2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
169 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL
*s
);
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
173 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_client_method(int ver
)
175 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
176 return (SSLv3_client_method());
181 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method
,
182 ssl_undefined_function
,
183 ssl3_connect
, ssl3_get_client_method
)
185 int ssl3_connect(SSL
*s
)
188 unsigned long Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
189 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
191 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
193 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
197 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
198 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
199 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
200 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
203 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) {
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
210 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
211 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
214 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
215 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
224 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
226 s
->state
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
227 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
231 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
232 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
236 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
238 if ((s
->version
& 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
240 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
245 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
250 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
251 s
->type
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
253 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
254 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
256 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
259 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
261 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
268 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
273 /* setup buffing BIO */
274 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 0)) {
276 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
280 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
282 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
284 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
285 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
287 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
289 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
291 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
294 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
295 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
298 ret
= ssl3_client_hello(s
);
301 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
304 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
305 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
306 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
310 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
311 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
312 ret
= ssl3_get_server_hello(s
);
317 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
319 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
320 /* receive renewed session ticket */
321 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
325 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
;
329 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
:
330 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B
:
331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
332 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
333 ret
= ssl3_check_finished(s
);
338 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
343 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
347 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
348 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
349 ret
= ssl3_get_server_certificate(s
);
352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
353 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
354 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
;
356 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
359 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
365 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
370 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
371 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
372 ret
= ssl3_get_key_exchange(s
);
375 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
;
379 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
382 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
384 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
389 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
:
390 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
:
391 ret
= ssl3_get_certificate_request(s
);
394 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
;
398 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
:
399 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
:
400 ret
= ssl3_get_server_done(s
);
403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
404 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
405 if ((ret
= SRP_Calc_A_param(s
)) <= 0) {
406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
407 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
408 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
413 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
414 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
;
416 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
421 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
:
422 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
:
423 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
:
424 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
:
425 ret
= ssl3_send_client_certificate(s
);
428 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
432 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
433 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
434 ret
= ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s
);
438 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
441 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
442 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
445 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
446 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
447 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
448 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
450 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
451 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
;
453 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
455 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
456 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
462 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
:
463 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
:
464 ret
= ssl3_send_client_verify(s
);
467 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
471 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
:
472 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
:
473 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
475 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
);
479 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
480 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
482 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
483 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
485 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
489 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
490 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
491 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
493 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
494 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
496 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
498 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
500 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
504 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
505 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
508 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
514 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
515 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
516 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
517 ret
= ssl3_send_next_proto(s
);
520 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
524 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
:
525 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
:
526 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
527 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
,
528 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
,
530 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
532 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
535 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
;
538 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
540 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
541 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED
) {
542 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
543 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
544 s
->s3
->delay_buf_pop_ret
= 0;
547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
549 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
551 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
552 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
556 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
562 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
563 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
564 ret
= ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s
);
567 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
571 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
:
572 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
:
573 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_status(s
);
576 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
581 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
:
582 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
:
583 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
584 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
585 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
,
586 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
);
591 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
593 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
597 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
:
598 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
599 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
603 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
604 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
608 /* clean a few things up */
609 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
610 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
614 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
617 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
))
618 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
619 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
625 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
627 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
631 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_connect
;
632 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
635 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
648 /* did we do anything */
649 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
651 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
655 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
656 new_state
= s
->state
;
658 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP
, 1);
659 s
->state
= new_state
;
668 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT
, ret
);
672 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
675 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
684 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
685 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
686 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
687 if ((sess
== NULL
) || (sess
->ssl_version
!= s
->version
) ||
688 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
689 !sess
->session_id_length
||
692 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
693 * "ticket" without a session ID.
695 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
697 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
698 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
701 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
702 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
703 int options
= s
->options
;
704 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
705 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
) {
706 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
,
708 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
712 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
714 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
) {
715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
719 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
721 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
722 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
725 * We only support one version: update method
727 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)
728 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
729 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
731 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
733 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
735 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
738 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
739 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
741 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
744 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
753 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
754 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
757 /* Do the message type and length last */
758 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
761 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
762 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
763 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
764 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
765 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
766 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
767 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
768 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
771 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
772 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
773 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
774 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
775 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
776 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
777 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
778 * know that is maximum server supports.
779 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
780 * containing version 1.0.
782 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
783 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
784 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
785 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
786 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
787 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
788 * the negotiated version.
