2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
169 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL
*s
);
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
173 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_client_method(int ver
)
175 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
176 return (SSLv3_client_method());
181 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method
,
182 ssl_undefined_function
,
183 ssl3_connect
, ssl3_get_client_method
)
185 int ssl3_connect(SSL
*s
)
188 unsigned long Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
189 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
191 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
193 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
197 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
198 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
199 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
200 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
203 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) {
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
210 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
211 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
214 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
215 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
224 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
226 s
->state
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
227 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
231 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
232 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
236 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
238 if ((s
->version
& 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
244 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
249 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
250 s
->type
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
252 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
253 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
257 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
265 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
270 /* setup buffing BIO */
271 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 0)) {
276 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
278 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
280 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
281 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
283 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
285 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
287 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
290 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
291 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
294 ret
= ssl3_client_hello(s
);
297 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
300 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
301 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
302 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
306 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
307 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
308 ret
= ssl3_get_server_hello(s
);
313 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
315 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
316 /* receive renewed session ticket */
317 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
321 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
;
325 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
:
326 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B
:
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
328 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
329 ret
= ssl3_check_finished(s
);
334 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
339 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
343 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
344 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
345 ret
= ssl3_get_server_certificate(s
);
348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
349 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
350 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
;
352 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
355 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
361 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
366 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
367 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
368 ret
= ssl3_get_key_exchange(s
);
371 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
;
375 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
378 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
384 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
:
385 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
:
386 ret
= ssl3_get_certificate_request(s
);
389 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
;
393 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
:
394 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
:
395 ret
= ssl3_get_server_done(s
);
398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
399 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
400 if ((ret
= SRP_Calc_A_param(s
)) <= 0) {
401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
402 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
407 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
408 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
;
410 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
415 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
:
416 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
:
417 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
:
418 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
:
419 ret
= ssl3_send_client_certificate(s
);
422 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
426 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
427 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
428 ret
= ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s
);
432 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
435 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
436 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
439 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
440 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
441 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
442 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
444 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
445 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
;
447 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
449 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
450 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
456 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
:
457 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
:
458 ret
= ssl3_send_client_verify(s
);
461 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
465 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
:
466 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
:
467 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
469 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
);
473 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
474 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
476 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
477 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
479 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
483 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
484 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
485 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
487 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
488 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
490 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
492 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
497 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
498 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
506 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
507 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
508 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
509 ret
= ssl3_send_next_proto(s
);
512 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
516 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
:
517 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
:
518 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
519 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
,
520 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
,
522 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
524 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
527 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
;
530 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
532 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
533 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED
) {
534 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
535 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
536 s
->s3
->delay_buf_pop_ret
= 0;
539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
541 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
543 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
544 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
548 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
554 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
555 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
556 ret
= ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s
);
559 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
563 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
:
564 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
:
565 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_status(s
);
568 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
573 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
:
574 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
:
575 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
576 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
577 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
,
578 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
);
583 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
585 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
589 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
:
590 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
591 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
595 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
596 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
600 /* clean a few things up */
601 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
603 if (s
->init_buf
!= NULL
) {
604 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
609 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
612 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
))
613 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
614 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
620 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
622 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
626 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_connect
;
627 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
630 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
642 /* did we do anything */
643 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
645 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
649 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
650 new_state
= s
->state
;
652 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP
, 1);
653 s
->state
= new_state
;
663 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT
, ret
);
667 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
670 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
679 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
680 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
681 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
682 if ((sess
== NULL
) || (sess
->ssl_version
!= s
->version
) ||
683 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
684 !sess
->session_id_length
||
687 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
688 * "ticket" without a session ID.
690 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
692 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
693 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
696 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
697 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
698 int options
= s
->options
;
699 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
700 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
) {
701 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
,
703 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
707 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
709 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
) {
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
714 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
716 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
717 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
720 * We only support one version: update method
722 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)
723 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
724 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
726 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
728 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
730 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
733 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
734 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
736 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
739 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
748 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
749 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
752 /* Do the message type and length last */
753 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
756 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
757 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
758 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
759 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
760 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
761 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
762 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
763 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
766 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
767 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
768 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
769 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
770 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
771 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
772 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
773 * know that is maximum server supports.
774 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
775 * containing version 1.0.
777 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
778 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
779 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
780 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
781 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
782 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
783 * the negotiated version.
