2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
136 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
);
140 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
142 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, int n
, int max
, int extend
)
145 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
146 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
147 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
148 * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
149 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
161 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
165 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
166 align
= (long)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
167 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
171 /* start with empty packet ... */
174 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
176 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
179 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
180 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
181 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
183 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
184 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
185 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
186 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
187 * overrun can be triggered.
189 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
193 s
->packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
194 s
->packet_length
= 0;
195 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
199 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
200 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
203 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
204 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
206 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
210 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
212 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
218 /* else we need to read more data */
220 len
= s
->packet_length
;
221 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
223 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
224 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
226 if (s
->packet
!= pkt
) { /* len > 0 */
227 memmove(pkt
, s
->packet
, len
+ left
);
229 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
232 if (n
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)) { /* does not happen */
233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
237 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
238 if (!s
->read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
239 /* ignore max parameter */
244 if (max
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
))
245 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
250 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
251 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
256 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
257 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
258 i
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
266 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
268 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
273 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
274 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
275 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
277 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
279 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
283 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
286 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
287 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
292 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
293 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
294 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
295 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
297 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
300 * Call this to get a new input record.
301 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
302 * or non-blocking IO.
303 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
304 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
305 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
306 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
308 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
309 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
)
311 int ssl_major
, ssl_minor
, al
;
312 int enc_err
, n
, i
, ret
= -1;
316 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
318 unsigned mac_size
, orig_len
;
320 unsigned empty_record_count
= 0;
325 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
)
326 extra
= SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA
;
329 if (extra
&& !s
->s3
->init_extra
) {
331 * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
332 * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
339 /* check if we have the header */
340 if ((s
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
341 (s
->packet_length
< SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
342 n
= ssl3_read_n(s
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
, 0);
344 return (n
); /* error or non-blocking */
345 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
349 s
->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, p
, 5, s
,
350 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
352 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
356 version
= (ssl_major
<< 8) | ssl_minor
;
359 fprintf(stderr
, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
362 /* Lets check version */
363 if (!s
->first_packet
) {
364 if (version
!= s
->version
) {
365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
366 if ((s
->version
& 0xFF00) == (version
& 0xFF00)
367 && !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
) {
368 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
370 * The record is using an incorrect version number, but
371 * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't
372 * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or
373 * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't
374 * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end.
379 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
381 s
->version
= (unsigned short)version
;
383 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
388 if ((version
>> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
) {
389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
393 if (rr
->length
> s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
394 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
399 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
402 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
404 if (rr
->length
> s
->packet_length
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
405 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
407 n
= ssl3_read_n(s
, i
, i
, 1);
409 return (n
); /* error or non-blocking io */
411 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
416 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
; /* set state for later operations */
419 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
420 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
422 rr
->input
= &(s
->packet
[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
425 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
426 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
427 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
428 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
432 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
433 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
436 /* check is not needed I believe */
437 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
+ extra
) {
438 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
443 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
444 rr
->data
= rr
->input
;
446 enc_err
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, 0);
449 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
450 * 1: if the padding is valid
451 * -1: if the padding is invalid
454 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED
;
455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG
);
459 printf("dec %d\n", rr
->length
);
462 for (z
= 0; z
< rr
->length
; z
++)
463 printf("%02X%c", rr
->data
[z
], ((z
+ 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
468 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
469 if ((sess
!= NULL
) &&
470 (s
->enc_read_ctx
!= NULL
) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->read_hash
) != NULL
)) {
471 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
472 unsigned char *mac
= NULL
;
473 unsigned char mac_tmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
474 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
475 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
478 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
480 orig_len
= rr
->length
+ ((unsigned int)rr
->type
>> 8);
483 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
484 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
485 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
486 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
488 if (orig_len
< mac_size
||
489 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
490 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
&&
491 orig_len
< mac_size
+ 1)) {
492 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
497 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
499 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
500 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
501 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
502 * contents of the padding bytes.
