2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
170 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_client_method(int ver
)
172 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
173 return (SSLv3_client_method());
178 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method
,
179 ssl_undefined_function
,
180 ssl3_connect
, ssl3_get_client_method
)
182 int ssl3_connect(SSL
*s
)
185 unsigned long Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
186 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
188 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
190 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
194 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
195 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
196 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
197 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
200 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) {
205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
207 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
208 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
211 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
212 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
223 s
->state
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
224 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
228 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
229 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
233 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
235 if ((s
->version
& 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
241 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
246 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
247 s
->type
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
249 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
250 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
254 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
262 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
267 /* setup buffing BIO */
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 0)) {
273 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
275 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
277 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
278 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
280 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
282 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
284 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
287 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
288 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
291 ret
= ssl3_client_hello(s
);
294 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
297 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
298 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
299 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
303 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
304 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
305 ret
= ssl3_get_server_hello(s
);
310 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
312 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
313 /* receive renewed session ticket */
314 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
318 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
;
322 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
:
323 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B
:
324 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
328 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
329 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
330 ret
= ssl3_get_server_certificate(s
);
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
334 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
335 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
;
337 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
340 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
346 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
351 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
352 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
353 ret
= ssl3_get_key_exchange(s
);
356 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
;
360 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
363 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
369 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
:
370 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
:
371 ret
= ssl3_get_certificate_request(s
);
374 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
;
378 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
:
379 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
:
380 ret
= ssl3_get_server_done(s
);
383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
384 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
385 if ((ret
= SRP_Calc_A_param(s
)) <= 0) {
386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
387 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
392 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
393 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
;
395 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
400 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
:
401 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
:
402 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
:
403 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
:
404 ret
= ssl3_send_client_certificate(s
);
407 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
411 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
412 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
413 ret
= ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s
);
417 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
420 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
421 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
424 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
425 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
426 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
427 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
429 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
430 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
;
432 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
434 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
435 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
441 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
:
442 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
:
443 ret
= ssl3_send_client_verify(s
);
446 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
450 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
:
451 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
:
452 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
454 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
);
458 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
459 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
461 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
462 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
464 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
468 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
469 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
470 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
472 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
473 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
475 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
477 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
482 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
483 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
491 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
492 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
493 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
494 ret
= ssl3_send_next_proto(s
);
497 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
501 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
:
502 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
:
503 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
504 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
,
505 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
,
507 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
509 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
512 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
;
515 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
517 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
518 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED
) {
519 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
520 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
521 s
->s3
->delay_buf_pop_ret
= 0;
524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
526 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
528 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
529 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
533 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
539 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
540 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
541 ret
= ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s
);
544 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
548 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
:
549 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
:
550 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_status(s
);
553 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
558 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
:
559 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
:
560 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
561 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
,
562 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
);
567 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
569 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
573 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
:
574 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
575 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
579 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
580 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
584 /* clean a few things up */
585 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
587 if (s
->init_buf
!= NULL
) {
588 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
593 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
596 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
))
597 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
598 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
604 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
606 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
610 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_connect
;
611 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
614 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
626 /* did we do anything */
627 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
629 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
633 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
634 new_state
= s
->state
;
636 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP
, 1);
637 s
->state
= new_state
;
647 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT
, ret
);
651 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
654 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
663 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
664 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
665 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
666 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
667 (sess
->ssl_version
!= s
->version
) ||
668 !sess
->session_id_length
|| (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
669 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
672 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
673 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
674 int options
= s
->options
;
675 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
676 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
) {
677 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
,
679 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
683 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
685 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
) {
686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
690 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
692 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
693 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
696 * We only support one version: update method
698 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)
699 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
700 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
702 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
704 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
706 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
709 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
710 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
712 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
715 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
724 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
725 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
728 /* Do the message type and length last */
729 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
732 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
733 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
734 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
735 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
736 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
737 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
738 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
739 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
742 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
743 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
744 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
745 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
746 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
747 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
748 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
749 * know that is maximum server supports.
750 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
751 * containing version 1.0.
753 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
754 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
755 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
756 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
757 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
758 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
759 * the negotiated version.