790 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
791 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
794 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
795 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
801 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
804 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
808 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
812 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
813 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
814 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
818 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
819 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
820 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
823 /* Ciphers supported */
824 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]), 0);
826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
829 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
831 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
832 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
835 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
836 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
837 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
843 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
847 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
850 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
852 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
853 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
857 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
861 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
866 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
868 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
875 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
876 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
880 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
883 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
884 return ssl_do_write(s
);
886 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
890 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
892 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
895 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
896 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ok
;
899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
903 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
904 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
909 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
910 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
,
911 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
, -1, 20000, &ok
);
916 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
918 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
919 if (s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0) {
920 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
922 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
924 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
925 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
931 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
932 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
937 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
938 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
939 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
940 int hversion
= (p
[0] << 8) | p
[1];
941 int options
= s
->options
;
942 if (hversion
== DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
943 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
944 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
946 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
947 s
->version
= hversion
;
948 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
950 } else if (hversion
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
951 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
954 s
->version
= hversion
;
955 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
958 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
961 if ((p
[0] != (s
->version
>> 8)) || (p
[1] != (s
->version
& 0xff))) {
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
963 s
->version
= (s
->version
& 0xff00) | p
[1];
964 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
969 /* load the server hello data */
970 /* load the server random */
971 memcpy(s
->s3
->server_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
972 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
976 /* get the session-id */
979 if ((j
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
) || (j
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
)) {
980 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
986 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
987 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
988 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
989 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
990 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
991 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
992 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
993 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
994 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
995 * server wants to resume.
997 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
998 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
999 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1000 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1001 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1002 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1004 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1005 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1006 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
+ j
);
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1009 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1013 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
1015 if (j
!= 0 && j
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1016 && memcmp(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, j
) == 0) {
1017 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1018 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1019 /* actually a client application bug */
1020 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1022 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1028 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1029 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1030 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1031 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1032 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1034 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1035 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1039 s
->session
->session_id_length
= j
;
1040 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, p
, j
); /* j could be 0 */
1043 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
);
1045 /* unknown cipher */
1046 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1047 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1050 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1051 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1052 ct
->mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1056 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1059 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1060 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1064 p
+= ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
1066 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1067 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1069 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1070 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1076 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1077 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1078 * set and use it for comparison.
1080 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1081 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1082 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1083 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1085 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1088 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1090 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1093 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1095 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1097 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1099 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1101 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1105 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1106 * using compression.
1108 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1114 if (s
->hit
&& j
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1115 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1117 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1122 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1123 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1127 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, j
);
1129 if ((j
!= 0) && (comp
== NULL
)) {
1130 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1132 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1135 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1140 /* TLS extensions */
1141 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1148 /* wrong packet length */
1149 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1156 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1158 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1162 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
1164 int al
, i
, ok
, ret
= -1;
1165 unsigned long n
, nc
, llen
, l
;
1167 const unsigned char *q
, *p
;
1169 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1171 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1172 int need_cert
= 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1175 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1178 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1183 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) ||
1184 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) &&
1185 (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
))) {
1186 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1190 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
1191 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
1195 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1197 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1203 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
1204 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1208 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
1210 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
1211 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1213 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1218 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &q
, l
);
1220 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1225 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1227 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1230 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1239 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1240 if ((s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
) && (i
<= 0)
1241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1242 && !((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1243 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1244 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1246 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1248 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1251 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1254 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1258 sc
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1262 ssl_sess_cert_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
);
1263 s
->session
->sess_cert
= sc
;
1265 sc
->cert_chain
= sk
;
1267 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1268 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1270 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1273 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1276 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
1278 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1279 need_cert
= ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1280 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1284 fprintf(stderr
, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey
, x
);
1285 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
));
1286 fprintf(stderr
, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1287 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->name
,
1288 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
,
1289 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
, need_cert
);
1290 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1292 if (need_cert
&& ((pkey
== NULL
) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))) {
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1296 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1300 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1301 if (need_cert
&& i
< 0) {
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1305 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1310 int exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1311 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
) {
1313 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1315 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1318 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1319 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1321 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1324 X509_free(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
1325 sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
= x
;
1326 sc
->peer_key
= &(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
]);
1328 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1329 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1330 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1332 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1333 sc
->peer_key
= NULL
;
1335 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1336 s
->session
->peer
= NULL
;
1338 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1345 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1347 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1349 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1351 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1355 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1358 unsigned char *q
, md_buf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
* 2];
