2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
121 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
);
122 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
);
124 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, int n
, int max
, int extend
)
126 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
127 * packet by another n bytes.
128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
138 if (n
<= 0) return n
;
142 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
146 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
147 align
= (long)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
148 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
153 /* start with empty packet ... */
156 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
158 /* check if next packet length is large
159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
160 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
161 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
162 && (pkt
[3]<<8|pkt
[4]) >= 128)
164 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
165 * and its length field is insane, we can
166 * only be led to wrong decision about
167 * whether memmove will occur or not.
168 * Header values has no effect on memmove
169 * arguments and therefore no buffer
170 * overrun can be triggered. */
171 memmove (rb
->buf
+align
,pkt
,left
);
175 s
->packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
176 s
->packet_length
= 0;
177 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
180 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
181 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
182 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
183 if (SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_VERSION
|| SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
185 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
189 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
198 /* else we need to read more data */
200 len
= s
->packet_length
;
202 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
203 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
204 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
205 if (s
->packet
!= pkt
) /* len > 0 */
207 memmove(pkt
, s
->packet
, len
+left
);
209 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
212 if (n
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)) /* does not happen */
214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
219 /* ignore max parameter */
225 if (max
> (int)(rb
->len
- rb
->offset
))
226 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
231 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
232 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
233 * len+max if possible) */
238 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
239 i
=BIO_read(s
->rbio
,pkt
+len
+left
, max
-left
);
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
250 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
251 SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_VERSION
&& SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
253 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
257 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
258 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
259 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
260 if (SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_VERSION
|| SSL_version(s
) == DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
263 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
267 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
270 s
->packet_length
+= n
;
271 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
275 /* Call this to get a new input record.
276 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
277 * or non-blocking IO.
278 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
279 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
280 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
281 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
283 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
284 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL
*s
)
286 int ssl_major
,ssl_minor
,al
;
287 int enc_err
,n
,i
,ret
= -1;
291 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
296 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
= 0;
297 unsigned char *mac
= NULL
;
302 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
)
303 extra
=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA
;
306 if (extra
&& !s
->s3
->init_extra
)
308 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
309 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
315 /* check if we have the header */
316 if ( (s
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
317 (s
->packet_length
< SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
))
319 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
, 0);
320 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking */
321 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
325 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
329 version
=(ssl_major
<<8)|ssl_minor
;
332 fprintf(stderr
, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
335 /* Lets check version */
336 if (!s
->first_packet
)
338 if (version
!= s
->version
)
340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
341 if ((s
->version
& 0xFF00) == (version
& 0xFF00))
342 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
343 s
->version
= (unsigned short)version
;
344 al
=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
349 if ((version
>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
355 if (rr
->length
> s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
357 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
362 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
365 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
367 if (rr
->length
> s
->packet_length
-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
369 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
371 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
,i
,i
,1);
372 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking io */
373 /* now n == rr->length,
374 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
377 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
; /* set state for later operations */
379 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
380 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
382 rr
->input
= &(s
->packet
[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
384 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
385 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
386 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
387 * the decryption or by the decompression
388 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
389 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
391 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
392 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
394 /* check is not needed I believe */
395 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
+extra
)
397 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
402 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
405 enc_err
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,0);
409 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
412 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
413 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
414 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
415 * the MAC computation anyway. */
416 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
= 1;
420 printf("dec %d\n",rr
->length
);
421 { unsigned int z
; for (z
=0; z
<rr
->length
; z
++) printf("%02X%c",rr
->data
[z
],((z
+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
425 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
426 if ( (sess
== NULL
) ||
427 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
) ||
428 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->read_hash
) == NULL
))
433 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
434 mac_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
435 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size
>= 0);
437 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+extra
+mac_size
)
439 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
440 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
444 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
= 1;
447 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
448 if (rr
->length
>= (unsigned int)mac_size
)
450 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
451 mac
= &rr
->data
[rr
->length
];
455 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
456 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
457 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
461 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
= 1;
465 i
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,md
,0);
466 if (i
< 0 || mac
== NULL
|| memcmp(md
, mac
, (size_t)mac_size
) != 0)
468 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
= 1;
472 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
)
474 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
475 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
476 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
477 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
478 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
479 al
=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
484 /* r->length is now just compressed */
485 if (s
->expand
!= NULL
)
487 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+extra
)
489 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
493 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s
))
495 al
=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
;
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
501 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
+extra
)
503 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
509 /* So at this point the following is true
510 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
511 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
512 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
513 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
517 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
520 /* just read a 0 length packet */
521 if (rr
->length
== 0) goto again
;
524 fprintf(stderr
, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr
->type
, rr
->length
);
530 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
535 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL
*ssl
)
537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
541 rr
= &(ssl
->s3
->rrec
);
542 i
=COMP_expand_block(ssl
->expand
,rr
->comp
,
543 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,rr
->data
,(int)rr
->length
);
553 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL
*ssl
)
555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
559 wr
= &(ssl
->s3
->wrec
);
560 i
=COMP_compress_block(ssl
->compress
,wr
->data
,
561 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
,
562 wr
->input
,(int)wr
->length
);
573 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
574 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
576 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
578 const unsigned char *buf
=buf_
;
579 unsigned int tot
,n
,nw
;
582 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
586 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
)
588 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
589 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
600 if (n
> s
->max_send_fragment
)
601 nw
=s
->max_send_fragment
;
605 i
=do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), nw
, 0);
613 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
614 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
)))
616 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
617 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
618 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
628 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
629 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
