]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blob - ssl/s3_pkt.c
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blob
? search:
summary | shortlog | log | commit | commitdiff | tree
blame | history | raw | HEAD
Remove redundant check.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_pkt.c
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <limits.h>
114 #include <errno.h>
115 #define USE_SOCKETS
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
123 #endif
124
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
130 )
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
133 #endif
134
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
138
139 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
140 {
141 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
142 * packet by another n bytes.
143 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
144 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
145 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
146 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
147 */
148 int i,len,left;
149 long align=0;
150 unsigned char *pkt;
151 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
152
153 if (n <= 0) return n;
154
155 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
156 if (rb->buf == NULL)
157 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
158 return -1;
159
160 left = rb->left;
161 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
162 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
163 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
164 #endif
165
166 if (!extend)
167 {
168 /* start with empty packet ... */
169 if (left == 0)
170 rb->offset = align;
171 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
172 {
173 /* check if next packet length is large
174 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
175 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
177 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
178 {
179 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
180 * and its length field is insane, we can
181 * only be led to wrong decision about
182 * whether memmove will occur or not.
183 * Header values has no effect on memmove
184 * arguments and therefore no buffer
185 * overrun can be triggered. */
186 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
187 rb->offset = align;
188 }
189 }
190 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
191 s->packet_length = 0;
192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
193 }
194
195 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
196 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
197 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
198 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
199 {
200 if (left > 0 && n > left)
201 n = left;
202 }
203
204 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
205 if (left >= n)
206 {
207 s->packet_length+=n;
208 rb->left=left-n;
209 rb->offset+=n;
210 return(n);
211 }
212
213 /* else we need to read more data */
214
215 len = s->packet_length;
216 pkt = rb->buf+align;
217 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
218 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
219 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
220 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
221 {
222 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
223 s->packet = pkt;
224 rb->offset = len + align;
225 }
226
227 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
228 {
229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
230 return -1;
231 }
232
233 if (!s->read_ahead)
234 /* ignore max parameter */
235 max = n;
236 else
237 {
238 if (max < n)
239 max = n;
240 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
241 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
242 }
243
244 while (left < n)
245 {
246 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
247 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
248 * len+max if possible) */
249
250 clear_sys_error();
251 if (s->rbio != NULL)
252 {
253 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
254 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
255 }
256 else
257 {
258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
259 i = -1;
260 }
261
262 if (i <= 0)
263 {
264 rb->left = left;
265 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
266 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
267 if (len+left == 0)
268 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
269 return(i);
270 }
271 left+=i;
272 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
273 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
274 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
275 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
276 {
277 if (n > left)
278 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
279 }
280 }
281
282 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
283 rb->offset += n;
284 rb->left = left - n;
285 s->packet_length += n;
286 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
287 return(n);
288 }
289
290 /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
291 * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
292 * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
293 * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
294 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
295
296 /* Call this to get a new input record.
297 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
298 * or non-blocking IO.
299 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
300 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
301 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
302 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
303 */
304 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
305 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
306 {
307 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
308 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
309 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
310 SSL_SESSION *sess;
311 unsigned char *p;
312 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
313 short version;
314 unsigned mac_size;
315 size_t extra;
316 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
317
318 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
319 sess=s->session;
320
321 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
322 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
323 else
324 extra=0;
325 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
326 {
327 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
328 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
330 return -1;
331 }
332
333 again:
334 /* check if we have the header */
335 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
336 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
337 {
338 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
339 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
340 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
341
342 p=s->packet;
343 if (s->msg_callback)
344 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
345
346 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
347 rr->type= *(p++);
348 ssl_major= *(p++);
349 ssl_minor= *(p++);
350 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
351 n2s(p,rr->length);
352 #if 0
353 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
354 #endif
355
356 /* Lets check version */
357 if (!s->first_packet)
358 {
359 if (version != s->version)
360 {
361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
362 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
363 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
364 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
365 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
366 goto f_err;
367 }
368 }
369
370 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
371 {
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
373 goto err;
374 }
375
376 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
377 {
378 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
380 goto f_err;
381 }
382
383 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
384 }
385
386 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
387
388 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
389 {
390 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
391 i=rr->length;
392 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
393 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
394 /* now n == rr->length,
395 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
396 }
397
398 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
399
400 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
401 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
402 */
403 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
404
405 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
406 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
407 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
408 * the decryption or by the decompression
409 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
410 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
411
412 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
413 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
414
415 /* check is not needed I believe */
416 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
417 {
418 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
420 goto f_err;
421 }
422
423 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
424 rr->data=rr->input;
425 rr->orig_len=rr->length;
426 /* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record.
