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ssl/*: remove SSL3_RECORD->orig_len to restore binary compatibility.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_pkt.c
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
119
120 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
121 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
122 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
123
124 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
125 {
126 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
127 * packet by another n bytes.
128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
132 */
133 int i,len,left;
134 long align=0;
135 unsigned char *pkt;
136 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
137
138 if (n <= 0) return n;
139
140 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
141 if (rb->buf == NULL)
142 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
143 return -1;
144
145 left = rb->left;
146 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
147 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
148 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
149 #endif
150
151 if (!extend)
152 {
153 /* start with empty packet ... */
154 if (left == 0)
155 rb->offset = align;
156 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
157 {
158 /* check if next packet length is large
159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
160 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
161 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
162 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
163 {
164 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
165 * and its length field is insane, we can
166 * only be led to wrong decision about
167 * whether memmove will occur or not.
168 * Header values has no effect on memmove
169 * arguments and therefore no buffer
170 * overrun can be triggered. */
171 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
172 rb->offset = align;
173 }
174 }
175 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 s->packet_length = 0;
177 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
178 }
179
180 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
181 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
182 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
183 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
184 {
185 if (left > 0 && n > left)
186 n = left;
187 }
188
189 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
190 if (left >= n)
191 {
192 s->packet_length+=n;
193 rb->left=left-n;
194 rb->offset+=n;
195 return(n);
196 }
197
198 /* else we need to read more data */
199
200 len = s->packet_length;
201 pkt = rb->buf+align;
202 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
203 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
204 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
205 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
206 {
207 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
208 s->packet = pkt;
209 rb->offset = len + align;
210 }
211
212 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
213 {
214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 return -1;
216 }
217
218 if (!s->read_ahead)
219 /* ignore max parameter */
220 max = n;
221 else
222 {
223 if (max < n)
224 max = n;
225 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
226 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
227 }
228
229 while (left < n)
230 {
231 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
232 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
233 * len+max if possible) */
234
235 clear_sys_error();
236 if (s->rbio != NULL)
237 {
238 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
239 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
240 }
241 else
242 {
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
244 i = -1;
245 }
246
247 if (i <= 0)
248 {
249 rb->left = left;
250 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
251 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
252 if (len+left == 0)
253 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
254 return(i);
255 }
256 left+=i;
257 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
258 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
259 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
260 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
261 {
262 if (n > left)
263 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
264 }
265 }
266
267 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
268 rb->offset += n;
269 rb->left = left - n;
270 s->packet_length += n;
271 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
272 return(n);
273 }
274
275 /* Call this to get a new input record.
276 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
277 * or non-blocking IO.
278 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
279 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
280 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
281 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
282 */
283 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
284 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
285 {
286 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
287 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
288 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
289 SSL_SESSION *sess;
290 unsigned char *p;
291 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
292 short version;
293 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
294 size_t extra;
295
296 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
297 sess=s->session;
298
299 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
300 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
301 else
302 extra=0;
303 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
304 {
305 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
306 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
308 return -1;
309 }
310
311 again:
312 /* check if we have the header */
313 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
314 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
315 {
316 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
317 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
318 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
319
320 p=s->packet;
321 if (s->msg_callback)
322 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
323
324 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
325 rr->type= *(p++);
326 ssl_major= *(p++);
327 ssl_minor= *(p++);
328 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
329 n2s(p,rr->length);
330 #if 0
331 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
332 #endif
333
334 /* Lets check version */
335 if (!s->first_packet)
336 {
337 if (version != s->version)
338 {
339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
340 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
341 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
342 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
343 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
344 goto f_err;
345 }
346 }
347
348 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
349 {
350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
351 goto err;
352 }
353
354 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
355 {
356 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
358 goto f_err;
359 }
360
361 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
362 }
363
364 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
365
366 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
367 {
368 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
369 i=rr->length;
370 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
371 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
372 /* now n == rr->length,
373 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
374 }
375
376 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
377
378 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
379 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
380 */
381 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
382
383 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
384 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
385 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
386 * the decryption or by the decompression
387 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
388 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
389
390 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
391 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
392
393 /* check is not needed I believe */