761 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
762 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
765 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
766 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
772 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
775 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
779 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
783 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
784 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
785 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
789 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
790 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
791 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
794 /* Ciphers supported */
795 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]), 0);
797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
800 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
802 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
803 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
806 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
807 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
808 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
814 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
818 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
821 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
823 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
824 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
828 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
832 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
837 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
839 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
846 if(!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
847 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
851 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
854 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
855 return ssl_do_write(s
);
860 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
862 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
865 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
866 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ok
;
869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
873 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
874 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
879 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
880 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
,
881 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
, -1, 20000, &ok
);
886 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
888 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
889 if (s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0) {
890 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
892 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
894 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
901 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
902 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
907 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
908 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
909 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
910 int hversion
= (p
[0] << 8) | p
[1];
911 int options
= s
->options
;
912 if (hversion
== DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
913 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
914 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
916 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
917 s
->version
= hversion
;
918 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
920 } else if (hversion
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
921 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
924 s
->version
= hversion
;
925 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
928 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
931 if ((p
[0] != (s
->version
>> 8)) || (p
[1] != (s
->version
& 0xff))) {
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
933 s
->version
= (s
->version
& 0xff00) | p
[1];
934 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
939 /* load the server hello data */
940 /* load the server random */
941 memcpy(s
->s3
->server_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
942 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
946 /* get the session-id */
949 if ((j
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
) || (j
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
)) {
950 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
956 * check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared
959 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
960 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
961 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
962 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
963 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
965 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
966 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
967 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
+ j
);
971 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
973 if (!s
->hit
&& j
!= 0 && j
== s
->session
->session_id_length
974 && memcmp(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, j
) == 0) {
975 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
976 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
977 /* actually a client application bug */
978 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
980 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
985 /* a miss or crap from the other end */
988 * If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new SSL_SESSION so
989 * we don't stuff up other people
991 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
992 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
996 s
->session
->session_id_length
= j
;
997 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, p
, j
); /* j could be 0 */
1000 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
);
1002 /* unknown cipher */
1003 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1007 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1008 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1009 ct
->mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1013 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1016 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1017 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1021 p
+= ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
1023 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1024 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1026 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1027 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1033 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1034 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1035 * set and use it for comparison.
1037 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1038 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1039 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1040 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1042 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1045 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1047 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1050 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1052 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1054 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1056 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1058 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1062 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1063 * using compression.
1065 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1071 if (s
->hit
&& j
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1072 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1074 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1079 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1080 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1084 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, j
);
1086 if ((j
!= 0) && (comp
== NULL
)) {
1087 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1089 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1092 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1097 /* TLS extensions */
1098 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
)) {
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1105 /* wrong packet length */
1106 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1113 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1118 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
1120 int al
, i
, ok
, ret
= -1;
1121 unsigned long n
, nc
, llen
, l
;
1123 const unsigned char *q
, *p
;
1125 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1127 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1128 int need_cert
= 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1131 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1134 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1139 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) ||
1140 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) &&
1141 (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
))) {
1142 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1146 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
1147 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
1151 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1153 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1159 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
1160 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1164 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
1166 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
1167 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1169 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1174 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &q
, l
);
1176 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1181 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1183 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1186 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1195 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1196 if ((s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
) && (i
<= 0)
1197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1198 && !((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1199 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1200 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1202 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1204 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1207 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1210 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1214 sc
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1218 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
)
1219 ssl_sess_cert_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
);
1220 s
->session
->sess_cert
= sc
;
1222 sc
->cert_chain
= sk
;
1224 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1225 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1227 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1230 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1233 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
1235 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1236 need_cert
= ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1237 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1241 fprintf(stderr
, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey
, x
);
1242 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
));
1243 fprintf(stderr
, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1244 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->name
,
1245 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
,
1246 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
, need_cert
);
1247 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1249 if (need_cert
&& ((pkey
== NULL
) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))) {
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1253 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1257 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1258 if (need_cert
&& i
< 0) {
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1262 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1267 int exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1268 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
) {
1270 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1272 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1275 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1276 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1278 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1281 if (sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
!= NULL
)
1282 X509_free(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
1283 sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
= x
;
1284 sc
->peer_key
= &(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
]);
1286 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
1287 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1288 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1289 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1291 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1292 sc
->peer_key
= NULL
;
1294 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
1295 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1296 s
->session
->peer
= NULL
;
1298 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1304 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1307 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1309 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1313 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1316 unsigned char *q
, md_buf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
* 2];
1319 unsigned char *param
, *p
;
1321 long i
, param_len
, n
, alg_k
, alg_a
;
1322 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1323 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1331 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
;
1332 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1333 EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1335 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