427 * All the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
428 */
429 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash)
430 {
431 unsigned char *mac;
432 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
433 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
434 if (rr->length < mac_size)
435 {
436 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
438 goto f_err;
439 }
440 rr->length -= mac_size;
441 mac = rr->data + rr->length;
442 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
443 if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
444 {
445 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
447 goto f_err;
448 }
449 }
450
451 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
452 /* enc_err is:
453 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
454 * 1: if the padding is valid
455 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
456 if (enc_err == 0)
457 {
458 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
460 goto f_err;
461 }
462
463 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
464 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
465 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
466 printf("\n");
467 #endif
468
469 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
470 if ((sess != NULL) &&
471 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
472 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s))
473 {
474 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
475 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
476 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
477 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
478 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
479
480 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
481 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
482 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
483 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
484 */
485 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
486 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
487 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
488 rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
489 {
490 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
492 goto f_err;
493 }
494
495 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
496 {
497 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
498 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
499 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
500 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
501 * */
502 mac = mac_tmp;
503 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
504 rr->length -= mac_size;
505 }
506 else
507 {
508 /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
509 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
510 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
511 rr->length -= mac_size;
512 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
513 }
514
515 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
516 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
517 enc_err = -1;
518 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
519 enc_err = -1;
520 }
521
522 if (enc_err < 0)
523 {
524 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
525 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
526 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
527 * we should not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this
528 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
529 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
531 goto f_err;
532 }
533
534 /* r->length is now just compressed */
535 if (s->expand != NULL)
536 {
537 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
538 {
539 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
541 goto f_err;
542 }
543 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
544 {
545 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
547 goto f_err;
548 }
549 }
550
551 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
552 {
553 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
555 goto f_err;
556 }
557
558 rr->off=0;
559 /* So at this point the following is true
560 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
561 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
562 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
563 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
564 * after use :-).
565 */
566
567 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
568 s->packet_length=0;
569
570 /* just read a 0 length packet */
571 if (rr->length == 0)
572 {
573 empty_record_count++;
574 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
575 {
576 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
578 goto f_err;
579 }
580 goto again;
581 }
582
583 #if 0
584 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
585 #endif
586
587 return(1);
588
589 f_err:
590 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
591 err:
592 return(ret);
593 }
594
595 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
596 {
597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
598 int i;
599 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
600
601 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
602 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
603 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
604 if (i < 0)
605 return(0);
606 else
607 rr->length=i;
608 rr->data=rr->comp;
609 #endif
610 return(1);
611 }
612
613 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
614 {
615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
616 int i;
617 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
618
619 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
620 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
621 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
622 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
623 if (i < 0)
624 return(0);
625 else
626 wr->length=i;
627
628 wr->input=wr->data;
629 #endif
630 return(1);
631 }
632
633 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
634 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
635 */
636 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
637 {
638 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
639 int tot;
640 unsigned int n,nw;
641 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
642 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
643 #endif
644 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
645 int i;
646
647 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
648 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
649 tot=s->s3->wnum;
650 s->s3->wnum=0;
651
652 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
653 {
654 i=s->handshake_func(s);
655 if (i < 0) return(i);
656 if (i == 0)
657 {
658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
659 return -1;
660 }
661 }
662
663 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
664 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
665 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
666 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
667 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
668 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
669 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
670 * will notice
671 */
672 if (len < tot)
673 {
674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
675 return(-1);
676 }
677
678 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
679 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
680 if (wb->left != 0)
681 {
682 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],s->s3->wpend_tot);
683 if (i<=0)
684 {
685 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
686 s->s3->wnum=tot;
687 return i;
688 }
689 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
690 }
691
692 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
693 /*
694 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
695 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
696 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
697 * compromise is considered worthy.