785 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
786 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
789 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
790 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
796 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
799 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
803 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
807 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
808 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
809 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
813 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
814 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
815 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
818 /* Ciphers supported */
819 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]), 0);
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
824 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
826 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
827 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
830 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
831 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
832 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
838 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
842 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
845 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
847 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
848 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
852 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
856 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
861 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
863 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
870 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
871 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
875 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
878 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
879 return ssl_do_write(s
);
884 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
886 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
889 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
890 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ok
;
893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
897 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
898 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
903 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
904 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
,
905 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
, -1, 20000, &ok
);
910 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
912 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
913 if (s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0) {
914 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
916 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
918 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
925 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
926 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
931 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
932 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
933 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
934 int hversion
= (p
[0] << 8) | p
[1];
935 int options
= s
->options
;
936 if (hversion
== DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
937 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
938 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
940 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
941 s
->version
= hversion
;
942 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
944 } else if (hversion
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
945 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
948 s
->version
= hversion
;
949 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
952 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
955 if ((p
[0] != (s
->version
>> 8)) || (p
[1] != (s
->version
& 0xff))) {
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
957 s
->version
= (s
->version
& 0xff00) | p
[1];
958 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
963 /* load the server hello data */
964 /* load the server random */
965 memcpy(s
->s3
->server_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
966 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
970 /* get the session-id */
973 if ((j
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
) || (j
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
)) {
974 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
980 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
981 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
982 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
983 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
984 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
985 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
986 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
987 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
988 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
989 * server wants to resume.
991 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
992 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
993 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
994 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
995 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
996 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
998 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
999 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1000 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
+ j
);
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1003 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1007 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
1009 if (j
!= 0 && j
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1010 && memcmp(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, j
) == 0) {
1011 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1012 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1013 /* actually a client application bug */
1014 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1016 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1022 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1023 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1024 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1025 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1026 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1028 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1029 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1033 s
->session
->session_id_length
= j
;
1034 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, p
, j
); /* j could be 0 */
1037 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
);
1039 /* unknown cipher */
1040 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1044 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1045 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1046 ct
->mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1050 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1053 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1054 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1058 p
+= ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
1060 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1061 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1063 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1064 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1070 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1071 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1072 * set and use it for comparison.
1074 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1075 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1076 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1077 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1079 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1082 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1084 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1087 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1089 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1091 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1093 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1095 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1099 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1100 * using compression.
1102 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1108 if (s
->hit
&& j
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1109 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1111 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1116 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1117 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1121 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, j
);
1123 if ((j
!= 0) && (comp
== NULL
)) {
1124 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1126 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1129 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1134 /* TLS extensions */
1135 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1142 /* wrong packet length */
1143 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1150 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1155 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
1157 int al
, i
, ok
, ret
= -1;
1158 unsigned long n
, nc
, llen
, l
;
1160 const unsigned char *q
, *p
;
1162 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1164 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1165 int need_cert
= 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1168 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1171 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1176 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) ||
1177 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) &&
1178 (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
))) {
1179 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1183 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
1184 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
1188 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1190 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1196 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
1197 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1201 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
1203 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
1204 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1206 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1211 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &q
, l
);
1213 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1218 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1220 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1223 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1232 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1233 if ((s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
) && (i
<= 0)
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1235 && !((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1236 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1237 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1239 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1241 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1244 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1247 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1251 sc
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1255 ssl_sess_cert_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
);
1256 s
->session
->sess_cert
= sc
;
1258 sc
->cert_chain
= sk
;
1260 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1261 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1263 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1266 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1269 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
1271 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1272 need_cert
= ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1273 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1277 fprintf(stderr
, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey
, x
);
1278 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
));
1279 fprintf(stderr
, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1280 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->name
,
1281 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
,
1282 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
, need_cert
);
1283 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1285 if (need_cert
&& ((pkey
== NULL
) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))) {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1289 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1293 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1294 if (need_cert
&& i
< 0) {
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1298 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1303 int exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1304 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
) {
1306 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1308 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1311 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1312 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1314 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1317 X509_free(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
1318 sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
= x
;
1319 sc
->peer_key
= &(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
]);
1321 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1322 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1323 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1325 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1326 sc
->peer_key
= NULL
;
1328 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1329 s
->session
->peer
= NULL
;
1331 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1337 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1340 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1342 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1346 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1349 unsigned char *q
, md_buf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
* 2];
1352 unsigned char *param
, *p
;
1354 long i
, param_len
, n
, alg_k
, alg_a
;
1355 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1356 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1364 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