1361 unsigned char *param
, *p
;
1363 long i
, param_len
, n
, alg_k
, alg_a
;
1364 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1365 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1373 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
;
1374 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1375 EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1377 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
1380 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1383 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1384 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1386 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1387 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1388 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1389 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1393 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1395 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1397 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1400 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) {
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1402 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1407 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1408 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1411 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1412 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1413 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1414 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1417 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1421 param
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1422 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
!= NULL
) {
1423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1424 RSA_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
);
1425 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= NULL
;
1427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1428 DH_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
);
1429 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= NULL
;
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1432 EC_KEY_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
);
1433 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= NULL
;
1436 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1439 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1442 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1444 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1447 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1448 char tmp_id_hint
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
1451 if (param_len
> n
) {
1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1458 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1459 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1460 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1463 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1464 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1468 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1470 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH
);
1476 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1477 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1478 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1480 memcpy(tmp_id_hint
, p
, i
);
1481 memset(tmp_id_hint
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
1482 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1483 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint
);
1484 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
1485 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1493 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1495 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1497 if (param_len
> n
) {
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1503 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH
);
1509 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1515 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1523 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH
);
1529 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1535 if (1 > n
- param_len
) {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1541 i
= (unsigned int)(p
[0]);
1544 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH
);
1550 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.s
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1556 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1564 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH
);
1570 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.B
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1577 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1582 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1583 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1584 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1586 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1587 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1591 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1592 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1594 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1595 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1599 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1601 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1602 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1603 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1604 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1608 if ((rsa
= RSA_new()) == NULL
) {
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1614 if (param_len
> n
) {
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1620 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH
);
1626 if ((rsa
->n
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->n
)) == NULL
) {
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1632 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1640 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH
);
1646 if ((rsa
->e
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->e
)) == NULL
) {
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1653 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1654 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1656 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1657 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1662 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1665 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1669 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
1670 if ((dh
= DH_new()) == NULL
) {
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1676 if (param_len
> n
) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1682 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH
);
1688 if ((dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1694 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1702 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH
);
1708 if ((dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1714 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1722 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH
);
1728 if ((dh
->pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1735 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1736 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1740 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1741 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1743 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1744 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1748 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1749 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1751 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1752 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1755 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1757 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= dh
;
1760 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1763 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
) {
1765 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1767 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1773 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1774 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1775 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1779 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1780 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1781 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1784 if (param_len
> n
) {
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1789 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1790 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1792 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, p
, 3)) {
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1797 if ((curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p
+ 2))) == 0) {
1798 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1800 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1804 ngroup
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid
);
1805 if (ngroup
== NULL
) {
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1809 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh
, ngroup
) == 0) {
1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1813 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup
);
1815 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
);
1817 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1818 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1819 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1821 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1827 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1828 if (((srvr_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) ||
1829 ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)) {
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1834 encoded_pt_len
= *p
; /* length of encoded point */
1837 if ((encoded_pt_len
> n
- param_len
) ||
1838 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, srvr_ecpoint
,
1839 p
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
) == 0)) {
1840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1843 param_len
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1846 p
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1849 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1850 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1854 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1855 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1857 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1858 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1860 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1861 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1863 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1864 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
1866 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1867 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh
, srvr_ecpoint
);
1868 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= ecdh
;
1870 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1872 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1873 srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1875 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1879 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1881 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1883 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1885 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1891 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
1898 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1911 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1914 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1916 if ((i
!= n
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
1917 /* wrong packet length */
1918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1922 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1928 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1929 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1930 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1931 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1932 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1934 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1936 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1937 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, &size
);
1941 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
, p
, n
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
);
1943 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
1949 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1956 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1957 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1959 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1961 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1962 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx
, p
, (int)n
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1964 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1970 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1971 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
1972 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1973 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
1974 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1978 /* still data left over */
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1984 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1985 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1988 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1990 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1998 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1999 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
2002 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2003 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2007 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2010 unsigned long n
, nc
, l
;
2011 unsigned int llen
, ctype_num
, i
;
2012 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2013 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
2015 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2017 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2018 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
,
2019 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
,
2020 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
2025 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2027 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
2028 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
2030 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2031 * wont be doing client auth.