394 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
395 {
396 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
398 goto f_err;
399 }
400
401 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
402 rr->data=rr->input;
403 orig_len=rr->length;
404
405 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
406 /* enc_err is:
407 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
408 * 1: if the padding is valid
409 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
410 if (enc_err == 0)
411 {
412 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
414 goto f_err;
415 }
416
417 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
418 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
419 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
420 printf("\n");
421 #endif
422
423 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
424 if ((sess != NULL) &&
425 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
426 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
427 {
428 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
429 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
430 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
431 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
432 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
433
434 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
435 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
436 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
437 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
438 */
439 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
440 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
441 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
442 orig_len < mac_size+1))
443 {
444 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
446 goto f_err;
447 }
448
449 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
450 {
451 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
452 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
453 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
454 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
455 * */
456 mac = mac_tmp;
457 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
458 rr->length -= mac_size;
459 }
460 else
461 {
462 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
463 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
464 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
465 rr->length -= mac_size;
466 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
467 }
468
469 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
470 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
471 enc_err = -1;
472 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
473 enc_err = -1;
474 }
475
476 if (enc_err < 0)
477 {
478 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
479 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
480 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
481 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
482 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
483 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
485 goto f_err;
486 }
487
488 /* r->length is now just compressed */
489 if (s->expand != NULL)
490 {
491 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
492 {
493 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
495 goto f_err;
496 }
497 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
498 {
499 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
501 goto f_err;
502 }
503 }
504
505 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
506 {
507 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
509 goto f_err;
510 }
511
512 rr->off=0;
513 /* So at this point the following is true
514 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
515 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
516 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
517 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
518 * after use :-).
519 */
520
521 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
522 s->packet_length=0;
523
524 /* just read a 0 length packet */
525 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
526
527 #if 0
528 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
529 #endif
530
531 return(1);
532
533 f_err:
534 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
535 err:
536 return(ret);
537 }
538
539 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
540 {
541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
542 int i;
543 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
544
545 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
546 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
547 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
548 if (i < 0)
549 return(0);
550 else
551 rr->length=i;
552 rr->data=rr->comp;
553 #endif
554 return(1);
555 }
556
557 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
558 {
559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
560 int i;
561 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
562
563 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
564 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
565 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
566 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
567 if (i < 0)
568 return(0);
569 else
570 wr->length=i;
571
572 wr->input=wr->data;
573 #endif
574 return(1);
575 }
576
577 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
578 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
579 */
580 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
581 {
582 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
583 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
584 int i;
585
586 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
587 tot=s->s3->wnum;
588 s->s3->wnum=0;
589
590 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
591 {
592 i=s->handshake_func(s);
593 if (i < 0) return(i);
594 if (i == 0)
595 {
596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
597 return -1;
598 }
599 }
600
601 n=(len-tot);
602 for (;;)
603 {
604 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
605 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
606 else
607 nw=n;
608
609 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
610 if (i <= 0)
611 {
612 s->s3->wnum=tot;
613 return i;
614 }
615
616 if ((i == (int)n) ||
617 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
618 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
619 {
620 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
621 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
622 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
623
624 return tot+i;
625 }
626
627 n-=i;
628 tot+=i;
629 }
630 }
631
632 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
633 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
634 {
635 unsigned char *p,*plen;
636 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
637 int prefix_len=0;
638 int eivlen;
639 long align=0;
640 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
641 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
642 SSL_SESSION *sess;
643
644 if (wb->buf == NULL)
645 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
646 return -1;
647
648 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
649 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
650 if (wb->left != 0)
651 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
652
653 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
654 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
655 {
656 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
657 if (i <= 0)
658 return(i);
659 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
660 }
661
662 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
663 return 0;
664
665 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
666 sess=s->session;
667
668 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
669 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
670 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
671 {
672 #if 1
673 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
674 #else
675 clear=1;
676 #endif
677 mac_size=0;
678 }
679 else
680 {
681 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
682 if (mac_size < 0)
683 goto err;
684 }
685
686 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
687 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
688 {
689 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
690 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
691
692 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
693 {
694 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