1338 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1341 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1342 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1344 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1345 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1346 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1347 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1351 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1353 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1355 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1358 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) {
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1360 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1365 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1366 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1369 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1370 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1371 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
1372 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1373 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1376 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1380 param
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1381 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
!= NULL
) {
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1383 RSA_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
);
1384 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= NULL
;
1386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1387 DH_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
);
1388 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= NULL
;
1390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1391 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
) {
1392 EC_KEY_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
);
1393 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= NULL
;
1397 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1400 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1403 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1405 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1408 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1409 char tmp_id_hint
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
1412 if (param_len
> n
) {
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1419 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1420 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1421 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1424 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1425 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1429 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1431 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH
);
1437 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1438 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1439 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1441 memcpy(tmp_id_hint
, p
, i
);
1442 memset(tmp_id_hint
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
1443 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
1444 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1445 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint
);
1446 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
1447 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1455 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1457 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1459 if (param_len
> n
) {
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1465 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH
);
1471 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.N
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1477 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1485 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH
);
1491 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1497 if (1 > n
- param_len
) {
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1503 i
= (unsigned int)(p
[0]);
1506 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH
);
1512 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.s
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1518 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1526 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH
);
1532 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.B
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1539 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1544 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1545 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1546 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1548 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1549 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1553 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1554 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1556 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1557 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1561 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1563 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1564 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1565 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1566 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1570 if ((rsa
= RSA_new()) == NULL
) {
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1576 if (param_len
> n
) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1582 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH
);
1588 if (!(rsa
->n
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->n
))) {
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1594 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1602 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH
);
1608 if (!(rsa
->e
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->e
))) {
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1615 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1616 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1618 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1619 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1624 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1627 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1631 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
1632 if ((dh
= DH_new()) == NULL
) {
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1638 if (param_len
> n
) {
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1644 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH
);
1650 if (!(dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1656 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1664 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH
);
1670 if (!(dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1676 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1684 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH
);
1690 if (!(dh
->pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1697 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1698 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1702 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1703 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1705 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1706 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1710 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1711 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1713 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1714 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1717 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1719 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= dh
;
1722 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1725 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
) {
1727 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1729 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1735 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1736 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1737 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1741 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1742 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1743 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1746 if (param_len
> n
) {
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1751 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1752 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1754 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, p
, 3)) {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1759 if ((curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p
+ 2))) == 0) {
1760 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1762 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1766 ngroup
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid
);
1767 if (ngroup
== NULL
) {
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1771 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh
, ngroup
) == 0) {
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1775 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup
);
1777 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
);
1779 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1780 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1781 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1783 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1789 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1790 if (((srvr_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) ||
1791 ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)) {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1796 encoded_pt_len
= *p
; /* length of encoded point */
1799 if ((encoded_pt_len
> n
- param_len
) ||
1800 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, srvr_ecpoint
,
1801 p
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
) == 0)) {
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1805 param_len
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1808 p
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1811 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1812 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1816 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1817 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1819 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1820 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1822 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1823 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1825 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1826 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
1828 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1829 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh
, srvr_ecpoint
);
1830 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= ecdh
;
1832 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1834 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1835 srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1837 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1841 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1843 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1845 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1847 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1853 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
1860 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1873 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1876 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1878 if ((i
!= n
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
1879 /* wrong packet length */
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1884 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1890 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1891 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1892 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1893 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1894 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1896 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1898 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1899 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, &size
);
1903 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
, p
, n
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
);
1905 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
1911 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1918 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1919 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1921 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1923 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1924 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx
, p
, (int)n
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1926 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1932 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1933 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
1934 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1935 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
1936 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1940 /* still data left over */
1942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1946 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1947 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1950 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1952 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1960 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1961 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1965 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1969 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1972 unsigned long n
, nc
, l
;
1973 unsigned int llen
, ctype_num
, i
;
1974 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
1975 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
1977 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
1979 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1980 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
,
1981 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
,
1982 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1987 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
1989 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
1990 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1992 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
1993 * wont be doing client auth.