631 unsigned char *p
,*plen
;
632 int i
,mac_size
,clear
=0;
637 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
=&(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
641 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
))
644 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
645 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
647 return(ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
));
649 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
650 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
)
652 i
=s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
655 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
658 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
664 if ( (sess
== NULL
) ||
665 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
666 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
))
669 clear
=s
->enc_write_ctx
?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
677 mac_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
682 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
683 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
)
685 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
686 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
688 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
690 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
691 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
692 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
693 * together with the actual payload) */
694 prefix_len
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, 0, 1);
699 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
))
701 /* insufficient space */
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
707 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
710 if (create_empty_fragment
)
712 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
713 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
714 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
715 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
716 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
717 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
718 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
725 p
= wb
->buf
+ wb
->offset
+ prefix_len
;
729 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
730 align
= (long)wb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
731 align
= (-align
)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
-1);
737 /* write the header */
742 *(p
++)=(s
->version
>>8);
743 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
744 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
746 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
748 && TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
751 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
753 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
756 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
757 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_1_VERSION
)
759 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
760 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
)
762 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
766 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
767 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
768 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
775 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
778 wr
->input
=(unsigned char *)buf
;
780 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
783 /* first we compress */
784 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
786 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
))
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
794 memcpy(wr
->data
,wr
->input
,wr
->length
);
798 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
799 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
800 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
804 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,&(p
[wr
->length
+ eivlen
]),1) < 0)
806 wr
->length
+=mac_size
;
814 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
816 wr
->length
+= eivlen
;
819 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
820 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,1);
822 /* record length after mac and block padding */
823 s2n(wr
->length
,plen
);
825 /* we should now have
826 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
828 wr
->type
=type
; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
829 wr
->length
+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
831 if (create_empty_fragment
)
833 /* we are in a recursive call;
834 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
839 /* now let's set up wb */
840 wb
->left
= prefix_len
+ wr
->length
;
842 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
843 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
=len
;
844 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
=buf
;
845 s
->s3
->wpend_type
=type
;
846 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
=len
;
848 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
849 return ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
);
854 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
855 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
859 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
=&(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
862 if ((s
->s3
->wpend_tot
> (int)len
)
863 || ((s
->s3
->wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
864 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
865 || (s
->s3
->wpend_type
!= type
))
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
876 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
878 (char *)&(wb
->buf
[wb
->offset
]),
879 (unsigned int)wb
->left
);
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
890 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
891 SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_VERSION
&& SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
892 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
893 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
894 return(s
->s3
->wpend_ret
);
897 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
||
898 s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
899 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
900 point in using a datagram service */
910 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
911 * 'type' is one of the following:
913 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
914 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
915 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
917 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
918 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
920 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
921 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
922 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
923 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
924 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
925 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
926 * Change cipher spec protocol
927 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
929 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
931 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
932 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
933 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
934 * Application data protocol
935 * none of our business
937 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
, int len
, int peek
)
942 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type2
,int val
)=NULL
;
944 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
== NULL
) /* Not initialized yet */
945 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
948 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && type
) ||
949 (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
955 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
956 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
958 unsigned char *src
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
959 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
964 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
967 len
--; s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
--;
970 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
971 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
972 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
976 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
978 if (!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
))
980 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
981 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
982 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
990 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
992 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
993 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
994 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
995 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
998 /* get new packet if necessary */
999 if ((rr
->length
== 0) || (s
->rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
))
1001 ret
=ssl3_get_record(s
);
1002 if (ret
<= 0) return(ret
);
1005 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1007 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1008 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1009 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
))
1011 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1016 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1017 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1018 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
)
1021 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1026 if (type
== rr
->type
) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1028 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1029 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1030 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1031 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
))
1033 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1038 if (len
<= 0) return(len
);
1040 if ((unsigned int)len
> rr
->length
)
1043 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
1045 memcpy(buf
,&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]),n
);
1050 if (rr
->length
== 0)
1052 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1054 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1055 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1062 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1063 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1065 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1066 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1069 unsigned int dest_maxlen
= 0;
1070 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1071 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
1073 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
1075 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1076 dest
= s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
;
1077 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
;
1079 else if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
)
1081 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1082 dest
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
;
1083 dest_len
= &s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
;
1085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1086 else if (rr
->type
== TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
)
1088 tls1_process_heartbeat(s
);
1090 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1092 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1093 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1094 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1099 if (dest_maxlen
> 0)
1101 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1103 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
1105 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1108 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] = rr
->data