505 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp
, rr
, mac_size
, orig_len
);
506 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
509 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
510 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
513 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
514 mac
= &rr
->data
[rr
->length
];
517 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, md
, 0 /* not send */ );
518 if (i
< 0 || mac
== NULL
519 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md
, mac
, (size_t)mac_size
) != 0)
521 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+ extra
+ mac_size
)
527 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
528 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
529 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
530 * not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become
531 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
533 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,
535 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
539 /* r->length is now just compressed */
540 if (s
->expand
!= NULL
) {
541 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+ extra
) {
542 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
546 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s
)) {
547 al
= SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
;
548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
553 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+ extra
) {
554 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
561 * So at this point the following is true
562 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
563 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
564 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
565 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
569 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
570 s
->packet_length
= 0;
572 /* just read a 0 length packet */
573 if (rr
->length
== 0) {
574 empty_record_count
++;
575 if (empty_record_count
> MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS
) {
576 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL
);
583 fprintf(stderr
, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
,
590 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
595 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL
*ssl
)
597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
601 rr
= &(ssl
->s3
->rrec
);
602 i
= COMP_expand_block(ssl
->expand
, rr
->comp
,
603 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, rr
->data
,
614 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL
*ssl
)
616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
620 wr
= &(ssl
->s3
->wrec
);
621 i
= COMP_compress_block(ssl
->compress
, wr
->data
,
622 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
,
623 wr
->input
, (int)wr
->length
);
629 wr
->input
= wr
->data
;
635 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
636 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
638 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
640 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
643 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
644 unsigned int max_send_fragment
;
646 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
649 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
650 OPENSSL_assert(s
->s3
->wnum
<= INT_MAX
);
654 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
) {
655 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
665 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
666 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
667 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
668 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
669 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
670 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
671 * report the error in a way the user will notice
673 if ((len
< tot
) || ((wb
->left
!= 0) && (len
< (tot
+ s
->s3
->wpend_tot
)))) {
674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
679 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
680 * will happen with non blocking IO
683 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->s3
->wpend_tot
);
685 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
689 tot
+= i
; /* this might be last fragment */
691 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
693 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
694 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
695 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
696 * compromise is considered worthy.
698 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
699 len
>= 4 * (int)(max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
700 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
701 SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
702 s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
&&
703 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s
->enc_write_ctx
->cipher
) &
704 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
705 unsigned char aad
[13];
706 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
709 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
710 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
711 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
713 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
714 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
716 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
717 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
718 max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
720 if (len
>= 8 * (int)max_send_fragment
)
725 wb
->buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(packlen
);
727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
731 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
732 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
739 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
740 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
745 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
746 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
753 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
754 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
756 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
758 memcpy(aad
, s
->s3
->write_sequence
, 8);
760 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
761 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
768 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
769 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
770 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
772 if (packlen
<= 0 || packlen
> (int)wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
773 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
778 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
779 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
782 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
783 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
784 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
787 s
->s3
->write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
788 if (s
->s3
->write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
790 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->s3
->write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
796 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
= nw
;
797 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
798 s
->s3
->wpend_type
= type
;
799 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
= nw
;
801 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
);
803 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
804 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
);
811 OPENSSL_free(wb
->buf
); /* free jumbo buffer */
820 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
821 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
822 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
829 if (n
> s
->max_send_fragment
)
830 nw
= s
->max_send_fragment
;
834 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), nw
, 0);
836 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
842 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
843 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
845 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
846 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
848 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
850 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
852 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
862 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
863 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
865 unsigned char *p
, *plen
;
866 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
871 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
875 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
876 * will happen with non blocking IO
879 return (ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
));