1995 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
1996 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
2002 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
2003 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2008 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2009 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2010 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) {
2011 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2013 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER
);
2018 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2020 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2025 /* get the certificate types */
2027 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
) {
2028 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2029 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2031 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2032 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2033 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2034 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2038 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, p
, ctype_num
);
2039 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
2040 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2042 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2043 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = p
[i
];
2045 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2048 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2051 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
+ 2) > n
) {
2052 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2054 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2057 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2058 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2059 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].digest
= NULL
;
2060 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].valid_flags
= 0;
2062 if ((llen
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, p
, llen
)) {
2063 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2065 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2068 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2069 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2076 /* get the CA RDNs */
2079 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
) != n
) {
2080 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2085 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
2087 if ((l
+ nc
+ 2) > llen
) {
2088 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG
);
2095 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &q
, l
)) == NULL
) {
2096 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2102 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2104 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2107 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2116 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2117 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2118 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2119 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
!= NULL
)
2120 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2121 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2127 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2131 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2133 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2137 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2139 int ok
, al
, ret
= 0, ticklen
;
2141 const unsigned char *p
;
2144 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2145 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
,
2146 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
,
2147 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, 16384, &ok
);
2153 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2154 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2159 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2160 n2l(p
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
);
2162 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2163 if (ticklen
+ 6 != n
) {
2164 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2168 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2169 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2170 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2172 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2173 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2177 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, p
, ticklen
);
2178 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2180 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2181 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2182 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2183 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2184 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2185 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2186 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2187 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2188 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2190 EVP_Digest(p
, ticklen
,
2191 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
2192 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
2196 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2201 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
2204 unsigned long resplen
, n
;
2205 const unsigned char *p
;
2207 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2208 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
,
2209 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
,
2210 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
, 16384, &ok
);
2215 /* need at least status type + length */
2216 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2220 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2221 if (*p
++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2222 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2227 if (resplen
+ 4 != n
) {
2228 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2232 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
)
2233 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2234 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= BUF_memdup(p
, resplen
);
2235 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
) {
2236 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2240 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2241 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2243 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2245 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2250 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2257 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2262 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL
*s
)
2267 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2268 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2269 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
,
2270 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
,
2271 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 30, &ok
);
2276 /* should contain no data */
2277 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2285 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2289 unsigned long alg_k
;
2290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2292 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2296 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2298 EC_KEY
*clnt_ecdh
= NULL
;
2299 const EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2300 EVP_PKEY
*srvr_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2301 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2302 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2303 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2305 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2308 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
2309 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2311 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2313 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2317 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2319 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2320 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2324 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2326 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2329 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2333 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
)
2334 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
2337 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2338 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].
2340 if ((pkey
== NULL
) || (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2341 || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2346 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2347 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2350 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2351 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2352 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2356 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2357 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2359 n
= RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen
, pms
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2361 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2363 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2368 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2372 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2373 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2380 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2381 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2382 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2383 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2384 krb5_data
*enc_ticket
;
2385 krb5_data authenticator
, *authp
= NULL
;
2386 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2387 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2388 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2389 unsigned char tmp_buf
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2390 unsigned char epms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2391 int padl
, outl
= sizeof(epms
);
2393 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2396 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2398 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2401 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2403 authp
= &authenticator
;
2404 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2406 krb5rc
= kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, authp
, &kssl_err
);
2407 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2412 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc
);
2413 if (krb5rc
&& kssl_err
.text
)
2414 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2417 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2420 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2426 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2427 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2429 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2430 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2431 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2432 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2433 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2435 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2436 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2437 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2438 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2440 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2441 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2442 * optional authenticator omitted.