2033 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2034 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
2040 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
2041 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2046 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2047 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2048 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) {
2049 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2051 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER
);
2056 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2058 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2063 /* get the certificate types */
2065 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2066 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2067 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2068 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2069 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2070 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2074 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, p
, ctype_num
);
2075 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
2076 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2078 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2079 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = p
[i
];
2081 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2084 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2087 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
+ 2) > n
) {
2088 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2090 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2093 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2094 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2095 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].digest
= NULL
;
2096 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].valid_flags
= 0;
2098 if ((llen
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, p
, llen
)) {
2099 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2101 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2104 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2105 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2112 /* get the CA RDNs */
2115 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
) != n
) {
2116 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2121 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
2123 if ((l
+ nc
+ 2) > llen
) {
2124 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG
);
2131 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &q
, l
)) == NULL
) {
2132 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2138 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2140 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2143 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2152 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2153 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2154 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2155 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2156 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2162 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2164 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2168 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2170 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2174 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2176 int ok
, al
, ret
= 0, ticklen
;
2178 const unsigned char *p
;
2181 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2182 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
,
2183 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
,
2184 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, 16384, &ok
);
2190 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2191 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2196 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2197 n2l(p
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
);
2199 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2200 if (ticklen
+ 6 != n
) {
2201 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2205 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2206 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2207 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2208 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2212 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, p
, ticklen
);
2213 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2215 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2216 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2217 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2218 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2219 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2220 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2221 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2222 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2223 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2225 EVP_Digest(p
, ticklen
,
2226 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
2227 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
2231 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2233 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2237 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
2240 unsigned long resplen
, n
;
2241 const unsigned char *p
;
2243 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2244 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
,
2245 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
,
2246 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
, 16384, &ok
);
2251 /* need at least status type + length */
2252 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2256 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2257 if (*p
++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2258 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2263 if (resplen
+ 4 != n
) {
2264 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2268 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2269 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= BUF_memdup(p
, resplen
);
2270 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
) {
2271 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2275 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2276 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2278 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2280 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2285 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2292 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2293 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2298 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL
*s
)
2303 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2304 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2305 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
,
2306 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
,
2307 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 30, &ok
);
2312 /* should contain no data */
2313 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2315 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2322 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2326 unsigned long alg_k
;
2327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2329 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2333 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2335 EC_KEY
*clnt_ecdh
= NULL
;
2336 const EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2337 EVP_PKEY
*srvr_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2338 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2339 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2340 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2342 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2345 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
2346 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2348 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2350 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2354 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2356 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2357 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2361 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2363 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2366 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2370 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
)
2371 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
2374 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2375 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].
2377 if ((pkey
== NULL
) || (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2378 || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2380 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2383 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2384 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2387 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2388 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2389 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2393 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2394 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2396 n
= RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen
, pms
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2398 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2400 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2405 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2409 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2410 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2417 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2418 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2419 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2420 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2421 krb5_data
*enc_ticket
;
2422 krb5_data authenticator
, *authp
= NULL
;
2423 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2424 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2425 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2426 unsigned char tmp_buf
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2427 unsigned char epms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2428 int padl
, outl
= sizeof(epms
);
2430 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2433 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2435 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2438 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2440 authp
= &authenticator
;
2441 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2443 krb5rc
= kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, authp
, &kssl_err
);
2444 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2449 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc
);
2450 if (krb5rc
&& kssl_err
.text
)
2451 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2454 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2457 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2463 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2464 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2466 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2467 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2468 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2469 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2470 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2472 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2473 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2474 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2475 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2477 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2478 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2479 * optional authenticator omitted.
2482 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2483 s2n(enc_ticket
->length
, p
);
2484 memcpy(p
, enc_ticket
->data
, enc_ticket
->length
);
2485 p
+= enc_ticket
->length
;
2486 n
= enc_ticket
->length
+ 2;
2488 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2489 if (authp
&& authp
->length
) {
2490 s2n(authp
->length
, p
);
2491 memcpy(p
, authp
->data
, authp
->length
);
2493 n
+= authp
->length
+ 2;
2499 s2n(0, p
); /* null authenticator length */
2503 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2504 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2508 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2509 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2510 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2514 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2515 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2516 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2517 * kssl_ctx->length);
2518 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2521 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof(iv
)); /* per RFC 1510 */
2522 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
);
2523 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, epms
, &outl
, pms
, pmslen
);
2524 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(epms
[outl
]), &padl
);
2526 if (outl
> (int)sizeof epms
) {
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2528 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2531 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2533 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2535 memcpy(p
, epms
, outl
);
2538 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms
, outl
);
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2542 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2543 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
;
2544 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
2546 if (scert
== NULL
) {
2547 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2549 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2553 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
!= NULL
)
2554 dh_srvr
= scert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2556 /* we get them from the cert */
2557 int idx
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
2558 EVP_PKEY
*spkey
= NULL
;
2561 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
2563 dh_srvr
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey
);
2564 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2566 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
) {
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2568 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2572 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
2573 /* Use client certificate key */
2574 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2577 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2578 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2580 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2584 /* generate a new random key */
2585 if ((dh_clnt
= DHparams_dup(dh_srvr
)) == NULL
) {
