) { /* does not happen */
253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
257 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
258 if (!s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
259 /* ignore max parameter */
264 if (max
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)
265 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
273 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
274 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
279 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
280 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
281 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
282 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
292 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
294 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
299 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
300 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
301 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
303 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
305 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
309 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
312 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
313 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
319 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
320 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
322 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
325 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
327 size_t n
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
328 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
329 size_t max_send_fragment
, nw
;
331 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
335 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
336 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
338 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
339 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
340 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
341 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
342 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
343 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
344 * report the error in a way the user will notice
346 if (len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
) {
347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
353 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
354 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
364 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
365 * will happen with non blocking IO
368 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
371 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
372 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
375 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
377 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
379 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
380 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
381 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
382 * compromise is considered worthy.
384 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
385 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
386 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
387 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
388 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
389 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
390 unsigned char aad
[13];
391 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
395 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
396 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
397 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
399 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
400 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
402 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
403 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
404 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
406 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
411 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
415 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
416 /* free jumbo buffer */
417 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
424 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
425 /* free jumbo buffer */
426 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
430 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
431 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
433 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
438 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
439 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
441 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
443 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
445 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
446 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
453 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
454 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
455 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
456 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
457 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
458 /* free jumbo buffer */
459 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
463 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
464 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
467 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
468 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
469 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
472 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
473 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
475 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
481 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
482 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
483 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
484 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
486 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
488 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
489 /* free jumbo buffer */
490 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
492 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
496 /* free jumbo buffer */
497 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
498 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
506 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
507 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
508 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
516 split_send_fragment
= s
->split_send_fragment
;
518 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
519 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
520 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
523 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
524 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
526 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
533 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
534 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
535 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
536 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
538 if (s
->max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
> s
->max_send_fragment
539 || split_send_fragment
== 0) {
541 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
542 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
549 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
555 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
556 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
559 if (n
/ numpipes
>= s
->max_send_fragment
) {
561 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
564 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
565 pipelens
[j
] = s
->max_send_fragment
;
568 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
569 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
570 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
571 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
572 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
578 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
581 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
582 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
587 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
588 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
590 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
591 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
593 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
595 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
597 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
599 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
608 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
609 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
610 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
612 WPACKET pkt
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
613 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
616 unsigned char *recordstart
;
617 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
618 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
623 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, wpinited
= 0;
626 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
627 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
629 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
630 * will happen with non blocking IO
632 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
))
633 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
635 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
636 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
637 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
640 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
643 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
)
644 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0))
647 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
652 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
653 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
654 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
657 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
658 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
664 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
666 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
668 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
669 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
672 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
674 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
675 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
676 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
679 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
682 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
687 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
688 /* insufficient space */
689 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
694 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
697 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
698 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
699 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
701 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
702 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
703 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
705 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
706 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
708 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
709 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
710 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
711 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], align
, NULL
)) {
712 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
716 } else if (prefix_len
) {
717 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
718 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0],
719 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
720 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
721 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
722 + prefix_len
, NULL
)) {
723 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
728 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
731 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
732 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
733 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
734 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
736 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
737 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt
, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
738 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
739 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, align
, NULL
)) {
740 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
747 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
748 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
)) {
749 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
750 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
751 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
752 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
755 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
) {
756 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
757 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
758 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
759 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
764 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
765 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof wr
);
766 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
767 unsigned int version
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? TLS1_VERSION
: s
->version
;
768 unsigned char *compressdata
= NULL
;
770 unsigned int rectype
;
775 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
);
777 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
780 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
)
781 rectype
= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
;
785 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
786 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
788 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
789 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
790 version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
792 maxcomplen
= pipelens
[j
];
793 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
794 maxcomplen
+= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
;
796 /* write the header */
797 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, rectype
)
798 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, version
)
799 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt
)
801 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, eivlen
, NULL
))
803 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, maxcomplen
,
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
809 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
810 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, compressdata
);
811 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, pipelens
[j
]);
812 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr
, (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
813 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
816 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
820 /* first we compress */
821 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
823 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
825 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, thiswr
)
826 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, thiswr
->length
, NULL
)) {
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
831 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt
, thiswr
->input
, thiswr
->length
)) {
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
835 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
838 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
839 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, type
)) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
843 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, 1);
845 * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
846 * For now, use no padding
851 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
852 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
856 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
859 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
860 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
861 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
867 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
868 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
869 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
871 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
,
874 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
877 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
882 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
883 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
;
885 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, recordstart
);
886 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr
);
887 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, len
);
890 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
893 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
899 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
900 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &origlen
)
901 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
902 || origlen
> thiswr
->length
903 || (thiswr
->length
> origlen
904 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
,
905 thiswr
->length
- origlen
, NULL
))) {
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
909 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
912 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
913 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
917 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, mac_size
);
920 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)
921 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt
)) {
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
926 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
927 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
928 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
929 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, recordstart
,
930 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
931 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
934 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt
)) {
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
940 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
941 * is thiswr->length long
943 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for
945 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
947 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
949 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
953 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
954 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
957 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
961 /* now let's set up wb */
962 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
963 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
));
967 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
970 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
971 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
972 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
973 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
975 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
976 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
978 for (j
= 0; j
< wpinited
; j
++)
979 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
[j
]);
983 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
985 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
987 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
991 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
995 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
996 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
997 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
998 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1004 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1005 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1006 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1011 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1012 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1013 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1014 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
1015 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
1016 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1017 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1024 if (i
> 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1025 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1026 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1027 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1029 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1030 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
1032 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1033 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1035 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1036 * using a datagram service
1038 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1042 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1043 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1048 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1049 * 'type' is one of the following:
1051 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1052 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1053 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1055 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1056 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1058 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1059 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1060 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1061 * argument is non NULL.