698 */
699 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
700 len >= 4*(int)(max_send_fragment=s->max_send_fragment) &&
701 s->compress==NULL && s->msg_callback==NULL &&
702 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
703 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
704 {
705 unsigned char aad[13];
706 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
707 int packlen;
708
709 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
710 if ((max_send_fragment&0xffff) == 0)
711 max_send_fragment -= 512;
712
713 if (tot==0 || wb->buf==NULL) /* allocate jumbo buffer */
714 {
715 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
716
717 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
718 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
719 max_send_fragment,NULL);
720
721 if (len>=8*(int)max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8;
722 else packlen *= 4;
723
724 wb->buf=OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
725 wb->len=packlen;
726 }
727 else if (tot==len) /* done? */
728 {
729 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
730 wb->buf = NULL;
731 return tot;
732 }
733
734 n=(len-tot);
735 for (;;)
736 {
737 if (n < 4*max_send_fragment)
738 {
739 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
740 wb->buf = NULL;
741 break;
742 }
743
744 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
745 {
746 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
747 if (i <= 0)
748 {
749 s->s3->wnum=tot;
750 return i;
751 }
752 }
753
754 if (n >= 8*max_send_fragment)
755 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=8);
756 else
757 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=4);
758
759 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
760 aad[8]=type;
761 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
762 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
763 aad[11]=0;
764 aad[12]=0;
765 mb_param.out = NULL;
766 mb_param.inp = aad;
767 mb_param.len = nw;
768
769 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
770 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
771 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
772
773 if (packlen<=0 || packlen>(int)wb->len) /* never happens */
774 {
775 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
776 wb->buf = NULL;
777 break;
778 }
779
780 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
781 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
782 mb_param.len = nw;
783
784 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
785 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
786 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param)<=0)
787 return -1;
788
789 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
790 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
791 {
792 int j=6;
793 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
794 }
795
796 wb->offset = 0;
797 wb->left = packlen;
798
799 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
800 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
801 s->s3->wpend_type= type;
802 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
803
804 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],nw);
805 if (i<=0)
806 {
807 if (i<0)
808 {
809 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
810 wb->buf = NULL;
811 }
812 s->s3->wnum=tot;
813 return i;
814 }
815 if (i==(int)n)
816 {
817 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
818 wb->buf = NULL;
819 return tot+i;
820 }
821 n-=i;
822 tot+=i;
823 }
824 }
825 else
826 #endif
827 if (tot==len) /* done? */
828 {
829 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
830 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
831 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
832
833 return tot;
834 }
835
836
837 n=(len-tot);
838 for (;;)
839 {
840 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
841 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
842 else
843 nw=n;
844
845 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
846 if (i <= 0)
847 {
848 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
849 s->s3->wnum=tot;
850 return i;
851 }
852
853 if ((i == (int)n) ||
854 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
855 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
856 {
857 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
858 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
859 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
860
861 if ((i==(int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
862 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
863 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
864
865 return tot+i;
866 }
867
868 n-=i;
869 tot+=i;
870 }
871 }
872
873 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
874 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
875 {
876 unsigned char *p,*plen;
877 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
878 int prefix_len=0;
879 int eivlen;
880 long align=0;
881 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
882 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
883 SSL_SESSION *sess;
884
885
886 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
887 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
888 if (wb->left != 0)
889 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
890
891 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
892 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
893 {
894 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
895 if (i <= 0)
896 return(i);
897 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
898 }
899
900 if (wb->buf == NULL)
901 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
902 return -1;
903
904 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
905 return 0;
906
907 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
908 sess=s->session;
909
910 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
911 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
912 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
913 {
914 #if 1
915 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
916 #else
917 clear=1;
918 #endif
919 mac_size=0;
920 }
921 else
922 {
923 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
924 if (mac_size < 0)
925 goto err;
926 }
927
928 #if 0 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
929 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && s->compress==NULL &&
930 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && /*!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&*/
931 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
932 do {
933 unsigned char aad[13];
934 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param = {NULL,aad,sizeof(aad),0};
935 int packlen;
936
937 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
938 aad[8]=type;
939 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
940 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
941 aad[11]=(unsigned char)(len>>8);
942 aad[12]=(unsigned char)len;
943 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
944 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
945 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
946
947 if (packlen==0 || packlen > wb->len) break;
948
949 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
950 mb_param.inp = buf;
951 mb_param.len = len;
952 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
953 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
954 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
955
956 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
957 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
958 {
959 int j=6;
960 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
961 }
962
963 wb->offset=0;
964 wb->left = packlen;
965
966 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
967 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
968 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
969 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
970 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
971
972 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
973 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
974 } while (0);
975 #endif
976
977 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
978 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
979 {
980 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
981 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
982
983 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
984 {
985 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
986 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
987 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
988 * together with the actual payload) */