2445 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2446 s2n(enc_ticket
->length
, p
);
2447 memcpy(p
, enc_ticket
->data
, enc_ticket
->length
);
2448 p
+= enc_ticket
->length
;
2449 n
= enc_ticket
->length
+ 2;
2451 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2452 if (authp
&& authp
->length
) {
2453 s2n(authp
->length
, p
);
2454 memcpy(p
, authp
->data
, authp
->length
);
2456 n
+= authp
->length
+ 2;
2462 s2n(0, p
); /* null authenticator length */
2466 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2467 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2471 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2472 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2473 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2477 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2478 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2479 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2480 * kssl_ctx->length);
2481 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2484 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2485 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
);
2486 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, epms
, &outl
, pms
, pmslen
);
2487 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(epms
[outl
]), &padl
);
2489 if (outl
> (int)sizeof epms
) {
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2491 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2494 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2496 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2498 memcpy(p
, epms
, outl
);
2501 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms
, outl
);
2504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2505 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2506 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
;
2507 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
2509 if (scert
== NULL
) {
2510 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2512 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2516 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
!= NULL
)
2517 dh_srvr
= scert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2519 /* we get them from the cert */
2520 int idx
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
2521 EVP_PKEY
*spkey
= NULL
;
2524 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
2526 dh_srvr
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey
);
2527 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2529 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
) {
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2531 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2535 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
2536 /* Use client certificate key */
2537 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2540 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2541 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2543 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2547 /* generate a new random key */
2548 if ((dh_clnt
= DHparams_dup(dh_srvr
)) == NULL
) {
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2552 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt
)) {
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2559 pmslen
= DH_size(dh_clnt
);
2560 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2565 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2566 * clear it out afterwards
2569 n
= DH_compute_key(pms
, dh_srvr
->pub_key
, dh_clnt
);
2570 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
== NULL
)
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2580 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
)
2583 /* send off the data */
2584 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2586 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2592 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2597 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2598 const EC_GROUP
*srvr_group
= NULL
;
2600 int ecdh_clnt_cert
= 0;
2603 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2604 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2606 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2611 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2612 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2613 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2615 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) && (s
->cert
!= NULL
)) {
2617 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2618 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2619 * To add such support, one needs to add
2620 * code that checks for appropriate
2621 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2622 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2623 * key on the same curve as the server's
2624 * and the key should be authorized for
2627 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2628 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2631 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2632 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2633 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2634 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2638 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2639 tkey
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
;
2641 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2643 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2644 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
2645 if ((srvr_pub_pkey
== NULL
)
2646 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2647 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
== NULL
)) {
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2649 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2653 tkey
= srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
;
2656 srvr_group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2657 srvr_ecpoint
= EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey
);
2659 if ((srvr_group
== NULL
) || (srvr_ecpoint
== NULL
)) {
2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2661 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2665 if ((clnt_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2667 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2671 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh
, srvr_group
)) {
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2675 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2677 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2678 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2680 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2681 tkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2682 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2683 if (priv_key
== NULL
) {
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2685 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2688 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2693 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2694 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh
))) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2702 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2703 * clear it out afterwards
2706 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group
);
2707 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2711 pmslen
= (field_size
+ 7) / 8;
2712 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2715 n
= ECDH_compute_key(pms
, pmslen
, srvr_ecpoint
, clnt_ecdh
, NULL
);
2716 if (n
<= 0 || pmslen
!= (size_t)n
) {
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2721 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2722 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2726 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2730 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2731 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2732 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2735 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
2736 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len
* sizeof(unsigned char));
2737 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
2738 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2740 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2744 /* Encode the public key */
2745 n
= EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2746 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2747 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2748 encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
);
2750 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2751 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2753 /* copy the point */
2754 memcpy((unsigned char *)p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2755 /* increment n to account for length field */
2759 /* Free allocated memory */
2760 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2761 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
2762 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2763 if (clnt_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2764 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2765 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2767 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2768 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2769 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2770 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2773 unsigned int md_len
;
2775 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2776 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2780 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2785 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2789 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
)].x509
;
2793 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST94
)].x509
;
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2796 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2800 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key
=
2801 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2803 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2805 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2806 * certificate key for key exchange
2809 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2811 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2812 /* Generate session key */
2813 if (RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2814 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2816 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2820 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2822 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2823 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2824 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2826 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2833 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2836 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2837 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2838 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
));
2839 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2841 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2843 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
);
2844 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash
);
2845 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2846 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2852 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2854 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2856 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2858 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) < 0) {
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2863 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2865 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2868 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2871 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2872 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2873 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2874 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2875 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2876 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2878 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2879 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key
);
2882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2883 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2884 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2885 /* send off the data */
2886 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2888 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2892 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2895 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2896 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2897 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2898 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2900 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2906 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2908 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2909 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2912 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 2];
2913 size_t identity_len
;
2914 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2915 unsigned int psk_len
= 0;
2919 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2921 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2925 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2926 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2927 pmslen
= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4;
2928 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2932 psk_len
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
2933 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2935 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2937 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2939 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2941 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2944 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2945 pmslen
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2946 identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1] = '\0';
2947 identity_len
= strlen(identity
);
2948 if (identity_len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2950 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2953 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2955 memmove(pms
+ psk_len
+ 4, pms
, psk_len
);
2957 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2961 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2962 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2963 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
=
2964 BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2965 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
2966 && s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2968 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2972 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2973 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2974 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup(identity
);
2975 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2977 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2981 s2n(identity_len
, p
);
2982 memcpy(p
, identity
, identity_len
);
2983 n
= 2 + identity_len
;
2986 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2988 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2994 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2999 if(!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
3000 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3005 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
3008 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3009 n
= ssl_do_write(s
);
3010 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3012 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3014 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
3015 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
3018 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3019 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s
,
3020 s
->session
->master_key
)) <
3022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3023 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3029 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3032 s
->cert
->pmslen
= pmslen
;
3034 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3037 pmslen
= s
->cert
->pmslen
;
3040 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3044 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3045 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3047 session
->master_key
,
3049 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms
, pmslen
);
3051 s
->cert
->pms
= NULL
;
3052 if(s
->session
->master_key_length
< 0) {
3053 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3060 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3064 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms
, pmslen
);
3066 s
->cert
->pms
= NULL
;
3068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3069 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
3070 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
3071 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3072 if (clnt_ecdh
!= NULL
)
3073 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
3074 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
3079 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
3082 unsigned char data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
3084 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3090 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3092 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
) {
3093 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3094 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3095 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3096 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3097 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx
);
3098 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx
, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3099 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3100 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3103 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
3108 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3109 * digest and cached handshake records.