695 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
696 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
697 * together with the actual payload) */
698 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
699 if (prefix_len <= 0)
700 goto err;
701
702 if (prefix_len >
703 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
704 {
705 /* insufficient space */
706 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
707 goto err;
708 }
709 }
710
711 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
712 }
713
714 if (create_empty_fragment)
715 {
716 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
717 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
718 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
719 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
720 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
721 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
722 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
723 #endif
724 p = wb->buf + align;
725 wb->offset = align;
726 }
727 else if (prefix_len)
728 {
729 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
730 }
731 else
732 {
733 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
734 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
735 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
736 #endif
737 p = wb->buf + align;
738 wb->offset = align;
739 }
740
741 /* write the header */
742
743 *(p++)=type&0xff;
744 wr->type=type;
745
746 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
747 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
748 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
749 */
750 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
751 && !s->renegotiate
752 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
753 *(p++) = 0x1;
754 else
755 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
756
757 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
758 plen=p;
759 p+=2;
760 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
761 if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
762 {
763 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
764 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
765 {
766 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
767 if (eivlen <= 1)
768 eivlen = 0;
769 }
770 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
771 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
772 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
773 else
774 eivlen = 0;
775 }
776 else
777 eivlen = 0;
778
779 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
780 wr->data=p + eivlen;
781 wr->length=(int)len;
782 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
783
784 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
785 * wr->data */
786
787 /* first we compress */
788 if (s->compress != NULL)
789 {
790 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
791 {
792 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
793 goto err;
794 }
795 }
796 else
797 {
798 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
799 wr->input=wr->data;
800 }
801
802 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
803 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
804 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
805
806 if (mac_size != 0)
807 {
808 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
809 goto err;
810 wr->length+=mac_size;
811 }
812
813 wr->input=p;
814 wr->data=p;
815
816 if (eivlen)
817 {
818 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
819 goto err; */
820 wr->length += eivlen;
821 }
822
823 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
824 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
825
826 /* record length after mac and block padding */
827 s2n(wr->length,plen);
828
829 if (s->msg_callback)
830 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
831
832 /* we should now have
833 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
834 * wr->length long */
835 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
836 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
837
838 if (create_empty_fragment)
839 {
840 /* we are in a recursive call;
841 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
842 */
843 return wr->length;
844 }
845
846 /* now let's set up wb */
847 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
848
849 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
850 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
851 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
852 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
853 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
854
855 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
856 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
857 err:
858 return -1;
859 }
860
861 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
862 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
863 unsigned int len)
864 {
865 int i;
866 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
867
868 /* XXXX */
869 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
870 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
871 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
872 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
873 {
874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
875 return(-1);
876 }
877
878 for (;;)
879 {
880 clear_sys_error();
881 if (s->wbio != NULL)
882 {
883 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
884 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
885 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
886 (unsigned int)wb->left);
887 }
888 else
889 {
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
891 i= -1;
892 }
893 if (i == wb->left)
894 {
895 wb->left=0;
896 wb->offset+=i;
897 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
898 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
899 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
900 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
901 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
902 }
903 else if (i <= 0) {
904 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
905 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
906 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
907 point in using a datagram service */
908 wb->left = 0;
909 }
910 return(i);
911 }
912 wb->offset+=i;
913 wb->left-=i;
914 }
915 }
916
917 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
918 * 'type' is one of the following:
919 *
920 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
921 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
922 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
923 *
924 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
925 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
926 *
927 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
928 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
929 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
930 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
931 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
932 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
933 * Change cipher spec protocol
934 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
935 * Alert protocol
936 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
937 * Handshake protocol
938 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
939 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
940 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
941 * Application data protocol
942 * none of our business
943 */
944 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
945 {
946 int al,i,j,ret;
947 unsigned int n;
948 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
949 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
950
951 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
952 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
953 return(-1);
954
955 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
956 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
957 {
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
959 return -1;
960 }
961
962 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
963 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
964 {
965 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
966 unsigned char *dst = buf;
967 unsigned int k;
968
969 /* peek == 0 */
970 n = 0;
971 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
972 {
973 *dst++ = *src++;
974 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
975 n++;
976 }
977 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
978 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