881 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
882 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
883 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
886 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
890 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
))
893 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
899 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
900 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
901 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
903 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
909 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
915 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
917 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
919 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
920 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
923 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
925 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
926 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
927 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
930 prefix_len
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, 0, 1);
935 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
))
937 /* insufficient space */
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
943 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
946 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
947 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
949 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
950 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
951 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
953 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
954 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
958 } else if (prefix_len
) {
959 p
= wb
->buf
+ wb
->offset
+ prefix_len
;
961 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
962 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
963 align
= (-align
) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1);
969 /* write the header */
971 *(p
++) = type
& 0xff;
974 *(p
++) = (s
->version
>> 8);
976 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
977 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
979 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
980 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
983 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
985 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
988 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
989 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
)) {
990 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
991 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
992 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
996 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
997 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
998 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
1004 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1005 wr
->data
= p
+ eivlen
;
1006 wr
->length
= (int)len
;
1007 wr
->input
= (unsigned char *)buf
;
1010 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1013 /* first we compress */
1014 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
1015 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
)) {
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
1020 memcpy(wr
->data
, wr
->input
, wr
->length
);
1021 wr
->input
= wr
->data
;
1025 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1026 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1030 if (mac_size
!= 0) {
1031 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &(p
[wr
->length
+ eivlen
]), 1) < 0)
1033 wr
->length
+= mac_size
;
1041 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
1043 wr
->length
+= eivlen
;
1046 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, 1) < 1)
1049 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1050 s2n(wr
->length
, plen
);
1052 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1053 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, plen
- 5, 5, s
,
1054 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1057 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1060 wr
->type
= type
; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1061 wr
->length
+= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1063 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1065 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1071 /* now let's set up wb */
1072 wb
->left
= prefix_len
+ wr
->length
;
1075 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1078 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
= len
;
1079 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
= buf
;
1080 s
->s3
->wpend_type
= type
;
1081 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
= len
;
1083 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1084 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
);
1089 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1091 * Return values are as per SSL_write(), i.e.
1093 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
1097 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
1099 if ((s
->s3
->wpend_tot
> (int)len
)
1100 || (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
)
1101 && (s
->s3
->wpend_buf
!= buf
))
1102 || (s
->s3
->wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1109 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1110 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1111 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
,
1112 (char *)&(wb
->buf
[wb
->offset
]),
1113 (unsigned int)wb
->left
);
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1118 if (i
== wb
->left
) {
1121 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1122 return (s
->s3
->wpend_ret
);
1123 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1124 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1126 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1127 * using a datagram service
1139 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1140 * 'type' is one of the following:
1142 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1143 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1144 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1146 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1147 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1149 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1150 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1151 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1152 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1153 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1154 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1155 * Change cipher spec protocol
1156 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1158 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1159 * Handshake protocol
1160 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1161 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1162 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1163 * Application data protocol
1164 * none of our business
1166 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
, int len
, int peek
)
1171 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1173 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
== NULL
) /* Not initialized yet */
1174 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1177 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1178 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1180 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1185 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1186 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1188 unsigned char *src
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1189 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1194 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1197 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
--;
1200 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1201 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1202 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1207 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1210 if (!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1211 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1212 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1221 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1224 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1225 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1226 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1227 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1229 rr
= &(s
->s3
->rrec
);
1231 /* get new packet if necessary */
1232 if ((rr
->length
== 0) || (s
->rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)) {
1233 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1239 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1240 * record that isn't an alert.