;
1365 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1366 EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1368 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
1371 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1374 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1375 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1377 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1378 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1379 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1380 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1384 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1386 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1388 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1391 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) {
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1393 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1398 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1399 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1402 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1403 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1404 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
1405 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1406 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1409 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1413 param
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1414 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
!= NULL
) {
1415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1416 RSA_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
);
1417 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= NULL
;
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1420 DH_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
);
1421 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= NULL
;
1423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1424 EC_KEY_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
);
1425 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= NULL
;
1428 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1431 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1434 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1436 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1439 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1440 char tmp_id_hint
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
1443 if (param_len
> n
) {
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1450 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1451 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1452 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1455 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1456 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1460 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1462 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH
);
1468 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1469 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1470 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1472 memcpy(tmp_id_hint
, p
, i
);
1473 memset(tmp_id_hint
+ i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1 - i
);
1474 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
1475 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1476 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint
);
1477 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
1478 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1486 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1488 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1490 if (param_len
> n
) {
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1496 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH
);
1502 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.N
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1508 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1516 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH
);
1522 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1528 if (1 > n
- param_len
) {
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1534 i
= (unsigned int)(p
[0]);
1537 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH
);
1543 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.s
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1549 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1557 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH
);
1563 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.B
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1570 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1575 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1576 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1577 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1579 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1580 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1584 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1585 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1587 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1588 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1592 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1594 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1595 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1596 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1597 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1601 if ((rsa
= RSA_new()) == NULL
) {
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1607 if (param_len
> n
) {
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1613 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH
);
1619 if (!(rsa
->n
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->n
))) {
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1625 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1633 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH
);
1639 if (!(rsa
->e
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->e
))) {
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1646 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1647 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1649 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1650 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1655 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1658 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1662 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
1663 if ((dh
= DH_new()) == NULL
) {
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1669 if (param_len
> n
) {
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1675 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH
);
1681 if (!(dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1687 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1695 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH
);
1701 if (!(dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1707 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1715 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH
);
1721 if (!(dh
->pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1728 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1729 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1733 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1734 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1736 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1737 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1741 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1742 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1744 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1745 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1748 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1750 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= dh
;
1753 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1756 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
) {
1758 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1760 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1766 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1767 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1768 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1772 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1773 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1774 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1777 if (param_len
> n
) {
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1782 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1783 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1785 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, p
, 3)) {
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1790 if ((curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p
+ 2))) == 0) {
1791 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1793 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1797 ngroup
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid
);
1798 if (ngroup
== NULL
) {
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1802 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh
, ngroup
) == 0) {
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1806 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup
);
1808 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
);
1810 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1811 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1812 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
1813 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1814 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1820 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1821 if (((srvr_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) ||
1822 ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)) {
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1827 encoded_pt_len
= *p
; /* length of encoded point */
1830 if ((encoded_pt_len
> n
- param_len
) ||
1831 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, srvr_ecpoint
,
1832 p
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
) == 0)) {
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1836 param_len
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1839 p
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1842 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1843 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1847 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1848 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1850 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1851 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1853 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1854 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1856 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1857 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
1859 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1860 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh
, srvr_ecpoint
);
1861 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= ecdh
;
1863 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1865 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1866 srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1868 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1872 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1874 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1876 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1878 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1884 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
1891 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1904 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1907 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1909 if ((i
!= n
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
1910 /* wrong packet length */
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1915 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1921 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1922 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1923 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1924 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1925 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1927 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1929 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1930 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, &size
);
1934 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
, p
, n
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
);
1936 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
1942 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1949 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1950 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1952 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1954 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1955 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx
, p
, (int)n
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1957 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1963 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1964 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
1965 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1966 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
1967 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1971 /* still data left over */
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
1977 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1978 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1981 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1983 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1991 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1992 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1995 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1999 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2002 unsigned long n
, nc
, l
;
2003 unsigned int llen
, ctype_num
, i
;
2004 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2005 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
2007 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2009 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2010 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
,
2011 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
,
2012 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
2017 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2019 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
2020 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
2022 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2023 * wont be doing client auth.