979 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
980 return n;
981 }
982
983 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
984
985 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
986 {
987 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
988 i=s->handshake_func(s);
989 if (i < 0) return(i);
990 if (i == 0)
991 {
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
993 return(-1);
994 }
995 }
996 start:
997 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
998
999 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1000 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1001 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1002 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
1003 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1004
1005 /* get new packet if necessary */
1006 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1007 {
1008 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1009 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1010 }
1011
1012 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1013
1014 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1015 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1016 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1017 {
1018 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1020 goto f_err;
1021 }
1022
1023 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1024 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1025 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1026 {
1027 rr->length=0;
1028 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1029 return(0);
1030 }
1031
1032
1033 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1034 {
1035 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1036 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1037 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1038 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1039 {
1040 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1042 goto f_err;
1043 }
1044
1045 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1046
1047 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1048 n = rr->length;
1049 else
1050 n = (unsigned int)len;
1051
1052 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1053 if (!peek)
1054 {
1055 rr->length-=n;
1056 rr->off+=n;
1057 if (rr->length == 0)
1058 {
1059 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1060 rr->off=0;
1061 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1062 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1063 }
1064 }
1065 return(n);
1066 }
1067
1068
1069 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1070 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1071
1072 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1073 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1074 */
1075 {
1076 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1077 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1078 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1079
1080 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1081 {
1082 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1083 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1084 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1085 }
1086 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1087 {
1088 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1089 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1090 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1091 }
1092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1093 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1094 {
1095 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1096
1097 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1098 rr->length = 0;
1099 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1100 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1101 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1102 return(-1);
1103 }
1104 #endif
1105
1106 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1107 {
1108 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1109 if (rr->length < n)
1110 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1111
1112 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1113 while (n-- > 0)
1114 {
1115 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1116 rr->length--;
1117 }
1118
1119 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1120 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1121 }
1122 }
1123
1124 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1125 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1126 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1127
1128 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1129 if ((!s->server) &&
1130 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1131 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1132 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1133 {
1134 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1135
1136 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1137 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1138 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1139 {
1140 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1142 goto f_err;
1143 }
1144
1145 if (s->msg_callback)
1146 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1147
1148 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1149 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1150 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1151 {
1152 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1153 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1154 {
1155 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1156 if (i < 0) return(i);
1157 if (i == 0)
1158 {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1160 return(-1);
1161 }
1162
1163 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1164 {
1165 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1166 {
1167 BIO *bio;
1168 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1169 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1170 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1171 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1172 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1173 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1174 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1175 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1176 return(-1);
1177 }
1178 }
1179 }
1180 }
1181 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1182 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1183 goto start;
1184 }
1185 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1186 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1187 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1188 */
1189 if (s->server &&
1190 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1191 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1192 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1193 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1194 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1195 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1196 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1197
1198 {
1199 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1200 rr->length = 0;
1201 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1202 goto start;
1203 }
1204 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1205 {
1206 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1207 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1208
1209 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1210
1211 if (s->msg_callback)
1212 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1213
1214 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1215 cb=s->info_callback;
1216 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1217 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1218
1219 if (cb != NULL)
1220 {
1221 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1222 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1223 }
1224
1225 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1226 {
1227 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1228 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1229 {
1230 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1231 return(0);
1232 }
1233 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1234 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1235 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1236 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1237 * expects it to succeed.