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2589 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt
)) {
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2596 pmslen
= DH_size(dh_clnt
);
2597 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2602 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2603 * clear it out afterwards
2606 n
= DH_compute_key(pms
, dh_srvr
->pub_key
, dh_clnt
);
2607 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
== NULL
)
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2617 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
)
2620 /* send off the data */
2621 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2623 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2629 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2634 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2635 const EC_GROUP
*srvr_group
= NULL
;
2637 int ecdh_clnt_cert
= 0;
2640 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2641 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2643 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2648 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2649 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2650 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2652 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) && (s
->cert
!= NULL
)) {
2654 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2655 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2656 * To add such support, one needs to add
2657 * code that checks for appropriate
2658 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2659 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2660 * key on the same curve as the server's
2661 * and the key should be authorized for
2664 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2665 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2668 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2669 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2670 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2671 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2675 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2676 tkey
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
;
2678 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2680 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2681 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
2682 if ((srvr_pub_pkey
== NULL
)
2683 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2684 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
== NULL
)) {
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2686 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2690 tkey
= srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
;
2693 srvr_group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2694 srvr_ecpoint
= EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey
);
2696 if ((srvr_group
== NULL
) || (srvr_ecpoint
== NULL
)) {
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2698 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2702 if ((clnt_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2704 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2708 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh
, srvr_group
)) {
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2712 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2714 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2715 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2717 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2718 tkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2719 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2720 if (priv_key
== NULL
) {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2722 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2725 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2730 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2731 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh
))) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2739 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2740 * clear it out afterwards
2743 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group
);
2744 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2748 pmslen
= (field_size
+ 7) / 8;
2749 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2752 n
= ECDH_compute_key(pms
, pmslen
, srvr_ecpoint
, clnt_ecdh
, NULL
);
2753 if (n
<= 0 || pmslen
!= (size_t)n
) {
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2758 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2759 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2763 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2767 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2768 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2769 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2772 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
2773 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len
* sizeof(unsigned char));
2774 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
2775 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2777 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2781 /* Encode the public key */
2782 n
= EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2783 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2784 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2785 encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
);
2787 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2788 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2790 /* copy the point */
2791 memcpy(p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2792 /* increment n to account for length field */
2796 /* Free allocated memory */
2797 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2798 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2799 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2800 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2802 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2803 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2804 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2805 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2808 unsigned int md_len
;
2810 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2811 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2815 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2820 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2824 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
)].x509
;
2828 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST94
)].x509
;
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2831 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2835 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key
=
2836 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2838 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2840 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2841 * certificate key for key exchange
2844 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2846 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2847 /* Generate session key */
2848 if (RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2849 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2851 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2855 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2857 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2858 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2859 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2861 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2868 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2871 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2872 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2873 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
));
2874 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2876 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2878 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
);
2879 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash
);
2880 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2881 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2887 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2889 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2891 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2893 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) < 0) {
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2898 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2900 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2903 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2906 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2907 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2908 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2909 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2910 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2911 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2913 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2914 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key
);
2917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2918 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2919 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2920 /* send off the data */
2921 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2923 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2927 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2930 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2931 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2932 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2934 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2940 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2942 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2943 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2946 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 2];
2947 size_t identity_len
;
2948 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2949 unsigned int psk_len
= 0;
2953 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2955 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2959 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2960 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2961 pmslen
= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4;
2962 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2966 psk_len
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
2967 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2969 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2971 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2973 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2975 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2978 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2979 pmslen
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2980 identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1] = '\0';
2981 identity_len
= strlen(identity
);
2982 if (identity_len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2984 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2987 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2989 memmove(pms
+ psk_len
+ 4, pms
, psk_len
);
2991 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2995 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2996 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
=
2997 BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2998 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
2999 && s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3001 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3005 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
3006 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup(identity
);
3007 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3009 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3013 s2n(identity_len
, p
);
3014 memcpy(p
, identity
, identity_len
);
3015 n
= 2 + identity_len
;
3018 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
3020 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3026 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3031 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
3032 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3037 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
3040 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3041 n
= ssl_do_write(s
);
3042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3044 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3046 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
3047 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
3050 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3051 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s
,
3052 s
->session
->master_key
)) <
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3055 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3061 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3064 s
->cert
->pmslen
= pmslen
;
3066 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3069 pmslen
= s
->cert
->pmslen
;
3072 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3076 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3077 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3079 session
->master_key
,
3081 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3082 s
->cert
->pms
= NULL
;
3083 if (s
->session
->master_key_length
< 0) {
3084 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3091 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3094 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3095 s
->cert
->pms
= NULL
;
3096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3097 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
3098 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3099 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
3100 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
3102 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3106 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
3109 unsigned char data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
3111 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3117 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3119 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
) {
3120 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3121 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3122 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3123 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3124 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx
);
3125 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx
, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3126 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3127 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3130 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
3135 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3136 * digest and cached handshake records.