1242 if (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& rr
->length
!= 0)
1243 s
->cert
->alert_count
= 0;
1245 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1247 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1248 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1249 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1250 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1256 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1259 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1261 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1265 if (type
== rr
->type
) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1266 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1268 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1269 * doing a handshake for the first time
1271 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1272 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1273 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1281 if ((unsigned int)len
> rr
->length
)
1284 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
1286 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1290 if (rr
->length
== 0) {
1291 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1293 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1294 && s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0)
1295 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1302 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1303 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1307 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1308 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1311 unsigned int dest_maxlen
= 0;
1312 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1313 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
1315 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1316 dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
);
1317 dest
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1318 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
;
1319 } else if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1320 dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->s3
->alert_fragment
);
1321 dest
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1322 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
;
1324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1325 else if (rr
->type
== TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
) {
1326 i
= tls1_process_heartbeat(s
);
1332 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)
1335 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1336 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1337 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1338 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1343 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1344 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1346 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
1348 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1350 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] = rr
->data
[rr
->off
++];
1354 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1355 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1360 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1361 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1362 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1365 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1367 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1368 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1369 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)) {
1370 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1372 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1373 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1374 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[3] != 0)) {
1375 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1380 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1381 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1382 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
, 4, s
,
1383 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1385 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1386 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1387 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
) {
1388 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1389 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
)) {
1390 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,
1395 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1399 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1400 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1403 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1404 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1405 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1406 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1408 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1409 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1410 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1411 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1418 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1419 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1425 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1426 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1429 && SSL_is_init_finished(s
)
1430 && !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
1431 && s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
1432 && s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
1433 && s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
1434 && s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
!= 0
1435 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
) == 0) {
1436 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1438 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1442 if (s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
>= 2) {
1443 int alert_level
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[0];
1444 int alert_descr
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[1];
1446 s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1448 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1449 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1450 s
->s3
->alert_fragment
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1452 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1453 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1454 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1455 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1458 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1459 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1462 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1463 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1465 s
->cert
->alert_count
++;
1466 if (s
->cert
->alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1467 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1472 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1473 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1477 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1478 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1479 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1480 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1481 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1482 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1484 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1485 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1489 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1490 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1493 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1496 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1497 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1499 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof(tmp
), "%d", alert_descr
);
1500 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1501 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1502 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1505 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1513 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1515 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1520 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1522 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1523 * what the record payload has to look like
1525 if ((rr
->length
!= 1) || (rr
->off
!= 0) ||
1526 (rr
->data
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
1527 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1532 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1533 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
1534 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1539 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
)) {
1540 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1545 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
1549 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1550 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
1551 rr
->data
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1553 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
1554 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
))
1561 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1563 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) && !s
->in_handshake
) {
1564 if (((s
->state
& SSL_ST_MASK
) == SSL_ST_OK
) &&
1565 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
)) {
1566 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1567 * are not as expected (and because this is
1568 * not really needed for clients except for
1569 * detecting protocol violations): */
1570 s
->state
= SSL_ST_BEFORE
| (s
->server
)
1571 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1573 s
->state
= s
->server
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1578 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1586 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1587 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1590 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1591 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1592 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1593 * problems in the blocking world
1595 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1596 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1597 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1598 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1608 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1609 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1610 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1611 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1612 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1614 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1617 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1619 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1621 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1622 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1623 * happen when type != rr->type
1625 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1628 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1630 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1631 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1632 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1633 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1634 * started), we will indulge it.
1636 if (s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
&&
1637 (s
->s3
->total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
1638 (((s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) &&
1639 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) &&
1640 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1641 ) || ((s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
) &&
1642 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) &&
1643 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
1646 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1649 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1657 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1662 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
)
1668 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
)
1669 i
= SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
;
1671 i
= SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
;
1673 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.key_block
== NULL
) {
1674 if (s
->session
== NULL
|| s
->session
->master_key_length
== 0) {
1675 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
1677 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1681 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
1682 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
1686 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
, i
))
1690 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
1691 * before we read the finished message
1693 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) {
1694 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
1695 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
1697 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
1698 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
1701 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
1703 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
1705 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1708 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= i
;
1713 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL
*s
, int level
, int desc
)
1715 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1716 desc
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->alert_value(desc
);
1717 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& desc
== SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
)
1718 desc
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
1719 * protocol_version alerts */
1722 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1723 if ((level
== 2) && (s
->session
!= NULL
))
1724 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1726 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 1;
1727 s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] = level
;
1728 s
->s3
->send_alert
[1] = desc
;
1729 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.left
== 0) /* data still being written out? */
1730 return s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
1732 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
1738 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL
*s
)
1741 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1743 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 0;
1744 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, &s
->s3
->send_alert
[0], 2, 0);
1746 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 1;
1749 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
1750 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
1753 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
)
1754 (void)BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1756 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1757 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->send_alert
,
1758 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1760 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1761 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1762 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1763 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1766 j
= (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] << 8) | s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1767 cb(s
, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT
, j
);