2025 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2026 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
2032 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
2033 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2038 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2039 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2040 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) {
2041 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2043 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER
);
2048 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2050 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2055 /* get the certificate types */
2057 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
) {
2058 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2059 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2061 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2062 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2063 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2064 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2068 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, p
, ctype_num
);
2069 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
2070 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2072 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2073 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = p
[i
];
2075 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2078 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2081 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
+ 2) > n
) {
2082 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2084 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2087 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2088 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2089 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].digest
= NULL
;
2090 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].valid_flags
= 0;
2092 if ((llen
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, p
, llen
)) {
2093 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2094 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2095 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2098 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2099 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2106 /* get the CA RDNs */
2109 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
) != n
) {
2110 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2115 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
2117 if ((l
+ nc
+ 2) > llen
) {
2118 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG
);
2125 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &q
, l
)) == NULL
) {
2126 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2132 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2134 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2137 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2146 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2147 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2148 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2149 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2150 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2155 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2159 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2161 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2165 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2167 int ok
, al
, ret
= 0, ticklen
;
2169 const unsigned char *p
;
2172 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2173 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
,
2174 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
,
2175 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, 16384, &ok
);
2181 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2182 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2187 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2188 n2l(p
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
);
2190 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2191 if (ticklen
+ 6 != n
) {
2192 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2196 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2197 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2198 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2200 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2201 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2205 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, p
, ticklen
);
2206 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2208 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2209 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2210 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2211 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2212 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2213 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2214 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2215 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2216 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2218 EVP_Digest(p
, ticklen
,
2219 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
2220 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
2224 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2229 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
2232 unsigned long resplen
, n
;
2233 const unsigned char *p
;
2235 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2236 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
,
2237 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
,
2238 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
, 16384, &ok
);
2243 /* need at least status type + length */
2244 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2248 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2249 if (*p
++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2250 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2255 if (resplen
+ 4 != n
) {
2256 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2260 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
)
2261 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2262 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= BUF_memdup(p
, resplen
);
2263 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
) {
2264 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2268 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2269 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2271 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2273 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2278 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2285 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2290 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL
*s
)
2295 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2296 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2297 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
,
2298 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
,
2299 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 30, &ok
);
2304 /* should contain no data */
2305 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2313 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2317 unsigned long alg_k
;
2318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2320 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2324 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2326 EC_KEY
*clnt_ecdh
= NULL
;
2327 const EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2328 EVP_PKEY
*srvr_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2329 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2330 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2331 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2333 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2336 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
2337 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2339 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2341 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2345 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2347 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2348 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2352 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2354 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2357 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2361 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
)
2362 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
2365 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2366 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].
2368 if ((pkey
== NULL
) || (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2369 || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2371 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2374 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2375 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2378 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2379 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2380 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2384 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2385 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2387 n
= RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen
, pms
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2389 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2391 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2396 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2400 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2401 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2408 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2409 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2410 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2411 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2412 krb5_data
*enc_ticket
;
2413 krb5_data authenticator
, *authp
= NULL
;
2414 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2415 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2416 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2417 unsigned char tmp_buf
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2418 unsigned char epms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2419 int padl
, outl
= sizeof(epms
);
2421 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2424 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2426 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2429 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2431 authp
= &authenticator
;
2432 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2434 krb5rc
= kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, authp
, &kssl_err
);
2435 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2440 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc
);
2441 if (krb5rc
&& kssl_err
.text
)
2442 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2445 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2448 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2454 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2455 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2457 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2458 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2459 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2460 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2461 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2463 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2464 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2465 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2466 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2468 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2469 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2470 * optional authenticator omitted.
2473 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2474 s2n(enc_ticket
->length
, p
);
2475 memcpy(p
, enc_ticket
->data
, enc_ticket
->length
);
2476 p
+= enc_ticket
->length
;
2477 n
= enc_ticket
->length
+ 2;
2479 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2480 if (authp
&& authp
->length
) {
2481 s2n(authp
->length
, p
);
2482 memcpy(p
, authp
->data
, authp
->length
);
2484 n
+= authp
->length
+ 2;
2490 s2n(0, p
); /* null authenticator length */
2494 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2495 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2499 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2500 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2501 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2505 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2506 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2507 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2508 * kssl_ctx->length);
2509 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2512 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2513 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
);
2514 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, epms
, &outl
, pms
, pmslen
);
2515 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(epms
[outl
]), &padl
);
2517 if (outl
> (int)sizeof epms
) {
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2519 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2522 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2524 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2526 memcpy(p
, epms
, outl
);
2529 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms
, outl
);
2532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2533 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2534 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
;
2535 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
2537 if (scert
== NULL
) {
2538 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2540 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2544 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
!= NULL
)
2545 dh_srvr
= scert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2547 /* we get them from the cert */
2548 int idx
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
2549 EVP_PKEY
*spkey
= NULL
;
2552 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
2554 dh_srvr
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey
);
2555 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2557 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
) {
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2559 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2563 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
2564 /* Use client certificate key */
2565 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2568 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2569 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2571 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2575 /* generate a new random key */
2576 if ((dh_clnt
= DHparams_dup(dh_srvr
)) == NULL
) {
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2580 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt
)) {
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2587 pmslen