3138 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3141 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->cert
->key
->digest
;
3142 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3143 if (hdatalen
<= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3149 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3152 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3153 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
3154 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3161 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3164 if (s
->session
->flags
& SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
) {
3165 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3166 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3167 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3168 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3172 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3173 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
, NID_md5
, &(data
[0]));
3174 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, data
,
3175 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
3176 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
3177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_RSA_LIB
);
3184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3185 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3186 if (!DSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3187 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3188 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3189 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
)) {
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_DSA_LIB
);
3197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3198 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3199 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3200 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3201 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3202 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) {
3203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB
);
3210 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3211 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3212 unsigned char signbuf
[64];
3214 size_t sigsize
= 64;
3215 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3216 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, data
);
3217 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx
, signbuf
, &sigsize
, data
, 32) <= 0) {
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3221 for (i
= 63, j
= 0; i
>= 0; j
++, i
--) {
3222 p
[2 + j
] = signbuf
[i
];
3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3230 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3234 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
;
3236 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3237 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3238 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3240 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3241 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3242 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3247 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3248 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3249 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3251 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3253 unsigned long alg_k
;
3254 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
3256 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3257 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->cert
->key
->digest
)
3260 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3261 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3263 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3264 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3266 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3267 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3268 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3269 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3270 int i
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
3271 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= NULL
, *spkey
= NULL
;
3272 clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3273 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3274 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey
) != EVP_PKEY_DH
)
3277 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
3279 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3280 i
= EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, spkey
);
3281 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
3285 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
3290 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3293 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3296 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
) {
3297 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3298 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3299 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3301 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3305 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3306 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3309 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3311 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3312 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3314 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3317 /* We need to get a client cert */
3318 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
) {
3320 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3321 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3324 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3326 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3329 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3330 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3331 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3332 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3334 } else if (i
== 1) {
3336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3337 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3341 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3342 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3345 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3346 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3347 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3350 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3351 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
)) {
3352 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3353 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3359 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3360 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3363 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
) {
3364 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
;
3365 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
3366 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
3367 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
3368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3369 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3370 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3374 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3375 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3378 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3380 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3384 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3389 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3393 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3394 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3396 /* we don't have a certificate */
3397 if ((alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
)) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3400 sc
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3406 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
3408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3409 dh
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
3412 /* This is the passed certificate */
3414 idx
= sc
->peer_cert_type
;
3415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3416 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3417 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, s
) == 0) {
3419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3424 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3426 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3428 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
3429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT
);
3433 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
3434 i
= X509_certificate_type(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, pkey
);
3435 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3437 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3438 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3440 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3444 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3446 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3451 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) &&
3452 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
) || (rsa
!= NULL
))) {
3453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3454 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3459 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) &&
3460 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKT_EXCH
) || (dh
!= NULL
))) {
3461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY
);
3463 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3464 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_RSA
)) {
3465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3466 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT
);
3469 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3470 else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3471 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_DSA
)) {
3472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3473 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT
);
3479 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PKT_EXP
)) {
3480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3481 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
3483 || RSA_size(rsa
) * 8 >
3484 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3486 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3492 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3494 || DH_size(dh
) * 8 >
3495 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3497 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3504 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
3510 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3517 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3518 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3519 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3520 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3521 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3522 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3523 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3525 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL
*s
)
3529 if (s
->version
< TLS1_VERSION
|| !s
->tls_session_secret_cb
||
3530 !s
->session
->tlsext_tick
)
3533 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3534 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
3536 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3537 * so permit appropriate message length.
3538 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3539 * and not its length.
3541 s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3544 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3545 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
3550 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3552 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
3555 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3556 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
3557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
3558 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
3565 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3566 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3568 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
3571 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
) {
3572 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3573 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3574 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3576 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
3577 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
3578 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
3579 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
3580 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
3581 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
;
3582 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
3586 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3591 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3595 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3596 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3597 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3598 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3603 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3604 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);