1238 *
1239 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1240 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1241 */
1242 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1243 {
1244 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1246 goto f_err;
1247 }
1248 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1249 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1250 return(0);
1251 #endif
1252 }
1253 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1254 {
1255 char tmp[16];
1256
1257 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1258 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1260 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1261 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1262 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1263 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1264 return(0);
1265 }
1266 else
1267 {
1268 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1270 goto f_err;
1271 }
1272
1273 goto start;
1274 }
1275
1276 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1277 {
1278 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1279 rr->length=0;
1280 return(0);
1281 }
1282
1283 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1284 {
1285 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1286 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1287 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1288 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1289 {
1290 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1292 goto f_err;
1293 }
1294
1295 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1296 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1297 {
1298 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1300 goto f_err;
1301 }
1302
1303 rr->length=0;
1304
1305 if (s->msg_callback)
1306 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1307
1308 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1309 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1310 goto err;
1311 else
1312 goto start;
1313 }
1314
1315 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1316 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1317 {
1318 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1319 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1320 {
1321 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1322 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1323 * protocol violations): */
1324 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1325 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1326 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1327 #else
1328 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1329 #endif
1330 s->renegotiate=1;
1331 s->new_session=1;
1332 }
1333 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1334 if (i < 0) return(i);
1335 if (i == 0)
1336 {
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1338 return(-1);
1339 }
1340
1341 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1342 {
1343 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1344 {
1345 BIO *bio;
1346 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1347 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1348 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1349 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1350 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1351 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1352 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1353 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1354 return(-1);
1355 }
1356 }
1357 goto start;
1358 }
1359
1360 switch (rr->type)
1361 {
1362 default:
1363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1364 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1365 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1366 */
1367 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1368 {
1369 rr->length = 0;
1370 goto start;
1371 }
1372 #endif
1373 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1375 goto f_err;
1376 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1377 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1378 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1379 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1380 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1381 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1382 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1384 goto f_err;
1385 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1386 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1387 * but have application data. If the library was
1388 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1389 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1390 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1391 * we will indulge it.
1392 */
1393 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1394 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1395 ((
1396 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1397 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1398 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1399 ) || (
1400 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1401 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1402 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1403 )
1404 ))
1405 {
1406 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1407 return(-1);
1408 }
1409 else
1410 {
1411 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1413 goto f_err;
1414 }
1415 }
1416 /* not reached */
1417
1418 f_err:
1419 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1420 err:
1421 return(-1);
1422 }
1423
1424 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1425 {
1426 int i;
1427 const char *sender;
1428 int slen;
1429
1430 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1431 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1432 else
1433 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1434
1435 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1436 {
1437 if (s->session == NULL)
1438 {
1439 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1441 return (0);
1442 }
1443
1444 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1445 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1446 }
1447
1448 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1449 return(0);
1450
1451 /* we have to record the message digest at
1452 * this point so we can get it before we read
1453 * the finished message */
1454 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1455 {
1456 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1457 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1458 }
1459 else
1460 {
1461 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1462 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1463 }
1464
1465 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1466 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1467
1468 return(1);
1469 }
1470
1471 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1472 {
1473 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1474 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1475 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1476 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1477 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1478 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1479 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1480 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1481
1482 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1483 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1484 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1485 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1486 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1487 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1488 * some time in the future */
1489 return -1;
1490 }
1491
1492 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1493 {
1494 int i,j;
1495 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1496
1497 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1498 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1499 if (i <= 0)
1500 {
1501 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1502 }
1503 else
1504 {
1505 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1506 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1507 * we will not worry too much. */
1508 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1509 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1510
1511 if (s->msg_callback)
1512 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1513
1514 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1515 cb=s->info_callback;
1516 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1517 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1518
1519 if (cb != NULL)
1520 {
1521 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1522 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1523 }
1524 }
1525 return(i);
1526 }
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