989 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
990 if (prefix_len <= 0)
991 goto err;
992
993 if (prefix_len >
994 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
995 {
996 /* insufficient space */
997 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
998 goto err;
999 }
1000 }
1001
1002 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1003 }
1004
1005 if (create_empty_fragment)
1006 {
1007 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1008 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
1009 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
1010 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
1011 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
1012 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1013 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
1014 #endif
1015 p = wb->buf + align;
1016 wb->offset = align;
1017 }
1018 else if (prefix_len)
1019 {
1020 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
1021 }
1022 else
1023 {
1024 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1025 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1026 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
1027 #endif
1028 p = wb->buf + align;
1029 wb->offset = align;
1030 }
1031
1032 /* write the header */
1033
1034 *(p++)=type&0xff;
1035 wr->type=type;
1036
1037 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1038 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
1039 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
1040 */
1041 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
1042 && !s->renegotiate
1043 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
1044 *(p++) = 0x1;
1045 else
1046 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1047
1048 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
1049 plen=p;
1050 p+=2;
1051 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1052 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
1053 {
1054 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1055 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
1056 {
1057 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1058 if (eivlen <= 1)
1059 eivlen = 0;
1060 }
1061 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1062 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1063 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1064 else
1065 eivlen = 0;
1066 }
1067 else
1068 eivlen = 0;
1069
1070 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1071 wr->data=p + eivlen;
1072 wr->length=(int)len;
1073 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1074
1075 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1076 * wr->data */
1077
1078 /* first we compress */
1079 if (s->compress != NULL)
1080 {
1081 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1082 {
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1084 goto err;
1085 }
1086 }
1087 else
1088 {
1089 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1090 wr->input=wr->data;
1091 }
1092
1093 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1094 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1095 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1096
1097 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
1098 {
1099 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
1100 goto err;
1101 wr->length+=mac_size;
1102 }
1103
1104 wr->input=p;
1105 wr->data=p;
1106
1107 if (eivlen)
1108 {
1109 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
1110 goto err; */
1111 wr->length += eivlen;
1112 }
1113
1114 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1115 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1116
1117 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
1118 {
1119 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,p + wr->length,1) < 0)
1120 goto err;
1121 wr->length+=mac_size;
1122 }
1123
1124 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1125 s2n(wr->length,plen);
1126
1127 if (s->msg_callback)
1128 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1129
1130 /* we should now have
1131 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1132 * wr->length long */
1133 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1134 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1135
1136 if (create_empty_fragment)
1137 {
1138 /* we are in a recursive call;
1139 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1140 */
1141 return wr->length;
1142 }
1143
1144 /* now let's set up wb */
1145 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1146
1147 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1148 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1149 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1150 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1151 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1152
1153 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1154 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1155 err:
1156 return -1;
1157 }
1158
1159 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1160 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1161 unsigned int len)
1162 {
1163 int i;
1164 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
1165
1166 /* XXXX */
1167 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1168 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1169 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1170 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
1171 {
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1173 return(-1);
1174 }
1175
1176 for (;;)
1177 {
1178 clear_sys_error();
1179 if (s->wbio != NULL)
1180 {
1181 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
1182 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
1183 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1184 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1185 }
1186 else
1187 {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1189 i= -1;
1190 }
1191 if (i == wb->left)
1192 {
1193 wb->left=0;
1194 wb->offset+=i;
1195 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1196 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
1197 }
1198 else if (i <= 0) {
1199 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
1200 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1201 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
1202 point in using a datagram service */
1203 wb->left = 0;
1204 }
1205 return(i);
1206 }
1207 wb->offset+=i;
1208 wb->left-=i;
1209 }
1210 }
1211
1212 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1213 * 'type' is one of the following:
1214 *
1215 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1216 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1217 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1218 *
1219 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1220 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1221 *
1222 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1223 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1224 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1225 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1226 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1227 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1228 * Change cipher spec protocol
1229 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1230 * Alert protocol
1231 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1232 * Handshake protocol
1233 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1234 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1235 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1236 * Application data protocol
1237 * none of our business
1238 */
1239 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1240 {
1241 int al,i,j,ret;
1242 unsigned int n;
1243 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1244 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
1245
1246 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1247 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1248 return(-1);
1249
1250 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
1251 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
1252 {
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1254 return -1;
1255 }
1256
1257 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1258 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1259 {
1260 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1261 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1262 unsigned int k;
1263
1264 /* peek == 0 */
1265 n = 0;
1266 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1267 {
1268 *dst++ = *src++;
1269 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1270 n++;
1271 }