= DH_size(dh_clnt
);
2588 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2593 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2594 * clear it out afterwards
2597 n
= DH_compute_key(pms
, dh_srvr
->pub_key
, dh_clnt
);
2598 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
== NULL
)
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2608 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
)
2611 /* send off the data */
2612 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2614 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2620 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2625 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2626 const EC_GROUP
*srvr_group
= NULL
;
2628 int ecdh_clnt_cert
= 0;
2631 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2632 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2634 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2639 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2640 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2641 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2643 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) && (s
->cert
!= NULL
)) {
2645 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2646 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2647 * To add such support, one needs to add
2648 * code that checks for appropriate
2649 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2650 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2651 * key on the same curve as the server's
2652 * and the key should be authorized for
2655 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2656 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2659 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2660 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2661 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2662 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2666 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2667 tkey
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
;
2669 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2671 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2672 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
2673 if ((srvr_pub_pkey
== NULL
)
2674 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2675 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
== NULL
)) {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2677 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2681 tkey
= srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
;
2684 srvr_group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2685 srvr_ecpoint
= EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey
);
2687 if ((srvr_group
== NULL
) || (srvr_ecpoint
== NULL
)) {
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2689 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2693 if ((clnt_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2695 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2699 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh
, srvr_group
)) {
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2703 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2705 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2706 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2708 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2709 tkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2710 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2711 if (priv_key
== NULL
) {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2713 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2716 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2721 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2722 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh
))) {
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2730 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2731 * clear it out afterwards
2734 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group
);
2735 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2739 pmslen
= (field_size
+ 7) / 8;
2740 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2743 n
= ECDH_compute_key(pms
, pmslen
, srvr_ecpoint
, clnt_ecdh
, NULL
);
2744 if (n
<= 0 || pmslen
!= (size_t)n
) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2749 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2750 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2754 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2758 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2759 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2760 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2763 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
2764 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len
* sizeof(unsigned char));
2765 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
2766 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2768 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2772 /* Encode the public key */
2773 n
= EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2774 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2775 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2776 encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
);
2778 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2779 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2781 /* copy the point */
2782 memcpy((unsigned char *)p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2783 /* increment n to account for length field */
2787 /* Free allocated memory */
2788 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2789 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
2790 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2791 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2792 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2794 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2795 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2796 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2797 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2800 unsigned int md_len
;
2802 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2803 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2807 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2812 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2816 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
)].x509
;
2820 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST94
)].x509
;
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2823 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2827 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key
=
2828 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2830 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2832 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2833 * certificate key for key exchange
2836 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2838 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2839 /* Generate session key */
2840 if (RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2841 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2843 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2847 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2849 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2850 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2851 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2853 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2860 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2863 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2864 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2865 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
));
2866 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2868 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2870 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
);
2871 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash
);
2872 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2873 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2879 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2881 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2883 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2885 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) < 0) {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2890 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2892 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2895 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2898 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2899 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2900 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2901 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2902 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2903 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2905 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2906 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key
);
2909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2910 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2911 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2912 /* send off the data */
2913 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2915 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2919 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2922 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2923 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2924 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2925 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2927 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2932 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2933 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2935 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2936 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2939 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 2];
2940 size_t identity_len
;
2941 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2942 unsigned int psk_len
= 0;
2946 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2948 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2952 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2953 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2954 pmslen
= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4;
2955 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2959 psk_len
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
,
2960 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2962 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2964 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2966 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2968 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2971 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2972 pmslen
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
2973 identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1] = '\0';
2974 identity_len
= strlen(identity
);
2975 if (identity_len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2977 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2980 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2982 memmove(pms
+ psk_len
+ 4, pms
, psk_len
);
2984 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2988 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2989 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2990 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
=
2991 BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2992 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
2993 && s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2995 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2999 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
3000 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
3001 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup(identity
);
3002 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3004 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3008 s2n(identity_len
, p
);
3009 memcpy(p
, identity
, identity_len
);
3010 n
= 2 + identity_len
;
3013 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
3015 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3021 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3026 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
3027 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3032 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
3035 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3036 n
= ssl_do_write(s
);
3037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3039 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3041 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
3042 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
3045 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3046 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s
,
3047 s
->session
->master_key
)) <
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3050 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3056 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3059 s
->cert
->pmslen
= pmslen
;
3061 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3064 pmslen
= s
->cert
->pmslen
;
3067 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3071 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3072 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3074 session
->master_key
,
3076 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms
, pmslen
);
3078 s
->cert
->pms
= NULL
;
3079 if (s
->session
->master_key_length
< 0) {
3080 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3087 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3091 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms
, pmslen
);
3093 s
->cert
->pms
= NULL
;
3095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3096 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
3097 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
3098 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3099 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
3100 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
3105 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
3108 unsigned char data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
3110 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3116 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3118 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
) {
3119 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3120 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3121 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3122 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3123 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx
);
3124 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx
, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3125 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3126 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3129 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
3134 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3135 * digest and cached handshake records.