3111 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3114 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->cert
->key
->digest
;
3115 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3116 if (hdatalen
<= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
3117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3122 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3125 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3126 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
3127 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
3128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3134 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3137 if (s
->session
->flags
& SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
) {
3138 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3139 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3140 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3141 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3145 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3146 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
, NID_md5
, &(data
[0]));
3147 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, data
,
3148 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
3149 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
3150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_RSA_LIB
);
3157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3158 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3159 if (!DSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3160 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3161 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3162 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
)) {
3163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_DSA_LIB
);
3170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3171 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3172 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3173 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3174 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3175 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) {
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB
);
3183 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3184 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3185 unsigned char signbuf
[64];
3187 size_t sigsize
= 64;
3188 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3189 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, data
);
3190 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx
, signbuf
, &sigsize
, data
, 32) <= 0) {
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3194 for (i
= 63, j
= 0; i
>= 0; j
++, i
--) {
3195 p
[2 + j
] = signbuf
[i
];
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3203 if(!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3207 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
;
3209 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3210 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3211 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3213 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3214 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3219 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3220 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3221 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3223 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3225 unsigned long alg_k
;
3226 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
3228 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3229 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->cert
->key
->digest
)
3232 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3233 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3235 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3236 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3238 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3239 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3240 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3241 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3242 int i
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
3243 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= NULL
, *spkey
= NULL
;
3244 clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3245 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3246 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey
) != EVP_PKEY_DH
)
3249 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
3251 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3252 i
= EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, spkey
);
3253 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
3257 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
3262 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3265 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3268 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
) {
3269 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3270 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3271 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3273 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3277 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3280 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3282 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3283 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3285 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3288 /* We need to get a client cert */
3289 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
) {
3291 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3292 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3295 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3297 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3300 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3301 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3302 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3303 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3305 } else if (i
== 1) {
3307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3308 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3314 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3315 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3318 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3319 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3320 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3323 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3327 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3328 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3331 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
) {
3332 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
;
3333 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
3334 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
3335 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
3336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3337 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3341 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3342 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3345 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3347 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3351 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3360 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3361 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3363 /* we don't have a certificate */
3364 if ((alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
)) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3367 sc
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3373 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
3375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3376 dh
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
3379 /* This is the passed certificate */
3381 idx
= sc
->peer_cert_type
;
3382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3383 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3384 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, s
) == 0) {
3386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3391 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3393 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3395 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
3396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT
);
3400 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
3401 i
= X509_certificate_type(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, pkey
);
3402 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3404 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3405 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3407 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3411 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3413 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3418 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) &&
3419 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
) || (rsa
!= NULL
))) {
3420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3421 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3426 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) &&
3427 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKT_EXCH
) || (dh
!= NULL
))) {
3428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY
);
3430 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3431 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_RSA
)) {
3432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3433 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT
);
3436 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3437 else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3438 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_DSA
)) {
3439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3440 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT
);
3446 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PKT_EXP
)) {
3447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3448 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
3450 || RSA_size(rsa
) * 8 >
3451 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3453 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3459 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3461 || DH_size(dh
) * 8 >
3462 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3464 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3471 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
3477 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3483 * Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a case
3484 * of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of session
3485 * tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
3488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3489 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3490 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3492 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
3495 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
) {
3496 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3497 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3498 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3500 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
3501 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
3502 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
3503 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
3504 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
3505 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
;
3506 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
3510 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3515 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3519 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3520 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3521 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3522 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3527 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3528 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);