1062 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1063 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1064 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1065 * Change cipher spec protocol
1066 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1068 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1069 * Handshake protocol
1070 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1071 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1072 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1073 * Application data protocol
1074 * none of our business
1076 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1077 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
1080 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, totalbytes
;
1083 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1085 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1087 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1088 /* Not initialized yet */
1089 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1093 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1094 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1096 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1101 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1102 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1104 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1105 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1110 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1113 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1116 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1117 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1118 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1120 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1121 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1128 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1131 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1132 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1133 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1142 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1145 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1146 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1147 * rr[i].data, - data
1148 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1149 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1151 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1152 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1155 /* get new records if necessary */
1156 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1157 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1160 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1161 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1162 /* Shouldn't happen */
1163 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1168 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1170 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1172 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1173 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1177 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1181 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1182 * record that isn't an alert.
1184 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1185 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1186 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1188 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1190 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1191 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1192 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1193 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1199 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1202 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1203 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1204 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1208 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1209 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1210 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
1211 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1213 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1214 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1215 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1218 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1219 * doing a handshake for the first time
1221 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1222 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1223 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1228 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1229 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1230 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1231 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1236 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1237 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1244 if (len
- totalbytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1245 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1247 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
1249 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1252 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1253 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1254 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1256 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1257 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1258 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1259 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1260 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1261 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1264 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1265 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1270 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1271 && totalbytes
< len
);
1272 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
1273 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1276 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1277 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1278 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1279 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1280 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
1285 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1286 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1287 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1291 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1293 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1295 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1296 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1297 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1298 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1300 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1305 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1306 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1308 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1309 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1310 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1311 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1313 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1314 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1320 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1321 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1324 size_t dest_maxlen
= 0;
1325 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1326 size_t *dest_len
= NULL
;
1328 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1329 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1330 dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1331 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1332 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1333 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1334 dest
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1335 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
;
1338 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1339 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1340 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1341 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1343 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1345 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] =
1346 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
)];
1347 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, 1);
1348 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -1);
1351 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
) {
1352 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1353 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1359 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1360 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1361 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1365 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1366 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1367 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1370 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1371 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1372 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1374 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1375 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1376 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1377 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1378 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1379 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1380 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1383 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
>= 2) {
1384 int alert_level
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[0];
1385 int alert_descr
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[1];
1387 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1389 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1390 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1391 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
, 2, s
,
1392 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1394 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1395 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1396 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1397 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1400 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1401 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1404 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1405 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1406 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1408 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1409 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1410 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1415 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1416 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1420 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1421 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1422 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1423 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1424 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1425 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1427 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1428 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1432 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1435 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1436 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1438 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1439 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1440 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1441 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1442 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1445 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1453 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1455 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1456 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1457 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1461 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1462 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1468 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1469 * protocol violation)
1471 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1472 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1474 * To get here we must be trying to read app data but found handshake
1475 * data. But if we're trying to read app data, and we're not in init
1476 * (which is tested for at the top of this function) then init must be
1479 assert(SSL_is_init_finished(s
));
1480 if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s
)) {
1481 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1486 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1487 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1489 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1497 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1498 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1499 /* no read-ahead left? */
1502 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1503 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1504 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1505 * problems in the blocking world
1507 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1508 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1509 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1510 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1517 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1520 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1521 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1522 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1523 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1524 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1526 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1529 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1531 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1533 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1534 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1535 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1537 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1540 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1542 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1543 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1544 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1545 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1546 * started), we will indulge it.
1548 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1549 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1552 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1560 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1564 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1568 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1576 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1577 * format and false otherwise.
1579 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1581 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1585 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1587 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1589 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);