3137 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3140 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->cert
->key
->digest
;
3141 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3142 if (hdatalen
<= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
3143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3148 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3151 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3152 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
3153 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3160 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3163 if (s
->session
->flags
& SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
) {
3164 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3165 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3166 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3167 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3171 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3172 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
, NID_md5
, &(data
[0]));
3173 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, data
,
3174 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
3175 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_RSA_LIB
);
3183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3184 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3185 if (!DSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3186 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3187 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3188 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
)) {
3189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_DSA_LIB
);
3196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3197 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3198 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3199 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3200 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3201 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) {
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB
);
3209 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3210 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3211 unsigned char signbuf
[64];
3213 size_t sigsize
= 64;
3214 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3215 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, data
);
3216 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx
, signbuf
, &sigsize
, data
, 32) <= 0) {
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3220 for (i
= 63, j
= 0; i
>= 0; j
++, i
--) {
3221 p
[2 + j
] = signbuf
[i
];
3226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3229 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3233 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
;
3235 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3236 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3237 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3239 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3240 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3245 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3246 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3247 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3249 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3251 unsigned long alg_k
;
3252 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
3254 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3255 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->cert
->key
->digest
)
3258 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3259 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3261 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3262 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3264 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3265 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3266 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3267 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3268 int i
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
3269 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= NULL
, *spkey
= NULL
;
3270 clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3271 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3272 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey
) != EVP_PKEY_DH
)
3275 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
3277 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3278 i
= EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, spkey
);
3279 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
3283 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
3288 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3291 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3294 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
) {
3295 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3296 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3297 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3299 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3303 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3306 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3308 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3309 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3311 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3314 /* We need to get a client cert */
3315 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
) {
3317 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3318 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3321 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3323 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3326 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3327 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3328 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3329 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3331 } else if (i
== 1) {
3333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3334 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3339 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3340 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3343 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3344 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3345 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3348 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3352 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3353 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3356 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
) {
3357 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
;
3358 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
3359 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
3360 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
3361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3362 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3366 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3367 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3370 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3372 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3376 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3385 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3386 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3388 /* we don't have a certificate */
3389 if ((alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
)) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3392 sc
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3398 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
3400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3401 dh
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
3404 /* This is the passed certificate */
3406 idx
= sc
->peer_cert_type
;
3407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3408 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3409 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, s
) == 0) {
3411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3416 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3418 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3420 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
3421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT
);
3425 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
3426 i
= X509_certificate_type(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, pkey
);
3427 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3429 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3430 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3431 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3432 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3436 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3438 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3443 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) &&
3444 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
) || (rsa
!= NULL
))) {
3445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3446 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3451 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) &&
3452 !(has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKT_EXCH
) || (dh
!= NULL
))) {
3453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY
);
3455 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3456 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_RSA
)) {
3457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3458 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT
);
3461 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3462 else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3463 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_DSA
)) {
3464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3465 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT
);
3471 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PKT_EXP
)) {
3472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3473 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
3475 || RSA_size(rsa
) * 8 >
3476 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3478 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3484 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3486 || DH_size(dh
) * 8 >
3487 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3489 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3496 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
3502 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3509 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3510 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3511 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3512 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3513 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3514 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3515 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3517 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL
*s
)
3521 if (s
->version
< TLS1_VERSION
|| !s
->tls_session_secret_cb
||
3522 !s
->session
->tlsext_tick
)
3525 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3526 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
3528 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3529 * so permit appropriate message length.
3530 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3531 * and not its length.
3533 s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3536 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3537 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
3542 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3544 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
3547 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3548 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
3549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
3550 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
3557 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3558 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3560 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
3563 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
) {
3564 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3565 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3566 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3568 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
3569 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
3570 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
3571 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
3572 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
3573 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
;
3574 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
3578 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3583 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3587 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3588 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3589 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3590 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3595 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3596 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);