[rr
->off
++];
1112 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1113 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1117 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1118 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1119 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1121 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1123 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1124 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1125 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
))
1127 s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1129 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1130 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1131 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[3] != 0))
1133 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1138 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1139 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
, 4, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1141 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1142 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1143 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
)
1145 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1146 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
))
1148 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1149 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1156 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
1158 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1161 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1162 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1163 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1164 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1165 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1166 bio
=SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1167 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1168 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1174 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1175 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1178 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1179 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1180 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1183 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1184 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1185 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1186 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1187 (s
->s3
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1188 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1189 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
1192 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1194 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1197 if (s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
>= 2)
1199 int alert_level
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[0];
1200 int alert_descr
= s
->s3
->alert_fragment
[1];
1202 s
->s3
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1204 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1205 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->alert_fragment
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1207 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1208 cb
=s
->info_callback
;
1209 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1210 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1214 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1215 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1218 if (alert_level
== 1) /* warning */
1220 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1221 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
)
1223 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1226 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1227 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1228 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1229 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1230 * expects it to succeed.
1232 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1233 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1235 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)
1237 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1241 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1242 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1246 else if (alert_level
== 2) /* fatal */
1250 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1251 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1253 BIO_snprintf(tmp
,sizeof tmp
,"%d",alert_descr
);
1254 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp
);
1255 s
->shutdown
|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1256 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
,s
->session
);
1261 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1269 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1271 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1276 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
1278 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1279 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1280 if ( (rr
->length
!= 1) || (rr
->off
!= 0) ||
1281 (rr
->data
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
))
1283 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1288 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1289 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
1291 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1298 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1299 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, rr
->data
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1301 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
=1;
1302 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
))
1308 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1309 if ((s
->s3
->handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) && !s
->in_handshake
)
1311 if (((s
->state
&SSL_ST_MASK
) == SSL_ST_OK
) &&
1312 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
))
1314 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1315 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1316 * protocol violations): */
1317 s
->state
=SSL_ST_BEFORE
|(s
->server
)
1321 s
->state
= s
->server
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1326 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1327 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1334 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
1336 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1339 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1340 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1341 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1342 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1343 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1344 bio
=SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1345 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1346 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1357 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1358 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1360 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->version
<= TLS1_1_VERSION
)
1366 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1369 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1371 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1372 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1373 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1374 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1375 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1378 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1379 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1380 * but have application data. If the library was
1381 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1382 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1383 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1384 * we will indulge it.
1386 if (s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
&&
1387 (s
->s3
->total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
1389 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) &&
1390 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) &&
1391 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1393 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
) &&
1394 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) &&
1395 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
1399 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
=2;
1404 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1412 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1417 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
)
1423 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
)
1424 i
=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
;
1426 i
=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
;
1428 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.key_block
== NULL
)
1430 if (s
->session
== NULL
)
1432 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1437 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
1438 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) return(0);
1441 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,i
))
1444 /* we have to record the message digest at
1445 * this point so we can get it before we read
1446 * the finished message */
1447 if (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
)
1449 sender
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
1450 slen
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
1454 sender
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
1455 slen
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
1458 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
1459 sender
,slen
,s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
1464 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL
*s
, int level
, int desc
)
1466 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1467 desc
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->alert_value(desc
);
1468 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& desc
== SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
)
1469 desc
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1470 if (desc
< 0) return -1;
1471 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1472 if ((level
== 2) && (s
->session
!= NULL
))
1473 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
,s
->session
);
1475 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=1;
1476 s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]=level
;
1477 s
->s3
->send_alert
[1]=desc
;
1478 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.left
== 0) /* data still being written out? */
1479 return s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
1480 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1481 * some time in the future */
1485 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL
*s
)
1488 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
1490 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=0;
1491 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, &s
->s3
->send_alert
[0], 2, 0);
1494 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=1;
1498 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1499 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1500 * we will not worry too much. */
1501 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
)
1502 (void)BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1504 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1505 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->send_alert
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1507 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1508 cb
=s
->info_callback
;
1509 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1510 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1514 j
=(s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]<<8)|s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1515 cb(s
,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT
,j
);