1272 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1273 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1274 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1275 return n;
1276 }
1277
1278 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1279
1280 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
1281 {
1282 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1283 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1284 if (i < 0) return(i);
1285 if (i == 0)
1286 {
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1288 return(-1);
1289 }
1290 }
1291 start:
1292 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1293
1294 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1295 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1296 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1297 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
1298 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1299
1300 /* get new packet if necessary */
1301 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1302 {
1303 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1304 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1305 }
1306
1307 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1308
1309 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1310 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1311 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1312 {
1313 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1315 goto f_err;
1316 }
1317
1318 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1319 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1320 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1321 {
1322 rr->length=0;
1323 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1324 return(0);
1325 }
1326
1327
1328 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1329 {
1330 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1331 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1332 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1333 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1334 {
1335 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1337 goto f_err;
1338 }
1339
1340 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1341
1342 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1343 n = rr->length;
1344 else
1345 n = (unsigned int)len;
1346
1347 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1348 if (!peek)
1349 {
1350 rr->length-=n;
1351 rr->off+=n;
1352 if (rr->length == 0)
1353 {
1354 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1355 rr->off=0;
1356 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1357 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1358 }
1359 }
1360 return(n);
1361 }
1362
1363
1364 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1365 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1366
1367 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1368 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1369 */
1370 {
1371 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1372 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1373 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1374
1375 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1376 {
1377 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1378 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1379 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1380 }
1381 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1382 {
1383 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1384 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1385 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1386 }
1387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1388 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1389 {
1390 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1391
1392 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1393 rr->length = 0;
1394 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1395 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1396 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1397 return(-1);
1398 }
1399 #endif
1400
1401 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1402 {
1403 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1404 if (rr->length < n)
1405 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1406
1407 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1408 while (n-- > 0)
1409 {
1410 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1411 rr->length--;
1412 }
1413
1414 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1415 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1416 }
1417 }
1418
1419 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1420 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1421 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1422
1423 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1424 if ((!s->server) &&
1425 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1426 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1427 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1428 {
1429 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1430
1431 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1432 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1433 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1434 {
1435 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1437 goto f_err;
1438 }
1439
1440 if (s->msg_callback)
1441 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1442
1443 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1444 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1445 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1446 {
1447 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1448 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1449 {
1450 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1451 if (i < 0) return(i);
1452 if (i == 0)
1453 {
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1455 return(-1);
1456 }
1457
1458 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1459 {
1460 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1461 {
1462 BIO *bio;
1463 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1464 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1465 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1466 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1467 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1468 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1469 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1470 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1471 return(-1);
1472 }
1473 }
1474 }
1475 }
1476 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1477 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1478 goto start;
1479 }
1480 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1481 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1482 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1483 */
1484 if (s->server &&
1485 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1486 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1487 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1488 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1489 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1490 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1491 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1492
1493 {
1494 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1495 rr->length = 0;
1496 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1497 goto start;
1498 }
1499 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1500 {
1501 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1502 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1503
1504 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1505
1506 if (s->msg_callback)
1507 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1508
1509 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1510 cb=s->info_callback;
1511 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1512 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1513
1514 if (cb != NULL)
1515 {
1516 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1517 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1518 }
1519
1520 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1521 {
1522 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1523 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1524 {
1525 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1526 return(0);
1527 }
1528 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1529 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1530 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1531 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1532 * expects it to succeed.
1533 *
1534 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1535 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1536 */
1537 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1538 {
1539 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1541 goto f_err;
1542 }
1543 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1544 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1545 return(0);
1546 #endif
1547 }
1548 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1549 {
1550 char tmp[16];
1551
1552 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1553 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1555 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1556 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1557 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1558 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1559 return(0);
1560 }
1561 else
1562 {
1563 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1565 goto f_err;
1566 }
1567
1568 goto start;
1569 }
1570
1571 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1572 {
1573 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1574 rr->length=0;
1575 return(0);
1576 }
1577
1578 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1579 {
1580 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1581 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1582 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1583 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1584 {
1585 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1587 goto f_err;
1588 }
1589
1590 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1591 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1592 {
1593 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1595 goto f_err;
1596 }
1597
1598 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
1599 {
1600 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1602 goto f_err;
1603 }
1604
1605 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1606
1607 rr->length=0;
1608
1609 if (s->msg_callback)
1610 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1611
1612 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1613 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1614 goto err;
1615 else
1616 goto start;
1617 }
1618
1619 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1620 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1621 {
1622 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1623 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1624 {
1625 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1626 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1627 * protocol violations): */
1628 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1629 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1630 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1631 #else
1632 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1633 #endif
1634 s->renegotiate=1;
1635 s->new_session=1;
1636 }
1637 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1638 if (i < 0) return(i);
1639 if (i == 0)
1640 {
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1642 return(-1);
1643 }
1644
1645 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1646 {
1647 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1648 {
1649 BIO *bio;
1650 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1651 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1652 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1653 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1654 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1655 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1656 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1657 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1658 return(-1);
1659 }
1660 }
1661 goto start;
1662 }
1663
1664 switch (rr->type)
1665 {
1666 default:
1667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1668 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1669 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1670 */
1671 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1672 {
1673 rr->length = 0;
1674 goto start;
1675 }
1676 #endif
1677 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1679 goto f_err;
1680 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1681 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1682 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1683 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1684 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1685 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1686 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1688 goto f_err;
1689 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1690 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1691 * but have application data. If the library was
1692 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1693 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1694 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1695 * we will indulge it.
1696 */
1697 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1698 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1699 ((
1700 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1701 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1702 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1703 ) || (
1704 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1705 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1706 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1707 )
1708 ))
1709 {
1710 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1711 return(-1);
1712 }
1713 else
1714 {
1715 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1717 goto f_err;
1718 }
1719 }
1720 /* not reached */
1721
1722 f_err:
1723 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1724 err:
1725 return(-1);
1726 }
1727
1728 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1729 {
1730 int i;
1731 const char *sender;
1732 int slen;
1733
1734 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1735 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1736 else
1737 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1738
1739 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1740 {
1741 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
1742 {
1743 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1745 return (0);
1746 }
1747
1748 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1749 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1750 }
1751
1752 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1753 return(0);
1754
1755 /* we have to record the message digest at
1756 * this point so we can get it before we read
1757 * the finished message */
1758 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1759 {
1760 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1761 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1762 }
1763 else
1764 {
1765 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1766 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1767 }
1768
1769 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1770 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1771 if (i == 0)
1772 {
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1774 return 0;
1775 }
1776 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1777
1778 return(1);
1779 }
1780
1781 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1782 {
1783 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1784 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1785 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1786 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1787 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1788 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1789 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1790 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1791
1792 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1793 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1794 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1795 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1796 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1797 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1798 * some time in the future */
1799 return -1;
1800 }
1801
1802 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1803 {
1804 int i,j;
1805 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1806
1807 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1808 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1809 if (i <= 0)
1810 {
1811 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1812 }
1813 else
1814 {
1815 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1816 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1817 * we will not worry too much. */
1818 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1819 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1820
1821 if (s->msg_callback)
1822 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1823
1824 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1825 cb=s->info_callback;
1826 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1827 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1828
1829 if (cb != NULL)
1830 {
1831 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1832 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1833 }
1834 }
1835 return(i);
1836 }
A mirror of the official openssl repository